A memory-safe reimplementation of the Linux
shadow-utils in
Rust. shadow-utils (useradd, passwd,
groupadd, etc.) is the suite of setuid-root tools that manages user accounts,
passwords, and groups on every Linux system.
shadow-utils runs as root or setuid-root on every Linux system. It parses
user-supplied input, writes to /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, /etc/group, and
has had recent CVEs (CVE-2023-4641: password leak in memory, CVE-2024-56433:
subuid collision enabling account takeover). Before this project there was
no Rust reimplementation — not in uutils, not in Prossimo/Trifecta, not on
crates.io.
sudo-rs proved the model: an independent Rust rewrite of a privilege-boundary tool can go from zero to default-in-Ubuntu in under 3 years. This project follows that playbook.
- Drop-in replacement: same flags, same exit codes, same output format as GNU shadow-utils. Differences are treated as bugs.
- uutils compatible: built on
uucorewith the standarduumain()/uu_app()API contract. Designed to merge into the uutils ecosystem. - Memory safe: eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities (buffer overflows,
use-after-free, uninitialized memory) that affect the C original. Passwords
zeroed in memory via
zeroize. - Well-tested: unit tests, property-based tests (
proptest), integration tests, fuzz targets for all parsers. Tested on Debian, Alpine (musl), and Fedora (SELinux). - Hardened: Landlock filesystem sandboxing, signal blocking during critical sections, core dump suppression, environment sanitization, privilege drop during PAM.
- Auditable: small dependency tree,
cargo-denylicense and advisory checks, no GPL dependencies.
| Tool | Status |
|---|---|
passwd |
All 16 flags implemented. Drop-in for GNU passwd. PAM password change, Landlock sandboxing, --root, --quiet, --stdin. Output bit-for-bit identical with GNU. |
pwck |
All checks implemented. Drop-in for GNU pwck. Bit-for-bit identical output. |
useradd |
Implemented. UID/GID allocation, home dir + skel, shadow entry, group creation. |
userdel |
Implemented. Remove from all system files, optional home/mail cleanup. |
usermod |
Implemented. Modify all properties, group membership, lock/unlock, set pre-hashed password. |
chpasswd |
Implemented. Batch password change from stdin. |
chage |
Implemented. Password aging management, -l list mode. |
groupadd |
Implemented. Auto GID allocation, system groups, force mode. |
groupdel |
Implemented. Primary group usage check. |
groupmod |
Implemented. GID change, rename, password. |
grpck |
Implemented. Group/gshadow integrity verification. |
chfn |
Implemented. GECOS sub-field modification. |
chsh |
Implemented. Shell change with /etc/shells validation. |
newgrp |
Implemented. Effective group change with crypt verification. |
- Rust (stable toolchain)
- Linux (PAM headers, SELinux headers optional)
- Docker + Docker Compose (for testing)
git clone https://github.com/uutils/shadow
cd shadow
docker compose build debian
docker compose run --rm debian cargo build --releaseDefault install: 14 standalone per-tool binaries with least-privilege setuid
layout matching GNU shadow-utils. Only passwd, chfn, chsh, newgrp are
installed setuid-root; the other 10 are plain 0755.
sudo make install PREFIX=/usr/localAlternative: single multicall binary with symlinks. Smaller footprint (~14×
disk savings). The binary is installed setuid-root so that passwd, chfn,
chsh and newgrp can serve unprivileged callers; every other applet drops
back to the caller's uid before it runs, so the privilege model is the same
as the per-tool layout. Intended for container/embedded use cases.
sudo make install-multicall PREFIX=/usr/localEach release publishes two
archives, each with a .sha256 alongside. They contain the same shadow-rs
multicall binary but are not interchangeable:
| Archive | libc | Linking | Use it for |
|---|---|---|---|
uu_shadow-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz |
glibc | dynamic | Any regular distribution. This is the full build. |
uu_shadow-x86_64-unknown-linux-musl-static.tar.gz |
musl | static | Minimal containers and embedded images: local /etc/passwd, no directory service, no PAM stack. |
The static archive has no runtime dependencies, and pays for that with three capabilities a static binary cannot have — none of them cosmetic for account tools:
- No PAM.
passwdcannot change a password interactively, andchfn/chshare root-only (they authenticate the caller through PAM and fail closed without it). - No NSS. Users from LDAP, SSSD, Active Directory or systemd-userdb are invisible to the five tools that look up the calling user.
- No yescrypt (
$y$). The default password hash on Debian 12+ and Ubuntu 24.04 can be neither verified nor produced.
If any of those matter on the host, use the glibc archive. docs/PLATFORM-SUPPORT.md explains each gap, what still works, and how the archive is built.
Either archive ships a plain binary — nothing is installed, symlinked, or made
setuid by extracting it. To deploy it the same way make install-multicall
would:
tar xzf uu_shadow-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz # or the -musl-static one
sudo install -o root -g root -m 4755 \
uu_shadow-*/shadow-rs /usr/local/bin/shadow-rs
for tool in passwd chfn chsh newgrp chage chpasswd groupadd groupdel \
groupmod grpck pwck useradd userdel usermod; do
sudo ln -sf shadow-rs "/usr/local/bin/$tool"
doneMode 4755 is what the four self-service applets need; the others give the
privilege up before running. Run shadow-rs --list to see the applets a
given build contains, and sha256sum -c uu_shadow-*.tar.gz.sha256 to verify
a download.
All builds and tests run inside Docker containers to isolate from the host system. Three distros are tested to catch libc and PAM differences:
docker compose run --rm debian cargo test --workspace # Debian Trixie (glibc)
docker compose run --rm alpine cargo test --workspace # Alpine (musl libc)
docker compose run --rm fedora cargo test --workspace # Fedora (SELinux enforcing)docker compose run --rm debian cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings
docker compose run --rm debian cargo fmt --all --checkCargo workspace monorepo built on uucore:
src/bin/shadow-rs.rs multicall binary (dispatches by argv[0])
|
src/uu/{tool}/ individual tool crates (passwd, useradd, ...)
|
┌────┴────┐
uucore shadow-core shared infrastructure + domain library
Tools use uucore for the standard uutils API (UResult, #[uucore::main],
show_error!) and shadow-core for domain-specific functionality.
shadow-core provides:
- File parsers for
/etc/passwd,/etc/shadow,/etc/group,/etc/gshadow,/etc/login.defs,/etc/subuid,/etc/subgid - Atomic file writes (lock, write tmp, fsync, rename, unlock, invalidate nscd) that keep the file's mode, owner, group and SELinux label
- PAM integration (feature-gated)
- Username/groupname and field validation (no
:or control characters can reach a record) - UID/GID allocation
Each tool crate exports uumain() and uu_app(), following
uutils conventions exactly so a future
merge is frictionless.
| Target | Base | libc | PAM | SELinux |
|---|---|---|---|---|
debian |
rust:latest (Trixie) |
glibc | Linux-PAM | headers |
alpine |
rust:alpine |
musl | Linux-PAM | none |
fedora |
fedora:latest |
glibc | Linux-PAM | enforcing |
The alpine image tests musl with dynamic linking, PAM included. The static
musl release archive is a different build — no PAM, no NSS, no yescrypt — and
has its own CI job that builds it and runs shadow-core's unit tests against
static musl on every pull request. See
docs/PLATFORM-SUPPORT.md.
Security patterns from OpenBSD
(ISC license). PAM integration patterns from
sudo-rs (Apache-2.0/MIT).
uutils infrastructure via uucore (MIT).
See CONTRIBUTING.md for guidelines.
Important: uutils/shadow is developed under a strict GPL clean-room policy. Do not read, reference, or feed into an LLM any code from shadow-maint/shadow (GPL-2.0+). Reference only: POSIX specs, man pages, BSD-licensed implementations (FreeBSD, OpenBSD, musl), and sudo-rs.
uutils/shadow is licensed under the MIT License.
GNU shadow-utils is licensed under the GPL 2.0 or later.